9600 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 4:32am Subject: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] Hi all, It may be of interest to some that the human eye/mind does not register changes shorter than 1/70th a second. Take the monitor you are looking at. It appears the image is static, yet it is being completely refreshed more than 50 times a second. If it is considered a sign of wisdom/insight to be able to discern changes at a more rapid rate than the average worldling, perhaps rebirth as a fly would be appealing. The fly sees at 120 Hz (refreshes the visual field 120 times per second). All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- > Dear Victor, > I think Dan has made it fairly plain that it is not a matter of > counting cittas. He was relying on the suttas and the ancient > commentaries and provided references to these in other posts. What he > did say was that one can infer, just from fairly mundane insights > into the changes at the sense doors is that the rise and fall must be > exceedingly fast. > In fact, only in later stages of vipassana is the rise and fall seen > directly by developed wisdom. > best wishes > robert > In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: > > To: > > Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2001 12:23 AM > > Subject: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] > > > > > > [snip] > > >Even in the time > > > of a fingersnap many trillions of cittas arise and cease. > > > > Hi Dan, > > > > How do you know there are many trillions of cittas arise and cease > in the > > time of fingersnap? Did you count it? If so, how? > > > > Regards, > > Victor 9601 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 4:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi Robert, "It is so complex how it all comes > together, just for a moment, to understand. " I saw that paragraph too. I can understand past cittas can be observed with direct insight due to sanna but future cittas that is something, I like to know how it works. Kind regards Ken O --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > Dear Ken O, and Howard > Every moment once it has passed has absolutely ceased according to > the Theravada. However, this doesn't mean that it can't be known. If > that was the case then we would be like newborn babies, only worse, > and know nothing. Direct seeing should be distinguished from thinking > about past events but it doesn't mean that direct seeing doesn't need > sanna. Sanna arises with every citta and thus it arises also in > cittas assocaited with panna. It is so complex how it all comes > together, just for a moment, to understand. Here are some brief > quotes: > Abhidhammattha sangaha( Anuruddha) translated as A comprehensive > Manual of Abhidhamma by Bhikkhu Bodhi: > Guide(note by bodhi) p.136 "although citta experiences objects, citta > in turn can become an object. It should be noted that a citta in its > immediacy cannot become an its own object, for the cognizer cannot > cognize itself; but a citta in an individual mental continuum can > experience earlier cittas in that same continuum as well as the > cittas of other beings" > p137 "Mind-door cittas can also cognise an object belonging to any of > the three periods of time- past present and future" > p138 "the Vibhavani tika explains: acording to whether the cittas are > sense sphere javanas, direct knowledge javanas , the remaining smile- > producing javanas etc. For the sense sphere javanas...take objects of > the three times[past, present, future] and timeless objects (nibbana > and concepts]. The smile producing consciousness takes only objects > of the three times[past, present, future]. The direct knowledge > cittas take objects of the three times as well as the timeless" > p138 The door freed consciousness (ie. patisandhicitta, cuti citta > and bhavanga citta ) "can be of six kinds: it can be any of the five > sense objects, either past or present, or it can be a mental object" > best wishes > robert > > In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Robert K, > > > > Could you kindly quote the commentary that says that. Or is it > saying > > that it is the memory of the past cittas that an enlighted person > able to > > remember past events eons ago. To me, all that is the past is only > in the > > memory as past objects have already ceased. If the past object do > not > > ceased, then I think it would be a contradiction of the standing > that > > cittas ceased. > > > > > > > > Kind Regards > > Ken O > > > > > > > > > > > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > > > > > In a message dated 11/24/01 11:02:11 PM Eastern Standard Time, > > > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > > > > > > > Dear Howard, > > > > I do see your point. The thing is that the cittas with panna > that > > > > know a past object have that past object as the object they > > > > understand. In practice - for us- this past object is so > > > > infinitesimally close to being present that it is called the > present > > > > moment. For the Buddha and some arahants it is possible to > directly > > > > insight even moments from aeons ago. This direct insight is > different > > > > from thinking or conceptualising about the moment even though > it is > > > > past. > > > > best wishes > > > > robert > > > > > > > > > > > ============================= > > > Mmm, hmm. I get what you are saying as well. It is an > interesting > > > > > > explanation which you give, though I find myself somewhat > uncomfortable > > > with > > > the notion of a past object, truly past, being the direct object > (and > > > not as > > > a memory) of a current mindstate. That is similar to the position > of the > > > > > > Sarvastivadins to the effect that dhammas exist throughout all > the three > > > time > > > periods, a position which I understand the Theravadins took issue > with > > > because of its eternalistic scent. > > > > > > With metta, > > > Howard > > > 9602 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 5:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] -- Dear ken O, Great that you are getting an idea of how past moments can be insighted. The future moments are another matter....! This applies only to a Buddha or, to a very limited degree, some very wise person (I'm talking about direct insight, not the intuitions of the future that some clairvoyants may have). The Parammattha manjusa (see note 7 Visuddhimagga VII)"This is not an object for ratiocination; for the blessed one has said thus:'The objective field of Enlightened Ones is unthinkable, it cannot be thought out; anyone who tries to think it out would reap madness and frustration' Aii, 80) The agreed explanation here is this: whatever the Blessed one wants to know, there his knowlede occurs as actual experience....And the Blessed one's knowledge that has past and future as its objective field is entirely actual experience since it is devoid of assumption based on inference, tradition or conjecture"endquote best wishes robert - In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Robert, > > "It is so complex how it all comes > > together, just for a moment, to understand. " > > I saw that paragraph too. I can understand past cittas can be observed > with direct insight due to sanna but future cittas that is something, I > like to know how it works. > > > Kind regards > Ken O > 9603 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 5:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi Robert K Thanks for the explanation. No wonder Buddha is called the Teacher of Gods and Man :). With thanks Ken O --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > -- > Dear ken O, > Great that you are getting an idea of how past moments can be > insighted. > The future moments are another matter....! > This applies only to a Buddha or, to a very limited degree, some very > wise person (I'm talking about direct insight, not the intuitions of > the future that some clairvoyants may have). > The Parammattha manjusa (see note 7 Visuddhimagga VII)"This is not an > object for ratiocination; for the blessed one has said thus:'The > objective field of Enlightened Ones is unthinkable, it cannot be > thought out; anyone who tries to think it out would reap madness and > frustration' Aii, 80) The agreed explanation here is this: whatever > the Blessed one wants to know, there his knowlede occurs as actual > experience....And the Blessed one's knowledge that has past and > future as its objective field is entirely actual experience since it > is devoid of assumption based on inference, tradition or > conjecture"endquote > best wishes > robert > 9604 From: Victor Yu Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 6:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] Hello Robert and all, Is there any reference to the discourse in which the phenomenon of many trillions of cittas rising and falling in the time of a fingersnap is mentioned? What is the purpose of developing insight? To see the phenomenon of trillions of cittas rising and falling in the time of fingersnap? Is it necessary for one to see trillions of cittas rising and falling in the time of fingersnap in order to understand that citta is impermanent, is dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self."? Rise and fall seen directly by developed wisdom? But wisdom is not self, not you, not I. :-) Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2001 5:34 AM Subject: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] > --- > Dear Victor, > I think Dan has made it fairly plain that it is not a matter of > counting cittas. He was relying on the suttas and the ancient > commentaries and provided references to these in other posts. What he > did say was that one can infer, just from fairly mundane insights > into the changes at the sense doors is that the rise and fall must be > exceedingly fast. > In fact, only in later stages of vipassana is the rise and fall seen > directly by developed wisdom. > best wishes > robert > In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: > > To: > > Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2001 12:23 AM > > Subject: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] > > > > > > [snip] > > >Even in the time > > > of a fingersnap many trillions of cittas arise and cease. > > > > Hi Dan, > > > > How do you know there are many trillions of cittas arise and cease > in the > > time of fingersnap? Did you count it? If so, how? > > > > Regards, > > Victor 9605 From: Victor Yu Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 6:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] Hello Erik, 65 cittas are certainly much less than many trillions cittas. :-) Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2001 6:24 AM Subject: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: > > To: > > Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2001 12:23 AM > > Subject: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] > > > > > > [snip] > > >Even in the time > > > of a fingersnap many trillions of cittas arise and cease. > > > > Hi Dan, > > > > How do you know there are many trillions of cittas arise and cease > in the > > time of fingersnap? Did you count it? If so, how? > > As an aside, the Abhidharmakosa says there are 65 cittas that arise > and pass away within the span of a fingersnap. For another take on > the matter, anyway! :) 9606 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 6:35am Subject: Re: catching up with Erik;-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Hi Erik, > > Glad to hear from you and to know you're still around;-) Around, well, sorta--been more busy than ever in my whole life, and so much to be done right now I'me feeling a bit overtaxed. > Also glad to hear that you and Mike met up, just when I was asking him if he'd > bumped into you too... Yes, I was very happy to finally meet our friend Mike! Great guy! :) > --- rikpa21@y... wrote: > > I have to say I was quite impressed with Ajahn Kantasilo in general, > > and his Khmer is WAY better than mi?e! My wife Eath was so impressed > > by him that she formally requested teachings from him after you > > left, and spent most of last night crying tears of happiness at the > > wonderful good fortune of meeting someone like that. She says she > > feels as though she knows him from somewhere :). Funny how she > > mentioned how familiar you looked to her as well, Mike! ;) > > Very glad to hear this news and I hope Eath (wasn't it Aert last time?) Try transliterating from Khmer to Roman characters and you'll understand when you hear her name pronounced. The correct transliteration is "Eath", she spelled it "Ert" (which caused her no end of laughter when I asked about "Urt" at one point. Pronunciation is closest to "eeyeht". Enough of that, though. What does aplhpabets have to do with the Dhamma anyway? Except that Cambodia has so little Dhamma now, and it is in deseprate need of those who can transmit the Dhamma correctly in the native language. Eath and I were compring the Tibetan and Khmer alphabets tonight, and how similar they are, being Sanskritic in origin both, and even the system of memorization and intonations are very similar. Now Thai, that's another story. > is > settling well in Thailand.....That's wonderful to hear that she can understand > and appreciate what A.Kantasilo is saying. Yesterday, both Phra Kantasilo remarked that she is someone of great merit, and my Vipassanana teacher from Wat Mahatat went as far to call her a "genius" after a brie conversation with her. Truly someone with a mind for the Dhamma, who's really studying hard even as I write this now. > There are one or two very learned Cambodians who sometimes visit Bkk whom she > may like to meet. K.Sujin would be happy to tell you when they're in town. The > elderly lady (forget the name) accompanied us when we were in Cambodia lst year > and was on the India trip. she has a lot of knowldege and wisdom. That would be wonderful. Please let me know when they're in town. > Anyway, Erik, hope to see you when we visit Bkk at the end of the year. You shall! The end of the year is not far off! :) Cheers, Erik 9607 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 1:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] Cheetahs and owls Hi, Dan - I'd like to make a couple comments about the post of yours copied below. My main comment is that it is one of the most useful, clear, and insightful posts I have read in a long time! It is *wonderful*, and I thank you for it! A second comment: My recent post entitled "Some Thoughts on Continuity, Blurs, and Cittas" was headed rather much in the same direction as this post of yours; that is, its intention was to "see" the matters addressed in the title of my post in a way that does *not* involve a separate observer, agent, or self, and also does not require convoluted explanation. Sometimes one sidesteps problems in a particular theory by using "explanations" that present more problems than the original theory! In my post, I believe I was starting to get somewhat below the outer flesh of the matter, but, in this post of yours, to paraphrase a certain Zen master, you have gotten within the bones to the very marrow. I think that if one were to continually contemplate on nothing but the fact of each mindstate being an impersonal cognitive event, following upon and conditioned by previous cognitive acts, with the only discerning of objects there ever is being these very cognitive events themselves, one could make much progress in disabusing oneself of the annoyingly persistent sense of "self". There *is* no observer standing back observing the flux of mindstates. Whatever is known is known *there*, with there being no "knower". As you imply, should ignorance sufficiently diminish and insight increase sufficiently, the arising and falling away of mindstates and of their associated objects and concomitants would be "seen", that seeing/wisdom itself being an aspect or concomitant of the mindstates, and there would be a growing realization of impersonality and emptiness, with neither continuity nor discreteness being an adequate characterization of the way things truly appear. The *details* of the map we use of this domain are less important than the critical requirement that the map be free of the views of personality and of essence. The more and more closely I look, the more I see how many, varied, and treacherous are the "pitfalls of self" waiting for us on the path, subtly hidden by dense leaf-layers of wrongly formulated, wrongly interpreted, and wrongly grasped theories. Your post goes a long way, for me, in clearing away these layers, exposing the pitfalls below. With metta, Howard In a message dated 11/25/01 12:00:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, dalthorp@o... writes: > _____________________________________________ > Howard: But who (or what) is this "we" who are so overwhelmed by the > speed of cittas to think they act simultaneously when it is only the > cittas, themselves, that are aware? > > Robert Ep.: > The only question is who is it so fast for?...Since we are working on > the assumption that there is no ego that is observing these cittas > jump around like mad, who or what is watching these cittas whiz > by? ... [H]ow [can] we have overriding, comparative or relative > experiences without an ego to hold and compare it all? > _____________________________________________ > > Howdy, Howard and Robert Ep., > You've inspired me to reflect again on the nature of cittas and > cetasikas, and I thank you. I don't know if my investigations have > any relevance to what you've been talking about, and it's always > dangerous to burst into a ongoing conversation between two sharp > cookies, but you may be able to help me think more clearly about the > issues. Here's what I've been thinking... > > I looked up a wonderful passage in Brahmajala sutta (DN 1, i 34 PTS > or §49 BPS): "In this case some recluse or Brahmin is addicted to > logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusions > of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his flight > of thought thus: 'That which is [connected with] "the eye", "the > ear", "the nose", "the tongue" and "the body"--that self is > impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, subject to change. But that which > is called "citta", "mano", or "viññana"--that self is permanent, > eternal, not subject to change..." Although the rationalistic partial- > eternalist described by Buddha in the passage above posits a "who" to > experience and compare cittas, it really isn't necessary. The > commentary discusses this interesting case in more detail: "The > rationalist sees the breakup of the eye, etc.; but because every > preceding act of consciousness (citta), in ceasing, conditions the > arising of its successor, he does not see the breakup of the > consciousness, even though the latter is more pronounced than the > breakup of the eye, etc. Since he does not see the breakup of > consciousness, he assumes that when the bodily frame breaks up the > consciousness goes elsewhere...This he declares as his view." > > Blurred vision (ignorance) prevents a clear view of the moment-to- > moment breakup of consciousness. A consequence of that blurred vision > is an intensification of the impression of continuity and the > positing of a self to "hold" that sense of continuity. The > subcommentary elaborates further: "'He does not see the breakup of > consciousness': although consciousness is breaking up moment after > moment, each act of consciousness, in breaking up, becomes the > proximity condition for the following act of consciousness. Because > each succeeding act of consciousness arises concealing, as it were, > the absence of its predecessor, the aspect of presence alone is > strong and clear, not the aspect of absense. Thus he does not see the > destruction of consciousness. This matter becomes very clear by the > example of the fire-disc (i.e. the unbroken disc of flame formed by > swinging a firebrand in rapid circular motion). Because the > rationalistic partial-eternalist is still more remote from > understanding and applying the method of diversity (viz. discrete > cittas), and wrongly applies the method of unity, he arrives at the > conviction: 'This very consciousness which always occurs with a > single nature, just this is a permanent self.'" > > So the view of a self to house the and interpret the experiences will > naturally take root when each succeeding act of consciousness arises > and conceals the absence of its predecessor, and the aspect of > presence alone is strong and clear, not the aspect of absense. Then, > there is no clear view of the dissolution of consciousness. > > To resolve the problem of the "who who experiences" requires a proper > balance of the "methods of diversity and unity". B. Bodhi gives a > good description of these "methods" in the introduction to his > translation of DN 1: "The eternalist doctrine is said to originate > through a misapplication of the 'method of unity' (ekattanaya) to the > continuum of experience which is the subject of examination....The > method of unity disloses the coherence of the succession of distinct > experiential occasions making up the continuum. It shows them as > bound together in a single series, participants in a process of > transmission and development, interconnected members unified through > a law of conditional dependence. The method of diversity balances > this by showing up the difference. Though unified, the current of > experience is still a chain made up of distint links. Some of these > funciton as causes, others as effects.... When these two methods are > applied in conjunction, the current of experience will be correctly > understood; but when they are misapplied or applied in a one-sided > fashion, it will be misunderstood. The misapplication of the method > of unity will lead to the belief in an identical self and thence to > eternalism. The misapplication of the method of diversity will take > the disruptive, discontinuous element in experience as absolute and > thence lead to a doctrine of annihilationism. The correct application > of both will show the continuum to be a causally connected succession > of momentary processes, which continues so long as the causes retain > their efficacy and ceases when the causes are deactivated, in either > case without harboring a pesisting core to be grasped as a personal > self. This is the middle way which avoids the two extremes." > > With its abundance of conventional language about "this bhikkhu, that > householder" and similes about "gold" and "luminous mind", it is easy > to (mis)read the suttas with a unity bias. With its elaborate > description and classification of cittas and cetasikas, Abhidhamma > (esp. Dhammasangani and the first few chapters of Abhidhammatha > sangaha) seems to emphasize more the method of diversity. I find it > very helpful to study Abhidhamma, and then I read the suttas with a > little more of a "diversity" method than a "conventional" reading > would give. > > Ledi Sayadaw asks: "But how are we to understand the momentary > arising and ceasing of mind?" (JPTS 7(1):115-163, 1913). He draws his > discussion from the Citta chapter of Yamaka, and his answer is > typical of both the suttas and Abhidhamma. Here's my take on it... > > There are six kinds of consciousness -- those of the five special > senses and the "coordinating sense" (mano). If with seeing there is > the sense, "I see a visible object", the visual cognition has been > taken as a "self". Same with hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling. > If there is the sense, "It is a mental phenomenon, an element, a > sphere of sense, it is not 'mine,' not 'I', not my 'self'", then the > sensation is not taken as self. > > But what about cognition itself (mano), considered apart from seeing > and other occasions of sense? Consider the sentiment: "I think such- > and-such", or "I experience a citta", or "I observed lots of cittas > passing by in the span of a second." Here, consciousness has been > taken as a "self" as soon as a distinction is sought between the > experience and the experiencer, between the act and the agent (or > actor). Abhidhamma makes no such distinction, and no such distinction > is necessary. The mind (citta) is not distinct from the > act "thinking". Similarly, there is no agent apart from the > act "sensation" (or "contact" or "sankhara" or "recognition"), i.e. > there is not a citta that experiences sensation. To think of citta as > something that experiences sensation is once again to make a > distinction between the experience and the experiencer; the act and > the agent; the actor and the action; the self that does this, > experiences that, and thinks this-or-that. BOOM! "Self" is found > masquerading right in the midst of a bunch of fancy Pali terminology > that merely serves as cover for sakayaditthi--and an effective cover > at that! > > Citta doesn't experience sensation; Citta IS the experience, and > sensation is one of the characteristics of that experience. > Experience (citta) at one moment differs from that at another moment, > and sensation is an aspect of each citta. So is sañña (perception, > recognition, memory). "This moment is similar to the moment a moment > ago" -- that impression is sañña, which "has the characteristic of > noting and the function of recognizing what has been previously > noted" [Asl I, Part IV, Chapter 1, 110), cited in > Nina's "Cetasikas"]. The object of sañña is the same as the object of > the citta; but the cognizing itself is "citta", while "sañña" is the > name given to a category of ingredient that flavors the cognition. > [When I was in high school, I had the good fortune to get to visit > Hawaii. I ordered a dinner at a fancy restaurant, and the waiter > asked, "What kind of starch would you like with that?" I'd never > heard it asked quite that way before (or since), but I thought it was > brilliant. "Sañña" is like "starch" -- it comes with the citta, but > it comes in different flavors.] A "function" of sañña is > the "recognition" of similarity or dissimilarity between cittas. > There is no sañña entity to do any recognizing; there is merely > cognition (with a certain sañña flavor, vedana flavor, phassa flavor, > etc.). Of course, we may speak of an act of recognition or an object > of sañña, but we must be very clear that there is no "sañña" doing > the acting and the "object" is not "experienced" by any sañña entity. > And although the temptation is overwhelming, the sañña flavor of > cittas does not necessitate a the positing of a self to explain the > experience of speedy cittas. > > Dan > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9608 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 7:12am Subject: Cambodia Ch 11, no. 3 Cambodia Lectures. Ch 11, no. 3 aran: Acharn said that when there is understanding you can remember what you learnt. Did I understand this correctly? When I listen to the Dhamma and I understand what I heard, kusala citta arises. Then there is sati with the level of kusala that is listening to the Dhamma, thus, the level of theoretical understanding. Saññå cetasika that arises with sati of that level will be of such strength that one can remember what one has heard. Is that correct? Sujin: Saññå accompanies each citta and it depends on conditions what type of citta arises. Saññå accompanies kusala citta of the level of dåna, of síla, of samatha and of satipaììhåna. Thus, the degrees of saññå are different, but saññå is not sati. Amara: Saññå and sati can arise together, but they perform each their own function. Soun: All dhammas that arise do so because there are conditions, paccayas, for their arising. These conditions are realities. We should often study the Dhamma. Mahå-kusala cittas are of different degrees, and confidence, saddhå, in the Buddha is of different degrees. Also sati has different degrees: sati arises when we read the scriptures or when we listen to the Dhamma. Saññå, remembrance, arises with sati. I would like to ask what sati arising with the fivefold Path is. Sujin: It is satipaììhåna. It is of the fivefold Path, without the three abstinences 2 . Soun: When sati arises with paññå, the kusala citta is ñåùa-sampayutta (accompanied by paññå), and kusala is of the level of satipaììhåna. Jaran: What are puñña, merit, and påpa, evil? Pradip: Puñña are the citta and cetasikas that are kusala of the level of dåna, síla and bhåvanå, including samatha and satipaììhåna. When citta is not engaged with the ten meritorious actions, it is påpa, evil. Sujin: Påpa are the realities that are not good, not beautiful. Puñña are the realities that are good, that are beautiful. Dhammas are very intricate because they arise and fall away very rapidly. Citta and its accompanying cetasikas arise and fall away together. Sometimes they are kusala, sometimes akusala, and the series of kusala cittas and of akusala cittas alternate with each other extremely rapidly. Sometimes people mistakenly say that at this or that moment there is kusala or akusala. They should study the Dhamma so that they know that when lobha, dosa, moha and other akusala dhammas arise there is påpa, unwholesomeness. Jeaoulsy, isså, and stinginess, macchariya, for example, are characteristics of akusala dhammas. Kusala or puñña is the opposite of akusala, thus, at that moment citta and cetasikas that are beautiful and wholesome arise together. Body and speech are the doorways of kusala citta and of akusala citta. There are not only citta and cetasika, there is also rúpa. If there would only be citta that is kusala or akusala, could other people be troubled? There is rúpa, and thus, when akusala citta arises, there are doorways of kamma, namely, bodily action and speech that are evil. Such action and speech originate from akusala citta and they harm and trouble other people. In reality, when akusala arises someone harms himself first, because he feels unhappy. 9609 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 2:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] That's Vasubandhu, right Erik? With metta, Howard In a message dated 11/25/01 6:25:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, rikpa21@y... writes: > As an aside, the Abhidharmakosa says there are 65 cittas that arise > and pass away within the span of a fingersnap. For another take on > the matter, anyway! :) > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9610 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 2:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] Hi, Herman - In a message dated 11/25/01 7:34:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, hhofman@d... writes: > Hi all, > > It may be of interest to some that the human eye/mind does not > register changes shorter than 1/70th a second. Take the monitor you > are looking at. It appears the image is static, yet it is being > completely refreshed more than 50 times a second. > > If it is considered a sign of wisdom/insight to be able to discern > changes at a more rapid rate than the average worldling, perhaps > rebirth as a fly would be appealing. The fly sees at 120 Hz > (refreshes the visual field 120 times per second). > > All the best > > Herman > > ============================ You make an amusing point here! ;-)) As I noted in a recent post, far more important than being able to see microscopic detail, is to see whatever appears as impermanent, unsatisfactory, impersonal, and without core. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9611 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 9:32am Subject: Re: [dsg] "engaged" [Robert Ep.] _______________________________ Robert Ep.: You wrote that the Buddha did not exhort us to get involved with people who were suffering, to be 'good people' and try to free those who were being oppressed. Dan: That's right. The Buddha's message was strictly spiritual. As wisdom develops, then compassion is deepened and the impulse to relieve suffering of all kinds is increased. Buddha did not teach that liberation comes through this particular good deed or that particular political view or even that these political struggles are helpful in any way. The reason is simply because these issues are ultimately not relevant to the real roots of suffering. Can these political struggles help soften material conditions to temporarily lessen the sting of suffering? Of course! But such struggles are not particularly Buddhist. Neither are they un-Buddhist. Just different. Historically speaking, confusing political issues with religious issues is a recipe for disaster, as anyone with an interest in Buddhism can attest for Christianity (e.g., Pat Robertson, Jesse Jackson in the U.S.; crusade and inquisitions in Europe; etc.), Islam (e.g., Omar and bin Laden in Afghanistan; Khomeini in Iran), Communism (a secular, rationalist, materialist "religion") in USSR and Cambodia. Dan 9612 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 9:42am Subject: Re: "engaged" [Christine] > I recall that there was an occasion where the Buddha literally ran > for his life, being pursued by someone who wanted to harm him. > Is this an act of self-preservation, an indication of chains, bonds > fetters etc. This is the story of Angulimala, who was going to kill the Buddha (MN 86). If he had been scared, it would certainly have been an act of self-preservation and an indication of fetters. But he wasn't the slightest bit scared. Angulimala was so impressed that he struck up a conversation with Buddha and was converted on the spot. Later, he became a sotapanna! If Buddha had not "run", he would have been killed, and Angulimala would not have been freed. > Don't you think there is room for wise "interference" with one's > environment? Of course there is. In a sense, that's the whole ball game. Dan 9613 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 9:45am Subject: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] Hi Victor, This is just a quote from the commentaties. I don't know the rate at which cittas arise and pass away; suffice it to say that the rate is fast, and that can readily be observed. Dan > [snip] > >Even in the time > > of a fingersnap many trillions of cittas arise and cease. > > Hi Dan, > > How do you know there are many trillions of cittas arise and cease in the > time of fingersnap? Did you count it? If so, how? > > Regards, > Victor 9614 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 11:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: _[DhammaStudyGroup]_Vipassana Dear Jon, I basically agree with what you are saying, and I agree that to let a lack of clarity on the exact nature of Nibbana keep one from trying to discern the present reality and develop mindfulness, would be a terrible shame. I certainly would never encourage anyone, including myself, to refrain from the obvious practices that give sanity and centeredness to one's life until they have solved the conceptual secret of Nibbana! This would be replacing intellectual pursuits for the real practice of Buddhism and is as unnecessary as it is distracting. However, I will just put in my two cents that I do think that if one is not just practicing for one's momentary benefit, but is committed to the path of Buddhism as a life's endeavor, that they would want to know what the expected end result would be. It does not have to be spelled out or agreed upon in explicit detail. Again, this would be silly or distracting. But they should be clear enough that they know that this is the result they seek. We may not agree, or ever come to agree, about whether Nibbana involves an annihilation of all experience, or whether it may resolve into a sort of 'base awareness' totally removed from the five kandhas, but we can certainly both agree that Nibbana must be the 'perfect state of Peace, free from further rebirth into forms of suffering'. And I'm sure that's all that's necessary to embark upon real practice with some confidence. Best, Robert Ep. ============== --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > I think perhaps you are saying that while the *experience* of nibbana is > speculative for us, a clear understanding of the *concept* of nibbana is > necessary or at least worthwhile, in the sense that only if we have a > clear concept of nibbana as the final destination can we have the > confidence to embark on the practice or, as you put it, to commit > ourselves to the path. > > I think one should regard such thoughts as a purely personal perspective, > in the sense that there would I think be many here for whom these > considerations would be a non-issue. While some may see the need for the > kind of clarification you are seeking, others find the teachings on, say, > different realities appearing through different doorways so fresh and yet > so 'obvious' once pointed out as to inspire immediate further study > without the need for a detailed grasp of the ultimate goal. > > I mention this only to suggest that it would be a pity to let one's quest > for a satisfactory grasp of the nibbana concept to be an obstacle to the > more relevant task of the present reality! > > Jon > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > Dear Jon, > > I think you are right that the 'experience' of nibbana or parinibbana is > > speculative for us, and is not of practical benefit on a > > moment-to-moment everyday > > level on which we must focus in order to develop. > > > > However, I think the limited benefit of these topics is simple: If we > > are > > committing ourselves to a path, possibly an extremely long one, we want > > to know at > > least provisionally that the end goal of that path is something that we > > at least > > theoretically understand, and, if it is not too bold, that it is > > something that we > > actually want to achieve. I don't think there's anyone who follows > > Buddhism who > > does not attempt to some extent to emulate and understand the Buddha, > > his > > experience and his reasons for prescribing the path he does. Even to > > come to > > understand that the path is a path of discernment, and not one of > > achievement or > > self-transformation [in the sense that anatta does not allow for > > personal > > ownership of the process] is to focus on both the method or lack > > thereof, and the > > goal of the path. > > > > So I think that some of us rightly want to know where our long focus > > should be, > > where we are headed if we are able to continue on this path, and why it > > is the way > > it is. Of course, we won't understand directly until we get there, if > > and when we > > get there, but it still seems important to understand the components of > > the whole > > system on some level. > > > > And then, I would agree with you, at some point we have to put our focus > > on right > > where we are and what we need to do now to keep learning. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. 9615 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 0:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > Your comments (below) certainly don’t *seem* like the comments of a > 'confused' mind, Rob! I think I got a little less confused in thinking out loud, Jon. But I was confused when I started out!! > I think you are saying that a person who has not heard about and > understood at some level the notion of anatta could not develop the > factors of the path (such as right effort)? I would agree with this as > far as it goes. > > It is sometimes overlooked that anatta is given not as a concept to ponder > on, and to be related to our views and our experience of life, but as a > verifiable characteristic of each and every reality (dhamma). As such, > anatta can only be *realised* as an adjunct of the direct experience and > awareness of a characteristic of a reality appearing at the present > moment. To my understanding, any other pondering over or understanding > about the notion of anatta, even to the extent of 'enlightening' or > life-changing moments when we see things differently, is not a level of > *realisation* of anatta, since there is no aspect of directly experiencing > a characteristic of a reality (dhamma). > > Let me suggest something that you may well wish to take issue with. > Without the direct awareness of the characteristic of a present reality > (dhamma) at a given moment, any 'understanding' of anatta at that or any > other moment is understanding at the thinking level. In other words, I am > suggesting that, regardless of the depth of one's pondering over anatta > and one's ability to relate that concept to one's 'self' or the > experiences of the present moment, it is thinking only and so is > understanding at a purely conceptual level. Let me just ask you on the way, do you think that one's 'self' can be the object of discernment to see the principle of anatta at play in the present moment? Can one look to the 'self' to see that it is really not an entity but a thought-form? > So even for someone who has heard the teachings and has a highly developed > understanding of anatta in the sense I have described, a moment of kusala > of any kind, other than satipatthana, is no more capable of being a path > factor moment than for the person who has never heard the teaching of > anatta. > > Were it otherwise then, according to the 'factors to be individually and > separately developed' view, any person exerting conventional effort to > perform kusala would be developing the path factor of Right Effort. > > This is why, for me, all paths lead back to the understanding of the > characteristic of the present reality, and the factors that form the > foundation for this understanding. I don't mean to be dense, Jon, but I'm not sure exactly what you are or aren't taking exception to in my discussion below. If the 'separate factors to be developed' theory is wrong, then it is just as wrong for people who think they're Buddhists. If I am aware of anatta as a concept, as you describe, and this will not help to develop satipatthana, then how am I better off than a mundanely aware non-Buddhist? I think that what you are saying implies that there are no true pracitioners of Buddhism who have not entered the supra-mundane level. All else, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist is just conventional effort that has nothing really to do with the Buddha's teachings. You seem to be saying here that even being subjected to the teachings of the suttas will not help if one is still conceptualizing. Thus this seems to put the mundane Buddhist on the same par as the mundane non-Buddhist. I would tend to have a less severe view of mundane efforts, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist and tend to think that they are gradually leading to an ability to really discern the characteristics of the moment with satipatthana. Moments of mindfulness, of sati, should in either case gradually accumulate to allow for satipatthana, real insight, and in those moments the truth of anatta, anicca and dukkha should perhaps be visible to the experiencer. I tend to think that the Buddha found real and actual principles that exist 'in nature', and therefore, anyone who practices discernment for a period of time should eventually get some glimpse of this. I would certainly think that reading the Suttas and knowing 'what to look for' conceptually should help the focus and speed up the time that one might see the truth of these principles in actual living observation. Anyway, I am really not sure what the conclusion of this is, but I think that the mundane path leads slowly to the supra-mundane path, and that the non-Buddhist mundan path may be a lot less efficient than the Buddhist mundane path, but that even this path, if followed sincerely, *may* eventually open a door to an understanding of non-entity, impermanence, and the universal nature of dissatisfaction or suffering. Whaddaya think? And if this is not true, how *do* the supra-mundane path factors ever 'kick in'? Good talking to you, and I mean that! I like this topic. Best, Robert Ep. ============ > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > > > It might perhaps be suggested that the fact that someone who has not > > heard > > > the dhamma has no notion of the teaching of 'not-self' makes a > > difference. > > > However, I do not think this can truly be said. Both the one who has > > > studied dhamma and the non-Buddhist have an innate view of self, and > > both > > > can strive without at that moment there being a manifest view of a > > self > > > who is making effort. So there is not necessarily any difference > > between > > > the two here. > > > > > > I would be interested to hear your views on this. > > > > > > Jon > > > > Well Jon, for some reason this question is very confusing to me. I kind > > of enjoy > > being confused, but I'll see if I can get out of it. I have always > > thought that > > the difference between Buddhism and all other teachings, is that the > > Buddha > > inherently recognized that the path was one of consciousness and not of > > changing, > > altering or somehow fixing up the self. > > > > If a Buddhist is doing Buddhism to accumulate kusala, in the sense of > > 'bettering > > his self', then he is not really practicing Buddhism at that time. > > :Perhaps > > eventually he will see that the self is an illusion in the sense that he > > normally > > thinks of it, and then he will be practicing Buddhism. The attempt to > > see through > > the ordinary self and see that it is not one's actual identity, and the > > attempt to > > see what the nature of consciousness is beyond that, based on that > > discovery, to > > me is the Buddhist path. > > > > So the person who was trying to accumulate kusala without this > > understanding may > > call himself a Buddhist or something else, but he is not rightly on the > > path the > > Buddha discovered. > > > > The truth of anatta, that the psychophysical being that we find > > ourselves being in > > this life, is not a 'self', but a filter for the experience of > > consciousness, I > > think in some language or another we can all agree on -- you may not > > like my > > wording, or you may disagree on my emphasis on 'consciousness', but we > > can agree > > that the ordinary self is really not-self, or an empty concept that we > > mistake for > > the being that we think we are. That's what makes it a 'Buddhist' > > discussion. > > > > Beyond this, I see no reason to differentiate between mundane and > > supra-mundane > > Right Effort, in the sense that all Effort should be made with the > > understanding > > that there is no one at the center of such effort. Does that mean that > > effort is > > non-volitional? Does there need to be a self in order to have volition > > or will? > > Can consciousness, through focussing on certain factors, increase it's > > discernment? And is such focussing totally predetermined by kamma and > > khandas? > > These questions are open to dispute and might be disagreed about between > > us. But > > the basic truth that there is no central self coordinating the action, > > we would > > agree upon. And that would be a basic Buddhist perspective. > > > > So I see this view as making all the difference, and I don't see the > > path as being > > basically about accumulating kusala states, except in so far as this > > allows for > > greater discernment. In the past, I have argued for the application of > > Buddhist > > principles to the experience of kusala in the affairs of daily life. > > But this is > > because I was focussed in those issues on daily life and how to improve > > it. In > > truth, being around this list has 'killed' some of that for me. I have > > realized > > that fixing daily living is more a property of attachment and aversion > > than of > > progressing on the path of discernment. So perhaps I have either made > > some > > progress, or fallen into a trap of another kind. > > > > Anyway, Right Effort in a Buddhist sense does not exist without a notion > > of > > anatta. Without that, it is not Buddhist, and if it has that, it is > > Buddhist, > > whether it is on the mundane level or on the supramundane. I will be > > anxious to > > hear your comments on this. both Jon and Howard, and others. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. 9616 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 0:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] meththa meditation Dear Sarah, Your reassurance that there can only be one citta for a particular cetasika, including sati, takes away the particular question I was confused about. Of course it raises other ones But I have raised them separately and won't repeat them at this time. There are mainly about how can 'impressions regarding the flow of cittas' be created, whether this is one of speed, confusion, blur, etc. For another time! Regards, Robert Ep. =========================== --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Rob Ep, > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > Thanks for your thoughtful answers to my questions, which I have snipped > > below, > > but which were much appreciated. > > > > I have only one question about what you said: You said that cetasikas, such > > as > > sati for instance, can have one or more cittas as its object. > > I think you'd have to quote my words as this doesn't ring any bells or sound > like my words... > > >Do the mental > > factors function independently of individual cittas? > > There cannot be mental factors without a citta and they all condition and > affect each other, even though they all have their own distinct functions. > There is no moment without citta. > > >I had had the > > impression > > that the cetasikas were tied to their specific citta, but if that is not the > > case, > > that would be very interesting. > > Sorry, I'm not sure how I confused you to think otherwise. > > >Can a single occurence of sati take in a > > stream > > of several cittas? And if so, how does this work. > > No, only one object or reality at a time (citta, cetasika or rupa). > > > > > Other than that, I am not raising any new issues in this post!!! > > Not sure whether to be happy or sad!!! > > > > ==================== > > > > I wish I was standing on my head. Lately I've been too busy to stand > > on my > > head, I'm too busy running around on my feet. > > ...and glad to see, busy at the keyboard too;-)..keeping up to speed with all > those cittas..... (speed as in 'fast', not as in 'standard', Christine;-) > > > > > But I'm going to have to go back to look at that post. I have saved some > > posts > > that I couldn't answer at the time, and I believe that was one of them. > > Like Howard put so well, no obligations or pressures or apologies ever > necessary here in this regard;-) > > > Sometimes > > the more interesting or complicated messages wind up getting left for later, > > especially when there have been 35-40 new posts a day here lately! Yikes!! > > ...and we all know who is the main trouble-maker in this regard;-) > > Let me know if I misunderstood anything above, > > Sarah 9617 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 0:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Dear Rob, I would be very grateful if you could tell me the mechanism by which a moment once completely passed, can be seen as an object by a new, emergent citta. I just don't understand it, but I'm sure there is a good structural explanation. It must be involved in how one citta passes its attributes to the next. And I am equally confused about how this 'handing-off' takes place, since each citta is 'flattened' before the next arises...or is this not the case? Regards, Robert Ep. ================= --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > Dear Ken O, and Howard > Every moment once it has passed has absolutely ceased according to > the Theravada. However, this doesn't mean that it can't be known. If > that was the case then we would be like newborn babies, only worse, > and know nothing. Direct seeing should be distinguished from thinking > about past events but it doesn't mean that direct seeing doesn't need > sanna. Sanna arises with every citta and thus it arises also in > cittas assocaited with panna. It is so complex how it all comes > together, just for a moment, to understand. Here are some brief > quotes: > Abhidhammattha sangaha( Anuruddha) translated as A comprehensive > Manual of Abhidhamma by Bhikkhu Bodhi: > Guide(note by bodhi) p.136 "although citta experiences objects, citta > in turn can become an object. It should be noted that a citta in its > immediacy cannot become an its own object, for the cognizer cannot > cognize itself; but a citta in an individual mental continuum can > experience earlier cittas in that same continuum as well as the > cittas of other beings" > p137 "Mind-door cittas can also cognise an object belonging to any of > the three periods of time- past present and future" > p138 "the Vibhavani tika explains: acording to whether the cittas are > sense sphere javanas, direct knowledge javanas , the remaining smile- > producing javanas etc. For the sense sphere javanas...take objects of > the three times[past, present, future] and timeless objects (nibbana > and concepts]. The smile producing consciousness takes only objects > of the three times[past, present, future]. The direct knowledge > cittas take objects of the three times as well as the timeless" > p138 The door freed consciousness (ie. patisandhicitta, cuti citta > and bhavanga citta ) "can be of six kinds: it can be any of the five > sense objects, either past or present, or it can be a mental object" > best wishes > robert > > In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Robert K, > > > > Could you kindly quote the commentary that says that. Or is it > saying > > that it is the memory of the past cittas that an enlighted person > able to > > remember past events eons ago. To me, all that is the past is only > in the > > memory as past objects have already ceased. If the past object do > not > > ceased, then I think it would be a contradiction of the standing > that > > cittas ceased. > > > > > > > > Kind Regards > > Ken O > > > > > > > > > > > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > > > > > In a message dated 11/24/01 11:02:11 PM Eastern Standard Time, > > > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > > > > > > > Dear Howard, > > > > I do see your point. The thing is that the cittas with panna > that > > > > know a past object have that past object as the object they > > > > understand. In practice - for us- this past object is so > > > > infinitesimally close to being present that it is called the > present > > > > moment. For the Buddha and some arahants it is possible to > directly > > > > insight even moments from aeons ago. This direct insight is > different > > > > from thinking or conceptualising about the moment even though > it is > > > > past. > > > > best wishes > > > > robert > > > > > > > > > > > ============================= > > > Mmm, hmm. I get what you are saying as well. It is an > interesting > > > > > > explanation which you give, though I find myself somewhat > uncomfortable > > > with > > > the notion of a past object, truly past, being the direct object > (and > > > not as > > > a memory) of a current mindstate. That is similar to the position > of the > > > > > > Sarvastivadins to the effect that dhammas exist throughout all > the three > > > time > > > periods, a position which I understand the Theravadins took issue > with > > > because of its eternalistic scent. > > > > > > With metta, > > > Howard > > > 9618 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 0:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: speed of cittas [Erik] --- hhofman@d... wrote: > Hi all, > > It may be of interest to some that the human eye/mind does not > register changes shorter than 1/70th a second. Take the monitor you > are looking at. It appears the image is static, yet it is being > completely refreshed more than 50 times a second. > > If it is considered a sign of wisdom/insight to be able to discern > changes at a more rapid rate than the average worldling, perhaps > rebirth as a fly would be appealing. The fly sees at 120 Hz > (refreshes the visual field 120 times per second). That's pretty funny, Herman. Robert Ep. 9619 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 0:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > -- > Dear ken O, > Great that you are getting an idea of how past moments can be > insighted. That makes two of you. How can past moments be insighted after they are 'completely gone'? Where are they present to be inspected or insighted? Where, alternatively, are their contents recorded? Robert Ep. ============================= > The future moments are another matter....! > This applies only to a Buddha or, to a very limited degree, some very > wise person (I'm talking about direct insight, not the intuitions of > the future that some clairvoyants may have). > The Parammattha manjusa (see note 7 Visuddhimagga VII)"This is not an > object for ratiocination; for the blessed one has said thus:'The > objective field of Enlightened Ones is unthinkable, it cannot be > thought out; anyone who tries to think it out would reap madness and > frustration' Aii, 80) The agreed explanation here is this: whatever > the Blessed one wants to know, there his knowlede occurs as actual > experience....And the Blessed one's knowledge that has past and > future as its objective field is entirely actual experience since it > is devoid of assumption based on inference, tradition or > conjecture"endquote > best wishes > robert > > > - In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Robert, > > > > "It is so complex how it all comes > > > together, just for a moment, to understand. " > > > > I saw that paragraph too. I can understand past cittas can be > observed > > with direct insight due to sanna but future cittas that is > something, I > > like to know how it works. > > > > > > Kind regards > > Ken O 9620 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 2:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Cheetahs and owls Hi Howard, Comments interspersed... _________________________________ Howard: >My recent post entitled "Some Thoughts on > Continuity, Blurs, and Cittas" was headed rather much in the same direction > as this post of yours; that is, its intention was to "see" the matters > addressed in the title of my post in a way that does *not* involve a separate > observer, agent, or self, and also does not require convoluted explanation. > Sometimes one sidesteps problems in a particular theory by using > "explanations" that present more problems than the original theory! Using Occam's razor, why not just excise the "self"? Well, it's easier said than done, as you note. > have gotten within the bones to the very marrow. I think that if one were to > continually contemplate on nothing but the fact of each mindstate being an > impersonal cognitive event, following upon and conditioned by previous > cognitive acts, with the only discerning of objects there ever is being these > very cognitive events themselves, one could make much progress in disabusing > oneself of the annoyingly persistent sense of "self". Dan: Basically, I agree [But I'd change the "continually contemplate...the fact" to "thoroughly understand the fact"], and this is where the anatta flavor of Abhidhamma can be so helpful -- not as a bunch of lists and dogmas to memorize, but as a beautiful description of the meaning of anatta via a decomposition of "self" into the five aggregates and a reconstruction of experience after an Occam's razor excising of "self". __________________________________ Howard: >There *is* no observer > standing back observing the flux of mindstates. Whatever is known is known > *there*, with there being no "knower". As you imply, should ignorance > sufficiently diminish and insight increase sufficiently, the arising and > falling away of mindstates and of their associated objects and concomitants > would be "seen", that seeing/wisdom itself being an aspect or concomitant of > the mindstates, and there would be a growing realization of impersonality and > emptiness, with neither continuity nor discreteness being an adequate > characterization of the way things truly appear. Dan: Well said (or should I say, "sadhu, sadhu, sadhu"). __________________________________ Howard: The *details* of the map we > use of this domain are less important than the critical requirement that the > map be free of the views of personality and of essence. Dan: This is a great insight, Howard--we need to always bear in mind that our theorizing and book learning is not helpful per se, but if it helps condition a little more clarity in our observations, then it can be most helpful. In a similar vein, U Narada [Guide to Conditional Relations, part I) wrote: "Patthana is understood if the table of contents of Dhammasangani is understood." If you have ever seen how cryptic and bizarre looking, how detailed and extensive the Patthana really is, the import of this statement is clear: Penetrating insight is where it's at, not the memorizing and reading of a scores of lists and doctrines. > The more and more closely I look, the more I see how many, varied, and > treacherous are the "pitfalls of self" waiting for us on the path, subtly > hidden by dense leaf-layers of wrongly formulated, wrongly interpreted, and > wrongly grasped theories. Your post goes a long way, for me, in clearing away > these layers, exposing the pitfalls below. The depth and intricacy of sakayaditti are astounding, as are the consequences. We are indeed fortunate to STILL be able to read the Tipitaka and listen to Dhamma. Dan 9621 From: m. nease Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 3:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Cheetahs and owls Dan, Thanks very much for another well-reasoned and -cited post. It's a good example of how abhidhamma can help to clarify the meanings in the suttas, I think. mike --- dalthorp@o... wrote: > _____________________________________________ > Howard: But who (or what) is this "we" who are so > overwhelmed by the > speed of cittas to think they act simultaneously > when it is only the > cittas, themselves, that are aware? > > Robert Ep.: > The only question is who is it so fast for?...Since > we are working on > the assumption that there is no ego that is > observing these cittas > jump around like mad, who or what is watching these > cittas whiz > by? ... [H]ow [can] we have overriding, comparative > or relative > experiences without an ego to hold and compare it > all? > _____________________________________________ > > Howdy, Howard and Robert Ep., > You've inspired me to reflect again on the nature of > cittas and > cetasikas, and I thank you. I don't know if my > investigations have > any relevance to what you've been talking about, and > it's always > dangerous to burst into a ongoing conversation > between two sharp > cookies, but you may be able to help me think more > clearly about the > issues. Here's what I've been thinking... > > I looked up a wonderful passage in Brahmajala sutta > (DN 1, i 34 PTS > or §49 BPS): "In this case some recluse or Brahmin > is addicted to > logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the > following conclusions > of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and > based on his flight > of thought thus: 'That which is [connected with] > "the eye", "the > ear", "the nose", "the tongue" and "the body"--that > self is > impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, subject to > change. But that which > is called "citta", "mano", or "viññana"--that self > is permanent, > eternal, not subject to change..." Although the > rationalistic partial- > eternalist described by Buddha in the passage above > posits a "who" to > experience and compare cittas, it really isn't > necessary. The > commentary discusses this interesting case in more > detail: "The > rationalist sees the breakup of the eye, etc.; but > because every > preceding act of consciousness (citta), in ceasing, > conditions the > arising of its successor, he does not see the > breakup of the > consciousness, even though the latter is more > pronounced than the > breakup of the eye, etc. Since he does not see the > breakup of > consciousness, he assumes that when the bodily frame > breaks up the > consciousness goes elsewhere...This he declares as > his view." > > Blurred vision (ignorance) prevents a clear view of > the moment-to- > moment breakup of consciousness. A consequence of > that blurred vision > is an intensification of the impression of > continuity and the > positing of a self to "hold" that sense of > continuity. The > subcommentary elaborates further: "'He does not see > the breakup of > consciousness': although consciousness is breaking > up moment after > moment, each act of consciousness, in breaking up, > becomes the > proximity condition for the following act of > consciousness. Because > each succeeding act of consciousness arises > concealing, as it were, > the absence of its predecessor, the aspect of > presence alone is > strong and clear, not the aspect of absense. Thus he > does not see the > destruction of consciousness. This matter becomes > very clear by the > example of the fire-disc (i.e. the unbroken disc of > flame formed by > swinging a firebrand in rapid circular motion). > Because the > rationalistic partial-eternalist is still more > remote from > understanding and applying the method of diversity > (viz. discrete > cittas), and wrongly applies the method of unity, he > arrives at the > conviction: 'This very consciousness which always > occurs with a > single nature, just this is a permanent self.'" > > So the view of a self to house the and interpret the > experiences will > naturally take root when each succeeding act of > consciousness arises > and conceals the absence of its predecessor, and the > aspect of > presence alone is strong and clear, not the aspect > of absense. Then, > there is no clear view of the dissolution of > consciousness. > > To resolve the problem of the "who who experiences" > requires a proper > balance of the "methods of diversity and unity". B. > Bodhi gives a > good description of these "methods" in the > introduction to his > translation of DN 1: "The eternalist doctrine is > said to originate > through a misapplication of the 'method of unity' > (ekattanaya) to the > continuum of experience which is the subject of > examination....The > method of unity disloses the coherence of the > succession of distinct > experiential occasions making up the continuum. It > shows them as > bound together in a single series, participants in a > process of > transmission and development, interconnected members > unified through > a law of conditional dependence. The method of > diversity balances > this by showing up the difference. Though unified, > the current of > experience is still a chain made up of distint > links. Some of these > funciton as causes, others as effects.... When these > two methods are > applied in conjunction, the current of experience > will be correctly > understood; but when they are misapplied or applied > in a one-sided > fashion, it will be misunderstood. The > misapplication of the method > of unity will lead to the belief in an identical > self and thence to > eternalism. The misapplication of the method of > diversity will take > the disruptive, discontinuous element in experience > as absolute and > thence lead to a doctrine of annihilationism. The > correct application > of both will show the continuum to be a causally > connected succession > of momentary processes, which continues so long as > the causes retain > their efficacy and ceases when the causes are > deactivated, in either > case without harboring a pesisting core to be > grasped as a personal > self. This is the middle way which avoids the two > extremes." > > With its abundance of conventional language about > "this bhikkhu, that > householder" and similes about "gold" and "luminous > mind", it is easy > to (mis)read the suttas with a unity bias. With its > elaborate > description and classification of cittas and > cetasikas, Abhidhamma > (esp. Dhammasangani and the first few chapters of > Abhidhammatha > sangaha) seems to emphasize more the method of > diversity. I find it > very helpful to study Abhidhamma, and then I read > the suttas with a > little more of a "diversity" method than a > "conventional" reading > would give. > > Ledi Sayadaw asks: "But how are we to understand the > momentary > arising and ceasing of mind?" (JPTS 7(1):115-163, > 1913). He draws his > discussion from the Citta chapter of Yamaka, and his > answer is > typical of both the suttas and Abhidhamma. Here's my > take on it... > > There are six kinds of consciousness -- those of the > five special > senses and the "coordinating sense" (mano). If with > seeing there is > the sense, "I see a visible object", the visual > cognition has been > taken as a "self". Same with hearing, smelling, > tasting, and feeling. > If there is the sense, "It is a mental phenomenon, > an element, a > sphere of sense, it is not 'mine,' not 'I', not my > 'self'", then the > sensation is not taken as self. > > But what about cognition itself (mano), considered > apart from seeing > and other occasions of sense? Consider the > sentiment: "I think such- > and-such", or "I experience a citta", or "I observed > lots of cittas > passing by in the span of a second." Here, > consciousness has been > taken as a "self" as soon as a distinction is sought > between the > experience and the experiencer, between the act and > the agent (or > actor). Abhidhamma makes no such distinction, and no > such distinction > is necessary. The mind (citta) is not distinct from > the > act "thinking". Similarly, there is no agent apart > from the > act "sensation" (or "contact" or "sankhara" or > "recognition"), i.e. > there is not a citta that experiences sensation. To > think of citta as > something that experiences sensation is once again > to make a > distinction between the experience and the > experiencer; the act and > the agent; the actor and the action; the self that > does this, > experiences that, and thinks this-or-that. BOOM! > "Self" is found > masquerading right in the midst of a bunch of fancy > Pali terminology > that merely serves as cover for sakayaditthi--and an > effective cover > at that! > > Citta doesn't experience sensation; Citta IS the > experience, and > sensation is one of the characteristics of that > experience. > Experience (citta) at one moment differs from that > at another moment, > and sensation is an aspect of each citta. So is > sañña (perception, > recognition, memory). "This moment is similar to the > moment a moment > ago" -- that impression is sañña, which "has the > characteristic of > noting and the function of recognizing what has been > previously > noted" [Asl I, Part IV, Chapter 1, 110), cited in > Nina's "Cetasikas"]. The object of sañña is the same > as the object of > the citta; but the cognizing itself is "citta", > while "sañña" is the > name given to a category of ingredient that flavors > the cognition. > [When I was in high school, I had the good fortune > to get to visit > Hawaii. I ordered a dinner at a fancy restaurant, > and the waiter > asked, "What kind of starch would you like with > that?" I'd never > heard it asked quite that way before (or since), but > I thought it was > brilliant. "Sañña" is like "starch" -- it comes with > the citta, but > it comes in different flavors.] A "function" of > sañña is > the "recognition" of similarity or dissimilarity > between cittas. > There is no sañña entity to do any recognizing; > there is merely > cognition (with a certain sañña flavor, vedana > flavor, phassa flavor, > etc.). Of course, we may speak of an act of > recognition or an object > of sañña, but we must be very clear that there is no > "sañña" doing > the acting and the "object" is not "experienced" by > any sañña entity. > And although the temptation is overwhelming, the > sañña flavor of > cittas does not necessitate a the positing of a self > to explain the > experience of speedy cittas. > > Dan 9622 From: m. nease Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 4:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Cheetahs and owls Very well-said, both! mike --- dalthorp@o... wrote: > Hi Howard, > > Comments interspersed... > _________________________________ > Howard: > >My recent post entitled "Some Thoughts on > > Continuity, Blurs, and Cittas" was headed rather > much in the same > direction > > as this post of yours; that is, its intention was > to "see" the > matters > > addressed in the title of my post in a way that > does *not* involve > a separate > > observer, agent, or self, and also does not > require convoluted > explanation. > > Sometimes one sidesteps problems in a particular > theory by using > > "explanations" that present more problems than the > original theory! > > Using Occam's razor, why not just excise the "self"? > Well, it's > easier said than done, as you note. > > > have gotten within the bones to the very marrow. I > think that if > one were to > > continually contemplate on nothing but the fact of > each mindstate > being an > > impersonal cognitive event, following upon and > conditioned by > previous > > cognitive acts, with the only discerning of > objects there ever is > being these > > very cognitive events themselves, one could make > much progress in > disabusing > > oneself of the annoyingly persistent sense of > "self". > > Dan: > Basically, I agree [But I'd change the "continually > contemplate...the > fact" to "thoroughly understand the fact"], and this > is where the > anatta flavor of Abhidhamma can be so helpful -- not > as a bunch of > lists and dogmas to memorize, but as a beautiful > description of the > meaning of anatta via a decomposition of "self" into > the five > aggregates and a reconstruction of experience after > an Occam's razor > excising of "self". > > __________________________________ > Howard: > >There *is* no observer > > standing back observing the flux of mindstates. > Whatever is known > is known > > *there*, with there being no "knower". As you > imply, should > ignorance > > sufficiently diminish and insight increase > sufficiently, the > arising and > > falling away of mindstates and of their associated > objects and > concomitants > > would be "seen", that seeing/wisdom itself being > an aspect or > concomitant of > > the mindstates, and there would be a growing > realization of > impersonality and > > emptiness, with neither continuity nor > discreteness being an > adequate > > characterization of the way things truly appear. > > Dan: > Well said (or should I say, "sadhu, sadhu, sadhu"). > __________________________________ > Howard: > The *details* of the map we > > use of this domain are less important than the > critical requirement > that the > > map be free of the views of personality and of > essence. > > Dan: > This is a great insight, Howard--we need to always > bear in mind that > our theorizing and book learning is not helpful per > se, but if it > helps condition a little more clarity in our > observations, then it > can be most helpful. In a similar vein, U Narada > [Guide to > Conditional Relations, part I) wrote: "Patthana is > understood if the > table of contents of Dhammasangani is understood." > If you have ever > seen how cryptic and bizarre looking, how detailed > and extensive the > Patthana really is, the import of this statement is > clear: > Penetrating insight is where it's at, not the > memorizing and reading > of a scores of lists and doctrines. > > > The more and more closely I look, the more > I see how many, > varied, and > > treacherous are the "pitfalls of self" waiting for > us on the path, > subtly > > hidden by dense leaf-layers of wrongly formulated, > wrongly > interpreted, and > > wrongly grasped theories. Your post goes a long > way, for me, in > clearing away > > these layers, exposing the pitfalls below. > > The depth and intricacy of sakayaditti are > astounding, as are the > consequences. We are indeed fortunate to STILL be > able to read the > Tipitaka and listen to Dhamma. > > Dan 9623 From: m. nease Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 4:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "engaged" [Christine] Hi Herman, --- hhofman@d... wrote: > Dan, > > I recall that there was an occasion where the Buddha > literally ran > for his life, being pursued by someone who wanted to > harm him. This certainly never occurred in the parts of the Tipitaka I've read and seems highly unlikely. If you can cite this event I'd be most interested. I wonder if you're thinking of Angulimala, who chased the Buddha as fast as he could to murder him and cut off one of his fingers for his necklace--though the Buddha continued walking at his regular pace, Angulimala was unable to catch up with him. > Is this an act of self-preservation, an indication > of chains, bonds > fetters etc. It's an interesting story but certainly has nothing to do either with self-preservation or social activism. The Buddha's approach to Angulimala was to teach him the Dhamma. When the Buddha spoke about chains, bonds, fetters etc., he was generally speaking about unskilled mental states. For what it's worth, mike 9624 From: m. nease Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 5:08pm Subject: Re: [dsg] worldling Jon and Robert, The question I have is, is a 'trainer' (sekkha?) necessarily a sotaapanna, or can a kalyana-putthujana be a sekkha? This does have some bearing on issues rather than semantic ones. mike --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob K > > Thanks for this point. I am indeed relieved to hear > that those who are > developing the path are no longer regarded as > 'uninstructed and foolish'. > I'm not sure if the same distinction is always > maintained in the suttas, > but in any event it would have been better to use > the term 'worldling' in > the context below. > > Jon > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- > In > dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott > wrote: > > > > > > > 2. It is a 'path' in the sense that once this > moment has been > > experienced > > > final enlightenment is inevitable in the > fullness of time. Prior > > to the > > > first of the 4 stages of enlightenment (ie. at > the mundane level), > > > attainment to final enlightenment is not > assured. The texts refer > > to one > > > who has attained to stream entry as a > *'path-winner'* or 'trainer', > > > whereas one who has not attained to a moment of > supramundane > > experience is > > > referred to as an `uninstructed worldling'. So > it is not a path in > > the > > > sense of being a 'path of practice' for the > worldling, as the term > > seems > > > to be understood nowadays. > > > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++ > > Dear Jon, > > The commentaries talk about two types of > putthujana (worldling): 1) > > the uninstructed, foolish one and 2) the > kalyana-putthujana (good > > worldling) who is learning and developing the > path. > > best wishes > > robert 9625 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 5:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] worldling --Dear Mike, I think a sekkha is always a sotapanna or above best wishes robert - In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Jon and Robert, > > The question I have is, is a 'trainer' (sekkha?) > necessarily a sotaapanna, or can a kalyana-putthujana > be a sekkha? This does have some bearing on issues > rather than semantic ones. > > mike > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > Rob K > > > > Thanks for this point. I am indeed relieved to hear > > that those who are > > developing the path are no longer regarded as > > 'uninstructed and foolish'. > > I'm not sure if the same distinction is always > > maintained in the suttas, > > but in any event it would have been better to use > > the term 'worldling' in > > the context below. > > > > Jon > > > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- > > In > > dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > 2. It is a 'path' in the sense that once this > > moment has been > > > experienced > > > > final enlightenment is inevitable in the > > fullness of time. Prior > > > to the > > > > first of the 4 stages of enlightenment (ie. at > > the mundane level), > > > > attainment to final enlightenment is not > > assured. The texts refer > > > to one > > > > who has attained to stream entry as a > > *'path-winner'* or 'trainer', > > > > whereas one who has not attained to a moment of > > supramundane > > > experience is > > > > referred to as an `uninstructed worldling'. So > > it is not a path in > > > the > > > > sense of being a 'path of practice' for the > > worldling, as the term > > > seems > > > > to be understood nowadays. > > > > > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++ > > > Dear Jon, > > > The commentaries talk about two types of > > putthujana (worldling): 1) > > > the uninstructed, foolish one and 2) the > > kalyana-putthujana (good > > > worldling) who is learning and developing the > > path. > > > best wishes > > > robert > 9626 From: m. nease Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 5:15pm Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi Robert, Very interesting and I'm glad to see this documented. Completely baffling, though. Must rethink a few things. mike --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > Dear Ken O, and Howard > Every moment once it has passed has absolutely > ceased according to > the Theravada. However, this doesn't mean that it > can't be known. If > that was the case then we would be like newborn > babies, only worse, > and know nothing. Direct seeing should be > distinguished from thinking > about past events but it doesn't mean that direct > seeing doesn't need > sanna. Sanna arises with every citta and thus it > arises also in > cittas assocaited with panna. It is so complex how > it all comes > together, just for a moment, to understand. Here are > some brief > quotes: > Abhidhammattha sangaha( Anuruddha) translated as A > comprehensive > Manual of Abhidhamma by Bhikkhu Bodhi: > Guide(note by bodhi) p.136 "although citta > experiences objects, citta > in turn can become an object. It should be noted > that a citta in its > immediacy cannot become an its own object, for the > cognizer cannot > cognize itself; but a citta in an individual mental > continuum can > experience earlier cittas in that same continuum as > well as the > cittas of other beings" > p137 "Mind-door cittas can also cognise an object > belonging to any of > the three periods of time- past present and future" > p138 "the Vibhavani tika explains: acording to > whether the cittas are > sense sphere javanas, direct knowledge javanas , the > remaining smile- > producing javanas etc. For the sense sphere > javanas...take objects of > the three times[past, present, future] and timeless > objects (nibbana > and concepts]. The smile producing consciousness > takes only objects > of the three times[past, present, future]. The > direct knowledge > cittas take objects of the three times as well as > the timeless" > p138 The door freed consciousness (ie. > patisandhicitta, cuti citta > and bhavanga citta ) "can be of six kinds: it can be > any of the five > sense objects, either past or present, or it can be > a mental object" > best wishes > robert > > In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong > wrote: > > Hi Robert K, > > > > Could you kindly quote the commentary that says > that. Or is it > saying > > that it is the memory of the past cittas that an > enlighted person > able to > > remember past events eons ago. To me, all that is > the past is only > in the > > memory as past objects have already ceased. If > the past object do > not > > ceased, then I think it would be a contradiction > of the standing > that > > cittas ceased. > > > > > > > > Kind Regards > > Ken O > > > > > > > > > > > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > > > > > In a message dated 11/24/01 11:02:11 PM Eastern > Standard Time, > > > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > > > > > > > Dear Howard, > > > > I do see your point. The thing is that the > cittas with panna > that > > > > know a past object have that past object as > the object they > > > > understand. In practice - for us- this past > object is so > > > > infinitesimally close to being present that it > is called the > present > > > > moment. For the Buddha and some arahants it is > possible to > directly > > > > insight even moments from aeons ago. This > direct insight is > different > > > > from thinking or conceptualising about the > moment even though > it is > > > > past. > > > > best wishes > > > > robert > > > > > > > > > > > ============================= > > > Mmm, hmm. I get what you are saying as > well. It is an > interesting > > > > > > explanation which you give, though I find myself > somewhat > uncomfortable > > > with > > > the notion of a past object, truly past, being > the direct object > (and > > > not as > > > a memory) of a current mindstate. That is > similar to the position > of the > > > > > > Sarvastivadins to the effect that dhammas exist > throughout all > the three > > > time > > > periods, a position which I understand the > Theravadins took issue > with > > > because of its eternalistic scent. > > > > > > With metta, > > > Howard 9627 From: m. nease Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 5:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] worldling Thanks Rob, So, for the kalyana-puthujjana, what means 'learning and developing the path'? Does this refer to sammuti-sacca, pariyatti or...? As it has been explained that the path refers to magga-citta? mike --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --Dear Mike, > I think a sekkha is always a sotapanna or above > best wishes > robert > > - In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" > wrote: > > Jon and Robert, > > > > The question I have is, is a 'trainer' (sekkha?) > > necessarily a sotaapanna, or can a > kalyana-putthujana > > be a sekkha? This does have some bearing on > issues > > rather than semantic ones. > > > > mike > > > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > > > Rob K > > > > > > Thanks for this point. I am indeed relieved to > hear > > > that those who are > > > developing the path are no longer regarded as > > > 'uninstructed and foolish'. > > > I'm not sure if the same distinction is always > > > maintained in the suttas, > > > but in any event it would have been better to > use > > > the term 'worldling' in > > > the context below. > > > > > > Jon > > > > > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- > > > In > > > dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > 2. It is a 'path' in the sense that once > this > > > moment has been > > > > experienced > > > > > final enlightenment is inevitable in the > > > fullness of time. Prior > > > > to the > > > > > first of the 4 stages of enlightenment (ie. > at > > > the mundane level), > > > > > attainment to final enlightenment is not > > > assured. The texts refer > > > > to one > > > > > who has attained to stream entry as a > > > *'path-winner'* or 'trainer', > > > > > whereas one who has not attained to a moment > of > > > supramundane > > > > experience is > > > > > referred to as an `uninstructed worldling'. > So > > > it is not a path in > > > > the > > > > > sense of being a 'path of practice' for the > > > worldling, as the term > > > > seems > > > > > to be understood nowadays. > > > > > > > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++ > > > > Dear Jon, > > > > The commentaries talk about two types of > > > putthujana (worldling): 1) > > > > the uninstructed, foolish one and 2) the > > > kalyana-putthujana (good > > > > worldling) who is learning and developing the > > > path. > > > > best wishes > > > > robert 9628 From: m. nease Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 5:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] "engaged" [Robert Ep.] Thanks again, Dan. mike --- dalthorp@o... wrote: > _______________________________ > Robert Ep.: You wrote that the Buddha did not exhort > us to get > involved with people who were suffering, to be 'good > people' and try > to free those who were being oppressed. > > Dan: That's right. The Buddha's message was strictly > spiritual. As > wisdom develops, then compassion is deepened and the > impulse to > relieve suffering of all kinds is increased. Buddha > did not teach > that liberation comes through this particular good > deed or that > particular political view or even that these > political struggles are > helpful in any way. The reason is simply because > these issues are > ultimately not relevant to the real roots of > suffering. Can these > political struggles help soften material conditions > to temporarily > lessen the sting of suffering? Of course! But such > struggles are not > particularly Buddhist. Neither are they un-Buddhist. > Just different. > > Historically speaking, confusing political issues > with religious > issues is a recipe for disaster, as anyone with an > interest in > Buddhism can attest for Christianity (e.g., Pat > Robertson, Jesse > Jackson in the U.S.; crusade and inquisitions in > Europe; etc.), Islam > (e.g., Omar and bin Laden in Afghanistan; Khomeini > in Iran), > Communism (a secular, rationalist, materialist > "religion") in USSR > and Cambodia. > > Dan 9629 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 7:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] worldling ---Good point Mike, I should have said :developing the way to the path: It gets confusing when we are refering to specific nuances of words. Best wishes robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Thanks Rob, > > So, for the kalyana-puthujjana, what means 'learning > and developing the path'? Does this refer to > sammuti-sacca, pariyatti or...? As it has been > explained that the path refers to magga-citta? > > mike > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > > --Dear Mike, > > I think a sekkha is always a sotapanna or above > > best wishes > > robert > > > > - In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" > > wrote: > > > Jon and Robert, > > > > > > The question I have is, is a 'trainer' (sekkha?) > > > necessarily a sotaapanna, or can a > > kalyana-putthujana > > > be a sekkha? This does have some bearing on > > issues > > > rather than semantic ones. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > > > > > Rob K > > > > > > > > Thanks for this point. I am indeed relieved to > > hear > > > > that those who are > > > > developing the path are no longer regarded as > > > > 'uninstructed and foolish'. > > > > I'm not sure if the same distinction is always > > > > maintained in the suttas, > > > > but in any event it would have been better to > > use > > > > the term 'worldling' in > > > > the context below. > > > > > > > > Jon > > > > > > > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- > > > > In > > > > dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2. It is a 'path' in the sense that once > > this > > > > moment has been > > > > > experienced > > > > > > final enlightenment is inevitable in the > > > > fullness of time. Prior > > > > > to the > > > > > > first of the 4 stages of enlightenment (ie. > > at > > > > the mundane level), > > > > > > attainment to final enlightenment is not > > > > assured. The texts refer > > > > > to one > > > > > > who has attained to stream entry as a > > > > *'path-winner'* or 'trainer', > > > > > > whereas one who has not attained to a moment > > of > > > > supramundane > > > > > experience is > > > > > > referred to as an `uninstructed worldling'. > > So > > > > it is not a path in > > > > > the > > > > > > sense of being a 'path of practice' for the > > > > worldling, as the term > > > > > seems > > > > > > to be understood nowadays. > > > > > > > > > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++ > > > > > Dear Jon, > > > > > The commentaries talk about two types of > > > > putthujana (worldling): 1) > > > > > the uninstructed, foolish one and 2) the > > > > kalyana-putthujana (good > > > > > worldling) who is learning and developing the > > > > path. > > > > > best wishes > > > > > robert 9630 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 7:46pm Subject: Re: [dsg] worldling And, of course, there is the five-fold path, which can be pre-magga, such as moments of genuine satipatthana as seen by kayana-putthujhana. best wishes robert--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > ---Good point Mike, > I should have said :developing the way to the path: It gets confusing > when we are refering to specific nuances of words. > Best wishes > robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > > Thanks Rob, > > > > So, for the kalyana-puthujjana, what means 'learning > > and developing the path'? Does this refer to > > sammuti-sacca, pariyatti or...? As it has been > > explained that the path refers to magga-citta? > > > > mike > > > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > > > --Dear Mike, > > > I think a sekkha is always a sotapanna or above > > > best wishes > > > robert > > > > > > - In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" > > > wrote: > > > > Jon and Robert, > > > > > > > > The question I have is, is a 'trainer' (sekkha?) > > > > necessarily a sotaapanna, or can a > > > kalyana-putthujana > > > > be a sekkha? This does have some bearing on > > > issues > > > > rather than semantic ones. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > > > > > > > Rob K > > > > > > > > > > Thanks for this point. I am indeed relieved to > > > hear > > > > > that those who are > > > > > developing the path are no longer regarded as > > > > > 'uninstructed and foolish'. > > > > > I'm not sure if the same distinction is always > > > > > maintained in the suttas, > > > > > but in any event it would have been better to > > > use > > > > > the term 'worldling' in > > > > > the context below. > > > > > > > > > > Jon > > > > > > > > > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- > > > > > In > > > > > dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2. It is a 'path' in the sense that once > > > this > > > > > moment has been > > > > > > experienced > > > > > > > final enlightenment is inevitable in the > > > > > fullness of time. Prior > > > > > > to the > > > > > > > first of the 4 stages of enlightenment (ie. > > > at > > > > > the mundane level), > > > > > > > attainment to final enlightenment is not > > > > > assured. The texts refer > > > > > > to one > > > > > > > who has attained to stream entry as a > > > > > *'path-winner'* or 'trainer', > > > > > > > whereas one who has not attained to a moment > > > of > > > > > supramundane > > > > > > experience is > > > > > > > referred to as an `uninstructed worldling'. > > > So > > > > > it is not a path in > > > > > > the > > > > > > > sense of being a 'path of practice' for the > > > > > worldling, as the term > > > > > > seems > > > > > > > to be understood nowadays. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +++++++++++++++++++++ > > > > > > Dear Jon, > > > > > > The commentaries talk about two types of > > > > > putthujana (worldling): 1) > > > > > > the uninstructed, foolish one and 2) the > > > > > kalyana-putthujana (good > > > > > > worldling) who is learning and developing the > > > > > path. > > > > > > best wishes > > > > > > robert 9631 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 9:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Cheetahs and owls Dear Dan, I would agree with Mike here that your explanation below is both impressive and very helpful in understanding the mechanics of how the cittas and their cetasikas function. If you tell me that sanna can have an 'impression' of a number of recently passed moments, that it has received and carried over from one single citta to the next, so that a given consequent citta can get the impression of 'speedy' or 'blurring' cittas having passed by recently, then I will have my question about how single cittas can have such an experience of a series of cittas resolved. Please tell me this is possible, and I will stop hammering on this topic with great relief! Best, Robert Ep. ====================== --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Dan - > > I'd like to make a couple comments about the post of yours copied > below. My main comment is that it is one of the most useful, clear, and > insightful posts I have read in a long time! It is *wonderful*, and I thank > you for it! > A second comment: My recent post entitled "Some Thoughts on > Continuity, Blurs, and Cittas" was headed rather much in the same direction > as this post of yours; that is, its intention was to "see" the matters > addressed in the title of my post in a way that does *not* involve a separate > observer, agent, or self, and also does not require convoluted explanation. > Sometimes one sidesteps problems in a particular theory by using > "explanations" that present more problems than the original theory! In my > post, I believe I was starting to get somewhat below the outer flesh of the > matter, but, in this post of yours, to paraphrase a certain Zen master, you > have gotten within the bones to the very marrow. I think that if one were to > continually contemplate on nothing but the fact of each mindstate being an > impersonal cognitive event, following upon and conditioned by previous > cognitive acts, with the only discerning of objects there ever is being these > very cognitive events themselves, one could make much progress in disabusing > oneself of the annoyingly persistent sense of "self". There *is* no observer > standing back observing the flux of mindstates. Whatever is known is known > *there*, with there being no "knower". As you imply, should ignorance > sufficiently diminish and insight increase sufficiently, the arising and > falling away of mindstates and of their associated objects and concomitants > would be "seen", that seeing/wisdom itself being an aspect or concomitant of > the mindstates, and there would be a growing realization of impersonality and > emptiness, with neither continuity nor discreteness being an adequate > characterization of the way things truly appear. The *details* of the map we > use of this domain are less important than the critical requirement that the > map be free of the views of personality and of essence. > The more and more closely I look, the more I see how many, varied, and > treacherous are the "pitfalls of self" waiting for us on the path, subtly > hidden by dense leaf-layers of wrongly formulated, wrongly interpreted, and > wrongly grasped theories. Your post goes a long way, for me, in clearing away > these layers, exposing the pitfalls below. > > With metta, > Howard > > In a message dated 11/25/01 12:00:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, > dalthorp@o... writes: > > > > _____________________________________________ > > Howard: But who (or what) is this "we" who are so overwhelmed by the > > speed of cittas to think they act simultaneously when it is only the > > cittas, themselves, that are aware? > > > > Robert Ep.: > > The only question is who is it so fast for?...Since we are working on > > the assumption that there is no ego that is observing these cittas > > jump around like mad, who or what is watching these cittas whiz > > by? ... [H]ow [can] we have overriding, comparative or relative > > experiences without an ego to hold and compare it all? > > _____________________________________________ > > > > Howdy, Howard and Robert Ep., > > You've inspired me to reflect again on the nature of cittas and > > cetasikas, and I thank you. I don't know if my investigations have > > any relevance to what you've been talking about, and it's always > > dangerous to burst into a ongoing conversation between two sharp > > cookies, but you may be able to help me think more clearly about the > > issues. Here's what I've been thinking... > > > > I looked up a wonderful passage in Brahmajala sutta (DN 1, i 34 PTS > > or §49 BPS): "In this case some recluse or Brahmin is addicted to > > logic and reasoning. He gives utterance to the following conclusions > > of his own, beaten out by his argumentations and based on his flight > > of thought thus: 'That which is [connected with] "the eye", "the > > ear", "the nose", "the tongue" and "the body"--that self is > > impermanent, unstable, non-eternal, subject to change. But that which > > is called "citta", "mano", or "viññana"--that self is permanent, > > eternal, not subject to change..." Although the rationalistic partial- > > eternalist described by Buddha in the passage above posits a "who" to > > experience and compare cittas, it really isn't necessary. The > > commentary discusses this interesting case in more detail: "The > > rationalist sees the breakup of the eye, etc.; but because every > > preceding act of consciousness (citta), in ceasing, conditions the > > arising of its successor, he does not see the breakup of the > > consciousness, even though the latter is more pronounced than the > > breakup of the eye, etc. Since he does not see the breakup of > > consciousness, he assumes that when the bodily frame breaks up the > > consciousness goes elsewhere...This he declares as his view." > > > > Blurred vision (ignorance) prevents a clear view of the moment-to- > > moment breakup of consciousness. A consequence of that blurred vision > > is an intensification of the impression of continuity and the > > positing of a self to "hold" that sense of continuity. The > > subcommentary elaborates further: "'He does not see the breakup of > > consciousness': although consciousness is breaking up moment after > > moment, each act of consciousness, in breaking up, becomes the > > proximity condition for the following act of consciousness. Because > > each succeeding act of consciousness arises concealing, as it were, > > the absence of its predecessor, the aspect of presence alone is > > strong and clear, not the aspect of absense. Thus he does not see the > > destruction of consciousness. This matter becomes very clear by the > > example of the fire-disc (i.e. the unbroken disc of flame formed by > > swinging a firebrand in rapid circular motion). Because the > > rationalistic partial-eternalist is still more remote from > > understanding and applying the method of diversity (viz. discrete > > cittas), and wrongly applies the method of unity, he arrives at the > > conviction: 'This very consciousness which always occurs with a > > single nature, just this is a permanent self.'" > > > > So the view of a self to house the and interpret the experiences will > > naturally take root when each succeeding act of consciousness arises > > and conceals the absence of its predecessor, and the aspect of > > presence alone is strong and clear, not the aspect of absense. Then, > > there is no clear view of the dissolution of consciousness. > > > > To resolve the problem of the "who who experiences" requires a proper > > balance of the "methods of diversity and unity". B. Bodhi gives a > > good description of these "methods" in the introduction to his > > translation of DN 1: "The eternalist doctrine is said to originate > > through a misapplication of the 'method of unity' (ekattanaya) to the > > continuum of experience which is the subject of examination....The > > method of unity disloses the coherence of the succession of distinct > > experiential occasions making up the continuum. It shows them as > > bound together in a single series, participants in a process of > > transmission and development, interconnected members unified through > > a law of conditional dependence. The method of diversity balances > > this by showing up the difference. Though unified, the current of > > experience is still a chain made up of distint links. Some of these > > funciton as causes, others as effects.... When these two methods are > > applied in conjunction, the current of experience will be correctly > > understood; but when they are misapplied or applied in a one-sided > > fashion, it will be misunderstood. The misapplication of the method > > of unity will lead to the belief in an identical self and thence to > > eternalism. The misapplication of the method of diversity will take > > the disruptive, discontinuous element in experience as absolute and > > thence lead to a doctrine of annihilationism. The correct application > > of both will show the continuum to be a causally connected succession > > of momentary processes, which continues so long as the causes retain > > their efficacy and ceases when the causes are deactivated, in either > > case without harboring a pesisting core to be grasped as a personal > > self. This is the middle way which avoids the two extremes." > > > > With its abundance of conventional language about "this bhikkhu, that > > householder" and similes about "gold" and "luminous mind", it is easy > > to (mis)read the suttas with a unity bias. With its elaborate > > description and classification of cittas and cetasikas, Abhidhamma > > (esp. Dhammasangani and the first few chapters of Abhidhammatha > > sangaha) seems to emphasize more the method of diversity. I find it > > very helpful to study Abhidhamma, and then I read the suttas with a > > little more of a "diversity" method than a "conventional" reading > > would give. > > > > Ledi Sayadaw asks: "But how are we to understand the momentary > > arising and ceasing of mind?" (JPTS 7(1):115-163, 1913). He draws his > > discussion from the Citta chapter of Yamaka, and his answer is > > typical of both the suttas and Abhidhamma. Here's my take on it... > > > > There are six kinds of consciousness -- those of the five special > > senses and the "coordinating sense" (mano). If with seeing there is > > the sense, "I see a visible object", the visual cognition has been > > taken as a "self". Same with hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling. > > If there is the sense, "It is a mental phenomenon, an element, a > > sphere of sense, it is not 'mine,' not 'I', not my 'self'", then the > > sensation is not taken as self. > > > > But what about cognition itself (mano), considered apart from seeing > > and other occasions of sense? Consider the sentiment: "I think such- > > and-such", or "I experience a citta", or "I observed lots of cittas > > passing by in the span of a second." Here, consciousness has been > > taken as a "self" as soon as a distinction is sought between the > > experience and the experiencer, between the act and the agent (or > > actor). Abhidhamma makes no such distinction, and no such distinction > > is necessary. The mind (citta) is not distinct from the > > act "thinking". Similarly, there is no agent apart from the > > act "sensation" (or "contact" or "sankhara" or "recognition"), i.e. > > there is not a citta that experiences sensation. To think of citta as > > something that experiences sensation is once again to make a > > distinction between the experience and the experiencer; the act and > > the agent; the actor and the action; the self that does this, > > experiences that, and thinks this-or-that. BOOM! "Self" is found > > masquerading right in the midst of a bunch of fancy Pali terminology > > that merely serves as cover for sakayaditthi--and an effective cover > > at that! > > > > Citta doesn't experience sensation; Citta IS the experience, and > > sensation is one of the characteristics of that experience. > > Experience (citta) at one moment differs from that at another moment, > > and sensation is an aspect of each citta. So is sañña (perception, > > recognition, memory). "This moment is similar to the moment a moment > > ago" -- that impression is sañña, which "has the characteristic of > > noting and the function of recognizing what has been previously > > noted" [Asl I, Part IV, Chapter 1, 110), cited in > > Nina's "Cetasikas"]. The object of sañña is the same as the object of > > the citta; but the cognizing itself is "citta", while "sañña" is the > > name given to a category of ingredient that flavors the cognition. > > [When I was in high school, I had the good fortune to get to visit > > Hawaii. I ordered a dinner at a fancy restaurant, and the waiter > > asked, "What kind of starch would you like with that?" I'd never > > heard it asked quite that way before (or since), but I thought it was > > brilliant. "Sañña" is like "starch" -- it comes with the citta, but > > it comes in different flavors.] A "function" of sañña is > > the "recognition" of similarity or dissimilarity between cittas. > > There is no sañña entity to do any recognizing; there is merely > > cognition (with a certain sañña flavor, vedana flavor, phassa flavor, > > etc.). Of course, we may speak of an act of recognition or an object > > of sañña, but we must be very clear that there is no "sañña" doing > > the acting and the "object" is not "experienced" by any sañña entity. > > And although the temptation is overwhelming, the sañña flavor of > > cittas does not necessitate a the positing of a self to explain the > > experience of speedy cittas. > > > > Dan 9632 From: Robert Epstein Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 9:45pm Subject: Re: [dsg] "engaged" [Robert Ep.] Dan, I agree that confusing religion and politics can be disastrous. As you say, as understanding and compassion increase, one will naturally be moved to alleviate suffering without having to reason it out. And I agree that to end the source of suffering is ultimately far more valuable. At the same time, I don't think it's a coincidence, and by your words here neither do you, that those with a spiritual bent are often the ones to step forward and try to ease suffering in the moment. Best, Robert Ep. =================================== --- dalthorp@o... wrote: > _______________________________ > Robert Ep.: You wrote that the Buddha did not exhort us to get > involved with people who were suffering, to be 'good people' and try > to free those who were being oppressed. > > Dan: That's right. The Buddha's message was strictly spiritual. As > wisdom develops, then compassion is deepened and the impulse to > relieve suffering of all kinds is increased. Buddha did not teach > that liberation comes through this particular good deed or that > particular political view or even that these political struggles are > helpful in any way. The reason is simply because these issues are > ultimately not relevant to the real roots of suffering. Can these > political struggles help soften material conditions to temporarily > lessen the sting of suffering? Of course! But such struggles are not > particularly Buddhist. Neither are they un-Buddhist. Just different. > > Historically speaking, confusing political issues with religious > issues is a recipe for disaster, as anyone with an interest in > Buddhism can attest for Christianity (e.g., Pat Robertson, Jesse > Jackson in the U.S.; crusade and inquisitions in Europe; etc.), Islam > (e.g., Omar and bin Laden in Afghanistan; Khomeini in Iran), > Communism (a secular, rationalist, materialist "religion") in USSR > and Cambodia. > > Dan 9633 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 10:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] --- DEar Mike, I thought this might be a little confusing. It is simply theory, useful for understanding how the past can be insighted. For us, in practice, as I said to Howard, the moments that are insighted are so infinitesimally close to being present that they are considered as the present moment. best wishes robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Hi Robert, > > Very interesting and I'm glad to see this documented. > Completely baffling, though. Must rethink a few > things. > > mike > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > > Dear Ken O, and Howard > > Every moment once it has passed has absolutely > > ceased according to > > the Theravada. However, this doesn't mean that it > > can't be known. If 9634 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 11:00pm Subject: [dsg] Re: "engaged" [Christine] Hi there, Mike, Just out of a purely theoretical interest, are you saying that this story is not in the Tipitaka, or that the story is in the Tipitaka but that my memory served me incorrectly about the Buddha running instead of walking, and possibly other details? All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Hi Herman, > > --- hhofman@d... wrote: > > > Dan, > > > > I recall that there was an occasion where the Buddha > > literally ran > > for his life, being pursued by someone who wanted to > > harm him. > > This certainly never occurred in the parts of the > Tipitaka I've read and seems highly unlikely. If you > can cite this event I'd be most interested. I wonder > if you're thinking of Angulimala, who chased the > Buddha as fast as he could to murder him and cut off > one of his fingers for his necklace--though the Buddha > continued walking at his regular pace, Angulimala was > unable to catch up with him. > > > Is this an act of self-preservation, an indication > > of chains, bonds > > fetters etc. > > It's an interesting story but certainly has nothing to > do either with self-preservation or social activism. > The Buddha's approach to Angulimala was to teach him > the Dhamma. When the Buddha spoke about chains, > bonds, fetters etc., he was generally speaking about > unskilled mental states. > > For what it's worth, > > mike 9635 From: Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 11:02pm Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Dear Rob, > I would be very grateful if you could tell me the mechanism by which a moment once > completely passed, can be seen as an object by a new, emergent citta. I just > don't understand it, but I'm sure there is a good structural explanation. > > It must be involved in how one citta passes its attributes to the next. And I am > equally confused about how this 'handing-off' takes place, since each citta is > 'flattened' before the next arises...or is this not the case? > > Regards, > Robert Ep. > > ================= >Dear Rob E., I'm not sure what you mean by 'flattened'? Each citta has completely passed away, ceased, ended before the next arises. But there is no space between them, no time gap. I've mentioned to you before the Patthana, which is considered the most profound section of the Tipitaka and it is there that the 24 conditions are elucidated. Ken O and Christine are now studying Nina Van Gorkoms introduction to it and you could download it from http://www.zolag.co.uk and we could all look at it together. It will make things clearer I think. best wishes robert 9636 From: Sarah Date: Sun Nov 25, 2001 11:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] lucid dreaming and seafood vegetarians Hi Frank, --- frank kuan wrote: > I had an interesting lucid dream today. I was rather hoping that someone more knowledgable would reply to your unusual post, but we seem to be 'fated' to talk together again;-) > My question is, do other members lucid dream with all > 6 sense bases? Which ones work better? Do they all > work? I know that dream analysis and dream therapy are considered very important by many people and especially by many psychotherapists. From a dhamma point of view, I understand that dreams are merely an indication of our kilesa which even follow us around as we sleep. This is the reason that arahats don't dream as I've heard (pls don't ask for the reference;-) When we give particular importance to certain dreams or to their lucidity or otherwise, I wonder if this isn't just attachment in the way there is attachment to any other stories we get 'lost' in or carried away by. In other words, if we attach importance to the papanca (proliferations) in themselves, rather than developing awareness of the present seeing or thinking, it can be most unhelpful I feel. People have expressed the idea before on dsg of different senses working whilst we sleep and dream. it's true that it really seems as though there is seeing and hearing and other sense door experiences at these times. In reality, aren't these just tricks of the mind, conditioned by sanna (perception/memory) and many other factors? In fact nothing is being seen, heard, smelt, tasted or touched, but the thinking through the mind-door is very busy and active. Of course, as soon as we're just a 'little' awake, seeing, hearing and so on are active again and sometimes it can be unclear for a few minutes whether we're dreaming or really experiencing sights and sounds and so on. So devious is the mind. Sorry if I've misunderstood or not given the kind of response you were looking for, Frank. Hope to hear your comments. Sarah 9637 From: Sarah Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 0:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] "engaged" [Robert Ep.] Hi Dan, --- "m. nease" wrote: > Thanks again, Dan. Like Mike, Howard, Jon and others, I've also really appreciated some of your amazing posts recently, starting with your first 'Human Rights' one and especially the one Howard commented on...(sorry, too rushed to find them now). Many thanks and hope Lisa is 'hangin' in' as best she can.....;-) Howard, also greatly appreciated your correspondence with Dan of late and your fine considerations in your 'Dear All' post.....so very glad to hear all the points you make so well. Thanks everyone else too for all the great contributions....too many to mention;-) Sarah 9638 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 1:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > Dear Rob, > > I would be very grateful if you could tell me the mechanism by > which a moment once > > completely passed, can be seen as an object by a new, emergent > citta. I just > > don't understand it, but I'm sure there is a good structural > explanation. > > > > It must be involved in how one citta passes its attributes to the > next. And I am > > equally confused about how this 'handing-off' takes place, since > each citta is > > 'flattened' before the next arises...or is this not the case? > > > > Regards, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ================= > >Dear Rob E., > I'm not sure what you mean by 'flattened'? Each citta has completely > passed away, ceased, ended before the next arises. that's what I meant. But there is no > space between them, no time gap. So they 'touch' in a sense? And thus the material is able to be transmitted from one to the next? > I've mentioned to you before the Patthana, which is considered the > most profound section of the Tipitaka and it is there that the 24 > conditions are elucidated. Ken O and Christine are now studying Nina > Van Gorkoms introduction to it and you could download it from > http://www.zolag.co.uk and we could all look at it together. It will > make things clearer I think. > best wishes > robert That is such a nice invitation, I can't resist. I can't promise I'll keep up too well, but I will try. After all, posting on dsg is a full time job. Best, Robert Ep. 9639 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 1:41am Subject: latest edition of Buddhism in Daily Life I see that at http://www.zolag.co.uk the new editions of Buddhism in Daily Life and Abhidhamma in Daily life are now available for free download as pdf files (has the correct pali fonts). Rather nice of the publisher to do this since these books can still be purchased in hard copy. robert 9640 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 1:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi Rob. Could you please tell me where on the site the intro to the Patthana is? I can't find it in the index on the site. I looked through Abhidhamma in Daily Life and a couple other of Nina's books and couldn't find it there....... Thanks, Robert ======== --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > Dear Rob, > > I would be very grateful if you could tell me the mechanism by > which a moment once > > completely passed, can be seen as an object by a new, emergent > citta. I just > > don't understand it, but I'm sure there is a good structural > explanation. > > > > It must be involved in how one citta passes its attributes to the > next. And I am > > equally confused about how this 'handing-off' takes place, since > each citta is > > 'flattened' before the next arises...or is this not the case? > > > > Regards, > > Robert Ep. > > > > ================= > >Dear Rob E., > I'm not sure what you mean by 'flattened'? Each citta has completely > passed away, ceased, ended before the next arises. But there is no > space between them, no time gap. > I've mentioned to you before the Patthana, which is considered the > most profound section of the Tipitaka and it is there that the 24 > conditions are elucidated. Ken O and Christine are now studying Nina > Van Gorkoms introduction to it and you could download it from > http://www.zolag.co.uk and we could all look at it together. It will > make things clearer I think. > best wishes > robert 9641 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 2:48am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > Rob K: But there is no > > space between them, no time gap. > > So they 'touch' in a sense? And thus the material is able to be transmitted from > one to the next?= ++++++++++++ Dear Rob E., I used to have this simple mental picture like that. But then I found about about the plane where there is no nama at all, it is completely supressed for aeons and the state called nirodha-samapatti which some arahants attain(no nama for up to seven days). Conditions work in complex ways . Naturally we try to imagine how it works using what we know about the world we can see and so we think about nama(mentality) as if was like rupa(matter); but it is not like rupa. Actually even the world of rupa is much harder to visualise and put into words than it seems. Scientists have ever more complicated models of the atomic world but none of it really can tell us what it is exactly like. When we learned the solar system model in elementary chemistry, with electrons spinning round the atom this helped to explain some behaviour but if we thought that an atom actually looked like that we were wrong. What the Dhamma points to is seeing how it(nama or rupa) appears directly and so we don't have to have a mental picture really. Anyway you'll see more after studying conditions: the url for it is http://www.zolag.co.uk/condf.pdf best wishes robert > > > I've mentioned to you before the Patthana, which is considered the > > most profound section of the Tipitaka and it is there that the 24 > > conditions are elucidated. Ken O and Christine are now studying Nina > > Van Gorkoms introduction to it and you could download it from > > http://www.zolag.co.uk and we could all look at it together. It will > > make things clearer I think. > > best wishes > > robert > > That is such a nice invitation, I can't resist. I can't promise I'll keep up too > well, but I will try. > > After all, posting on dsg is a full time job. > > Best, > Robert Ep. 9642 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 3:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] Cheetahs and owls Hi Robert Ep., > function. If you tell me that sanna can have an 'impression' of a number of > recently passed moments, that it has received and carried over from one single > citta to the next, so that a given consequent citta can get the impression of > 'speedy' or 'blurring' cittas having passed by recently, then I will have my > question about how single cittas can have such an experience of a series of cittas > resolved. > > Please tell me this is possible, and I will stop hammering on this topic with > great relief! Instead of saying that "sañña has an impression", it might be helpful to think of sañña AS that impression -- this helps cut out the middleman. Of course, this isn't exactly right because "sañña" is just a word. I'm still trying to figure out a good way to state all this. Maybe Howard or Robert K can help... 9643 From: Sarah Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 4:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Dear Christine, --- Christine Forsyth wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > Thanks for your patient explanations - I do not dispute anything you > have said. I learn a great deal from all of your posts, if not from > the words themselves - then from the thinking about the words > later :-) > But I am interested to notice my reactions and how this topic > troubled me and came to assume such an importance to me. I think it > grew out of need. > At work, I feel constantly buffeted by waves of distressed feelings > flooding off people in heartrending situations......... I understand well. Reminds me of when I lived in London (a long time ago now) and I worked in pyschiatric centres and centres for delinquent adolescents......enough said;-) > Theoretically, > I could leave the job.......do I want to?.........maybe I'm addicted > to pain, or have an 'If not I, then who...?' complex.........don't > know...... Well, I’m sure we all have mixed motives and mixed thoughts about what we do...but for sure there are all sorts of complex causes which lead our lives to be led as they are. I’m also sure you must help a lot and many people will be glad you do the work you do, Christine;-) The negative thoughts and reactions we have don’t last either and tend to follow us around, finding different objects, whatever our lifestyles. > I think I have been using Metta Meditation as a personal first-aid > mechanism, and, at this point in time, I cannot see any alternative > to continuing to act in this way. Some sort of psychic shield would > be great. :-) Does Buddhism offer such a thing? I don't know of > anything other than Metta Meditation (beginning with self as target) > that revitalises, restores - puts money back in the emotional bank, > when there has been a heavy pay-out. I understand what you’re saying. I also have the highest regard and respect for B.Bodhi and his wonderful work and especially his translations. Any encounters we have had with him (and before him with B. Nyanaponika) have always been inspiring and memorable too. While I appreciate most of what he writes, there are areas, however, including aspects of the development of metta, where we come to different interpretations, as you kindly and gently point out. As you have suggested before, most people share BB’s understanding and have the idea of setting a time and place for metta meditation and then developing it towards oneself in the first instance. Please accept that I am not attempting to try and stop you or change your mind about any activity which helps you with your work or daily life or ‘puts money back in the emotional bank’. When I was doing those jobs in London, I remember how on the cold winter evenings, I’d either go off to study Pali, go to a yoga class or stay at home and listen over and over and over to tapes of discussions with Khun Sujin. Perhaps these were my ways of filling up the emotional bank. We all follow our interests and inclinations in this regard. What I do question, however are: 1. When we think we are having metta to ourselves, whether this really is metta. >detached altruistic > wish for one's own well-being. I’d be interested to see any references to the above which include metta. I would think that when there’s any wish for one’s own well-being, there is attachment. It’s so common in daily life as we know and I heard the other day that this is why it is the first state under consciousness in the Satipatthana Sutta to be known. 2. I wonder what the point is of waiting for a special time and place and object, when there are so many opportunities for metta and other kinds of kusala right now. Most the time aren’t we just looking hoping or chasing some pleasant feelings rather than understanding anything about the present state. Isn’t it the understanding now that conditions more metta, compassion and so on? 3. > It is suggested that one take > oneself as the first object of //metta// because true lovingkindness > for others only becomes possible when one is able to feel genuine > lovingkindness for oneself. I wonder where the contextual support is for this argument. 4.>..Probably most of the anger and hostility > we direct to others springs from negative attitudes we hold towards > ourselves This is a popular idea. What I understand the Buddha to teach is that anger and hostility springs from attachment to and ignorance of what is experienced through the 6 sense doors. 5. Finally and most importantly, if we see the development of metta or any other kind of wholesome state as a series of steps to be followed and action to be taken at a certain time, isn’t there an idea of self that can and should control or direct again? Doesn’t it show the clinging to having more metta, and for being the person with metta? Attachment can be very comforting and very pleasant, but isn’t it better to recognise it for what it is? Christine, there are many, many other excellent points in the article you quoted and I could easily have just referred to these. Please know I have the highest respect for your considerations (as for BB’s) and by raising these questions, I’m not expecting answers or wishing to undermine any practices or ideas others may have. There is precious little metta in my day and I appreciate all the quotes and reminders. In appreciation, Sarah 9644 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 2:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi, Robert - In a message dated 11/25/01 3:19:36 PM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Dear Rob, > I would be very grateful if you could tell me the mechanism by which a > moment once > completely passed, can be seen as an object by a new, emergent citta. I > just > don't understand it, but I'm sure there is a good structural explanation. > > It must be involved in how one citta passes its attributes to the next. > And I am > equally confused about how this 'handing-off' takes place, since each citta > is > 'flattened' before the next arises...or is this not the case? > > Regards, > Robert Ep. > ============================== With regard to your first question about "seeing the past" ;-)), I have no answer. (I suspect that if the matter is an actual one, then what might be going on is that it is possible to pass along faithful replicas - more than mere memories - for the mind door to take as object, but, of course, this is rank speculation on my part.) This is a matter which I also would like to see further explanation of. Also, with regard to the citta theory, and its many assumptions, I have to hold back from full, willing commitment. However, the notion of one event conditioning another "at a distance" so to speak does not really trouble me. The Buddha never really taught causality in the sense of involving some sort of underlying, substantial "causal powers". He taught *conditionality*: When this is, that is. when this arises, that arises. We never see any kind of causal power. Conditionality amounts to a means of *explaining* the arising of phenomena. We merely point to the arising of previous phenomena to "account" for current phenomena. When someone asks *how* it is that A caused Z, we then simply show a chain of intermediate conditions, A => B => C => Z which refines the original, and continue to further refine the explanatory chain until it is fine enough to satisfy the questioner. Conditionality is a matter of recognizing patterns of regular and necessary pre-occurrence and co-occurrence, and not of discerning occult causal powers. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9645 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 7:41am Subject: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Hi, [snip] > What I do question, however are: > > 1. When we think we are having metta to ourselves, whether this really is > metta. > > >detached altruistic > > wish for one's own well-being. > > I'd be interested to see any references to the above which include metta. I > would think that when there's any wish for one's own well-being, there is > attachment. It's so common in daily life as we know and I heard the other day > that this is why it is the first state under consciousness in the Satipatthana > Sutta to be known. > [snip] > > 3. > It is suggested that one take > > oneself as the first object of //metta// because true lovingkindness > > for others only becomes possible when one is able to feel genuine > > lovingkindness for oneself. > > I wonder where the contextual support is for this argument. > [snip] These two discourses might be relevant to questions 1 and 3. Samyutta Nikaya III.4 Piya Sutta Dear http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn03-004.html Udana V.1 Raja Sutta The King http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/udana/ud5-01.html > > 5. Finally and most importantly, if we see the development of metta or any > other kind of wholesome state as a series of steps to be followed and action to > be taken at a certain time, isn't there an idea of self that can and should > control or direct again? Not necessarily. Doesn't it show the clinging to having more metta, and > for being the person with metta? Not necessarily. Attachment can be very comforting and very > pleasant, but isn't it better to recognise it for what it is? > Metta can lead to pleasant, comforting feeling. And this feeling is impermanent, is dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." Metta, Victor 9646 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 8:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Thanks, Robert, and thanks for the specific link. I will read it and look forward to discussing it with you all. I hope my brain will eventually be informed as to how a citta can be the object for another citta after it is completely gone. If not, I will have to calm my brain down and tell it to 'let go'. Best, Robert Ep. =========================== --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > > > > > Rob K: But there is no > > > space between them, no time gap. > > > > So they 'touch' in a sense? And thus the material is able to be > transmitted from > > one to the next?= > ++++++++++++ > > Dear Rob E., > I used to have this simple mental picture like that. But then I found > about about the plane where there is no nama at all, it is completely > supressed for aeons and the state called nirodha-samapatti which some > arahants attain(no nama for up to seven days). Conditions work in > complex ways . > Naturally we try to imagine how it works using what we know about the > world we can see and so we think about nama(mentality) as if was like > rupa(matter); but it is not like rupa. Actually even the world of > rupa is much harder to visualise and put into words than it seems. > Scientists have ever more complicated models of the atomic world but > none of it really can tell us what it is exactly like. When we > learned the solar system model in elementary chemistry, with > electrons spinning round the atom this helped to explain some > behaviour but if we thought that an atom actually looked like that we > were wrong. > What the Dhamma points to is seeing how it(nama or rupa) appears > directly and so we don't have to have a mental picture really. > Anyway you'll see more after studying conditions: > the url for it is > http://www.zolag.co.uk/condf.pdf > > best wishes > robert > > > > > I've mentioned to you before the Patthana, which is considered > the > > > most profound section of the Tipitaka and it is there that the 24 > > > conditions are elucidated. Ken O and Christine are now studying > Nina > > > Van Gorkoms introduction to it and you could download it from > > > http://www.zolag.co.uk and we could all look at it together. It > will > > > make things clearer I think. > > > best wishes > > > robert > > > > That is such a nice invitation, I can't resist. I can't promise > I'll keep up too > > well, but I will try. > > > > After all, posting on dsg is a full time job. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. 9647 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 8:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi Rob. I just took a look at the book. 159 pages!!!! I don't mean to be sacreligious, but holy catfish!!!! Okay, I better start reading...... ....Do you think 'homework' is the result of un-worked-out kamma???? Best, Robert Ep. =================== --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > > > > > Rob K: But there is no > > > space between them, no time gap. > > > > So they 'touch' in a sense? And thus the material is able to be > transmitted from > > one to the next?= > ++++++++++++ > > Dear Rob E., > I used to have this simple mental picture like that. But then I found > about about the plane where there is no nama at all, it is completely > supressed for aeons and the state called nirodha-samapatti which some > arahants attain(no nama for up to seven days). Conditions work in > complex ways . > Naturally we try to imagine how it works using what we know about the > world we can see and so we think about nama(mentality) as if was like > rupa(matter); but it is not like rupa. Actually even the world of > rupa is much harder to visualise and put into words than it seems. > Scientists have ever more complicated models of the atomic world but > none of it really can tell us what it is exactly like. When we > learned the solar system model in elementary chemistry, with > electrons spinning round the atom this helped to explain some > behaviour but if we thought that an atom actually looked like that we > were wrong. > What the Dhamma points to is seeing how it(nama or rupa) appears > directly and so we don't have to have a mental picture really. > Anyway you'll see more after studying conditions: > the url for it is > http://www.zolag.co.uk/condf.pdf > > best wishes > robert > > > > > I've mentioned to you before the Patthana, which is considered > the > > > most profound section of the Tipitaka and it is there that the 24 > > > conditions are elucidated. Ken O and Christine are now studying > Nina > > > Van Gorkoms introduction to it and you could download it from > > > http://www.zolag.co.uk and we could all look at it together. It > will > > > make things clearer I think. > > > best wishes > > > robert > > > > That is such a nice invitation, I can't resist. I can't promise > I'll keep up too > > well, but I will try. > > > > After all, posting on dsg is a full time job. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. 9648 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 8:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Cheetahs and owls Hi Dan. Well the important point to me is that you seem to be confirming that sanna can pass the imprint of accumulated impressions, and has the capability to record the results of one citta to the next to the next, so that the 'impression' of a number of cittas passing could be recorded by a given resultant citta, even though the former cittas are completely gone. This would allow for a citta having a blurred, speedy or mistaken impression about the 'passage of cittas' as a concept, or even as a kind of perceptual impression that has been stored and released into the current citta. Your clarification that sanna is closer to *being* the impression makes sense and does cut out the 'middleman' who could turn out to be yet another sneaky 'entity-object'. It gives me the image of perhaps a photographic impression that is impressed upon the citta, perhaps transmitted from former experiences and projected upon the citta. If you think of the photograph example, you can impress an image on a piece of photographic paper by blocking it with an object and allowing the light to hit it around the object. The resultant image is 'of' the object that was in the way of the light. In this sense, the citta might be like the blank sheet of paper and sanna might be like the object whose image is impressed upon the citta. Metaphors and similes a-plenty, Robert Ep. ============================= --- dalthorp@o... wrote: > Hi Robert Ep., > > function. If you tell me that sanna can have an 'impression' of a > number of > > recently passed moments, that it has received and carried over from > one single > > citta to the next, so that a given consequent citta can get the > impression of > > 'speedy' or 'blurring' cittas having passed by recently, then I > will have my > > question about how single cittas can have such an experience of a > series of cittas > > resolved. > > > > Please tell me this is possible, and I will stop hammering on this > topic with > > great relief! > > Instead of saying that "sañña has an impression", it might be helpful > to think of sañña AS that impression -- this helps cut out the > middleman. Of course, this isn't exactly right because "sañña" is > just a word. I'm still trying to figure out a good way to state all > this. Maybe Howard or Robert K can help... 9649 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 8:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 11/25/01 3:19:36 PM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Dear Rob, > > I would be very grateful if you could tell me the mechanism by which a > > moment once > > completely passed, can be seen as an object by a new, emergent citta. I > > just > > don't understand it, but I'm sure there is a good structural explanation. > > > > It must be involved in how one citta passes its attributes to the next. > > And I am > > equally confused about how this 'handing-off' takes place, since each citta > > is > > 'flattened' before the next arises...or is this not the case? > > > > Regards, > > Robert Ep. > > > ============================== > With regard to your first question about "seeing the past" ;-)), I > have no answer. (I suspect that if the matter is an actual one, then what > might be going on is that it is possible to pass along faithful replicas - > more than mere memories - for the mind door to take as object, but, of > course, this is rank speculation on my part.) This is a matter which I also > would like to see further explanation of. Also, with regard to the citta > theory, and its many assumptions, I have to hold back from full, willing > commitment. > However, the notion of one event conditioning another "at a distance" > so to speak does not really trouble me. The Buddha never really taught > causality in the sense of involving some sort of underlying, substantial > "causal powers". He taught *conditionality*: When this is, that is. when this > arises, that arises. We never see any kind of causal power. Conditionality > amounts to a means of *explaining* the arising of phenomena. We merely point > to the arising of previous phenomena to "account" for current phenomena. When > someone asks *how* it is that A caused Z, we then simply show a chain of > intermediate conditions, A => B => C => Z which refines the original, and > continue to further refine the explanatory chain until it is fine enough to > satisfy the questioner. Conditionality is a matter of recognizing patterns of > regular and necessary pre-occurrence and co-occurrence, and not of discerning > occult causal powers. > > With metta, > Howard Hi Howard, So are you saying that conditional arising is not like a billiard ball heading in a certain direction which hits another billiard ball and sends it speeding in a related direction of its own? This would have a kind of causality to it, but it is a combination of the tendencies of the billiard ball being hit and the impact of the billiard ball that is hitting it. That would give one model of dependent co-arising. If you are instead saying that the billiard balls don't actually hit each other, or don't actually change each other's direction and speed by meeting, then this sounds more mystical to me than some sort of actual contact. Are you saying the relations between objects is *only* explanatory, or would you say there is some kind of actual contact and effect. Best, Robert Ep. 9650 From: frank kuan Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 8:38am Subject: serious questions about lucid dreaming Hi Sarah, I was surprised by the lack of response to my query, and I can only conclude that: 1) People wrote off my post as completely frivolous and did not see the importance of what I was really asking 2) People simply have not paid attention to the details in their own dreams that I was asking about and hence do not have any comments or answers at this time. let me re-ask my questions in a different way. 1) I care not about astrology or any special signifigance of non-lucid or lucid dreams, and I don't waste time wondering about my fate or the future. 2) The really key point that I observed in this lucid dream is that based on the visual sense door alone I could not distinguish whether it was a dream world or "real" world! I had to rely on the other sense faculties being somewhat defective to give me the evidence that it was not the "real" world. 2a) do other members experience perfect clarity in the visual sense door while dreaming? I.e. dream in color, good peripheral vision, image persists without great effort (i.e. world environment isn't changing every 2 seconds in some subtle or nonsubtle way)? 3) Do the other sense faculties for members work as well in lucid dreams as visual? For me, they were far inferior in quality. 4) A friend of mine mentioned he is able to manipulate his dreamworld and reshape the environment, change characteristics of people, like a big virtual reality playground. 5) The same friend also mentioned occasionaly even though realizing the lucidity of the dream initially, after playing around and reshaping the dream world, he would forget his lucidity and reimmerse into the dream reality thinking it was real. 6) Do other members do some form of meditation in their lucid or non-lucid dreams? My father mentions doing mindfulness of breathing or chanting mantras in his dreams, but those dreams are non-lucid (i.e. while in the dream he thinks they're real). 6a) Other meditators I talked to say they meditate in their dream, and they know they're dreaming, so they effectively double their daily spiritual practice by making use of sleep time :-) 7) When I'm "awake" in the "real" world, I don't question the reality of things - i.e. I take for granted my personality view is a real "I", subtle conceit is a real "I", objects in reality have some ultimate existence. Only when dreaming to I start to question whether things are really true. 8) Along the lines of what Sarah says below, I was also theorizing how the sense organ of the mind is really the most important one, and in the dream world, it would seem to be the only one active (i.e. it simulates and tricks us into thinking the other 5 or making contact and receiving stimulus). I was mighty surprised that an abidhamma list did not produce a horde of responses explaining this phenomena in explicit detail giving a blow by blow citta account of what's happening :-) 9) To reiterate my earlier insight from my lucid dream, if I was ONLY relying on the visual sense door, I can not discern whether I'm dreaming or awake! Does this not stun or bother anyone else? -fk --- Sarah wrote: > Hi Frank, > > --- frank kuan wrote: > I had > an interesting lucid dream > today. > > I was rather hoping that someone more knowledgable > would reply to your unusual > post, but we seem to be 'fated' to talk together > again;-) > > > > My question is, do other members lucid dream with > all > > 6 sense bases? Which ones work better? Do they all > > work? > > I know that dream analysis and dream therapy are > considered very important by > many people and especially by many psychotherapists. > > From a dhamma point of view, I understand that > dreams are merely an indication > of our kilesa which even follow us around as we > sleep. This is the reason that > arahats don't dream as I've heard (pls don't ask for > the reference;-) When we > give particular importance to certain dreams or to > their lucidity or otherwise, > I wonder if this isn't just attachment in the way > there is attachment to any > other stories we get 'lost' in or carried away by. > In other words, if we attach > importance to the papanca (proliferations) in > themselves, rather than > developing awareness of the present seeing or > thinking, it can be most > unhelpful I feel. > > People have expressed the idea before on dsg of > different senses working whilst > we sleep and dream. it's true that it really seems > as though there is seeing > and hearing and other sense door experiences at > these times. In reality, aren't > these just tricks of the mind, conditioned by sanna > (perception/memory) and > many other factors? In fact nothing is being seen, > heard, smelt, tasted or > touched, but the thinking through the mind-door is > very busy and active. Of > course, as soon as we're just a 'little' awake, > seeing, hearing and so on are > active again and sometimes it can be unclear for a > few minutes whether we're > dreaming or really experiencing sights and sounds > and so on. So devious is the > mind. > > Sorry if I've misunderstood or not given the kind of > response you were looking > for, Frank. Hope to hear your comments. > > Sarah 9651 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 4:22am Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi, Robert - In a message dated 11/26/01 11:21:01 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > Hi Howard, > So are you saying that conditional arising is not like a billiard ball > heading in > a certain direction which hits another billiard ball and sends it speeding > in a > related direction of its own? This would have a kind of causality to it, > but it > is a combination of the tendencies of the billiard ball being hit and the > impact > of the billiard ball that is hitting it. That would give one model of > dependent > co-arising. > > If you are instead saying that the billiard balls don't actually hit each > other, > or don't actually change each other's direction and speed by meeting, then > this > sounds more mystical to me than some sort of actual contact. > > Are you saying the relations between objects is *only* explanatory, or > would you > say there is some kind of actual contact and effect. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > ============================== I don't know what that "actual contact" would amount to. Even in terms of physics theory, I doubt that there is any notion of actual "contact". There is nothing mystical in conditionality to the effect that when this is, that is, and when this arises, that arises. It is mere matter of fact. What would constitute a better explanation? When we push a stalled car, we conventionally think of ourselves as "making contact", but all that means phenomenologically is that certain experiences occur, the feelings of pressure/resistance, the sense of touch activated, a sense of motion, etc, and these occurring following upon intention. Not only is there impersonality involved as far as "beings" are concerned, but just as much is there impersonality involved in the relations among "things". When one looks for one thing having the "causal power" to affect another thing, one is engaged in a subtle kind of personification, I believe. With respect to this matter, I encourage you to look at Garfield's translation of and commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamaka Karika, and particularly at the early chapter (it may be the first) on causality. It is excellent, and, in my estimation, is very solid, traditional Dhamma. One example that Garfield gives that I like very much is the following (not verbatim): If we were to ask a farmer whether a sprout has the power to grow into a plant, he would certainly confirm that it does. But were we to then ask him where in the plant that power is to be found, he would look at us as if we were out of our mind! It is a mere manner of speaking to say that the sprout has the power to grow into a plant. Unpacking that terminology would involve saying something along the lines that given the presence of adequate other conditions, including decent soil, rainfall, sun (but not too much), etc, the sprout will grow. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9652 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 4:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] serious questions about lucid dreaming Hi, Frank - I think this follow-up post of yours is very well done. Lucid dreaming is a topic of interest to me, particularly because I see lucid dreams not only as an opportunity for practice (as you bring up), but also because I see the very fact of "awakening" in one's dreams as a metaphor for and a pointing to the possibility of a general awakening. I don't have the time to get into a detailed discussion of this matter right now, but I hope to in the not-too-distant future. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9653 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 4:40am Subject: TYPO Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi, Robert - When I wrote: > But were we to then > ask him where in the plant that power is to be found, he would look at us > as > if we were out of our mind! I meant to write "where in the sprout" instead of "where in the plant". With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9654 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 10:18am Subject: Cambodia Ch 11, no. 4 Cambodian Lectures, Ch 11, no. 4 When lobha arises we believe that this is good. Lobha is clinging to and desire for something. When we acquire what we want we are glad, we are absorbed in it and rejoice in it; we believe that it is something good. What we ourselves believe to be valuable is different from what is valuable in the way of the Dhamma. We estimate happy feeling to be valuable. However, in reality, lobha is akusala, it is the reality that clings. People are not satified to cling just a little, they want to cling more intensely, so that they have pleasant feeling accompanying clinging. No matter what they are doing, they desire pleasant feeling, not just indifferent feeling. Thus we see that if we do not study the Dhamma we have wrong understanding of it. When people, for example, do not feel happy, they sit and concentrate. They believe that at such a moment the citta is kusala, but they do not know that there are lobha and moha at such moments. Thus, there are then both ignorance and clinging. If someone has studied the Dhamma, he will more clearly understand that there cannot be lobha, dosa and moha at the moment of kusala citta. When kusala citta arises he will correctly understand what the objective of kusala citta is. It is not easy to know the characteristic of that citta, but when it expresses itself by deeds through body or speech we can know it. However, someone¹s understanding should be correct, otherwise he will be misled and have wrong understanding. When we see a poor person and we think of helping him, is there kusala citta or akusala citta? When we think of helping, it is kusala citta, but kusala has not been completed, because we did not perform any action. If kusala that has not been completed would be regarded as an accomplished action, everybody would have a wealth of kusala. When someone thinks of performing kusala, it is not sure that the wholesome action he intends to perform will arise. There are three times, kåla, of kusala: the time before one performs kusala, and then cetanå, intention or volition, is called: pubba cetanå (pubba meaning former); there is the actual time of performing kusala, and then cetanå is called: muñcana cetanå (muñcana meaning emitting or bestowing); there is the time after one has performed kusala, and then cetanå is called: apara cetanå (apara meaning following)3. The citta is kusala, it is pure, when one can help someone else to be free from suffering and to be happier. Kusala are the meritorious actions which can be classified in brief as threefold: dåna, síla and bhåvanå. In the case of the monk, kusala can be classified as síla, samådhi and paññå. Kusala dhammas arise with the citta, they are the dhammas that are good and wholesome. Akusala dhammas arise also with the citta, they are the dhammas that are unwholesome, such as lobha, moha and dosa. Do we have today a great deal of kusala or of akusala? If a person is truthful he is actually taking his refuge in the Dhamma. Fongchan: Someone may be sincere, but he has akusala time and again. At least he knows that it is important to be sincere. ******* Footnotes 1. The Påli term namati means to bend. 2. Only when the citta is lokuttara citta the three abstinences arise all at the same time. 3. When someone, for example, performs dåna, there can be three times of kusala: before, when he thinks of giving, during the action of dåna and afterwards, when he thinks with kusala citta of his kusala. ****** 9655 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 10:30am Subject: conventional language Hello all, I've seen people using the term "conventional speech" or "conventional language" or "conventionally speaking" in this group and the dhamma-list, and I wonder what it means by "conventional." My questions are: 1. What does it mean by "conventional"? 2. When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? Thank you for your time. Regards, Victor 9656 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 1:34pm Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Good explanation Howard, but one requiring more reflection for this mind. One comment below: --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 11/26/01 11:21:01 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > Hi Howard, > > So are you saying that conditional arising is not like a billiard ball > > heading in > > a certain direction which hits another billiard ball and sends it speeding > > in a > > related direction of its own? This would have a kind of causality to it, > > but it > > is a combination of the tendencies of the billiard ball being hit and the > > impact > > of the billiard ball that is hitting it. That would give one model of > > dependent > > co-arising. > > > > If you are instead saying that the billiard balls don't actually hit each > > other, > > or don't actually change each other's direction and speed by meeting, then > > this > > sounds more mystical to me than some sort of actual contact. > > > > Are you saying the relations between objects is *only* explanatory, or > > would you > > say there is some kind of actual contact and effect. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. > > > ============================== > I don't know what that "actual contact" would amount to. Even in terms > of physics theory, I doubt that there is any notion of actual "contact". > There is nothing mystical in conditionality to the effect that when this is, > that is, and when this arises, that arises. It is mere matter of fact. What > would constitute a better explanation? > When we push a stalled car, we conventionally think of ourselves as > "making contact", but all that means phenomenologically is that certain > experiences occur, the feelings of pressure/resistance, the sense of touch > activated, a sense of motion, etc, and these occurring following upon > intention. Not only is there impersonality involved as far as "beings" are > concerned, but just as much is there impersonality involved in the relations > among "things". When one looks for one thing having the "causal power" to > affect another thing, one is engaged in a subtle kind of personification, I > believe. > With respect to this matter, I encourage you to look at Garfield's > translation of and commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamaka Karika, and > particularly at the early chapter (it may be the first) on causality. Oh no, not more homework! No! I won't do it!!!!!! Okay, I'll put it on my 'reading list'. Now that's suffering! Robert Ep. ===================== It is > excellent, and, in my estimation, is very solid, traditional Dhamma. One > example that Garfield gives that I like very much is the following (not > verbatim): If we were to ask a farmer whether a sprout has the power to grow > into a plant, he would certainly confirm that it does. But were we to then > ask him where in the plant that power is to be found, he would look at us as > if we were out of our mind! It is a mere manner of speaking to say that the > sprout has the power to grow into a plant. Unpacking that terminology would > involve saying something along the lines that given the presence of adequate > other conditions, including decent soil, rainfall, sun (but not too much), > etc, the sprout will grow. > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9657 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 3:52pm Subject: Re: conventional language ---Dear Victor, Conventional speech is vohara vaca in pali. Buddhism in a Nutshell Narada Mahathera "In the Sutta Pitaka is found the conventional teaching (vohara desana) while in the Abhidhamma Pitaka is found the ultimate teaching (paramattha-desana). " http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/misc/nutshell.html On your question below: while the thinking process occurs "this is not mine. This I am not.." If there is direct awareness and comprehension of the actual thinking it will be known(to some degree) that there is no one who is thinking this, but that thinking arises due to conditions. Otherwise we can think and think that there is no self but without direct insight, and that can't eradicate the deep rooted view of self. best wishes robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., victoryu@s... wrote: > Hello all, > > I've seen people using the term "conventional speech" > or "conventional language" or "conventionally speaking" in this group > and the dhamma-list, and I wonder what it means by "conventional." > > My questions are: > > 1. What does it mean by "conventional"? > > 2. When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with > right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is > not my self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how > so? If not, what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha > used? > > Thank you for your time. > ++++++++++ 9658 From: m. nease Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 5:09pm Subject: Mundane Path Hello All, Could someone please remind me why the 5/6fold path is the 'mundane' path? I do understand what it is and why, but it seems like magga to me. It doesn't arise in a puthujjana, does it? Any documentation would also be welcomed. Thanks in advance, mike 9659 From: m. nease Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 5:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] worldling Thanks Robert, I posted my last message before receiving this one. Again, I'd be very interested in any citations. mn --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > And, of course, there is the five-fold path, which > can be pre-magga, > such as moments of genuine satipatthana as seen by > kayana-putthujhana. > best wishes > robert--- 9660 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 5:44pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: conventional language --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > ---Dear Victor, > Conventional speech is vohara vaca in pali. > Buddhism in a Nutshell > Narada Mahathera > "In the Sutta Pitaka is found the conventional teaching (vohara > desana) while in the Abhidhamma Pitaka is found the ultimate teaching > (paramattha-desana). " > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/misc/nutshell.html > On your question below: while the thinking process occurs "this is > not mine. This I am not.." If there is direct awareness and > comprehension of the actual thinking it will be known(to some degree) > that there is no one who is thinking this, but that thinking arises > due to conditions. Otherwise we can think and think that there is no > self but without direct insight, and that can't eradicate the deep > rooted view of self. Dear Rob, This is a very good and important point, worthy of further discussion, I think. I would like to ask some questions that may not have answers: 1/ Where is the 'deep-rooted view of the self' contained? Is it a matter of a content of consciousness that is passed along from citta to citta along with many other false concepts? Is there a variety of contents in each citta or does each one only have *one* main object? If there is only one main object for each citta, how does the view of self arise? Is it a recurring object of consciousness which occurs in certain cittas after certain other cittas and keeps associating a sense of self with cittas that have arisen immediately before it? Beyond these technicalities, I think it is very worthwhile to differentiate between conceptual knowing -- the conviction that one may develop that indeed anatta is the truth of existence and that cittas do not arise *for someone* -- and the experience of direct insight into a moment, to see that there is no self there while the moment is being apprehended. If you could say a little more about this, it would be very interesting. While we're on the subject of direct insight, I have another question: could you describe what a rupa consists of a little more specifically? And perhaps distinguish this in a little detail from a nama? I have a bit of a hard time really understanding a rupa. I think I have a misconception about it, because I have an impression that there is always a mental act in every perception, which would disqualify it from being a direct knowing of a physical object. Any clarification would be appreciated. Best, Robert Ep. ======================== > best wishes > robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., victoryu@s... wrote: > > Hello all, > > > > I've seen people using the term "conventional speech" > > or "conventional language" or "conventionally speaking" in this > group > > and the dhamma-list, and I wonder what it means by "conventional." > > > > My questions are: > > > > 1. What does it mean by "conventional"? > > > > 2. When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is > with > > right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is > > not my self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how > > so? If not, what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha > > used? > > > > Thank you for your time. > > ++++++++++ 9661 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 6:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] worldling --- Dear Mike, From the atthasalini, p204 where they talk about the fivefold path: "For althogh the pAth is eightfold, yet, in the wordly consciousness the tthree abstinences are not obtained at one and the same instant. hence it is said to be fivefold only. BUT it may be objected, there is this scripture;'The path by which one came is a phrase for the eightfold ariyan path'(samyutta 1v 195)In this sutta the path of insight preceeding the transcendental path is eightfold. now since the mundane path as implied by the term 'path by which they came'is eightfold, should it not be eightfold here also?' Nay, it should not be. the suttanta teaching is carried out by expounding. In this way he said, for instance, 'verily his bodily acts, vocal acts and life were quite pure'(majhhimma 111 289). BUT this abhidhamma teaching is bare teaching without exposition. in the worldly consciousness the three abstinces are not obtained at one and the same instant and therefore the Path is fivefold"ENDQUOTE. It helps us to read the texts if we know that satipatthana and the eighfold (fivefold) path are identical. A moment of satipatthana is a moment of the fivefold path. It is the beginning of direct insight into paramattha dhamma, patipatti. It happens for kalyana-putthujhana and will gradually lead to magga citta. These things become a little clearer to me over the years. robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Thanks Robert, > > I posted my last message before receiving this one. > Again, I'd be very interested in any citations. > > mn > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > > And, of course, there is the five-fold path, which > > can be pre-magga, > > such as moments of genuine satipatthana as seen by > > kayana-putthujhana. > > best wishes > > robert--- 9662 From: Victor Yu Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 6:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: conventional language Hello Robert, Thank you for taking the time to reply. ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Monday, November 26, 2001 6:52 PM Subject: [dsg] Re: conventional language > ---Dear Victor, > Conventional speech is vohara vaca in pali. Ok, so conventional speech is vohara vaca in pali. The question was: What does it mean by "conventional"? > Buddhism in a Nutshell > Narada Mahathera > "In the Sutta Pitaka is found the conventional teaching (vohara > desana) while in the Abhidhamma Pitaka is found the ultimate teaching > (paramattha-desana). " > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/misc/nutshell.html > On your question below: while the thinking process occurs "this is > not mine. This I am not.." >If there is direct awareness and > comprehension of the actual thinking it will be known(to some degree) > that there is no one who is thinking this, but that thinking arises > due to conditions. Thanks for the link and quote. The question was: When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? Otherwise we can think and think that there is no > self but without direct insight, and that can't eradicate the deep > rooted view of self. >++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > Hello all, > > > > I've seen people using the term "conventional speech" > > or "conventional language" or "conventionally speaking" in this > group > > and the dhamma-list, and I wonder what it means by "conventional." > > > > My questions are: > > > > 1. What does it mean by "conventional"? > > > > 2. When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is > with > > right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is > > not my self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how > > so? If not, what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha > > used? > > > > Thank you for your time. > > ++++++++++ Again, thank you for taking the time to reply. Regards, Victor 9663 From: m. nease Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 6:06pm Subject: Re: [dsg] speed of cittas [Howard] Hi Robert, I don't mind so much that it's baffling. If fact, I couldn't care less whether or not all this abhidhamma theory actually happens exactly like this or not--i.e. how short-lived cittas are, whether they're discrete or not, etc. etc.--the question to me is twofold: (1) Does this model help or hinder the understanding of a subjective moment of experience? (2) Does it agree or disagree with the Dhammavinaya, as well as I'm able to understand it? which is why I remain keenly interested in the abhidhamma. I have yet to know it to fail to answer either of these question in the affirmative, as well as I'm able to grasp it. mike --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- > DEar Mike, > I thought this might be a little confusing. > It is simply theory, useful for understanding how > the past can be > insighted. For us, in practice, as I said to Howard, > the moments that > are insighted are so infinitesimally close to being > present that they > are considered as the present moment. > best wishes > robert > 9664 From: Victor Yu Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 6:17pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: conventional language Hello Robert, > On your question below: while the thinking process occurs "this is > not mine. This I am not.." Thinking process? How did you get that idea? If there is direct awareness and > comprehension of the actual thinking it will be known(to some degree) > that there is no one who is thinking this, but that thinking arises > due to conditions. The Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." Again, how did you get the idea of thinking process? Otherwise we can think and think that there is no > self but without direct insight, and that can't eradicate the deep > rooted view of self. What is an example of a deep rooted view of self? Regards, Victor 9665 From: m. nease Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 6:24pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "engaged" [Christine] Hi Herman, --- hhofman@d... wrote: > Hi there, Mike, > > Just out of a purely theoretical interest, are you > saying that this > story is not in the Tipitaka, or that the story is > in the Tipitaka > but that my memory served me incorrectly about the > Buddha running > instead of walking, and possibly other details? If you're referring to Angulimalasutta, it's the latter. If you're referring to an instance of the Buddha 'running for his life', I'm requesting a citation as I don't recall it and find it unlikely--thanks in advance. Best Wishes, mike 9666 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 6:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] serious questions about lucid dreaming Hi Frank, I do think I treat your post as completely frivolous neither do I don't paid attention. It is just that I am not good at this topic of help or in fact, I know nothing abt such issues. As Howard says he is interested, so maybe we got to wait for his post (hope not too long :)) Kind regards Ken O --- frank kuan wrote: > Hi Sarah, > I was surprised by the lack of response to my query, > and I can only conclude that: > 1) People wrote off my post as completely frivolous > and did not see the importance of what I was really > asking > 2) People simply have not paid attention to the > details in their own dreams that I was asking about > and hence do not have any comments or answers at this > time. > > let me re-ask my questions in a different way. > 1) I care not about astrology or any special > signifigance of non-lucid or lucid dreams, and I don't > waste time wondering about my fate or the future. > 2) The really key point that I observed in this lucid > dream is that based on the visual sense door alone I > could not distinguish whether it was a dream world or > "real" world! I had to rely on the other sense > faculties being somewhat defective to give me the > evidence that it was not the "real" world. > 2a) do other members experience perfect clarity in > the visual sense door while dreaming? I.e. > dream > in color, good peripheral vision, image > persists > without great effort (i.e. world environment > isn't changing every 2 seconds in some subtle or > nonsubtle way)? > 3) Do the other sense faculties for members work as > well in lucid dreams as visual? For me, they were far > inferior in quality. > 4) A friend of mine mentioned he is able to manipulate > his dreamworld and reshape the environment, change > characteristics of people, like a big virtual reality > playground. > 5) The same friend also mentioned occasionaly even > though realizing the lucidity of the dream initially, > after playing around and reshaping the dream world, he > would forget his lucidity and reimmerse into the dream > reality thinking it was real. > 6) Do other members do some form of meditation in > their lucid or non-lucid dreams? My father mentions > doing mindfulness of breathing or chanting mantras in > his dreams, but those dreams are non-lucid (i.e. while > in the dream he thinks they're real). > 6a) Other meditators I talked to say they meditate > in their dream, and they know they're dreaming, so > they effectively double their daily spiritual practice > by making use of sleep time :-) > 7) When I'm "awake" in the "real" world, I don't > question the reality of things - i.e. I take for > granted my personality view is a real "I", subtle > conceit is a real "I", objects in reality have some > ultimate existence. Only when dreaming to I start to > question whether things are really true. > 8) Along the lines of what Sarah says below, I was > also theorizing how the sense organ of the mind is > really the most important one, and in the dream world, > it would seem to be the only one active (i.e. it > simulates and tricks us into thinking the other 5 or > making contact and receiving stimulus). I was mighty > surprised that an abidhamma list did not produce a > horde of responses explaining this phenomena in > explicit detail giving a blow by blow citta account of > what's happening :-) > 9) To reiterate my earlier insight from my lucid > dream, if I was ONLY relying on the visual sense door, > I can not discern whether I'm dreaming or awake! Does > this not stun or bother anyone else? > > -fk > > > --- Sarah wrote: > > Hi Frank, > > > > --- frank kuan wrote: > I had > > an interesting lucid dream > > today. > > > > I was rather hoping that someone more knowledgable > > would reply to your unusual > > post, but we seem to be 'fated' to talk together > > again;-) > > > > > > > My question is, do other members lucid dream with > > all > > > 6 sense bases? Which ones work better? Do they all > > > work? > > > > I know that dream analysis and dream therapy are > > considered very important by > > many people and especially by many psychotherapists. > > > > From a dhamma point of view, I understand that > > dreams are merely an indication > > of our kilesa which even follow us around as we > > sleep. This is the reason that > > arahats don't dream as I've heard (pls don't ask for > > the reference;-) When we > > give particular importance to certain dreams or to > > their lucidity or otherwise, > > I wonder if this isn't just attachment in the way > > there is attachment to any > > other stories we get 'lost' in or carried away by. > > In other words, if we attach > > importance to the papanca (proliferations) in > > themselves, rather than > > developing awareness of the present seeing or > > thinking, it can be most > > unhelpful I feel. > > > > People have expressed the idea before on dsg of > > different senses working whilst > > we sleep and dream. it's true that it really seems > > as though there is seeing > > and hearing and other sense door experiences at > > these times. In reality, aren't > > these just tricks of the mind, conditioned by sanna > > (perception/memory) and > > many other factors? In fact nothing is being seen, > > heard, smelt, tasted or > > touched, but the thinking through the mind-door is > > very busy and active. Of > > course, as soon as we're just a 'little' awake, > > seeing, hearing and so on are > > active again and sometimes it can be unclear for a > > few minutes whether we're > > dreaming or really experiencing sights and sounds > > and so on. So devious is the > > mind. > > > > Sorry if I've misunderstood or not given the kind of > > response you were looking > > for, Frank. Hope to hear your comments. > > > > Sarah 9667 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 6:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] serious questions about lucid dreaming (SORRY BIG MISTAKE) Hi Frank the front portion should be "I don't think I treat your post as completely frivilous". My deepest apology. Sometime the fingers do the thinking than the mind. With apology Ken O --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Frank, > > I do think I treat your post as completely frivolous neither do I don't > paid attention. It is just that I am not good at this topic of help or > in > fact, I know nothing abt such issues. As Howard says he is interested, > so > maybe we got to wait for his post (hope not too long :)) > > > > Kind regards > Ken O > > > > --- frank kuan wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > I was surprised by the lack of response to my query, > > and I can only conclude that: > > 1) People wrote off my post as completely frivolous > > and did not see the importance of what I was really > > asking > > 2) People simply have not paid attention to the > > details in their own dreams that I was asking about > > and hence do not have any comments or answers at this > > time. > > > > let me re-ask my questions in a different way. > > 1) I care not about astrology or any special > > signifigance of non-lucid or lucid dreams, and I don't > > waste time wondering about my fate or the future. > > 2) The really key point that I observed in this lucid > > dream is that based on the visual sense door alone I > > could not distinguish whether it was a dream world or > > "real" world! I had to rely on the other sense > > faculties being somewhat defective to give me the > > evidence that it was not the "real" world. > > 2a) do other members experience perfect clarity in > > the visual sense door while dreaming? I.e. > > dream > > in color, good peripheral vision, image > > persists > > without great effort (i.e. world environment > > isn't changing every 2 seconds in some subtle or > > nonsubtle way)? > > 3) Do the other sense faculties for members work as > > well in lucid dreams as visual? For me, they were far > > inferior in quality. > > 4) A friend of mine mentioned he is able to manipulate > > his dreamworld and reshape the environment, change > > characteristics of people, like a big virtual reality > > playground. > > 5) The same friend also mentioned occasionaly even > > though realizing the lucidity of the dream initially, > > after playing around and reshaping the dream world, he > > would forget his lucidity and reimmerse into the dream > > reality thinking it was real. > > 6) Do other members do some form of meditation in > > their lucid or non-lucid dreams? My father mentions > > doing mindfulness of breathing or chanting mantras in > > his dreams, but those dreams are non-lucid (i.e. while > > in the dream he thinks they're real). > > 6a) Other meditators I talked to say they meditate > > in their dream, and they know they're dreaming, so > > they effectively double their daily spiritual practice > > by making use of sleep time :-) > > 7) When I'm "awake" in the "real" world, I don't > > question the reality of things - i.e. I take for > > granted my personality view is a real "I", subtle > > conceit is a real "I", objects in reality have some > > ultimate existence. Only when dreaming to I start to > > question whether things are really true. > > 8) Along the lines of what Sarah says below, I was > > also theorizing how the sense organ of the mind is > > really the most important one, and in the dream world, > > it would seem to be the only one active (i.e. it > > simulates and tricks us into thinking the other 5 or > > making contact and receiving stimulus). I was mighty > > surprised that an abidhamma list did not produce a > > horde of responses explaining this phenomena in > > explicit detail giving a blow by blow citta account of > > what's happening :-) > > 9) To reiterate my earlier insight from my lucid > > dream, if I was ONLY relying on the visual sense door, > > I can not discern whether I'm dreaming or awake! Does > > this not stun or bother anyone else? > > > > -fk > > > > 9668 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 7:51pm Subject: where is self view stored? --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > I would like to ask some questions that may not have answers: 1/ Where is the > 'deep-rooted view of the self' contained? Is it a matter of a content of > consciousness that is passed along from citta to citta along with many other false > concepts? +++++++++++++++++ Dear Rob. E,. It is rather hard to put this into words because it is not like the citta is some sort of container where stuff is squashed in. Ditthi is not really stored somewhere in this fleeting mind or in any part of the Body. But dependent on conditions, including accumulated ditthi and ignorance and attachment it manifests itself at opportune moments. Just as mangoes are not said to be stored somewhere in the mango tree, but dependent on the mango tree they spring up in due season. The milinda-panha gives an example of kamma that is perhaps relevant: Kamma is "like a shadow that never leaves " . ...It is not possible to point to those deeds and say that they remain here or there" "what do you think king ? is it possible to point to the fruits of a tree that has not yet borne fruit and say that the fruits are here or there? NO , revered sir. In the same way it is not possible to point to those deeds and say that they remain either here or there". +++++++++ > Beyond these technicalities, I think it is very worthwhile to differentiate > between conceptual knowing -- the conviction that one may develop that indeed > anatta is the truth of existence and that cittas do not arise *for someone* -- and > the experience of direct insight into a moment, to see that there is no self there > while the moment is being apprehended. +++++++++++ Yes, and this is why such details as the extreme rapidity of change are useful. Then we know that our understanding of anatta is still almost all theoretical and not yet is there penetrating insight into the characteristics of actual realities. In the beginning it is still vague. +++++++++++++ > > While we're on the subject of direct insight, I have another question: could you > describe what a rupa consists of a little more specifically? And perhaps > distinguish this in a little detail from a nama? I have a bit of a hard time > really understanding a rupa. I think I have a misconception about it, because I > have an impression that there is always a mental act in every perception, which > would disqualify it from being a direct knowing of a physical object. Any > clarification would be appreciated. +++++++ Ok, after we finish with a through look at the Patthana lets move onto another book by Nina, "Rupa". http//www.zolag.co.uk best wishes robert 9669 From: m. nease Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 7:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? Robert, Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or have I misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its being conditioned rather than stored. mike --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein > wrote: > > > I would like to ask some questions that may not > have answers: 1/ > Where is the > > 'deep-rooted view of the self' contained? Is it a > matter of a > content of > > consciousness that is passed along from citta to > citta along with > many other false > > concepts? > > +++++++++++++++++ > > Dear Rob. E,. > It is rather hard to put this into words because it > is not like the > citta is some sort of container where stuff is > squashed in. > > Ditthi is not really stored somewhere in this > fleeting mind or in any > part of the Body. But dependent on conditions, > including accumulated > ditthi and ignorance and attachment it manifests > itself at opportune > moments. Just as mangoes are > not said to be stored somewhere in the mango tree, > but dependent > on the mango tree they spring up in due season. > The milinda-panha gives an example of kamma that is > perhaps > relevant: Kamma is "like a shadow > that never leaves " . ...It is not possible to point > to those > deeds and say that they remain here or there" "what > do you think > king ? is it possible to point to the fruits of a > tree that has > not yet borne fruit and say that the fruits are here > or there? > NO , revered sir. > In the same way it is not possible to point to those > deeds and > say that they remain either here or there". > > +++++++++ > > Beyond these technicalities, I think it is very > worthwhile to > differentiate > > between conceptual knowing -- the conviction that > one may develop > that indeed > > anatta is the truth of existence and that cittas > do not arise *for > someone* -- and > > the experience of direct insight into a moment, to > see that there > is no self there > > while the moment is being apprehended. > +++++++++++ > > Yes, and this is why such details as the extreme > rapidity of change > are useful. Then we know that our understanding of > anatta is still > almost all theoretical and not yet is there > penetrating insight into > the characteristics of actual realities. In the > beginning it is still > vague. > > > +++++++++++++ > > > > While we're on the subject of direct insight, I > have another > question: could you > > describe what a rupa consists of a little more > specifically? And > perhaps > > distinguish this in a little detail from a nama? > I have a bit of a > hard time > > really understanding a rupa. I think I have a > misconception about > it, because I > > have an impression that there is always a mental > act in every > perception, which > > would disqualify it from being a direct knowing of > a physical > object. Any > > clarification would be appreciated. > +++++++ > > Ok, after we finish with a through look at the > Patthana lets move > onto another book by Nina, "Rupa". > http//www.zolag.co.uk > > best wishes > robert 9670 From: Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 8:45pm Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? --- Dear Mike, Yes, I was pushing it a bit to compare ditthi or other cetasikas with the example of kamma given by ven. Nagasensa. The main point I wanted to make was that when we think of anusaya as being stored somewhere there is already possibly a taint of permanence involved. The word accumulated is perhaps better, and certainly ditthi is accumulated as part of sankhara-khanda. Until it is eradicated it is latent and ready to spring up when the onditions are right. For those who have considered alot of correct Dhamma it doesnt reach the pariyutthana stage very often but until it is fully eradicated it is anusaya. AS you well know it is only vipassana that can reach down and eradicate the anusaya. best wishes robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: > Robert, > > Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or have I > misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its > being conditioned rather than stored. > > mike > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein > > wrote: > > > > > I would like to ask some questions that may not > > have answers: 1/ > > Where is the > > > 'deep-rooted view of the self' contained? Is it a > > matter of a > > content of > > > consciousness that is passed along from citta to > > citta along with > > many other false > > > concepts? > > > > +++++++++++++++++ > > > > Dear Rob. E,. > > It is rather hard to put this into words because it > > is not like the > > citta is some sort of container where stuff is > > squashed in. > > > > Ditthi is not really stored somewhere in this > > fleeting mind or in any > > part of the Body. But dependent on conditions, > > including accumulated > > ditthi and ignorance and attachment it manifests > > itself at opportune > > moments. Just as mangoes are > > not said to be stored somewhere in the mango tree, > > but dependent > > on the mango tree they spring up in due season. > > The milinda-panha gives an example of kamma that is > > perhaps > > relevant: Kamma is "like a shadow > > that never leaves " . ...It is not possible to point > > to those > > deeds and say that they remain here or there" "what > > do you think > > king ? is it possible to point to the fruits of a > > tree that has > > not yet borne fruit and say that the fruits are here > > or there? > > NO , revered sir. > > In the same way it is not possible to point to those > > deeds and > > say that they remain either here or there". > > > > +++++++++ > > > Beyond these technicalities, I think it is very > > worthwhile to > > differentiate > > > between conceptual knowing -- the conviction that > > one may develop > > that indeed > > > anatta is the truth of existence and that cittas > > do not arise *for > > someone* -- and > > > the experience of direct insight into a moment, to > > see that there > > is no self there > > > while the moment is being apprehended. > > +++++++++++ > > > > Yes, and this is why such details as the extreme > > rapidity of change > > are useful. Then we know that our understanding of > > anatta is still > > almost all theoretical and not yet is there > > penetrating insight into > > the characteristics of actual realities. In the > > beginning it is still > > vague. > > > > > > +++++++++++++ > > > > > > While we're on the subject of direct insight, I > > have another > > question: could you > > > describe what a rupa consists of a little more > > specifically? And > > perhaps > > > distinguish this in a little detail from a nama? > > I have a bit of a > > hard time > > > really understanding a rupa. I think I have a > > misconception about > > it, because I > > > have an impression that there is always a mental > > act in every > > perception, which > > > would disqualify it from being a direct knowing of > > a physical > > object. Any > > > clarification would be appreciated. > > +++++++ > > > > Ok, after we finish with a through look at the > > Patthana lets move > > onto another book by Nina, "Rupa". > > http//www.zolag.co.uk > > > > best wishes > > robert 9671 From: Victor Yu Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 8:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? > > Yes, and this is why such details as the extreme rapidity of change > are useful. Then we know that our understanding of anatta is still > almost all theoretical and not yet is there penetrating insight into > the characteristics of actual realities. In the beginning it is still > vague. > What is theoretical about seeing a conditioned phenomenon as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self."? Regards, Victor 9672 From: Robert Epstein Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 8:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > I would like to ask some questions that may not have answers: 1/ > Where is the > > 'deep-rooted view of the self' contained? Is it a matter of a > content of > > consciousness that is passed along from citta to citta along with > many other false > > concepts? > > +++++++++++++++++ > > Dear Rob. E,. > It is rather hard to put this into words because it is not like the > citta is some sort of container where stuff is squashed in. > > Ditthi is not really stored somewhere in this fleeting mind or in any > part of the Body. But dependent on conditions, including accumulated > ditthi and ignorance and attachment it manifests itself at opportune > moments. Just as mangoes are > not said to be stored somewhere in the mango tree, but dependent > on the mango tree they spring up in due season. > The milinda-panha gives an example of kamma that is perhaps > relevant: Kamma is "like a shadow > that never leaves " . ...It is not possible to point to those > deeds and say that they remain here or there" "what do you think > king ? is it possible to point to the fruits of a tree that has > not yet borne fruit and say that the fruits are here or there? > NO , revered sir. > In the same way it is not possible to point to those deeds and > say that they remain either here or there". > > +++++++++ > > Beyond these technicalities, I think it is very worthwhile to > differentiate > > between conceptual knowing -- the conviction that one may develop > that indeed > > anatta is the truth of existence and that cittas do not arise *for > someone* -- and > > the experience of direct insight into a moment, to see that there > is no self there > > while the moment is being apprehended. > +++++++++++ > > Yes, and this is why such details as the extreme rapidity of change > are useful. Then we know that our understanding of anatta is still > almost all theoretical and not yet is there penetrating insight into > the characteristics of actual realities. In the beginning it is still > vague. > > > +++++++++++++ > > > > While we're on the subject of direct insight, I have another > question: could you > > describe what a rupa consists of a little more specifically? And > perhaps > > distinguish this in a little detail from a nama? I have a bit of a > hard time > > really understanding a rupa. I think I have a misconception about > it, because I > > have an impression that there is always a mental act in every > perception, which > > would disqualify it from being a direct knowing of a physical > object. Any > > clarification would be appreciated. > +++++++ > > Ok, after we finish with a through look at the Patthana lets move > onto another book by Nina, "Rupa". http//www.zolag.co.uk > > best wishes > robert Thanks for your explanations, Rob. on the other hand...hmpf...every time I ask a one line question lately I get a 150 page reading assignment..... your scheme for revenge against my posts is perfectly clear! Best, Robert Ep. 9673 From: Sarah Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 10:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <2> Dear All, Just to recap: in the Baahiranidaana, the introductory commentary to the Vinaya, Buddhaghosa is establishing the authenticity of the vinaya, suttanta and abhidhamma. As I mentioned: > > The first chapter discusses the ‘First Great Convocation’, in other words > the > > First Council of arahats who rehearsed the ‘Dhamma and the Vinaya’.Just to > > clarify, Dhamma and Vinaya, includes the Abhidhamma texts: > > Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by Buddhaghosa, Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the introductory chapter to the Smp. This is the text, translated into English by N.A. Jayawickrama, Sacred Books, that I’m quoting from. In other words, generally I’m quoting Buddhaghosa, but from time to time I quote from Jayawickrama’s introduction or his quotes from Smp. Details of how the first 499 Arahants were selected by Mahakassapa were given in <1> > > “Thereupon the venerable Mahakassapa selected five hundred Arahants less > one.” To continue quoting from the Baahiranidaana: “Why did the Elder make the number fall short by one? To make room for the venerable Elder Ananda. It was not possible to hold the Convocation with or without that venerable one, for he was yet a Learner (a sekha) with his (spiritual) task yet unaccomplished. Therefore it was not permissible to have him at the Convocation. Since there was no section whatsoever of the Teachings of the Lord of Ten powers commencing with the discourses and mixed prose and verse utterances which he himself had not learned from the Exalted One, it was equally not possible to hold it without him. This being so, even though he was yet a learner he would have to be selected by the Elder on acccount of the great service that might be rendered by him at the rehearsal of the Dhamma; but the reason for his not being selected was to absolve himself (Kassapa) of the blame of others.” “...............Thereupon the monks themselves begged of the Elder on Ananda’s behalf.......Thereupon Venerable Mahakassapa selected Venerable Ananda as well. there were thus 5oo elders including that vernerable onw who was selected on the express wish of the monks....” Quotes from Smp. included in Jayawickrama’s intro: > > “Thus this Word of the Buddha which is uniform in sentiment...was > > rehearsed together.and not only this, but other divers distinctions in > > compilation to be met with in the Three pitakas...have been determined when > it > > was thus rehearsed together in seven months” (Smp.33) > > > > Jayawickrama, in his introduction says ‘Ultimately Buddhaghosa traces the > > vinaya, as well as the rest of the sayings of the Buddha > in > > their present form, to the first Great convocation and explains the > meanings of > > the words, “by whom was it said, when and for what reason?” (Smp.34) Jayawickrama adds later that ‘As is usually the case with all his (Buddhaghosa’s) commentaries, it is by no means an original exegesis, but a restatement of the material available to him in the Sihala Atthakatha, for, in his own words “it is a navasangahitaava.n.nanaa, ‘a re-compiled commentary” ‘. Later we read ‘According to the prologues of many of Buddhaghosa’s Commentaries, the origin of this tradition (that of commentarial tradition) goes back to the time of the first council. The stanzas Nos 6, 7 of the prologues (DA, MA, SA, AA, DhsA etc) state: “Whatever commentaries were rehearsed at the very outset, for the purpose of elucidating the meaning, by the five hundred (who were) endowed with self-mastery, and were likewise rehearsed even afterwards were subsequently brought to the island of the Siiha.laa by Mahaa-Mahinda (who was) endowed with self-mastery, and were made to remain in the Siiha.la language for the benefit of the inhabitants of the island.” ‘ ‘In Buddhaghosa’s opinion it was necessary to translate the then available commentaries into Pali........Thus Buddhaghosa’s reason for translating the Sinhalese Commentaries was to make their contents available to monks outside Ceylon as well’. (Jayawickrama) There have been many comments about the possible value of only reading the Buddha’s exact words as in the suttas, but not in the commentaries.. I think that if this had been intended, the Buddha would not have encouraged his key disciples such as Ananda to discuss the Buddha’s Teachings, using their own words as we can read in the Suttas too. As I mentioned before, I’ll just dip into these texts when I have time and continue reading out loud unless anyone objects;-), hopping between the actual text and introduction. Nina, the biography you picked up in India sounds interesting too. Please add any snippets if you wish (i.e if you have time!) from this or anything else. Sarah 9674 From: Sarah Date: Mon Nov 26, 2001 11:51pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Dear Victor, Thanks for your interest and references;-) S:> > What I do question, however are: > > > > 1. When we think we are having metta to ourselves, whether this > really is > > metta. > > 3. > It is suggested that one take > > > oneself as the first object of //metta// because true > lovingkindness > > > for others only becomes possible when one is able to feel > genuine > > > lovingkindness for oneself. > > > > I wonder where the contextual support is for this argument. > > > [snip] .................... V:> These two discourses might be relevant to questions 1 and 3. > > Samyutta Nikaya III.4 > Piya Sutta > Dear > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn03-004.html > > Udana V.1 > Raja Sutta > The King > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/udana/ud5-01.html > .................... Sarah: With regard to the SN ref, if anyone else has the same difficulty I had in locating it in another text, it can be found at SN1 (Sagathavagga), 4 (4), Dear. (I’m quoting from BB’s translation): The gist is that for ‘those who engage in good conduct of body, speech, and mind treat themselves as dear..’ “If one regards oneself as dear One should not yoke oneself to evil for happiness is not easily gained By one who does a wrong ful deed....” The following verses stress the value of kusala deeds and the results they bring. I read the references to holding oneself dear as being descriptive of the strong attachment to ourselves and not as metta to ourselves to be developed. If we find ourselves so ‘dear’, why not engage in more wholesome conduct, which in the end is the way we’ll experience more pleasant result (through understanding, not through attachment or expectation;-) The Udana ref you quote is the same one I discussed with commentary notes recently: S: After King Pasenadi and Queen Mallika concluded that indeed there was no one dearer than themselves, the Buddha spoke these lines in Udana, 5-1, ‘Dear’ (Masefield trans): ‘Having explored all quarters with the mind, one would simply not attain that dearer than the self in any place; thus is the self dear separately to others - therefore one desiring self should not harm another.’ The commentary adds: ‘.....One would simply not attain that dearer than the self in any place (n’ev’ajjhagaapiyataram attanaa kvaci): whatever man, seeking out with every endeavour someone else (more) excessively dear than the self, would neither attain nor behold (such) in any place, anywhere in the (ten) quarters.Thus is the self dear separately to others (evam piyo puthu attaa paresa.m): thus is the self alone dear separately, severally, to this and that being, by way of the non-discovery of anyone dearer than the self. Therefore one desiring self should not harm another (tasmaa na hi.mse param attakaama): since each being holds the self dear in that way, is one desiring happiness for that self, one for whom dukkha is repulsive..........’ > In other words, again by ‘dear’, we’re reading about the great attachment we have to ourselves , dearer than any other being. Again, by reflecting on this attachment, it may be a condition to have metta to others and treat them well (with their equally strong attachment to themselves). .................... S:> Attachment can be very comforting and very > > pleasant, but isn't it better to recognise it for what it is? > > > V:> Metta can lead to pleasant, comforting feeling. And this feeling is > impermanent, is dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > self." .................... Sarah: You have a good point or two here, Victor. In the end it is the understanding of the reality (whether metta, pleasant feeling or any other) as you describe that counts and therefore, the realisation that it’s not worth clinging to, that is most useful. Thanks I’d just like to use your post to add a couple of other comments on metta, hopefully relating it to one or two other threads. I’ve stressed, that as I understand, metta and/or other wholesome states can arise now (rather than a special time) if there are conditions. At the moment the citta is accompanied by metta, the object of the citta is a concept, another being or beings which act as object condition conditioning the“seeing the lovable’ in them at that moment. This is a present object of the citta and it may or may not be accompanied by understanding at the level of samatha. It’s not a moment of satipatthana, because concepts, beings are the object. (Actually, Victor, we can say that the beings are ‘conventional truths’, the ‘accepted truths’. If we called them ‘dolls’, this would not be conventionally true.) This moment (or moments) of metta may be followed immediately by cittas with panna and sati at the level of satipatthana which understand directly the nature of metta as a particular nama. In this case, strictly speaking, the metta has just fallen away, but we still refer to it as the present object of the citta with sati and panna. When the characteristic of metta is understood directly in this way, ultimate reality, rather than conventional truth is the object of the citta. Someone else may also rejoice in the metta just shown.. The appreciation of someone else's metta (or any other wholesome state or deed) is also a kind of kusala. So even if there are no conditions for us to have metta, we can still appreciate the other’s example. The citta at this time is reflecting on the concept of metta, again with or without understanding at the level of samatha.. In the same way, when we have shown metta, there can again be cittas with wise reflection afterwards. We can reflect with cittas which are calm and pure. In this case, the concept of metta is the present object, but I think we can say that the actual metta shown earlier is the past object of the present citta. By understanding the object (whether it is metta or visible object), the panna begins to understand how it conditions the citta at that time. It seems as though the understanding of conditions is merely theoretical, but actually the conditions are realities which have the nature to condition other dhammas. If we have accumulated the tendency to show metta, we can reflect often with peaceful or calm cittas. This is the way that samatha can develop and does develop naturally in daily life. It’s not by intention or wishing or hoping to have more metta, but by understanding the value of all kinds of kusala cittas when they arise. If there is any expectation of result or of acquiring metta for oneself or attachment to moments of metta, then there is no calmness at these times. This was intended as a quick response to Victor, but has taken on a life of its own;-) Thanks Victor for giving me the excuse to consider and ramble further... Sarah 9675 From: Sarah Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 0:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] serious questions about lucid dreaming Hi Frank, --- frank kuan wrote: > Hi Sarah, > I was surprised by the lack of response to my query, > and I can only conclude that: > 1) People wrote off my post as completely frivolous > and did not see the importance of what I was really > asking > 2) People simply have not paid attention to the > details in their own dreams that I was asking about > and hence do not have any comments or answers at this > time. I think there's also some serious competition for attention on dsg just now;-)) > > let me re-ask my questions in a different way. > 1) I care not about astrology or any special > signifigance of non-lucid or lucid dreams, and I don't > waste time wondering about my fate or the future. > 2) The really key point that I observed in this lucid > dream is that based on the visual sense door alone I > could not distinguish whether it was a dream world or > "real" world! I had to rely on the other sense > faculties being somewhat defective to give me the > evidence that it was not the "real" world. Isn't it the nature of our 'fantasy world' whether we're awake or asleep to be lost in the 'dreams' with no awareness? > 2a) do other members experience perfect clarity in > the visual sense door while dreaming? I.e. > dream > in color, good peripheral vision, image > persists > without great effort (i.e. world environment > isn't changing every 2 seconds in some subtle or > nonsubtle way)? > 3) Do the other sense faculties for members work as > well in lucid dreams as visual? For me, they were far > inferior in quality. Doesn't this reflect the great attachment we have to the eye-door process? Isn't this the reason it's always given as the first door-way? Seeing is so very common, followed immediately by attachment to what's seen. And then, conditions in waking and dreaming states to be lost in the stories and images of what has been seen, with sanna playing tricks all the time. > 4) A friend of mine mentioned he is able to manipulate > his dreamworld and reshape the environment, change > characteristics of people, like a big virtual reality > playground. > 5) The same friend also mentioned occasionaly even > though realizing the lucidity of the dream initially, > after playing around and reshaping the dream world, he > would forget his lucidity and reimmerse into the dream > reality thinking it was real. Can there really be any control of any world at any time? Conventionally it may seem like this, but isn't it just an idea we have that we can control these states? > 6) Do other members do some form of meditation in > their lucid or non-lucid dreams? My father mentions > doing mindfulness of breathing or chanting mantras in > his dreams, but those dreams are non-lucid (i.e. while > in the dream he thinks they're real). > 6a) Other meditators I talked to say they meditate > in their dream, and they know they're dreaming, so > they effectively double their daily spiritual practice > by making use of sleep time :-) Hmm....I know that after studying Chinese I sometimes speak Chinese in my dreams...again, i think these are just reflections of our waking states and proliferations.....as you know so well from your favourite sutta, awareness can only be aware of a reality experienced through one of the 6 doorways. > 7) When I'm "awake" in the "real" world, I don't > question the reality of things - i.e. I take for > granted my personality view is a real "I", subtle > conceit is a real "I", objects in reality have some > ultimate existence. Only when dreaming to I start to > question whether things are really true. And the answer? > 8) Along the lines of what Sarah says below, I was > also theorizing how the sense organ of the mind is > really the most important one, and in the dream world, > it would seem to be the only one active (i.e. it > simulates and tricks us into thinking the other 5 or > making contact and receiving stimulus). Yes, exactly... I was mighty > surprised that an abidhamma list did not produce a > horde of responses explaining this phenomena in > explicit detail giving a blow by blow citta account of > what's happening :-) I know you're hoping someone will rise to this bait;-) If you look at the details of the mind-door processes, interspersed with bhavanga cittas in a book like ADL, you'll get an idea. > 9) To reiterate my earlier insight from my lucid > dream, if I was ONLY relying on the visual sense door, > I can not discern whether I'm dreaming or awake! Does > this not stun or bother anyone else? The thinking about the stories whilst one is asleep will not know..only the thinking at moments of being awake (or semi-awake) followed by seeing, hearing and the rest will know that it was a dream I think, heavily dependent on memories of eye-door processes. Yikes, students at the door, rgds, Sarah 9676 From: Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 1:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? Hi, Mike - In a message dated 11/26/01 11:01:43 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > > Robert, > > Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or have I > misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its > being conditioned rather than stored. > > mike > =========================== It strikes me that both Robert and you are correct. There is the inclination to the sense of self, to reification, and this is passed subliminally (at the anusaya level?); and when the needed conditions are present, it is expressed as an active outflowing (asava?). (One isn't ALWAYS "selfing"! ;-) Or so it seems to me. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9677 From: Dan Dalthorp Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 7:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? ditthi vs. mana... > > Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or have I > > misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its > > being conditioned rather than stored. > > > > mike > > > =========================== > It strikes me that both Robert and you are correct. There is the > inclination to the sense of self, to reification, and this is passed > subliminally (at the anusaya level?); and when the needed conditions are > present, it is expressed as an active outflowing (asava?). (One isn't ALWAYS > "selfing"! ;-) Or so it seems to me. > > With metta, > Howard > 9678 From: Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 1:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? Hi, Robert - In a message dated 11/27/01 9:29:15 AM Eastern Standard Time, Upasaka writes: > Hi, Mike - > > In a message dated 11/26/01 11:01:43 PM Eastern Standard Time, > mlnease@y... writes: > > > >> >> Robert, >> >> Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or have I >> misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its >> being conditioned rather than stored. >> >> mike >> > =========================== > It strikes me that both Robert and you are correct. There is the > inclination to the sense of self, to reification, and this is passed > subliminally (at the anusaya level?); and when the needed conditions are > present, it is expressed as an active outflowing (asava?). (One isn't > ALWAYS "selfing"! ;-) Or so it seems to me. > > With metta, > Howard > ============================= I should have waited before I sent this post. I now see that you replied to Mike's post with the mention of anusaya. I need to develop more patience! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9679 From: Christine Forsyth Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 1:17pm Subject: purpose? Dear All, Would it be fair to say that a purpose in studying Abhidamma is partly an attempt to understand and analyse what we conventionally see as 'self' rather than to veto any reference at all to 'self' (even though 'self' may be defined as a flow of processes). metta, Christine 9680 From: Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 8:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? In a message dated 11/27/01 10:25:33 AM Eastern Standard Time, dhd5@c... writes: > ditthi vs. mana... > ======================== Gotcha! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9681 From: m. nease Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 3:39pm Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? Thanks Robert, and By the Way, Doesn't kusala kamma accumulate also? I think this has been covered before, but is there some kind of kusala equivalent of anusaya? Does it have a similar, 'sedimentary' character and does it manifest similarly according to conditions? Is there a name for this? Thanks in advance, mike --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > --- > Dear Mike, > Yes, I was pushing it a bit to compare ditthi or > other cetasikas with > the example of kamma given by ven. Nagasensa. The > main point I wanted > to make was that when we think of anusaya as being > stored somewhere > there is already possibly a taint of permanence > involved. The word > accumulated is perhaps better, and certainly ditthi > is accumulated > as part of sankhara-khanda. Until it is eradicated > it is latent and > ready to spring up when the onditions are right. For > those who have > considered alot of correct Dhamma it doesnt reach > the pariyutthana > stage very often but until it is fully eradicated it > is anusaya. AS > you well know it is only vipassana that can reach > down and eradicate > the anusaya. > best wishes > robert > In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" > wrote: > > Robert, > > > > Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or > have I > > misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its > > being conditioned rather than stored. > > > > mike > > > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein > > > wrote: > > > > > > > I would like to ask some questions that may > not > > > have answers: 1/ > > > Where is the > > > > 'deep-rooted view of the self' contained? Is > it a > > > matter of a > > > content of > > > > consciousness that is passed along from citta > to > > > citta along with > > > many other false > > > > concepts? > > > > > > +++++++++++++++++ > > > > > > Dear Rob. E,. > > > It is rather hard to put this into words > because it > > > is not like the > > > citta is some sort of container where stuff is > > > squashed in. > > > > > > Ditthi is not really stored somewhere in this > > > fleeting mind or in any > > > part of the Body. But dependent on conditions, > > > including accumulated > > > ditthi and ignorance and attachment it manifests > > > itself at opportune > > > moments. Just as mangoes are > > > not said to be stored somewhere in the mango > tree, > > > but dependent > > > on the mango tree they spring up in due season. > > > The milinda-panha gives an example of kamma > that is > > > perhaps > > > relevant: Kamma is "like a shadow > > > that never leaves " . ...It is not possible to > point > > > to those > > > deeds and say that they remain here or there" > "what > > > do you think > > > king ? is it possible to point to the fruits of > a > > > tree that has > > > not yet borne fruit and say that the fruits are > here > > > or there? > > > NO , revered sir. > > > In the same way it is not possible to point to > those > > > deeds and > > > say that they remain either here or there". > > > > > > +++++++++ > > > > Beyond these technicalities, I think it is > very > > > worthwhile to > > > differentiate > > > > between conceptual knowing -- the conviction > that > > > one may develop > > > that indeed > > > > anatta is the truth of existence and that > cittas > > > do not arise *for > > > someone* -- and > > > > the experience of direct insight into a > moment, to > > > see that there > > > is no self there > > > > while the moment is being apprehended. > > > +++++++++++ > > > > > > Yes, and this is why such details as the extreme > > > rapidity of change > > > are useful. Then we know that our understanding > of > > > anatta is still > > > almost all theoretical and not yet is there > > > penetrating insight into > > > the characteristics of actual realities. In the > > > beginning it is still > > > vague. > > > > > > > > > +++++++++++++ > > > > > > > > While we're on the subject of direct insight, > I > > > have another > > > question: could you > > > > describe what a rupa consists of a little more > > > specifically? And > > > perhaps > > > > distinguish this in a little detail from a > nama? > > > I have a bit of a > > > hard time > > > > really understanding a rupa. I think I have a > > > misconception about > > > it, because I > > > > have an impression that there is always a > mental > > > act in every > > > perception, which > > > > would disqualify it from being a direct > knowing of > > > a physical > > > object. Any > > > > clarification would be appreciated. > > > +++++++ > > > > > > Ok, after we finish with a through look at the > > > Patthana lets move > > > onto another book by Nina, "Rupa". > > > http//www.zolag.co.uk > > > > > > best wishes > > > robert 9682 From: Victor Yu Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 5:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Hi Sarah, No problem and thanks for replying too. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sarah" To: Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 2:51 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation > Dear Victor, > > Thanks for your interest and references;-) > > S:> > What I do question, however are: > > > > > > 1. When we think we are having metta to ourselves, whether this > > really is > > > metta. > > > > > 3. > It is suggested that one take > > > > oneself as the first object of //metta// because true > > lovingkindness > > > > for others only becomes possible when one is able to feel > > genuine > > > > lovingkindness for oneself. > > > > > > > I wonder where the contextual support is for this argument. > > > > > [snip] > > .................... > > V:> These two discourses might be relevant to questions 1 and 3. > > > > Samyutta Nikaya III.4 > > Piya Sutta > > Dear > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn03-004.html > > > > Udana V.1 > > Raja Sutta > > The King > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/udana/ud5-01.html > > > .................... > > Sarah: > > With regard to the SN ref, if anyone else has the same difficulty I had in > locating it in another text, it can be found at SN1 (Sagathavagga), 4 (4), > Dear. (I'm quoting from BB's translation): > > The gist is that for 'those who engage in good conduct of body, speech, and > mind treat themselves as dear..' > > "If one regards oneself as dear > One should not yoke oneself to evil > for happiness is not easily gained > By one who does a wrong ful deed...." > > The following verses stress the value of kusala deeds and the results they > bring. > > I read the references to holding oneself dear as being descriptive of the > strong attachment to ourselves and not as metta to ourselves to be developed. > If we find ourselves so 'dear', why not engage in more wholesome conduct, which > in the end is the way we'll experience more pleasant result (through > understanding, not through attachment or expectation;-) V: Sarah, I am interested in understanding in what it means by "strong attachment to oneself." This is how I understand it: If one engages in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & good mental conduct and does not engage in bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, & mental misconduct, one is dear to oneself. Conversely, if one is dear to oneself, one engages in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & good mental conduct and does not engage in bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, & mental misconduct. For instance, arahants certainly engage in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & good mental conduct and do not engage in bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, & mental misconduct. They may not say: "We are dear to ourselves," still they are dear to themselves. Being dear to oneself does not imply being attached to form, to feeling, to perception, to mental formations, to consciousness. Being dear to oneself does not imply ignorance and craving. > > The Udana ref you quote is the same one I discussed with commentary notes > recently: > > > S: After King Pasenadi and Queen Mallika concluded that indeed there was no one > dearer than themselves, the Buddha spoke these lines in Udana, 5-1, 'Dear' > (Masefield trans): > > 'Having explored all quarters with the mind, one would simply not attain that > dearer than the self in any place; thus is the self dear separately to others > - therefore one desiring self should not harm another.' > > The commentary adds: > > '.....One would simply not attain that dearer than the self in any place > (n'ev'ajjhagaapiyataram attanaa kvaci): whatever man, seeking out with every > endeavour someone else (more) excessively dear than the self, would neither > attain nor behold (such) in any place, anywhere in the (ten) quarters.Thus is > the self dear separately to others (evam piyo puthu attaa paresa.m): thus is > the self alone dear separately, severally, to this and that being, by way of > the non-discovery of anyone dearer than the self. Therefore one desiring self > should not harm another (tasmaa na hi.mse param attakaama): since each being > holds the self dear in that way, is one desiring happiness for that self, one > for whom dukkha is repulsive..........' > > > In other words, again by 'dear', we're reading about the great attachment we > have to ourselves , dearer than any other being. Again, by reflecting on this > attachment, it may be a condition to have metta to others and treat them well > (with their equally strong attachment to themselves). This is how I understand it: Understanding the fact that there is no one dearer than oneself is the basis for loving-kindness, compassion, appreciative joy, and equanimity. By doing harm to others, one does harm to oneself. > .................... > > S:> Attachment can be very comforting and very > > > pleasant, but isn't it better to recognise it for what it is? > > > > > > V:> Metta can lead to pleasant, comforting feeling. And this feeling is > > impermanent, is dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > > self." > .................... > > Sarah: > You have a good point or two here, Victor. In the end it is the understanding > of the reality (whether metta, pleasant feeling or any other) as you describe > that counts and therefore, the realisation that it's not worth clinging to, > that is most useful. Thanks > > I'd just like to use your post to add a couple of other comments on metta, > hopefully relating it to one or two other threads. > > I've stressed, that as I understand, metta and/or other wholesome states can > arise now (rather than a special time) if there are conditions. At the moment > the citta is accompanied by metta, the object of the citta is a concept, > another being or beings which act as object condition conditioning the"seeing > the lovable' in them at that moment. This is a present object of the citta and > it may or may not be accompanied by understanding at the level of samatha. > > It's not a moment of satipatthana, because concepts, beings are the object. > (Actually, Victor, we can say that the beings are 'conventional truths', the > 'accepted truths'. If we called them 'dolls', this would not be conventionally > true.) I would like to make sure if I understand this: Is there any statement that is conventionally true but ultimately false? And is there any statement that is ultimately true but conventionally false? > > This moment (or moments) of metta may be followed immediately by cittas with > panna and sati at the level of satipatthana which understand directly the > nature of metta as a particular nama. In this case, strictly speaking, the > metta has just fallen away, but we still refer to it as the present object of > the citta with sati and panna. When the characteristic of metta is understood > directly in this way, ultimate reality, rather than conventional truth is the > object of the citta. > > Someone else may also rejoice in the metta just shown.. The appreciation of > someone else's metta (or any other wholesome state or deed) is also a kind of > kusala. So even if there are no conditions for us to have metta, we can still > appreciate the other's example. The citta at this time is reflecting on the > concept of metta, again with or without understanding at the level of samatha.. > > > In the same way, when we have shown metta, there can again be cittas with > wise reflection afterwards. We can reflect with cittas which are calm and pure. > In this case, the concept of metta is the present object, but I think we can > say that the actual metta shown earlier is the past object of the present > citta. > > By understanding the object (whether it is metta or visible object), the panna > begins to understand how it conditions the citta at that time. It seems as > though the understanding of conditions is merely theoretical, but actually the > conditions are realities which have the nature to condition other dhammas. > > If we have accumulated the tendency to show metta, we can reflect often with > peaceful or calm cittas. This is the way that samatha can develop and does > develop naturally in daily life. It's not by intention or wishing or hoping to > have more metta, but by understanding the value of all kinds of kusala cittas > when they arise. If there is any expectation of result or of acquiring metta > for oneself or attachment to moments of metta, then there is no calmness at > these times. > > This was intended as a quick response to Victor, but has taken on a life of its > own;-) > > Thanks Victor for giving me the excuse to consider and ramble further... > > Sarah No problem Sarah, and thanks for replying. :-) Regards, Victor 9683 From: Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 7:18pm Subject: [dsg] Re: conventional language --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > The question was: > When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.", > was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, what is > not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? > > Dear Victor I replied to this earlier but it hasnt come through so here it is again. If we examine the words in the statement of the Buddha above:Form is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.", Does form(rupa) have actual characteristics ? Does *I* have actual characteristics? Thinking about this can help us see what is conventional speech. best wishes robert 9684 From: Victor Yu Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 7:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: conventional language Hello Robert, The question was: When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? I am not sure how thinking about your questions can help me see what conventional speech is. :-) Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 10:18 PM Subject: [dsg] Re: conventional language > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > > The question was: > > When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with > right > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not > my self.", > > was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, > what is > > not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? > > > > Dear Victor > I replied to this earlier but it hasnt come through so here it is > again. > If we examine the words in the statement of the Buddha above:Form is > to be seen as it actually is with right > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not > my self.", > > Does form(rupa) have actual characteristics ? > Does *I* have actual characteristics? > Thinking about this can help us see what is conventional speech. > best wishes > robert 9685 From: Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 9:27pm Subject: [dsg] Re: conventional language --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > Hello Robert, > > The question was: > When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with > right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my > self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, > what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? > > I am not sure how thinking about your questions can help me see what > conventional speech is. :-) > ___________ Ok, so just answer yes or no. The questions were:> Does form(rupa) have actual characteristics ? > > Does *I* have actual characteristics? best wishes robert > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: > To: > Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 10:18 PM > Subject: [dsg] Re: conventional language > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > > > The question was: > > > When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with > > right > > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not > > my self.", > > > was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, > > what is > > > not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? > > > > > > Dear Victor > > I replied to this earlier but it hasnt come through so here it is > > again. > > If we examine the words in the statement of the Buddha above:Form is > > to be seen as it actually is with right > > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not > > my self.", > > > > Does form(rupa) have actual characteristics ? > > Does *I* have actual characteristics? > > Thinking about this can help us see what is conventional speech. > > best wishes > > robert 9686 From: Robert Epstein Date: Tue Nov 27, 2001 10:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike - > > In a message dated 11/26/01 11:01:43 PM Eastern Standard Time, > mlnease@y... writes: > > > > > > Robert, > > > > Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or have I > > misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its > > being conditioned rather than stored. > > > > mike > > > =========================== > It strikes me that both Robert and you are correct. There is the > inclination to the sense of self, to reification, and this is passed > subliminally (at the anusaya level?); and when the needed conditions are > present, it is expressed as an active outflowing (asava?). (One isn't ALWAYS > "selfing"! ;-) Or so it seems to me. > > With metta, > Howard This is very nice Howard, showing that the occurence of the 'self' is probably just another arising moment, rather than a real structure of some kind. Of course the pinball responses of various thoughts and feelings that are activated around the idea of the self is probably pretty complicated, but the arising of the self-concept itself is just another moment. I think if we look back carefully, we can probably find the 'record in memory' of moments where we just responded, just looked, just smiled, just had a thought, without any 'self consciousness' present. It might not be so easy to see, but it would be an interesting research project. I'm under the impression that these sorts of moments occur all the time, but that they are then 'owned' by a subsequent self-moment, which takes itself as the subject to these objects. Robert Ep. 9687 From: Sarah Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 0:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Dear Victor, I’m pulling out various texts and giving myself a pali lesson here. Any Pali comments I make are likely to be half-baked (to coin a Mike phrase), but it’s intresting for me anyway;-) --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi Sarah, > V: Sarah, I am interested in understanding in what it means by "strong > attachment to oneself." > > This is how I understand it: > If one engages in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & good mental > conduct and does not engage in bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, & > mental misconduct, one is dear to oneself. > Conversely, > if one is dear to oneself, one engages in good bodily conduct, good verbal > conduct, & good mental conduct and does not engage in bodily misconduct, > verbal misconduct, & mental misconduct. > > For instance, > arahants certainly engage in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & > good mental conduct and do not engage in bodily misconduct, verbal > misconduct, & mental misconduct. They may not say: "We are dear to > ourselves," still they are dear to themselves. > > Being dear to oneself does not imply being attached to form, to feeling, to > perception, to mental formations, to consciousness. > > Being dear to oneself does not imply ignorance and craving. .................... Sarah: I think we need to look at the Pali word ‘piya’ as used in both the suttas you referred us to and usually translated as ‘dear’. then we’ll have more idea of whether we always hold ourselves dear, whether the arahat holds himself dear (as you suggest) and whether being dear to oneself suggests any attachment (as I understand) to self and in particular to the various aggregates you mention. In my Pali dictionary, it mentions 2 kinds of ‘dear’: dve piya: sattaa vaa piyaa sankhaaraa vaa piyaa, one with regard to living beings (as father, mother, husband etc) and one with regard to formations which are pleasant, agreeable, liked Here are just a few other references which all suggest (strong) attachment involved and not a mention of metta to self: 1. Piyajatika Sutta, MN 87 this has been quoted before on dsg. (Piya=dear, jatika=being like, being of, having from jaata+born, arisen as in Jaataka Tales) In brief, we read about a householder’s ‘dear and beloved only son’ who died and after some discussion we read: ‘ “It was with reference to this, sire, that the Blessed One who knows and ses, accomplished and fully enlightened, said: ‘Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from those who are dear (piyajaatika), arise from those who are dear.’...” ‘ 2. Vism ref, ch 1X, Divine Abodings, compassion: 77: ‘..And when he begins it, he should not direct it at first towards the dear (piya), etc, persons; for one who is dear simply retains the position of one who is dear....’ 3. Dhammapada verse: tasma piyaj na kayiratha piyapayo hi papako gantha tesaj na vijjanti yesaj natthi piyappiyaj (DhP 211) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Therefore, do not hold anything dear; separation from the dear ones is bad. There are no bonds for those, for whom there is nothing dear or unloved. ----------------- 4. SN, 1. Sagaathaavagga, 1 Devataasa.myutta,verse 210 “The world is tightly fettered by delight (piya, I THINK); Thought is its means of travelling about. Craving is what one must forsake In order to say, ‘Nibbana.’ “ (I can’t find the Pali for SN, so am relying on the Pali dict for this ref) 5. Sutta Nipata, 11, kalahavivaada Sutta, 863 ‘The tears and anguish that follow arguments and quarrels’, said the Buddha, ‘the arrogance and pride and the grudges and insults that go with them are all the result of one thing. They come from having preferences, from holding things precious and dear (piya). With regard to the Udana verse: > > 'Having explored all quarters with the mind, one would simply not attain > that > > dearer than the self in any place; thus is the self dear separately to > others > > - therefore one desiring self should not harm another.' I think it’s pretty clear that it is attachment to self rather than metta to oneself that is so strong and powerful. Please note that piya is again used in these notes: > > > > The commentary adds: > > > > '.....One would simply not attain that dearer than the self in any place > > (n'ev'ajjhagaapiyataram attanaa kvaci): whatever man, seeking out with > every > > endeavour someone else (more) excessively dear than the self, would > neither > > attain nor behold (such) in any place, anywhere in the (ten) quarters.Thus > is > > the self dear separately to others (evam piyo puthu attaa paresa.m): thus > is > > the self alone dear separately, severally, to this and that being, by way > of > > the non-discovery of anyone dearer than the self. Therefore one desiring > self > > should not harm another (tasmaa na hi.mse param attakaama): since each > being > > holds the self dear in that way, is one desiring happiness for that self, > one > > for whom dukkha is repulsive..........' > > > > > In other words, again by 'dear', we're reading about the great attachment > we > > have to ourselves , dearer than any other being. Again, by reflecting on > this > > attachment, it may be a condition to have metta to others and treat them > well > > (with their equally strong attachment to themselves). .................... V:> This is how I understand it: > Understanding the fact that there is no one dearer than oneself is the basis > for loving-kindness, compassion, appreciative joy, and equanimity. By doing > harm to others, one does harm to oneself. > .................... I agree that it (understanding how we all hold ourselves so dearly beloved) is the basis for treating others well ‘is one desiring happiness for that self’.and one ‘should not harm another’. It’s true as we read in the earlier sutta that by doing harm to others, one does harm to oneself as you say. So I don’t read these suttas or the meaning of ‘dear’ as being any support for the suggestion that metta should be cultivated towards oneself in the first instance at all. The emphasis, indeed, is on treated others well and performing good deeds and so on. .................... V:> I would like to make sure if I understand this: Is there any statement that > is conventionally true but ultimately false? And is there any statement > that is ultimately true but conventionally false? .................... Sarah: Most statements we make are conventionally true but ultimately false. When we talk about tables, chairs and people, these are all conventionally true , i.e sammuti sacca (or vohaara-sacca). While we use them, we many or may not understand that they are only conventionally true. Before we hear the Buddha’s Teachings, we take them for being actually or ultimately true as well. With more understanding of paramatha sacca (ultimate truths), we know that when we use these terms, we are doing so for convenience. So when the Buddha used conventional truths, of course there was no misunderstanding or wrong view about them existing. In other words, it’s not the terms that change so much as the understanding. Your 2nd question is about ultimately true statements which are conventionally false. This is a bit more tricky. If we talk about seeing or hearing, they are paramatha dhammas but we also use these terms conventionally. If we say Seeing only sees visible object (and not cups and tables), this is an ‘ultimately true statement’ but perhaps we could say it is conventionally false....I think I won’t pursue this further for now;-) The Buddha sometimes uses conventionally true statements and sometimes ultimately true statements (as in the 6 Sixes) in the Suttas. This is why there has to be an understanding of paramatha dhammas to understand what is meant when he uses conventional terms. Thanks for giving me a Pali lesson and helping me to consider these texts more carefully. they are not as simple as they may appear, I think;-) Best wishes, Sarah 9688 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 1:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] past cittas as objects Hi Robert Ep, My understanding was that past cittas (gone already) are able to be recollect due to the function of sanna. The difference is Buddha is not affect in any way by such recollection due to their enlightment whereas for normal person, we will be attached to past cittas. Second explanation will be for eg, when we are an overwhelming sadness. This vedana cetasika is the object of the citta. Such overwhelming feelings is pass to the next cittas, since cetasikas cannot arise without cittas, they are considered "become" (cittas plus the cetasikas) one object for the next cittas. In a sense, these past cittas are object for the present cittas due to sanna. Just my theory and guessing here :). Kind regards Ken O --- Robert Epstein wrote: > Thanks, Robert, > and thanks for the specific link. I will read it and look forward to > discussing > it with you all. > > I hope my brain will eventually be informed as to how a citta can be the > object > for another citta after it is completely gone. If not, I will have to > calm my > brain down and tell it to 'let go'. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > > =========================== > > --- robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Rob K: But there is no > > > > space between them, no time gap. > > > > > > So they 'touch' in a sense? And thus the material is able to be > > transmitted from > > > one to the next?= > > ++++++++++++ > > > > Dear Rob E., > > I used to have this simple mental picture like that. But then I found > > about about the plane where there is no nama at all, it is completely > > supressed for aeons and the state called nirodha-samapatti which some > > arahants attain(no nama for up to seven days). Conditions work in > > complex ways . > > Naturally we try to imagine how it works using what we know about the > > world we can see and so we think about nama(mentality) as if was like > > rupa(matter); but it is not like rupa. Actually even the world of > > rupa is much harder to visualise and put into words than it seems. > > Scientists have ever more complicated models of the atomic world but > > none of it really can tell us what it is exactly like. When we > > learned the solar system model in elementary chemistry, with > > electrons spinning round the atom this helped to explain some > > behaviour but if we thought that an atom actually looked like that we > > were wrong. > > What the Dhamma points to is seeing how it(nama or rupa) appears > > directly and so we don't have to have a mental picture really. > > Anyway you'll see more after studying conditions: > > the url for it is > > http://www.zolag.co.uk/condf.pdf > > > > best wishes > > robert > > > > > > > I've mentioned to you before the Patthana, which is considered > > the > > > > most profound section of the Tipitaka and it is there that the 24 > > > > conditions are elucidated. Ken O and Christine are now studying > > Nina > > > > Van Gorkoms introduction to it and you could download it from > > > > http://www.zolag.co.uk and we could all look at it together. It > > will > > > > make things clearer I think. > > > > best wishes > > > > robert > > > > > > That is such a nice invitation, I can't resist. I can't promise > > I'll keep up too > > > well, but I will try. > > > > > > After all, posting on dsg is a full time job. > > > > > > Best, > > > Robert Ep. 9689 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 1:30am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: _[DhammaStudyGroup]_Vipassana Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > > > > As I understand it, for an > > > > > arahant, the khandas, and all dhammas for that matter, have > "ceased" > > > in > > > > > the > > > > > sense that no separate, independent, self-sufficient dhammas are > any > > > > > longer > > > > > to be observed. > > > > Jon: > > > > I'm not sure what this refers to, Howard. Would you mind giving a > > > > reference/explanation? Thanks. > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Howard: > > > I am thinking here in terms of an arahant's direct > apprehension > > > of > > > patticasamupada as the "middle way". See, for example, the > Kaccayangotta > > Sutta. > > > ----------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > I'm afraid I could not locate a reference to this sutta. The concept > of > > dhammas that have been seen as anicca, dukkha and anatta as being > dhammas > > that have 'ceased' is a new one for me. If you care to follow it > further, > > I would be interested to hear more. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > Here is a reference, Jon: > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-015.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ Thanks for the reference to this interesting sutta, Howard. However, I cannot see in it support for your earlier posts to the effect that— As I understand it, for an arahant, the khandas, and all dhammas for that matter, have "ceased" in the sense that no separate, independent, self-sufficient dhammas are any longer to be observed. … I am thinking here in terms of an arahant's direct apprehension of patticasamupada as the "middle way". See, for example, the Kaccayangotta Sutta. I do not find the sutta in question an easy one to understand, and would be very happy to have your take on it, if you find time. Thanks. Jon 9690 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 1:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Dukkha (was, Concepts) Rob Ep --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > I would say that under this definition, suffering includes any > experience that > does not include the arising of wisdom [panna]. The reason for this is > that the > commentary makes clear that *all* life-experiences in the normal course > of events > either contains or leads to the experience of suffering. Because > phenomonal > experience is constantly arising and falling away, it is inherently > unstable, > confusing and dissatisfying. The very nature of experience is extremely > insecure > and ungraspable and leads to the state we find ourselves in, in which > everyone is > nearly always in a somewhat bad mood! > > The only stable force in this wayward universe is the state in which > panna arises. > From the standpoint of discernment one can account for and see the flow > of > impermanent events as nothing but what it is, neither grasping it nor > trying to > get away from it. In this state, the experience of life is accepted and > no longer > unbalances consciousness. > > Anyway, that's a stab at it. Did I pass? > > Robert Ep. Far be it from me to grade anyone on such a subject. But to my limited understanding, you have done very well indeed. A couple of comments. First, even the citta with wisdom, which you exclude from the class of experiences that are ‘suffering’, would seem to meet the basic criterion for suffering which you give (correctly, I believe) in these terms: “Because phenomenal experience is constantly arising and falling away, it is inherently unstable, confusing and dissatisfying”. So, you may like to refine your answer further... Secondly, apart from namas, what about rupas -- should these be considered as suffering also, according to your understanding of the texts? Jon PS Not a test, not homework -- think of it as a quiz ;-)) 9691 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 1:59am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities Howard, Ken Just a thought on this question. --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > I suspect most people find the term ‘ultimate’ (a translation of > the Pali > > ‘paramattha’ used in conjunction with ‘reality’ (Pali: > ‘dhamma’) a > > strange pairing, initially. The term ‘paramattha’ is, I believe, > more > > often found in conjunction with ‘truth’ (‘sacca’), where its > import is > > easier to see. > > > =========================== > Yes. I, for one, am far more comfortable with the the idea of > "ultimate truth" than that of "ultimate dhamma". > > With metta, > Howard > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > I got no problem of its use just suggesting maybe could we find and > explore other better word. > > Ken O The term ‘ultimate’ could be regarded as superfluous in this context, since there are really no conventional dhammas (unlike with ‘truths’). So perhaps we can just refer to dhammas? Or does this term have too many vague implications for most people? Jon 9692 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 2:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities Hi Jon I would prefer to change the word of ultimate maybe to fundamental or empirical, or root Ken O --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Howard, Ken > > Just a thought on this question. > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > I suspect most people find the term ‘ultimate’ (a translation of > > the Pali > > > ‘paramattha’ used in conjunction with ‘reality’ (Pali: > > ‘dhamma’) a > > > strange pairing, initially. The term ‘paramattha’ is, I believe, > > more > > > often found in conjunction with ‘truth’ (‘sacca’), where its > > import is > > > easier to see. > > > > > =========================== > > Yes. I, for one, am far more comfortable with the the idea of > > "ultimate truth" than that of "ultimate dhamma". > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > > I got no problem of its use just suggesting maybe could we find and > > explore other better word. > > > > Ken O > > The term ‘ultimate’ could be regarded as superfluous in this context, > since there are really no conventional dhammas (unlike with ‘truths’). > So > perhaps we can just refer to dhammas? Or does this term have too many > vague implications for most people? > > Jon 9693 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 2:33am Subject: Re: purpose? --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Christine Forsyth" wrote: > Dear All, > > Would it be fair to say that a purpose in studying Abhidamma is > partly an attempt to understand and analyse what we conventionally > see as 'self' rather than to veto any reference at all to 'self' > (even though 'self' may be defined as a flow of processes). The purpose of the study of Abhidhamma SHOULD be the purpose of the practice of the Dhamma itself: the heart's sure release. If it is not related directly to this singular aim, then it has nothing to do with anything taught by Lord Buddha, which is what he taught: suffering, and the end of suffering. I would say some find the Abhidhamma useful in this way, and for some it is a helpful tool that can help loosen the fixation on the notion of a "permanent self"--as some inherently existent "driver" that exists independent of causes and conditions, since it emphasizes conditionality so heavily. Then again, this can be a double-edged sword as well, because it can be so easy to become enamoured of the textual descriptions one misses the forest for the trees. Speaking only for myself, I haven't found the Abhidhamma particularly helpful for me in this regard. Then again, I came through a tradition that teaches anatta/emmptiness using the Tibetan consequentialist logic and debate tradition. I found Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika and the Tibetan persentation on Trangye by Je Tsongkhapa infinitely more helpful for these khandas in terms of understanding what this so-called "self" is that is to be rejected as self, and all the various subtle flavors of "self view" that have been taken for correct view by various tenet systems in the past, and why these are rejected, using both logic and reasoning and applied meditation (anapanasati and jhana) to see how all things lack core, are composed of other things, etc. Speaking again only for myself, where I have found the Abhidhamma most helpful is as an explanatory tool as a way to see intellectually the more theoretical interrelationships between the various aspects of the Dhamma. Abhidhamma has also helped provide me the theoretical underpinnings for how mental processes function, how they arise and pass away, etc. And also, just as important, I have found it extremely helpful as a skill-in-means way of explaning the Dhamma in greater depth to those who require more than a simplistic explanation on certain points. That is the primary reason I find it helpful in my own case. I have, however, seen a number of dangers in the study of Abhidhamma as well--if taken by itself, without a solid parctice of ALL four foundations of mindfulness (beginning with the breath-- kayanupassana, vedananupassana, cittanuopassana, and dhammanupassana). It is quite easy to mistake an intellectual understanding of anatta gleanded from these texts for correct understanding of anatta, or to take the textual descriptions provided therein to create subtler and subtler intellectual reifications of self-view that sound superficially corect but are subtly wrong, and even potentially harmful to the cultivation of the very factors that lead to thje heart's sure release--such as the idea that because everything arises from pervious conditions there is no such thing as volitional control (cetana) or the need for Right Effort (sammapadana) in developing the path. These sorts of mistaken ideas can arise when the "anatta" aspect of Abhidhamma is taken too far; when it is not seen as a mere explanatory aid as a demonstration of how all things lack "core" or "entitness", but by taking its descriptions as a things-in-themselves. For example, by taking "paramattha dhammas" for "true existents." To put this in some historical context, that particular bogeyman was intensely rejected by the Tibetan Madhyamika philosophers as a serious wrong view--holding that citta, cetasika, rupa, nibbana, are "real" in an ultimate sense. There is a very real danger in ANY textual description (Abhidhamma or even Nagarjuna) of the Dhamma that, when coupled with wrong understanding and a fixation on a paerticular set of views about how things exist, that leads to mistaken understanding, and quite possibly when one's intellectual uunderstanding of anatta becomes so refined from reading these texts for so long, to a deeper and extremely pernicious entrenchement of the very thing that directly blocks knowledge of things as they are (yatha-bhuta-dasa-nana), and direct seeing of the Dhamma in the heart, which is free from all mental elaborations. As the incomparable Nagarjuna has noted (and I have repeated here many a time), those who hold emptiness (anatta) to be a real thing I declare incurable." I believe it is always wise to be careful whenever interpreting ANY texts describing anatta or emptiness, and always to recall they can never be more than mere "fingers pointing at the moon." The true Dhamma is a direct pointing at the heart, and the only sure release is found in knowing the Dhamma directly in the heart, free from all elaboration and conceptualizations. One need not have any formal education or any deep textual study of the Dhamma to realize the essential nature of things-as-they-are, so long as one comes to see how all composed things (especially that composed entity we take for "I, me, mine") are impermanent, and as a result, devoid of anyything pertaining to "core", and how this implies suffering. If a teaching leads to abandoning the unwholesome and taking up the wholesome, to energetic persistence, not to laziness, to relinquishment (particularly to the fetter of views, but also sensual desires), then it is in accord with the Dhamma as expounded by Lord Buddha. If it leads, on the other hand, to an accumulation of positions, views, speculations, and dogmas, material goods, mere intellectual knowledge, then it is the opposite of the deep, profound, subtle, to-be-experience-by-the-wise Dhamma propounded by the Buddha, which again has one purpose only: the heart's sure release. 9694 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 2:48am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Hi Christine Something I get from this link written by Ven Ñanamoli Thera. He also suggested the same as Ven Bodhi. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel007.html However when I read the references, my inclination is that this training is directed towards others. I think my interpretation started from "we shall abide with loving kindness extending to that person, and we shall abide..." Even though this suttas is in relation to unkind speech, I think it is quite relevant in the practise of metta mediation as a whole. (from Ven links) 4. From the Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 21 (spoken by the Buddha) "Our minds will remain unaffected, we shall utter no bad words, we shall abide friendly and compassionate, with thoughts of loving-kindness and no inner hate. We shall abide with loving-kindness in our hearts extending to that person, and we shall dwell extending it to the entire world as our object, with our hearts abundant, exalted, measureless in loving-kindness, without hostility or ill-will." That is how you should train yourselves. " Personally I do not think it is directed at oneself. At first few glances at the below suttas I was thinking it was directed to oneself. After looking at the above paragrah and this paragraph again and again, I more incline to think that it is directed at others. The establishment of this practise is on others and not oneself. (from Ven link) 7. From the Samyutta Nikaya, 20:3 (spoken by the Buddha) "So, bhikkhus, you should train in this way: The heart-deliverance of loving-kindness will be maintained in being and made much of by us, used as our vehicle, used as our foundation, established, consolidated, and properly managed. That is how you should train." (from Ven link) 9. From the Digha Nikaya, Sutta 33 (spoken by the Arahant Sariputta) Here, friends, a bhikkhu might say: "When the heart-deliverance of loving-kindness is maintained in being and made much of by me, used as my vehicle, used as my foundation, established, consolidated, and properly managed, ill-will nevertheless still invades my heart and remains." He should be told: "Not so. Let the worthy one not say so. Let him not misrepresent the Blessed One. It is not good to misrepresent the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not express it thus." Friends, it is impossible, it cannot happen, that when the heart-deliverance of loving-kindness is maintained in being and made much of, used as one's vehicle, used as one's foundation, established, consolidated, and properly managed, ill-will can invade the heart and remain; for this, that is to say, the heart-deliverance of loving-kindness, is the escape from ill-will. Kind regards Ken O 9695 From: Victor Yu Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 3:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: conventional language Hello Robert, I posted the questions regarding conventional language to the public, and you are welcome to answer them if you like. Anyway, thank you for taking the time to reply. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: To: Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2001 12:27 AM Subject: [dsg] Re: conventional language > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > Hello Robert, > > > > The question was: > > When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with > > right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is > not my > > self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? > If not, > > what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? > > > > I am not sure how thinking about your questions can help me see what > > conventional speech is. :-) > > > ___________ > Ok, so just answer yes or no. > The questions were:> Does form(rupa) have actual characteristics ? > > > Does *I* have actual characteristics? > best wishes > robert > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: > > To: > > Sent: Tuesday, November 27, 2001 10:18 PM > > Subject: [dsg] Re: conventional language > > > > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > > > > The question was: > > > > When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is > with > > > right > > > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is > not > > > my self.", > > > > was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If > not, > > > what is > > > > not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? > > > > > > > > Dear Victor > > > I replied to this earlier but it hasnt come through so here it is > > > again. > > > If we examine the words in the statement of the Buddha above:Form > is > > > to be seen as it actually is with right > > > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is > not > > > my self.", > > > > > > Does form(rupa) have actual characteristics ? > > > Does *I* have actual characteristics? > > > Thinking about this can help us see what is conventional speech. > > > best wishes > > > robert 9696 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 4:17am Subject: Pancupadanakkhandha (five aggregates that are the object for clinging) Dear Howard, I remember awhile ago you mentioned that sometimes the texts refer to the five khandas and sometimes to the five khandas that are the object for clinging and you wondered about this. I was reading over the Majjhima nikaya today and saw this note on the Culavedalla sutta (44) In this The Bhikkhuni Dhammadinna answers questions from Visakha (layman). p397(bodhi) 6 "Is that clinging the same as these five khandas affected by clinging, or is the clinging something apart from the five khandas affected by clinging? Friend, that clinging is neither the same as these five khandas affected by clinging nor is clinging apart from the five khandas affected by clinging. It is the desire and lust in regard to the five khandas affected by clinging there" endquote The Atthakatha says (bodhip1239) "because clinging is only part of the aggregate of formations(sankharakkhanda), it is not the same as the five khandas; and because clinging cannot be altogether disconnected from the aggregates, there is no clinging apart from these aggregates"endquote best wishes robert 9697 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 2:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? Hi, Robert - In a message dated 11/28/01 1:11:08 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Mike - > > > > In a message dated 11/26/01 11:01:43 PM Eastern Standard Time, > > mlnease@y... writes: > > > > > > > > > > Robert, > > > > > > Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or have I > > > misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its > > > being conditioned rather than stored. > > > > > > mike > > > > > =========================== > > It strikes me that both Robert and you are correct. There is the > > inclination to the sense of self, to reification, and this is passed > > subliminally (at the anusaya level?); and when the needed conditions are > > present, it is expressed as an active outflowing (asava?). (One isn't > ALWAYS > > "selfing"! ;-) Or so it seems to me. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > This is very nice Howard, showing that the occurence of the 'self' is > probably > just another arising moment, rather than a real structure of some kind. Of > course > the pinball responses of various thoughts and feelings that are activated > around > the idea of the self is probably pretty complicated, but the arising of the > self-concept itself is just another moment. > > I think if we look back carefully, we can probably find the 'record in > memory' of > moments where we just responded, just looked, just smiled, just had a > thought, > without any 'self consciousness' present. > -------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I think so. This is a point that Buddhadasa Bhikkhu also made. It also so happens that Bankei, a Zen master a book of whose writings I'm in the midst of reading, also said pretty much the same thing but in different terms. -------------------------------------------------------------- It might not be so easy to see, but it> > would be an interesting research project. I'm under the impression that > these > sorts of moments occur all the time, but that they are then 'owned' by a > subsequent self-moment, which takes itself as the subject to these objects. > --------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I would guess that much of the time we are really "at ease", without apparent grasping, pushing away, or desiring, there are moments relatively free of "selfing" interspersed. How little "self" there is must, I would think, also be a function of the degree of mindfulness and clear comprehension present as well. That is, the conditions for the arising (or non-arising) of "selfing" include both emotive and cognitive ones. ---------------------------------------------------------------- > > Robert Ep. > > ================================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9698 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 2:58am Subject: The Kaccanyanagotta Sutta Re: [dsg] Re: _[DhammaStudyGroup]_Vipassana Hi, Jon - In a message dated 11/28/01 4:32:02 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > > Howard: > > Here is a reference, Jon: > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-015.html > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Thanks for the reference to this interesting sutta, Howard. However, I > cannot see in it support for your earlier posts to the effect that— > > As I understand it, for an arahant, the khandas, and all dhammas for that > matter, have "ceased" in the sense that no separate, independent, > self-sufficient dhammas are any longer to be observed. … I am thinking > here in terms of an arahant's direct apprehension of patticasamupada as > the "middle way". See, for example, the Kaccayangotta Sutta. > > I do not find the sutta in question an easy one to understand, and would > be very happy to have your take on it, if you find time. Thanks. > > Jon > > ============================= The point made by this sutta, as I see it, is that the mode of existence of dhammas is not as people generally see it. Some see "true existence" of unitary, self-supporting "things" and others see the diametrical opposite, namely nothing existing at all - the substantialist view vs the nihilist view. The reality is neither of these, with dependent arising being the basis for a "middle-way" type of existence synonymous with emptiness. But this is not something at all easy to explain. It cannot be truly seen by intellect alone, but only with the "Dhamma eye of wisdom". The Buddha, himself, said to (I think it was) Ananda, when Ananda told the Buddha that dependent arising seemed to be readily understandable, that no, it is actually quite profound and (when rightly seen) *appears* that way. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9699 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 3:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities Hi, Jon - I rather like the solution you propose below. With metta, Howard In a message dated 11/28/01 5:01:26 AM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Howard, Ken > > Just a thought on this question. > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > I suspect most people find the term ‘ultimate’ (a translation of > > the Pali > > > ‘paramattha’ used in conjunction with ‘reality’ (Pali: > > ‘dhamma’) a > > > strange pairing, initially. The term ‘paramattha’ is, I believe, > > more > > > often found in conjunction with ‘truth’ (‘sacca’), where its > > import is > > > easier to see. > > > > > =========================== > > Yes. I, for one, am far more comfortable with the the idea of > > "ultimate truth" than that of "ultimate dhamma". > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > > I got no problem of its use just suggesting maybe could we find and > > explore other better word. > > > > Ken O > > The term ‘ultimate’ could be regarded as superfluous in this context, > since there are really no conventional dhammas (unlike with ‘truths’). So > perhaps we can just refer to dhammas? Or does this term have too many > vague implications for most people? > > Jon > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9700 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 3:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Pancupadanakkhandha (five aggregates that are the object for cling... Hi, Robert - In a message dated 11/28/01 7:18:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Dear Howard, > I remember awhile ago you mentioned that sometimes the texts refer to > the five khandas and sometimes to the five khandas that are the > object for clinging and you wondered about this. > I was reading over the Majjhima nikaya today and saw this note on the > Culavedalla sutta (44) > In this The Bhikkhuni Dhammadinna answers questions from Visakha > (layman). p397(bodhi) 6 "Is that clinging the same as these five > khandas affected by clinging, or is the clinging something apart from > the five khandas affected by clinging? > Friend, that clinging is neither the same as these five khandas > affected by clinging nor is clinging apart from the five khandas > affected by clinging. It is the desire and lust in regard to the five > khandas affected by clinging there" endquote > The Atthakatha says (bodhip1239) "because clinging is only part of > the aggregate of formations(sankharakkhanda), it is not the same as > the five khandas; and because clinging cannot be altogether > disconnected from the aggregates, there is no clinging apart from > these aggregates"endquote > best wishes > robert > ============================= Thanks for this. It doesn't seem to me that this so much discusses the 5 khandhas vs the 5 khandhas-affected-by-clinging as it discusses the relationship between the 5 khandhas-affected-by-clinging and the clinging involved. It seems to me that the point made is that while we may attempt to conceptually separate them, neither of these is a thing unto itself; neither exists independently of the other. There are no khandas-affected-by-clinging to be found apart from the clinging, and there is no clinging for the khandhas-affected-by-clinging which exists as a thing independent of them. It reminds me a bit of how there is no (conditioned) thing without characteristics, and there are no characteristics that are not characteristics of some thing. There is an interdependence involved. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9701 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 10:10am Subject: Cambodia, Ch 12, no. 1 Cambodian Lectures by A. Sujin. Ch 12, no 1. Chapter 12. Dhamma Discussions in Hotel Gakkalok, Siem Reap (Part II) Kulvilai: I know from the study of the Dhamma that there are eight types of kusala citta, and that some of them are accompanied by paññå and some unaccompanied by paññå. If we have theoretical understanding of realities but we do not realize their characteristics, can we say that there is paññå? Sujin: There is paññå but it is very slight. It can be compared to a very small tree that has not grown yet. While one is listening to the Dhamma at this moment, there is kusala of the degree of mental development, bhåvanå, but it is not yet of the degree that satipaììhåna can arise. Kulvilai: Kusala of the degree of dåna and of síla do not arise easily in daily life. If we understand the characteristics of realities and develop satipatthåna, we shall be able to develop all kinds of kusala in daily life. Sujin: All people here are good, they are not bandits, they do not kill, steal or engage in other kinds of bad conduct. But this does not mean that one understands realities. Kusala citta or akusala may arise, but people may not know the characteristics of those realities. When they commit akusala, they may not know that it is akusala, or they may know it, but they still commit it. Even when they know that it is akusala, they do not realize that it is not self. There are several degrees of wholesomeness. In reality, not self, but kusala is good, and not self, but akusala is evil, and it is paññå that can realize this. Question: When we still see beings and people, is there akusala citta? Sujin: When we see that there are beings and people it is because of saññå that remembers. When paramattha dhammas have fallen away, we remember that what appears is this or that thing or person. When we remember things it is not necessarily akusala. The Buddha remembered and we also remember different things, but the cittas which remember are varied. People who have listened to the Dhamma have understanding stemming from listening, they know that moha, ignorance, is the greatest danger. Whereas those who have not listened to the Dhamma do not have this degree of understanding. Jaran: Forgiving is a kind of dåna, abhaya dåna. I would like to ask in what way it is kusala. Sujin: The ³a² in abhaya is a negation, meaning: not. Bhaya means trouble, danger or different kinds of harm. Abhaya is freedom from harm or danger. In the case of abhaya dåna, a person wishes that there will not be any kind of harm to someone else. Is it not kusala to abstain from harming someone else through body or speech, or from even harming him in thought? When we forgive, thus when we perform abhaya dåna, there is kusala citta, and when we do not forgive there is still anger. Kulavilai: The performing of abhaya dåna is actually mettå, we give friendship to someone else, even if he is our enemy. Question: What kind of citta arises when I wish to have kusala, when I wish to perform kusala? Sujin: The moment you wish to have kusala is different from the moment you perform kusala. When you wish to have it, there is lobha, and when you perform it there is kusala citta. We should investigate whether there is wishing or whether there is the real determination for kusala. You can only know this with regard to yourself. Wishing to perform kusala is something other than the actual performing of kusala. If we can perform a good deed and we perform it immediately, there is kusala citta straightaway. Or it may happen that we wish to perform kusala but we are not able to do this. Someone, for example, may be very wealthy, but he says that he will perform kusala only if he wins a lottery prize. Thus, we should consider whether there is mere wishing for kusala or the determination to perform it. When there is merely wishing for it there is lobha. Question: What is the difference between people who listen to the Dhamma and have understanding of realities stemming from listening, and those who penetrate the characteristics of realities? Although these people have a different level of understanding, they are the same in as far as they know that realities are not beings or people. Sujin: There are different levels of paññå, namely, pariyatti, theoretical knowledge, paìipatti, practice, and paìivedha, realization. Question: In what way are these levels of paññå different? Sujin: What appears now? Answer: Hardness. That is a reality. Sujin: Why do you say that it is a reality? Answer: Because I remember that everything is a dhamma with its own characteristic (sabhåva dhamma). Sujin: This is understanding of the level of pariyatti. Pradip: Paññå of the level of pariyatti is the understanding stemming from listening. When we listen we learn something we had not known before: dhammas arise and appear through the six doorways of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, bodysense and mind-door. Through the eyes only colour is known, through the ears only sound. Realities are not beings, people or self. ***** 9702 From: m. nease Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 5:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Hi Sarah, Very nicely researched and cited and pertinent I think. In particular, > Most statements we make are conventionally true but > ultimately false. When we > talk about tables, chairs and people, these are all > conventionally true , i.e > sammuti sacca (or vohaara-sacca). While we use them, > we many or may not > understand that they are only conventionally true. > Before we hear the Buddha’s > Teachings, we take them for being actually or > ultimately true as well. With > more understanding of paramatha sacca (ultimate > truths), we know that when we > use these terms, we are doing so for convenience. So > when the Buddha used > conventional truths, of course there was no > misunderstanding or wrong view > about them existing. In other words, it’s not the > terms that change so much as > the understanding. As I see it this problem of language (conventional vs. 'ultimate'--I have yet to find a satisfactory expression for the latter) is one that makes for a lot of misunderstandings and pointless arguments. Sometimes, e.g., when the Buddha said 'right livelihood', he was just talking about what you do for a living--not the cetasika arising with magga-citta. Applying 'vimutti' criticism to 'samutti' expressions is misguided, I think--though understanding samutti-sacca in vimutti-sacca terms paramattha (as well as possible) is indispensible toTHEORETICAL right view, I think. So I think it's perfectly OK to talk about being 'dear to oneself' and so on--it's easy to recognize the correspondence of an expression like this to the conventional experience of everyday life. So much better though to also understand it in terms of the tilakkhaana. Just my opinion of course--standing by for the flood of corrections... mike > Dear Victor, > > I’m pulling out various texts and giving myself a > pali lesson here. Any Pali > comments I make are likely to be half-baked (to coin > a Mike phrase), but it’s > intresting for me anyway;-) > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi > Sarah, > > > V: Sarah, I am interested in understanding in > what it means by "strong > > attachment to oneself." > > > > This is how I understand it: > > If one engages in good bodily conduct, good verbal > conduct, & good mental > > conduct and does not engage in bodily misconduct, > verbal misconduct, & > > mental misconduct, one is dear to oneself. > > Conversely, > > if one is dear to oneself, one engages in good > bodily conduct, good verbal > > conduct, & good mental conduct and does not engage > in bodily misconduct, > > verbal misconduct, & mental misconduct. > > > > For instance, > > arahants certainly engage in good bodily conduct, > good verbal conduct, & > > good mental conduct and do not engage in bodily > misconduct, verbal > > misconduct, & mental misconduct. They may not > say: "We are dear to > > ourselves," still they are dear to themselves. > > > > Being dear to oneself does not imply being > attached to form, to feeling, to > > perception, to mental formations, to > consciousness. > > > > Being dear to oneself does not imply ignorance and > craving. > .................... > > Sarah: > > I think we need to look at the Pali word ‘piya’ as > used in both the suttas you > referred us to and usually translated as ‘dear’. > then we’ll have more idea of > whether we always hold ourselves dear, whether the > arahat holds himself dear > (as you suggest) and whether being dear to oneself > suggests any attachment (as > I understand) to self and in particular to the > various aggregates you mention. > > In my Pali dictionary, it mentions 2 kinds of > ‘dear’: dve piya: sattaa vaa > piyaa sankhaaraa vaa piyaa, one with regard to > living beings (as father, > mother, husband etc) and one with regard to > formations which are pleasant, > agreeable, liked > > Here are just a few other references which all > suggest (strong) attachment > involved and not a mention of metta to self: > > 1. Piyajatika Sutta, MN 87 > > this has been quoted before on dsg. (Piya=dear, > jatika=being like, being of, > having from jaata+born, arisen as in Jaataka Tales) > > In brief, we read about a householder’s ‘dear and > beloved only son’ who died > and after some discussion we read: > ‘ “It was with reference to this, sire, that the > Blessed One who knows and ses, > accomplished and fully enlightened, said: ‘Sorrow, > lamentation, pain, grief, > and despair are born from those who are dear > (piyajaatika), arise from those > who are dear.’...” ‘ > > 2. Vism ref, ch 1X, Divine Abodings, compassion: > > 77: ‘..And when he begins it, he should not direct > it at first towards the dear > (piya), etc, persons; for one who is dear simply > retains the position of one > who is dear....’ > > 3. Dhammapada verse: > > tasma piyaj na kayiratha piyapayo hi papako > gantha tesaj na vijjanti yesaj natthi piyappiyaj > > (DhP 211) > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Therefore, do not hold anything dear; separation > from the dear ones is bad. > There are no bonds for those, for whom there is > nothing dear or unloved. > ----------------- > > 4. SN, 1. Sagaathaavagga, 1 Devataasa.myutta,verse > 210 > > “The world is tightly fettered by delight (piya, I > THINK); > Thought is its means of travelling about. > Craving is what one must forsake > In order to say, ‘Nibbana.’ “ > > (I can’t find the Pali for SN, so am relying on the > Pali dict for this ref) > > 5. Sutta Nipata, 11, kalahavivaada Sutta, 863 > > ‘The tears and anguish that follow arguments and > quarrels’, said the Buddha, > ‘the arrogance and pride and the grudges and insults > that go with them are all > the result of one thing. They come from having > preferences, from holding > things precious and dear (piya). > > > With regard to the Udana verse: > > > > 'Having explored all quarters with the mind, one > would simply not attain > > that > > > dearer than the self in any place; thus is the > self dear separately to > > others > > > - therefore one desiring self should not harm > another.' > > I think it’s pretty clear that it is attachment to > self rather than metta to > oneself that is so strong and powerful. Please note > that piya is again used in > these notes: > > > > > > > The commentary adds: > > > > > > '.....One would simply not attain that dearer > than the self in any place > > > (n'ev'ajjhagaapiyataram attanaa kvaci): whatever > man, seeking out with > > every > > > endeavour someone else (more) excessively dear > than the self, would > > neither > > > attain nor behold (such) in any place, anywhere > in the (ten) quarters.Thus > > is > > > the self dear separately to others (evam piyo > puthu attaa paresa.m): thus > > is > > > the self alone dear separately, severally, to > this and that being, by way > > of > > > the non-discovery of anyone dearer than the > self. Therefore one desiring > > self > > > should not harm another (tasmaa na hi.mse param > attakaama): since each > > being > > > holds the self dear in that way, is one desiring > happiness for that self, > > one > > > for whom dukkha is repulsive..........' quote>> > > > > > > In other words, again by 'dear', we're reading > about the great attachment > > we > > > have to ourselves , dearer than any other being. > Again, by reflecting on > > this > > > attachment, it may be a condition to have metta > to others and treat them > > well > > > (with their equally strong attachment to > themselves). > .................... > > V:> This is how I understand it: > > Understanding the fact that there is no one dearer > than oneself is the basis > > for loving-kindness, compassion, appreciative joy, > and equanimity. By doing > > harm to others, one does harm to oneself. > > > .................... > > I agree that it (understanding how we all hold > ourselves so dearly beloved) is > the basis for treating others well ‘is one desiring > happiness for that > self’.and one ‘should not harm another’. It’s true > as we read in the earlier > sutta that by doing harm to others, one does harm to > oneself as you say. > > So I don’t read these suttas or the meaning of > ‘dear’ as being any support for > the suggestion that metta should be cultivated > towards oneself in the first > instance at all. The emphasis, indeed, is on treated > others well and performing > good deeds and so on. > .................... > > V:> I would like to make sure if I understand this: > Is there any statement > that > > is conventionally true but ultimately false? And > is there any statement > > that is ultimately true but conventionally false? > .................... > > Sarah: > > Most statements we make are conventionally true but > ultimately false. When we > talk about tables, chairs and people, these are all > conventionally true , i.e > sammuti sacca (or vohaara-sacca). While we use them, > we many or may not > understand that they are only conventionally true. > Before we hear the Buddha’s > Teachings, we take them for being actually or > ultimately true as well. With > more understanding of paramatha sacca (ultimate > truths), we know that when we > use these terms, we are doing so for convenience. So > when the Buddha used > conventional truths, of course there was no > misunderstanding or wrong view > about them existing. In other words, it’s not the > terms that change so much as > the understanding. > > Your 2nd question is about ultimately true > statements which are conventionally > false. This is a bit more tricky. If we talk about > seeing or hearing, they are > paramatha dhammas but we also use these terms > conventionally. If we say Seeing > only sees visible object (and not cups and tables), > this is an ‘ultimately true > statement’ but perhaps we could say it is > conventionally false....I think I > won’t pursue this further for now;-) > > The Buddha sometimes uses conventionally true > statements and sometimes > ultimately true statements (as in the 6 Sixes) in > the Suttas. This is why there > has to be an understanding of paramatha dhammas to > understand what is meant > when he uses conventional terms. > > Thanks for giving me a Pali lesson and helping me to > consider these texts more > carefully. they are not as simple as they may > appear, I think;-) > > Best wishes, > > Sarah 9703 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 5:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Pancupadanakkhandha (five aggregates that are the object for cling... Hi Robert, Clinging is clinging and khandas is khandhas only when ""It is the desire and lust in regard to the five khandas affected by clinging there"", then clinging become interdependent of khandhas. Clinging is arise from lobha mula citta, in this aspect we could say that there is clinging in the khandhas as cittas is part of the khandas during akusala cittas or akusala vipaka cita. So during kusala, is there clinging then?. We could say that clinging could be effective after kusala cittas. To me, clinging must be view separately from the khandas and clinging is only effective during lobha mula citta, if not how are we going to developed panna and sati which are part of khandhas. Kind Regards Ken O --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 11/28/01 7:18:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > Dear Howard, > > I remember awhile ago you mentioned that sometimes the texts refer to > > the five khandas and sometimes to the five khandas that are the > > object for clinging and you wondered about this. > > I was reading over the Majjhima nikaya today and saw this note on the > > Culavedalla sutta (44) > > In this The Bhikkhuni Dhammadinna answers questions from Visakha > > (layman). p397(bodhi) 6 "Is that clinging the same as these five > > khandas affected by clinging, or is the clinging something apart from > > the five khandas affected by clinging? > > Friend, that clinging is neither the same as these five khandas > > affected by clinging nor is clinging apart from the five khandas > > affected by clinging. It is the desire and lust in regard to the five > > khandas affected by clinging there" endquote > > The Atthakatha says (bodhip1239) "because clinging is only part of > > the aggregate of formations(sankharakkhanda), it is not the same as > > the five khandas; and because clinging cannot be altogether > > disconnected from the aggregates, there is no clinging apart from > > these aggregates"endquote > > best wishes > > robert > > > ============================= > Thanks for this. It doesn't seem to me that this so much > discusses the > 5 khandhas vs the 5 khandhas-affected-by-clinging as it discusses the > relationship between the 5 khandhas-affected-by-clinging and the > clinging > involved. It seems to me that the point made is that while we may > attempt to > conceptually separate them, neither of these is a thing unto itself; > neither > exists independently of the other. There are no > khandas-affected-by-clinging > to be found apart from the clinging, and there is no clinging for the > khandhas-affected-by-clinging which exists as a thing independent of > them. It > reminds me a bit of how there is no (conditioned) thing without > characteristics, and there are no characteristics that are not > characteristics of some thing. There is an interdependence involved. > > With metta, > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a > bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, > a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9704 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 5:33pm Subject: Well said! Re: purpose? Well-said! Thank you. Metta, Binh --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., rikpa21@y... wrote: > I would say some find the Abhidhamma useful in this way, and for > some it is a helpful tool that can help loosen the fixation on the > notion of a "permanent self"--as some inherently existent "driver" > that exists independent of causes and conditions, since it > emphasizes conditionality so heavily. Then again, this can be a > double-edged sword as well, because it can be so easy to become > enamoured of the textual descriptions one misses the forest for the > trees. ... > It is quite easy to mistake an intellectual understanding of anatta > gleanded from these texts for correct understanding of anatta, or to > take the textual descriptions provided therein to create subtler and > subtler intellectual reifications of self-view that sound > superficially corect but are subtly wrong, and even potentially > harmful to the cultivation of the very factors that lead to thje > heart's sure release--such as the idea that because everything > arises from pervious conditions there is no such thing as volitional > control (cetana) or the need for Right Effort (sammapadana) in > developing the path. These sorts of mistaken ideas can arise when > the "anatta" aspect of Abhidhamma is taken too far; when it is not > seen as a mere explanatory aid as a demonstration of how all things > lack "core" or "entitness", but by taking its descriptions as a > things-in-themselves. For example, by taking "paramattha dhammas" > for "true existents." ... > If a teaching leads to abandoning the unwholesome and taking up the > wholesome, to energetic persistence, not to laziness, to > relinquishment (particularly to the fetter of views, but also > sensual desires), then it is in accord with the Dhamma as expounded > by Lord Buddha. If it leads, on the other hand, to an accumulation > of positions, views, speculations, and dogmas, material goods, mere > intellectual knowledge, then it is the opposite of the deep, > profound, subtle, to-be-experience-by-the-wise Dhamma propounded by > the Buddha, which again has one purpose only: the heart's sure > release. 9705 From: m. nease Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 6:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > I suspect most people find the term ‘ultimate’ > (a translation of > > the Pali > > > ‘paramattha’ used in conjunction with ‘reality’ > (Pali: > > ‘dhamma’) a > > > strange pairing, initially. The term > ‘paramattha’ is, I believe, > > more > > > often found in conjunction with ‘truth’ > (‘sacca’), where its > > import is > > > easier to see. > > > > > =========================== > > Yes. I, for one, am far more comfortable > with the the idea of > > "ultimate truth" than that of "ultimate dhamma". Ditto! mike 9706 From: m. nease Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 6:32pm Subject: Re: The Kaccanyanagotta Sutta Re: [dsg] Re: _[DhammaStudyGroup]_Vipassana Hi Howard, --- upasaka@a... wrote: > The point made by this sutta, as I see it, is > that the mode of > existence of dhammas is not as people generally see > it. Some see "true > existence" of unitary, self-supporting "things" and > others see the > diametrical opposite, namely nothing existing at all > - the substantialist > view vs the nihilist view. The reality is neither of > these, with dependent > arising being the basis for a "middle-way" type of > existence synonymous with > emptiness. It seems to me that if the focus is shifted from 'existence' to 'experience', this all becomes a lot clearer. Existence is always speculative I think whereas experience is always present (even if we can only reflect on in retrospectively). In other words I think I agree with you, Howard, but think it would be better (practically, I mean) to say 'dependent arising being the basis for a "middle-way" type of EXPERIENCE synonymous with emptiness'. Make any sense? mike 9707 From: Victor Yu Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 6:37pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Hi Sarah, It is very interesting to read about the references with the pali word "piya." I am learning something. :-) Thank you. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Sarah" To: Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2001 3:50 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation > Dear Victor, > > I'm pulling out various texts and giving myself a pali lesson here. Any Pali > comments I make are likely to be half-baked (to coin a Mike phrase), but it's > intresting for me anyway;-) > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > > V: Sarah, I am interested in understanding in what it means by "strong > > attachment to oneself." > > > > This is how I understand it: > > If one engages in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & good mental > > conduct and does not engage in bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct, & > > mental misconduct, one is dear to oneself. > > Conversely, > > if one is dear to oneself, one engages in good bodily conduct, good verbal > > conduct, & good mental conduct and does not engage in bodily misconduct, > > verbal misconduct, & mental misconduct. > > > > For instance, > > arahants certainly engage in good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct, & > > good mental conduct and do not engage in bodily misconduct, verbal > > misconduct, & mental misconduct. They may not say: "We are dear to > > ourselves," still they are dear to themselves. > > > > Being dear to oneself does not imply being attached to form, to feeling, to > > perception, to mental formations, to consciousness. > > > > Being dear to oneself does not imply ignorance and craving. > .................... As I understand from reading the Samyutta Nikaya III.4, Piya Sutta, Dear http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn03-004.html being dear to oneself means being kind and good to oneself, not acting toward oneself as an enemy would act toward another enemy. In that sense, one has metta/loving-kindness toward oneself. In the context of Piya Sutta, as I see it, being dear to oneself means being kind to oneself and does not imply attachment. > > Sarah: > > I think we need to look at the Pali word 'piya' as used in both the suttas you > referred us to and usually translated as 'dear'. then we'll have more idea of > whether we always hold ourselves dear, whether the arahat holds himself dear > (as you suggest) and whether being dear to oneself suggests any attachment (as > I understand) to self and in particular to the various aggregates you mention. > > In my Pali dictionary, it mentions 2 kinds of 'dear': dve piya: sattaa vaa > piyaa sankhaaraa vaa piyaa, one with regard to living beings (as father, > mother, husband etc) and one with regard to formations which are pleasant, > agreeable, liked > > Here are just a few other references which all suggest (strong) attachment > involved and not a mention of metta to self: > > 1. Piyajatika Sutta, MN 87 > > this has been quoted before on dsg. (Piya=dear, jatika=being like, being of, > having from jaata+born, arisen as in Jaataka Tales) > > In brief, we read about a householder's 'dear and beloved only son' who died > and after some discussion we read: > ' "It was with reference to this, sire, that the Blessed One who knows and ses, > accomplished and fully enlightened, said: 'Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, > and despair are born from those who are dear (piyajaatika), arise from those > who are dear.'..." ' > As I understand it: We can attach to people who are dear to us. When there is attachment to those who are dear, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from them, arise from them. > 2. Vism ref, ch 1X, Divine Abodings, compassion: > > 77: '..And when he begins it, he should not direct it at first towards the dear > (piya), etc, persons; for one who is dear simply retains the position of one > who is dear....' > This is how I understand it: For those who are dear to us, we already have compassion for them. What needs to further develop is compassion for people other than the ones we already have compassion for. > 3. Dhammapada verse: > > tasma piyaj na kayiratha piyapayo hi papako > gantha tesaj na vijjanti yesaj natthi piyappiyaj > > (DhP 211) > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Therefore, do not hold anything dear; separation from the dear ones is bad. > There are no bonds for those, for whom there is nothing dear or unloved. > ----------------- Here I think the key word is "hold." It means: do not attach to anything that is dear. We all have/had mothers and fathers, and they are dear to us. If we attached to them, there would be sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair when they passed away. > > 4. SN, 1. Sagaathaavagga, 1 Devataasa.myutta,verse 210 > > "The world is tightly fettered by delight (piya, I THINK); > Thought is its means of travelling about. > Craving is what one must forsake > In order to say, 'Nibbana.' " > > (I can't find the Pali for SN, so am relying on the Pali dict for this ref) > > 5. Sutta Nipata, 11, kalahavivaada Sutta, 863 > > 'The tears and anguish that follow arguments and quarrels', said the Buddha, > 'the arrogance and pride and the grudges and insults that go with them are all > the result of one thing. They come from having preferences, from holding > things precious and dear (piya). Again, I think the key word here is "hold", which implies a sense of attaching, grasping. Having preferences is like attaching.... > > > With regard to the Udana verse: > > > > 'Having explored all quarters with the mind, one would simply not attain > > that > > > dearer than the self in any place; thus is the self dear separately to > > others > > > - therefore one desiring self should not harm another.' > > I think it's pretty clear that it is attachment to self rather than metta to > oneself that is so strong and powerful. Please note that piya is again used in > these notes: > I think it is simply state a fact or honest observation that no one else is dearer than oneself. I don't think it is saying that one is attaching to oneself. Understanding that no one is dearer than oneself is the foundation for loving-kindness, compassion, appreciative joy, and equanimity. > > > > > > The commentary adds: > > > > > > '.....One would simply not attain that dearer than the self in any place > > > (n'ev'ajjhagaapiyataram attanaa kvaci): whatever man, seeking out with > > every > > > endeavour someone else (more) excessively dear than the self, would > > neither > > > attain nor behold (such) in any place, anywhere in the (ten) quarters.Thus > > is > > > the self dear separately to others (evam piyo puthu attaa paresa.m): thus > > is > > > the self alone dear separately, severally, to this and that being, by way > > of > > > the non-discovery of anyone dearer than the self. Therefore one desiring > > self > > > should not harm another (tasmaa na hi.mse param attakaama): since each > > being > > > holds the self dear in that way, is one desiring happiness for that self, > > one > > > for whom dukkha is repulsive..........' > > > > > > > In other words, again by 'dear', we're reading about the great attachment > > we > > > have to ourselves , dearer than any other being. Again, by reflecting on > > this > > > attachment, it may be a condition to have metta to others and treat them > > well > > > (with their equally strong attachment to themselves). > .................... > > V:> This is how I understand it: > > Understanding the fact that there is no one dearer than oneself is the basis > > for loving-kindness, compassion, appreciative joy, and equanimity. By doing > > harm to others, one does harm to oneself. > > > .................... > > I agree that it (understanding how we all hold ourselves so dearly beloved) is > the basis for treating others well 'is one desiring happiness for that > self'.and one 'should not harm another'. It's true as we read in the earlier > sutta that by doing harm to others, one does harm to oneself as you say. > > So I don't read these suttas or the meaning of 'dear' as being any support for > the suggestion that metta should be cultivated towards oneself in the first > instance at all. The emphasis, indeed, is on treated others well and performing > good deeds and so on. This is how I understand it: If I am not kind to myself, I cannot be kind to others. If I am not kind to others, I cannot be kind to myself. Since no one else is dearer than oneself, one can start being kind to oneself first. Once one is kind to oneself, then one can be kind to others. > .................... > > V:> I would like to make sure if I understand this: Is there any statement > that > > is conventionally true but ultimately false? And is there any statement > > that is ultimately true but conventionally false? > .................... > > Sarah: > > Most statements we make are conventionally true but ultimately false. When we > talk about tables, chairs and people, these are all conventionally true , i.e > sammuti sacca (or vohaara-sacca). While we use them, we many or may not > understand that they are only conventionally true. Before we hear the Buddha's > Teachings, we take them for being actually or ultimately true as well. With > more understanding of paramatha sacca (ultimate truths), we know that when we > use these terms, we are doing so for convenience. So when the Buddha used > conventional truths, of course there was no misunderstanding or wrong view > about them existing. In other words, it's not the terms that change so much as > the understanding. > > Your 2nd question is about ultimately true statements which are conventionally > false. This is a?bit more tricky. If we talk about seeing or hearing, they are > paramatha dhammas but we also use these terms conventionally. If we say Seeing > only sees visible object (and not cups and tables), this is an 'ultimately true > statement' but perhaps we could say it is conventionally false....I think I > won't pursue this further for now;-) > > The Buddha sometimes uses conventionally true statements and sometimes > ultimately true statements (as in the 6 Sixes) in the Suttas. This is why there > has to be an understanding of paramatha dhammas to understand what is meant > when he uses conventional terms. I thought about it, and this is how I understand it now: The conventional truths and the ultimate truths refer to two categories of truths. The ultimate truths refer to the Four Noble Truth, the Dependent Origination, the Three Characteristics of Phenomenon, and the truths that are exclusive to what the Buddha taught, that are pertaining to dukkha and the cessation of dukkha. The conventional truths refer to the truths that is not exclusively to what the Buddha taught. For example the statement "2 + 1 = 3" can be categorized as a conventional truth. The Buddha used only one speech, the Right Speech. Regarding to my question in another post: When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.", was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, what is not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? I think the question itself is not phrased correctly: the idea of conventional speech does not apply and neither does ultimate speech. The Buddha was using Right Speech to teach a truth that leads to the cessation of dukkha. > > Thanks for giving me a Pali lesson and helping me to consider these texts more > carefully. they are not as simple as they may appear, I think;-) > > Best wishes, > > Sarah Thank you for the references. :-) Regards, Victor 9708 From: Victor Yu Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 6:53pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Hi Sarah, ----- Original Message ----- From: "Victor Yu" To: Sent: Wednesday, November 28, 2001 9:37 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation > > > > (DhP 211) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Therefore, do not hold anything dear; separation from the dear ones is > bad. > > There are no bonds for those, for whom there is nothing dear or unloved. > > ----------------- > > Here I think the key word is "hold." It means: do not attach to anything > that is dear. We all have/had mothers and fathers, and they are dear to us. > If we attached to them, there would be sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and > despair when they passed away. > Just a thought when I reread what I wrote: I would be very wary of the view "there is no mother, no father", a particularly pernicious view. Regards, Victor 9709 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 2:01pm Subject: Re: The Kaccanyanagotta Sutta Re: [dsg] Re: _[DhammaStudyGroup]_Vipassana Hi, Mike - In a message dated 11/28/01 9:34:04 PM Eastern Standard Time, mlnease@y... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > The point made by this sutta, as I see it, is > > that the mode of > > existence of dhammas is not as people generally see > > it. Some see "true > > existence" of unitary, self-supporting "things" and > > others see the > > diametrical opposite, namely nothing existing at all > > - the substantialist > > view vs the nihilist view. The reality is neither of > > these, with dependent > > arising being the basis for a "middle-way" type of > > existence synonymous with > > emptiness. > > It seems to me that if the focus is shifted from > 'existence' to 'experience', this all becomes a lot > clearer. Existence is always speculative I think > whereas experience is always present (even if we can > only reflect on in retrospectively). In other words I > think I agree with you, Howard, but think it would be > better (practically, I mean) to say 'dependent > arising being the basis for a "middle-way" type of > EXPERIENCE synonymous with emptiness'. > > Make any sense? > > mike > ================================= It makes enormous sense to me, as I am a phenomenalist, even a radical phenomenalist. However, there is a substantialist extreme to be found even within the "experiential perspective". Such an extreme is found, for example, in certain branches of vijnanavada/yogacara, where consciousness is thought of substantially, as the one and only true "reality", and the world and all that is in it is also mind - it is almost like consciousness being a substance and objects being transformations of that substance. That position is quite similar to that of Advaita Vedanta, with mind = Brahman. My point here is that 'experience' isn't a magic word whose chanting will dispell reification. I *do* far prefer the experiential/phenomenalist perspective to an "externalist" one, and I think it is far less vulnerable to reificationist error. But it is *not* impervious to such error. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9710 From: Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 7:22pm Subject: The Two Truths (for Howard) Howard, a while back you specifically requested me for some more on the "two truths" (paramattha vs. samutti sacca). I apologize for not replying in a timely fashion, but for your benefit (and hopefully that of others), here's a short description of the "two truths" I put together for one of my students as a beginning-point in understanding emptiness. This is based entirely on my lama's teachings on same, from his book "The Principal Teachings of Buddhism", which is in turn based on Je Tsongkhapa's Fourteen Root Verses on Lam Rim (Stages on the Path), and presents the classical Tibetan Geluk-pa Madhymika-Prasangika tenet system as taught by, for example, the Dalai Lama. Je Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) was the guru of the First Dalai Lama, incidentally: "You may master renunciation and the wish, But unless you have the wisdom perceiving reality You cannot cut the root of cyclic life. Make efforts in ways then to perceive interdependence. "A person's entered the path that pleases the Buddhas When for all objects, in the cycle or beyond, He sees that cause and effect can never fail, And when for him they lose all solid appearance. "You've yet to realize the thought of the Able As long as two ideas seem to you disparate: The appearance of things-infallible interdependence; And emptiness-beyond taking any position. "At some point, they no longer alternate, come together; Just seeing that interdependence never fails Brings realization that destroys how you hold to objects, And then your analysis with view is complete. In addition the appearance prevents the existence extreme; Emptiness that of non-existence, and if You see how emptiness shows in cause and effect You'll never be stolen off by extreme views." Howeard, I hope you find the following explanation helpful: The "Two Truths" of Reality (Tib. Denpa-nyi) The Two Truths refers to how we divide reality. (Important note: the "Two Truths" here are distinct from The Truth of the Origin of Suffering and The Truth of the Cessation of Suffering mentioned above). To realize emptiness directly, one must perceive these Two Truths. In this context, "truth" refers to the nature, or reality, of things we perceive. 1. Deceptive, or conventional, reality (Pali samutti sacca) Things appear to us to exist in one way but actually exist in another way. "Deceptive reality" refers to our normal, everyday reality—the one we're always perceiving. Unless we are fully Enlightened, we are constantly misperceiving things, mistakenly believing they possess an inherent, or fixed, self- nature. We mistakenly believe things possess some substantial, or true, identity. For example, we wrongly believe a person has intrinsic "personness." This mistaken perception is also sometimes referred to a "figurative" reality, because it does not accord with the way things actually exist. This conventional view of reality arises solely due to ignorance (Tib. Ma-rikpa or Skt. Avidya). It is in this way that ignorance is considered the root of samsara's sufferings. 2. Non-deceptive, or ultimate, reality—Emptiness (Tib. Tong-pa or Skt. Shunyata or Pali paramatta sacca) This refers to the fact that all things lacked a fixed essence, or independent self-nature. In an ultimate sense, any object under analysis can be shown to lack a fixed essence by using only simple reasoning. In other words, all changing things—especially this collection of parts we refer to as the "self"—are devoid of any fixed, or intrinsic, identity. Because they lack this fixed essence they are empty—empty of independent existence. That things lack a fixed nature refutes the absurd and extreme wrong view of eternalism—which is the view that holds things do possess a true identity, or fixed nature. This lack of fixed nature is specifically what emptiness refers to, not that nothing exists, which is also an absurdity—the extreme wrong view of nihilism. So emptiness simply refers to the way in which things do not exist, i.e. they do not exist independently, "from their own side," by way of their own entitiness, etc.—but rather 1) in dependence on their causes; 2) in dependence on their parts; and 3) in dependence on the mind that labels them. Thus emptiness is not a thing, because if it were a thing it couldn't be emptiness. The label "emptiness" refers to the absence of something: independent existence. Consequently you cannot "see" emptiness as you would a property like the color blue, because emptiness is a negation that refers to an absence of the quality of possessing a fixed self-nature; it is not some property of a thing in the way the color blue is the property of the sky. This ultimate reality of emptiness is sometimes also referred to as "literal" reality—meaning it's literally true—as opposed to the "figurative" conventional reality where objects appear to possess an inherent self-nature. So when it's said that one perceives emptiness "directly," it is not a thing that's perceived, but rather the absence of the quality of existing independently. Dependent Origination (Tib. Ten-drel or Skt. Pratitya Samutpada or Pali Paticca Samuppada) Dependent Origination is the fact that all things arise in dependence on other factors. There is nothing that does not arise in dependence on other factors of some kind. The alternative view—which is a wrong view—entails the absurd consequence that somehow things arise independent of other factors, through their own power. But this is impossible, because that would mean things would happen at random, without any sort of rhyme or reason. For example, if it were possible that things could arise independent of other factors, a big purple elephant might magically appear in your room for no reason at all, at complete random. A classic Tibetan example refuting the wrong view that things can arise independent of causes and conditions is that of the "sky flower," or the "lotus that grows in midair." It is impossible—an absurdity—that such a lotus could randomly appear in midair without the proper causes. For a lotus to exist at all it requires the proper causes and conditions, such as a lotus seed, soil, nutrients, air, water, sunlight, and favorable climate. Likewise, it is absurd to believe that something—any object of experience—can possibly come from nothing. It must come from something else! How Things Exist: Three Aspects of Dependent Origination It is not enough to merely know how things don't exist—that things lack independent existence; it is also vital to understand how they do exist. In other words, understanding the emptiness of intrinsic existence alone is not enough; one must also, at the same time, understand Dependent Origination—how things appear to exist as they do. How things exist can be broken down into three aspects: 1. All thing exist in dependence upon their causes This means that everything comes from causes—all things come from other factors. In the case of a lotus, that would include the lotus seed, the presence of soil, sunlight, water, time, etc. This is the causal aspect of Dependent Origination. 2. All things exist in dependence upon their parts, and possess valid basis. This means that every object of experience depends on its parts. A classic example is that of the "person." The "person" is merely a collection of specific parts; it must possess a head, a torso, arms, and legs. This is the physical aspect of Dependent Origination. For example, all these parts must come together in a specific way to form the basis of designation for the label "person." 3. All things exist in dependence upon the mind that labels them This means that without a mind labeling a collection containing a head, torso, arms, and legs, the idea of a "person" will have no reason to arise. Furthermore, one cannot reasonably apply the label "person" to a collection of wheels, tires, etc. Any label we apply to a collection of parts must depend upon a valid basis—in other words, these parts must conform to a "valid basis of designation." In the case of a person, that means a collection of parts including a head, torso, arms, legs, etc. This is the mental or conceptual aspect of Dependent Origination. How Emptiness and Dependent Origination Relate to Each Other To understand Right View, it is necessary to understand how emptiness of independent existence and the dependently originated nature of all things relate to each other. Both Emptiness and Dependent Origination are complementary aspects of the same reality. They are not identical; rather, one supports and complements the other. For example, because all things are dependently originated, they must lack a fixed or independent nature. In other words, the fact that things exist dependent on causes directly implies and supports the fact they lack a fixed or solid identity. Likewise, because things are empty and lack a fixed nature, it implies that they must arise in dependence on other factors. In this way emptiness and dependent origination can be seen as two sides of the same coin. Without one, the other is impossible. Because one is true, the other is implied. The Middle Way (Madhyamaka): The Middle Way Between Extremes The Middle Way school is so named because it threads the Scylla and Charybdis of the two extreme views, Eternalism and Nihilism. These wrong views can be stopped by this one logical statement: "it cannot exist truly, because it is interdependent." As Arya Nâgârjuna says in the Fundamentals of the Middle Way: "`Inherent existence' is holding to permanence. `No conventional existence' is a view of nihilism. Therefore the wise do not abide in either `inherent existence' or `no conventional existence.'" 1. Eternalism This is the view that objects possess a fixed nature, a "true" entitiness; or that objects can somehow arise on their own, independent of causes and conditions; or that objects "exist from their own side." 2. Nihilism This is the view that nothing exists at all, that because objects lack a fixed essence they do not exist even conventionally. This view holds that because objects lack a self-nature they cannot exist at all. --- I recall your post of the farmer and the plant, and thought you might appreciate that reference on paticca samuppada and the Tibetan "sky flower" analogy! :) 9711 From: Christine Forsyth Date: Wed Nov 28, 2001 11:44pm Subject: Please be aware I may have unknowingly sent a virus Dear All, I have been infected with the w32.Badtrans.B@mm worm, and have been off-line for 24 hours trying to kill the intruder. (compassionately, of course.) It arrives in a blank email seemingly from a trusted friend. After my last battle with a virus, I was updating my definitions weekly. I last updated on 23 Nov. 2001, Symantic prepared a new Virus definition on 24 Nov. 2001. Infection Length is 29,020 bytes. If anyone received any email from me - my deepest apologies. I especially apologise for possible lurid subject lines, and wish to assure everyone that I definitely, positively, absolutely did not compose. http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/ One of its little tricks is to note keystrokes and send your credit card numbers and passwords of any sort back to a dozen anonymous email addresses - apart from sending messages to everyone in your address book. metta, Christine 9712 From: Christine Forsyth Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 2:05am Subject: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Dear KenO, Thanks for reminding me of this link. I enjoyed reading it again. 'Heart-deliverance of loving-kindness' - isn't that a beautiful phrase? I think missing out oneself in metta practice shows a lack of lovingkindness to someone - oneself. Perhaps a determination that metta should only be directed to beings other than oneself could be a Christian hangover, based on the feeling that "love" is associated with "self-sacrifice." But to my understanding, self-sacrifice is alien to Buddhism - i.e. to early and Theravada Buddhism. Is it possible that to be preoccupied with not sending metta to oneself is to show evidence of obsession with oneself, thus contradicting the spirit and teaching of not-self? From the same link, The Venerable says...... "Loving-kindness ought to be brought to the point where there are no longer any barriers set between persons, and for this the following example is given: Suppose a man is with a dear, a neutral and a hostile person, himself being the fourth; then bandits come to him and say "we need one of you for human sacrifice." Now if that man thinks "Let then take this one, or that one," he has not yet broken down the barriers, and also if he thinks "Let them take me but not these three," he has not broken down the barriers either. Why not? Because he seeks the harm of him who he wishes to be taken and the welfare of only the other three. It is only when he does not see a single one among the four to be chosen in preference to the other three, and directs his mind quite impartially towards himself and the other three, that he has broken down the barriers." metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Christine > > Something I get from this link written by Ven Ñanamoli Thera. He also > suggested the same as Ven Bodhi. > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel007.html > > However when I read the references, my inclination is that this training > is directed towards others. I think my interpretation started from "we > shall abide with loving kindness extending to that person, and we shall > abide..." Even though this suttas is in relation to unkind speech, I > think it is quite relevant in the practise of metta mediation as a whole. (from Ven links) > 4. From the Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 21 > (spoken by the Buddha) > > "Our minds will remain unaffected, we shall utter no bad words, we shall > abide friendly and compassionate, with thoughts of loving-kindness and no > inner hate. We shall abide with loving-kindness in our hearts extending to > that person, and we shall dwell extending it to the entire world as our > object, with our hearts abundant, exalted, measureless in loving- kindness, > without hostility or ill-will." That is how you should train yourselves. " > Personally I do not think it is directed at oneself. At first few glances > at the below suttas I was thinking it was directed to oneself. After > looking at the above paragrah and this paragraph again and again, I more > incline to think that it is directed at others. The establishment of this > practise is on others and not oneself. > (from Ven link) > 7. From the Samyutta Nikaya, 20:3 > (spoken by the Buddha) > "So, bhikkhus, you should train in this way: The heart-deliverance of > loving-kindness will be maintained in being and made much of by us, used > as our vehicle, used as our foundation, established, consolidated, and > properly managed. That is how you should train." > > (from Ven link) > 9. From the Digha Nikaya, Sutta 33 > (spoken by the Arahant Sariputta) > Here, friends, a bhikkhu might say: "When the heart-deliverance of > loving-kindness is maintained in being and made much of by me, used as my > vehicle, used as my foundation, established, consolidated, and properly > managed, ill-will nevertheless still invades my heart and remains." He > should be told: "Not so. Let the worthy one not say so. Let him not > misrepresent the Blessed One. It is not good to misrepresent the Blessed > One. The Blessed One would not express it thus." Friends, it is > impossible, it cannot happen, that when the heart-deliverance of > loving-kindness is maintained in being and made much of, used as one's > vehicle, used as one's foundation, established, consolidated, and properly > managed, ill-will can invade the heart and remain; for this, that is to > say, the heart-deliverance of loving-kindness, is the escape from > ill-will. > Kind regards > Ken O 9713 From: Christine Forsyth Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 2:23am Subject: Re: purpose? "The purpose of the study of Abhidhamma SHOULD be the purpose of the practice of the Dhamma itself: the heart's sure release. If it is not related directly to this singular aim, then it has nothing to do with anything taught by Lord Buddha, which is what he taught: suffering, and the end of suffering." 'the heart's sure release' - a day for beautiful phrases.....may it truly be 'sure' for us all.... I have been reading and thinking about your interesting reply..... much food for thought.....It is evident that you have had familiarity with more than one tradition at a deep level and over a long time. Thank you. The Abhidhamma seems to be seen as a pivotal part of practice by some, and as a helpful though non-essential aid by others, and scathingly dismissed by still others. To me, it seems to be growing in value the more I come to understand such a very little part of it. But I take note of what you say "this can be a double-edged sword as well, because it can be so easy to become enamoured of the textual descriptions one misses the forest for the trees." With spiritual matters, wouldn't it be wonderful (and save a lot of time) if the wisdom, experience and knowing of one person, could be transmitted to another somehow - sometimes it can seem to happen, but I think that is just the culmination of a long, weary road of living and testing and searching. Maybe there is no other way - everyone having to painfully 're-invent the wheel' and come to understanding by themselves. The writings of Nagarjuna and Je Tsongkhapa sound attractive, but a teacher told me recently that I would be better to dig one deep hole than several shallow ones. I think he saw very clearly my grasshopper mind. :-) And so, I will try to explore the depths and heights of Theravada for the present...... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., rikpa21@y... wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Christine Forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear All, > > > > Would it be fair to say that a purpose in studying Abhidamma is > > partly an attempt to understand and analyse what we conventionally > > see as 'self' rather than to veto any reference at all to 'self' > > (even though 'self' may be defined as a flow of processes). > > The purpose of the study of Abhidhamma SHOULD be the purpose of the > practice of the Dhamma itself: the heart's sure release. If it is > not related directly to this singular aim, then it has nothing to do > with anything taught by Lord Buddha, which is what he taught: > suffering, and the end of suffering. > > I would say some find the Abhidhamma useful in this way, and for > some it is a helpful tool that can help loosen the fixation on the > notion of a "permanent self"--as some inherently existent "driver" > that exists independent of causes and conditions, since it > emphasizes conditionality so heavily. Then again, this can be a > double-edged sword as well, because it can be so easy to become > enamoured of the textual descriptions one misses the forest for the > trees. > > Speaking only for myself, I haven't found the Abhidhamma > particularly helpful for me in this regard. Then again, I came > through a tradition that teaches anatta/emmptiness using the Tibetan > consequentialist logic and debate tradition. I found Nagarjuna's > Mulamadhyamakakarika and the Tibetan persentation on Trangye by Je > Tsongkhapa infinitely more helpful for these khandas in terms of > understanding what this so-called "self" is that is to be rejected > as self, and all the various subtle flavors of "self view" that have > been taken for correct view by various tenet systems in the past, > and why these are rejected, using both logic and reasoning and > applied meditation (anapanasati and jhana) to see how all things > lack core, are composed of other things, etc. > > Speaking again only for myself, where I have found the Abhidhamma > most helpful is as an explanatory tool as a way to see > intellectually the more theoretical interrelationships between the > various aspects of the Dhamma. > > Abhidhamma has also helped provide me the theoretical underpinnings > for how mental processes function, how they arise and pass away, > etc. And also, just as important, I have found it extremely helpful > as a skill-in-means way of explaning the Dhamma in greater depth to > those who require more than a simplistic explanation on certain > points. That is the primary reason I find it helpful in my own case. > > I have, however, seen a number of dangers in the study of Abhidhamma > as well--if taken by itself, without a solid parctice of ALL four > foundations of mindfulness (beginning with the breath-- > kayanupassana, vedananupassana, cittanuopassana, and > dhammanupassana). > > It is quite easy to mistake an intellectual understanding of anatta > gleanded from these texts for correct understanding of anatta, or to > take the textual descriptions provided therein to create subtler and > subtler intellectual reifications of self-view that sound > superficially corect but are subtly wrong, and even potentially > harmful to the cultivation of the very factors that lead to thje > heart's sure release--such as the idea that because everything > arises from pervious conditions there is no such thing as volitional > control (cetana) or the need for Right Effort (sammapadana) in > developing the path. These sorts of mistaken ideas can arise when > the "anatta" aspect of Abhidhamma is taken too far; when it is not > seen as a mere explanatory aid as a demonstration of how all things > lack "core" or "entitness", but by taking its descriptions as a > things-in-themselves. For example, by taking "paramattha dhammas" > for "true existents." > > To put this in some historical context, that particular bogeyman was > intensely rejected by the Tibetan Madhyamika philosophers as a > serious wrong view--holding that citta, cetasika, rupa, nibbana, > are "real" in an ultimate sense. There is a very real danger in ANY > textual description (Abhidhamma or even Nagarjuna) of the Dhamma > that, when coupled with wrong understanding and a fixation on a > paerticular set of views about how things exist, that leads to > mistaken understanding, and quite possibly when one's intellectual > uunderstanding of anatta becomes so refined from reading these texts > for so long, to a deeper and extremely pernicious entrenchement of > the very thing that directly blocks knowledge of things as they are > (yatha-bhuta-dasa-nana), and direct seeing of the Dhamma in the > heart, which is free from all mental elaborations. As the > incomparable Nagarjuna has noted (and I have repeated here many a > time), those who hold emptiness (anatta) to be a real thing I > declare incurable." > > I believe it is always wise to be careful whenever interpreting ANY > texts describing anatta or emptiness, and always to recall they can > never be more than mere "fingers pointing at the moon." > > The true Dhamma is a direct pointing at the heart, and the only sure > release is found in knowing the Dhamma directly in the heart, free > from all elaboration and conceptualizations. One need not have any > formal education or any deep textual study of the Dhamma to realize > the essential nature of things-as-they-are, so long as one comes to > see how all composed things (especially that composed entity we take > for "I, me, mine") are impermanent, and as a result, devoid of > anyything pertaining to "core", and how this implies suffering. > > If a teaching leads to abandoning the unwholesome and taking up the > wholesome, to energetic persistence, not to laziness, to > relinquishment (particularly to the fetter of views, but also > sensual desires), then it is in accord with the Dhamma as expounded > by Lord Buddha. If it leads, on the other hand, to an accumulation > of positions, views, speculations, and dogmas, material goods, mere > intellectual knowledge, then it is the opposite of the deep, > profound, subtle, to-be-experience-by-the-wise Dhamma propounded by > the Buddha, which again has one purpose only: the heart's sure > release. 9714 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 2:27am Subject: Re: purpose? Dear Erik --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., rikpa21@y... wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Christine Forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear All, > > > > Would it be fair to say that a purpose in studying Abhidamma is > > partly an attempt to understand and analyse what we conventionally > > see as 'self' rather than to veto any reference at all to 'self' > > (even though 'self' may be defined as a flow of processes). > > The purpose of the study of Abhidhamma SHOULD be the purpose of the > practice of the Dhamma itself: the heart's sure release. If it is > not related directly to this singular aim, then it has nothing to do > with anything taught by Lord Buddha, which is what he taught: > suffering, and the end of suffering. > ----------------------- I'm not familiar with the term `the heart's sure release' but I think I'm with you so far. ----------------------- > I would say some find the Abhidhamma useful in this way, and for > some it is a helpful tool that can help loosen the fixation on the > notion of a "permanent self"--as some inherently existent "driver" > that exists independent of causes and conditions, since it > emphasizes conditionality so heavily. Then again, this can be a > double-edged sword as well, because it can be so easy to become > enamoured of the textual descriptions one misses the forest for the > trees. > ----------------------- This is obvious in theory, but is it a big danger in practice? ----------------------- > Speaking only for myself, I haven't found the Abhidhamma > particularly helpful for me in this regard. ----------------------- Is this because it contradicts some of your fundamental beliefs? ----------------------- Then again, I came >through a tradition that teaches anatta/emmptiness using the Tibetan > consequentialist logic and debate tradition. I found Nagarjuna's > Mulamadhyamakakarika and the Tibetan persentation on Trangye by Je > Tsongkhapa infinitely more helpful for these khandas in terms of > understanding what this so-called "self" is that is to be rejected > as self, and all the various subtle flavors of "self view" that have > been taken for correct view by various tenet systems in the past, > and why these are rejected, using both logic and reasoning and > applied meditation (anapanasati and jhana) to see how all things > lack core, are composed of other things, etc. > ----------------------- Do these teachings contradict the Dhamma as preserved in the Pali Canon? ----------------------- > Speaking again only for myself, where I have found the Abhidhamma > most helpful is as an explanatory tool as a way to see > intellectually the more theoretical interrelationships between the > various aspects of the Dhamma. > > Abhidhamma has also helped provide me the theoretical underpinnings > for how mental processes function, how they arise and pass away, > etc. And also, just as important, I have found it extremely helpful > as a skill-in-means way of explaning the Dhamma in greater depth to > those who require more than a simplistic explanation on certain > points. That is the primary reason I find it helpful in my own case. > > I have, however, seen a number of dangers in the study of Abhidhamma > as well--if taken by itself, without a solid parctice of ALL four > foundations of mindfulness (beginning with the breath-- > kayanupassana, vedananupassana, cittanuopassana, and > dhammanupassana). > ----------------------- Do the Abhidhamma and the Commentaries contradict your understanding of how the breath should be taken as an object of Right Mindfulness? Is this the problem? ...................... > It is quite easy to mistake an intellectual understanding of anatta > gleanded from these texts for correct understanding of anatta, ----------------------- Do you mean, "for correct intellectual understanding" or, "for correct understanding at the level of satipatthana? In the latter case, would it be more accurate to speak of understanding dhammas as anatta,' rather than `understanding anatta? Sorry if that's nit- picking. ----------------------- or to > take the textual descriptions provided therein to create subtler and > subtler intellectual reifications of self-view that sound > superficially corect but are subtly wrong, and even potentially > harmful to the cultivation of the very factors that lead to thje > heart's sure release--such as the idea that because everything > arises from pervious conditions there is no such thing as volitional > control (cetana) or the need for Right Effort (sammapadana) in > developing the path. ----------------------- Nowhere is it held that there are no such things, only that there is no self who has them. ----------------------- These sorts of mistaken ideas can arise when > the "anatta" aspect of Abhidhamma is taken too far; ----------------------- It can become inconvenient for conventional purposes, but can anatta be taken too far? ----------------------- when it is not > seen as a mere explanatory aid as a demonstration of how all things > lack "core" or "entitness", but by taking its descriptions as a > things-in-themselves. For example, by taking "paramattha dhammas" > for "true existents." > ----------------------- By taking absolute realities as absolutely real . . . ? Or do you mean, taking paramattha dhammas for things that are unconditioned? There is only one unconditioned paramattha dhamma, Nibbana, and this fact is made abundantly clear. What wrong view has been asserted? Has it been said that dhammas are atta? ----------------------- > To put this in some historical context, that particular bogeyman was > intensely rejected by the Tibetan Madhyamika philosophers as a > serious wrong view--holding that citta, cetasika, rupa, nibbana, > are "real" in an ultimate sense. ----------------------- What English translation would these philosophers give for,`paramattha dhamma'? ----------------------- There is a very real danger in ANY > textual description (Abhidhamma or even Nagarjuna) ----------------------- Why do you say, `or *even* Nagarjuna'? Is Nagarjuna a greater teaching than Abhidhamma? ----------------------- of the Dhamma > that, when coupled with wrong understanding and a fixation on a > paerticular set of views about how things exist, that leads to > mistaken understanding, and quite possibly when one's intellectual > uunderstanding of anatta becomes so refined ----------------------- Is it only when it becomes refined that it troubles you? The assertion, "there is no self who can direct which paramattha dhammas will arise or when they should arise," is not an especially refined point to make, but I think it is the cause of your discontent. ----------------------- from reading these texts > for so long, to a deeper and extremely pernicious entrenchement of > the very thing that directly blocks knowledge of things as they are > (yatha-bhuta-dasa-nana), and direct seeing of the Dhamma in the > heart, which is free from all mental elaborations. As the > incomparable Nagarjuna ----------------------- incomparable? ----------------------- has noted (and I have repeated here many a > time), those who hold emptiness (anatta) to be a real thing I > declare incurable." > ----------------------- Which paramattha dhamma are those people holding anatta to be? ----------------------- > I believe it is always wise to be careful whenever interpreting ANY > texts describing anatta or emptiness, and always to recall they can > never be more than mere "fingers pointing at the moon." > ----------------------- But they can be true or false representations of the Dhamma, and it is imperative that we know which is which. ----------------------- > The true Dhamma is a direct pointing at the heart, and the only sure > release is found in knowing the Dhamma directly in the heart, free > from all elaboration and conceptualizations. One need not have any > formal education or any deep textual study of the Dhamma to realize > the essential nature of things-as-they-are, ----------------------- How else could this realization be brought about? ----------------------- so long as one comes to > see how all composed things (especially that composed entity we take > for "I, me, mine") are impermanent, and as a result, devoid of > anyything pertaining to "core", and how this implies suffering. > ----------------------- But that half sentence is not enough. Speaking for myself, and for everyone else I've ever met, we need much, much more instruction than that. (I've seen some people claim it can be reduced to, "just do it." (For heavens sake!)) ----------------------- > If a teaching leads to abandoning the unwholesome and taking up the > wholesome, to energetic persistence, not to laziness, to > relinquishment (particularly to the fetter of views, but also > sensual desires), then it is in accord with the Dhamma as expounded > by Lord Buddha. ----------------------- To the extent that any of the above is the same as other teachers have taught, before or since, then it is certainly not the teaching of the Buddha. ----------------------- If it leads, on the other hand, to an accumulation > of positions, views, speculations, and dogmas, material goods, mere > intellectual knowledge, then it is the opposite of the deep, > profound, subtle, to-be-experience-by-the-wise Dhamma propounded by > the Buddha, which again has one purpose only: the heart's sure > release. ----------------------- Opposite? Does the Middle Path have an opposite? Right intellectual understanding is the opposite of wrong intellectual understanding (Mahacattarika Sutta (M N 117)), but because it can condition perfect Right Understanding, it should not be regarded as the opposite of it - - it is not opposed to it. ----------------------- ----------------------- Kind regards Ken H. 9715 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 2:34am Subject: Re: purpose? --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Christine Forsyth" wrote: Hi Christine, > The Abhidhamma seems to be seen as a pivotal part of practice by > some, and as a helpful though non-essential aid by others, and > scathingly dismissed by still others. To me, it seems to be growing > in value the more I come to understand such a very little part of > it. But I take note of what you say "this can be a > double-edged sword as well, because it can be so easy to become > enamoured of the textual descriptions one misses the forest for the > trees." > With spiritual matters, wouldn't it be wonderful > (and save a lot of time) if the wisdom, experience and knowing of one > person, could be transmitted to another somehow - sometimes it can > seem to happen, but I think that is just the culmination of a long, > weary road of living and testing and searching. I think there is a combination of both. The wisdom of the bopoks transmitted by the wisdom embodied by those who have realized it. Together these seem to be a wonderful combination. > Maybe there is no > other way - everyone having to painfully 're-invent the wheel' and > come to understanding by themselves. No need to reinvent the Dhamrmachakra--it's already been expounded in great detail by Lord Buddha. Only to diligently put into practice its profound message. > The writings of Nagarjuna and Je Tsongkhapa sound attractive, but a > teacher told me recently that I would be better to dig one deep hole > than several shallow ones. Indeed this is the case. It is typically advised by those in the know to dig deeply into a single system of practice until one comes to see there is and only ever has been one system to begin with! :) > I think he saw very clearly my > grasshopper mind. :-) And so, I will try to explore the depths and > heights of Theravada for the present...... If the aim is the wisdom of release, then it is impossible to go wrong with the Theravada tradition, when its teachings are correctly explained and put into practice with great diligence and confidence in their ability to set "you" free. 9716 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 3:49am Subject: Re: purpose? --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., khow14@h... wrote: > Dear Erik > > I would say some find the Abhidhamma useful in this way, and for > > some it is a helpful tool that can help loosen the fixation on the > > notion of a "permanent self"--as some inherently existent "driver" > > that exists independent of causes and conditions, since it > > emphasizes conditionality so heavily. Then again, this can be a > > double-edged sword as well, because it can be so easy to become > > enamoured of the textual descriptions one misses the forest for the > > trees. > ----------------------- > This is obvious in theory, but is it a big danger in practice? > ----------------------- Based solely on my my own obsevations, yes. An enormous danger. > > Speaking only for myself, I haven't found the Abhidhamma > > particularly helpful for me in this regard. > ----------------------- > Is this because it contradicts some of your fundamental beliefs? I see no contradiction in the Abhidhamma to any "fundamental beliefs" (at least as far as things such as views go); only that when the Abhidhamma is misinterpreted it can lead to a very subtle misunderstandings of anatta that can hinder, not enhance, one's progress on the path. > ----------------------- > Then again, I came > >through a tradition that teaches anatta/emmptiness using the Tibetan > > consequentialist logic and debate tradition. I found Nagarjuna's > > Mulamadhyamakakarika and the Tibetan persentation on Trangye by Je > > Tsongkhapa infinitely more helpful for these khandas in terms of > > understanding what this so-called "self" is that is to be rejected > > as self, and all the various subtle flavors of "self view" that > have > > been taken for correct view by various tenet systems in the past, > > and why these are rejected, using both logic and reasoning and > > applied meditation (anapanasati and jhana) to see how all things > > lack core, are composed of other things, etc. > > > ----------------------- > Do these teachings contradict the Dhamma as preserved in the Pali > Canon? They refine the teachings on anatta to the point that if you were so inclined and spent serious time studying these teachings under a qualified teacher, it is highly probable you would come to a far clearer understanding of anatta than by studying only the Abhidhamma's presentation. In fact, as far as the study of anatta goes, I have found the Madhyamika systems smokes all other system in terms of how deep it goes into blowing apart the various flavors of subtle wrong views that have been propounded throughout the ages. Of course I am prejudiced by the fact I know this system works, and that it is "my" tradition. Nevertheless, what matters is if a teaching leads to correct understanding. Period. Whether it comes from some collection of books labeled the Pali Canon or the Kanjur, who cares? So long as it explains the Dhamma in such a way it leads to the heart's sure release. > ----------------------- > Do the Abhidhamma and the Commentaries contradict your > understanding of how the breath should be taken as an object of Right > Mindfulness? Is this the problem? I have seen no contradiction in the Abhidhamma about this sort of thing, mainly because I haven't read about this in the Abhidhamma. I refer specifically to the Satipatthana Sutta. I have seen some interpretations of the Abhidhamma's etachings that are at variance with the teachings Lord Buddha expounded in the Satipatthana Sutta, however, which I consider primary. I consider the Abhidhamma, like the works of Nagarjuna and later masters as helpful commentaries necessary for those attracted to them by reason of necessity. > or to > > take the textual descriptions provided therein to create subtler > and > > subtler intellectual reifications of self-view that sound > > superficially corect but are subtly wrong, and even potentially > > harmful to the cultivation of the very factors that lead to thje > > heart's sure release--such as the idea that because everything > > arises from pervious conditions there is no such thing as > volitional > > control (cetana) or the need for Right Effort (sammapadana) in > > developing the path. > ----------------------- > Nowhere is it held that there are no such things, only that there is > no self who has them. Of course! That was my point exactly! I have seen interpretation that take anatta, however, to the point of denying the need for conventional effort, which IS at variance with the Suttas as expounded by the Buddha, given the Buddha deliverd 90% of his sermons using conventional names and terms (withuot misapprehending them, as was noted elsewhere). That is the danger I see in taking the Abhidhamma's teachings too far. I am not implying the Abhidhamma is incorrect (though there are many things which certainly appear speculative to an undeveloped trainee like me, such as the javana cittas and so on), but in general, I take no issue with the Abhidhamma at all. I am only pointing out, again, that ANY teaching can be taken too far, whether the Buddha, Abhidhamma or Nagarjuna, et. al. Again, these are guides, fingers pointing at the moon. The Dhamma is a "raft for crossing over; not for getting ahold of." It is about erlinquishing the clinging to views, dogmas, speculations, and coming to see things as they erally are: devoind of intrinsic essence, impermanent, and suffering. > ----------------------- > These sorts of mistaken ideas can arise when > > the "anatta" aspect of Abhidhamma is taken too far; > ----------------------- > It can become inconvenient for conventional purposes, but can anatta > be taken too far? Yes, and I have seen interpretation of anatta taken WAY too far--to the point of using it to justify atrocities. Hey, if it's all empty ultimately, why not just kill, steal, lie, etc.? This is a HUGE danger! MANY MANY MANY people have fallen into this pit. I know there was a point I did, back in my early days studying Zen, where I had been taught too little emphasis on cultivating compassion and too much emphasis (for me) on realizing emptiness. Are you familiar with any of the terrible justifications the truth of anatta has been used to qualify? Try reading "Zen at War" for a good example of what I'm talking abuot. > ----------------------- > when it is not > > seen as a mere explanatory aid as a demonstration of how all things > > lack "core" or "entitness", but by taking its descriptions as a > > things-in-themselves. For example, by taking "paramattha dhammas" > > for "true existents." > > > ----------------------- > By taking absolute realities as absolutely real . . . ? Or do you > mean, taking paramattha dhammas for things that are unconditioned? "Absolutely real" as in existents with self-nature, or entitiness. > What English translation would these philosophers give for,`paramattha > dhamma'? I dunno. How about the Sanskrit? Paramartha Dharma? > ----------------------- > There is a very real danger in ANY > > textual description (Abhidhamma or even Nagarjuna) > ----------------------- > Why do you say, `or *even* Nagarjuna'? Is Nagarjuna a greater > teaching than Abhidhamma? In my opinion, in terms of teachings on emptiness--the gateway to Right View of the supramundane variety, yes. But that reflects my own training, inclinations, accumulations, and biases. Other than that, my opinion is that the Abhidhamma shouldn't even be studied until one has directly comprehended emptiness/anatta via the faculty of lokuttara panna, or has at least highly developed practical experience with sati (in particular anapanasati or some other form of mindfulness of the body), well-developed concentration, and a fairly clear intellectual understanding of anicca, dukkha, and anatta--none of which require a single line from the Abhidhamma to learn or come to know at least to the degree one can begin working with them at a level where one can understand them to a (limited) visceral degree. In my opinion I think study of the Abhidhamma to the exclusion of the BASIC BASIC practices outlined in the Satipatthana Sutta (all of them) is unhelpful, potentially even a hindrance. Of course I expect some here on DSG may disagree with this opinion, heh heh heh! :) > ----------------------- > of the Dhamma > > that, when coupled with wrong understanding and a fixation on a > > paerticular set of views about how things exist, that leads to > > mistaken understanding, and quite possibly when one's intellectual > > uunderstanding of anatta becomes so refined > ----------------------- > Is it only when it becomes refined that it troubles you? I am not troubled by misunderstanding of anatta, except by the knowledge that when anatta is misunderstood it leads not to the heart's sure release but to further bondage, and I have no wish to see sentient beings suffer. > The > assertion, "there is no self who can direct which paramattha dhammas > will arise or when they should arise," is not an especially refined > point to make, but I think it is the cause of your discontent. Why do you posit discontent in anything I wrote? I am actually quite contented sitting here right now (as I was writing my previous missive), discussing the Dhamma. I was discussing dangers and pitfalls in taking the study of the Abhidhamma (or ANY teaching) to an extreme. That is all. Did you or are you feeling any aversion to anything I wrote regarding the Abhidhamma? If you read discontent in my writing, perhaps so. If so, then why? > ----------------------- > from reading these texts > > for so long, to a deeper and extremely pernicious entrenchement of > > the very thing that directly blocks knowledge of things as they are > > (yatha-bhuta-dasa-nana), and direct seeing of the Dhamma in the > > heart, which is free from all mental elaborations. As the > > incomparable Nagarjuna > ----------------------- > incomparable? Incomparable. > ----------------------- > has noted (and I have repeated here many a > > time), those who hold emptiness (anatta) to be a real thing I > > declare incurable." > > > ----------------------- > Which paramattha dhamma are those people holding anatta to be? SOME of the Vaibhasika schools's proponents posited that paramattha dhammas existed as "absolute realities"--meaning that they exit "truly". This is a deeper conversation we can get into later, but the basic refutation of the Vaibhasika system is that they posited these things as "real" in the sense of possessing "self." Mind you, this is a hypothetical school, and represents wrong views held by SOME proponents of this system. It is merely listed for pedagogical purposes in Trangye, because some have and do believe that "hearing, seeing, tasting, etc." are "real things", or "things- in-themselves"--"absolute existents" with "core" or atta. > ----------------------- > > I believe it is always wise to be careful whenever interpreting ANY > > texts describing anatta or emptiness, and always to recall they can > > never be more than mere "fingers pointing at the moon." > > > ----------------------- > But they can be true or false representations of the Dhamma, and it is > imperative that we know which is which. And there is only one way to know this definitively: to realize emptiness directly. It is safe to say that you will find Right View presented in Tibetan, Zen, and Theravada. Whatever system you're attracted to, if studied with qualified teachers and put into DILIGENT practice willl yield fruit at some point. It can't NOT. > ----------------------- > > The true Dhamma is a direct pointing at the heart, and the only > sure > > release is found in knowing the Dhamma directly in the heart, free > > from all elaboration and conceptualizations. One need not have any > > formal education or any deep textual study of the Dhamma to realize > > the essential nature of things-as-they-are, > ----------------------- > How else could this realization be brought about? The suttas are filled with stories those who came to directly see the Four Noble Truths on the hearing of a single sutta. The most recent example I can think of is Hui Neng, who awakened on hearing a few stanzas from the Diamond Sutra. > ----------------------- > so long as one comes to > > see how all composed things (especially that composed entity we > take > > for "I, me, mine") are impermanent, and as a result, devoid of > > anyything pertaining to "core", and how this implies suffering. > > > ----------------------- > But that half sentence is not enough. Speaking for myself, and for > everyone else I've ever met, we need much, much more instruction than > that. (I've seen some people claim it can be reduced to, "just do > it." (For heavens sake!)) You have to begin someplace, and where better to begin than by observing how all thing arise and cease, by following the instructions in the Satipatthana Suttta to a tee--finding a secluded spot, sitting cross-legged, spine erect, when breathing in long, noting breathibng in long; when breathing out long, noting breathing out long, etc... This does not take any massive amount of theory. It takes practice. And that practice will yield increased mindfulness and clear comprehension, leading to right concentration, leading to seeing directly into the nature of all Dhammas as devoid of self. At least it has for many. Some may require much study in addition to this. I have found study essential in my own case. But in the final analysis, all that study leads to one point: how to observe things as they are arising and passing away RIGHT NOW, how they are impermanent, lack self-nature, are subject to cessation, and therefore dukkha. > ----------------------- > > If a teaching leads to abandoning the unwholesome and taking up the > > wholesome, to energetic persistence, not to laziness, to > > relinquishment (particularly to the fetter of views, but also > > sensual desires), then it is in accord with the Dhamma as expounded > > by Lord Buddha. > ----------------------- > To the extent that any of the above is the same as other teachers have > taught, before or since, then it is certainly not the teaching of the > Buddha. Nonsense. It may be helpful to read and carefully reflect on the Buddha's instructions to Gotami: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an08-053.html > ----------------------- > If it leads, on the other hand, to an accumulation > > of positions, views, speculations, and dogmas, material goods, mere > > intellectual knowledge, then it is the opposite of the deep, > > profound, subtle, to-be-experience-by-the-wise Dhamma propounded by > > the Buddha, which again has one purpose only: the heart's sure > > release. > ----------------------- > Opposite? Does the Middle Path have an opposite? Right intellectual > understanding is the opposite of wrong intellectual understanding > (Mahacattarika Sutta (M N 117)), but because it can condition perfect > Right Understanding, it should not be regarded as the opposite of it - > - it is not opposed to it. I am really not sure what you mean at all here. 9717 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 1:26am Subject: Re: [dsg] The Two Truths (for Howard) Hi, Erik - This is excellent, and I thank you for sending it, though I think it may have been someone other than I who had requested info about the two truths. Just one comment: It seems to me that not all "things" consist of parts. In fact, that *may* be a parameter whereby one can distinguish so-called "ultimate dhammas" from purely conventional ones. For example, the experience of the rupa of solidity is indivisible or irreducible. While solidity never arises independent of conditions for its arising, and while solidity never arises apart from the experience of solidity (so that it is discernment-dependent), still solidity has no parts. Thus when it is said that all things arise in dependence on their parts, I think that needs qualification. It needs to be restricted to those dhammas which are not direct objects of discernment, but are concept-only (such as people, trees, cars, and chariots). With metta, Howard In a message dated 11/28/01 10:26:46 PM Eastern Standard Time, rikpa21@y... writes: > Howard, a while back you specifically requested me for some more on > the "two truths" (paramattha vs. samutti sacca). I apologize for not > replying in a timely fashion, but for your benefit (and hopefully > that of others), here's a short description of the "two truths" I > put together for one of my students as a beginning-point in > understanding emptiness. This is based entirely on my lama's > teachings on same, from his book "The Principal Teachings of > Buddhism", which is in turn based on Je Tsongkhapa's Fourteen Root > Verses on Lam Rym (Stages on the Path), and presents the classical > Tibetan Geluk-pa Madhymika-Prasangika tenet system as taught by, for > example, the Dalai Lama. Je Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) was the guru of > the First Dalai Lama, incidentally: > > "You may master renunciation and the wish, > But unless you have the wisdom perceiving reality > You cannot cut the root of cyclic life. > Make efforts in ways then to perceive interdependence. > > "A person's entered the path that pleases the Buddhas > When for all objects, in the cycle or beyond, > He sees that cause and effect can never fail, > And when for him they lose all solid appearance. > > "You've yet to realize the thought of the Able > As long as two ideas seem to you disparate: > The appearance of things-infallible interdependence; > And emptiness-beyond taking any position. > > "At some point, they no longer alternate, come together; > Just seeing that interdependence never fails > Brings realization that destroys how you hold to objects, > And then your analysis with view is complete. > > In addition the appearance prevents the existence extreme; > Emptiness that of non-existence, and if > You see how emptiness shows in cause and effect > You'll never be stolen off by extreme views." > > Howeard, I hope you find the following explanation helpful: > > The "Two Truths" of Reality (Tib. Denpa-nyi) > > The Two Truths refers to how we divide reality. (Important note: > the "Two Truths" here are distinct from The Truth of the > Origin of Suffering and The Truth of the Cessation of Suffering > mentioned above). To realize emptiness directly, one must perceive > these Two Truths. In this context, "truth" refers to the > nature, or reality, of things we perceive. > > 1. Deceptive, or conventional, reality (Pali samutti sacca) > > Things appear to us to exist in one way but actually exist in > another way. "Deceptive reality" refers to our normal, > everyday reality—the one we're always perceiving. Unless we > are fully Enlightened, we are constantly misperceiving things, > mistakenly believing they possess an inherent, or fixed, self- > nature. We mistakenly believe things possess some substantial, or > true, identity. For example, we wrongly believe a person has > intrinsic "personness." This mistaken perception is also > sometimes referred to a "figurative" reality, because it does > not accord with the way things actually exist. This conventional > view of reality arises solely due to ignorance (Tib. Ma-rikpa or > Skt. Avidya). It is in this way that ignorance is considered the > root of samsara's sufferings. > > 2. Non-deceptive, or ultimate, reality—Emptiness (Tib. Tong-pa > or Skt. Shunyata or Pali paramatta sacca) > > This refers to the fact that all things lacked a fixed essence, or > independent self-nature. In an ultimate sense, any object under > analysis can be shown to lack a fixed essence by using only simple > reasoning. In other words, all changing things—especially this > collection of parts we refer to as the "self"—are devoid of > any fixed, or intrinsic, identity. Because they lack this fixed > essence they are empty—empty of independent existence. That > things lack a fixed nature refutes the absurd and extreme wrong view > of eternalism—which is the view that holds things do possess a > true identity, or fixed nature. This lack of fixed nature is > specifically what emptiness refers to, not that nothing exists, > which is also an absurdity—the extreme wrong view of nihilism. So > emptiness simply refers to the way in which things do not exist, > i.e. they do not exist independently, "from their own side," > by way of their own entitiness, etc.—but rather 1) in dependence on > their causes; 2) in dependence on their parts; and 3) in dependence > on the mind that labels them. > > Thus emptiness is not a thing, because if it were a thing it > couldn't be emptiness. The label "emptiness" refers to > the absence of something: independent existence. Consequently you > cannot "see" emptiness as you would a property like the color > blue, because emptiness is a negation that refers to an absence of > the quality of possessing a fixed self-nature; it is not some > property of a thing in the way the color blue is the property of the > sky. This ultimate reality of emptiness is sometimes also referred > to as "literal" reality—meaning it's literally true—as opposed to > the "figurative" conventional reality where objects appear to > possess an inherent self-nature. So when it's said > that one perceives emptiness "directly," it is not a thing > that's perceived, but rather the absence of the quality of > existing independently. > > Dependent Origination (Tib. Ten-drel or Skt. Pratitya Samutpada or > Pali Paticca Samuppada) > > Dependent Origination is the fact that all things arise in > dependence on other factors. There is nothing that does not arise in > dependence on other factors of some kind. The alternative > view—which is a wrong view—entails the absurd consequence > that somehow things arise independent of other factors, through > their own power. But this is impossible, because that would mean > things would happen at random, without any sort of rhyme or reason. > For example, if it were possible that things could arise independent > of other factors, a big purple elephant might magically appear in > your room for no reason at all, at complete random. A classic > Tibetan example refuting the wrong view that things can arise > independent of causes and conditions is that of the "sky > flower," or the "lotus that grows in midair." It is > impossible—an absurdity—that such a lotus could randomly appear in > midair without the proper causes. For a lotus to exist at all it > requires the proper causes and conditions, such as a lotus seed, > soil, nutrients, air, water, sunlight, and favorable climate. > Likewise, it is absurd to believe that something—any object of > experience—can possibly come from nothing. It must come from > something else! > > How Things Exist: Three Aspects of Dependent Origination > > It is not enough to merely know how things don't exist—that > things lack independent existence; it is also vital to understand > how they do exist. In other words, understanding the emptiness of > intrinsic existence alone is not enough; one must also, at the same > time, understand Dependent Origination—how things appear to exist > as they do. How things exist can be broken down into three aspects: > > 1. All thing exist in dependence upon their causes > This means that everything comes from causes—all things come from > other factors. In the case of a lotus, that would include the lotus > seed, the presence of soil, sunlight, water, time, etc. This is the > causal aspect of Dependent Origination. > > 2. All things exist in dependence upon their parts, and possess > valid basis. This means that every object of experience depends on > its parts. A classic example is that of the "person." The > "person" is merely a collection of specific parts; it must > possess a head, a torso, arms, and legs. This is the physical aspect > of Dependent Origination. For example, all these parts must come > together in a specific way to form the basis of designation for the > label "person." > > 3. All things exist in dependence upon the mind that labels them > This means that without a mind labeling a collection containing a > head, torso, arms, and legs, the idea of a "person" will have > no reason to arise. Furthermore, one cannot reasonably apply the > label "person" to a collection of wheels, tires, etc. Any > label we apply to a collection of parts must depend upon a valid > basis—in other words, these parts must conform to a "valid > basis of designation." In the case of a person, that means a > collection of parts including a head, torso, arms, legs, etc. This > is the mental or conceptual aspect of Dependent Origination. > > How Emptiness and Dependent Origination Relate to Each Other > > To understand Right View, it is necessary to understand how > emptiness of independent existence and the dependently originated > nature of all things relate to each other. Both Emptiness and > Dependent Origination are complementary aspects of the same reality. > They are not identical; rather, one supports and complements the > other. For example, because all things are dependently originated, > they must lack a fixed or independent nature. In other words, the > fact that things exist dependent on causes directly implies and > supports the fact they lack a fixed or solid identity. Likewise, > because things are empty and lack a fixed nature, it implies that > they must arise in dependence on other factors. In this way > emptiness and dependent origination can be seen as two sides of the > same coin. Without one, the other is impossible. Because one is > true, the other is implied. > > The Middle Way (Madhyamaka): The Middle Way Between Extremes > > The Middle Way school is so named because it threads the Scylla and > Charybdis of the two extreme views, Eternalism and Nihilism. These > wrong views can be stopped by this one logical statement: "it > cannot exist truly, because it is interdependent." As Arya > Nâgârjuna says in the Fundamentals of the Middle Way: > "`Inherent existence' is holding to permanence. `No > conventional existence' is a view of nihilism. Therefore the wise > do not abide in either `inherent existence' or `no conventional > existence.'" > > 1. Eternalism > > This is the view that objects possess a fixed nature, a > "true" entitiness; or that objects can somehow arise on their > own, independent of causes and conditions; or that objects "exist > from their own side." > > 2. Nihilism > > This is the view that nothing exists at all, that because objects > lack a fixed essence they do not exist even conventionally. This > view holds that because objects lack a self-nature they cannot exist > at all. > > --- > > I recall your post of the farmer and the plant, and thought you > might appreciate that reference on paticca samuppada and the > Tibetan "sky flower" analogy! :) > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9718 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 6:37am Subject: Fwd: Re: Ego, soul, awareness, mind, consciousness ... - wrote: "Christine Forsyth" wrote: > Dear Robert, > ... I really don't want to believe that > I am just a 'process' who seems to be a living puppet that > everything happens to, things (mental states) arise as an intrusion, > without permission, or without being intended or evoked....the > problem is, of course, that I don't want it to be so.....anatta, and > no control. +++++++ Dear Christine, It is very nice that you can admit the difficulty you're having with 'getting' anatta. Sometimes we talk about about this most profound truth rather easily, and so it might seem that it should be like ABC. But is the deepest aspect of life and thus it is incomparably difficult to grasp let alone fathom. I like what you said about 'the living puppet', it reminds me of the Bhikkhuni-samyutta where Mara approaches the Bhikkhuni Sela "Then Mara the Evil One, desiring to arouse fear, trepidation, and terror in the bhikkhuni Sela, desiring to make her fall away from concentration, approached her and addressed her in verse: "By whom has this puppet been created? Where is the maker of the puppet? Where has the puppet arisen? Where does the puppet cease?"[24] Then it occurred to the bhikkhuni Sela: "Now who is this...? This is Mara the Evil One... desiring to make me fall away from concentration." Then the bhikkhuni Sela, having understood, "This is Mara the Evil One," replied to him in verses: "This puppet is not made by itself, Nor is this misery made by another. It has come to be dependent on a cause, When the cause dissolves then it will cease."endquote Things do indeed, as you said, happen "without permission or without being intended or invoked". When I first started to see that this is really the way things are it scared me alot, and I wanted to turn away and try to believe that it was otherwise. But, you know, this is what dukkha really is. We can't stop seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, feeling, knowing, thinking; these dhammas are not ours and they arise by conditions. They oppress by continually arising and ceasing. The amazing thing is that the more we look into this, and the more obvious dukkha thus becomes, the happier we become. And paradoxically the more we see that there is no control the more freedom we have. The more we see that right effort is a conditioned phenomena the more vigor there is - because we are not wasting energy trying to have what can't yet be had. Other parami are needed too - patience and wisdom should develop together. Could I recommend yet another book - a short one - The Perfections Leading to Enlightenment , which explains the ten parami (much easier than the patthana). You can read it at http://www.abhidhamma.org best wishes robert 9719 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 7:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Samannaphala verse 65 Christine Your questions are all interesting ones. I think a number of them raise a common point about reading and understanding the suttas (a point that has been much discussed on this list). Sometimes a passage that is *descriptive of a particular situation* can be misread as *suggesting a way of 'practice'*. In the case of the excerpt below about going forward, for example, this could be illustrated by asking the question whether on a true reading the passage is describing how realities may appear to one of (highly) developed awareness or understanding, or whether it is suggesting that one who wishes to develop awareness should undertake a slow walking practice. As I think you can appreciate, there is a world of difference between the two. So bearing this in mind, while I don’t have answers to all your questions, I can offer one or two brief comments (interspersed below) --- Christine Forsyth wrote: > Dear All, > > It occurs to me I could be sinking into the quicksand of too much > detail in this commentary......however, a few rambling questions: > > Verse 65 The Samannaphala Sutta commentary Bhikkhu Bodhi. > "And how, great king, is the bhikkhu endowed with mindfulness and > clear comprehension? Herein, great king, in going forward and > returning, the bhikkhu acts with clear comprehension. In looking > ahead and looking aside, he acts with clear comprehension. In > bending and stretching the limbs, he acts with clear comprehension. > In wearing his robes and cloak and using his almsbowl, he acts with > clear comprehension. In eating, drinking, chewing, and tasting, he > acts with clear comprehension. In defecating and urinating, he acts > with clear comprehension. In going, standing, sitting, lying down, > waking up, speaking, and remaining silent, he acts with clear > comprehension. In this way, great king, the bhikkhu is endowed with > mindfulness and clear comprehension." Commentary on this verse pp.96- > 134 > > The commentary states that clear comprehension is fourfold: clear > comprehension of purposefulness, clear comprehension of suitability, > clear comprehension of the resort, and clear comprehension of non- > delusion. > > Within clear comprehension of purposefulness.....p.98 'One arouses > rapture having the Buddha as object....one arouses rapture having the > Sangha as object.......' I'm assuming this doesn't mean the > everyday use of 'rapture' as in 'The Prime Minister was given a > rapturous welcome by Party members'. What is 'rapture' in the > Buddhist sense, and 'how' does one arouse it, and 'why' would one > wish to? Is 'rapture' the same as 'jhana'? 'Rapture' here is a reference to one of the wholesome (kusala) mental concomitants (cetasikas), probably the one called 'piti'. While the text says 'one arouses', this is to be understood in the sense that wholesome states of mind cannot be brought about at will. This kusala cetasika I take to be probably a quality that is developed when other forms of kusala such as samatha are being developed. > What is meant by the 'Sangha' in this verse.?....it seems to mean > different things to different people. For example, many people > refer only to ordained Bhikkhus, others refer to every Buddhist who > has ever lived (as per the Communion of Saints in the Christian > sense), and still others refer to just their meditation group, or > buddhist email group as their sangha. Which version, if any, would be > defined as 'object'? The textual meanings of 'sangha' are also quite numerous. Here it probably means those beings who have attained enlightenment (my guess). Any reason why the third jewel the Dhamma isn't > used as an object? - doesn't seem the way of a commentator to leave > out something they could talk about for a page and a half.. > (:-)) Sorry - this part got a bit tedious.....38 pages on one > verse...) No thoughts on this at the moment, I'm afraid. > I have always practiced meditation by watching the breath (rising > and falling of the abdomen).........having the Buddha as object, is > this recollecting his wonderful qualities,....I think RobertK > recently mentioned Buddhanusati (in the context of using this rather > than metta towards oneself) - but I found this a little artificial to > do.....no 'pleasant' feelings... Buddhanusati is the recollection of the qualities of the Buddha, with wholesome (kusala) mind. It is not necessarily the same as what one might think of as meditation. > Jon said in a recent post, "Let me say at the outset, because I > think this is very important, that no-one is asking us to change, or > to try to change, any of what is happening now, naturally. In other > words, the teaching is not about 'slowing down' the present moment, > or contriving to reduce the speed, variety or strength of sense > impressions. That would be trying to change the reality of the > present moment in some manner, rather than simply understanding it > more for what it is." In 'Clear comprehension of non-delusion' - I > understand (theoretically) that it is not 'a self who goes forward, > the action of going forward is not produced by a self' , but the > commentary goes into such long descriptions of 'raising the > foot', 'bringing it forward' 'shifting it away', 'dropping the > foot', 'bringing the new foot forward' - it seems very much to be > encouraging just that 'slowing down' and examining of the action > commonly taught in Walking Meditation in Retreats, but is this what > is discouraged, in Jon's paragraph above? I would be surprised to find that the passage properly understood does actually encourage a slowing down. But I am happy to discuss further if on a re-reading you still think it does. Keep up the good work! Jon 9720 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 7:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Commentary on Samannaphala Christine I must say I admire your effort and determination, Christine. You mention below intelligence and perseverance. In my view, perseverance (of the right kind) is a far greater asset than intelligence (as conventionally understood) in developing the path. I am not surprised that your internet searches have turned up so little in the way of references to nimitta and anubyanjana. It is an aspect of the teachings that seems to be rarely discussed. I am sure it would be found in Khun Sujin's book, but I don't have a reference to the particular passage handy. I'll let you have it later if I come across it. The reference in the passage from Bhikkhu Bodhi's book is a passing reference only and does little more that give a definition of the two terms. I won't comment now on the passage generally, since I don’t suppose you are looking for that kind of discussion right now. The other mention of nimitta that you refer to is probably the meaning of nimitta that most people are be familiar with, a 'mental image' of the object of concentration in samatha (tranquillity) development. However, this meaning has no relevance in the present context. Sorry that I can't add much this time. Will keep a lookout for more sources for you to look at. Jon PS I must say, it's nice to find someone who is happy to have suggestions for further reading or consideration (not thinking of any other list member(s) in particular, of course!!). --- Christine Forsyth wrote: > > Dear Jon, > > Thanks for your reply. You're right, it isn't easy to understand at > first...(or second or third approach.) And understanding the 'how you > do it'bit always seems harder than the 'this is what it is' bit. Not > much info. elsewhere on the Net that I can find - > > My way of learning is to gather as much information, from as many > sources as possible about a subject or term and then try to sift the > wheat from the chaff. Not the quickest or most efficient way, and > sometimes prone to error....I find lots of irrelevant details, > without the ability yet to discern initially what's relevant and > what's not. Sort of like making a soup - all the ingredients seem > unrelated and not very palatable - but in the end it all hopefully > works in together.... So please don't if I seem to be missing > completely a very simple point you are making - I might not have > lightning fast intelligence, but I have perseverance. :-) A (gentle) > kick on the rudder now and then to help me change direction would > be appreciated.(eventually) :-) > > > "The Noble Eightfold Path" by Bhikkhu Bodhi Ch V 'Right Effort' > > {I like his description of the mind with no sense control - makes it > sound like a juvenile delinquent out on the town on a Saturday Night > looking for action...... "If sense control is lacking, the mind roams > recklessly over the sense fields. First it grasps the sign, which > sets the defilements into motion, then it explores the particulars, > which permits them to multiply and thrive."} > > {His description of "greed" in the last paragraph, gives me some > qualms about my wanting to learn about every new term or subject that > catches my interest - "on account of greed one will become fascinated > by an agreeable object" hmmmm. And here I thought it was > commendable, wanting to learn.} > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > BB: "Generally what sparks the hindrances into activity is the input > afforded by sense experience. The physical organism is equipped with > five sense faculties each receptive to its own specific kind of data - > - the eye to forms, the ear to sounds, the nose to smells, the tongue > to tastes, the body to tangibles. Sense objects continuously impinge > on the senses, which relay the information they receive to the mind, > where it is processed, evaluated, and accorded an appropriate > response. But the mind can deal with the impressions it receives in > different ways, governed in the first place by the manner in which it > attends to them. When the mind adverts to the incoming data > carelessly, with unwise consideration (ayoniso manasikara), the sense > objects tend to stir up unwholesome states. They do this either > directly, through their immediate impact, or else indirectly by > depositing memory traces which later may swell up as the objects of > defiled thoughts, images, and fantasies. As a general rule the > defilement that is activated corresponds to the object: attractive > objects provoke desire, disagreeable objects provoke ill will, and > indeterminate objects provoke the defilements connected with > delusion. > Since an uncontrolled response to the sensory input stimulates the > latent defilements, what is evidently needed to prevent them from > arising is control over the senses. Thus the Buddha teaches, as the > discipline for keeping the hindrances in check, an exercise called > the restraint of the sense faculties (indriya-samvara): > When he perceives a form with the eye, a sound with the ear, an odour > with the nose, a taste with the tongue, an impression with the body, > or an object with the mind, he apprehends neither the sign nor the > particulars. And he strives to ward off that through which evil and > unwholesome states, greed and sorrow, would arise, if he remained > with unguarded senses; and he watches over his senses, restrains his > senses.[5] > Restraint of the senses does not mean denial of the senses, > retreating into a total withdrawal from the sensory world. This is > impossible, and even if it could be achieved, the real problem would > still not be solved; for the defilements lie in the mind, not in the > sense organs or objects. The key to sense control is indicated by the > phrase "not apprehending the sign or the particulars." The "sign" > (nimitta) is the object's general appearance insofar as this > appearance is grasped as the basis for defiled thoughts; > the "particulars" (anubyanjana) are its less conspicuous features. If > sense control is lacking, the mind roams recklessly over the sense > fields. First it grasps the sign, which sets the defilements into > motion, then it explores the particulars, which permits them to > multiply and thrive. > To restrain the senses requires that mindfulness and clear > understanding be applied to the encounter with the sense fields. > Sense consciousness occurs in a series, as a sequence of momentary > cognitive acts each having its own special task. The initial stages > in the series occur as automatic functions: first the mind adverts to > the object, then apprehends it, then admits the percept, examines it, > and identifies it. Immediately following the identification a space > opens up in which there occurs a free evaluation of the object > leading to the choice of a response. When mindfulness is absent the > latent defilements, pushing for an opportunity to emerge, will > motivate a wrong consideration. One will grasp the sign of the > object, explore its details, and thereby give the defilements their > opportunity: on account of greed one will become fascinated by an > agreeable object, on account of aversion one will be repelled by a > disagreeable object. But when one applies mindfulness to the sensory > encounter, one nips the cognitive process in the bud before it can > evolve into the stages that stimulate the dormant taints. Mindfulness > holds the hindrances in check by keeping the mind at the level of > what is sensed. It rivets awareness on the given, preventing the mind > from embellishing the datum with ideas born of greed, aversion, and > delusion. Then, with this lucent awareness as a guide, the mind can > proceed to comprehend the object as it is, without being led astray." > Http://www.vipassana.com/resources/8fp5.html > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > The only other mention of nimitta that I found is in an article by > Bhikkhu Sona on "The Mystery of the Breath Nimitta" which I have > resolutely resisted reading, as I have an Assignment to complete. It > seems to speak of nimitta with a slightly different meaning, and > raises questions saying..............." there is a significant puzzle > to be solved by any meditator or scholar who tries to clearly > understand the qualities of experience, > > I will attempt to show that there are good grounds for confusion on > this matter as one traces the historical progression of the > commentarial accounts from the Patisambhidamagga through the > Vimuttimagga to the (later) Visuddhimagga. > Since the Visuddhimagga is so influential and so widely quoted by > modern teachers, it would seem critical that it is reliable and, if > in certain aspects it is not, then, with supporting evidence, to show > clearly why it is not." Hmmmmmmmmm > The resolution not to read yet is fading a little, sounds > fascinating.... > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Metta, > Christine 9721 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 7:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation --- Christine Forsyth wrote: > Dear KenO, > > Thanks for reminding me of this link. I enjoyed reading it again. > > 'Heart-deliverance of loving-kindness' - isn't that a beautiful > phrase? k: It is a beautiful. In fact this is how I interpret as it is directed to other and not oneself. > I think missing out oneself in metta practice shows a lack of > lovingkindness to someone - oneself. > Perhaps a determination that metta should only be directed to beings > other than oneself could be a Christian hangover, based on the > feeling that "love" is associated with "self-sacrifice." But to my > understanding, self-sacrifice is alien to Buddhism - i.e. to early > and Theravada Buddhism. Is it possible that to be preoccupied with > not sending metta to oneself is to show evidence of obsession with > oneself, thus contradicting the spirit and teaching of not-self? k: I think the problem with Mahayana is that the self sacrifice is over emphasised. In the Chinese sayings, too much compassion, the method becomes counterproductive. Without wisdom, self sacrifice is not going to be helpful to oneself or others and to me, this is indeed very counter productive. k: Sending metta to oneself, I would say should be done with utmost cautions due to our nature to cling to pluasant feelings which could arise in metta meditation. By sending it out to others, then the problem of clinging is less of a problem but that does not mean that we will not cling to it. Metta is an antidote to dosa as been said in one of the sutta in the Ven link. It very good to practise but sorry to be blunt it should not to be used as an antidote to one fatiguenss or one pshycological needs. It defeats metta purpose and to me this is clinging to feelings or emotions. Kind regards Ken O > From the same link, The Venerable says...... > "Loving-kindness ought to be brought to the point where there are no > longer any barriers set between persons, and for this the following > example is given: Suppose a man is with a dear, a neutral and a > hostile person, himself being the fourth; then bandits come to him > and say "we need one of you for human sacrifice." Now if that man > thinks "Let then take this one, or that one," he has not yet broken > down the barriers, and also if he thinks "Let them take me but not > these three," he has not broken down the barriers either. Why not? > Because he seeks the harm of him who he wishes to be taken and the > welfare of only the other three. It is only when he does not see a > single one among the four to be chosen in preference to the other > three, and directs his mind quite impartially towards himself and the > other three, that he has broken down the barriers." > > metta, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Christine > > > > Something I get from this link written by Ven Ñanamoli Thera. He > also > > suggested the same as Ven Bodhi. > > > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/wheel007.html > > > > However when I read the references, my inclination is that this > training > > is directed towards others. I think my interpretation started > from "we > > shall abide with loving kindness extending to that person, and we > shall > > abide..." Even though this suttas is in relation to unkind speech, > I > > think it is quite relevant in the practise of metta mediation as a > whole. > (from Ven links) > > 4. From the Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 21 > > (spoken by the Buddha) > > > > "Our minds will remain unaffected, we shall utter no bad words, we > shall > > abide friendly and compassionate, with thoughts of loving-kindness > and no > > inner hate. We shall abide with loving-kindness in our hearts > extending to > > that person, and we shall dwell extending it to the entire world as > our > > object, with our hearts abundant, exalted, measureless in loving- > kindness, > > without hostility or ill-will." That is how you should train > yourselves. " > > Personally I do not think it is directed at oneself. At first few > glances > > at the below suttas I was thinking it was directed to oneself. > After > > looking at the above paragrah and this paragraph again and again, I > more > > incline to think that it is directed at others. The establishment > of this > > practise is on others and not oneself. > > (from Ven link) > > 7. From the Samyutta Nikaya, 20:3 > > (spoken by the Buddha) > > "So, bhikkhus, you should train in this way: The heart-deliverance > of > > loving-kindness will be maintained in being and made much of by us, > used > > as our vehicle, used as our foundation, established, consolidated, > and > > properly managed. That is how you should train." > > > > (from Ven link) > > 9. From the Digha Nikaya, Sutta 33 > > (spoken by the Arahant Sariputta) > > Here, friends, a bhikkhu might say: "When the heart-deliverance of > > loving-kindness is maintained in being and made much of by me, used > as my > > vehicle, used as my foundation, established, consolidated, and > properly > > managed, ill-will nevertheless still invades my heart and remains." > He > > should be told: "Not so. Let the worthy one not say so. Let him not > > misrepresent the Blessed One. It is not good to misrepresent the > Blessed > > One. The Blessed One would not express it thus." Friends, it is > > impossible, it cannot happen, that when the heart-deliverance of > > loving-kindness is maintained in being and made much of, used as > one's > > vehicle, used as one's foundation, established, consolidated, and > properly > > managed, ill-will can invade the heart and remain; for this, that > is to > > say, the heart-deliverance of loving-kindness, is the escape from > > ill-will. > > Kind regards > > Ken O 9722 From: Dan Dalthorp Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 7:57am Subject: Re: purpose? Hi Dan, Erik wrote an interesting comment that you may want to comment on this weekend. To wit: > to a (limited) visceral degree. In my opinion I think study of the > Abhidhamma to the exclusion of the BASIC BASIC practices outlined in > the Satipatthana Sutta (all of them) is unhelpful, potentially even > a hindrance. Of course I expect some here on DSG may disagree with > this opinion, heh heh heh! :) Hope your work is going well. Say hello to the wife and kids for me! Best wishes, Dan 9723 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 9:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] The Two Truths (for Howard) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Erik - > > This is excellent, and I thank you for sending it, though I think it > may have been someone other than I who had requested info about the two > truths. > Just one comment: It seems to me that not all "things" consist of > parts. In fact, that *may* be a parameter whereby one can distinguish > so-called "ultimate dhammas" from purely conventional ones. For example, the > experience of the rupa of solidity is indivisible or irreducible. While > solidity never arises independent of conditions for its arising, and while > solidity never arises apart from the experience of solidity (so that it is > discernment-dependent), still solidity has no parts. Thus when it is said > that all things arise in dependence on their parts, I think that needs > qualification. It needs to be restricted to those dhammas which are not > direct objects of discernment, but are concept-only (such as people, trees, > cars, and chariots). Hi Howard, What about the "experience of solidity" arises independent of the ayatanas, of nama, of rupa? Are the ayatanas parts? Are rupas parts? Is not this experience of solidity not also applicable in the sense of being a dependent arising in the way described? If not, it would imply "solidity" is partless, "ultimately real". But solidity is not partless in an ultimate sense; solidity depends on rupa and nama. The EXPERIENCE of solidity may be irreducible conventionally; but is it irreducible that the experience of solidity exists by way of its own character or entity, all by its lonesome? Is it real in an ultimate sense, or merely designated in dependence on object and observer? 9724 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 10:00am Subject: Cambodia Ch 12, no 2. Cambodia, Ch 12, no 2. Kulvilai: I heard Acharn say that we should pay attention to the kusala of someone else in order to rejoice in it (anumodana), and as regards ourselves, we should look for our akusala in order to eradicate it. Sujin: Do we look for it or do we see it? Kulavilai: We should see it. Sujin: If a saying is true, it must be spoken by the Buddha, no matter which method of explanation is used. One should not be fixed on it to find out in which text of the scriptures these words can be found. If they are true they explain realities. Nipat: There is the following saying of the Buddha: ³We should not think of the superior and the mean deeds of someone else, but we should think of the superior and the mean deeds of ourselves.² Sujin: Isn¹t that also in agreement with the saying that we should not pay attention to the evils of someone else? It is certain that the citta will be impure when we see someone else¹s evil. We should immediately realize that we forget to consider our own citta at that moment. If we look into the mirror we can see our own citta at that moment and we can find out what kind of citta thinks in that way. Therefore, instead of thinking of someone else¹s evil, which conditions the arising of akusala, we should think of his wholesomeness. When we think of someone else¹s wholesomeness, without jealousy or contempt, it is excellent. At that moment there is kusala citta. Nipat: In the Buddha¹s time there were not yet books and people could study the teachings by listening, not by means of textbooks. Those who listened could immediately understand what they heard. At the present time it is difficult for us to reach the level of abandoning the clinging to texts. Question: When Khun Jaran knows hardness, is this of the level of pariyatti, theoretical knowledge, or patipatti, practice? Jaran: It is the practice; well, I am not sure. Kimrod: Someone should not use the word practice, if he is not sure about its meaning. Jaran: Pariyatti is theoretical understanding of realities according to the texts. Acharn asks about my understanding when I study the texts. I do not know whether my understanding at such moments is of the level of pariyatti or patipatti. But I still think that there is a self who is here. Sujin: Paìipatti is different from pariyatti. When there is only pariyatti, theoretical understanding, and not paìipatti, one may doubt which it is. What appears at this moment? Jaran: Hardness appears at my hand. Sujin: Is this pariyatti or paìipatti? Jaran: Pariyatti. Sujin: If there is paìipatti, what is it? Jaran: When a characteristic of reality appears to sati there is paìipatti. Sujin: That is the difference. We understand the name or the meaning of the word sati. However, when sati arises with dåna or síla, it may not be apparent. At the level of samatha, when the citta is calm, free from akusala, there is sati but it does not appear as non-self. However, when sati of the level of satipaììhåna arises, its characteristic appears. When hardness is experienced through touch, everybody can say that this is hard. When people experience heat, taste something hot or sweet, or when they hear a sound, they know it and they can say what it is. The reason is that citta is the reality which can experience an object through each of the doorways. Seeing-consciousness sees what appears through the eyes and hearing-consciousness hears sound. When odour appears, smelling-consciousness experiences odour. When flavour is experienced, tasting-consciousness experiences flavour. If something is experienced through body-contact, body-consciousness is the reality that experiences hardness naturally, and everybody knows this. However, when sammå-sati, right mindfulness, arises and is aware, there is understanding based on listening, which realizes that there is no self. It realizes that there are elements or dhammas, each with their own characteristics, that are able to appear through the doorways of the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the bodysense and the mind-door. The realities that appear through the bodysense are the characteristics of softness, hardness, cold, heat, motion or pressure appearing at this moment. However, when they have appeared, they pass away extremely rapidly. Mind-door process cittas arising afterwards know that there is a table or a chair, but whenever sati arises and is aware, the mind-door process cittas do not know concepts, but they know realities. Understanding, although it is still very slight, can begin to realize that there are dhammas, each with their own characteristic, and at such moments there is no need to think of them or to speak about them. There can be understanding of the characteristic of hardness that appears at such a moment, it can be realized as a kind of dhamma that has the characteristic of hardness. When hardness appears, there are two kinds of realities: hardness and the experience of hardness. The moment of sati and of paññå that gradually begins to understand realities, is very short, because such a moment arises and then falls away extremely rapidly. It is impossible that is immediately clear understanding of realities. There can gradually be awareness and more understanding of the characteristic which experiences, of the reality which experiences hardness; there will be more understanding of that characteristic as it really is. This is satipatthåna, but not yet of the level of pativedha, the direct realization of the truth. One only begins to develop correct understanding of the characteristics of realities we used to take for people, for beings, for this or that thing. When sati arises and is aware of what appears, one begins to understand that there are only different dhammas, each with their own characteristic, and that this is reality. When sati arises people will know when they are forgetful of realities and when there is sati. Knowing the difference between the moment of sati and the moment of forgetfulness is the beginning level of its development, and people can only know this themselves. Other people cannot know with regard to someone else what sati is aware of, whether sati arises or not. Each person can only know this for himself. *** 9725 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 8:58am Subject: Not Inflicting E-Viruses on Others Hi, all - With regard to an e-virus caught by someone on one of the e-lists I'm on, a friend of mine came up with the following altruistic suggestion which I'm passing on to you: "You should tell the people on your various lists to create an AddressBook entry named: !000000000 or AAAA or some such, with no e-mail address. This entry will be listed as the first name in the AddressBook and will be read as an error by any program set up to send an e-mail to all people in one's Address Book, and will not proceed with the task." It seems like a rather good idea to me! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9726 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 2:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] where is self view stored? --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert - > > In a message dated 11/28/01 1:11:08 AM Eastern Standard Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > Hi, Mike - > > > > > > In a message dated 11/26/01 11:01:43 PM Eastern Standard Time, > > > mlnease@y... writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Robert, > > > > > > > > Doesn't ditthi arise with sankhaarakhanda? Or have I > > > > misunderstood this? I do take your point re. its > > > > being conditioned rather than stored. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > =========================== > > > It strikes me that both Robert and you are correct. There is the > > > inclination to the sense of self, to reification, and this is passed > > > subliminally (at the anusaya level?); and when the needed conditions are > > > present, it is expressed as an active outflowing (asava?). (One isn't > > ALWAYS > > > "selfing"! ;-) Or so it seems to me. > > > > > > With metta, > > > Howard > > > > This is very nice Howard, showing that the occurence of the 'self' is > > probably > > just another arising moment, rather than a real structure of some kind. Of > > course > > the pinball responses of various thoughts and feelings that are activated > > around > > the idea of the self is probably pretty complicated, but the arising of the > > self-concept itself is just another moment. > > > > I think if we look back carefully, we can probably find the 'record in > > memory' of > > moments where we just responded, just looked, just smiled, just had a > > thought, > > without any 'self consciousness' present. > > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Yes, I think so. This is a point that Buddhadasa Bhikkhu also made. It > also so happens that Bankei, a Zen master a book of whose writings I'm in the > midst of reading, also said pretty much the same thing but in different > terms. > -------------------------------------------------------------- > It might not be so easy to see, but it> > > would be an interesting research project. I'm under the impression that > > these > > sorts of moments occur all the time, but that they are then 'owned' by a > > subsequent self-moment, which takes itself as the subject to these objects. > > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I would guess that much of the time we are really "at ease", without > apparent grasping, pushing away, or desiring, there are moments relatively > free of "selfing" interspersed. How little "self" there is must, I would > think, also be a function of the degree of mindfulness and clear > comprehension present as well. That is, the conditions for the arising (or > non-arising) of "selfing" include both emotive and cognitive ones. > ---------------------------------------------------------------- Makes sense, Howard. An interesting way of looking at the mechanism of 'self-ownership'. Robert Ep. 9728 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 3:03pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Dukkha (was, Concepts) --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Rob Ep > > --- Robert Epstein wrote: > > > I would say that under this definition, suffering includes any > > experience that > > does not include the arising of wisdom [panna]. The reason for this is > > that the > > commentary makes clear that *all* life-experiences in the normal course > > of events > > either contains or leads to the experience of suffering. Because > > phenomonal > > experience is constantly arising and falling away, it is inherently > > unstable, > > confusing and dissatisfying. The very nature of experience is extremely > > insecure > > and ungraspable and leads to the state we find ourselves in, in which > > everyone is > > nearly always in a somewhat bad mood! > > > > The only stable force in this wayward universe is the state in which > > panna arises. > > From the standpoint of discernment one can account for and see the flow > > of > > impermanent events as nothing but what it is, neither grasping it nor > > trying to > > get away from it. In this state, the experience of life is accepted and > > no longer > > unbalances consciousness. > > > > Anyway, that's a stab at it. Did I pass? > > > > Robert Ep. > > Far be it from me to grade anyone on such a subject. But to my limited > understanding, you have done very well indeed. A couple of comments. > > First, even the citta with wisdom, which you exclude from the class of > experiences that are ‘suffering’, would seem to meet the basic criterion > for suffering which you give (correctly, I believe) in these terms: > “Because phenomenal experience is constantly arising and falling away, it > is inherently unstable, confusing and dissatisfying”. So, you may like to > refine your answer further... > > Secondly, apart from namas, what about rupas -- should these be considered > as suffering also, according to your understanding of the texts? > > Jon > > PS Not a test, not homework -- think of it as a quiz ;-)) Ah, well here we have a vicious feedback loop! I just asked Rob to help explain the nature of rupas, as I was having trouble understanding any form of perception that did not involve the formation of a concept [nama]. Rob's answer was that after we discussed 'conditions' we can move on to study rupas! So unless you can convince Rob to answer me sooner, or sneak me an answer yourself, I won't be able to say anything for at least six months! Provisionally though, I would say that direct perception of the current reality as what it actually is should be exempt from suffering. Why? Because there is no expectation that it will last longer than a moment, therefore there is no discomfort or dissatisfaction at its impermanence. Best, Robert Ep. 9729 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 10:04am Subject: Re: [dsg] The Two Truths (for Howard) Hi, Erik - In a message dated 11/29/01 12:11:54 PM Eastern Standard Time, rikpa21@y... writes: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Erik - > > > > This is excellent, and I thank you for sending it, though I > think it > > may have been someone other than I who had requested info about > the two > > truths. > > Just one comment: It seems to me that not all "things" > consist of > > parts. In fact, that *may* be a parameter whereby one can > distinguish > > so-called "ultimate dhammas" from purely conventional ones. For > example, the > > experience of the rupa of solidity is indivisible or irreducible. > While > > solidity never arises independent of conditions for its arising, > and while > > solidity never arises apart from the experience of solidity (so > that it is > > discernment-dependent), still solidity has no parts. Thus when it > is said > > that all things arise in dependence on their parts, I think that > needs > > qualification. It needs to be restricted to those dhammas which > are not > > direct objects of discernment, but are concept-only (such as > people, trees, > > cars, and chariots). > > Hi Howard, > > What about the "experience of solidity" arises independent of the > ayatanas, of nama, of rupa? ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Nothing. Of course it depends on these. -------------------------------------------------------------- Are the ayatanas parts? Are rupas parts? > > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Parts of what? The faculty of touch is not a part of the experience of solidity, but is a condition for it. I agree that in a sense, the nama of tactile vi~n~nana and the rupa of solidity are "parts" of every solidity experience, but I think the term 'pole' or 'aspect' would be better to use than 'part'. Every five-sensory experience has a namic pole and a rupic pole; they co-occur as inseparable aspects of that experience. But more to the point, while the experience of solidity (i.e., the event) has the rupa of solidity as a "part" and the nama of tactile discernment as a "part", neither the solidity, itself, nor the discernment, itself, to the extent that it makes any sense at all to speak of them independently of the other, have parts. ---------------------------------------------------------- Is not this experience of solidity not also applicable in the sense > > of being a dependent arising in the way described? If not, it would > imply "solidity" is partless, "ultimately real". -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Something may be partless but arise in dependence on conditions. Why must it have parts? -------------------------------------------------------- But solidity is not > > partless in an ultimate sense; solidity depends on rupa and nama. --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: To depend on something is not necessarily to have that thing as a part. Speaking conventionally, my body arose in dependence on my parents. But they are not parts of my body!! There seems to be a confusion between "being a condition for" and "being a part of". The latter is an (atemporal) instance of the former, the former being more general. The notion that a condition for something must be a "part" of that thing strikes me as a type of substantialism, wherein the cause "continues" into the effect, the very sort of thing that would make Nagarjuna unhappy. ------------------------------------------------------------ > > The EXPERIENCE of solidity may be irreducible conventionally; but is > it irreducible that the experience of solidity exists by way of its > own character or entity, all by its lonesome? ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't consider that experience to be irreducible, just partless. I'm making a very specific technical point here. ----------------------------------------------------------- Is it real in an > > ultimate sense, or merely designated in dependence on object and > observer? ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: The latter. ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9730 From: Victor Yu Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 6:38pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Dukkha (was, Concepts) Hi Robert Ep. Direct perception itself is impermanent. What is impermanent is stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha. Regards, Victor > > Provisionally though, I would say that direct perception of the current reality as > what it actually is should be exempt from suffering. Why? Because there is no > expectation that it will last longer than a moment, therefore there is no > discomfort or dissatisfaction at its impermanence. > > Best, > Robert Ep. 9731 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 6:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: cittas-(Jon) Nina Many thanks for this reference. I have not been able to find the copy of this text that I thought we had. I will follow up later when I manage to get hold of the passage in question. Thanks again for pointing it out. Jon --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 12-11-2001 14:47 schreef Jonothan Abbott op jonoabb@y...: > > > Num > > > > > >> Manodvara-vithi which continues the object (aramana) from > 5-sense-door > >> process (panca-dvara-vithi) > >> > >> 1.Atitak-kahana-vithi (atita = past, kahana = grasping or forming) > >> 2.Smuhak-kahana-vithi (smuha = group, mass) > >> 3.Atthak-kahana-vithi (attha = meaning) > >> 4.Namak-kahana-vithi (nama = name) > >> > >> In Eye-door-process, after eye-door-process, > > (1) Atitak-kahana-vithi occurs > >> alternatively and repeatedly with eye-door-process for numerous > times. > >> Then follows by > > (2) Smuhak-kahana-vithi. It's function is to gather colors > >> together, again occurs repeatedly many times. Then follows by > > (3) Attak-kahana-vithi, knows the meaning of what has just been seen > and > >> finally > > (4) Namak-kahana-vithi functions as recognition of the name of > >> the objects. (3) & (4) also occur repeatedly many times. > >> > >> To sum. up (1) and (2) have paramattha as aramana, (3) & (4) have > >> pannatti as aramana. > >> > >> There is also another type of manodvara-vithi which does not occur > after > >> sense-door-process as well. > >> > > Dear Jonothan, there is another edition of Abhidhammatta Sangaha, > translated > as Compendium of Buddhist Philosophy. It has an introductory essay with > the > same info (p. 32,33): > atiitaggaha.na, samudaayaggaha.na, atthaggaha.na, naamagggaha.na. (Num's > kk > become gg). I shall not add more, I lack time. Nina. 9732 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 7:10pm Subject: Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: Hi Howard, my dear friend! Erik: What about the "experience of solidity" arises independent of the ayatanas, of nama, of rupa? > ------------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Nothing. Of course it depends on these. > -------------------------------------------------------------- > Are the ayatanas parts? Are rupas parts? > > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Parts of what? The faculty of touch is not a part of the experience of > solidity, but > is a condition for it. I agree that in a sense, the nama of tactile vi~n~nana > and the rupa of solidity are "parts" of every solidity experience, but I > think the term 'pole' or 'aspect' would be better to use than 'part'. Okay then, so it suonds as though we're working with some semantical issues here in the use of the term "part". "Condition" would probably be a more accurate word to use. With that in mind, I think this discussion may be more useful. One consideration. One of the most important ways of describing emptiness is in breaking down the notion that no thing possesses fixed entity. The example given (chariot, person, etc.) deals mainly with these, but this issue goes much deeper, and has been the cause for GREAT debate--at least in the Tibetan Madhyamika-Prasangika system. For one take on this: "The [hypothetical] Vaibhashikas hold that mind, divided into cognition and mental events, exists as objectively real. The arising and dissolving of the five sense faculties and five sense fields also exist as objectively real. Non-concurrent formations, the three uncompounded elements such as the sky, and the past and future of things, they assert that these elements truly exist. They also assert that gross objects and the continuum of objects are unreal. Consciousness arises out of truly existent sense faculties and objects. The eye directly perceives form. "The most refined Vaibhashika doctrines, like the Kashmir School, assert that all compounded phenomena dissolve from moment to moment and thus are impermanent. They maintain that the personal self is merely a mental designation and insubstantial. "The Vaibhashikas maintain that the Seven Books Of Abhidharma are the words of the Buddha. Because the sutras contain many teachings with hidden meanings and provisional truths, they believe it is necessary to rely on a commentary for the view and teachings, called the Mahavaibhasa." Howard: Every > five-sensory experience has a namic pole and a rupic pole; they co- occur as > inseparable aspects of that experience. But more to the point, while the > experience of solidity (i.e., the event) has the rupa of solidity as a "part" > and the nama of tactile discernment as a "part", neither the solidity, > itself, nor the discernment, itself, to the extent that it makes any sense at > all to speak of them independently of the other, have parts. This is an interesting and subtle point, one I'd like to research some more, if you don't mind. Just off-the-cuff, are you suggesting that the exisrience of "hardness" has reality in an ultimate sense, as a "true existent"? This is the subtle distinction I think the Madhyamika philosophers are trying to refute, but please forgive me if I misprepresent this position beause it's been awhile for me on debating this particular position :). > ---------------------------------------------------------- > Is not this experience of solidity not also applicable in the sense > > > of being a dependent arising in the way described? If not, it would > > imply "solidity" is partless, "ultimately real". > -------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Something may be partless but arise in dependence on conditions. Why > must it have parts? Let's just toss the word "parts" and erplace it with "conditions". I think that will go a long way toward solving the particular dilemma that is appearing now. > -------------------------------------------------------- > But solidity is not > > > partless in an ultimate sense; solidity depends on rupa and nama. > --------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > To depend on something is not necessarily to have that thing as a > part. Speaking conventionally, my body arose in dependence on my parents. But > they are not parts of my body!! There seems to be a confusion between "being > a condition for" and "being a part of". The latter is an (atemporal) instance > of the former, the former being more general. The notion that a condition for > something must be a "part" of that thing strikes me as a type of > substantialism, wherein the cause "continues" into the effect, the very sort > of thing that would make Nagarjuna unhappy. Just one note: one key point in the opint on the "two truths" made in my earler post was the emphasis given to refuting the notion that composed physical entities exist independent of parts. Let's not take this one too far. You make excellent points, as always Howard, and I accept your reasoning here completely. But since one of the fundamental historical problems dealt with by the Mahdyamika philosophers dealt exlpicitly with the refutation of things like "partless particles" (refuted by Vasubhandu) of the Sautrrantika school, and even the substantialism fuond in the "lower Madhyamika" Svtantrika school of Bhavaviveka where he asserted a difference in the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, perhaps this context may provide more context for why this particular mode of explanation is used in the tripartite analysis of dependent origination refuting "partfulness" given earlier. > > The EXPERIENCE of solidity may be irreducible conventionally; but is > > it irreducible that the experience of solidity exists by way of its > > own character or entity, all by its lonesome? > ----------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't consider that experience to be irreducible, just partless. I'm > making a very specific technical point here. Not ierreducible? In what sense? I am little confused here on your meaning and intent. I had assumed that the notion of a paramattha dhamma correctly understood dealt with its irreducibility as an element of experience. I hope I'm making sense and not creating more confusion here! :) As always, a pleasure Howard, Erik 9733 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 9:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Dukkha (was, Concepts) Thanks for your good point. My thought was that if the perceiver has transcended all clinging, the dukkha inherent in the act of perception is also transcended. Robert Ep. --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi Robert Ep. > > Direct perception itself is impermanent. What is impermanent is > stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha. > > Regards, > Victor > > > > > Provisionally though, I would say that direct perception of the current > reality as > > what it actually is should be exempt from suffering. Why? Because there > is no > > expectation that it will last longer than a moment, therefore there is no > > discomfort or dissatisfaction at its impermanence. > > > > Best, > > Robert Ep. 9734 From: Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 5:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Hi, Erik - I suspect that we are really not differing substantively at all, but merely in your using "dependence on parts" as synonymous with "dependence on conditions". In a message dated 11/29/01 10:30:53 PM Eastern Standard Time, rikpa21@y... writes: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi Howard, my dear friend! > > Erik: > > What about the "experience of solidity" arises independent of the > ayatanas, of nama, of rupa? > > ------------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Nothing. Of course it depends on these. > > -------------------------------------------------------------- > > Are the ayatanas parts? Are rupas parts? > > > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Parts of what? The faculty of touch is not a part of the > experience of > > solidity, but > > is a condition for it. I agree that in a sense, the nama of > tactile vi~n~nana > > and the rupa of solidity are "parts" of every solidity experience, > but I > > think the term 'pole' or 'aspect' would be better to use > than 'part'. > > Okay then, so it suonds as though we're working with some semantical > issues here in the use of the term "part". "Condition" would > probably be a more accurate word to use. ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Yes. I think this is the crux. ------------------------------------------------------------ With that in mind, I think > > this discussion may be more useful. One consideration. One of the > most important ways of describing emptiness is in breaking down the > notion that no thing possesses fixed entity. The example given > (chariot, person, etc.) deals mainly with these, but this issue goes > much deeper, and has been the cause for GREAT debate--at least in > the Tibetan Madhyamika-Prasangika system. For one take on this: > > "The [hypothetical] Vaibhashikas hold that mind, divided into > cognition and mental events, exists as objectively real. The arising > and dissolving of the five sense faculties and five sense fields > also exist as objectively real. Non-concurrent formations, the three > uncompounded elements such as the sky, and the past and future of > things, they assert that these elements truly exist. They also > assert that gross objects and the continuum of objects are unreal. > Consciousness arises out of truly existent sense faculties and > objects. The eye directly perceives form. > > "The most refined Vaibhashika doctrines, like the Kashmir School, > assert that all compounded phenomena dissolve from moment to moment > and thus are impermanent. They maintain that the personal self is > merely a mental designation and insubstantial. > > "The Vaibhashikas maintain that the Seven Books Of Abhidharma are > the words of the Buddha. Because the sutras contain many teachings > with hidden meanings and provisional truths, they believe it is > necessary to rely on a commentary for the view and teachings, called > the Mahavaibhasa." > > Howard: > Every > > five-sensory experience has a namic pole and a rupic pole; they co- > occur as > > inseparable aspects of that experience. But more to the point, > while the > > experience of solidity (i.e., the event) has the rupa of solidity > as a "part" > > and the nama of tactile discernment as a "part", neither the > solidity, > > itself, nor the discernment, itself, to the extent that it makes > any sense at > > all to speak of them independently of the other, have parts. > > This is an interesting and subtle point, one I'd like to research > some more, if you don't mind. Just off-the-cuff, are you suggesting > that the exisrience of "hardness" has reality in an ultimate sense, > as a "true existent"? > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Certainly not. ALL that I meant was that hardness (or, better, any hardness-instance) has no parts. [Actually, as an aside, I don't really think there *is* a thing called "hardness" to be encountered, but there *are* hardness-instances which are encountered. The abstraction 'hardness' is, from my perspective, mere concept - but a concept that is grounded in direct experience.] But for sure it arises in dependence on conditions, including cognition, and it is nothing in-and-of-itself (though not an absolutely nullity ). ----------------------------------------------------- This is the subtle distinction I think the > > Madhyamika philosophers are trying to refute, but please forgive me > if I misprepresent this position beause it's been awhile for me on > debating this particular position :). > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Is not this experience of solidity not also applicable in the > sense > > > > of being a dependent arising in the way described? If not, it > would > > > imply "solidity" is partless, "ultimately real". > > -------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Something may be partless but arise in dependence on > conditions. Why > > must it have parts? > > Let's just toss the word "parts" and erplace it with "conditions". > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Then that leaves nothing we disagree on with repect to this matter. I was ONLY taking exception to the notion that everything consists of parts. The issue I was addressing is a relatively trivial one. --------------------------------------------------------- I > > think that will go a long way toward solving the particular dilemma > that is appearing now. > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > > But solidity is not > > > > partless in an ultimate sense; solidity depends on rupa and nama. > > --------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > To depend on something is not necessarily to have that > thing as a > > part. Speaking conventionally, my body arose in dependence on my > parents. But > > they are not parts of my body!! There seems to be a confusion > between "being > > a condition for" and "being a part of". The latter is an > (atemporal) instance > > of the former, the former being more general. The notion that a > condition for > > something must be a "part" of that thing strikes me as a type of > > substantialism, wherein the cause "continues" into the effect, the > very sort > > of thing that would make Nagarjuna unhappy. > > Just one note: one key point in the opint on the "two truths" made > in my earler post was the emphasis given to refuting the notion that > composed physical entities exist independent of parts. Let's not > take this one too far. You make excellent points, as always Howard, > and I accept your reasoning here completely. But since one of the > fundamental historical problems dealt with by the Mahdyamika > philosophers dealt exlpicitly with the refutation of things > like "partless particles" (refuted by Vasubhandu) of the > Sautrrantika school, and even the substantialism fuond in the "lower > Madhyamika" Svtantrika school of Bhavaviveka where he asserted a > difference in the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of > phenomena, perhaps this context may provide more context for why > this particular mode of explanation is used in the tripartite > analysis of dependent origination refuting "partfulness" given > earlier. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: For sure, when something is composed of parts, that fact is enough to easily show the lack of inherent existence in that thing as well to show its existing in dependence on mental designation. But even a so-called paramattha dhamma - a dhamma which is directly discerned and is irreducible *in the sense* of not being the referent of a mere concept mentally constructed from the concepts of paramattha dhammas, and not being decomposable into parts - is lacking essence/own being, because all worldly dhammas arise in dependence on conditions, and are thus empty. (Let's avoid bringing nibbana into this conversation. This matter is complex enough without bringing that in! ;-) ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > The EXPERIENCE of solidity may be irreducible conventionally; > but is > > > it irreducible that the experience of solidity exists by way of > its > > > own character or entity, all by its lonesome? > > ----------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > I don't consider that experience to be irreducible, just > partless. I'm > > making a very specific technical point here. > > Not ierreducible? In what sense? I am little confused here on your > meaning and intent. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: With respect to this, please see the last comment I made about paramattha dhammas. -------------------------------------------------------- I had assumed that the notion of a paramattha > > dhamma correctly understood dealt with its irreducibility as an > element of experience. I hope I'm making sense and not creating more > confusion here! :) > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: From my perspective, every element of samsaric experience is reducible in the sense of depending on other such experiences. ------------------------------------------------------- > > As always, a pleasure Howard, > Erik > > ======================== Likewise, Erik. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9735 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 10:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) --- upasaka@a... wrote: > ------------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > ... ALL that I meant was that hardness (or, better, any > hardness-instance) has no parts. [Actually, as an aside, I don't really think > there *is* a thing called "hardness" to be encountered, but there *are* > hardness-instances which are encountered. The abstraction 'hardness' is, from > my perspective, mere concept - but a concept that is grounded in direct > experience.] Dear Howard, I thought I would pick up on this, since there are a few interesting issues contained therein. When you say there are 'hardness-instances', I take you to mean that there is an experience of that which we then interpret as hardness, not that the abstraction 'hardness' itself is actually encountered. I would say further that if we wanted to discuss the encounter with 'hardness' in phenomenal language we would need a lot more language that we don't have, and that even that language would obviously reach a limit, since language itself is an abstraction that does not directly describe anything. But we could say in a phenomenally styled language that in making contact with a particular surface that we encounter a moment of 'not-yielding', a moment of 'non-penetrating', a moment of 'smoothness', a moment of 'pushing back', a moment of 'firmness', etc., as we pick up various perceptual aspects from contact with an 'object'. This kind of phenomenal language could go a long way to creating a description of what non-conceptual experience might be like, with actualities being approximated, rather than glossing them into overall impressions, such as 'hardness' as an abiding characteristic. Anyway, I thought that might be worth talking about. My own undergraduate background, many years ago, in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty seems very relevant to this idea, of finding a language that describes rather than defines experience. As far as Western philosophy goes, there are some beautiful descriptions of how this might work in the world of Merleau-Ponty, a truly poetic philosopher. Best, Robert Ep. ========================= 9736 From: Sarah Date: Thu Nov 29, 2001 10:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Dear Victor, --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi Sarah, > It is very interesting to read about the references with the pali word > "piya." I am learning something. :-) Thank you. > .................... S: I think we both are, including the different interpretations and conclusions that we can both draw about the same texts, even as in the Udana passage, when we have the commentary and Pali notes;-) I understand the Brahma Viharas to have other beings as object, which I realise may be a ‘minority’ view. This doesn’t meant the cittas are necessarily akusala (unwholesome) when they have oneself as object. For example, there may be wise reflection on ‘one’s’ good deeds performed or on the danger or harmful nature of ‘one’s’ bad deeds. If the citta is wholesome, we don't have to pinpoint exactly whether the cetasika accompanying it is metta or alobha or detachment . If there is direct understanding of realities, including metta, as not-self, this is most helpful indeed. However, it’s helpful to begin to understand how very prevalent attachment is, even when it’s taken for something skilful. We read in the Visuddhimagga (XV11) that there are 108 kinds of craving, including 18 kinds for the objects experienced through the 6 doors. Is it really possible to find anything dear without attachment I wonder? I’m going to let the other references rest as we’ve both shared our understandings. I would just like to discuss the Dhp verse a little more, however, because we have the Pali and I just read the delightful story from the Commentary which I’d like to share. .................... S: > > 3. Dhammapada verse: > > > > tasma piyaj na kayiratha piyapayo hi papako > > gantha tesaj na vijjanti yesaj natthi piyappiyaj > > > > (DhP 211) > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > Therefore, do not hold anything dear; separation from the dear ones is > bad. > > There are no bonds for those, for whom there is nothing dear or unloved. > > ----------------- V: > Here I think the key word is "hold." It means: do not attach to anything > that is dear. We all have/had mothers and fathers, and they are dear to us. > If we attached to them, there would be sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and > despair when they passed away. .................... S: Literally, I think, the Pali reads: From that (tasma) dear/beloved (piyaj) not (na) should do (kayiratha) loss of dear (piyapayo) is bad (hi papako) etc In other words, the suggestion is that dear (piya) already suggests ‘holding dear’. The short story is that an only son, after hearing some monks teach the Dhamma, wished to become a monk. His parents were very concerned about this and guarded him carefully . He managed to trick them, go to the monastery and ordain. His father followed him, found him in robes and ‘wept and lamented’. He then decided that there was no point in his continuing the lay life, and ordained as well. The mother, for similar reasons, also ordained as a nun. However, the three of them were unable to remain apart and the other monks and nuns told the Buddha that they were always chatting together. The Buddha then said “From the time of retirement from the world, such conduct is highly improper; it is painful both to be deprived of the sight of those who are dear, and to be obliged to look upon that which is not dear; for this reason, whether persons or material things be involved, one should take no account either of what is dear or of what is not dear.” (piyappiyaj). The Buddha then pronounces Dhp verses 209, 210, 211 .................... S:> > The Buddha sometimes uses conventionally true statements and sometimes > > ultimately true statements (as in the 6 Sixes) in the Suttas. This is why > there > > has to be an understanding of paramatha dhammas to understand what is > meant > > when he uses conventional terms. .................... V:> I thought about it, and this is how I understand it now: > The conventional truths and the ultimate truths refer to two categories of > truths. > The ultimate truths refer to the Four Noble Truth, the Dependent > Origination, the Three Characteristics of Phenomenon, and the truths that > are exclusive to what the Buddha taught, that are pertaining to dukkha and > the cessation of dukkha. .................... S: Ultimate or ‘highest’ truths (paramattha saca) refer to all realities (i.e all namas and rupas) regardless of whether there is any understanding of them or not.This may be what you are implying above. .................... V:> The conventional truths refer to the truths that > is not exclusively to what the Buddha taught. For example the statement "2 > + 1 = 3" can be categorized as a conventional truth. .................... S:There have been a lot of discussions on concepts vs realities and all the different categories of concepts. Some of these can be found under this heading at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts The book, ‘Realities and Concepts’ also describes these in detail and can be found on; http://www.abhidhamma.org/ .................... V;> The Buddha used only one speech, the Right Speech. .................... S;Very true;-) .................... V: > Regarding to my question in another post: > When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with right > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.", > was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, what is > not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? > > I think the question itself is not phrased correctly: the idea of > conventional speech does not apply and neither does ultimate speech. > > The Buddha was using Right Speech to teach a truth that leads to the > cessation of dukkha. .................... S: When we say, referring to seeing or visible object, for example, that they are anatta, these are then ultimate truths. Conventional speech would usually say ‘I’m looking at the computer’ for example. It doesn’t mean there is necessarily any wrong view when one speaks conventionally in this way. It just depends on the understanding. So of course, the Buddha always used Right Speech, even though he sometimes (often) used conventional speech. Even at these times, he is always referring to ultimate truths, but it will depend on the wisdom of the listeners as to whether they understand or not. This is why we can say that whatever he talks about, whether in the suttanta, Vinaya or Abhidhamma, he is always teaching the development of Satipatthana and the texts should be read in this light. .................... V;> Thank you for the references. :-) > > Regards, > Victor .................... S: thank you for the opportunities to consider further. Sarah ===================== 9737 From: Sarah and Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 0:03am Subject: Reminder - Non-Theravadin texts Dear All In keeping with the declared focus of this group, members are asked to kindly keep citations from non-Theravadin texts to a minimum. Thanks. Jon & Sarah From the group's homepage: 'A discussion forum for anyone interested in understanding the Buddha's teachings as found in the ancient texts and commentaries of the Theravada tradition.' 9738 From: Christine Forsyth Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 4:11am Subject: Fwd: Re: Ego, soul, awareness, mind, consciousness ... - Dear Robert, Thank you for this kind response...I looked up the story of Bhikkhuni Sela, and found there were two translations, this one you provided by Bodhi and the other by Thanissaro. I think I prefer the BB translation (surprised?), as TB uses the word doll for puppet. Puppet fits more closely my meaning of being manipulated by outside forces; .... and TB uses the grating and truly awful choice of 'horripilation' in the place of BB's 'trepidation'. I had a glance at a couple of the other Bhikkhuni stories, and feel that some of their verses are heavy with condensed meaning - a bit like verse 65 from the Samannaphala Sutta (38 pages of commentarial explanation!) I wonder....in Buddhism, is Mara believed to be real? or a projection of our own desires and impulses? And, the words 'desiring to make her fall away from concentration' - is this the concentration of stylised, sitting meditation, Robert.....? :-) So, the way to overcome Mara seems to be to realise his involvement ...."Then Mara the Evil One, realizing, "The Bhikkhuni knows me," sad and disappointed, disappeared right there." Mara 'the Evil One', 'the Lord of Sensuality' (Such a grand title, such an ignominious defeat - I almost felt sorry for him) Is He described this way to encourage people to 'strive on with vigour' as KenO would say, by showing He is not all-powerful? - If so, this may have an unforeseen consequence - The Christian churches lost much of their vigour about the same time that they softened and disempowered the image of Satan and Hell, and made Him into an almost comic book character. ---------------------------------------------------------- You say: "When I first started to see that this is really the way things are it scared me alot, and I wanted to turn away and try to believe that it was otherwise." But, you know, this is what dukkha really is. We can't stop seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, feeling, knowing, thinking; these dhammas are not ours and they arise by conditions. They oppress by continually arising and ceasing." I found this paragraph to be very valuable Robert. Thanks for sharing that you were once scared too. And, it IS scary when, though not able 'yet' to affirm the truth of anatta, I can't site anything else in the Teachings that I have (to this point) found to be false. It is easy for me to forget that all the longer term members of the List who seem so sure and certain now, weren't always like that. I tend to assume they were born confident. I agree about not being able to stop seeing, hearing, (....) - so, then my not agreeing that there is no control seems irrational, but...Maybe it's a systems theory thing....I'll think about it.... -------------------------------------------------- You say: " The amazing thing is that the more we look into this, and the more obvious dukkha thus becomes, the happier we become. And paradoxically the more we see that there is no control the more freedom we have. The more we see that right effort is a conditioned phenomena the more vigor there is - because we are not wasting energy trying to have what can't yet be had." Maybe I'll have to put this 'happier' idea on hold for a while....I can't see that this would be so => 'the more we see that there is no control the more freedom we have' ........Aren't you really equating 'no control' and 'no responsibility', and 'no responsibility' is surely not the same as 'freedom' , it often grows out of a sense of hopelessness and a feeling that any effort or action will be futile and ineffective. ------------------------------------------------------ You say: 'Other parami are needed too - patience and wisdom should develop together. Could I recommend yet another book - a short one - The Perfections Leading to Enlightenment , which explains the ten parami (much easier than the patthana). You can read it at http://www.abhidhamma.org' Thanks for The Perfections Leading to Enlightenment.....I enjoy your recommendations, but may not get around to properly reading them until the end of December (I'm doing some study for work, a compressed course with a summer semester and no break. Summer starts tomorrow. 30 degrees Celsius here today.) I am slowly reading about the Patthana (actually only the Preface and the first Chapter of Nina's book(twice) so far ), and might even understand just enough to be able to ask some questions in a separate post soon.) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., robertkirkpatrick@r... wrote: > +++++++ > Dear Christine, > It is very nice that you can admit the difficulty you're having > with 'getting' anatta. Sometimes we talk about about this most > profound truth rather easily, and so it might seem that it > should be like ABC. But is the deepest aspect of life and thus > it is incomparably difficult to grasp let alone fathom. > I like what you said about 'the living puppet', it reminds me of > the Bhikkhuni-samyutta where Mara approaches the Bhikkhuni Sela > "Then Mara the Evil One, desiring to arouse fear, trepidation, > and terror in the bhikkhuni Sela, desiring to make her fall away > from concentration, approached her and addressed her in verse: > "By whom has this puppet been created? > Where is the maker of the puppet? > Where has the puppet arisen? > Where does the puppet cease?"[24] > Then it occurred to the bhikkhuni Sela: "Now who is this...? > This is Mara the Evil One... desiring to make me fall away from > concentration." > Then the bhikkhuni Sela, having understood, "This is Mara the > Evil One," replied to him in verses: > > "This puppet is not made by itself, > Nor is this misery made by another. > It has come to be dependent on a cause, > When the cause dissolves then it will cease."endquote > > Things do indeed, as you said, happen "without permission or > without being intended or invoked". When I first started to see > that this is really the way things are it scared me alot, and I > wanted to turn away and try to believe that it was otherwise. > But, you know, this is what dukkha really is. We can't stop > seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, feeling, knowing, thinking; > these dhammas are not ours and they arise by conditions. They > oppress by continually arising and ceasing. > > The amazing thing is that the more we look into this, and the > more obvious dukkha thus becomes, the happier we become. And > paradoxically the more we see that there is no control the more > freedom we have. The more we see that right effort is a > conditioned phenomena the more vigor there is - because we are > not wasting energy trying to have what can't yet be had. > > Other parami are needed too - patience and wisdom should develop > together. Could I recommend yet another book - a short one - The > Perfections Leading to Enlightenment , which explains the ten > parami (much easier than the patthana). You can read it at > http://www.abhidhamma.org > best wishes > robert 9739 From: Sarah Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 4:48am Subject: Re: [dsg] Fwd: Re: Ego, soul, awareness, mind, consciousness ... - Dear Rob K and Christine, > "Christine Forsyth" wrote: > > Dear Robert, > > > ... I really don't want to believe that > > I am just a 'process' who seems to be a living puppet that > > everything happens to, things (mental states) arise as an > intrusion, > > without permission, or without being intended or evoked....the > > > problem is, of course, that I don't want it to be > so.....anatta, and > > no control. > +++++++ > Dear Christine, > It is very nice that you can admit the difficulty you're having > with 'getting' anatta. -------------------- I was just checking some early posts and came across what I consider to be this very helpful one from Rob which is also very pertinent to your present discussion, so I'd like to re-post it here in its entirety: -------------------- Message 558 of 9738 From: Robert Kirkpatrick Date: Wed Jun 21, 2000 1:09 pm Subject: anatta and no control Dear group, Someone said to me recently that we should not say that there was no-self or no control as this would lead to despair; we would conclude we could do nothing. Another wrote that by striving with right effort we could have continuos right mindfulness. I suggested that this idea of being able to keep mindfulness comes about because of belief in a self who can control. This friend replied that if we thought that we could not have constant mindfulness that we would lose all interest in Buddhist practice. I think this matter is very difficult indeed. Developing insight into the characteristic of anatta is in essence what Buddhism is about. It is so important that we should feel ‘as if our head is on fire”, we should strive to understand it. Why is it so difficult to comprehend? It is explained that the tilakkha –the three characteristics- anicca, dukkha, and anatta are the nature of all paramattha dhammas, past, present and future. And paramattha dhammas (absolute realities) include all the common things that we experience every day such as pain, pleasant feeling, seeing, hearing tasting touching, sound. You would think that as it is is such a fundamental essence of nature that it should be apparent- all we have to do is observe. However, it is far more difficult than that. Delusion clouds our vision. Trying to observe this process can easily be done with wrong effort, wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration and so lead nowhere. It is difficult because of accumulations. We have had countless trillions of aeons during which we have listened to all sorts of teachers tell us all sorts of things. Although we have, according to the scrptures in countless numbers of lives developed high levels of jhana, and have lived for billions of aeons as Brahma gods. But these very pure states do not uproot the idea of self. If they are grasped wrongly they can even enforce the idea of atta. According to the Buddhist scriptures it is only rarely that a Buddha comes into the world and can explain in detail about no-self. Thus rarely have we listened to Buddhas and even when we did we may have misunderstood. There are pacceka-buddhas who arise at other times who can understand this for themselves but they cannot teach the details of it to others. It is deep. What can be done? I quoted the Kitagiri sutta recently: "And how bhikkhus does the attainment of profound knowledge come by means of a gradual training...? .... he hears Dhamma; having heard Dhamma he remembers it; he tests the meaning of the things he has borne in mind; while testing the meaning, the things are approved of; there being approval of the things, chanda is born; with chanda born he makes an effort; having made the effort, he weighs it up; having weighed it up..." Perhaps we think of this gradual training as a straight line? I think it is more accurate to think of it like a spiral. We hear, we test, we apply, we approve of the meaning.. we make an effort and then we listen again, test again, we apply again, we approve…and then back again for more listening, more testing, more application, again and again and again. Where is the practice and where is the theory? I don’t think we can draw a line between the two. They are closely connected, they build on each other. As understanding grows there is less belief that any dhammas can be controlled. Does this mean there is despair and lack of interest in Buddhism? I don’t think so. I think we find that there are less worries about the problems in life let alone despair. We despair because we believe in a self. I find that as long as “I” am not in the way that the “practice” (if we call it a practice) goes smoothly. It is up and down and all around but to me that is going smoothly. It doesn’t go fast but that is just the way it goes. What are we in essence? I like the simile of a bonfire. A large fire is burning. All day long someone keeps adding more fuel to the fire. The fire never stops; generation after generation some one keeps tending it. Sometimes the person feeding the fire works very hard to control the fire, it looks tidy and attractive. At other times it rages out of control. But always they keep adding more fuel. In this simile we ourselves are the fire. The three papanca, tanha(desire), ditthi(view) and mana(conceit) are the fuel. The lives when it is under control are when we develop high levels of kusala such as jhana. The times when it is dangerous and raging are the lives we neglect kusala. When we hear and consider and apply the deep teachings about anatta, about the khandas, the ayatanas, the dhatus, the paticusamupada, the 24 paccaya and so on we start to slowly turn away from feeding this unceasing toil of adding fuel to the fire. If we continue to develop understanding one day the process of adding fuel will stop. Soon after that the fire will burn out forever. Robert -------------------- Christine, I'm sure if you have any further comments or questions on this topic, Rob or I or someone else will be happy to discuss further. Best wishes, Sarah 9740 From: Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 0:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard) Hi, Robert - In a message dated 11/30/01 1:22:37 AM Eastern Standard Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > ------------------------------------------------------ > > Howard: > > ... ALL that I meant was that hardness (or, better, any > > hardness-instance) has no parts. [Actually, as an aside, I don't really > think > > there *is* a thing called "hardness" to be encountered, but there *are* > > hardness-instances which are encountered. The abstraction 'hardness' is, > from > > my perspective, mere concept - but a concept that is grounded in direct > > experience.] > > Dear Howard, > I thought I would pick up on this, since there are a few interesting issues > contained therein. > > When you say there are 'hardness-instances', I take you to mean that there > is an > experience of that which we then interpret as hardness, not that the > abstraction > 'hardness' itself is actually encountered. > > I would say further that if we wanted to discuss the encounter with > 'hardness' in > phenomenal language we would need a lot more language that we don't have, > and that > even that language would obviously reach a limit, since language itself is > an > abstraction that does not directly describe anything. But we could say in > a > phenomenally styled language that in making contact with a particular > surface that > we encounter a moment of 'not-yielding', a moment of 'non-penetrating', a > moment > of 'smoothness', a moment of 'pushing back', a moment of 'firmness', etc., > as we > pick up various perceptual aspects from contact with an 'object'. > ----------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. I think you catch my meaning. There occur those sorts of experiences, all quite similar, the objective pole of which we give the common name of 'hardness'. But then, through sloppy and reificationist thinking, we tend to think of some "thing" called 'hardness' that we encounter from time to time, each instance of which our mind semi-consciously thinks of as "a little bit of hardness" or even "a portion of hardness", and we end up thinking in substance terms instead of experiential event terms. Now, I am *not* implying that we we should avoid seeing commonalities and common patterns, and forming general concepts and words for them. If we didn't do that, our dealing with the conventional world would be greatly hampered and our language use would be radically compromised. But we shouldn't be taken in by our own concepts and terminology. ---------------------------------------------------- > > This kind of phenomenal language could go a long way to creating a > description of > what non-conceptual experience might be like, with actualities being > approximated, > rather than glossing them into overall impressions, such as 'hardness' as > an > abiding characteristic. > ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: Exactly. However, our regular language is very, very useful, and, so, I would suggest retricting the use of such phenomenalist language to technical discussions with others and with oneself to aid in "seeing through" reificationist ideas and terminology. ----------------------------------------------------- > > Anyway, I thought that might be worth talking about. My own undergraduate > background, many years ago, in the phenomenology of Husserl and > Merleau-Ponty > seems very relevant to this idea, of finding a language that describes > rather than > defines experience. As far as Western philosophy goes, there are some > beautiful > descriptions of how this might work in the world of Merleau-Ponty, a truly > poetic > philosopher. > > Best, > Robert Ep. > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9741 From: Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 6:03am Subject: Re: Reminder - Non-Theravadin texts --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah and Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Dear All Hi Sarah! :) > In keeping with the declared focus of this group, And what is this declared focus, dearest Sarah? If I quote from the description of this forum on the opening page, I see "A discussion forum for anyone interested in understanding and practising the Buddha's teachings as found in the ancient texts and commentaries of the Theravada tradition...The discussions are of a practical nature, with the aim of developing understanding of the realities of the present moment." I am taking the latter statement at face-value and assuming that you have a wish to achieve freedom from dukkha permanently, and that is why you're bothering with this DSG and "Theravada" business at all. So then, what is the REAL aim of DSG? Is it the knowledge of suffering and the end of suffering, or is it primarly concerned with a single-sourced interpretation of the Tripitaka. If it's the latter, I am afraid I will no longer be able to participate in the discussions here in DSG, since my time is extremel;y percious (this rare human birth & all) and my sole concern is for the Dhamma, not with labels like "Theravada". And if that is the cae, I bid all my dear friends in the Dhamma here adieu and wish for your collective speedy enlightenment end permanent freedom from the bondange of samsara! :) 9742 From: Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 3:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reminder - Non-Theravadin texts Hi, Erik - In a message dated 11/30/01 9:06:23 AM Eastern Standard Time, rikpa21@y... writes: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah and Jonothan Abbott > wrote: > > Dear All > > Hi Sarah! :) > > > In keeping with the declared focus of this group, > > And what is this declared focus, dearest Sarah? If I quote from the > description of this forum on the opening page, I see "A discussion > forum for anyone interested in understanding and practising the > Buddha's teachings as found in the ancient texts and commentaries of > the Theravada tradition...The discussions are of a practical nature, > with the aim of developing understanding of the realities of the > present moment." > > I am taking the latter statement at face-value and assuming that you > have a wish to achieve freedom from dukkha permanently, and that is > why you're bothering with this DSG and "Theravada" business at all. > > So then, what is the REAL aim of DSG? Is it the knowledge of > suffering and the end of suffering, or is it primarly concerned with > a single-sourced interpretation of the Tripitaka. If it's the > latter, I am afraid I will no longer be able to participate in the > discussions here in DSG, since my time is extremel;y percious (this > rare human birth & all) and my sole concern is for the Dhamma, not > with labels like "Theravada". > > And if that is the cae, I bid all my dear friends in the Dhamma here > adieu and wish for your collective speedy enlightenment end > permanent freedom from the bondange of samsara! :) > > ============================ If I might add my two cents: I think that Sarah's e-mail wasn't really censorious, but was more in the way of a "nudge". I think it went more in the direction of suggesting that the *extent* of quoting from non-Theravadin sources be limited, quoting and/or paraphrasing just enough to make the point. I talk a bit about Nagarjuna et al (and etc) from time to time, and, of course, my signature line is from the Diamond Sutra, and I don't think anyone thinks twice about it. Also, some of my conversations with you and with Robert Epstein involve Madhyamika perpectives, as do many of your posts. So, it seems to me that it is only a question of how *much* quoting from non-Theravadin sources is appropriate on a Theravadin-oriented list which is being looked at. I urge you to take this matter lightly. There was no suggestion of your posts being "monitored", as was done in the past even for "inner circle" members. ;-)) I really hope you take no offense at Sarah's post, and, for *sure*, remain on the list! Your insights and ecumenism are really useful, I think, to all of us. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 9743 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 8:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reminder - Non-Theravadin texts Hi Erik, Please kindly remain. I like your posts here. Very helpful and insightful. Kind regards. Ken O --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Erik - > > In a message dated 11/30/01 9:06:23 AM Eastern Standard Time, > rikpa21@y... writes: > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah and Jonothan Abbott > > wrote: > > > Dear All > > > > Hi Sarah! :) > > > > > In keeping with the declared focus of this group, > > > > And what is this declared focus, dearest Sarah? If I quote from the > > description of this forum on the opening page, I see "A discussion > > forum for anyone interested in understanding and practising the > > Buddha's teachings as found in the ancient texts and commentaries of > > the Theravada tradition...The discussions are of a practical nature, > > with the aim of developing understanding of the realities of the > > present moment." > > > > I am taking the latter statement at face-value and assuming that you > > have a wish to achieve freedom from dukkha permanently, and that is > > why you're bothering with this DSG and "Theravada" business at all. > > > > So then, what is the REAL aim of DSG? Is it the knowledge of > > suffering and the end of suffering, or is it primarly concerned with > > a single-sourced interpretation of the Tripitaka. If it's the > > latter, I am afraid I will no longer be able to participate in the > > discussions here in DSG, since my time is extremel;y percious (this > > rare human birth & all) and my sole concern is for the Dhamma, not > > with labels like "Theravada". > > > > And if that is the cae, I bid all my dear friends in the Dhamma here > > adieu and wish for your collective speedy enlightenment end > > permanent freedom from the bondange of samsara! :) > > > > > ============================ > If I might add my two cents: I think that Sarah's e-mail wasn't > really > censorious, but was more in the way of a "nudge". I think it went more > in the > direction of suggesting that the *extent* of quoting from non-Theravadin > > sources be limited, quoting and/or paraphrasing just enough to make the > point. > I talk a bit about Nagarjuna et al (and etc) from time to time, > and, > of course, my signature line is from the Diamond Sutra, and I don't > think > anyone thinks twice about it. Also, some of my conversations with you > and > with Robert Epstein involve Madhyamika perpectives, as do many of your > posts. > So, it seems to me that it is only a question of how *much* quoting from > > non-Theravadin sources is appropriate on a Theravadin-oriented list > which is > being looked at. I urge you to take this matter lightly. There was no > suggestion of your posts being "monitored", as was done in the past even > for > "inner circle" members. ;-)) I really hope you take no offense at > Sarah's > post, and, for *sure*, remain on the list! Your insights and ecumenism > are > really useful, I think, to all of us. > > With metta, > Howard > 9745 From: Yulia Klimov Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 10:45am Subject: RE: [dsg] Cambodia Ch 12, no 3. Dear Nina Can you please, tell me if all this discourses are available somewhere in one place on-line? Thank you, Yulia -----Original Message----- From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...] Sent: Friday, November 30, 2001 1:11 PM To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: [dsg] Cambodia Ch 12, no 3. Cambodia, Ch 12, no. 3. Kulvilai: I heard Acharn say that we should pay attention to the kusala of someone else in order to rejoice in it (anumodana), and as regards ourselves, we should look for our akusala in order to eradicate it. Sujin: Do we look for it or do we see it? Kulavilai: We should see it. Sujin: If a saying is true, it must be spoken by the Buddha, no matter which method of explanation is used. One should not be fixed on it to find out in which text of the scriptures these words can be found. If they are true they explain realities. Nipat: There is the following saying of the Buddha: ³We should not think of the superior and the mean deeds of someone else, but we should think of the superior and the mean deeds of ourselves.² Sujin: Isn¹t that also in agreement with the saying that we should not pay attention to the evils of someone else? It is certain that the citta will be impure when we see someone else¹s evil. We should immediately realize that we forget to consider our own citta at that moment. If we look into the mirror we can see our own citta at that moment and we can find out what kind of citta thinks in that way. Therefore, instead of thinking of someone else¹s evil, which conditions the arising of akusala, we should think of his wholesomeness. When we think of someone else¹s wholesomeness, without jealousy or contempt, it is excellent. At that moment there is kusala citta. Nipat: In the Buddha¹s time there were not yet books and people could study the teachings by listening, not by means of textbooks. Those who listened could immediately understand what they heard. At the present time it is difficult for us to reach the level of abandoning the clinging to texts. Question: When Khun Jaran knows hardness, is this of the level of pariyatti, theoretical knowledge, or paìipatti, practice? Jaran: It is the practice; well, I am not sure. Kimrod: Someone should not use the word practice, if he is not sure about its meaning. Jaran: Pariyatti is theoretical understanding of realities according to the texts. Acharn asks about my understanding when I study the texts. I do not know whether my understanding at such moments is of the level of pariyatti or paìipatti. But I still think that there is a self who is here. Sujin: Patipatti is different from pariyatti. When there is only pariyatti, theoretical understanding, and not patipatti, one may doubt which it is. What appears at this moment? Jaran: Hardness appears at my hand. Sujin: Is this pariyatti or patipatti? Jaran: Pariyatti. Sujin: If there is patipatti, what is it? Jaran: When a characteristic of reality appears to sati there is patipatti. Sujin: That is the difference. We understand the name or the meaning of the word sati. However, when sati arises with dåna or síla, it may not be apparent. At the level of samatha, when the citta is calm, free from akusala, there is sati but it does not appear as non-self. However, when sati of the level of satipatthåna arises, its characteristic appears. When hardness is experienced through touch, everybody can say that this is hard. When people experience heat, taste something hot or sweet, or when they hear a sound, they know it and they can say what it is. The reason is that citta is the reality which can experience an object through each of the doorways. Seeing-consciousness sees what appears through the eyes and hearing-consciousness hears sound. When odour appears, smelling-consciousness experiences odour. When flavour is experienced, tasting-consciousness experiences flavour. If something is experienced through body-contact, body-consciousness is the reality that experiences hardness naturally, and everybody knows this. However, when sammå-sati, right mindfulness, arises and is aware, there is understanding based on listening, which realizes that there is no self. It realizes that there are elements or dhammas, each with their own characteristics, that are able to appear through the doorways of the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the bodysense and the mind-door. The realities that appear through the bodysense are the characteristics of softness, hardness, cold, heat, motion or pressure appearing at this moment. However, when they have appeared, they pass away extremely rapidly. Mind-door process cittas arising afterwards know that there is a table or a chair, but whenever sati arises and is aware, the mind-door process cittas do not know concepts, but they know realities. Understanding, although it is still very slight, can begin to realize that there are dhammas, each with their own characteristic, and at such moments there is no need to think of them or to speak about them. There can be understanding of the characteristic of hardness that appears at such a moment, it can be realized as a kind of dhamma that has the characteristic of hardness. When hardness appears, there are two kinds of realities: hardness and the experience of hardness. The moment of sati and of paññå that gradually begins to understand realities, is very short, because such a moment arises and then falls away extremely rapidly. It is impossible that is immediately clear understanding of realities. There can gradually be awareness and more understanding of the characteristic which experiences, of the reality which experiences hardness; there will be more understanding of that characteristic as it really is. This is satipatthåna, but not yet of the level of pativedha, the direct realization of the truth. One only begins to develop correct understanding of the characteristics of realities we used to take for people, for beings, for this or that thing. When sati arises and is aware of what appears, one begins to understand that there are only different dhammas, each with their own characteristic, and that this is reality. When sati arises people will know when they are forgetful of realities and when there is sati. Knowing the difference between the moment of sati and the moment of forgetfulness is the beginning level of its development, and people can only know this themselves. Other people cannot know with regard to someone else what sati is aware of, whether sati arises or not. Each person can only know this for himself. **** 9746 From: Christine Forsyth Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 11:32am Subject: [dsg] Fwd: Re: Ego, soul, awareness, mind, consciousness ... - Dear Sarah, Thanks for this post...It is a truism that there is nothing new under the sun....and I am aware of and apologise for how tiresome it must have been to see the same old topic, and the same old questions, and the same old comments appear - with just a new signature appended. I am grateful for the time and patience you have all extended to me recently. metta Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > I was just checking some early posts and came across what I consider to be this > very helpful one from Rob which is also very pertinent to your present > discussion, so I'd like to re-post it here in its entirety: > Christine, I'm sure if you have any further comments or questions on this > topic, Rob or I or someone else will be happy to discuss further. > > Best wishes, > > Sarah 9747 From: Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 11:33am Subject: [dsg] Re: meththa meditation Hi Sarah, Thanks for replying. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Victor, > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > It is very interesting to read about the references with the pali word > > "piya." I am learning something. :-) Thank you. > > > .................... > > S: I think we both are, including the different interpretations and conclusions > that we can both draw about the same texts, even as in the Udana passage, when > we have the commentary and Pali notes;-) > > I understand the Brahma Viharas to have other beings as object, which I realise > may be a `minority' view. This doesn't meant the cittas are necessarily akusala > (unwholesome) when they have oneself as object. For example, there may be wise > reflection on `one's' good deeds performed or on the danger or harmful nature > of `one's' bad deeds. If the citta is wholesome, we don't have to pinpoint > exactly whether the cetasika accompanying it is metta or alobha or detachment . > If there is direct understanding of realities, including metta, as not-self, > this is most helpful indeed. > > However, it's helpful to begin to understand how very prevalent attachment is, > even when it's taken for something skilful. We read in the Visuddhimagga (XV11) > that there are 108 kinds of craving, including 18 kinds for the objects > experienced through the 6 doors. Is it really possible to find anything dear > without attachment I wonder? Yes. It is possible. And yes, it is hard. > > I'm going to let the other references rest as we've both shared our > understandings. > > I would just like to discuss the Dhp verse a little more, however, because we > have the Pali and I just read the delightful story from the Commentary which > I'd like to share. > .................... > > S: > > 3. Dhammapada verse: > > > > > > tasma piyaj na kayiratha piyapayo hi papako > > > gantha tesaj na vijjanti yesaj natthi piyappiyaj > > > > > > (DhP 211) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- -------- > > > Therefore, do not hold anything dear; separation from the dear ones is > > bad. > > > There are no bonds for those, for whom there is nothing dear or unloved. > > > ----------------- > > V: > Here I think the key word is "hold." It means: do not attach to anything > > that is dear. We all have/had mothers and fathers, and they are dear to us. > > If we attached to them, there would be sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and > > despair when they passed away. > > .................... > > S: Literally, I think, the Pali reads: From that (tasma) dear/beloved (piyaj) > not (na) should do (kayiratha) loss of dear (piyapayo) is bad (hi papako) etc > > In other words, the suggestion is that dear (piya) already suggests `holding > dear'. Sarah, I think you can understand the point: One does not have to attach to someone or something that is dear to him or her. > > The short story is that an only son, after hearing some monks teach the Dhamma, > wished to become a monk. His parents were very concerned about this and guarded > him carefully . He managed to trick them, go to the monastery and ordain. His > father followed him, found him in robes and `wept and lamented'. He then > decided that there was no point in his continuing the lay life, and ordained as > well. The mother, for similar reasons, also ordained as a nun. > > However, the three of them were unable to remain apart and the other monks and > nuns told the Buddha that they were always chatting together. The Buddha then > said "From the time of retirement from the world, such conduct is highly > improper; it is painful both to be deprived of the sight of those who are > dear, and to be obliged to look upon that which is not dear; for this reason, > whether persons or material things be involved, one should take no account > either of what is dear or of what is not dear." (piyappiyaj). The Buddha then > pronounces Dhp verses 209, 210, 211 > Thanks quoting for these verses. These verses illustrate a very pertinent point that I think you are trying to make: We are often attached to someone or something that is dear to us. It is hard not to attach to someone or something that is dear to us. I think this is the point that you are trying to make, and that is true: we are often attached to someone or something that is dear to us. It is hard not to. :-) > .................... > > S:> > The Buddha sometimes uses conventionally true statements and sometimes > > > ultimately true statements (as in the 6 Sixes) in the Suttas. This is why > > there > > > has to be an understanding of paramatha dhammas to understand what is > > meant > > > when he uses conventional terms. > .................... > > V:> I thought about it, and this is how I understand it now: > > The conventional truths and the ultimate truths refer to two categories of > > truths. > > The ultimate truths refer to the Four Noble Truth, the Dependent > > Origination, the Three Characteristics of Phenomenon, and the truths that > > are exclusive to what the Buddha taught, that are pertaining to dukkha and > > the cessation of dukkha. > .................... > > S: Ultimate or `highest' truths (paramattha saca) refer to all realities (i.e > all namas and rupas) regardless of whether there is any understanding of them > or not.This may be what you are implying above. This is not what I am implying above. It is how I would use the term "ultimate truth." I would use it to refer to the Four Noble Truth, the Dependent Origination, the Three Characteristics of Phenomenon, and the truths that are exclusive to what the Buddha taught, that are pertaining to dukkha and the cessation of dukkha. I would not use the term "ultimate truth" to refer to namas or rupas or electrons or protons or cittas or cetasikas. > > V:> The conventional truths refer to the truths that > > is not exclusively to what the Buddha taught. For example the statement "2 > > + 1 = 3" can be categorized as a conventional truth. > .................... > > S:There have been a lot of discussions on concepts vs realities and all the > different categories of concepts. Some of these can be found under this heading > at: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts > > The book, `Realities and Concepts' also describes these in detail and can be > found on; > http://www.abhidhamma.org/ > .................... > > V;> The Buddha used only one speech, the Right Speech. > .................... > > S;Very true;-) > .................... > > V: > Regarding to my question in another post: > > When the Buddha taught: Form is to be seen as it actually is with right > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.", > > was he using conventional speech or not? If so, how so? If not, what is > > not conventional about the speech the Buddha used? > > > > I think the question itself is not phrased correctly: the idea of > > conventional speech does not apply and neither does ultimate speech. > > > > The Buddha was using Right Speech to teach a truth that leads to the > > cessation of dukkha. > .................... > > S: When we say, referring to seeing or visible object, for example, that they > are anatta, these are then ultimate truths. Conventional speech would usually > say `I'm looking at the computer' for example. It doesn't mean there is > necessarily any wrong view when one speaks conventionally in this way. It just > depends on the understanding. So of course, the Buddha always used Right > Speech, even though he sometimes (often) used conventional speech. Even at > these times, he is always referring to ultimate truths, but it will depend on > the wisdom of the listeners as to whether they understand or not. This is why > we can say that whatever he talks about, whether in the suttanta, Vinaya or > Abhidhamma, he is always teaching the development of Satipatthana and the texts > should be read in this light. > .................... > > V;> Thank you for the references. :-) > > > > Regards, > > Victor > .................... > > S: thank you for the opportunities to consider further. > > Sarah Regards, Victor 9748 From: Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 1:14pm Subject: [dsg] Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Dukkha (was, Concepts) I am not sure what you mean by transcending. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein wrote: > Thanks for your good point. > My thought was that if the perceiver has transcended all clinging, the dukkha > inherent in the act of perception is also transcended. > > Robert Ep. > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Hi Robert Ep. > > > > Direct perception itself is impermanent. What is impermanent is > > stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > > > > > > Provisionally though, I would say that direct perception of the current > > reality as > > > what it actually is should be exempt from suffering. Why? Because there > > is no > > > expectation that it will last longer than a moment, therefore there is no > > > discomfort or dissatisfaction at its impermanence. > > > > > > Best, > > > Robert Ep. 9749 From: Sarah Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 2:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Fwd: Re: Ego, soul, awareness, mind, consciousness ... - Dear Christine, --- Christine Forsyth wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > Thanks for this post...It is a truism that there is nothing new under > the sun....and I am aware of and apologise for how tiresome it must > have been to see the same old topic, and the same old questions, and > the same old comments appear - with just a new signature appended. > I am grateful for the time and patience you have all extended to me > recently. Not tiresome in the slightest....your points and questions are all excellent and give us all many opportunities for wise reflection. We all ned to hear and consider anatta and control over and over, so please don't think twice about it. Sarah rushing out at 6am ;-) 9750 From: m. nease Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 4:24pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Fwd: Re: Ego, soul, awareness, mind, consciousness ... - Hi Sarah, Thanks for reposting this excellent piece and thanks to Christine for occasioning it and for your own fine posts. Just a couple of questions below. --- Sarah wrote: > In this simile we ourselves are the fire. The three > papanca, tanha(desire), ditthi(view) and > mana(conceit) > are the fuel. The lives when it is under control are > when we develop high levels of kusala such as jhana. > The times when it is dangerous and raging are the > lives we neglect kusala. When we hear and consider > and > apply the deep teachings about anatta, about the > khandas, the ayatanas, the dhatus, the > paticusamupada, > the 24 paccaya and so on we start to slowly turn > away > from feeding this unceasing toil of adding fuel to > the fire. If we continue to develop understanding > one > day the process of adding fuel will stop. Soon after > that the fire will burn out forever. I like this simile a lot and it has the ring of authenticity, but I don't recall it from the Tipitaka. Can someone cite the source? Also any other references to 'the three papa~ncas'? I don't remember seeing this grouping before but it seems extremely apt to me. Thanks again, mike 9751 From: m. nease Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 4:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Fwd: Re: Ego, soul, awareness, mind, consciousness ... - Dear Christine, --- Christine Forsyth wrote: > ...I am aware of and apologise for how > tiresome it must > have been to see the same old topic, and the same > old questions, and > the same old comments appear - with just a new > signature appended. I know the feeling. Speaking for myself, please don't apologize--just as often as the same questions have been asked, the point has been made that we need to hear these points, however basic, again and again and again--I know I do. Thanks again for all your correspondence. mike 9752 From: Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 4:33pm Subject: [dsg] Fwd: Re: Ego, soul, awareness, mind, consciousness ... - --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "m. nease" wrote: >> Just a couple of questions below. > > --- Sarah wrote: > > >Robert: In this simile we ourselves are the fire. The three > > papanca, tanha(desire), ditthi(view) and > > mana(conceit) > > are the fuel. The lives when it is under control are > > when we develop high levels of kusala such as jhana. > > The times when it is dangerous and raging are the > > lives we neglect kusala. When we hear and consider > > and > > apply the deep teachings about anatta, about the > > khandas, the ayatanas, the dhatus, the > > paticusamupada, > > the 24 paccaya and so on we start to slowly turn > > away > > from feeding this unceasing toil of adding fuel to > > the fire. If we continue to develop understanding > > one > > day the process of adding fuel will stop. Soon after > > that the fire will burn out forever. > > I like this simile a lot and it has the ring of > authenticity, but I don't recall it from the Tipitaka. > Can someone cite the source? Also any other > references to 'the three papa~ncas'? I don't remember > seeing this grouping before but it seems extremely apt > to me. > > Thanks again, > mike >+++++++++ dear Mike, I thought this simile up (probably why I like it), so not authentic, but fire is a common simile in the texts . The three papanca are defined as such in the commentaries . I can get a reference easily if you are interested. best wishes robert 9753 From: Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 7:27pm Subject: Interesting sutta SN II, 12, 51: Nidanasamyutta (Dukkhavaggo), Parivimamsanasutta. "Bhikkhus, when a bhikkhu is making a thorough investigation, in what way should he thoroughly investigate for the utterly complete destruction of suffering?...a bhikkhu thoroughly investigates thus: 'The many diverse kinds of suffering that arise in the world [headed by] aging-and-death: what is the source of this suffering, what is its origin, from what is it born and produced? When what exists does aging-and-death come to be? When what does not exist does aging-and-death not come to be?... "...He understands aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading on that is in conformity with cessation. He practices that way and conducts himself accordingly. This is called a bhikkhu who is practicing for the utterly complete destruction of suffering... "Then, investigating further [all the links in paticcasamuppada], ...he understands thus, 'Volitional formations have ignorance as their source, ignorance as their origin; they are born and produced from ignorance...' "Bhikkhus, if a person immersed in ignorance generates a meritorious volitional formation, consciousness fares on the the meritorious; if he generates a demeritorious volitional formation, consciousness fares on the the demeritorious; if he generates an imperturbable volitional formation, consciousness fares on the the imperturbable. But when a bhikkhu has abandoned ignorance and aroused true knowledge, then, with the fading away of ignorance and aroused true knowledge, then, with the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, he does not generate ... volitional formation[s]..." We all know what this means: "He understands: 'Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.'" O.K., so liberation is attained by such thorough investigation. What next? Well, the text immediately jumps to an interesting description: "If he feels a pleasant feeling, he understands: 'It is impermanent'; he understands: 'It is not held to'; he understands: 'It is not delighted in.'..." It seems fairly clear that, here, the "he understands" means something akin to "he understands", rather than something like "he generates volitional formations rooted in a desire to make progress in understanding and thereby actually brings about understanding." Does this mean that understanding comes more through understanding and thorough investigation rather than through training the mind to quickly say things like "It is impermanent" in reaction to the various sensations? Dan 9754 From: Date: Fri Nov 30, 2001 7:31pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Reminder - Non-Theravadin texts --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasa