10000

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:18pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two)

 	
Dear Suan,
Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary.
My remarks are dispersed below:

--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> 
> Dear Dhamma Friends
> 
> The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary written 
> in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, Robert 
> Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the subcommentary, I 
> directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also 
> include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies
> Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. 
> 
> 
> 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI
> 
> "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa 
> khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavattassa 
> khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi 
> parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam gataati 
> attho."
> 
> "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete 
> extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of 
> defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, and 
> the other without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical 
> machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying consciousness). 
> It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality 
> like the lamp without fuel." 
> 
> 
> Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind 
> Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality
> 
> 
> 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two 
> 
> 
> Robert Epstein wrote:
> 
> "Well, I don't know about anyone else, but reaching the state of
> the 
> undefined
> reality to me means that he has reached a state in which his reality 
> is undefined
> by any remaining fragment of distinguishing consciousness, but that 
> he is still
> in a state of existence in which his reality is undefined. This does 
> not mean that
> there is no existent of any kind, only that all consciousness has 
> been cooled
> and is no longer present. The idea of an underlying beingness or 
> awareness that is
> however totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to 
> be ruled
> out here.
> 
> What puzzles me in the above paragraph is Robert's addition of
> the statement:
> 
> "…but that he is still in a state of existence in which his
> reality is undefined."
> 
> Buddhaghosa's explanation of `parinibbutaa' includes the
> unmistakable expression `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the 
> last mind' on the death of an Arahant. 

Let me say from the beginning here, Suan, that you are invoking the termination of
the 'last mind' as evidence that there is no remaining experience. Later on you
say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, experience and
'sensual existence' are not synonymous. So let's start by totally agreeing that
there is no 'sensual existence' or 'sensory experience' of any kind in
parinibbana. On this I think it is absolutely clear.

If there is *any kind* of existence in parinibbana, it would not be one that is
connected to the body or the mind. So the existence of any such experience would
indeed be a mystical state. It would be quite beyond anything that relates to
this world, to this body, mind or personality.

now the problem that arises when i try to get into this kind of possibility, of
such a state existing fro the arahant, is that anyone who hears that assumes that
this means there must be some kind of soul, or mind or entity that is there. I
try to say that if it is existent, this parinibbanic existence would have to be a
kind of pure presence, field or aware quality, disassociated from any
individuation or subject-object differentiation. But most don't accept the
possibility that such a state can exist without the false positing of some kind of
'self'. I myself think that such an impersonal existence of awareness is a
possibility, but I understand if you cannot take the Buddha's words to imply that.
I think that Howard, up to a point, agrees with me on this, and that it is
possible that Kenneth O. would also see this as a possibility. So to an extent it
seems to divide among those who have or have had some sympathy for the ideas of
Mahayana Buddhism and those who are strictly reading according to a Theravadin
interpretation.

But I am trying to restrict myself to that which can be seen in the actually words
of the Buddha, as expressed in the Theravadin Suttas and commentaries.

So that is just to be forthright about my orientation. So I would not propose
this possibility if I did not see it in the actual verses, and in fact, in this
case, in your very noble translation of the verses, which have a nice sense of
freshness and literal immediacy about them, and for which I thank you. I truly
enjoy feeling that I have gotten a bit closer to the living word of the Buddha,
even if our interpretations may diverge after that.

So you are talking about the 'last mind' or 'sensual reality' being finally cooled
and coming to an end. 

First of all, I find the idea of these things being 'finally cooled' a wonderful
translation. Nowhere does the Buddha talk about destruction or eradication when
it comes to the final coming to rest of the experiential mechanism.

Second of all, what you do not account for in this second sub-commentary and which
is the sole evidence for my view that there may be a state of 'non-sensual'
awareness in the parinibbanic state, is that the Buddha says that the Arahant's
final reality is 'undefined'.

For myself, Suan, I can see absolutely no reason why the Buddha would use this
enignmatic and provisional term, 'undefined' if it were not for a very specific
purpose. Why couldn't he simply say 'it is ended and there is nothing left'. But
he does not say that, he says that the Arahant is 'without the existential
residues emptied of psychophysical machinery by termination of the last mind'. As
absolute as this sounds, he does not say this leaves *nothing* which is what it
should mean if it is a true obliteration of all experience. He says it leaves the
Arahant in a state of 'undefined reality', a truly enigmatic term.

Now we all agree that the Buddha didn't mince words and that he could be clear as
a bell, decisive in fact. So why would he not say 'the experiencing consciousness
and any possibility of any remaining awareness are totally destroyed leaving
absolutely no experience of any kind in its wake'? Or something to that effect. 
Instead he talks of the 'undefined reality'. For the life of me, this does not
sound anything like the total abolition of existence to me. It sounds like the
total obliteration of *worldly* subject/object existence, but not of existence per
se. And since we all agree that the Buddha chose his words wisely, why we have to
account for all that he said and try to make some kind of sense out of it. We
can't just ignore an expression like 'undefined reality' without a sense of what
it implies about his other statements which aree right next to each other. So
that is my sticking point, just as he says in the other Sutta we talked about, the
one about the 'luminous mind which is freed from defilements from within'. You
see there is a certain consistency here, in which the Buddha seems to point at a
'higher' reality, rather than 'no reality' at all in the Nibbanic state.

Finally, he uses as his metaphor for this state of undefined reality 'the lamp
without fuel' which can no longer burn. This again points to the end of 'sensual
experience' but not to 'no existence of any kind'. Why do I say this? He says
the lamp is gone out, but whenever he uses this metaphor he never says the lamp is
gone or destroyed. The lamp is always left sitting there in its state of
'ultimate cool' with no more fuel to burn. So the flame of suffering and sensual
experience, which are intimately tied together, are finished. No more
subject/object experience, no more objects of craving or aversion, just the
ultimately cooled lamp. So what is that lamp? It is the base of being or
existence without any discernable activity. It is just like a lamp that does not
burn, like awareness that has returned to itself and no longer goes outward to
seek any object. Although there is absolutely no activity in this lamp, in this
awareness, that does not mean it is obliterated. If it was, I believe that
Buddhism would reduce inevitably to Nihilism. If one posits an absolute nullity,
one has no choice but to put one's stock in annihilation. I do not believe that
complete annihilation of experience is what the Buddha taught. I do believe he
taught the end of suffering as the complete cessation of sensory activity and
subject/object separation.

For practical purposes, this distinction may be splitting hairs, but in the sense
of what it means for the ground of being, what we really are or arent' in the
final analysis, it has enormous implications. One who believes in total and final
obliteration of all awareness can take no stock in the human quality of awakeness
or awareness. It is merely a tool to get to obliteration of suffering, and in
that sense one turns away from even the inmost content of one's own mind. Even
the cittas are a source of suffering and there is nothing beyond them. For one
who believes in the final rest of awareness itself as something that can become
enlightened by returning to itself, rather than being extinguished, there is an
inherently positive quality in the entire path, a seed of truth that exists now in
the human being, but is obscured by delusion and unwholesome tendencies. I
believe this difference makes an enormous difference in orientation, and that we
have at least two examples of where the Buddha hints strongly, without turning it
into an object or entity, of this posssibility of light at the end of the tunnel,
rather than a final darkness. And I take strong stock in those statements. I
think they mean something that needs to be investigated and discerned.

And thank you for such a stimulating discussion of these important issues. I am
very interested in hearing your response.

Best,
Robert Ep.

====================================

> The last mind in a lifetime is the dying consciousness (cuticittam), 
> which is, by the way, the finish line of `bhavanga cittam –
> the life-cause consciousness.' 
> 
> The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava means 
> life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. Thus, 
> bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of sentient 
> existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes the 
> sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient 
> existence.
> 
> On the death of a sentient being who hasn't attained Arahatta 
> awakening, the linking consciousness (patisandhi cittam) immediately 
> follows the dying consciousness for a rebirth. Why immediately? It is 
> because we can't suspend the bhavanga cittam in a limbo state.
> The linking consciousness is the start line of the life-cause 
> consciousness (bhavanga cittam) in a lifetime.
> 
> In other words, the difference between an Arahant and a non-Arahant 
> is the termination of the life-cause consciousness for the Arahant 
> and the perpetuation of the life-cause consciousness for the non-
> Arahant.
> 
> An Arahant terminates the life-cause consciousness while ordinary 
> sentient beings perpetuate the life-cause consciousnesses.
> 
> The death of an Arahant is the termination of bhavanga cittam, the 
> life-cause consciousness. In other words, the Parinibbaana of an 
> Arahant is the end of the sentient existence.
> 
> Robert Epstein also wrote:
> 
> "The idea of an underlying beingness or awareness that is however 
> totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to be 
> ruled out here."
> 
> 
> Robert's idea of an underlying beingness or awareness looks
> rather like an interpretation of the bhavanga cittam, the life-cause 
> consciousness.
> 
> If Robert meant to refer to the bhavanga cittam as an underlying 
> beingness or awareness, and regarded it as something that would 
> survive in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant, he has my 
> sympathy, and I would not blame him. Why not?
> 
> Bhavanga cittam is the cool-down, resting state of the mind, so it is 
> very tempting to equate nibbaana with a kind of perpetual bhavanga 
> cittam. 
> 
> However, as we have analysed earlier above, the expression 
> `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the last mind',
> did not help to indicate the survival of the bhavanga cittam in 
> parinibbaana on the death of an Arahant.
> 
> Contrary to Robert Epstein's ideas, termination of the bhavanga 
> cittam has ruled out any underlying beingness or awareness, I am 
> afraid.
> 
> Howard also wrote:
> 
> "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests
> parinibbana as a kind of nullity."
> 
> The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity of sentient existence.
> 
> 
> PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two Ends Here.
> 
> 
> With regards,
> 
> Suan Lu Zaw
> 
> http://www.bodhiology.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> PREVIOUSLY ON THIS LIST
> 
> 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI
> 
> "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa 
> khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavattassa 
> khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi 
> parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam gataati 
> attho."
> 
> "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete 
> extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of 
> defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, and 
> the other without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical 
> machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying consciousness). 
> It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality 
> like the lamp without fuel." 
> 
> Parinibbaana - complete extinguishment
> Kilesavatta - defilement machinery (vatta is literally circle, cycle, 
> or round. We have `vicious circle' in English.)
> Khandhavatta - psychophysical machinery
> Upaadisesa - existential residues (upaadi is merely another name of 
> pancakkhadhaa). Upaadi means phenomena taken strongly by craving or 
> attachment (tanhaa).
> 
> Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind 
> Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality
> 
> 
> 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY
> 
> Howard wrote:
> 
> "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests
> parinibbana 
> as a kind of nullity. A couple matters remain: (1) The exact meaning 
> of Apannattikabhaavaam - the state of undefined reality, and the 
> exact meaning of vi~n~nana, which I take as the dualistic operation 
> of separating out an individualized object from the potential field 
> of awareness, a special type of knowing/~nana."
> 
> 
> The expression `apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined
> reality' 
> has given both Howard and Robert Epstein an opportunity to undergo 
> profound contemplation, as it would everybody else. 
> 
> Therefore, this unique expression has become a suitable topic for 
> further analysis and elucidation as Buddhaghosa did not elaborate on 
> it, at least on this occasion.
> 
> The expression `Apannattikabhaavo' can be broken up 
> as `a+pannatti+ika+bhaavo'. 
> 
> The term `pannatti' has the same meaning as
> `paññatti'. Therefore, 
> pannatti means a name, a convention, or a verbalization as
> `paññatti' 
> would. We all know that a name can refer to either an existent 
> phenomenon or a non-existent category such as God the Creator. No 
> offense to theists amid the Buddhists! 
> 
> In Pali texts, the term that describes the opposite of a non-existent 
> category is `paramattho – a reality'. Examples of
> realities are 
> matter and mind. No offense to extremist Mahayanists amid the 
> Theravadis and scientists!
> 
> Now, let us look at the combination `a+pannatti'. The prefix
> `a' 
> in `apannatti' means `not' or `no' just like
> the prefix `a' in the 
> words `amoral' and `amorphous' giving the opposite
> meanings 
> of `moral' and `morphous'. 
> 
> Thus, we get `not + name (or convention, or verbalization)'.
> 
> And, what about the bit `ika'? The suffix `ika' means
> `having or 
> doing something that the preceding term indicates.'
> 
> Thus, the combination `pannatti+ika' means `having + name
> (or 
> convention, or verbalization).' 
> 
> Now, when we add both the prefix and the suffix to the 
> term `pannatti', we get the `apannattika – something
> not having a 
> name, something not of convention, something not of verbalization, or 
> something undefined. 
> 
> The word `bhaava' denotes a state. Therefore, the 
> expression `apannattikabhaavo' refers to the state of
> something 
> unconventional, unverbalizable, or undefinable.
> 
> As we mentioned earlier above, the antonym of the term
> `paññatti' in 
> the Pali texts, is the term `paramattho – a reality'.
> Therefore, the 
> expression `apannattikabhaavo' means the state of something
> existent, 
> something real, but not subject to verbalization, or 
> conventionalization.
> 
> The above analysis should satisfy Howard's request for the exact 
> meaning of apannattikabhaavo – the state of undefined reality.
> 
> Now, I will try to answer why Buddhaghosa described parinibbutaa as 
> the state of undefined reality.
> 
> By using the espression `apannattikabhaavo - the state of
> undefined 
> reality', Buddhaghosa has killed two birds with one stone. We
> could 
> toy with the idea of using the term `paramattho – a
> reality' instead 
> of `apannatti'. But, that could deprive us of the ability to
> convey 
> the meanings of unverbalizableness and undefinableness. Not only that 
> handicap, paramattho could refer to other types of realities as well, 
> which we can also verbalize and define easily. Therefore, it is a 
> very clever choice of word that Buddhaghosa described parinibbutaa 
> as `apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality'.
> 
> Now, what is the meaning of undefinableness or unverbalizableness? 
> Why did Buddhaghosa regarded parinibbutaa as being undefinable?
> 
> The world is programmed to think only in terms of stereotypes and 
> stereotyping. It is programmed to verbalize only in terms of ready 
> expressions and convenient vocabulary.
> 
> Our linguistic stereotypes include both existent and non-existent 
> categories. But, all our verbalizable catagories refer only to either 
> mind and mental (associates and) products, or matter and material 
> things.
> 
> In short, we are programmed to define things and beings only in the 
> terminology of mind and matter, the two main existential realities. 
> This two-reality existential programming has conditioned us to regard 
> anything outside psychophysical givens as nullity.
> 
> The Arahatta awakening that Gotama the Buddha has discovered is 
> capable of demolishing our existential programming and allowing us to 
> realize the third reality outside mind and matter. Here, the 
> term `mind' includes mental associates (cetasikas) as well.
> Because 
> this third reality is outside mind and matter, we cannot verbalize it 
> in terms of psychophysical existences. Yet, this third reality exists 
> as parinibbutaa, the ultimate cool. As Buddhaghosa has done, we can 
> describe parinibbutaa only as complete extinguishment of defilements 
> and psychophysical existence. 
> 
> Therefore, the meaning of undefinableness in the expression `the 
> state of undefined reality' is that parinibbaana is an existence
> that 
> we cannot define in terms of mind and matter.
> 
> 
> PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part One Ends Here.
> 
> 
> With regards
> 
> Suan Lu Zaw
> 
> http://www.bodhiology.org
>

	
10001

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:22pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in
Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the
Not-self Characteristic
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html
especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the monks.

Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement
"Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be seen
as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am
not. This is not my self.'"

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 12:44 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Jon and Rob,
> >
> > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct
> > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is
unsatisfactory/dukkha.
> > What is impermanent, unsatisfactory/dukkha, subject to change is to be
seen
> > as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This
I
> > am not. This is not my self."
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
>
> This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain what
the
> logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to anicca,
anatta
> and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not
mine, not
> me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other?
>
> Thanks,
> Robert Ep.
>
	
10002

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:27pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Thanks, Howard. That makes sense, and was exactly what I was trying to check. It
leaves open the possibility, if one interprets it that way, that Buddha was
redefining what would be rightly called one's 'self', and what the status was of
the 'ordinary self', rather than saying there was 'no true self'.

Does one say of Nibbana that is is 'not mine, not me, not my self?' I'd be
curious if the Buddha makes the same statement about the only object or state that
is not provisional.

Robert Ep.

======================================

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 12/15/01 12:45:17 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain what 
> > the
> > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to anicca, 
> > anatta
> > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not mine, 
> > not
> > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other? 
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> ========================
> I think that for Indian philosophic thought, a 'self' is permanent (it 
> remains) and it is an agent of control for whatever belongs to it, 
> determining its status. That being so, whatever is owned by a self is fully 
> controllable by it and, thus, would not be a source of dissatisfaction. On 
> that basis, anything which is impermanent and unsatisfying would not be a 
> self (not me), and would not be mine. Them's my thoughts. ;-))
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 
> 

	
10003

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:30pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in
> Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the
> Not-self Characteristic
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html
> especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the monks.
> 
> Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement
> "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be seen
> as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am
> not. This is not my self.'"
> 
> Regards,
> Victor

I will certainly look at the sutta in question, Victor and thanks for that. You
are also right that anatta does provide the logical link to something not being
'my self'. For some reason, I hadn't looked at it that way. I think that looking
into the Buddha's definition of not-self would be a good next step.

Robert Ep.





	
10004

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:30pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Howard,

I am not sure if the Buddha was using the term "self" in the statement
"Consciousness is not self" in the philosophical sense that you have
described.

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: <upasaka@a...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:08 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Hi, Rob -
>
> In a message dated 12/15/01 12:45:17 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
>
>
> > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain
what
> > the
> > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to anicca,
> > anatta
> > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not
mine,
> > not
> > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other?
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Robert Ep.
> >
> ========================
> I think that for Indian philosophic thought, a 'self' is permanent
(it
> remains) and it is an agent of control for whatever belongs to it,
> determining its status. That being so, whatever is owned by a self is
fully
> controllable by it and, thus, would not be a source of dissatisfaction. On
> that basis, anything which is impermanent and unsatisfying would not be a
> self (not me), and would not be mine. Them's my thoughts. ;-))
>
> With metta,
> Howard
>
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a
bubble
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra)
>
	
10005

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:37pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Dear Victor,
I have read the Sutta excerpt that you indicated, and found it quite clear and
satisfying. Here is the concluding paragraph:

"Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal or
external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near:
every consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment as:
'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.' 

"Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows disenchanted
with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with
perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with consciousness.
Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion,
he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully released.'
He discerns that 'Birth is depleted, the holy life fulfilled, the
task done. There is nothing further for this world.'" 

With a little help from you and Howard, I see that Buddha defined 'not self' as
anything that one did not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes. 
In other words, if one could not say, 'make the body thus' or 'make the
consciousness thus' and it would not do that, that this body or consciousness was
therefore 'not one's self'. 

As usual, this opens more doors for me than it closes. It indicates two
possiblities: either Buddha was attempting to show that there is nothing in this
world that is the self, or he was attempting to show that there is no self, and
that nothing on heaven or earth or in the realm of consciousness or awareness or
anywhere would ever meet this definition, that in fact it was nothing but a false
concept.

On the other hand, one would surely say that the Buddha could say: let my body be
thus and that his perfect body would accord, no? Or say 'let consciousness be
thus' and that he would produce the consciousness in question, no?' If this is
not so, then the Buddha had limitations as regards this world and the kandhas. 
That would be interesting to note. If it is so, then there is a state in which
those conditions are met, namely Nibbana, and that, as Anders always insisted,
would qualify as the true self.

Best,
Robert Ep.

============================

--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in
> Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the
> Not-self Characteristic
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html
> especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the monks.
> 
> Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement
> "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be seen
> as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am
> not. This is not my self.'"
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 

	
10006

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 10:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html

Nibbana is not self. Nibbana is to be seen as it actually is with right
discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self."

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:27 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Thanks, Howard. That makes sense, and was exactly what I was trying to
check. It
> leaves open the possibility, if one interprets it that way, that Buddha
was
> redefining what would be rightly called one's 'self', and what the status
was of
> the 'ordinary self', rather than saying there was 'no true self'.
>
> Does one say of Nibbana that is is 'not mine, not me, not my self?' I'd
be
> curious if the Buddha makes the same statement about the only object or
state that
> is not provisional.
>
> Robert Ep.
>
> ======================================
>
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> > Hi, Rob -
	
10007

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 6:05pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two)

 	
Hi, Rob (and Suan) -

As you suggest below, Rob, I am sympathetic to the view you express. I 
do not accept that parinibbana is a cessation of experience in *every 
possible sense* of the term 'experience'. I would see that as a form of 
annihilationism.
However, I am also not at all certain that the cessation of the 
khandhas which is parinibbana ushers in an amorphous, contentless awareness 
either. Certainly there is no discernment of separate objects "there" - for 
there really are no completely separate objects, neither of sight, sound, 
taste, touch, smell, or mind. (There *might* still be, one could surmise, an 
"experience" which is a kind of flowing, vibrant, interconnected, luminous 
suchness without any subject-object duality. But any notion along such lines 
is *mere* speculation and without any genuine basis for belief. Moreover, it 
is surely (ultimately) wrong, being so influenced, as it is, by our samsaric 
experience. Without the direct experience of nibbana, we really haven't a 
clue as to what we are talking about!) But whatever nibbana beyond the death 
of the body is, I would doubt three things: (1) that it is identical with the 
pre-death state of the arahant, (2) that it is an absolute nothingness, and 
(3) that it is an amorphous, contentless awareness. Of course, what that 
leaves is something totally beyond our current experience, and really quite 
beyond our wildest dreams. However, what I think we can feel assured of, 
given that we believe the Buddha - and I do - is that nibbana, before and 
beyond death, is the ultimate happiness, is real, and is perfect peace 
without defect, lacking nothing.

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/15/01 1:19:52 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> Dear Suan,
> Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary.
> My remarks are dispersed below:
> 
> --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > Dear Dhamma Friends
> > 
> > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary written 
> > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, Robert 
> > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the subcommentary, I 
> > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also 
> > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies
> > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. 
> > 
> > 
> > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI
> > 
> > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa 
> > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavattassa 
> > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi 
> > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam gataati 
> > attho."
> > 
> > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete 
> > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of 
> > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, and 
> > the other without the existential residues emptied of psychophysical 
> > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying consciousness). 
> > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality 
> > like the lamp without fuel." 
> > 
> > 
> > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind 
> > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality
> > 
> > 
> > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two 
> > 
> > 
> > Robert Epstein wrote:
> > 
> > "Well, I don't know about anyone else, but reaching the state of
> > the 
> > undefined
> > reality to me means that he has reached a state in which his reality 
> > is undefined
> > by any remaining fragment of distinguishing consciousness, but that 
> > he is still
> > in a state of existence in which his reality is undefined. This does 
> > not mean that
> > there is no existent of any kind, only that all consciousness has 
> > been cooled
> > and is no longer present. The idea of an underlying beingness or 
> > awareness that is
> > however totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to 
> > be ruled
> > out here.
> > 
> > What puzzles me in the above paragraph is Robert's addition of
> > the statement:
> > 
> > "…but that he is still in a state of existence in which his
> > reality is undefined."
> > 
> > Buddhaghosa's explanation of `parinibbutaa' includes the
> > unmistakable expression `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the 
> > last mind' on the death of an Arahant. 
> 
> Let me say from the beginning here, Suan, that you are invoking the 
> termination of
> the 'last mind' as evidence that there is no remaining experience. Later 
> on you
> say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, experience 
> and
> 'sensual existence' are not synonymous. So let's start by totally agreeing 
> that
> there is no 'sensual existence' or 'sensory experience' of any kind in
> parinibbana. On this I think it is absolutely clear.
> 
> If there is *any kind* of existence in parinibbana, it would not be one 
> that is
> connected to the body or the mind. So the existence of any such experience 
> would
> indeed be a mystical state. It would be quite beyond anything that relates 
> to
> this world, to this body, mind or personality.
> 
> now the problem that arises when i try to get into this kind of 
> possibility, of
> such a state existing fro the arahant, is that anyone who hears that 
> assumes that
> this means there must be some kind of soul, or mind or entity that is 
> there. I
> try to say that if it is existent, this parinibbanic existence would have 
> to be a
> kind of pure presence, field or aware quality, disassociated from any
> individuation or subject-object differentiation. But most don't accept the
> possibility that such a state can exist without the false positing of some 
> kind of
> 'self'. I myself think that such an impersonal existence of awareness is a
> possibility, but I understand if you cannot take the Buddha's words to 
> imply that.
> I think that Howard, up to a point, agrees with me on this, and that it is
> possible that Kenneth O. would also see this as a possibility. So to an 
> extent it
> seems to divide among those who have or have had some sympathy for the 
> ideas of
> Mahayana Buddhism and those who are strictly reading according to a 
> Theravadin
> interpretation.
> 
> But I am trying to restrict myself to that which can be seen in the 
> actually words
> of the Buddha, as expressed in the Theravadin Suttas and commentaries.
> 
> So that is just to be forthright about my orientation. So I would not 
> propose
> this possibility if I did not see it in the actual verses, and in fact, in 
> this
> case, in your very noble translation of the verses, which have a nice sense 
> of
> freshness and literal immediacy about them, and for which I thank you. I 
> truly
> enjoy feeling that I have gotten a bit closer to the living word of the 
> Buddha,
> even if our interpretations may diverge after that.
> 
> So you are talking about the 'last mind' or 'sensual reality' being finally 
> cooled
> and coming to an end. 
> 
> First of all, I find the idea of these things being 'finally cooled' a 
> wonderful
> translation. Nowhere does the Buddha talk about destruction or eradication 
> when
> it comes to the final coming to rest of the experiential mechanism.
> 
> Second of all, what you do not account for in this second sub-commentary an
> d which
> is the sole evidence for my view that there may be a state of 'non-sensual'
> awareness in the parinibbanic state, is that the Buddha says that the 
> Arahant's
> final reality is 'undefined'.
> 
> For myself, Suan, I can see absolutely no reason why the Buddha would use 
> this
> enignmatic and provisional term, 'undefined' if it were not for a very 
> specific
> purpose. Why couldn't he simply say 'it is ended and there is nothing 
> left'. But
> he does not say that, he says that the Arahant is 'without the existential
> residues emptied of psychophysical machinery by termination of the last 
> mind'. As
> absolute as this sounds, he does not say this leaves *nothing* which is 
> what it
> should mean if it is a true obliteration of all experience. He says it 
> leaves the
> Arahant in a state of 'undefined reality', a truly enigmatic term.
> 
> Now we all agree that the Buddha didn't mince words and that he could be 
> clear as
> a bell, decisive in fact. So why would he not say 'the experiencing 
> consciousness
> and any possibility of any remaining awareness are totally destroyed 
> leaving
> absolutely no experience of any kind in its wake'? Or something to that 
> effect. 
> Instead he talks of the 'undefined reality'. For the life of me, this does 
> not
> sound anything like the total abolition of existence to me. It sounds like 
> the
> total obliteration of *worldly* subject/object existence, but not of 
> existence per
> se. And since we all agree that the Buddha chose his words wisely, why we 
> have to
> account for all that he said and try to make some kind of sense out of it. 
> We
> can't just ignore an expression like 'undefined reality' without a sense of 
> what
> it implies about his other statements which aree right next to each other. 
> So
> that is my sticking point, just as he says in the other Sutta we talked 
> about, the
> one about the 'luminous mind which is freed from defilements from within'. 
> You
> see there is a certain consistency here, in which the Buddha seems to point 
> at a
> 'higher' reality, rather than 'no reality' at all in the Nibbanic state.
> 
> Finally, he uses as his metaphor for this state of undefined reality 'the 
> lamp
> without fuel' which can no longer burn. This again points to the end of 
> 'sensual
> experience' but not to 'no existence of any kind'. Why do I say this? He 
> says
> the lamp is gone out, but whenever he uses this metaphor he never says the 
> lamp is
> gone or destroyed. The lamp is always left sitting there in its state of
> 'ultimate cool' with no more fuel to burn. So the flame of suffering and 
> sensual
> experience, which are intimately tied together, are finished. No more
> subject/object experience, no more objects of craving or aversion, just the
> ultimately cooled lamp. So what is that lamp? It is the base of being or
> existence without any discernable activity. It is just like a lamp that 
> does not
> burn, like awareness that has returned to itself and no longer goes outward 
> to
> seek any object. Although there is absolutely no activity in this lamp, in 
> this
> awareness, that does not mean it is obliterated. If it was, I believe that
> Buddhism would reduce inevitably to Nihilism. If one posits an absolute 
> nullity,
> one has no choice but to put one's stock in annihilation. I do not believe 
> that
> complete annihilation of experience is what the Buddha taught. I do 
> believe he
> taught the end of suffering as the complete cessation of sensory activity 
> and
> subject/object separation.
> 
> For practical purposes, this distinction may be splitting hairs, but in the 
> sense
> of what it means for the ground of being, what we really are or arent' in 
> the
> final analysis, it has enormous implications. One who believes in total 
> and final
> obliteration of all awareness can take no stock in the human quality of 
> awakeness
> or awareness. It is merely a tool to get to obliteration of suffering, and 
> in
> that sense one turns away from even the inmost content of one's own mind. 
> Even
> the cittas are a source of suffering and there is nothing beyond them. For 
> one
> who believes in the final rest of awareness itself as something that can 
> become
> enlightened by returning to itself, rather than being extinguished, there 
> is an
> inherently positive quality in the entire path, a seed of truth that exists 
> now in
> the human being, but is obscured by delusion and unwholesome tendencies. I
> believe this difference makes an enormous difference in orientation, and 
> that we
> have at least two examples of where the Buddha hints strongly, without 
> turning it
> into an object or entity, of this posssibility of light at the end of the 
> tunnel,
> rather than a final darkness. And I take strong stock in those statements. 
> I
> think they mean something that needs to be investigated and discerned.
> 
> And thank you for such a stimulating discussion of these important issues. 
> I am
> very interested in hearing your response.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10008

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 6:09pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Victor -

In a message dated 12/15/01 1:31:46 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
victoryu@s... writes:


> Hello Howard,
> 
> I am not sure if the Buddha was using the term "self" in the statement
> "Consciousness is not self" in the philosophical sense that you have
> described.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
===========================
So, what do *you* think he meant by self?

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10009

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

I am not sure if the Buddha is defining "not self" as anything that one did
not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes.

The Buddha was demonstrating the absurdity of, for instance, consciousness
being self. If consciousness were self, this consciousness would not lend
itself to dis-ease. But consciousness does lend itself to dis-ease, The
assumption that consciousness is self leads to a contradiction. Why does
consciousness lend itself to dis-ease? Precisely because consciousness is
not self.

Please note that consciousness is not self does not imply whether one has
control over consciousness or not, and whether one has control over
consciousness or not does not imply that consciousness is not self.

Regards,
Victor


----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:37 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Dear Victor,
> I have read the Sutta excerpt that you indicated, and found it quite clear
and
> satisfying. Here is the concluding paragraph:
>
> "Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal
or
> external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near:
> every consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment
as:
> 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.'
>
> "Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows
disenchanted
> with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with
> perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with
consciousness.
> Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion,
> he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully
released.'
> He discerns that 'Birth is depleted, the holy life fulfilled, the
> task done. There is nothing further for this world.'"
>
> With a little help from you and Howard, I see that Buddha defined 'not
self' as
> anything that one did not have control over or would not accord to one's
wishes.
> In other words, if one could not say, 'make the body thus' or 'make the
> consciousness thus' and it would not do that, that this body or
consciousness was
> therefore 'not one's self'.
>
> As usual, this opens more doors for me than it closes. It indicates two
> possiblities: either Buddha was attempting to show that there is nothing
in this
> world that is the self, or he was attempting to show that there is no
self, and
> that nothing on heaven or earth or in the realm of consciousness or
awareness or
> anywhere would ever meet this definition, that in fact it was nothing but
a false
> concept.
>
> On the other hand, one would surely say that the Buddha could say: let my
body be
> thus and that his perfect body would accord, no? Or say 'let
consciousness be
> thus' and that he would produce the consciousness in question, no?' If
this is
> not so, then the Buddha had limitations as regards this world and the
kandhas.
> That would be interesting to note. If it is so, then there is a state in
which
> those conditions are met, namely Nibbana, and that, as Anders always
insisted,
> would qualify as the true self.
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
>
> ============================
>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> >
> > Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in
> > Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the
> > Not-self Characteristic
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html
> > especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the
monks.
> >
> > Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement
> > "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be
seen
> > as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This
I am
> > not. This is not my self.'"
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> > To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 12:44 AM
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> >
> >
> > >
> > > --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > > > Hello Jon and Rob,
> > > >
> > > > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct
> > > > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is
> > unsatisfactory/dukkha.
> > > > What is impermanent, unsatisfactory/dukkha, subject to change is to
be
> > seen
> > > > as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine.
This
> > I
> > > > am not. This is not my self."
> > > >
> > > > Regards,
> > > > Victor
> > > >
> > >
> > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain
what
> > the
> > > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to
anicca,
> > anatta
> > > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not
> > mine, not
> > > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other?
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Robert Ep.
> > >
> > > ==================================
> > >
> > > > [snip]
> > > > > > Provisionally though, I would say that direct perception of the
> > current
> > > > > > reality as
> > > > > > what it actually is should be exempt from suffering. Why?
Because
> > > > > > there is no
> > > > > > expectation that it will last longer than a moment, therefore
there
> > is
> > > > > > no
> > > > > > discomfort or dissatisfaction at its impermanence.
> > > > >
> > > > > Except that, as someone (I think Victor) has already pointed out,
the
> > > > > moment of 'direct perception' shares the same characteristics of
> > > > > impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and not-self as the reality that
is
> > its
> > > > > object. So is it any less unsatisfactory than any other moment of
> > > > > consciousness?
> > > > [snip]
	
10010

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:28pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Howard,

Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: <upasaka@a...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 2:09 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Hi, Victor -
>
> In a message dated 12/15/01 1:31:46 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> victoryu@s... writes:
>
>
> > Hello Howard,
> >
> > I am not sure if the Buddha was using the term "self" in the statement
> > "Consciousness is not self" in the philosophical sense that you have
> > described.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> ===========================
> So, what do *you* think he meant by self?
>
> With metta,
> Howard
>
	
10011

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:38pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 

> > To summarise, I see the understanding of 'not-self' as being directly
> > linked to the teaching on satipatthana, and not realisable by other
> means.
> > 
> > Hope this answers your question.
> > 
> > Jon
> 
> Hi Jon,
> Thanks for your answer.
> 
> The Buddha does, however, include seeing Mind as Mind, and the objects
> of Mind as
> objects of Mind as part of the path of discernment. If 'concepts',
> including
> self-concept, is not an eligible 'object of Mind', what do the objects
> of Mind
> include that are eligible for satipatthana?

I think you are referring here to the Satipatthana Sutta? Of the 4
sections or ‘establishments’ (anupassana), the 2 you mention are the
consciousness section (cittanupassana) and the 'mind objects/mental
objects' section (dhammanupassana).

The objects of awareness under the Satipatthana Sutta are dhammas
(realities), not concepts. The consciousness/mind section refers to the
dhamma that is the moment of consciousness. The mind objects/mental
objects section refers to the dhammas (realities) that can be the object
of a moment of consciousness, and this in turn means any and all realities
(including those covered by the other 3 sections of the sutta).

To give an example. At a moment of seeing there is contact between the
consciousness that sees and visible object. That visible object is a
reality and also, at that precise moment, a mind object (it is the object
of seeing consciousness).

So the visible object at that moment falls under both the ‘rupas’ section
and the ‘mind object’ section of the 4 satipatthanas. This helps remind
us that the 4 sections in the sutta are merely ways of classifying
realities and are not in themselves absolutes.

Only dhammas (realties) can be the object of satipatthana, because only
something that has its own characteristic that is capable of being
experienced is considered to be a ‘dhamma’; anything that does not, is
not. 

In the Satipatthana Sutta itself, the 'eligible' mind-objects are
described in different ways. One of these ways is as the 5 khandhas
(Aggregates), and these 5 khandhas encompass all dhammas (other than
Nibbana). I have pasted below the passage from ‘The Way of Mindfulness’

Jon

Section on Mental Objects
2. The Aggregates

"And, further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in
the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging. 

"How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the
mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging? 

"Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu thinks: 
'Thus is material form [rupa]; thus is the arising of material form; and
thus is the disappearance of material form. 
Thus is feeling [vedana]; thus is the arising of feeling; and thus is the
disappearance of feeling. 
Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is
the disappearance of perception. 
Thus are the formations [sankhara]; thus is the arising of the formations;
and thus is the disappearance of the formations. 
Thus is consciousness [vinnana]; thus is the arising of consciousness; and
thus is the disappearance of consciousness.' 

Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, internally
... and clings to naught in the world. 

"Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in
the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging." [ends]



	
10012

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:49pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Rob Ep

This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with 'khandhas'. 
Must be that khandha day.

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > A question or two,
Jon.
> Is there a difference between a dhamma and a rupa? What is their
> relationship?

The term ‘dhamma’ is used in different ways in the texts, one of which is
to refer to the ‘realities’ of which this life and world as we know it are
composed. This is the meaning here.

In this sense it is a collective term, and virtual synonym, for:
- the 5 khandhas (in the suttas)
- namas and rupas (in the abhidhamma)
- citta, cetasika and rupa (abhidhamma)
(Note: Nibbana is a dhamma, classified as a nama, but is not one of the 5
khandhas)

So a rupa can be considered as a kind of dhamma or, if you like, as a
subset of dhammas.

> In either case, is the conclusion I am reaching correct, that according
> to the
> Abhidhamma commentaries, physical objects as they actually exist and
> appear in the
> moment are the the only things that are real, and that can be referred
> to as
> 'entities'?

Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ are not
dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about particular
agglomerations of rupas.

That point aside, however, neither rupas nor physical objects are referred
to in the texts as ‘entities’, as far as I am aware. 

Each dhamma does have an *individual, distinct characteristic* that can be
observed (this refers to the factor that distinguishes the dhamma from any
other dhamma). This aspect of an individual, distinct characteristic
(sabhava) is sometimes called the ‘individual essence’, but this in no way
implies any sense of ‘entitiness’.

‘Entitiness’ would seem to me to be an aspect of ‘self’ view (or, to use a
Howard term, reification).

> If that is the case, as it seems, how can one account for the momentary
> [anicca]
> nature of dhammas in terms of their 'entity' status. My understanding
> is that
> anything that is temporary [partaking of annica] does not partake of
> entity in the
> sense that it is constantly changing and does not last for more than the
> moment in
> any given form? And how does one account then for the fact that cittas
> are also
> momentary, yet do not rate entity status merely because they are not
> physical?
> 
> What is the basis for this, if true?

I think what you are saying here is that rupas are said to have an
‘entitiness’ or 'entity status' of some kind that is not shared by other
dhammas (ie., namas - citta and cetasika).

I don’t think I’ve seen any such distinction made. The main difference
between the 2 kinds of dhammas is that one (ie., the nama) has the nature
of being a reality that experiences an object, while the other (the rupa)
has the nature of being a reality that does not experience an object. 

Beyond that they each have in common the 3 general characteristics
(anicca, dukkha and anatta) and of course each particular nama and rupa
has its own individual characteristic (sabhava) as noted above. I am not
aware of any other major distinction between the 2.

This of course is all ‘from the book’, but unless we are absolutely clear
about these aspects the practice cannot be correct, because we will
confuse different realities, or take concepts for realities.

Jon

PS Found the following comments on the khandhas as ‘entities’ in the
khandhas entry in Buddhist Dictionary. Thought it might be of interest--

“Some writers on Buddhism who have not understood that the five khandha
are just classificatory groupings, have conceived them as compact entities
('heaps', 'bundles'), while actually, as stated above, the groups never
exist as such, i.e. they never occur in a simultaneous totality of all
their constituents. 
Also those single constituents of a group which are present in any given
body- and -mind process, are of an evanescent nature, and so also their
varying combinations. Feeling, perception and mental formations are only
different aspects and functions of a single unit of consciousness.”


	
10013

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:29am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard)

 	
Howard

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -

> > Yes, except I think that in any discussion of the "hardness
> experience" we
> > should be seeking to make clear the distinction between the dhamma
> that is
> > the *hardness being experienced* and the dhamma that is the
> *experiencing
> > of that hardness*, since they are totally separate dhammas, although
> not
> > normally perceived as such.
> > 
> ---------------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> I'm in basic agreement here, though I would formulate it
> differently. 
> I am more inclined to describe the hardness experienced and the
> experiencing 
> of the hardness as two inter-related and mutually dependent aspects of
> the 
> same experiencing-event. They are distinguishable as are the inside and
> the 
> outside of a hollow sphere, but they co-occur, are mutually dependent,
> and, 
> thus are not "totally separate". (In fact, no things are totally
> separate, 
> though some are more "remote" from each other than dyads.

Jon:

A matter of emphasis, perhaps. I was trying to emphasise the difference
between the 2 kinds of reality, and perhaps ‘totally different’ would have
been a better choice of words.

I agree that they are mutually dependent at the moment of co-arising, and
this describes an aspect of the relationship between the 2 realities. 
These relationships are described in detail in the teaching on conditions.

To my way of thinking, a clearer understanding of the difference between
realities that we tend to ‘mix together’ is the means to a clearer
understanding of the relationship between those different realities.

Jon




	
10014

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:02am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Held-to views (and khandhas)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > The point I find really interesting myself is the one I have mentioned
> > above, namely that the 'undoing' of one's wrong views occurs not from
> > 'straightening out' the views nor from confronting them head-on (the
> > conventional belief) but from the much more indirect way of
> understanding
> > more about dhammas, something which, at first glance, appears to have
> > little or nothing to do with the problem.
> > 
> > Jon
> 
> I think this is very interesting. To understand your proposal better,
> could you
> give your current definition of 'dhamma'. I'm not sure if you mean it
> mainly as
> 'rupas' or whether you are including a larger set of objects of
> consciousness.
> 
> What qualifies as a 'reality' to be truly discerned?

Same answer ;-). In other words, nama and rupa, aka citta, cetasika and
rupa, aka the 5 khandhas (leaving out nibbana for the moment). See the
extract pasted below.

Rupas may seem ‘more real’ than namas, but according to the teaching this
is not so. So perhaps we’ve got something wrong ;-)).

Jon

‘Buddhist Dictionary’
Khandha: 
The 5 'groups (of existence)' or 'groups of clinging' (upádánakkhandha).
Alternative renderings: aggregates, categories of clinging's objects. 

These are the 5 aspects in which the Buddha has summed up all the physical
and mental phenomena of existence, and which appear to the ignorant man as
his ego, or personality, to wit:
(1) the corporeality group (rúpa-kkhandha),
(2) the feeling group (vedaná-kkhandha),
(3) the perception group (saññá-kkhandha),
(4) the mental-formation group (sankhára-kkhandha),
(5) the consciousness-group (viññána-kkhandha).

Another division is that into the 2 groups of náma and rúpa: 
- mind (khandhas 2-5 above) and corporeality (kh 1 above) 

whilst in Dhamma Sanganí, the first book of the Abhidhamma, all the
phenomena are treated by way of 3 groups of citta, cetasika and rúpa:
- consciousness (kh 5), mental factors (khs 2-4), corporeality (kh 1).
[ends]


	
10015

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:31am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> 
> Nibbana is not self. Nibbana is to be seen as it actually is with right
> discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self."
> 
> Regards,
> Victor

Dear Victor, 
With respect, there is no definition of the self in the section that you have here
indicated, and in fact one is admonished to control and purify oneself, using a
conventional meaning of 'self'. One is admonished to abstain from harmful acts
and not to forsake 'oneself' for the sake of another. I fail to see how this
addresses the question of the proper usage of the word 'self'.

Furthermore, there is no mention of Nibbana and its relation to the self in this
passage. I await any references you would like to make that either asserts or
refutes the possibility of Nibbana being the true self, or anything along these
lines. I am not necessarily arguing for the word 'self' to be in the same
sentence as Nibbana, but since Nibbana is the only unconditioned object or state,
depending on how you look at it, it is the only candidate for a state of being
that would not be conditioned and subject to the conditioning of the khandas.

Best,
Robert Ep.

============

> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:27 AM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> 
> 
> > Thanks, Howard. That makes sense, and was exactly what I was trying to
> check. It
> > leaves open the possibility, if one interprets it that way, that Buddha
> was
> > redefining what would be rightly called one's 'self', and what the status
> was of
> > the 'ordinary self', rather than saying there was 'no true self'.
> >
> > Does one say of Nibbana that is is 'not mine, not me, not my self?' I'd
> be
> > curious if the Buddha makes the same statement about the only object or
> state that
> > is not provisional.
> >
> > Robert Ep.
> >
> > ======================================
> >
> > --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> > > Hi, Rob -
> > >
> > > In a message dated 12/15/01 12:45:17 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> > > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> > >
> > >
> > > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain
> what
> > > > the
> > > > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to
> anicca,
> > > > anatta
> > > > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not
> mine,
> > > > not
> > > > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other?
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > Robert Ep.
> > > >
> > > ========================
> > > I think that for Indian philosophic thought, a 'self' is
> permanent (it
> > > remains) and it is an agent of control for whatever belongs to it,
> > > determining its status. That being so, whatever is owned by a self is
> fully
> > > controllable by it and, thus, would not be a source of dissatisfaction.
> On
> > > that basis, anything which is impermanent and unsatisfying would not be
> a
> > > self (not me), and would not be mine. Them's my thoughts. ;-))
> > >
> > > With metta,
> > > Howard


	
10016

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:34am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Victor

Thanks for coming in on this thread.

--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Jon and Rob,
> 
> I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct
> perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is
> unsatisfactory/dukkha.
> What is impermanent, unsatisfactory/dukkha, subject to change is to be
> seen
> as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This
> I
> am not. This is not my self."

'Direct perception' suggests to me a moment of consciousness that is
accompanied by a level of awareness and understading of the characteristic
of a reality.

Like all other mundane realities, such consciousness is impermanent,
unsatisfactory and not-self, according to the teachings.

These things are hard to realise for ourselves, though. Would you agree?

Jon


> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> [snip]
> > > Provisionally though, I would say that direct perception of the
> current
> > > reality as
> > > what it actually is should be exempt from suffering. Why? Because
> > > there is no
> > > expectation that it will last longer than a moment, therefore there
> is
> > > no
> > > discomfort or dissatisfaction at its impermanence.
> >
> > Except that, as someone (I think Victor) has already pointed out, the
> > moment of 'direct perception' shares the same characteristics of
> > impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and not-self as the reality that is
> its
> > object. So is it any less unsatisfactory than any other moment of
> > consciousness?
> [snip]

	
10017

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:34am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two)

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Rob (and Suan) -
> 
> As you suggest below, Rob, I am sympathetic to the view you express. I 
> do not accept that parinibbana is a cessation of experience in *every 
> possible sense* of the term 'experience'. I would see that as a form of 
> annihilationism.
> However, I am also not at all certain that the cessation of the 
> khandhas which is parinibbana ushers in an amorphous, contentless awareness 
> either. Certainly there is no discernment of separate objects "there" - for 
> there really are no completely separate objects, neither of sight, sound, 
> taste, touch, smell, or mind. (There *might* still be, one could surmise, an 
> "experience" which is a kind of flowing, vibrant, interconnected, luminous 
> suchness without any subject-object duality. But any notion along such lines 
> is *mere* speculation and without any genuine basis for belief. Moreover, it 
> is surely (ultimately) wrong, being so influenced, as it is, by our samsaric 
> experience. Without the direct experience of nibbana, we really haven't a 
> clue as to what we are talking about!) 

hence, 'undefined reality', certainly from our standpoint. 

But in that sense, wouldn't a view of complete annihilation of experience be
equally speculative?

And if both are speculative, then what is 'right view'?

But whatever nibbana beyond the death 
> of the body is, I would doubt three things: (1) that it is identical with the 
> pre-death state of the arahant, (2) that it is an absolute nothingness, and 
> (3) that it is an amorphous, contentless awareness. Of course, what that 
> leaves is something totally beyond our current experience, and really quite 
> beyond our wildest dreams. However, what I think we can feel assured of, 
> given that we believe the Buddha - and I do - is that nibbana, before and 
> beyond death, is the ultimate happiness, is real, and is perfect peace 
> without defect, lacking nothing.

And this would have to be something other than mere annihilation.

Best,
Robert Ep.



	
10018

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:38am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Dear Victor,
In the Sutta you referred me to, the Buddha says that if consciousness were the
self, one could say 'have this consciousness be like this' and it would do so. 
Since it does not, it is clearly not self.

He says that if this body were self it would likewise accord with our wishes, but
since it does not, it is not self.

Hence my reference to that which cannot be controlled not being self.

In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the controller of
oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference to one
being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does not imply a
true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it mean?

Best,
Robert Ep.

========

--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> I am not sure if the Buddha is defining "not self" as anything that one did
> not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes.
> 
> The Buddha was demonstrating the absurdity of, for instance, consciousness
> being self. If consciousness were self, this consciousness would not lend
> itself to dis-ease. But consciousness does lend itself to dis-ease, The
> assumption that consciousness is self leads to a contradiction. Why does
> consciousness lend itself to dis-ease? Precisely because consciousness is
> not self.
> 
> Please note that consciousness is not self does not imply whether one has
> control over consciousness or not, and whether one has control over
> consciousness or not does not imply that consciousness is not self.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:37 AM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> 
> 
> > Dear Victor,
> > I have read the Sutta excerpt that you indicated, and found it quite clear
> and
> > satisfying. Here is the concluding paragraph:
> >
> > "Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal
> or
> > external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near:
> > every consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment
> as:
> > 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.'
> >
> > "Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows
> disenchanted
> > with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with
> > perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with
> consciousness.
> > Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion,
> > he is fully released. With full release, there is the knowledge, 'Fully
> released.'
> > He discerns that 'Birth is depleted, the holy life fulfilled, the
> > task done. There is nothing further for this world.'"
> >
> > With a little help from you and Howard, I see that Buddha defined 'not
> self' as
> > anything that one did not have control over or would not accord to one's
> wishes.
> > In other words, if one could not say, 'make the body thus' or 'make the
> > consciousness thus' and it would not do that, that this body or
> consciousness was
> > therefore 'not one's self'.
> >
> > As usual, this opens more doors for me than it closes. It indicates two
> > possiblities: either Buddha was attempting to show that there is nothing
> in this
> > world that is the self, or he was attempting to show that there is no
> self, and
> > that nothing on heaven or earth or in the realm of consciousness or
> awareness or
> > anywhere would ever meet this definition, that in fact it was nothing but
> a false
> > concept.
> >
> > On the other hand, one would surely say that the Buddha could say: let my
> body be
> > thus and that his perfect body would accord, no? Or say 'let
> consciousness be
> > thus' and that he would produce the consciousness in question, no?' If
> this is
> > not so, then the Buddha had limitations as regards this world and the
> kandhas.
> > That would be interesting to note. If it is so, then there is a state in
> which
> > those conditions are met, namely Nibbana, and that, as Anders always
> insisted,
> > would qualify as the true self.
> >
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> >
> > ============================
> >
> > --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > > Hello Robert,
> > >
> > > Please reflect on what the Buddha taught in
> > > Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the
> > > Not-self Characteristic
> > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html
> > > especially on the question-answer dialogue between the Buddha and the
> monks.
> > >
> > > Also, please see the equivalence of meaning between the statement
> > > "Consciousness is not self" and the statement "Consciousness is to be
> seen
> > > as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This
> I am
> > > not. This is not my self.'"
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Victor
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> > > To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> > > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 12:44 AM
> > > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> > >
> > >
> > > >
> > > > --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > > > > Hello Jon and Rob,
> > > > >
> > > > > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct
> > > > > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is
> > > unsatisfactory/dukkha.
> > > > > What is impermanent, unsatisfactory/dukkha, subject to change is to
> be
> > > seen
> > > > > as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine.
> This
> > > I
> > > > > am not. This is not my self."
> > > > >
> > > > > Regards,
> > > > > Victor
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > This may sound extremely redundant or simplistic, but can you explain
> what
> > > the
> > > > logical link is between recognizing that something is subject to
> anicca,
> > > anatta
> > > > and dukkha, and leaping from there to the recognition that it is 'not
> > > mine, not
> > > > me, not my self.' How does one necessitate the other?
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > Robert Ep.
> > > >


	
10019

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 14, 2001 11:55pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (and khandhas)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > So I take it that the
answer is that rupas are also a cause of
> suffering. This
> confuses me since the rupas are supposed to be the 'absolute realities'.
> If the
> absolutel realities are also cause of suffering, then what is
> distinctive about
> them? Is it just to say that they are what they are, while other
> perceptions are
> illusions, but that they still cause suffering equally?

Yes, rupas are ‘realities’ (dhammas) and they are also ‘suffering’
(dukkha). This is because, although ‘real’ in the sense of having an
individual characteristic (sabhava), they are also conditioned (sankhara –
the same term as the 4th khandha, but used in a slightly different sense
here). 

The same applies to all other dhammas (ie., namas or, more particularly,
citta and cetasika), with the single exception of nibbana.

The conditioned nature of dhammas is a very important aspect. It is
because dhammas are conditioned that they are impermanent, beyond our
control and hence dukkha.

Nibbana is the only dhamma that is not conditioned (it is ‘asankhara’) and
hence is not ‘suffering’ (dukkha). But it is still ‘not-self’. 

Hence the well-known passage--
All ‘sankharas’ [dhammas other than nibbana] are impermanent (anicca)
All ‘sankharas’ [dhammas other than nibbana] are suffering (dukkha)
All ‘dhammas’ [including nibbana] are not-self (anatta)

> Also, you may acccuse me of being a semantical demon, but every example
> below says
> that the khandas 'as objects of clinging' are all causes of suffering. 
> Is there a
> quote that says that the khandas ' cannot occur except as objects of
> clinging?' 
> It occurs to me that it is the clinging that is the problem, not the
> objects. If
> the problem is not with the objects of clinging but with the clinging,
> can there
> be kandhas without clinging? It sounds like a possibility depending on
> the state
> of he who either clings or has gained the wisdom not to cling to the
> kandhas. 
> Would this define an arahant?

A fair observation, Rob. (And anyway, who would I be to call anyone a
semantical demon?)

The khandas are sometimes referred to as ‘upadana-kkhandhas’, which
translates as ‘aggregates that are objects of clinging’, and at other
times as plain old ‘khandas’ (aggregates).

As far as I know, no difference is intended between the 2 terms. The
former is simply a more descriptive version of the latter, conveying
something of their nature.

The khandhas of the arahant can of course be the object of (another’s)
clinging, or aversion.

JOn

From Nyanatiloka’s ‘Buddhist Dictionary’
Khandha: 
The 5 'groups (of existence)' or 'groups of clinging' (upádánakkhandha).
Alternative renderings: aggregates, categories of clinging's objects. 

Upádána-kkhandha: 
The 5 'groups of clinging', or more clearly stated in accordance with
Vis.M., 'the 5 groups of existence which form the objects of clinging'. 
Cf. M. 44


	
10020

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 0:58am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Dear Jon,
Thank you very much for helping to clarify some of these terms and how they fit
together. The idea that dhammas include namas and rupas, and that cittas and
Nibbana are also included, is very helpful. 

Now here is where I got confused: if dhammas are the 'ultimate realities' I
derived from this that they were 'real', meaning that they had a status as
'entities'. This is obviously not what is meant by 'real' at all.

I now take it that what is meant by 'real' and 'ultimate' is merely that:
a/ they are being discerned as they actually are, in their fleeting, momentary
occurence as an aspect of physical or mental reality, ie, rupas or namas.

b/ they are irreducible to anything other or smaller. No combined or aggregate
arisings, such as the complex concept of an object existing independently, would
be considered real or ultimate. They are like the prime numbers of experience.

Is this correct?

And so in a sense by saying they are 'real', one is saying that they are 'not
real' in the conventional sense, but only momentary and fleeting, not lasting
beyond the moment. In this sense they are accurately seen as what they are in the
moment without any conceptual attributions of entity, lasting quality or
satisfaction arising with them, and then they would be seen correctly.

Does that accord with your meaning?

Thanks again, and I think I may be starting to get the concept as it is described.

Best,
Robert Ep.

=========================

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with 'khandhas'. 
> Must be that khandha day.
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > A question or two,
> Jon.
> > Is there a difference between a dhamma and a rupa? What is their
> > relationship?
> 
> The term ‘dhamma’ is used in different ways in the texts, one of which is
> to refer to the ‘realities’ of which this life and world as we know it are
> composed. This is the meaning here.
> 
> In this sense it is a collective term, and virtual synonym, for:
> - the 5 khandhas (in the suttas)
> - namas and rupas (in the abhidhamma)
> - citta, cetasika and rupa (abhidhamma)
> (Note: Nibbana is a dhamma, classified as a nama, but is not one of the 5
> khandhas)
> 
> So a rupa can be considered as a kind of dhamma or, if you like, as a
> subset of dhammas.
> 
> > In either case, is the conclusion I am reaching correct, that according
> > to the
> > Abhidhamma commentaries, physical objects as they actually exist and
> > appear in the
> > moment are the the only things that are real, and that can be referred
> > to as
> > 'entities'?
> 
> Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ are not
> dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about particular
> agglomerations of rupas.
> 
> That point aside, however, neither rupas nor physical objects are referred
> to in the texts as ‘entities’, as far as I am aware. 
> 
> Each dhamma does have an *individual, distinct characteristic* that can be
> observed (this refers to the factor that distinguishes the dhamma from any
> other dhamma). This aspect of an individual, distinct characteristic
> (sabhava) is sometimes called the ‘individual essence’, but this in no way
> implies any sense of ‘entitiness’.
> 
> ‘Entitiness’ would seem to me to be an aspect of ‘self’ view (or, to use a
> Howard term, reification).
> 
> > If that is the case, as it seems, how can one account for the momentary
> > [anicca]
> > nature of dhammas in terms of their 'entity' status. My understanding
> > is that
> > anything that is temporary [partaking of annica] does not partake of
> > entity in the
> > sense that it is constantly changing and does not last for more than the
> > moment in
> > any given form? And how does one account then for the fact that cittas
> > are also
> > momentary, yet do not rate entity status merely because they are not
> > physical?
> > 
> > What is the basis for this, if true?
> 
> I think what you are saying here is that rupas are said to have an
> ‘entitiness’ or 'entity status' of some kind that is not shared by other
> dhammas (ie., namas - citta and cetasika).
> 
> I don’t think I’ve seen any such distinction made. The main difference
> between the 2 kinds of dhammas is that one (ie., the nama) has the nature
> of being a reality that experiences an object, while the other (the rupa)
> has the nature of being a reality that does not experience an object. 
> 
> Beyond that they each have in common the 3 general characteristics
> (anicca, dukkha and anatta) and of course each particular nama and rupa
> has its own individual characteristic (sabhava) as noted above. I am not
> aware of any other major distinction between the 2.
> 
> This of course is all ‘from the book’, but unless we are absolutely clear
> about these aspects the practice cannot be correct, because we will
> confuse different realities, or take concepts for realities.
> 
> Jon
> 
> PS Found the following comments on the khandhas as ‘entities’ in the
> khandhas entry in Buddhist Dictionary. Thought it might be of interest--
> 
> “Some writers on Buddhism who have not understood that the five khandha
> are just classificatory groupings, have conceived them as compact entities
> ('heaps', 'bundles'), while actually, as stated above, the groups never
> exist as such, i.e. they never occur in a simultaneous totality of all
> their constituents. 
> Also those single constituents of a group which are present in any given
> body- and -mind process, are of an evanescent nature, and so also their
> varying combinations. Feeling, perception and mental formations are only
> different aspects and functions of a single unit of consciousness.”


	
10021

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 1:04am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas)

 	
Thanks, Jon.
Can you please explain to me within the scheme described below,
what exactly is a concept, and where is it classified?

And why is it not a dhamma?
It would seem to me that a thought, image, idea or concept would also have a
particular content that would identify it. If I imagine or think of a rupa, is
that considered completely different than actually mentally apprehending one at
the moment of seeing? Is this the distinction?

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

===========================

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> 
> > > To summarise, I see the understanding of 'not-self' as being directly
> > > linked to the teaching on satipatthana, and not realisable by other
> > means.
> > > 
> > > Hope this answers your question.
> > > 
> > > Jon
> > 
> > Hi Jon,
> > Thanks for your answer.
> > 
> > The Buddha does, however, include seeing Mind as Mind, and the objects
> > of Mind as
> > objects of Mind as part of the path of discernment. If 'concepts',
> > including
> > self-concept, is not an eligible 'object of Mind', what do the objects
> > of Mind
> > include that are eligible for satipatthana?
> 
> I think you are referring here to the Satipatthana Sutta? Of the 4
> sections or ‘establishments’ (anupassana), the 2 you mention are the
> consciousness section (cittanupassana) and the 'mind objects/mental
> objects' section (dhammanupassana).
> 
> The objects of awareness under the Satipatthana Sutta are dhammas
> (realities), not concepts. The consciousness/mind section refers to the
> dhamma that is the moment of consciousness. The mind objects/mental
> objects section refers to the dhammas (realities) that can be the object
> of a moment of consciousness, and this in turn means any and all realities
> (including those covered by the other 3 sections of the sutta).
> 
> To give an example. At a moment of seeing there is contact between the
> consciousness that sees and visible object. That visible object is a
> reality and also, at that precise moment, a mind object (it is the object
> of seeing consciousness).
> 
> So the visible object at that moment falls under both the ‘rupas’ section
> and the ‘mind object’ section of the 4 satipatthanas. This helps remind
> us that the 4 sections in the sutta are merely ways of classifying
> realities and are not in themselves absolutes.
> 
> Only dhammas (realties) can be the object of satipatthana, because only
> something that has its own characteristic that is capable of being
> experienced is considered to be a ‘dhamma’; anything that does not, is
> not. 
> 
> In the Satipatthana Sutta itself, the 'eligible' mind-objects are
> described in different ways. One of these ways is as the 5 khandhas
> (Aggregates), and these 5 khandhas encompass all dhammas (other than
> Nibbana). I have pasted below the passage from ‘The Way of Mindfulness’
> 
> Jon
> 
> Section on Mental Objects
> 2. The Aggregates
> 
> "And, further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in
> the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging. 
> 
> "How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the
> mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging? 
> 
> "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu thinks: 
> 'Thus is material form [rupa]; thus is the arising of material form; and
> thus is the disappearance of material form. 
> Thus is feeling [vedana]; thus is the arising of feeling; and thus is the
> disappearance of feeling. 
> Thus is perception [sanna]; thus is the arising of perception; and thus is
> the disappearance of perception. 
> Thus are the formations [sankhara]; thus is the arising of the formations;
> and thus is the disappearance of the formations. 
> Thus is consciousness [vinnana]; thus is the arising of consciousness; and
> thus is the disappearance of consciousness.' 
> 
> Thus he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, internally
> ... and clings to naught in the world. 
> 
> "Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in
> the mental objects of the five aggregates of clinging." [ends]

	
10022

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 4:51am
Subject: Fwd: Re: Dying moments

 	
--- In dhamma-list@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" 
<robertkirkpatrick@r...> wrote:
---
Dear Christine,
My message was a little pithy, but you were able to comprend just why 
it is that ""learning to see that every moment is really 
uncontrollable 
> and conditioned, be so reassuring as to no longer scare you"".
The reason is exactly:"Or is it more an acceptance 
> of 'that's the way it is whether I like it or not'""

That is it! If it is just a feeling of resignation then this is 
akusala but it can be 180degrees different and kusala. For myself it 
changed gradually and I accepted that it may be that a kamma arises 
at death that leads to a lower realm BUT that that was not going to 
stop me doing kusala now. And when there is kusala(even a tiny 
amount) it is always detached (a little) and so fearlessness 
accumulates. I well know that my understanding is tiny and that the 
illdeeds done in this life alone would be enormous - and so I accept 
the worst, that a sojourn in hell might be in store at some time. I 
figure it is a minor matter compared to learning a little of what the 
Buddha truly taught. The accumulations we make are not lost, even if 
we spend a long time in the lower realms they will come to the 
surface in future lives.

And also ALL our fear comes from the conceit and view of self (oh God 
NO, "I" am going to die and be reborn in hell!). This matter of death 
can become the whetstone that sharpens wisdom, because whenever there 
is fear the trouble that self view causes shows itself very clearly. 
This can be an encouragement to let go a little more of the clinging 
to self. Then the contemplation on death (maranasati) becomes our 
good friend.

Another point on your earlier post. Only kammapattha (completed 
kamma) is of sufficient strength to give result leading to rebirth. 
If we are in a coma the kamma done then, while dreaming or whatever, 
could not give a rebirth result. It would have to be from a past 
time. Nor can a feeling of nervousness about rebirth alone be strong 
enough to give such a result: it is akusala but by itself is not 
completed kamma.
I think your posts would be of interest to many, Christine. They are 
always useful.
best wishes
robert



In dhamma-list@y..., "christine_forsyth" <cforsyth@v...> wrote:
> Dear Robert,
> Thank you for this post. As usual, it lead me to more questions. :-
)
> Why would learning to see that every moment is really 
uncontrollable 
> and conditioned, be so reassuring as to no longer scare you? (That 
> idea scares me more).....Wouldn't understanding reality in that way 
> induce 'resignation' or 'hopelessness'? Or is it more an acceptance 
> of 'that's the way it is whether I like it or not', and doing merit 
> is the only way of influencing the future? 
> I always appreciate your responses Robert - it would be wonderful 
if 
> an answer could be heard once and permanently understood instead of 
> this constant asking again and again....I know it must try peoples' 
> patience...
> 
> metta,
> Christine
> 
> --- In dhamma-list@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" 
> <robertkirkpatrick@r...> wrote:
> > ---
> > Dear Christine,
> > You ask the best questions. This matter used to scare me like 
> nothing 
> > else: until I learnt enough to see that every moment is really 
> > uncontrollable and conditioned. The death moment is no different 
> from 
> > now and the kamma that conditions rebirth can be one of several 
> > types. 
> > It might be from years past or it might be not from this life but 
> one 
> > done in last life or even a thousand lives ago. OR it could be 
one 
> > done near to death and that is why it is good to do merit as much 
> as 
> > possible close to ones death. And the wise person knows that 
death 
> > can occur next moment and so the mind turns toward merit at all 
> times.
> > If this happens there can be a growing confidence that whatever 
> state 
> > one dies in, even in a coma, that the conditioning kamma will be 
> > wholesome.
> > robert
--- End forwarded message ---
	
10023

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 5:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

Please understand that any definition, any delineation on what self is is
speculative self-view. Please note that he term "self" or its variation
"oneself" is used as a pronoun in Dhammapa 12 without speculation on what
self is. Please also see that the term "self" is used as a pronoun in
Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the
Not-self Characteristic,
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html

Please consider this question:
Is it fitting to see Nibbana as: "This is mine. This I am. This is my
self."?

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:31 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> >
> > Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> >
> > Nibbana is not self. Nibbana is to be seen as it actually is with right
> > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my
self."
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
>
> Dear Victor,
> With respect, there is no definition of the self in the section that you
have here
> indicated, and in fact one is admonished to control and purify oneself,
using a
> conventional meaning of 'self'. One is admonished to abstain from harmful
acts
> and not to forsake 'oneself' for the sake of another. I fail to see how
this
> addresses the question of the proper usage of the word 'self'.
>
> Furthermore, there is no mention of Nibbana and its relation to the self
in this
> passage. I await any references you would like to make that either
asserts or
> refutes the possibility of Nibbana being the true self, or anything along
these
> lines. I am not necessarily arguing for the word 'self' to be in the same
> sentence as Nibbana, but since Nibbana is the only unconditioned object or
state,
> depending on how you look at it, it is the only candidate for a state of
being
> that would not be conditioned and subject to the conditioning of the
khandas.
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
>
> ============
 
10024

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 6:09am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

Yes, one can control oneself.

If form were self, it would be possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be
thus. Let this form not be thus.' However, precisely because form is not
self, it is not possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this
form not be thus.'

Please note that form is not self does not imply whether it is possible or
not for ONE to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:38 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Dear Victor,
> In the Sutta you referred me to, the Buddha says that if consciousness
were the
> self, one could say 'have this consciousness be like this' and it would do
so.
> Since it does not, it is clearly not self.
>
> He says that if this body were self it would likewise accord with our
wishes, but
> since it does not, it is not self.
>
> Hence my reference to that which cannot be controlled not being self.
>
> In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the
controller of
> oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference to
one
> being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does not
imply a
> true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it mean?
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
>
> ========
>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> >
> > I am not sure if the Buddha is defining "not self" as anything that one
did
> > not have control over or would not accord to one's wishes.
> >
> > The Buddha was demonstrating the absurdity of, for instance,
consciousness
> > being self. If consciousness were self, this consciousness would not
lend
> > itself to dis-ease. But consciousness does lend itself to dis-ease, The
> > assumption that consciousness is self leads to a contradiction. Why
does
> > consciousness lend itself to dis-ease? Precisely because consciousness
is
> > not self.
> >
> > Please note that consciousness is not self does not imply whether one
has
> > control over consciousness or not, and whether one has control over
> > consciousness or not does not imply that consciousness is not self.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> >

	
10025

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 6:53am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Jon,

Thank you. Whether it is hard to realize or not, conditioned phenomenon
such as consciousness or perception is impermanent, is
unsatisfactory/dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right
discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self."

Regards,
Victor


----- Original Message -----
From: "Jonothan Abbott" <jonoabb@y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:34 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Victor
>
> Thanks for coming in on this thread.
>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Jon and Rob,
> >
> > I am not sure what the moment of direct perception is. But direct
> > perception is impermanent. What is impermanent is
> > unsatisfactory/dukkha.
	
10026

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:09am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Victor -

In a message dated 12/15/01 2:32:06 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
victoryu@s... writes:


> 
> Hello Howard,
> 
> Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
=============================
Yes, I checked that reference after you gave it in a previous post. 
That sutta has for years been a favorite of those who dearly wanted to 
believe that the Buddha accepted the existence of a self. But it is clear to 
me, and to many commentators, that the Buddha is merely using convemtional 
speech in that sutta, in the same way (using an example I gave once before) 
that one might say that a sprout has the power to grow into a plant, but no 
one would ask where in the sprout that power is located! It is the same 
conventional usage as the Buddha adopted in referring to *anything*. He 
referred to trees, to mountains, to people - all without attributing true, 
separate existence there. He referred to Ananda, to Sariputta, to Moggalana - 
all without accepting the notion of a "true person" to be found among or 
outside of the khandhas. This conventional use of nouns, and especially 
'self', all the while not attributing more than conventional status to such 
usage, is common to Theravada and to Mahayana, and began with the Buddha 
himself.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10027

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> 
> This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with 'khandhas'. 
> Must be that khandha day.
> 
==============================
Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring your 
own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-))

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10028

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:29am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ are not
> dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about particular
> agglomerations of rupas.
> 
=============================
I think this is an important matter. "Physical objects" are the 
imagined external entities that are referenced by those mental constructs, 
conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by concepts. The physical objects 
have only conventional existence, though they are based on genuine 
observation of rupas and relations among rupas. Imagined external entities, 
of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom or anything else. However, 
those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* directly observable. It seems 
to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the term 'concept' to refer to 
the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I use the term 'concept' to 
refer to the thought, itself, something which I think *does* fall under the 
4th foundation of mindfulness.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10029

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:34am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard)

 	
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 12/15/01 3:30:05 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> Howard:
> > I'm in basic agreement here, though I would formulate it
> > differently. 
> > I am more inclined to describe the hardness experienced and the
> > experiencing 
> > of the hardness as two inter-related and mutually dependent aspects of
> > the 
> > same experiencing-event. They are distinguishable as are the inside and
> > the 
> > outside of a hollow sphere, but they co-occur, are mutually dependent,
> > and, 
> > thus are not "totally separate". (In fact, no things are totally
> > separate, 
> > though some are more "remote" from each other than dyads.
> 
> Jon:
> 
> A matter of emphasis, perhaps. I was trying to emphasise the difference
> between the 2 kinds of reality, and perhaps ‘totally different’ would have
> been a better choice of words.
> 
> I agree that they are mutually dependent at the moment of co-arising, and
> this describes an aspect of the relationship between the 2 realities. 
> These relationships are described in detail in the teaching on conditions.
> 
> To my way of thinking, a clearer understanding of the difference between
> realities that we tend to ‘mix together’ is the means to a clearer
> understanding of the relationship between those different realities.
> 
> Jon
> 
============================
I understand your point, and I agree that clear understanding is 
important, both of differences in characteristic and of interdependence. If 
either is given short shrift, our understanding is incomplete.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10030

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Rob -

In a message dated 12/15/01 3:40:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the 
> controller of
> oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference to 
> one
> being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does not 
> imply a
> true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it mean?
> 
> 
==============================
It's just a manner of speaking, Rob, much like telling somebody: "Get 
yourself in hand; no one else can do that for you!"

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10031

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 9:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Howard,

From what I understand reading the discourse, the Buddha was using right
speech that is truthful, beneficial, clear, not obscure, and not esoteric.

How we express ourselves often reflects the views we have. And regarding
views, I would like to include a metaphor:
View is like direction. Having right view is like going in the right
direction, which will lead to the destination. Having wrong view is like
going in the wrong direction, which will not lead to the destination,.
Having view such "self exists" or "self does not exist" is like going around
in a circle. Having the view "self exists" is like going around in a circle
in one direction. Having the view "self does not exist" is like going
around in a circle in opposite direction.

One will not reach the destination going around in a circle, clockwise or
counter-clockwise.

Thank you for replying.

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: <upasaka@a...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 11:09 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Hi, Victor -
>
> In a message dated 12/15/01 2:32:06 AM Eastern Standard Time,
> victoryu@s... writes:
>
>
> >
> > Hello Howard,
> >
> > Please see how the term "self" is used in Dhammapada 12, The Self
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> =============================
> Yes, I checked that reference after you gave it in a previous post.
> That sutta has for years been a favorite of those who dearly wanted to
> believe that the Buddha accepted the existence of a self. But it is clear
to
> me, and to many commentators, that the Buddha is merely using convemtional
> speech in that sutta, in the same way (using an example I gave once
before)
> that one might say that a sprout has the power to grow into a plant, but
no
> one would ask where in the sprout that power is located! It is the same
> conventional usage as the Buddha adopted in referring to *anything*. He
> referred to trees, to mountains, to people - all without attributing true,
> separate existence there. He referred to Ananda, to Sariputta, to
Moggalana -
> all without accepting the notion of a "true person" to be found among or
> outside of the khandhas. This conventional use of nouns, and especially
> 'self', all the while not attributing more than conventional status to
such
> usage, is common to Theravada and to Mahayana, and began with the Buddha
> himself.
>
> With metta,
> Howard
	
10032

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 4:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Victor -

In a message dated 12/15/01 12:14:29 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
victoryu@s... writes:


> 
> Hello Howard,
> 
> From what I understand reading the discourse, the Buddha was using right
> speech that is truthful, beneficial, clear, not obscure, and not esoteric.
> 
> How we express ourselves often reflects the views we have. And regarding
> views, I would like to include a metaphor:
> View is like direction. Having right view is like going in the right
> direction, which will lead to the destination. Having wrong view is like
> going in the wrong direction, which will not lead to the destination,.
> Having view such "self exists" or "self does not exist" is like going 
> around
> in a circle. Having the view "self exists" is like going around in a 
> circle
> in one direction. Having the view "self does not exist" is like going
> around in a circle in opposite direction.
> 
> One will not reach the destination going around in a circle, clockwise or
> counter-clockwise.
> 
> Thank you for replying.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
============================
As I see it, any view is inadequate, and clinging to a view is 
harmful. However, between the views "There is a self" and "There is not a 
self", the latter is preferable, not only in its effect, but also because a 
positive claim calls for evidence, and wherever the Buddha has us look we 
only see something that is not self.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10033

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 10:56am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Howard and all,

If one sees that any view is inadequate, then I am not sure how one would
see the Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path.

Regards,
Victor


----- Original Message -----
From: <upasaka@a...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 12:40 PM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Hi, Victor -
>
> In a message dated 12/15/01 12:14:29 PM Eastern Standard Time,
> victoryu@s... writes:
>
>
> >
> > Hello Howard,
> >
> > From what I understand reading the discourse, the Buddha was using right
> > speech that is truthful, beneficial, clear, not obscure, and not
esoteric.
> >
> > How we express ourselves often reflects the views we have. And
regarding
> > views, I would like to include a metaphor:
> > View is like direction. Having right view is like going in the right
> > direction, which will lead to the destination. Having wrong view is
like
> > going in the wrong direction, which will not lead to the destination,.
> > Having view such "self exists" or "self does not exist" is like going
> > around
> > in a circle. Having the view "self exists" is like going around in a
> > circle
> > in one direction. Having the view "self does not exist" is like going
> > around in a circle in opposite direction.
> >
> > One will not reach the destination going around in a circle, clockwise
or
> > counter-clockwise.
> >
> > Thank you for replying.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> ============================
> As I see it, any view is inadequate, and clinging to a view is
> harmful. However, between the views "There is a self" and "There is not a
> self", the latter is preferable, not only in its effect, but also because
a
> positive claim calls for evidence, and wherever the Buddha has us look we
> only see something that is not self.
>
> With metta,
> Howard
	
10034

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:50am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> Please understand that any definition, any delineation on what self is is
> speculative self-view. Please note that he term "self" or its variation
> "oneself" is used as a pronoun in Dhammapa 12 without speculation on what
> self is. Please also see that the term "self" is used as a pronoun in
> Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59, Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, The Discourse on the
> Not-self Characteristic,
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html
> 
> Please consider this question:
> Is it fitting to see Nibbana as: "This is mine. This I am. This is my
> self."?
> 
> Regards,
> Victor

I'd like to see what the Suttas say about Nibbana and oneself. But my inclination
would certainly not be to make any of the statements as you put them above.

Regards,
Robert Ep.




	
10035

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:52am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> Yes, one can control oneself.
> 
> If form were self, it would be possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be
> thus. Let this form not be thus.' However, precisely because form is not
> self, it is not possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this
> form not be thus.'
> 
> Please note that form is not self does not imply whether it is possible or
> not for ONE to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> 
> Regards,
> Victor

Dear Victor,
Well, then, if ONE were to say 'Let this form be thus' and it would accord, then
would ONE be the self? If self can control any dhammas, it would not fall into
the category of being impermanent and unsatisfactory. One would have defeated
dukkha. So I would say that one can provisional exercise self-control, but that
perhaps the idea that ONE is doing this is an illusion.

Best,
Robert Ep.





	
10036

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:54am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> jonoabb@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’ are not
> > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about particular
> > agglomerations of rupas.
> > 
> =============================
> I think this is an important matter. "Physical objects" are the 
> imagined external entities that are referenced by those mental constructs, 
> conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by concepts. The physical objects 
> have only conventional existence, though they are based on genuine 
> observation of rupas and relations among rupas. Imagined external entities, 
> of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom or anything else. However, 
> those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* directly observable. It seems 
> to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the term 'concept' to refer to 
> the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I use the term 'concept' to 
> refer to the thought, itself, something which I think *does* fall under the 
> 4th foundation of mindfulness.


I await the response to this point, which is equally important to me, and which
you have said more clearly, with eager anticipation. 

Robert Ep.




	
10037

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:59am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 12/15/01 3:40:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the 
> > controller of
> > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference to 
> > one
> > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does not 
> > imply a
> > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it mean?
> > 
> > 
> ==============================
> It's just a manner of speaking, Rob, much like telling somebody: "Get 
> yourself in hand; no one else can do that for you!"

That may be so, Howard, but I believe that there are several of our friends here
who have said that Buddha never actually made conventional statements and that
they should not be take as prescriptions. So it's a bit of puzzle how else one
would see this.

If they are not conventional statements, which would be meaningless if one were
not able to do anything about them, since we have no control, then it also seems
to me that it is saying more than this, and referring to will in some way. To say
one is the controller of oneself points to a sort of mechanism that accomplishes
things through intention. Why would the Buddha say this if it would cause no
possible result?

Best,
Robert Ep.



	
10038

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 7:25am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Victor -

In a message dated 12/15/01 1:58:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
victoryu@s... writes:


> 
> Hello Howard and all,
> 
> If one sees that any view is inadequate, then I am not sure how one would
> see the Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
=========================
As I see it, even right view is inadequate compared to direct 
*knowing*, to wisdom.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10039

From: lpjoe <jcummings@p...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 2:58pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Erik,
> 
> I'm sorry if I've ever given the impression of pretending to have any 
knowledge
> or wisdom other than that of the most basic beginner level. I merely 
read,
> study and listen to Tipitaka texts and explanations according to the 
Pali Canon
> and slowly find more and more comprehension and confidence in 
what they
> contain. That's all.
> 
> In this light, I'll just make very brief comments on the suttas you raise= 
:
> 
> 1) Uraga Sutta (The worn Out Skin)
> 
> I mentioned before that until Dan posted Nyanaponika's helpful notes, 
I was at
> somewhat of a loss. The cross-references to the same ideas in 
Salayatana
> Samyutta, `the World' and `The All' and later the reference to 
Itivuttaka 41
> which contains a detailed explanation about the 2 kinds of view to 
explain the
> `goes too far nor lags behind' helped clarify the points we were 
discussing.
> The explanations are in these Suttas as I read them.
> (sorry, I've lost the link as I was using my dusty old book;-)
> 
> 2) Phena Sutta (A Lump of Foam) 
> 
> A favourite sutta of mine;-) let me take theis excuse to quote some 
extra
> commentary notes:
> 
> B.Bodhi adds the commentary note to the passage about the bubble 
you quote:
> 
> note 190: "Spk: a bubble (bubbu.la) is feeble and cannot be grasped, 
for it
> breaks up as soon as it is seized; so too feeling is feeble and cannot 
be
> grasped as permanent and stable. As a bubble arises and ceases in a 
drop of
> water and does not last long, so too with feeling: 100,000 `ko.tis' of
> feelings arise and cease in the time of a fingersnap (one ko.ti = 10 
million). 
> As a bubble arises in dependence on conditions, so feeling arises in 
dependence
> on a sense base, an object, the defilements, and contact."
> 
> "Spk: Perception is like a mirage (marikaa) in the sense that it is
> insubstantial, for one cannot grasp a mirage to drink or bathe or fill a
> pitcher. As a mirage deceives the multitude, so does perception, 
which entices
> people with th idea that the colourful object is beautiful, pleasurable, = 

and
> permanent."
> 
> Does this mean feelings, perceptions and other paramatha dhammas 
(realities)
> don't have lakhana (characteristics) or sabhava (nature) or that they 
don't
> exist momentarily in their different `activities'? No.
> 
> "Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many 
sheaths,
> each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional 
formations is
> an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own characteristic."
> 
> "Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (maayaa) in the sense 
that it is
> insubstantial and cannot be grasped. Consciousness is even more 
transient and
> fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a 
person
> comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is 
different
> in each of these activities. Consciousness deceives the multitude like a= 

> magical illusion." 
> 
> 3) Satipatthana Sutta
> 
> I believe I've answered all your questions or points pertaining to the
> Satipatthana Sutta at length before. As it's getting late, if you don't 
mind
> I'll just re-post my last one (which I don't believe you replied to) it 
after
> signing off .
> 
> Best wishes always,
> 
> Sarah
> 
> Message 8231 of 9967  
> From:  Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
> Date:  Sun Sep 23, 2001  5:17 am
> Subject:  Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Sabhava or 'essence'- Erik
> 
> Hi Erik,
> > 
> S:> > Erik, the third object of mindfulness is consciousness:
> > 
> E:> Right, though I am also concerned with the other three, namely, 
the 
> > body, the feelings, and mental qualities. It is called the "Four 
> > Foundations of Mindfulness" after all. :)
> 
> Good, we're all agreed here.
> 
> S:> > What is meant by consciousness (citta or vi~n~naana) is 
seeing, 
> > hearing,
> > > smelling, tasting, touching (through the body-sense) and mind-
door
> > > experiencing.
> > 
> E:> I don't quite take away this interpretation from the Maha-
> > Satipatthana Sutta:
> 
> S:Hopefully my posts to Rob E have clarified;-) ` citte
> cittaanupassi....viharati' - he lives contemplating consciousness in
> consciousness. I've personally found it really helps to consider any 
sutta in
> the light of other suttas, the abhidhamma and commentary notes, but 
I know this
> is all controversial;-))
> > 
> > "And how does a monk remain focused on the mind in & of itself? 
There 
> > is the case where a monk, when the mind has passion, discerns 
that 
> > the mind has passion. When the mind is without passion, he 
discerns 
> > that the mind is without passion. When the mind has aversion, he 
> > discerns that the mind has aversion. When the mind is without 
> > aversion, he discerns that the mind is without aversion. When the 
> > mind has delusion, he discerns that the mind has delusion. When 
the 
> > mind is without delusion, he discerns that the mind is without 
> > delusion. 
> > 
> > 
> S: > > One doesn't go about anything,
> > 
> E:> Not even "remaining focused" as the Buddha enjoined? Do you 
mean we 
> > just sit here like lumps?
> 
> S:The translation for this section by Soma Thera starts:
> 
> "And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating 
consciousness in
> conciousness?"
> " Here, o bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with 
lust; the
> conciousness without lust, as without lust; the consciousness with 
hate, as
> with hate............"
> 
> By contemplating consciousness (cittanupassanaa) is meant sati 
(awareness) of
> the cittas discussed. There is no self to remain focussed or to sit like = 
a 
lump
> except in the world of pa~n~natti (concepts).
> > 
> S:> > but at this moment there is the experiencing of visible object in 
> > front of us. 
> > 
> E:> Agreed, but how, specifically, does merely knowing this fact 
engender 
> > mindfulness and concentration to the degree we can penetrate the 
> > characteristics of what we're seeing?
> 
> S:Again, we don't penetrate anything. It may seem, like you were 
saying to Dan,
> that we're arguing about semantics, but like he expressed so clearly, 
these are
> very important distinctions. By beginning to understand more precisely 
the
> difference between concepts and realities now, by knowing more and 
more what
> the objects of sati (awareness) are, by realizing there is nothing at all= 

to be
> done by you or me, no method to follow at all, sati can and will begin 
to be
> aware of these same realities and panna (understanding) will begin to 
know or
> penetrate the characteristics. If there is doubt about this (or anything = 

else)
> or attachment to results (or anything else), these are also realities 
which can
> be known as they arise now. 
> 
> E:> I agree that knowing how things are not "self" is critical, and the 
> > bare beginning point in discerning realities as they are. Unless we 
> > understand this fact we are liable to interpret what we see as 
> > permanent, or desirable, for example. But this is only the barest 
> > beginning point as I understand it. There has to be more, because I 
> > cannot see how merely knowing this fact (like knowing that the birth 
> > and death of an self-entity are ultimately illusory) does anything to 
> > help terminate birth and death. If it were this simple, I am sure 
> > we'd all be arahats by now.
> 
> S:I think it's simple and not simple. It's simple in that nothing has to = 
be
> done
> or changed. Realities are already arising and falling away and when 
awareness
> begins to be aware of them, it's not a matter of changing them or 
leading a
> different lifestyle at all. It's not simple because although we repeat th= 
at
> these realities are not self and so on, there is no understanding at all = 

of
> what this means if there isn't any understanding now of the reality 
appearing,
> whether it is seeing, visible object, doubt or attachment .
> > 
> S:> > I can't find any contradiction. By states or objects are meant 
> > these same
> > > realities found in the Satipatthana Sutta (and all the other 
> > suttas) such
> > as
> > > seeing, visible object, hearing, sound and so on.
> > 
> E:> Where are these items mentioned specifically in the Satipatthana 
> > Sutta and "all the other suttas" other than by implication? Again, 
> > the objects I see mentioned in the Satipatthana Sutta include 
> > specific parts of the body, specific feelings, specific 
> > characteristics of the mind, specific mental qualities with reference 
> > (does "Frame of Reference" have any bearing here?) to the five 
> > hindrances, the five aggregates, the six sense-bases, the seven 
> > factors of awakening, the Four Noble Truths.
> 
> S:Let me know if this still isn't clear after my posts to Rob E. All 
realities
> are included at least twice over as I read it. The same realities are
> discussed over and over in the suttas. In the Samyutta Nikaya (Kindred
> Sayings), Salayatana-vagga, there are many suttas which discuss 
the `6 worlds'
> and the 'All'. In First Fifty, Ch 111, par 25 we read:
> 
> `The eye, monks, must be abandoned by fully knowing, by fully 
comprehending it.
> Objects..eye-consciousness..eye-contact..that pleasant feeling, 
unpleasant
> feeling or neutral feeling..that also must be abandoned by fully 
knowing , by
> fully comprehending it.
> 
> The mind..mind-states..that pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling or 
neutral
> feeling..that also must be abandoned by fully knowing it, by 
comprehending it.'
> > 
> E:> Other than merely knowing that what we observe arises is not 
self, it 
> > doesn't follow that merely being aware of this in theory has any 
> > bearing on seeing deeply enough into the true nature of things that 
> > this bringe about the end of suffering. There have to be objects to 
> > apply this understanding to, so that we come to directly see the 
> > characteristics of these objects as impermanent, suffering, and not-
> > self.
> 
> S:Exactly so, and this is why your questions here about the objects of
> satipatthana are exactly the questions many of us have been waiting 
quite a
> long time for you to ask;-)) 
> 
> E:> I have not forgotten, but that is not what I am driving at. Again, I = 

> > question how merely knowing this factually is conducive of the sort 
> > of concentration needed to penetrate the characteristics of these 
> > things at all. Again, without an object, there is nothing for sati to 
> > focus on. And the most important factor in mindfulness is remaining 
> > focused. This is the basis for sampajana (clear comprehension) and 
> > sati (mindfulness). Without this deliberate concentration (at least 
> > at first, until it is so well-established it becomes automatic), the 
> > mind will never be concentrated enough to penetrate the 
> > characteristics of anything, because it won't have any object to in 
> > which it sees these characteristics reflected, being so scattered and 
> > heedless it flits from one thing to another without ever "sinking in" 
> > deeply enough to know what it is perceiving with clarity and 
> > discernment.
> 
> S:I'd say, forget about this deliberate concentration, `sinking in' and
> focussing. They are all accompanied by a subtle idea of self `trying to 
do'.
> Understanding is the key. If there is minding about the object, it 
shows the
> attachment rather than the understanding. Concentration (ekaggata 
cetasika) as
> we've discussed before, will in any case arise with every citta and 
when there
> is a wholesome citta, concentration will be wholesome anyway, 
assisting the
> other cetasikas and citta by being one-pointed on the object 
or 'welding
> together the co-existent states' at that moment. As the citta falls away = 

in an
> instant (right now), concentration falls away with it. It doesn't make it= 

last
> longer.
> > 
> E:> and it takes enormous discipline to practice to 
> > develop awareness and clear comprehension to the point they 
remain 
> > focused for extended periods of time--which is the prerequisite for 
> > penetrating the characteristics of any object being noted. 
> 
> S:Does it? Is it?
> > 
> E:> Mindfulness can only be aware of one object at a time.
> 
> S:True. It lasts for an instant and then gone!
> 
> E:It may get 
> > more refined and be able to switch very quickly between different 
> > objects the more developed it is, but it is not possible for the mind 
> > to focus on more than one thing at a time, which is why the 
exercises 
> > in the Satipatthana Sutta detail various objects and how they are 
> > best investigated. What is again unclear from your presentation is 
> > how this degree of focus is established in the first place.
> 
> S:I don't find any exercises in the Sutta and I think it's more 
interesting to 
> understand what awareness is and what the objects are rather than 
focussing.
> > 
> E:> Right, but it doesn't just happen just from studying texts, but by 
> > deliberately noting specific feelings arising and passing away.
> 
> S:Being aware rather than deliberately noting with attachment.
> 
> E:> Knowing what these objects of investigation are is the first step, 
> > the barest beginning, as I see it. 
> 
> S:YES!
> 
> <snip>
> Sarah 
> 
	
10040

From: lpjoe <jcummings@p...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:04pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik

 	
Sarah & Erik

I've been following your volley with interest, while reading some short 
works by Upasika Kee Nanayon (1902-1978), one of the most respected 
women dhamma teachers in Thailand. I was wondering if the following 
excerpts from Upasika's LOOKING INWARD: Observations on the Art of 
Meditation, bear on the discussion at all. 

I may have accidentally posted this msg twice - my apologies if so.

Joe

THE PURE PRESENT

We have to catch sight of the sensation of knowing when the mind 
gains knowledge of anything and yet isn't aware of itself, to see how 
it latches onto things -- physical form, feeling, perceptions, 
thought-formations, and consciousness. We have to probe on in and 
look 
on our own. We can't use the teachings we've memorized to catch 
sight 
of these things. That won't get us anywhere at all. We may remember, 
"The body is inconstant," but even though we can say it, we can't see 
it.

We have to focus on in to see exactly //how// the body is 
inconstant, to see how it changes. And we have to focus on feelings -- 
pleasant, painful, and neutral -- to see how they change. The same 
holds true with perceptions, thought-formations, and so forth: We have 
to focus on them, investigate them, contemplate them to see their 
characteristics //as they actually are//. Even if you can see these 
things for only a moment, it'll do you a world of good. You'll be able 
to catch yourself: The things you thought you knew, you didn't really 
know at all....This is why the knowledge we gain in the practice has 
to keep changing through many, many levels. It doesn't stay on just 
one level.

So even when you're able to know arising and disbanding with 
every moment right in the present: If your contemplation isn't 
continuous, it won't be very clear.

You have to know how to contemplate the bare sensation of arising 
and disbanding, simply arising and disbanding, without any labels of 
"good" or "bad." Just keep with the pure sensation of arising and 
disbanding. When you do this, other things will come to intrude -- but 
no matter how they intrude, it's still a matter of arising and 
disbanding, so you can keep your stance with arising and disbanding in 
this way.

If you start labeling things, it gets confusing. All you need to 
do is keep looking at the right spot: the bare sensation of arising 
and disbanding. Simply make sure you really keep watch of it. Whether 
there's awareness of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, or tactile 
sensations, just stay with the sensation of arising and disbanding. 
Don't go labeling the sight, sound, smell, taste, or tactile 
sensation. If you can keep watch in this way, you're with the pure 
present -- and there won't be any issues.

When you keep watch in this way, you're keeping watch on 
inconstancy, on change, as it actually occurs -- because even the 
arising and disbanding changes. It's not the same thing arising and 
disbanding all the time. First this sort of sensation arises and 
disbands, then that sort arises and disbands. If you keep watch on 
bare arising and disbanding like this, you're sure to arrive at 
insight. But if you keep watch with labels -- "That's the sound of a 
cow," "That's the bark of a dog" -- you won't be watching the bare 
sensation of sound, the bare sensation of arising and disbanding. As 
soon as there's labeling, thought-formations come along with it. Your 
senses of touch, sight, hearing, and so forth will continue their bare 
arising and disbanding, but you won't know it. Instead, you'll label 
everything: sights, sounds, etc., and then there will be attachments, 
feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and you won't know the truth.

The truth keeps going along on its own. Sensations keep arising 
and then disbanding. If we focus right here -- at the consciousness of 
the bare sensation of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile 
sensations, then we'll be able to gain insight quickly....

If we know how to observe things in this way, we'll be able to 
see easily when the mind is provoked by passion or greed, and even 
more easily when it's provoked by anger. As for delusion, that's 
something more subtle...something you have to take a great interest in 
and investigate carefully. You'll come to see all sorts of hidden 
things -- how the mind is covered with many, many layers of film. It's 
really fascinating. But then that's what insight meditation is for -- 
to open our eyes so that we can know and see, so that we can destroy 
our delusion and ignorance.

June 3, 1964

------------

One night I was sitting in meditation outside in the open air -- 
my back straight as an arrow -- firmly determined to make the mind 
quiet, but even after a long time it wouldn't settle down. So I 
thought, "I've been working at this for many days now, and yet my 
mind 
won't settle down at all. It's time to stop being so determined and to 
simply be aware of the mind." I started to take my hands and feet out 
of the meditation posture, but at the moment I had unfolded one leg 
but had yet to unfold the other, I could see that my mind was like a 
pendulum swinging more and more slowly, more and more slowly -- 
until 
it stopped.

Then there arose an awareness that was sustained by itself. 
Slowly I put my legs and hands back into position. At the same time, 
the mind was in a state of awareness absolutely and solidly still, 
seeing clearly into the elementary phenomena of existence as they 
arose and disbanded, changing in line with their nature -- and also 
seeing a separate condition inside, with no arising, disbanding, or 
changing, a condition beyond birth and death: something very difficult 
to put clearly into words, because it was a realization of the 
elementary phenomena of nature, completely internal and individual.

After a while I slowly got up and lay down to rest. This state of 
mind remained there as a stillness that sustained itself deep down 
inside. Eventually the mind came out of this state and gradually 
returned to normal.

From this I was able to observe how practice consisting of 
nothing but fierce desire simply upsets the mind and keeps it from 
being still. But when one's awareness of the mind is just right, an 
inner awareness will arise naturally of its own accord. Because of 
this clear inner awareness, I was able to continue knowing the facts 
of what's true and false, right and wrong from that point on, and it 
enabled me to know that the moment when the mind let go of 
everything 
was a clear awareness of the elementary phenomena of nature, 
because 
it was an awareness that knew within and saw within of its own accord 
-- not something you can know or see by wanting.

For this reason the Buddha's teaching, //"Sabbe dhamma anatta// 
-- All phenomena are not-self," tells us not to latch onto //any// of 
the phenomena of nature, whether conditioned or unconditioned. From 
that point on I was able to understand things and let go of 
attachments step by step.

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Erik,
> 
> I'm sorry if I've ever given the impression of pretending to have any 
knowledge
> or wisdom other than that of the most basic beginner level. I merely 
read,
> study and listen to Tipitaka texts and explanations according to the 
Pali Canon
> and slowly find more and more comprehension and confidence in 
what they
> contain. That's all.
> 
> In this light, I'll just make very brief comments on the suttas you raise= 
:
> 
> 1) Uraga Sutta (The worn Out Skin)
> 
> I mentioned before that until Dan posted Nyanaponika's helpful notes, 
I was at
> somewhat of a loss. The cross-references to the same ideas in 
Salayatana
> Samyutta, `the World' and `The All' and later the reference to 
Itivuttaka 41
> which contains a detailed explanation about the 2 kinds of view to 
explain the
> `goes too far nor lags behind' helped clarify the points we were 
discussing.
> The explanations are in these Suttas as I read them.
> (sorry, I've lost the link as I was using my dusty old book;-)
> 
> 2) Phena Sutta (A Lump of Foam) 
> 
> A favourite sutta of mine;-) let me take theis excuse to quote some 
extra
> commentary notes:
> 
> B.Bodhi adds the commentary note to the passage about the bubble 
you quote:
> 
> note 190: "Spk: a bubble (bubbu.la) is feeble and cannot be grasped, 
for it
> breaks up as soon as it is seized; so too feeling is feeble and cannot 
be
> grasped as permanent and stable. As a bubble arises and ceases in a 
drop of
> water and does not last long, so too with feeling: 100,000 `ko.tis' of
> feelings arise and cease in the time of a fingersnap (one ko.ti = 10 
million). 
> As a bubble arises in dependence on conditions, so feeling arises in 
dependence
> on a sense base, an object, the defilements, and contact."
> 
> "Spk: Perception is like a mirage (marikaa) in the sense that it is
> insubstantial, for one cannot grasp a mirage to drink or bathe or fill a
> pitcher. As a mirage deceives the multitude, so does perception, 
which entices
> people with th idea that the colourful object is beautiful, pleasurable, = 

and
> permanent."
> 
> Does this mean feelings, perceptions and other paramatha dhammas 
(realities)
> don't have lakhana (characteristics) or sabhava (nature) or that they 
don't
> exist momentarily in their different `activities'? No.
> 
> "Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many 
sheaths,
> each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional 
formations is
> an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own characteristic."
> 
> "Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (maayaa) in the sense 
that it is
> insubstantial and cannot be grasped. Consciousness is even more 
transient and
> fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a 
person
> comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is 
different
> in each of these activities. Consciousness deceives the multitude like a= 

> magical illusion." 
> 
> 3) Satipatthana Sutta
> 
> I believe I've answered all your questions or points pertaining to the
> Satipatthana Sutta at length before. As it's getting late, if you don't 
mind
> I'll just re-post my last one (which I don't believe you replied to) it 
after
> signing off .
> 
> Best wishes always,
> 
> Sarah
> 
> Message 8231 of 9967  
> From:  Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
> Date:  Sun Sep 23, 2001  5:17 am
> Subject:  Re: [DhammaStudyGroup] Re: Sabhava or 'essence'- Erik
> 
> Hi Erik,
> > 
> S:> > Erik, the third object of mindfulness is consciousness:
> > 
> E:> Right, though I am also concerned with the other three, namely, 
the 
> > body, the feelings, and mental qualities. It is called the "Four 
> > Foundations of Mindfulness" after all. :)
> 
> Good, we're all agreed here.
> 
> S:> > What is meant by consciousness (citta or vi~n~naana) is 
seeing, 
> > hearing,
> > > smelling, tasting, touching (through the body-sense) and mind-
door
> > > experiencing.
> > 
> E:> I don't quite take away this interpretation from the Maha-
> > Satipatthana Sutta:
> 
> S:Hopefully my posts to Rob E have clarified;-) ` citte
> cittaanupassi....viharati' - he lives contemplating consciousness in
> consciousness. I've personally found it really helps to consider any 
sutta in
> the light of other suttas, the abhidhamma and commentary notes, but 
I know this
> is all controversial;-))
> > 
> > "And how does a monk remain focused on the mind in & of itself? 
There 
> > is the case where a monk, when the mind has passion, discerns 
that 
> > the mind has passion. When the mind is without passion, he 
discerns 
> > that the mind is without passion. When the mind has aversion, he 
> > discerns that the mind has aversion. When the mind is without 
> > aversion, he discerns that the mind is without aversion. When the 
> > mind has delusion, he discerns that the mind has delusion. When 
the 
> > mind is without delusion, he discerns that the mind is without 
> > delusion. 
> > 
> > 
> S: > > One doesn't go about anything,
> > 
> E:> Not even "remaining focused" as the Buddha enjoined? Do you 
mean we 
> > just sit here like lumps?
> 
> S:The translation for this section by Soma Thera starts:
> 
> "And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating 
consciousness in
> conciousness?"
> " Here, o bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with 
lust; the
> conciousness without lust, as without lust; the consciousness with 
hate, as
> with hate............"
> 
> By contemplating consciousness (cittanupassanaa) is meant sati 
(awareness) of
> the cittas discussed. There is no self to remain focussed or to sit like = 
a 
lump
> except in the world of pa~n~natti (concepts).
> > 
> S:> > but at this moment there is the experiencing of visible object in 
> > front of us. 
> > 
> E:> Agreed, but how, specifically, does merely knowing this fact 
engender 
> > mindfulness and concentration to the degree we can penetrate the 
> > characteristics of what we're seeing?
> 
> S:Again, we don't penetrate anything. It may seem, like you were 
saying to Dan,
> that we're arguing about semantics, but like he expressed so clearly, 
these are
> very important distinctions. By beginning to understand more precisely 
the
> difference between concepts and realities now, by knowing more and 
more what
> the objects of sati (awareness) are, by realizing there is nothing at all= 

to be
> done by you or me, no method to follow at all, sati can and will begin 
to be
> aware of these same realities and panna (understanding) will begin to 
know or
> penetrate the characteristics. If there is doubt about this (or anything = 

else)
> or attachment to results (or anything else), these are also realities 
which can
> be known as they arise now. 
> 
> E:> I agree that knowing how things are not "self" is critical, and the 
> > bare beginning point in discerning realities as they are. Unless we 
> > understand this fact we are liable to interpret what we see as 
> > permanent, or desirable, for example. But this is only the barest 
> > beginning point as I understand it. There has to be more, because I 
> > cannot see how merely knowing this fact (like knowing that the birth 
> > and death of an self-entity are ultimately illusory) does anything to 
> > help terminate birth and death. If it were this simple, I am sure 
> > we'd all be arahats by now.
> 
> S:I think it's simple and not simple. It's simple in that nothing has to = 
be
> done
> or changed. Realities are already arising and falling away and when 
awareness
> begins to be aware of them, it's not a matter of changing them or 
leading a
> different lifestyle at all. It's not simple because although we repeat th= 
at
> these realities are not self and so on, there is no understanding at all = 

of
> what this means if there isn't any understanding now of the reality 
appearing,
> whether it is seeing, visible object, doubt or attachment .
> > 
> S:> > I can't find any contradiction. By states or objects are meant 
> > these same
> > > realities found in the Satipatthana Sutta (and all the other 
> > suttas) such
> > as
> > > seeing, visible object, hearing, sound and so on.
> > 
> E:> Where are these items mentioned specifically in the Satipatthana 
> > Sutta and "all the other suttas" other than by implication? Again, 
> > the objects I see mentioned in the Satipatthana Sutta include 
> > specific parts of the body, specific feelings, specific 
> > characteristics of the mind, specific mental qualities with reference 
> > (does "Frame of Reference" have any bearing here?) to the five 
> > hindrances, the five aggregates, the six sense-bases, the seven 
> > factors of awakening, the Four Noble Truths.
> 
> S:Let me know if this still isn't clear after my posts to Rob E. All 
realities
> are included at least twice over as I read it. The same realities are
> discussed over and over in the suttas. In the Samyutta Nikaya (Kindred
> Sayings), Salayatana-vagga, there are many suttas which discuss 
the `6 worlds'
> and the 'All'. In First Fifty, Ch 111, par 25 we read:
> 
> `The eye, monks, must be abandoned by fully knowing, by fully 
comprehending it.
> Objects..eye-consciousness..eye-contact..that pleasant feeling, 
unpleasant
> feeling or neutral feeling..that also must be abandoned by fully 
knowing , by
> fully comprehending it.
> 
> The mind..mind-states..that pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling or 
neutral
> feeling..that also must be abandoned by fully knowing it, by 
comprehending it.'
> > 
> E:> Other than merely knowing that what we observe arises is not 
self, it 
> > doesn't follow that merely being aware of this in theory has any 
> > bearing on seeing deeply enough into the true nature of things that 
> > this bringe about the end of suffering. There have to be objects to 
> > apply this understanding to, so that we come to directly see the 
> > characteristics of these objects as impermanent, suffering, and not-
> > self.
> 
> S:Exactly so, and this is why your questions here about the objects of
> satipatthana are exactly the questions many of us have been waiting 
quite a
> long time for you to ask;-)) 
> 
> E:> I have not forgotten, but that is not what I am driving at. Again, I = 

> > question how merely knowing this factually is conducive of the sort 
> > of concentration needed to penetrate the characteristics of these 
> > things at all. Again, without an object, there is nothing for sati to 
> > focus on. And the most important factor in mindfulness is remaining 
> > focused. This is the basis for sampajana (clear comprehension) and 
> > sati (mindfulness). Without this deliberate concentration (at least 
> > at first, until it is so well-established it becomes automatic), the 
> > mind will never be concentrated enough to penetrate the 
> > characteristics of anything, because it won't have any object to in 
> > which it sees these characteristics reflected, being so scattered and 
> > heedless it flits from one thing to another without ever "sinking in" 
> > deeply enough to know what it is perceiving with clarity and 
> > discernment.
> 
> S:I'd say, forget about this deliberate concentration, `sinking in' and
> focussing. They are all accompanied by a subtle idea of self `trying to 
do'.
> Understanding is the key. If there is minding about the object, it 
shows the
> attachment rather than the understanding. Concentration (ekaggata 
cetasika) as
> we've discussed before, will in any case arise with every citta and 
when there
> is a wholesome citta, concentration will be wholesome anyway, 
assisting the
> other cetasikas and citta by being one-pointed on the object 
or 'welding
> together the co-existent states' at that moment. As the citta falls away = 

in an
> instant (right now), concentration falls away with it. It doesn't make it= 

last
> longer.
> > 
> E:> and it takes enormous discipline to practice to 
> > develop awareness and clear comprehension to the point they 
remain 
> > focused for extended periods of time--which is the prerequisite for 
> > penetrating the characteristics of any object being noted. 
> 
> S:Does it? Is it?
> > 
> E:> Mindfulness can only be aware of one object at a time.
> 
> S:True. It lasts for an instant and then gone!
> 
> E:It may get 
> > more refined and be able to switch very quickly between different 
> > objects the more developed it is, but it is not possible for the mind 
> > to focus on more than one thing at a time, which is why the 
exercises 
> > in the Satipatthana Sutta detail various objects and how they are 
> > best investigated. What is again unclear from your presentation is 
> > how this degree of focus is established in the first place.
> 
> S:I don't find any exercises in the Sutta and I think it's more 
interesting to 
> understand what awareness is and what the objects are rather than 
focussing.
> > 
> E:> Right, but it doesn't just happen just from studying texts, but by 
> > deliberately noting specific feelings arising and passing away.
> 
> S:Being aware rather than deliberately noting with attachment.
> 
> E:> Knowing what these objects of investigation are is the first step, 
> > the barest beginning, as I see it. 
> 
> S:YES!
> 
> <snip>
> Sarah 

	
10041

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Jon,

I must agree with Howard--I see no pu×~n~na in this
sort of thing whatever.

mike

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern
> Standard Time, 
> jonoabb@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2
> all deal with 'khandhas'. 
> > Must be that khandha day.
> > 
> ==============================
> Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner,
> commence monitoring your 
> own posts so that there be no further abuse of this
> sort!! ;-))
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 


	
10042

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:39pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote:

> jonoabb@y... writes:
> 
> > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. 
> "Physical objects" are not
> > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which
> we think about particular
> > agglomerations of rupas.
> > 
> =============================
> I think this is an important matter.
> "Physical objects" are the 
> imagined external entities that are referenced by
> those mental constructs, 
> conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by
> concepts. The physical objects 
> have only conventional existence, though they are
> based on genuine 
> observation of rupas and relations among rupas.
> Imagined external entities, 
> of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom
> or anything else. However, 
> those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are*
> directly observable. It seems 
> to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the
> term 'concept' to refer to 
> the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I
> use the term 'concept' to 
> refer to the thought, itself, something which I
> think *does* fall under the 
> 4th foundation of mindfulness.

I agree that this is important. I'm not very clear
myself on the differences between vitakka, vicaara and
pa.n.natti. As I understand it, the two former are
(naama) dhammas, each with its particular sabhaava,
and as such can be satipa.t.thaanas; where as the
latter is not considered a dhamma because it doesn't
'possess' sabhaava, doesn't arise and subside in the
same sense that a dhamma does and cannot be
satipa.t.thaana.

So a 'thought' does fall under the 4th foundation, if
by
' thought', 'vitakka' or' vicaara' is meant--that is
(as I understand it) a moment of initial or sustained
thought. A concept or idea though, doesn't. This is
similar, I think, to the way that a ruupadhamma does
fall under the 1st foundation while 'body' (a concept)
doesn't.

Make sense to you?

mike

	
10043

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 10:39am
Subject: What is Concentration Actually?

 	
Hi, all -

Some more thoughts on another topic. When meditating, whether for 
samatha bhavana or vipassana bhavana, part of the process is the development 
of (increased) concentration. I have been wondering exactly what 
concentration *is* from the Abhidhamma perspective. It seems that in the 
course of our experience there is a constant arising (and ceasing) of 
arammanas, varying arammanas through the same and through differing sense 
doors, occurring, I should think, in a kind of time-sharing fashion, with the 
mind shuttling back and forth among the various objects. Would concentration 
then consist in a reduction of that shuttling, a reduction of the number of 
differing objects observed, the limit of such being the reduction to a single 
arammana?

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10044

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 10:46am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 12/15/01 3:00:35 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> > Hi, Rob -
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/15/01 3:40:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the 
> > > controller of
> > > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference 
> to 
> > > one
> > > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does 
> not 
> > > imply a
> > > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it 
> mean?
> > > 
> > > 
> > ==============================
> > It's just a manner of speaking, Rob, much like telling somebody: 
> "Get 
> > yourself in hand; no one else can do that for you!"
> 
> That may be so, Howard, but I believe that there are several of our friends 
> here
> who have said that Buddha never actually made conventional statements and 
> that
> they should not be take as prescriptions. So it's a bit of puzzle how else 
> one
> would see this.
> 
> If they are not conventional statements, which would be meaningless if one 
> were
> not able to do anything about them, since we have no control, then it also 
> seems
> to me that it is saying more than this, and referring to will in some way. 
> To say
> one is the controller of oneself points to a sort of mechanism that 
> accomplishes
> things through intention. Why would the Buddha say this if it would cause 
> no
> possible result?
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> 
================================
Well, regardless of what may be the opinion of some in this regard, it 
is obvious to me that the Buddha spoke conventionally *most* of the time. And 
this is especially so when he used terms like 'oneself'.
I suppose you are writing here what you are writing in an attempt to 
show that, in fact, the Buddha did speak conventionally much of the time. 
But, for me, that is crystal clear and really requires little proof. ;-)


With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10045

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:52pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as
pronouns.

Please consider Argument A:
Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say
'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
Premise A2: Form is not self.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be
thus. Let this form not be thus.'

Given
p: form is not self.
q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form
not be thus.'

If p, then q.
p.
Therefore, q.

Argument A is a valid argument.


Please consider Argument B
Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this
form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
this form not be thus."
Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.

Given
p: form is self.
q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not
be thus.'

If p, then q.
not q.
Therefore, not p.

Argument B is also a valid argument.


Let's examine Argument C:
Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this
form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
this form not be thus."
Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.

Given
p: form is self.
q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not
be thus.'
r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not
be thus."

If p, then q.
not r.
Therefore, not p.

Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q and
statement r is.


Regards,
Victor


----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 2:52 PM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> >
> > Yes, one can control oneself.
> >
> > If form were self, it would be possible for FORM to say 'Let this form
be
> > thus. Let this form not be thus.' However, precisely because form is
not
> > self, it is not possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let
this
> > form not be thus.'
> >
> > Please note that form is not self does not imply whether it is possible
or
> > not for ONE to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
>
> Dear Victor,
> Well, then, if ONE were to say 'Let this form be thus' and it would
accord, then
> would ONE be the self? If self can control any dhammas, it would not fall
into
> the category of being impermanent and unsatisfactory. One would have
defeated
> dukkha. So I would say that one can provisional exercise self-control,
but that
> perhaps the idea that ONE is doing this is an illusion.
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
>
	
10046

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 3:59pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Howard,

I would not say that Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path is inadequate.

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: <upasaka@a...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:25 PM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Hi, Victor -
>
> In a message dated 12/15/01 1:58:30 PM Eastern Standard Time,
> victoryu@s... writes:
>
>
> >
> > Hello Howard and all,
> >
> > If one sees that any view is inadequate, then I am not sure how one
would
> > see the Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> =========================
> As I see it, even right view is inadequate compared to direct
> *knowing*, to wisdom.
>
> With metta,
> Howard
>

	
10047

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:28am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Hi, Mike -

In a message dated 12/15/01 6:40:42 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> So a 'thought' does fall under the 4th foundation, if
> by
> ' thought', 'vitakka' or' vicaara' is meant--that is
> (as I understand it) a moment of initial or sustained
> thought. A concept or idea though, doesn't. This is
> similar, I think, to the way that a ruupadhamma does
> fall under the 1st foundation while 'body' (a concept)
> doesn't.
> 
> Make sense to you?
> 
> mike
> 
> 
==============================
Makes great sense to me.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10048

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:37am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Victor -

In a message dated 12/15/01 7:01:33 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
victoryu@s... writes:


> Hello Howard,
> 
> I would not say that Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path is inadequate.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
============================
If Right View = wisdom (or *direct knowing* of the way things are), I 
agree. But if Right View = correct opinion, I disagree. Perhaps if we agree 
on terminology, we might also agree on content.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10049

From: Ven. Bhikkhu Dhammapiyo <vinmardeb@e...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 1:42pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
It takes practice! The intellect is not wholly capable of realizing the
benefits. Without Right Understanding put into practice there is no right
view to be garnered as an experience!



----- Original Message -----
From: "Victor Yu" <victoryu@s...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 1:56 PM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Hello Howard and all,
>
> If one sees that any view is inadequate, then I am not sure how one would
> see the Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path.
>
> Regards,
> Victor
>
>

	
10050

From: rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 6:38pm
Subject: Re: What is Concentration Actually?

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, all -
> 
> Some more thoughts on another topic. When meditating, 
whether for 
> samatha bhavana or vipassana bhavana, part of the process is the 
development 
> of (increased) concentration. I have been wondering exactly what 
> concentration *is* from the Abhidhamma perspective. It seems that 
in the 
> course of our experience there is a constant arising (and ceasing) 
of 
> arammanas, varying arammanas through the same and through 
differing sense 
> doors, occurring, I should think, in a kind of time-sharing 
fashion, with the 
> mind shuttling back and forth among the various objects. Would 
concentration 
> then consist in a reduction of that shuttling, a reduction of the 
number of 
> differing objects observed, the limit of such being the reduction 
to a single 
> arammana?

Speaking as perhaps the lone samatha-yanika meditator here, I can 
say from experience that the diferrence between the sort of 
concentration needed to fulfill Right Concentration as I understand 
it (and it tool a LOT of practice to get to the point to where 
concentration was firmly established in the sense that the mind 
remained fixed on an arammana and apanna arose) and the normal sort 
of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day life through concentrating 
on random object arising through thes sense-doors to be as big as 
the difference distance between Heaven and Earth.
	
10051

From: rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 7:04pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik

 	
Hi Joe,

> One night I was sitting in meditation outside in the open air -- 
> my back straight as an arrow -- firmly determined to make the 
mind 
> quiet, 

Ho! Ho! Ho! :) :) :) I RESOLVE TOP STOP MAKING MY MIND WANDER! (hee 
hee hee)! Sorry, couldn't resist chuckling at that one! :) I know, 
I've been there, I call it the the Gritting the Teeth approach. 

> but even after a long time it wouldn't settle down. So I 
> thought, "I've been working at this for many days now, and yet 
my 
> mind 
> won't settle down at all. It's time to stop being so determined 
and to 
> simply be aware of the mind." 

Aaah. You know what the trick was for me? I recalled one meditation 
instrutor once telling me "it's as easy as falling of a log!" (I'm 
thinking BUT BUT BUT, I've TRIED all this time and NOTHING!).

Okay then. No big deal. The mind wanders, let it go. Oh, it 
wandered, okay, bring it back. There it goes again, off into the 
forest, swinging vine-to-vine, no big deal. And you know what? The 
mind just amazingly settled down, RIGHT THERE. As easy as falling 
off a log!

> Then there arose an awareness that was sustained by itself. 

Indeed. In my case, that awareness became brighter and brighter, 
more and more powerful. All of a sudden this struggling meditator 
was sitting in equipoise and the mind locked effortlessly onto the 
breath and its arising and passing away. It was a watershed moment 
in my meditation! All that striving, gritting the teeth trying to 
FORCE the mind to concengratate, and yet this simple letting go of 
all expectation just brought it all together. Go figure!

> Slowly I put my legs and hands back into position. At the same 
time, 
> the mind was in a state of awareness absolutely and solidly 
still, 
> seeing clearly into the elementary phenomena of existence as 
they 
> arose and disbanded, changing in line with their nature -- and 
also 
> seeing a separate condition inside, with no arising, disbanding, 
or 
> changing, a condition beyond birth and death: something very 
difficult 
> to put clearly into words, because it was a realization of the 
> elementary phenomena of nature, completely internal and 
individual.

This is as is should be.

> 
> After a while I slowly got up and lay down to rest. This 
state of 
> mind remained there as a stillness that sustained itself deep 
down 
> inside. Eventually the mind came out of this state and gradually 
> returned to normal.

Now do this every day for at least one hour without missing a day 
and the mind will never return to "normal." Of ourse I say this in 
total hypocrisy since I haven't meditated like this for quite some 
time now, being focused instead of learning to endure what is 
difficult to endure and maintain equanimity in the face of trouble 
outside of meditation (though I am sure an hour a day would help 
immensely, and my wife insists we meditatate an hour together each 
so I have to take her up on it).

> From this I was able to observe how practice consisting of 
> nothing but fierce desire simply upsets the mind and keeps it 
from 
> being still.

And yet, there must be a fierce, unshakeable reseolve all the same. 
It's a different sort of determination, but the desire you mention 
sounds like a desire for *results* in meditation, not the desire 
that compels one to sit on the cushion each and every day, without 
fail. Big difference between the two.

But when one's awareness of the mind is just right, an 
> inner awareness will arise naturally of its own accord.

Indeed, indeed! :) That lute-string analogy again.

Cheers,
Erik
	
10052

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 10:41pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Howard,

I don't see Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path as inadequate, and I
wouldn't say it is inadequate.

Regards,
Victor


----- Original Message -----
From: <upasaka@a...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 7:37 PM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Hi, Victor -
>
> In a message dated 12/15/01 7:01:33 PM Eastern Standard Time,
> victoryu@s... writes:
>
>
> > Hello Howard,
> >
> > I would not say that Right View in the Noble Eightfold Path is
inadequate.
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> ============================
> If Right View = wisdom (or *direct knowing* of the way things are),
I
> agree. But if Right View = correct opinion, I disagree. Perhaps if we
agree
> on terminology, we might also agree on content.
>
> With metta,
> Howard
	
10053

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik

 	
great!

Robert Ep.

======

--- lpjoe <jcummings@p...> wrote:
> Sarah & Erik
> 
> I've been following your volley with interest, while reading some short 
> works by Upasika Kee Nanayon (1902-1978), one of the most respected 
> women dhamma teachers in Thailand. I was wondering if the following 
> excerpts from Upasika's LOOKING INWARD: Observations on the Art of 
> Meditation, bear on the discussion at all. 
> 
> I may have accidentally posted this msg twice - my apologies if so.
> 
> Joe
> 
> THE PURE PRESENT
> 
> We have to catch sight of the sensation of knowing when the mind 
> gains knowledge of anything and yet isn't aware of itself, to see how 
> it latches onto things -- physical form, feeling, perceptions, 
> thought-formations, and consciousness. We have to probe on in and 
> look 
> on our own. We can't use the teachings we've memorized to catch 
> sight 
> of these things. That won't get us anywhere at all. We may remember, 
> "The body is inconstant," but even though we can say it, we can't see 
> it.
> 
> We have to focus on in to see exactly //how// the body is 
> inconstant, to see how it changes. And we have to focus on feelings -- 
> pleasant, painful, and neutral -- to see how they change. The same 
> holds true with perceptions, thought-formations, and so forth: We have 
> to focus on them, investigate them, contemplate them to see their 
> characteristics //as they actually are//. Even if you can see these 
> things for only a moment, it'll do you a world of good. You'll be able 
> to catch yourself: The things you thought you knew, you didn't really 
> know at all....This is why the knowledge we gain in the practice has 
> to keep changing through many, many levels. It doesn't stay on just 
> one level.
> 
> So even when you're able to know arising and disbanding with 
> every moment right in the present: If your contemplation isn't 
> continuous, it won't be very clear.
> 
> You have to know how to contemplate the bare sensation of arising 
> and disbanding, simply arising and disbanding, without any labels of 
> "good" or "bad." Just keep with the pure sensation of arising and 
> disbanding. When you do this, other things will come to intrude -- but 
> no matter how they intrude, it's still a matter of arising and 
> disbanding, so you can keep your stance with arising and disbanding in 
> this way.
> 
> If you start labeling things, it gets confusing. All you need to 
> do is keep looking at the right spot: the bare sensation of arising 
> and disbanding. Simply make sure you really keep watch of it. Whether 
> there's awareness of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, or tactile 
> sensations, just stay with the sensation of arising and disbanding. 
> Don't go labeling the sight, sound, smell, taste, or tactile 
> sensation. If you can keep watch in this way, you're with the pure 
> present -- and there won't be any issues.
> 
> When you keep watch in this way, you're keeping watch on 
> inconstancy, on change, as it actually occurs -- because even the 
> arising and disbanding changes. It's not the same thing arising and 
> disbanding all the time. First this sort of sensation arises and 
> disbands, then that sort arises and disbands. If you keep watch on 
> bare arising and disbanding like this, you're sure to arrive at 
> insight. But if you keep watch with labels -- "That's the sound of a 
> cow," "That's the bark of a dog" -- you won't be watching the bare 
> sensation of sound, the bare sensation of arising and disbanding. As 
> soon as there's labeling, thought-formations come along with it. Your 
> senses of touch, sight, hearing, and so forth will continue their bare 
> arising and disbanding, but you won't know it. Instead, you'll label 
> everything: sights, sounds, etc., and then there will be attachments, 
> feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and you won't know the truth.
> 
> The truth keeps going along on its own. Sensations keep arising 
> and then disbanding. If we focus right here -- at the consciousness of 
> the bare sensation of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and tactile 
> sensations, then we'll be able to gain insight quickly....
> 
> If we know how to observe things in this way, we'll be able to 
> see easily when the mind is provoked by passion or greed, and even 
> more easily when it's provoked by anger. As for delusion, that's 
> something more subtle...something you have to take a great interest in 
> and investigate carefully. You'll come to see all sorts of hidden 
> things -- how the mind is covered with many, many layers of film. It's 
> really fascinating. But then that's what insight meditation is for -- 
> to open our eyes so that we can know and see, so that we can destroy 
> our delusion and ignorance.
> 
> June 3, 1964
> 
> ------------
> 
> One night I was sitting in meditation outside in the open air -- 
> my back straight as an arrow -- firmly determined to make the mind 
> quiet, but even after a long time it wouldn't settle down. So I 
> thought, "I've been working at this for many days now, and yet my 
> mind 
> won't settle down at all. It's time to stop being so determined and to 
> simply be aware of the mind." I started to take my hands and feet out 
> of the meditation posture, but at the moment I had unfolded one leg 
> but had yet to unfold the other, I could see that my mind was like a 
> pendulum swinging more and more slowly, more and more slowly -- 
> until 
> it stopped.
> 
> Then there arose an awareness that was sustained by itself. 
> Slowly I put my legs and hands back into position. At the same time, 
> the mind was in a state of awareness absolutely and solidly still, 
> seeing clearly into the elementary phenomena of existence as they 
> arose and disbanded, changing in line with their nature -- and also 
> seeing a separate condition inside, with no arising, disbanding, or 
> changing, a condition beyond birth and death: something very difficult 
> to put clearly into words, because it was a realization of the 
> elementary phenomena of nature, completely internal and individual.
> 
> After a while I slowly got up and lay down to rest. This state of 
> mind remained there as a stillness that sustained itself deep down 
> inside. Eventually the mind came out of this state and gradually 
> returned to normal.
> 
> From this I was able to observe how practice consisting of 
> nothing but fierce desire simply upsets the mind and keeps it from 
> being still. But when one's awareness of the mind is just right, an 
> inner awareness will arise naturally of its own accord. Because of 
> this clear inner awareness, I was able to continue knowing the facts 
> of what's true and false, right and wrong from that point on, and it 
> enabled me to know that the moment when the mind let go of 
> everything 
> was a clear awareness of the elementary phenomena of nature, 
> because 
> it was an awareness that knew within and saw within of its own accord 
> -- not something you can know or see by wanting.
> 
> For this reason the Buddha's teaching, //"Sabbe dhamma anatta// 
> -- All phenomena are not-self," tells us not to latch onto //any// of 
> the phenomena of nature, whether conditioned or unconditioned. From 
> that point on I was able to understand things and let go of 
> attachments step by step.
	
10054

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:55pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 12/15/01 3:00:35 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> > > Hi, Rob -
> > > 
> > > In a message dated 12/15/01 3:40:03 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the 
> > > > controller of
> > > > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite reference 
> > to 
> > > > one
> > > > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does 
> > not 
> > > > imply a
> > > > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it 
> > mean?
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > ==============================
> > > It's just a manner of speaking, Rob, much like telling somebody: 
> > "Get 
> > > yourself in hand; no one else can do that for you!"
> > 
> > That may be so, Howard, but I believe that there are several of our friends 
> > here
> > who have said that Buddha never actually made conventional statements and 
> > that
> > they should not be take as prescriptions. So it's a bit of puzzle how else 
> > one
> > would see this.
> > 
> > If they are not conventional statements, which would be meaningless if one 
> > were
> > not able to do anything about them, since we have no control, then it also 
> > seems
> > to me that it is saying more than this, and referring to will in some way. 
> > To say
> > one is the controller of oneself points to a sort of mechanism that 
> > accomplishes
> > things through intention. Why would the Buddha say this if it would cause 
> > no
> > possible result?
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> > 
> ================================
> Well, regardless of what may be the opinion of some in this regard, it 
> is obvious to me that the Buddha spoke conventionally *most* of the time. And 
> this is especially so when he used terms like 'oneself'.
> I suppose you are writing here what you are writing in an attempt to 
> show that, in fact, the Buddha did speak conventionally much of the time. 
> But, for me, that is crystal clear and really requires little proof. ;-)

Hi Howard.
One assumes that 'oneself' must be used conventionally, since we assume that
Buddha would not invoke the existence of a personal 'self'. It is clear that
'oneself' must mean something, therefore it must be conventional use or else must
be the invocation of a personal self.

I agree that it is most likely conventional speech, but if that is the case, he is
basically giving prescriptions for behavior or pep talks for practitioners of a
certain level. This seems to me to undercut the notion that conventional effort
and exercise of will has no effect on the practitioner.

Best,
Robert Ep.


	
10055

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 15, 2001 11:59pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik

 	
Dear Joe and Eric,
Thank you both for a wonderful discourse.

Robert Ep.

========

--- rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> wrote:
> Hi Joe,
> 
> > One night I was sitting in meditation outside in the open air -- 
> > my back straight as an arrow -- firmly determined to make the 
> mind 
> > quiet, 
> 
> Ho! Ho! Ho! :) :) :) I RESOLVE TOP STOP MAKING MY MIND WANDER! (hee 
> hee hee)! Sorry, couldn't resist chuckling at that one! :) I know, 
> I've been there, I call it the the Gritting the Teeth approach. 
> 
> > but even after a long time it wouldn't settle down. So I 
> > thought, "I've been working at this for many days now, and yet 
> my 
> > mind 
> > won't settle down at all. It's time to stop being so determined 
> and to 
> > simply be aware of the mind." 
> 
> Aaah. You know what the trick was for me? I recalled one meditation 
> instrutor once telling me "it's as easy as falling of a log!" (I'm 
> thinking BUT BUT BUT, I've TRIED all this time and NOTHING!).
> 
> Okay then. No big deal. The mind wanders, let it go. Oh, it 
> wandered, okay, bring it back. There it goes again, off into the 
> forest, swinging vine-to-vine, no big deal. And you know what? The 
> mind just amazingly settled down, RIGHT THERE. As easy as falling 
> off a log!
> 
> > Then there arose an awareness that was sustained by itself. 
> 
> Indeed. In my case, that awareness became brighter and brighter, 
> more and more powerful. All of a sudden this struggling meditator 
> was sitting in equipoise and the mind locked effortlessly onto the 
> breath and its arising and passing away. It was a watershed moment 
> in my meditation! All that striving, gritting the teeth trying to 
> FORCE the mind to concengratate, and yet this simple letting go of 
> all expectation just brought it all together. Go figure!
> 
> > Slowly I put my legs and hands back into position. At the same 
> time, 
> > the mind was in a state of awareness absolutely and solidly 
> still, 
> > seeing clearly into the elementary phenomena of existence as 
> they 
> > arose and disbanded, changing in line with their nature -- and 
> also 
> > seeing a separate condition inside, with no arising, disbanding, 
> or 
> > changing, a condition beyond birth and death: something very 
> difficult 
> > to put clearly into words, because it was a realization of the 
> > elementary phenomena of nature, completely internal and 
> individual.
> 
> This is as is should be.
> 
> > 
> > After a while I slowly got up and lay down to rest. This 
> state of 
> > mind remained there as a stillness that sustained itself deep 
> down 
> > inside. Eventually the mind came out of this state and gradually 
> > returned to normal.
> 
> Now do this every day for at least one hour without missing a day 
> and the mind will never return to "normal." Of ourse I say this in 
> total hypocrisy since I haven't meditated like this for quite some 
> time now, being focused instead of learning to endure what is 
> difficult to endure and maintain equanimity in the face of trouble 
> outside of meditation (though I am sure an hour a day would help 
> immensely, and my wife insists we meditatate an hour together each 
> so I have to take her up on it).
> 
> > From this I was able to observe how practice consisting of 
> > nothing but fierce desire simply upsets the mind and keeps it 
> from 
> > being still.
> 
> And yet, there must be a fierce, unshakeable reseolve all the same. 
> It's a different sort of determination, but the desire you mention 
> sounds like a desire for *results* in meditation, not the desire 
> that compels one to sit on the cushion each and every day, without 
> fail. Big difference between the two.
> 
> But when one's awareness of the mind is just right, an 
> > inner awareness will arise naturally of its own accord.
> 
> Indeed, indeed! :) That lute-string analogy again.
> 
> Cheers,
> Erik


	
10056

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 0:00am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert, Howard, and all,

If the Buddha used two kinds of speeches, conventional and non-conventional,
I would be interested in knowing some examples of non-conventional speech
that the Buddha used.

Thank you in advance.

Regards,
Victor



> > Well, regardless of what may be the opinion of some in this
regard, it
> > is obvious to me that the Buddha spoke conventionally *most* of the
time. And
> > this is especially so when he used terms like 'oneself'.
> > I suppose you are writing here what you are writing in an attempt
to
> > show that, in fact, the Buddha did speak conventionally much of the
time.
> > But, for me, that is crystal clear and really requires little proof. ;-)
>
> Hi Howard.
> One assumes that 'oneself' must be used conventionally, since we assume
that
> Buddha would not invoke the existence of a personal 'self'. It is clear
that
> 'oneself' must mean something, therefore it must be conventional use or
else must
> be the invocation of a personal self.
>
> I agree that it is most likely conventional speech, but if that is the
case, he is
> basically giving prescriptions for behavior or pep talks for practitioners
of a
> certain level. This seems to me to undercut the notion that conventional
effort
> and exercise of will has no effect on the practitioner.
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
	
10057

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:07am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Dear Victor,

If I understand you correctly, than these are the axioms on which 
your rejection of the application of self/ not-self to anything at 
all is based:

Self is permanent. and
Self is it's own object.

If this is how you define self, then I agree with you. Nothing fits 
the bill. Empty set. 

I am sure that defining non-existing things and then saying that 
these things don't exist has been a pleasant pastime for thousands of 
millenia :-).

All the best


Herman



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as
> pronouns.
> 
> Please consider Argument A:
> Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form 
to say
> 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> Premise A2: Form is not self.
> Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this 
form be
> thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> 
> Given
> p: form is not self.
> q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let 
this form
> not be thus.'
> 
> If p, then q.
> p.
> Therefore, q.
> 
> Argument A is a valid argument.
> 
> 
> Please consider Argument B
> Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to 
say 'Let this
> form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be 
thus. Let
> this form not be thus."
> Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> 
> Given
> p: form is self.
> q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this 
form not
> be thus.'
> 
> If p, then q.
> not q.
> Therefore, not p.
> 
> Argument B is also a valid argument.
> 
> 
> Let's examine Argument C:
> Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to 
say 'Let this
> form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be 
thus. Let
> this form not be thus."
> Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> 
> Given
> p: form is self.
> q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this 
form not
> be thus.'
> r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this 
form not
> be thus."
> 
> If p, then q.
> not r.
> Therefore, not p.
> 
> Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar 
statement q and
> statement r is.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
	
10058

From: jonoabb <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right view)

 	
Hi All

First, a clarification of the reference to 'CMA' in my earlier post.

'CMA' here is a reference to the Bhikkhu Bodhi translation of the 
Abhidhammattha Sangaha titled 'A Comprehensive Manual of 
Abhidhamma' and published by the BPS. (The 'Guide' sections 
are compiled from, but are not a direct translation of, the main 
commentaries to the A-S.)

My apologies for not including these details in the original post.

Secondly, a follow-up. The passage from CMA continues with a 
useful description of the difference between mundane jhana 
moments (i.e. jhana consciousness resulting from the 
development of samatha) and Eightfold Path moments (i.e. the 
supramundane consciousness arising at a moment of 
enlightenment). This follows the comment in the earlier 
passage that for every attainer to the Eightfold Path, whether 
'bare insight' attainer (i.e. without mundane jhana) or otherwise, 
all supramundane path moments are considered types of jhana 
consciousness "because they occur in the mode of closely 
contemplating their object with full absorption, like the mundane 
jhanas, and because they possess the jhana factors with an 
intensity corresponding to their counterparts in the mundane 
jhanas".

I find interesting the differences that are noted in the passage, 
which I have pasted below. To me they certainly do not suggest 
any *necessary* connection between mundane jhana and the 
moment of path consciousness.

Jon

CMA Ch. I, Guide to ##30-31
The supramundane jhanas of the paths and fruits differ from the 
mundane jhanas in several important respects. [5] 
First, whereas the mundane jhanas take as their object some 
concept, such as the sign of the kasina, the supramundane 
jhanas take as their object Nibbana, the unconditioned reality. 
[5.1] 
Second, whereas the mundane jhanas merely suppress the 
defilements while leaving their underlying seeds intact, the 
supramundane jhanas of the path eradicate defilements so that 
they can never again arise. [5.2]
Third, while the mundane jhanas lead to rebirth in the fine 
material world and thus sustain existence in the round of 
rebirths, the jhanas of the path cut off the fetters binding one to 
the cycle and thus issue in liberation from the round of birth and 
death. [5.3] 
Finally, whereas the role of wisdom in the mundane jhanas is 
subordinate to that of concentration, in the supramundane 
jhanas wisdom and concentration are well balanced, with 
concentration fixing the mind on the unconditioned element and 
wisdom fathoming the deep significance of the Four Noble 
Truths. [5.4]

[Jon's notes:]
5. There are 4 important differences between jhana citta and the 
path citta –
5.1. The object of jhana citta is a concept , while the object of 
the moment of path citta is Nibbana.
5.2. Jhana cittas merely suppress kilesa, while magga citta 
eradicates kilesa.
5.3. Jhana cittas are a condition for future rebirth, whereas 
magga cittas result in liberation from the cycle of birth and death.
5.4. The primary attribute of a moment of jhana citta is the 
degree of concentration on the object at that moment, whereas 
the attribute of a moment of magga citta is the wisdom that 
pierces the Truths.
---------------------------------------



> CMA Ch. I, Guide (ie. summary of commentary) to ##30-31
> 
> "All meditators reach the supramundane paths and fruits 
through the
> development of wisdom (panna) – insight into the three 
characteristics of
> impermanence, suffering, and non-self. [1] However, they 
differ among
> themselves in the degree of their development of concentration 
(samadhi).
> 
> "Those who develop insight without a basis of jhana are called
> practitioners of bare insight (sukkhavipassaka). [2] When they 
reach the
> path and fruit, their path and fruition cittas occur at a level
> corresponding to the first jhana. [3]
> 
> "Those who develop insight on the basis of jhana attain a path 
and fruit
> which corresponds to the level of jhana they had attained 
before reaching
> the path...
> 
> "For bare insight meditator and jhana meditator alike, all path 
and
> fruition cittas are considered types of jhana consciousness. 
They are so
> considered because they occur in the mode of closely 
contemplating their
> object with full absorption, like the mundane jhanas, and 
because they
> possess the jhana factors with an intensity corresponding to 
their
> counterparts in the mundane jhanas." [4] 
> [ends]
> ===================================
> 
> Jon's notes:
> 1. It is the development of understanding of the characteristics 
of
> reality, rather than any other factor, that brings the attainment of 
the
> path/enlightenment/8-fold path citta (magga citta).
> 2. Magga citta can be attained without the previus 
development of
> concentration to the level of mundane jhana.
> 3. However, even for the sukkhavipassaka the concentration 
accompanying
> the moment of path citta *`corresponds to'* the first level of 
jhana.
> 4. The concentration accompanying magga citta is said to 
`correspond to'
> jhana because the magga citta experiences its object with 
same full
> absorption and intensity of other factors as the jhana citta.
	
10059

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:19am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 

> Okay, I know you've talked about this many times before, but perhaps
> this would be
> a good time for a summary of the following, a small outline maybe:
> 
> 1/ How does reading and understanding the suttas lead to mundane Right
> View/Understanding.

I liked Nina’s recent post to Herman (message #9954) on a similar
question, so I won’t cover the same ground again. Suffice it to say that
listening to and considering the teachings is an indispensable condition
to any understanding. The reason for this, it seems to me, has as much to
do with avoiding wrong understanding as ‘getting’ the right understanding.
The teaching on the development of understanding is extremely subtle.

> 2/ How does mundane Right View/Understanding lay the groundwork for the
> Supramundane Path Factors to arise.

Every moment of mundane Right View (i.e. panna of the level of
satipatthana) is accompanied by other mundane factors of the Eightfold
Path. These mundane path factors are accumulated and grow in strength. 
This is how, on my reading of the teachings, the conditions for
supramundane consciousness are developed.

Jon

	
10060

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:29am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Commentaries (was, Cetana (volition, intention))

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> To follow the process you have outlined, which seems very worthwhile,
> you would:
> 1/ study the texts.
> 2/ attempt to ascertain as surely as possible what is actually being
> said, and
> what path is being mapped out with the help of commentaries and
> qualified teachers
> 3/ assess what we have understood via our own experience and
> understanding
> 4/ apply the understanding gained by the previous steps to the faithful
> discernment of the moment

I would like to fine-tune your 4 factors a little. I would state them as
follows:
1/ The study of the texts 
2/ Ascertaining as surely as possible the intended meaning of the texts
(and this I believe requires association with someone who understands them
correctly)
3/ Considering and reflecting on what has been read and heard
4/ Understanding how that relates to the experience of the present moment

More important, however, in my view is the understanding that there is no
'process to be followed'. No, I am not trying to be a 'semantic devil'
here(!), but to convey something that is very difficult to 'get' (and also
that I find difficult to explain -- due no doubt to my limited grasp).

Consider the difference between these 2 statements:
(1) If you do A, B and C, then you will experience D.
(2) D can only be experienced if factors A, B and C have been developed.

The difference between the 2, which I'm sure you can appreciate, Rob, is
an important one. It is my attempt at distinguishing between the factors
being seen as 'things-to-do' and the same factors being regarded as things
of value in their own right, worth developing, and about which we have
confidence that, properly developed, will lead us in the right direction
but the fruit of which will only become apparent as and when conditions
that are peculiar to us allow.

What I am trying to say is that there is no *perceptible, immediately
obvious* connection between the necessary factors properly developed and
the understanding for which these factors are an indispensible
pre-condition (but then who said it was a '4-steps-to-understanding' kind
of thing?). The simile given in the suttas is that of the grip marks that
gradually get worn into the wooden handle of a carpenter's tool: no
wearing away is ever apparent at the time, only over time and after
continued use (this is the 'adze handle' simile).

This lack of immediate feedback by which 'progress' can be seen and
'practice' thereby verified makes it all the more important that we have a
proper understanding in the first place of what the path is as taught.

Jon



	
10061

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:37am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 

> No, I think you're right. It suddenly seems very interesting to try to
> distinguish 'looking' at the problem that is really seeing it in terms
> of a
> current reality, as opposed to making up a conceptual example, even
> though it
> imitates a reality. in our hardness discussion, I was 'imagining' an
> experience
> of hardness rather than actually, say, touching a table and reporting
> back, and
> failed to distinguish between these very different enterprises. They
> seem the
> same to the mind, but are not.

Yes, one is purely conceptual and always so; the other may be experiential
(with or without awareness, of course).

The root cause of our problems is not our wrong conceptual grasp of
things, but our incorrect understanding of realities.

Jon

	
10062

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:56am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Herman,

I was not defining nor characterizing what self is. I was not giving any
axiom. I was showing two valid arguments and an invalid argument regarding
how certain conclusions are reached.

To reiterate the point in the previous message, please consider again this
invalid argument:

Premise 1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this
form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
Premise 2: It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
this form not be thus."
Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.

In other words, given
p: form is self.
q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not
be thus.'
r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not
be thus."

If p, then q.
not r.
Therefore, not p.

In the argument above, a fallacious assumption is used, namely, (not r).
This fallacious assumption (not r), which is very similar to the true
premise (not q), makes the argument invalid.

I am not sure what it means by rejection of the application of self/not-self
to anything at all is based.
I am not sure what is the purpose of defining non-existent things.

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "egberdina" <hhofman@d...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 6:07 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Dear Victor,
>
> If I understand you correctly, than these are the axioms on which
> your rejection of the application of self/ not-self to anything at
> all is based:
>
> Self is permanent. and
> Self is it's own object.
>
> If this is how you define self, then I agree with you. Nothing fits
> the bill. Empty set.
>
> I am sure that defining non-existing things and then saying that
> these things don't exist has been a pleasant pastime for thousands of
> millenia :-).
>
> All the best
>
>
> Herman
>
>
>
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> >
> > Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as
> > pronouns.
> >
> > Please consider Argument A:
> > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form
> to say
> > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > Premise A2: Form is not self.
> > Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this
> form be
> > thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> >
> > Given
> > p: form is not self.
> > q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let
> this form
> > not be thus.'
> >
> > If p, then q.
> > p.
> > Therefore, q.
> >
> > Argument A is a valid argument.
> >
> >
> > Please consider Argument B
> > Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to
> say 'Let this
> > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be
> thus. Let
> > this form not be thus."
> > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> >
> > Given
> > p: form is self.
> > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this
> form not
> > be thus.'
> >
> > If p, then q.
> > not q.
> > Therefore, not p.
> >
> > Argument B is also a valid argument.
> >
> >
> > Let's examine Argument C:
> > Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to
> say 'Let this
> > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be
> thus. Let
> > this form not be thus."
> > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> >
> > Given
> > p: form is self.
> > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this
> form not
> > be thus.'
> > r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this
> form not
> > be thus."
> >
> > If p, then q.
> > not r.
> > Therefore, not p.
> >
> > Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar
> statement q and
> > statement r is.
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
	
10063

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 7:10am
Subject: Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Robert

How are you? Thank you for your reply message.

I had a chance to read your reply just now. I missed my Internet 
sessions previous night due to technical problems in my ISP's servers.

You wrote:

"Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now 
to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous." 

Could you please check the spelling "sensual existence"?

In my post, I wrote "nullity of sentient existence", (not sensual 
existence).

So, if your arguments in the present post were based on "nullity of 
sensual existence", you now may need to rewrite your arguments based 
on "nullity of sentient existence."

I will read the rest of your present post, and other posts later. I 
am very sleepy now (2 a.m in Canberra).

With regards,

Suan



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> Dear Suan,
> Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary.
> My remarks are dispersed below:
> 
> --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > Dear Dhamma Friends
> > 
> > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary 
written 
> > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, 
Robert 
> > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the 
subcommentary, I 
> > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also 
> > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies
> > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. 
> > 
> > 
> > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI
> > 
> > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa 
> > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena 
khandhavattassa 
> > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi 
> > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam 
gataati 
> > attho."
> > 
> > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete 
> > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of 
> > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, 
and 
> > the other without the existential residues emptied of 
psychophysical 
> > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying 
consciousness). 
> > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality 
> > like the lamp without fuel." 
> > 
> > 
> > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind 
> > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality
> > 
> > 
> > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two 
> > 
> > 
> > Robert Epstein wrote:
> > 
> > "Well, I don't know about anyone else, but reaching the state of
> > the 
> > undefined
> > reality to me means that he has reached a state in which his 
reality 
> > is undefined
> > by any remaining fragment of distinguishing consciousness, but 
that 
> > he is still
> > in a state of existence in which his reality is undefined. This 
does 
> > not mean that
> > there is no existent of any kind, only that all consciousness has 
> > been cooled
> > and is no longer present. The idea of an underlying beingness or 
> > awareness that is
> > however totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to 
me to 
> > be ruled
> > out here.
> > 
> > What puzzles me in the above paragraph is Robert's addition of
> > the statement:
> > 
> > "…but that he is still in a state of existence in which his
> > reality is undefined."
> > 
> > Buddhaghosa's explanation of `parinibbutaa' includes the
> > unmistakable expression `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of 
the 
> > last mind' on the death of an Arahant. 
> 
> Let me say from the beginning here, Suan, that you are invoking the 
termination of
> the 'last mind' as evidence that there is no remaining experience. 
Later on you
> say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, 
experience and
> 'sensual existence' are not synonymous. So let's start by totally 
agreeing that
> there is no 'sensual existence' or 'sensory experience' of any kind 
in
> parinibbana. On this I think it is absolutely clear.
> 
> If there is *any kind* of existence in parinibbana, it would not be 
one that is
> connected to the body or the mind. So the existence of any such 
experience would
> indeed be a mystical state. It would be quite beyond anything that 
relates to
> this world, to this body, mind or personality.
> 
> now the problem that arises when i try to get into this kind of 
possibility, of
> such a state existing fro the arahant, is that anyone who hears 
that assumes that
> this means there must be some kind of soul, or mind or entity that 
is there. I
> try to say that if it is existent, this parinibbanic existence 
would have to be a
> kind of pure presence, field or aware quality, disassociated from 
any
> individuation or subject-object differentiation. But most don't 
accept the
> possibility that such a state can exist without the false positing 
of some kind of
> 'self'. I myself think that such an impersonal existence of 
awareness is a
> possibility, but I understand if you cannot take the Buddha's words 
to imply that.
> I think that Howard, up to a point, agrees with me on this, and 
that it is
> possible that Kenneth O. would also see this as a possibility. So 
to an extent it
> seems to divide among those who have or have had some sympathy for 
the ideas of
> Mahayana Buddhism and those who are strictly reading according to a 
Theravadin
> interpretation.
> 
> But I am trying to restrict myself to that which can be seen in the 
actually words
> of the Buddha, as expressed in the Theravadin Suttas and 
commentaries.
> 
> So that is just to be forthright about my orientation. So I would 
not propose
> this possibility if I did not see it in the actual verses, and in 
fact, in this
> case, in your very noble translation of the verses, which have a 
nice sense of
> freshness and literal immediacy about them, and for which I thank 
you. I truly
> enjoy feeling that I have gotten a bit closer to the living word of 
the Buddha,
> even if our interpretations may diverge after that.
> 
> So you are talking about the 'last mind' or 'sensual reality' being 
finally cooled
> and coming to an end. 
> 
> First of all, I find the idea of these things being 'finally 
cooled' a wonderful
> translation. Nowhere does the Buddha talk about destruction or 
eradication when
> it comes to the final coming to rest of the experiential mechanism.
> 
> Second of all, what you do not account for in this second sub-
commentary and which
> is the sole evidence for my view that there may be a state of 'non-
sensual'
> awareness in the parinibbanic state, is that the Buddha says that 
the Arahant's
> final reality is 'undefined'.
> 
> For myself, Suan, I can see absolutely no reason why the Buddha 
would use this
> enignmatic and provisional term, 'undefined' if it were not for a 
very specific
> purpose. Why couldn't he simply say 'it is ended and there is 
nothing left'. But
> he does not say that, he says that the Arahant is 'without the 
existential
> residues emptied of psychophysical machinery by termination of the 
last mind'. As
> absolute as this sounds, he does not say this leaves *nothing* 
which is what it
> should mean if it is a true obliteration of all experience. He 
says it leaves the
> Arahant in a state of 'undefined reality', a truly enigmatic term.
> 
> Now we all agree that the Buddha didn't mince words and that he 
could be clear as
> a bell, decisive in fact. So why would he not say 'the 
experiencing consciousness
> and any possibility of any remaining awareness are totally 
destroyed leaving
> absolutely no experience of any kind in its wake'? Or something to 
that effect. 
> Instead he talks of the 'undefined reality'. For the life of me, 
this does not
> sound anything like the total abolition of existence to me. It 
sounds like the
> total obliteration of *worldly* subject/object existence, but not 
of existence per
> se. And since we all agree that the Buddha chose his words wisely, 
why we have to
> account for all that he said and try to make some kind of sense out 
of it. We
> can't just ignore an expression like 'undefined reality' without a 
sense of what
> it implies about his other statements which aree right next to each 
other. So
> that is my sticking point, just as he says in the other Sutta we 
talked about, the
> one about the 'luminous mind which is freed from defilements from 
within'. You
> see there is a certain consistency here, in which the Buddha seems 
to point at a
> 'higher' reality, rather than 'no reality' at all in the Nibbanic 
state.
> 
> Finally, he uses as his metaphor for this state of undefined 
reality 'the lamp
> without fuel' which can no longer burn. This again points to the 
end of 'sensual
> experience' but not to 'no existence of any kind'. Why do I say 
this? He says
> the lamp is gone out, but whenever he uses this metaphor he never 
says the lamp is
> gone or destroyed. The lamp is always left sitting there in its 
state of
> 'ultimate cool' with no more fuel to burn. So the flame of 
suffering and sensual
> experience, which are intimately tied together, are finished. No 
more
> subject/object experience, no more objects of craving or aversion, 
just the
> ultimately cooled lamp. So what is that lamp? It is the base of 
being or
> existence without any discernable activity. It is just like a lamp 
that does not
> burn, like awareness that has returned to itself and no longer goes 
outward to
> seek any object. Although there is absolutely no activity in this 
lamp, in this
> awareness, that does not mean it is obliterated. If it was, I 
believe that
> Buddhism would reduce inevitably to Nihilism. If one posits an 
absolute nullity,
> one has no choice but to put one's stock in annihilation. I do not 
believe that
> complete annihilation of experience is what the Buddha taught. I 
do believe he
> taught the end of suffering as the complete cessation of sensory 
activity and
> subject/object separation.
> 
> For practical purposes, this distinction may be splitting hairs, 
but in the sense
> of what it means for the ground of being, what we really are or 
arent' in the
> final analysis, it has enormous implications. One who believes in 
total and final
> obliteration of all awareness can take no stock in the human 
quality of awakeness
> or awareness. It is merely a tool to get to obliteration of 
suffering, and in
> that sense one turns away from even the inmost content of one's own 
mind. Even
> the cittas are a source of suffering and there is nothing beyond 
them. For one
> who believes in the final rest of awareness itself as something 
that can become
> enlightened by returning to itself, rather than being extinguished, 
there is an
> inherently positive quality in the entire path, a seed of truth 
that exists now in
> the human being, but is obscured by delusion and unwholesome 
tendencies. I
> believe this difference makes an enormous difference in 
orientation, and that we
> have at least two examples of where the Buddha hints strongly, 
without turning it
> into an object or entity, of this posssibility of light at the end 
of the tunnel,
> rather than a final darkness. And I take strong stock in those 
statements. I
> think they mean something that needs to be investigated and 
discerned.
> 
> And thank you for such a stimulating discussion of these important 
issues. I am
> very interested in hearing your response.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ====================================
> 
> > The last mind in a lifetime is the dying consciousness 
(cuticittam), 
> > which is, by the way, the finish line of `bhavanga cittam –
> > the life-cause consciousness.' 
> > 
> > The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava 
means 
> > life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. Thus, 
> > bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of 
sentient 
> > existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes the 
> > sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient 
> > existence.
> > 
> > On the death of a sentient being who hasn't attained Arahatta 
> > awakening, the linking consciousness (patisandhi cittam) 
immediately 
> > follows the dying consciousness for a rebirth. Why immediately? 
It is 
> > because we can't suspend the bhavanga cittam in a limbo state.
> > The linking consciousness is the start line of the life-cause 
> > consciousness (bhavanga cittam) in a lifetime.
> > 
> > In other words, the difference between an Arahant and a non-
Arahant 
> > is the termination of the life-cause consciousness for the 
Arahant 
> > and the perpetuation of the life-cause consciousness for the non-
> > Arahant.
> > 
> > An Arahant terminates the life-cause consciousness while ordinary 
> > sentient beings perpetuate the life-cause consciousnesses.
> > 
> > The death of an Arahant is the termination of bhavanga cittam, 
the 
> > life-cause consciousness. In other words, the Parinibbaana of an 
> > Arahant is the end of the sentient existence.
> > 
> > Robert Epstein also wrote:
> > 
> > "The idea of an underlying beingness or awareness that is however 
> > totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to be 
> > ruled out here."
> > 
> > 
> > Robert's idea of an underlying beingness or awareness looks
> > rather like an interpretation of the bhavanga cittam, the life-
cause 
> > consciousness.
> > 
> > If Robert meant to refer to the bhavanga cittam as an underlying 
> > beingness or awareness, and regarded it as something that would 
> > survive in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant, he has my 
> > sympathy, and I would not blame him. Why not?
> > 
> > Bhavanga cittam is the cool-down, resting state of the mind, so 
it is 
> > very tempting to equate nibbaana with a kind of perpetual 
bhavanga 
> > cittam. 
> > 
> > However, as we have analysed earlier above, the expression 
> > `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the last mind',
> > did not help to indicate the survival of the bhavanga cittam in 
> > parinibbaana on the death of an Arahant.
> > 
> > Contrary to Robert Epstein's ideas, termination of the bhavanga 
> > cittam has ruled out any underlying beingness or awareness, I am 
> > afraid.
> > 
> > Howard also wrote:
> > 
> > "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests
> > parinibbana as a kind of nullity."
> > 
> > The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity of sentient 
existence.
> > 
> > 
> > PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two Ends Here.
> > 
> > 
> > With regards,
> > 
> > Suan Lu Zaw
> > 
> > http://www.bodhiology.org
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > PREVIOUSLY ON THIS LIST
> > 
> > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI
> > 
> > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa 
> > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena 
khandhavattassa 
> > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi 
> > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam 
gataati 
> > attho."
> > 
> > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete 
> > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of 
> > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, 
and 
> > the other without the existential residues emptied of 
psychophysical 
> > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying 
consciousness). 
> > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality 
> > like the lamp without fuel." 
> > 
> > Parinibbaana - complete extinguishment
> > Kilesavatta - defilement machinery (vatta is literally circle, 
cycle, 
> > or round. We have `vicious circle' in English.)
> > Khandhavatta - psychophysical machinery
> > Upaadisesa - existential residues (upaadi is merely another name 
of 
> > pancakkhadhaa). Upaadi means phenomena taken strongly by craving 
or 
> > attachment (tanhaa).
> > 
> > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind 
> > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality
> > 
> > 
> > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY
> > 
> > Howard wrote:
> > 
> > "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests
> > parinibbana 
> > as a kind of nullity. A couple matters remain: (1) The exact 
meaning 
> > of Apannattikabhaavaam - the state of undefined reality, and the 
> > exact meaning of vi~n~nana, which I take as the dualistic 
operation 
> > of separating out an individualized object from the potential 
field 
> > of awareness, a special type of knowing/~nana."
> > 
> > 
> > The expression `apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined
> > reality' 
> > has given both Howard and Robert Epstein an opportunity to 
undergo 
> > profound contemplation, as it would everybody else. 
> > 
> > Therefore, this unique expression has become a suitable topic for 
> > further analysis and elucidation as Buddhaghosa did not elaborate 
on 
> > it, at least on this occasion.
> > 
> > The expression `Apannattikabhaavo' can be broken up 
> > as `a+pannatti+ika+bhaavo'. 
> > 
> > The term `pannatti' has the same meaning as
> > `paññatti'. Therefore, 
> > pannatti means a name, a convention, or a verbalization as
> > `paññatti' 
> > would. We all know that a name can refer to either an existent 
> > phenomenon or a non-existent category such as God the Creator. No 
> > offense to theists amid the Buddhists! 
> > 
> > In Pali texts, the term that describes the opposite of a non-
existent 
> > category is `paramattho – a reality'. Examples of
> > realities are 
> > matter and mind. No offense to extremist Mahayanists amid the 
> > Theravadis and scientists!
> > 
> > Now, let us look at the combination `a+pannatti'. The prefix
> > `a' 
> > in `apannatti' means `not' or `no' just like
> > the prefix `a' in the 
> > words `amoral' and `amorphous' giving the opposite
> > meanings 
> > of `moral' and `morphous'. 
> > 
> > Thus, we get `not + name (or convention, or verbalization)'.
> > 
> > And, what about the bit `ika'? The suffix `ika' means
> > `having or 
> > doing something that the preceding term indicates.'
> > 
> > Thus, the combination `pannatti+ika' means `having + name
> > (or 
> > convention, or verbalization).' 
> > 
> > Now, when we add both the prefix and the suffix to the 
> > term `pannatti', we get the `apannattika – something
> > not having a 
> > name, something not of convention, something not of 
verbalization, or 
> > something undefined. 
> > 
> > The word `bhaava' denotes a state. Therefore, the 
> > expression `apannattikabhaavo' refers to the state of
> > something 
> > unconventional, unverbalizable, or undefinable.
> > 
> > As we mentioned earlier above, the antonym of the term
> > `paññatti' in 
> > the Pali texts, is the term `paramattho – a reality'.
> > Therefore, the 
> > expression `apannattikabhaavo' means the state of something
> > existent, 
> > something real, but not subject to verbalization, or 
> > conventionalization.
> > 
> > The above analysis should satisfy Howard's request for the exact 
> > meaning of apannattikabhaavo – the state of undefined reality.
> > 
> > Now, I will try to answer why Buddhaghosa described parinibbutaa 
as 
> > the state of undefined reality.
> > 
> > By using the espression `apannattikabhaavo - the state of
> > undefined 
> > reality', Buddhaghosa has killed two birds with one stone. We
> > could 
> > toy with the idea of using the term `paramattho – a
> > reality' instead 
> > of `apannatti'. But, that could deprive us of the ability to
> > convey 
> > the meanings of unverbalizableness and undefinableness. Not only 
that 
> > handicap, paramattho could refer to other types of realities as 
well, 
> > which we can also verbalize and define easily. Therefore, it is a 
> > very clever choice of word that Buddhaghosa described 
parinibbutaa 
> > as `apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality'.
> > 
> > Now, what is the meaning of undefinableness or 
unverbalizableness? 
> > Why did Buddhaghosa regarded parinibbutaa as being undefinable?
> > 
> > The world is programmed to think only in terms of stereotypes and 
> > stereotyping. It is programmed to verbalize only in terms of 
ready 
> > expressions and convenient vocabulary.
> > 
> > Our linguistic stereotypes include both existent and non-existent 
> > categories. But, all our verbalizable catagories refer only to 
either 
> > mind and mental (associates and) products, or matter and material 
> > things.
> > 
> > In short, we are programmed to define things and beings only in 
the 
> > terminology of mind and matter, the two main existential 
realities. 
> > This two-reality existential programming has conditioned us to 
regard 
> > anything outside psychophysical givens as nullity.
> > 
> > The Arahatta awakening that Gotama the Buddha has discovered is 
> > capable of demolishing our existential programming and allowing 
us to 
> > realize the third reality outside mind and matter. Here, the 
> > term `mind' includes mental associates (cetasikas) as well.
> > Because 
> > this third reality is outside mind and matter, we cannot 
verbalize it 
> > in terms of psychophysical existences. Yet, this third reality 
exists 
> > as parinibbutaa, the ultimate cool. As Buddhaghosa has done, we 
can 
> > describe parinibbutaa only as complete extinguishment of 
defilements 
> > and psychophysical existence. 
> > 
> > Therefore, the meaning of undefinableness in the expression `the 
> > state of undefined reality' is that parinibbaana is an existence
> > that 
> > we cannot define in terms of mind and matter.
> > 
> > 
> > PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part One Ends Here.
> > 
> > 
> > With regards
> > 
> > Suan Lu Zaw
> > 
> > http://www.bodhiology.org
> >
> 
	
10064

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:21am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually?

 	
Hi, Erik -

In a message dated 12/15/01 9:39:22 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
rikpa21@y... writes:


> Speaking as perhaps the lone samatha-yanika meditator here, I can 
> say from experience that the diferrence between the sort of 
> concentration needed to fulfill Right Concentration as I understand 
> it (and it tool a LOT of practice to get to the point to where 
> concentration was firmly established in the sense that the mind 
> remained fixed on an arammana and apanna arose) and the normal sort 
> of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day life through concentrating 
> on random object arising through thes sense-doors to be as big as 
> the difference distance between Heaven and Earth.
> 
> 
==============================
I've had a drop of experience in samatha bhavana, involving 
concentration practice focusing the mind on a single meditation subject, and 
also some practice in vipassana bhavana, involving what is sometimes called 
moment-to-moment concentration practice. In my experience these types of 
concentration are different, but, in their different ways, equally powerful. 
In either of these cases, the concentration is, as you say, radically 
different from "the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day 
life through concentrating on random object arising through thes 
sense-doors".
The point of my post, however, was to inquire into the technical 
question of what is actually occurring, at a microscopic level of detail, 
when concentration has increased. My conjecture was that the switching back 
and forth among various (instances of) objects from citta to citta to citta 
typical of ordinary experience is reduced, in the extreme case to a single 
object (or near-replicates identified as "the same object") which is the 
arammana in mental process after mental process. Now, it seems almost certain 
to me that such a curtailing of the diversity of objects of awareness, such 
focusing and stabilization, is due to some functional characteristic or 
cetasika within each mindstate becoming strengthened, in which case that 
cetasika, itself, might be called "concentration". I am asking those who are 
well versed in Abhidhamma what their understanding of the Abhidhamma "take" 
is on this subject. 

With metta,
Howard 

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10065

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 12/16/01 2:55:46 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> Hi Howard.
> One assumes that 'oneself' must be used conventionally, since we assume 
> that
> Buddha would not invoke the existence of a personal 'self'. It is clear 
> that
> 'oneself' must mean something, therefore it must be conventional use or 
> else must
> be the invocation of a personal self.
> 
> I agree that it is most likely conventional speech, but if that is the 
> case, he is
> basically giving prescriptions for behavior or pep talks for practitioners 
> of a
> certain level. This seems to me to undercut the notion that conventional 
> effort
> and exercise of will has no effect on the practitioner.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
=============================
While I cannot give you the reference, I recall with certainty that 
the Buddha stated in a sutta that he uses conventional language! If I can 
find it, I will give you the reference. (I will bet the Robert K can provide 
it.)

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10066

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 4:31am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Victor -

In a message dated 12/16/01 3:02:49 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
victoryu@s... writes:


> Hello Robert, Howard, and all,
> 
> If the Buddha used two kinds of speeches, conventional and 
> non-conventional,
> I would be interested in knowing some examples of non-conventional speech
> that the Buddha used.
> 
> Thank you in advance.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
===========================
ALL speech is conventional in the sense that it is a complex 
convention tacitly agreed upon by people to use patterns of sounds in certain 
ways. Moreover, built into those speech conventions are functionalities which 
express our tendency towards reification, naming things as though they had 
independent existence, and expressing a substantive subject-object dichotomy. 

However, it is possible to use speech in a way to *point* to the way 
things actually are. When the Buddha did so, speaking of impermanence and 
emptiness and nibbana, his speech can be called "non-conventional". Others, 
such as Zen masters, have used speech in unconventional ways, often poetic, 
to sidestep the reificationist core of language use, to point beyond our 
concepts, and towards reality. But the only *truly* non-conventional grasp of 
matters is done directly, and not through speech or concept.

With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10067

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 9:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello all,

Another invalid argument that is used to support the views on control / no
control goes like this

Premise 1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say 'Let
this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
Premise 2: Form is not self.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form be
thus. Let this form not be thus.'

In other words, given
p: form is not self.
q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form
not be thus.'
r: it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form
not be thus.'

If p, then q.
p.
Therefore, r.

Both premises are true; however, the conclusion simply doesn't follow from
the premises.
Again, please note how similar statement q and statement r are.


Regards,
Victor
	
10068

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 5:25am
Subject: Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, all -

At any time (from the Abhidhamma perspective) there is a unique citta 
functioning, along with all the associated cetasikas, and a unique arammana. 
All previous cittas are nonexistent, and no future cittas have arisen. 
Moreover, there is no "observer" in the backgound watching the flow of cittas 
as an audience member watches the film frames on a screen. Yet, there is the 
sense of continuity, flow, and change. It seems to me that this can only be 
due to the function of *memory*.There is then the question of whether the 
content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for the 
experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for the 
memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta (else 
such memories are already gone). In that case, it becomes important whether 
or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, then 
there is more than one arammana per citta. Side question: Does the principle 
of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in the 
commentaries?

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10069

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:07pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right view)

 	
Jon,

Thanks for this great excerpt--hope you'll add it to
the files. Where you write:

--- jonoabb <jonoabb@y...> wrote:

> Finally, whereas the role of wisdom in the mundane
> jhanas is 
> subordinate to that of concentration, in the
> supramundane 
> jhanas wisdom and concentration are well balanced,
> with 
> concentration fixing the mind on the unconditioned
> element and 
> wisdom fathoming the deep significance of the Four
> Noble 
> Truths. [5.4]
> 
> [Jon's notes:]

> 5.4. The primary attribute of a moment of jhana
> citta is the 
> degree of concentration on the object at that
> moment, whereas 
> the attribute of a moment of magga citta is the
> wisdom that 
> pierces the Truths.

Do you mean, "The primary attribute of a moment of
[mundane] jhana citta is the degree of concentration
on the object at that moment, whereas the attribute
of a moment of magga citta is the wisdom that pierces
the Truths [in balance with concentration (as well as
the other path-factors)]? Or have I missed or
misunderstood something here?

Thanks in advance,

mike

	
10070

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 3:53pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote:

> At any time (from the Abhidhamma perspective)
> there is a unique citta 
> functioning, along with all the associated
> cetasikas, and a unique arammana. 
> All previous cittas are nonexistent, and no future
> cittas have arisen. 
> Moreover, there is no "observer" in the backgound
> watching the flow of cittas 
> as an audience member watches the film frames on a
> screen. Yet, there is the 
> sense of continuity, flow, and change. It seems to
> me that this can only be 
> due to the function of *memory*.There is then the
> question of whether the 
> content of a memory is considered to be an arammana
> or not. In order for the 
> experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary,
> it seems to me, for the 
> memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with
> the current citta (else 
> such memories are already gone). 

As I understand it, when a citta takes a memory as an
aarammana, sa~n~naa remembers the aaramma.na (this
citta is manovi~n~naa.na, which can take a concept as
an aaramma.na). 

> In that case, it
> becomes important whether 
> or not the content of a memory is considered an
> aramma.na, for if it is, then 
> there is more than one aramma.na per citta. 

Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept
(memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other
aarammana is present?

> Side
> question: Does the principle 
> of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma,
> itself, or only in the 
> commentaries?

Not sure about this, but I believe that the Theravaada
considers some of the commentaries (those recited at
the First Council) to be part of the Abhidhamma. I
don't know if this idea occurs in the Abhidhamma
outside the commentaries or not, though...

mike


	
10071

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 7:54pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Still a little confusing Victor. One and self are used synomously, but one, self
and 'form' are not. It is not only whether the candidate 'form' can control
'form' or not, but whether oneself can control form.

Oneself may = self, but the identity of 'oneself' [or what the self consists of]
is never identified. Form is excluded as being 'self', but this does not settle
the question of what 'oneself', which remains undefined, refers to.

Therefore I assume it is a conventional expression, referring to the generally
accepted concept of a 'person' for the sake of discussion.

Best,
Robert Ep.

====================


--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as
> pronouns.
> 
> Please consider Argument A:
> Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say
> 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> Premise A2: Form is not self.
> Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be
> thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> 
> Given
> p: form is not self.
> q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form
> not be thus.'
> 
> If p, then q.
> p.
> Therefore, q.
> 
> Argument A is a valid argument.
> 
> 
> Please consider Argument B
> Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this
> form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
> this form not be thus."
> Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> 
> Given
> p: form is self.
> q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not
> be thus.'
> 
> If p, then q.
> not q.
> Therefore, not p.
> 
> Argument B is also a valid argument.
> 
> 
> Let's examine Argument C:
> Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this
> form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
> this form not be thus."
> Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> 
> Given
> p: form is self.
> q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not
> be thus.'
> r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form not
> be thus."
> 
> If p, then q.
> not r.
> Therefore, not p.
> 
> Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q and
> statement r is.
> 
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 2:52 PM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> 
> 
> >
> > --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > > Hello Robert,
> > >
> > > Yes, one can control oneself.
> > >
> > > If form were self, it would be possible for FORM to say 'Let this form
> be
> > > thus. Let this form not be thus.' However, precisely because form is
> not
> > > self, it is not possible for FORM to say 'Let this form be thus. Let
> this
> > > form not be thus.'
> > >
> > > Please note that form is not self does not imply whether it is possible
> or
> > > not for ONE to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Victor
> >
> > Dear Victor,
> > Well, then, if ONE were to say 'Let this form be thus' and it would
> accord, then
> > would ONE be the self? If self can control any dhammas, it would not fall
> into
> > the category of being impermanent and unsatisfactory. One would have
> defeated
> > dukkha. So I would say that one can provisional exercise self-control,
> but that
> > perhaps the idea that ONE is doing this is an illusion.
> >
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> >
> >
> >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> > > To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> > > Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2001 3:38 AM
> > > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> > >
> > >
> > > > Dear Victor,
> > > > In the Sutta you referred me to, the Buddha says that if consciousness
> > > were the
> > > > self, one could say 'have this consciousness be like this' and it
> would do
> > > so.
> > > > Since it does not, it is clearly not self.
> > > >
> > > > He says that if this body were self it would likewise accord with our
> > > wishes, but
> > > > since it does not, it is not self.
> > > >
> > > > Hence my reference to that which cannot be controlled not being self.
> > > >
> > > > In the second sutta you referred me to, he says: 'One must be the
> > > controller of
> > > > oneself; who else would be the controller?' making a definite
> reference to
> > > one
> > > > being able to develop control over one's own activities. If this does
> not
> > > imply a
> > > > true self who is able to establish this control, then what does it
> mean?
> > > >
> > > > Best,
> > > > Robert Ep.
> > > >
> > > > ========


	
10072

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 8:29pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort)

 	
--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> 
> > Okay, I know you've talked about this many times before, but perhaps
> > this would be
> > a good time for a summary of the following, a small outline maybe:
> > 
> > 1/ How does reading and understanding the suttas lead to mundane Right
> > View/Understanding.
> 
> I liked Nina’s recent post to Herman (message #9954) on a similar
> question, so I won’t cover the same ground again. Suffice it to say that
> listening to and considering the teachings is an indispensable condition
> to any understanding. The reason for this, it seems to me, has as much to
> do with avoiding wrong understanding as ‘getting’ the right understanding.
> The teaching on the development of understanding is extremely subtle.
> 
> > 2/ How does mundane Right View/Understanding lay the groundwork for the
> > Supramundane Path Factors to arise.
> 
> Every moment of mundane Right View (i.e. panna of the level of
> satipatthana) is accompanied by other mundane factors of the Eightfold
> Path. These mundane path factors are accumulated and grow in strength. 
> This is how, on my reading of the teachings, the conditions for
> supramundane consciousness are developed.
> 
> Jon

So a single citta can accumulate and pass on any path factors that it has
experienced? And they, in accumulation, lead to the arising of the others?

Robert Ep.



	
10073

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 8:33pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Commentaries (was, Cetana (volition, intention))

 	
thanks, Jon.
very well stated, all the way down the line, and very helpful.

Robert Ep.

===================

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > To follow the process you have outlined, which seems very worthwhile,
> > you would:
> > 1/ study the texts.
> > 2/ attempt to ascertain as surely as possible what is actually being
> > said, and
> > what path is being mapped out with the help of commentaries and
> > qualified teachers
> > 3/ assess what we have understood via our own experience and
> > understanding
> > 4/ apply the understanding gained by the previous steps to the faithful
> > discernment of the moment
> 
> I would like to fine-tune your 4 factors a little. I would state them as
> follows:
> 1/ The study of the texts 
> 2/ Ascertaining as surely as possible the intended meaning of the texts
> (and this I believe requires association with someone who understands them
> correctly)
> 3/ Considering and reflecting on what has been read and heard
> 4/ Understanding how that relates to the experience of the present moment
> 
> More important, however, in my view is the understanding that there is no
> 'process to be followed'. No, I am not trying to be a 'semantic devil'
> here(!), but to convey something that is very difficult to 'get' (and also
> that I find difficult to explain -- due no doubt to my limited grasp).
> 
> Consider the difference between these 2 statements:
> (1) If you do A, B and C, then you will experience D.
> (2) D can only be experienced if factors A, B and C have been developed.
> 
> The difference between the 2, which I'm sure you can appreciate, Rob, is
> an important one. It is my attempt at distinguishing between the factors
> being seen as 'things-to-do' and the same factors being regarded as things
> of value in their own right, worth developing, and about which we have
> confidence that, properly developed, will lead us in the right direction
> but the fruit of which will only become apparent as and when conditions
> that are peculiar to us allow.
> 
> What I am trying to say is that there is no *perceptible, immediately
> obvious* connection between the necessary factors properly developed and
> the understanding for which these factors are an indispensible
> pre-condition (but then who said it was a '4-steps-to-understanding' kind
> of thing?). The simile given in the suttas is that of the grip marks that
> gradually get worn into the wooden handle of a carpenter's tool: no
> wearing away is ever apparent at the time, only over time and after
> continued use (this is the 'adze handle' simile).
> 
> This lack of immediate feedback by which 'progress' can be seen and
> 'practice' thereby verified makes it all the more important that we have a
> proper understanding in the first place of what the path is as taught.
> 
> Jon


	
10074

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 8:35pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard)

 	
--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> 
> > No, I think you're right. It suddenly seems very interesting to try to
> > distinguish 'looking' at the problem that is really seeing it in terms
> > of a
> > current reality, as opposed to making up a conceptual example, even
> > though it
> > imitates a reality. in our hardness discussion, I was 'imagining' an
> > experience
> > of hardness rather than actually, say, touching a table and reporting
> > back, and
> > failed to distinguish between these very different enterprises. They
> > seem the
> > same to the mind, but are not.
> 
> Yes, one is purely conceptual and always so; the other may be experiential
> (with or without awareness, of course).
> 
> The root cause of our problems is not our wrong conceptual grasp of
> things, but our incorrect understanding of realities.
> 
> Jon

Can I take it that this last sentence could be finished: "...our incorrect
understanding of realities as they arise.' ?

Robert Ep.


	
10075

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 9:07pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Suan,
I did misread your comments to say 'sensual' rather than 'sensory' existence,
which is very strange, because when I *read* it [I thought] I thought to myself
'well that is slightly odd, I'm sure he means the same as *sentient* existence,
but in fact you didn't even write that. In any case, I assumed it meant something
similar. Here is the dictionary on sentient: 

Having a faculty, or faculties, of sensation and perception.

and as a noun:

One who has the faculty of perception; a sentient being. 

In this context, that is what I assumed was meant by 'sensual', so in fact, my
meaning in the argument below is exactly the same.

However, I apologize for misreading the word. And I look forward to your response
when you have the chance.

Best,
Robert Ep.

===================

--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Dear Robert
> 
> How are you? Thank you for your reply message.
> 
> I had a chance to read your reply just now. I missed my Internet 
> sessions previous night due to technical problems in my ISP's servers.
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> "Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now 
> to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous." 
> 
> Could you please check the spelling "sensual existence"?
> 
> In my post, I wrote "nullity of sentient existence", (not sensual 
> existence).
> 
> So, if your arguments in the present post were based on "nullity of 
> sensual existence", you now may need to rewrite your arguments based 
> on "nullity of sentient existence."
> 
> I will read the rest of your present post, and other posts later. I 
> am very sleepy now (2 a.m in Canberra).
> 
> With regards,
> 
> Suan
> 
> 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> > Dear Suan,
> > Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good subcommentary.
> > My remarks are dispersed below:
> > 
> > --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > > 
> > > Dear Dhamma Friends
> > > 
> > > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary 
> written 
> > > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka Howard, 
> Robert 
> > > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the 
> subcommentary, I 
> > > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I also 
> > > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies
> > > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI
> > > 
> > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya kilesavattassa 
> > > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena 
> khandhavattassa 
> > > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi parinibbaanehi 
> > > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam 
> gataati 
> > > attho."
> > > 
> > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way complete 
> > > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of 
> > > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta awakening, 
> and 
> > > the other without the existential residues emptied of 
> psychophysical 
> > > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying 
> consciousness). 
> > > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined reality 
> > > like the lamp without fuel." 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind 
> > > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Robert Epstein wrote:
> > > 
> > > "Well, I don't know about anyone else, but reaching the state of
> > > the 
> > > undefined
> > > reality to me means that he has reached a state in which his 
> reality 
> > > is undefined
> > > by any remaining fragment of distinguishing consciousness, but 
> that 
> > > he is still
> > > in a state of existence in which his reality is undefined. This 
> does 
> > > not mean that
> > > there is no existent of any kind, only that all consciousness has 
> > > been cooled
> > > and is no longer present. The idea of an underlying beingness or 
> > > awareness that is
> > > however totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to 
> me to 
> > > be ruled
> > > out here.
> > > 
> > > What puzzles me in the above paragraph is Robert's addition of
> > > the statement:
> > > 
> > > "…but that he is still in a state of existence in which his
> > > reality is undefined."
> > > 
> > > Buddhaghosa's explanation of `parinibbutaa' includes the
> > > unmistakable expression `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of 
> the 
> > > last mind' on the death of an Arahant. 
> > 
> > Let me say from the beginning here, Suan, that you are invoking the 
> termination of
> > the 'last mind' as evidence that there is no remaining experience. 
> Later on you
> > say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. Now to me, 
> experience and
> > 'sensual existence' are not synonymous. So let's start by totally 
> agreeing that
> > there is no 'sensual existence' or 'sensory experience' of any kind 
> in
> > parinibbana. On this I think it is absolutely clear.
> > 
> > If there is *any kind* of existence in parinibbana, it would not be 
> one that is
> > connected to the body or the mind. So the existence of any such 
> experience would
> > indeed be a mystical state. It would be quite beyond anything that 
> relates to
> > this world, to this body, mind or personality.
> > 
> > now the problem that arises when i try to get into this kind of 
> possibility, of
> > such a state existing fro the arahant, is that anyone who hears 
> that assumes that
> > this means there must be some kind of soul, or mind or entity that 
> is there. I
> > try to say that if it is existent, this parinibbanic existence 
> would have to be a
> > kind of pure presence, field or aware quality, disassociated from 
> any
> > individuation or subject-object differentiation. But most don't 
> accept the
> > possibility that such a state can exist without the false positing 
> of some kind of
> > 'self'. I myself think that such an impersonal existence of 
> awareness is a
> > possibility, but I understand if you cannot take the Buddha's words 
> to imply that.
> > I think that Howard, up to a point, agrees with me on this, and 
> that it is
> > possible that Kenneth O. would also see this as a possibility. So 
> to an extent it
> > seems to divide among those who have or have had some sympathy for 
> the ideas of
> > Mahayana Buddhism and those who are strictly reading according to a 
> Theravadin
> > interpretation.
> > 
> > But I am trying to restrict myself to that which can be seen in the 
> actually words
> > of the Buddha, as expressed in the Theravadin Suttas and 
> commentaries.
> > 
> > So that is just to be forthright about my orientation. So I would 
> not propose
> > this possibility if I did not see it in the actual verses, and in 
> fact, in this
> > case, in your very noble translation of the verses, which have a 
> nice sense of
> > freshness and literal immediacy about them, and for which I thank 
> you. I truly
> > enjoy feeling that I have gotten a bit closer to the living word of 
> the Buddha,
> > even if our interpretations may diverge after that.
> > 
> > So you are talking about the 'last mind' or 'sensual reality' being 
> finally cooled
> > and coming to an end. 
> > 
> > First of all, I find the idea of these things being 'finally 
> cooled' a wonderful
> > translation. Nowhere does the Buddha talk about destruction or 
> eradication when
> > it comes to the final coming to rest of the experiential mechanism.
> > 
> > Second of all, what you do not account for in this second sub-
> commentary and which
> > is the sole evidence for my view that there may be a state of 'non-
> sensual'
> > awareness in the parinibbanic state, is that the Buddha says that 
> the Arahant's
> > final reality is 'undefined'.
> > 
> > For myself, Suan, I can see absolutely no reason why the Buddha 
> would use this
> > enignmatic and provisional term, 'undefined' if it were not for a 
> very specific
> > purpose. Why couldn't he simply say 'it is ended and there is 
> nothing left'. But
> > he does not say that, he says that the Arahant is 'without the 
> existential
> > residues emptied of psychophysical machinery by termination of the 
> last mind'. As
> > absolute as this sounds, he does not say this leaves *nothing* 
> which is what it
> > should mean if it is a true obliteration of all experience. He 
> says it leaves the
> > Arahant in a state of 'undefined reality', a truly enigmatic term.
> > 
> > Now we all agree that the Buddha didn't mince words and that he 
> could be clear as
> > a bell, decisive in fact. So why would he not say 'the 
> experiencing consciousness
> > and any possibility of any remaining awareness are totally 
> destroyed leaving
> > absolutely no experience of any kind in its wake'? Or something to 
> that effect. 
> > Instead he talks of the 'undefined reality'. For the life of me, 
> this does not
> > sound anything like the total abolition of existence to me. It 
> sounds like the
> > total obliteration of *worldly* subject/object existence, but not 
> of existence per
> > se. And since we all agree that the Buddha chose his words wisely, 
> why we have to
> > account for all that he said and try to make some kind of sense out 
> of it. We
> > can't just ignore an expression like 'undefined reality' without a 
> sense of what
> > it implies about his other statements which aree right next to each 
> other. So
> > that is my sticking point, just as he says in the other Sutta we 
> talked about, the
> > one about the 'luminous mind which is freed from defilements from 
> within'. You
> > see there is a certain consistency here, in which the Buddha seems 
> to point at a
> > 'higher' reality, rather than 'no reality' at all in the Nibbanic 
> state.
> > 
> > Finally, he uses as his metaphor for this state of undefined 
> reality 'the lamp
> > without fuel' which can no longer burn. This again points to the 
> end of 'sensual
> > experience' but not to 'no existence of any kind'. Why do I say 
> this? He says
> > the lamp is gone out, but whenever he uses this metaphor he never 
> says the lamp is
> > gone or destroyed. The lamp is always left sitting there in its 
> state of
> > 'ultimate cool' with no more fuel to burn. So the flame of 
> suffering and sensual
> > experience, which are intimately tied together, are finished. No 
> more
> > subject/object experience, no more objects of craving or aversion, 
> just the
> > ultimately cooled lamp. So what is that lamp? It is the base of 
> being or
> > existence without any discernable activity. It is just like a lamp 
> that does not
> > burn, like awareness that has returned to itself and no longer goes 
> outward to
> > seek any object. Although there is absolutely no activity in this 
> lamp, in this
> > awareness, that does not mean it is obliterated. If it was, I 
> believe that
> > Buddhism would reduce inevitably to Nihilism. If one posits an 
> absolute nullity,
> > one has no choice but to put one's stock in annihilation. I do not 
> believe that
> > complete annihilation of experience is what the Buddha taught. I 
> do believe he
> > taught the end of suffering as the complete cessation of sensory 
> activity and
> > subject/object separation.
> > 
> > For practical purposes, this distinction may be splitting hairs, 
> but in the sense
> > of what it means for the ground of being, what we really are or 
> arent' in the
> > final analysis, it has enormous implications. One who believes in 
> total and final
> > obliteration of all awareness can take no stock in the human 
> quality of awakeness
> > or awareness. It is merely a tool to get to obliteration of 
> suffering, and in
> > that sense one turns away from even the inmost content of one's own 
> mind. Even
> > the cittas are a source of suffering and there is nothing beyond 
> them. For one
> > who believes in the final rest of awareness itself as something 
> that can become
> > enlightened by returning to itself, rather than being extinguished, 
> there is an
> > inherently positive quality in the entire path, a seed of truth 
> that exists now in
> > the human being, but is obscured by delusion and unwholesome 
> tendencies. I
> > believe this difference makes an enormous difference in 
> orientation, and that we
> > have at least two examples of where the Buddha hints strongly, 
> without turning it
> > into an object or entity, of this posssibility of light at the end 
> of the tunnel,
> > rather than a final darkness. And I take strong stock in those 
> statements. I
> > think they mean something that needs to be investigated and 
> discerned.
> > 
> > And thank you for such a stimulating discussion of these important 
> issues. I am
> > very interested in hearing your response.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> > ====================================
> > 
> > > The last mind in a lifetime is the dying consciousness 
> (cuticittam), 
> > > which is, by the way, the finish line of `bhavanga cittam –
> > > the life-cause consciousness.' 
> > > 
> > > The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava 
> means 
> > > life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. Thus, 
> > > bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of 
> sentient 
> > > existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes the 
> > > sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient 
> > > existence.
> > > 
> > > On the death of a sentient being who hasn't attained Arahatta 
> > > awakening, the linking consciousness (patisandhi cittam) 
> immediately 
> > > follows the dying consciousness for a rebirth. Why immediately? 
> It is 
> > > because we can't suspend the bhavanga cittam in a limbo state.
> > > The linking consciousness is the start line of the life-cause 
> > > consciousness (bhavanga cittam) in a lifetime.
> > > 
> > > In other words, the difference between an Arahant and a non-
> Arahant 
> > > is the termination of the life-cause consciousness for the 
> Arahant 
> > > and the perpetuation of the life-cause consciousness for the non-
> > > Arahant.
> > > 
> > > An Arahant terminates the life-cause consciousness while ordinary 
> > > sentient beings perpetuate the life-cause consciousnesses.
> > > 
> > > The death of an Arahant is the termination of bhavanga cittam, 
> the 
> > > life-cause consciousness. In other words, the Parinibbaana of an 
> > > Arahant is the end of the sentient existence.
> > > 
> > > Robert Epstein also wrote:
> > > 
> > > "The idea of an underlying beingness or awareness that is however 
> > > totally disengaged from any experience does not seem to me to be 
> > > ruled out here."
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Robert's idea of an underlying beingness or awareness looks
> > > rather like an interpretation of the bhavanga cittam, the life-
> cause 
> > > consciousness.
> > > 
> > > If Robert meant to refer to the bhavanga cittam as an underlying 
> > > beingness or awareness, and regarded it as something that would 
> > > survive in parinibbaana after the death of an Arahant, he has my 
> > > sympathy, and I would not blame him. Why not?
> > > 
> > > Bhavanga cittam is the cool-down, resting state of the mind, so 
> it is 
> > > very tempting to equate nibbaana with a kind of perpetual 
> bhavanga 
> > > cittam. 
> > > 
> > > However, as we have analysed earlier above, the expression 
> > > `carimacittanirodhena – by termination of the last mind',
> > > did not help to indicate the survival of the bhavanga cittam in 
> > > parinibbaana on the death of an Arahant.
> > > 
> > > Contrary to Robert Epstein's ideas, termination of the bhavanga 
> > > cittam has ruled out any underlying beingness or awareness, I am 
> > > afraid.
> > > 
> > > Howard also wrote:
> > > 
> > > "Certainly, taken at face value, this commentary suggests
> > > parinibbana as a kind of nullity."
> > > 
> > > The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity of sentient 
> existence.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two Ends Here.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > With regards,
> > > 
> > > Suan Lu Zaw
> > > 
> > > http://www.bodhiology.org
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > PREVIOUSLY ON THIS LIST


	
10076

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 9:09pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 12/16/01 2:55:46 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Hi Howard.
> > One assumes that 'oneself' must be used conventionally, since we assume 
> > that
> > Buddha would not invoke the existence of a personal 'self'. It is clear 
> > that
> > 'oneself' must mean something, therefore it must be conventional use or 
> > else must
> > be the invocation of a personal self.
> > 
> > I agree that it is most likely conventional speech, but if that is the 
> > case, he is
> > basically giving prescriptions for behavior or pep talks for practitioners 
> > of a
> > certain level. This seems to me to undercut the notion that conventional 
> > effort
> > and exercise of will has no effect on the practitioner.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> =============================
> While I cannot give you the reference, I recall with certainty that 
> the Buddha stated in a sutta that he uses conventional language! If I can 
> find it, I will give you the reference. (I will bet the Robert K can provide 
> it.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

I don't doubt it. The reference would be interesting.

Robert Ep.


	
10077

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 9:52pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have
noticed.

Let's consider:
Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say
'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

and

Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say
'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

Premise A2: Form is not self.

Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form
be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form
be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1.
With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'.

Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form.
Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1' has
a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we replace
in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?)


Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions.
Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this
form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let this
form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
this form not be thus."
Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
this form not be thus."

Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self.

We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can reach
the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'.

Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However, Premise
B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that form
is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to the
explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'.

Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing more
than Conclusion A1'.

It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with
Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However,
what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both
Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self.

The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self."

Regards,
Victor



----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 10:54 PM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Still a little confusing Victor. One and self are used synomously, but
one, self
> and 'form' are not. It is not only whether the candidate 'form' can
control
> 'form' or not, but whether oneself can control form.
>
> Oneself may = self, but the identity of 'oneself' [or what the self
consists of]
> is never identified. Form is excluded as being 'self', but this does not
settle
> the question of what 'oneself', which remains undefined, refers to.
>
> Therefore I assume it is a conventional expression, referring to the
generally
> accepted concept of a 'person' for the sake of discussion.
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
>
> ====================
>
>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> >
> > Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as
> > pronouns.
> >
> > Please consider Argument A:
> > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say
> > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > Premise A2: Form is not self.
> > Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form
be
> > thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> >
> > Given
> > p: form is not self.
> > q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this
form
> > not be thus.'
> >
> > If p, then q.
> > p.
> > Therefore, q.
> >
> > Argument A is a valid argument.
> >
> >
> > Please consider Argument B
> > Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let
this
> > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus.
Let
> > this form not be thus."
> > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> >
> > Given
> > p: form is self.
> > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form
not
> > be thus.'
> >
> > If p, then q.
> > not q.
> > Therefore, not p.
> >
> > Argument B is also a valid argument.
> >
> >
> > Let's examine Argument C:
> > Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let
this
> > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus.
Let
> > this form not be thus."
> > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> >
> > Given
> > p: form is self.
> > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form
not
> > be thus.'
> > r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form
not
> > be thus."
> >
> > If p, then q.
> > not r.
> > Therefore, not p.
> >
> > Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q
and
> > statement r is.
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> >
>
	
10078

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 10:29pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Victor,
I more or less understand your logic here, but I don't see how it leads to the
conclusion that form is being posited as self. I think the 'oneself' in the
statement is an undisclosed identity. Which is what makes it conventional speech.

In any case, if you were right, and 'oneself' was really being implied to be the
same form that is being disqualified from being self, you would be saying that the
Buddha is making the equation, Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]. I assume you are not
claiming this. Or X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X.

Robert

=============

--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have
> noticed.
> 
> Let's consider:
> Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say
> 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> 
> and
> 
> Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say
> 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> 
> Premise A2: Form is not self.
> 
> Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form
> be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> 
> Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this form
> be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> 
> With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1.
> With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'.
> 
> Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form.
> Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1' has
> a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we replace
> in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?)
> 
> 
> Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions.
> Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let this
> form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let this
> form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> 
> Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
> this form not be thus."
> Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let
> this form not be thus."
> 
> Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self.
> 
> We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can reach
> the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'.
> 
> Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However, Premise
> B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that form
> is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to the
> explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'.
> 
> Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing more
> than Conclusion A1'.
> 
> It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with
> Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However,
> what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both
> Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self.
> 
> The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self."
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 10:54 PM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> 
> 
> > Still a little confusing Victor. One and self are used synomously, but
> one, self
> > and 'form' are not. It is not only whether the candidate 'form' can
> control
> > 'form' or not, but whether oneself can control form.
> >
> > Oneself may = self, but the identity of 'oneself' [or what the self
> consists of]
> > is never identified. Form is excluded as being 'self', but this does not
> settle
> > the question of what 'oneself', which remains undefined, refers to.
> >
> > Therefore I assume it is a conventional expression, referring to the
> generally
> > accepted concept of a 'person' for the sake of discussion.
> >
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> >
> > ====================
> >
> >
> > --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > > Hello Robert,
> > >
> > > Please note that both the term "one" and the term "self" are used as
> > > pronouns.
> > >
> > > Please consider Argument A:
> > > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say
> > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > > Premise A2: Form is not self.
> > > Conclusion: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form
> be
> > > thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > >
> > > Given
> > > p: form is not self.
> > > q: it is not possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this
> form
> > > not be thus.'
> > >
> > > If p, then q.
> > > p.
> > > Therefore, q.
> > >
> > > Argument A is a valid argument.
> > >
> > >
> > > Please consider Argument B
> > > Premise B1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let
> this
> > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > > Premise B2. It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus.
> Let
> > > this form not be thus."
> > > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> > >
> > > Given
> > > p: form is self.
> > > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form
> not
> > > be thus.'
> > >
> > > If p, then q.
> > > not q.
> > > Therefore, not p.
> > >
> > > Argument B is also a valid argument.
> > >
> > >
> > > Let's examine Argument C:
> > > Premise C1. If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let
> this
> > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > > Premise C2. It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus.
> Let
> > > this form not be thus."
> > > Conclusion: Therefore, form is not self.
> > >
> > > Given
> > > p: form is self.
> > > q: it is possible for form to say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form
> not
> > > be thus.'
> > > r: it is possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus. Let this form
> not
> > > be thus."
> > >
> > > If p, then q.
> > > not r.
> > > Therefore, not p.
> > >
> > > Argument C is an invalid argument. Please note how similar statement q
> and
> > > statement r is.
> > >
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Victor


	
10079

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 10:41pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Dear Howard,

I have print-outs of several of your posts in front of me and firstly I’d like
to say how much I enjoy all your refelctions. There are several I’ve wished to
comment on, but this last week has been really hectic. Yesterday I caught up on
some-much needed sleep after my last full day’s teaching on Saturday. After
today’s class, I may even be celebrating;-)

Anyway, I’ll just make a start (in a random order), maybe cut and paste and see
how it goes on this ‘Howard day’;-)

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all -
> 
> At any time (from the Abhidhamma perspective) there is a unique citta 
> functioning, along with all the associated cetasikas, and a unique arammana. 
> All previous cittas are nonexistent, and no future cittas have arisen. 
> Moreover, there is no "observer" in the backgound watching the flow of cittas
> 
> as an audience member watches the film frames on a screen. Yet, there is the 
> sense of continuity, flow, and change. 

All very well put, too.

>It seems to me that this can only be 
> due to the function of *memory*.

Memory (sa~n~na and thinking) are very important, but so are many other
phenomena in this process too, I think. (seeing, visible object, conctact,
concentration, attention and so on and so on and of course the 24 conditions.)

>There is then the question of whether the 
> content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for the 
> experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for the 
> memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta (else 
> such memories are already gone). In that case, it becomes important whether 
> or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, then 
> there is more than one arammana per citta. 

As I understand arammana (object), besides the 5 sense objects (visible object
and so on) this can also be dhammaaramma.na (mind-object) which can be a
concept or a reality (nama or rupa), past, present or future....For example, at
the moment of thinking, the thinking is real, but it thinks about a concept as
arammana. As you suggest, it’ll depend on memory (and other conditions) what
the story or concept is at any given moment and of course sanna is doing its
job of marking with every citta. Still, there is only one arammana at any
moment as object of any citta, regardless of whether it is visible object or
concept as object of thinking.

Of course, as we know, awareness can only be aware of realities and not of
concepts, so there can be awareness of thinking or visible object say, but not
of the concept.

>Side question: Does the principle 
> of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in the 
> commentaries? 

I believe both....Let me try to give a quote direct about object condition from
the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma (though I’d much
rather have given one from the Comentaries;-):

“ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element and its
associated states by object condition.

(and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to cetasikas,
I’m pretty sure,S.)

“ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness and mental
factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) states by
object condition.” PTS conditional Relations, p2
> 
From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the 6th
cognizable object that it consists of:

“......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 consciousness, 53
mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, materiality,
consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or future but
Nibbana and concept are time-freed.
So int this object condition there is no state that cannot be an object of
consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades the teaching
in the pali Canon.....”

Time to move on,

Sarah


	
10080

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 10:57pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Some Thoughts on Continuity, Blurs, and Cittas

 	
Dear Howard,

I thought there were many fine reflections and perceptive comments in your
excellent post below (retained in full as you posted it a while ago now).

I'd just a couple of 'modifications'...:

1.You refer in the middle to cittas and cetasikas (or mindstates) as 'complex
events'.....Doesn't 'event' suggest more than phenomena or momentary namas..?

2. At the end you suggest the theory about cittas and so on is only of use to
'the very advanced practitioner...' May I suggest, as others have, that again
it is not the labels in themselves that are important, but the beginning to
directly comprehend that what we take for self are these same cittas, cetaskas
and rupas, in other words the phenomena (I'm trying hard to avoid realities for
you, Howard;-) that experience an arammana and those phenomena which do not
experience an arammana. 

Whatever language we use, if there is no direct understanding of these
phenomena, then higher levels of wisdom which comprehend the impermanence and
passing nature of phenomena cannot be developed. in other words, the path has
to start 'right' from the very beginning.

3. I'm not so sure what the 'vast dynamic emptiness' in your last line is. As
mentioned in my last post, awareness can only be aware of specific phenomena
with characteristics. Surely, the above term is a concept rather than a citta,
cetasika or rupa?

Thanks for all the excellent points nonetheless;-))

Sarah

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all -
> 
> Some things have just occurred to me. Let's for the moment forget 
> about all the proposed details of cittas and cetasikas, and simply proceed 
> with informally accepting the general notion of cittas and cetasikas. 
> There is no observing self. At any moment, there is just the knowing 
> which is the function of the current citta, conditioned by all its cetasikas;
> 
> and the citta and all its accompaniments are conditioned by previous cittas 
> and their characteristics. This means that whatever is the current cognitive 
> state is a carrying forward of an infinite history of acts of cognition, of 
> cognitive events, with much of the transmitted information in the form of 
> "accumulations" or "seeds", at a subliminal level. Whatever seeming of 
> continuity there may be is held within each moment of knowing, and there is a
> 
> regular, lawful passing on of information, inclinations, and "flavors" from 
> mindstate to mindstate. These mindstates are not "things" in the substance 
> sense; they are complex events whose components are interdependently related 
> and all arising together in dependence on previous events, thus lacking in 
> independent existence or essence/core.
> What am I saying here? What I'm saying is that the citta theory, if 
> not interpreted in a substantialist/annihilationist manner is not 
> *necessarily* off the mark, and that there may be good reason for me to look 
> a bit more carefully at it; not so much at all of the specific details 
> necessarily, but definitely at the general thrust of the matter. Will I still
> 
> have problems with specifics, and especially with what I see as 
> substantialist and annihilationist tendencies? You bet I will! But I do find 
> myself a bit more accepting of the general framework than previously.
> A separate question is to what extent such a theory is useful or 
> necessary for Buddhist practice. I tend to think that given that the theory 
> is more than just theory, it will become useful only to the very advanced 
> practitioner whose insight is already well developed. What is most important 
> at all stages of the path, it seems to me, is not a microscopic, analytic 
> observation of various phenomena, let alone a mere intellectual encyclopedic 
> detailing of them, but rather, a direct knowing of all dhammas *as* 
> impermanent, unsatisfactory, impersonal, and without core. We need to *see 
> through* and let go of the world of apparently independent, self-existing 
> things, and awaken to a direct seeing of that vast dynamic emptiness which is
> 
> the way things are.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 


	
10081

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 11:00pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi Howard,

Really well-put here below.....thanks in full agreement;-)

(that was easy;-) S.

> ===========================
> ALL speech is conventional in the sense that it is a complex 
> convention tacitly agreed upon by people to use patterns of sounds in certain
> 
> ways. Moreover, built into those speech conventions are functionalities which
> 
> express our tendency towards reification, naming things as though they had 
> independent existence, and expressing a substantive subject-object dichotomy.
> 
> 
> However, it is possible to use speech in a way to *point* to the way 
> things actually are. When the Buddha did so, speaking of impermanence and 
> emptiness and nibbana, his speech can be called "non-conventional". Others, 
> such as Zen masters, have used speech in unconventional ways, often poetic, 
> to sidestep the reificationist core of language use, to point beyond our 
> concepts, and towards reality. But the only *truly* non-conventional grasp of
> 
> matters is done directly, and not through speech or concept.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 


	
10082

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 11:36pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually?

 	
Hi, Howard,

(still me, I’m afraid ;-) 

--- upasaka@a... wrote:>
==============================
> I've had a drop of experience in samatha bhavana, involving 
> concentration practice focusing the mind on a single meditation subject, and 
> also some practice in vipassana bhavana, involving what is sometimes called 
> moment-to-moment concentration practice. In my experience these types of 
> concentration are different, but, in their different ways, equally powerful. 
> In either of these cases, the concentration is, as you say, radically 
> different from "the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day 
> life through concentrating on random object arising through thes 
> sense-doors".

These are interesting comments and a lot more challenging for me to respond to
than your last post;-)

Firstly, as most people here know, ekaggata cetasika (one-pointedness,
concentration) arises at every moment with each citta. If it arises with a
wholesome citta, then it is also wholesome, but most of the time it is arising
with unwholesome cittas (with ignorance, attachment or aversion) or with vipaka
cittas (result of kamma).

At each wholesome moment, whether it is sila, dana or bhavana, we can say it is
a moment of samatha in that the consciousness is calm and free from
unwholesomeness. However, for it to be a moment of samatha or vipassana
bhavana, the consciousness must not only be wholesome but there must also be
panna (rt understanding) at the respective level which knows what the object
is.

As I was trying to suggest in the ‘metta’ thread, when there is concentration
on a single object or what you describe as ‘moment-to-moment concentration
practice’ is there not a ‘wish to concentrate’ and an attachment to a certain
result at these times? In other words, can we be sure the citta is really
wholesome at these moments? Is this really the way that samatha and vipassana
bhavana are developed?

d > The point of my post, however, was to inquire into the technical 
> question of what is actually occurring, at a microscopic level of detail, 
> when concentration has increased. My conjecture was that the switching back 
> and forth among various (instances of) objects from citta to citta to citta 
> typical of ordinary experience is reduced, in the extreme case to a single 
> object (or near-replicates identified as "the same object") which is the 
> arammana in mental process after mental process. 

Howard, I understand very well what you are mentioning and also understand your
experience on the Goenka retreat (I had a similar experience on a Goenka
retreat in India in the early 1970s).

Again, let me suggest that concentration can be of different levels and can
have any object. It is usually unwholesome, but occasionally accompanies a
wholesome citta. Whenever there is desire or intent to focus on a particular
object to get a certain result, I don’t believe it is skilful. The Goenka
experience and what I consider now to be the ‘unblocking of energy flows’ from
a more Chinese perspective is rather similar to a kind of ‘sweeping’
experienced in Tai Chi or after Tai Chi practice or whilst having acupuncture
which also works to ‘unblock’ the chi. I think it’s very, very useful, but
with all due respect I seriously question whether it has anything to do with
the development of right concentration as taught by the Buddha. 

Actually, it may seem at these times that there is a ‘single arammana’ of citta
after citta, but I think this is only because there is so little awareness of
other objects being experienced at these times such as the attachment or
aversion, the heat or cold, sounds and so on.

>Now, it seems almost certain 
> to me that such a curtailing of the diversity of objects of awareness, such 
> focusing and stabilization, is due to some functional characteristic or 
> cetasika within each mindstate becoming strengthened, in which case that 
> cetasika, itself, might be called "concentration". I am asking those who are 
> well versed in Abhidhamma what their understanding of the Abhidhamma "take" 
> is on this subject.

I’m not at all confident of qualifying here, but until someone more qualified
responds, my question would be why one would want to curtail ‘the diversity of
objects of awareness’? Isn’t this still a wish to find a short-cut and an idea
of self that can find one? As i understand it, the development of both samatha
and vipassana is the develpment of detachment and understanding. So while, what
you describe above, may include ‘strengthened’ concentration or certain objects
being more likely to be taken as arammana, my question would be whether this is
‘right’ concentration at either level.

OK, I’ll try to find one of your posts to agree with next, I think;-)

Sarah 

p.s Nina has a helpful chapter on concentration in 'Cetasikas', but I'm sure
you've read this and were not asking to have it re-quoted.
	
10083

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 16, 2001 11:40pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Howard,

a real Howard day..but I'm running out of time now:--- upasaka@a... wrote: 
> =============================
> While I cannot give you the reference, I recall with certainty that 
> the Buddha stated in a sutta that he uses conventional language! If I can 
> find it, I will give you the reference. (I will bet the Robert K can provide 
> it.)

DN9 recently quoted:

"These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common
use in the world, which the Perfect One uses without misapprehending them." See
also S.1.25 <from Nyantiloka dict>

S.


10084

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 0:02am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na

 	
OK Howard,

last one you'll be glad to hear;-)

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all -
> 
> Just a couple comments on some more musings of mine: As mindfulness 
> practice starts to bear fruit, one (they say! ;-) becomes quite aware of 
> beginnings and endings of mindstates, along with the observed object and the 
> accompanying cetasikas. 

Who says, I wonder?(no, not a pand q question, Victor, this time;-)

I would say, as panna and sati begin to develop, characteristics of realities
(sorry, but I'm speeding, Howard, so forgive any lack of niceties here) begin
to be apparent, one at a time and just occasionally in between all the usual
moha and the other 'junk'.

In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any awareness
of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes for an
understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual
understanding. In other words, when someone knows a painful sensation starts
or finishes, this isn't sati of satipatthana which is aware of a characteristic
as a nama or rupa at that moment. The changing sensations in Tai Chi (which
don't need a Buddha to explain) are not the highly developed panna as he
taught, either.

>Again, the question occurs as to *how* the beginnings
> 
> and endings are observed, because there is no observer standing back watching
> 
> the flow - each mindstate *is* "the observer". It occurs to me that the 
> answer lies in the meaning of 'sati', which literally means 'memory'. It 
> seems to me that via sati, each citta, besides observing its object, also has
> 
> a more or less clear memory of just-passed cittas. The presence of such fresh
> 
> memory together with the other content of the current citta constitutes a 
> "seeing" of change. This, then conditions subsequent cittas which involve 
> clear comprehension of that change, an instance of pa~n~na. It seems to me 
> that the memory aspect of sati is critical in all this. Thoughts, anyone?

OK, I agree that sati and panna are the key. The reason that it is taught (in
the Vism and texts) that the first stage is namarupa pariccheda-~nana ) is
because first panna and sati have to know different namas and rupas very very
precisely over and over again as those realities experiencing objects (seeing,
hearing, thinking and mental factors) and those realities which are only ever
experienced (sounds, tastes and so on). All are known as they are, as
conditioned phenomena and there is no confusion with concepts which cannot be
directly known. Only by understanding these phenomena, can the higher levels of
panna develop to know the arammana more deeply, more precisely and more about
the characteristics of them, such as the arising, 'staying' and falling away of
each.

Of course, memory is crucial in both right and wrong understanding, right and
wrong 'marking' and in making it possible to reflect on any understanding that
has or hasn't taken place.

This is rather (read very) rushed, so please let me know if it sounds garbled
and I'll try to do better later in the week.

Speak soon,
Sarah

	


10085

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 0:23am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> OK Howard,
> 
> last one you'll be glad to hear;-)
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all -
> > 
> > Just a couple comments on some more musings of mine: As mindfulness 
> > practice starts to bear fruit, one (they say! ;-) becomes quite aware of 
> > beginnings and endings of mindstates, along with the observed object and the 
> > accompanying cetasikas. 
> 
> Who says, I wonder?(no, not a pand q question, Victor, this time;-)
> 
> I would say, as panna and sati begin to develop, characteristics of realities
> (sorry, but I'm speeding, Howard, so forgive any lack of niceties here) begin
> to be apparent, one at a time and just occasionally in between all the usual
> moha and the other 'junk'.
> 
> In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any awareness
> of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes for an
> understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual
> understanding. In other words, when someone knows a painful sensation starts
> or finishes, this isn't sati of satipatthana which is aware of a characteristic
> as a nama or rupa at that moment. The changing sensations in Tai Chi (which
> don't need a Buddha to explain) are not the highly developed panna as he
> taught, either.
> 
> >Again, the question occurs as to *how* the beginnings
> > 
> > and endings are observed, because there is no observer standing back watching
> > 
> > the flow - each mindstate *is* "the observer". It occurs to me that the 
> > answer lies in the meaning of 'sati', which literally means 'memory'. It 
> > seems to me that via sati, each citta, besides observing its object, also has
> > 
> > a more or less clear memory of just-passed cittas. The presence of such fresh
> > 
> > memory together with the other content of the current citta constitutes a 
> > "seeing" of change. This, then conditions subsequent cittas which involve 
> > clear comprehension of that change, an instance of pa~n~na. It seems to me 
> > that the memory aspect of sati is critical in all this. Thoughts, anyone?
> 
> OK, I agree that sati and panna are the key. The reason that it is taught (in
> the Vism and texts) that the first stage is namarupa pariccheda-~nana ) is
> because first panna and sati have to know different namas and rupas very very
> precisely over and over again as those realities experiencing objects (seeing,
> hearing, thinking and mental factors) and those realities which are only ever
> experienced (sounds, tastes and so on). All are known as they are, as
> conditioned phenomena and there is no confusion with concepts which cannot be
> directly known. Only by understanding these phenomena, can the higher levels of
> panna develop to know the arammana more deeply, more precisely and more about
> the characteristics of them, such as the arising, 'staying' and falling away of
> each.
> 
> Of course, memory is crucial in both right and wrong understanding, right and
> wrong 'marking' and in making it possible to reflect on any understanding that
> has or hasn't taken place.
> 
> This is rather (read very) rushed, so please let me know if it sounds garbled
> and I'll try to do better later in the week.
> 
> Speak soon,
> Sarah

Hi Sarah.
Well I liked it! And, yes, I am typing in my sleep. [It's after 3 am here. See
you at 8! <g> ]

Best,
Robert Ep.

	
10086

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:02am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Howard

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> jonoabb@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with
> 'khandhas'. 
> > Must be that khandha day.
> > 
> ==============================
> Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring
> your 
> own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-))

I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same
pitiful standard!!).

Good advice. I'll see to it.

Jon

	
10087

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:03am
Subject: A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi all,

When I think I am having a moment of awareness, I am not aware of 
phenomena as they are, but I am aware of phenomena as they are not.
When the penny drops, I understand , this is not real. What I mean by 
that is: When the penny drops, I understand, that what I thought I 
was seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling (note five, not six 
senses) is not what is out there, in reality, but in here , as 
recreated by a complex series of interdependant processes, including 
stimuli from very real, but very unknowable rupas.

What exactly is a mental representation of a physical object but a 
mental object? What is my point? Rupas are not known as rupas, they 
are known as namas. Awareness can only be restricted to the content 
of the mind, the outside world is always an interpreted 
representation.

I read an interesting line the other day : "We live in a three pound 
universe, the brain". If anyone doubts it, a visit to a mental 
hospital or clinic for brain-injured people would be enlightening.

All the best


Herman
	
10088

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:16am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Mike

--- "m. nease" <mlnease@y...> wrote: > Jon,
> 
> I must agree with Howard--I see no pu*~n~na in this
> sort of thing whatever.

No pa~n~na, i think you mean Mike (and no merit either, for that matter!).

Jon

> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> > Hi, Jon -
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern
> > Standard Time, 
> > jonoabb@y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2
> > all deal with 'khandhas'. 
> > > Must be that khandha day.
> > > 
> > ==============================
> > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner,
> > commence monitoring your 
> > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this
> > sort!! ;-))
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard

	
10089

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:54am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

Please read Conclusion B carefully. I am not sure if you understand the
logic here.

I am not sure what you mean by "Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]."

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 1:29 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Victor,
> I more or less understand your logic here, but I don't see how it leads to
the
> conclusion that form is being posited as self. I think the 'oneself' in
the
> statement is an undisclosed identity. Which is what makes it conventional
speech.
>
> In any case, if you were right, and 'oneself' was really being implied to
be the
> same form that is being disqualified from being self, you would be saying
that the
> Buddha is making the equation, Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]. I assume you
are not
> claiming this. Or X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X.
>
> Robert
>
> =============
>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> >
> > It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have
> > noticed.
> >
> > Let's consider:
> > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say
> > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> >
> > and
> >
> > Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say
> > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> >
> > Premise A2: Form is not self.
> >
> > Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this
form
> > be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> >
> > Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this
form
> > be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> >
> > With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1.
> > With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'.
> >
> > Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form.
> > Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1'
has
> > a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we
replace
> > in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?)
> >
> >
> > Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions.
> > Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let
this
> > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let
this
> > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> >
> > Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus.
Let
> > this form not be thus."
> > Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus.
Let
> > this form not be thus."
> >
> > Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self.
> >
> > We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can
reach
> > the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'.
> >
> > Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However,
Premise
> > B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that
form
> > is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to
the
> > explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'.
> >
> > Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing
more
> > than Conclusion A1'.
> >
> > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with
> > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'.
However,
> > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B.
Both
> > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is
self.
> >
> > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self."
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> > To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> > Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2001 10:54 PM
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> >
> >
> > > Still a little confusing Victor. One and self are used synomously,
but
> > one, self
> > > and 'form' are not. It is not only whether the candidate 'form' can
> > control
> > > 'form' or not, but whether oneself can control form.
> > >
> > > Oneself may = self, but the identity of 'oneself' [or what the self
> > consists of]
> > > is never identified. Form is excluded as being 'self', but this does
not
> > settle
> > > the question of what 'oneself', which remains undefined, refers to.
> > >
> > > Therefore I assume it is a conventional expression, referring to the
> > generally
> > > accepted concept of a 'person' for the sake of discussion.
> > >
> > > Best,
> > > Robert Ep.
> > >
> > > ====================
	
10090

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Robert,

The terms "one", "oneself", "self" are all pronouns for designation. 
To make it more clearer, I will just use the term "self" in place 
of "one"

Please consider the questions:
Comparing Premise A1 and Premise A1', what is the difference between 
this two premises? In Premise A1', what is being replaced from 
Premise A1? 

Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to 
say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for self to 
say 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

How did you get the idea that I am claiming the Buddha is making the 
equation Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form] or I am claiming X(Y) = -X(Y), 
or X = -X?


Regards,
Victor


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> Victor,
> I more or less understand your logic here, but I don't see how it 
leads to the
> conclusion that form is being posited as self. I think 
the 'oneself' in the
> statement is an undisclosed identity. Which is what makes it 
conventional speech.
> 
> In any case, if you were right, and 'oneself' was really being 
implied to be the
> same form that is being disqualified from being self, you would be 
saying that the
> Buddha is making the equation, Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]. I 
assume you are not
> claiming this. Or X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X.
> 
> Robert
> 
> =============
> 
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> > 
> > It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you 
probably have
> > noticed.
> > 
> > Let's consider:
> > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form 
to say
> > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > 
> > and
> > 
> > Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one 
to say
> > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > 
> > Premise A2: Form is not self.
> > 
> > Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let 
this form
> > be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > 
> > Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let 
this form
> > be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > 
> > With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1.
> > With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'.
> > 
> > Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form.
> > Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, 
Premise A1' has
> > a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do 
we replace
> > in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?)
> > 
> > 
> > Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions.
> > Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to 
say 'Let this
> > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to 
say 'Let this
> > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > 
> > Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be 
thus. Let
> > this form not be thus."
> > Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be 
thus. Let
> > this form not be thus."
> > 
> > Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self.
> > 
> > We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we 
can reach
> > the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'.
> > 
> > Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However, 
Premise
> > B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, 
that form
> > is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in 
addition to the
> > explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'.
> > 
> > Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is 
nothing more
> > than Conclusion A1'.
> > 
> > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion 
B with
> > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. 
However,
> > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in 
Conclusion B. Both
> > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that 
form is self.
> > 
> > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self."
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
	
10091

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:58am
Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Robert


How are you? Thank you for your clarification on your understanding 
of the term "sentient".

However, I happened, and will continue, to use the term "sentient" 
and the expression "sentient existence" to mean any living organism, 
or a life form, which would be an equivalent Pali term "satta" or 
Vedic Sanskrit term "sattva". 

Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary defines the term "Satta" 
as a living being, creature, a sentient & rational being, a person. 
Please see column 1, page 673 in the dictionary. 

I also used the term "sentient existence" as the equivalent Pali 
term "bhava" or life.

I wrote the following in my Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part Two):

"The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava 
means life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. 
Thus, bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of 
sentient existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes 
the sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient 
existence."

Therefore, the meaning of the term "sentient" in my subcommentary is 
not limited to the five sensory consciousnesses only. In the language 
of abhidhamma, the expression "sentient existence" covers both the 
five sensory consciousnesses (pancadvaara viññaana) and the mental 
consciousness (manodvaara viññaana).

Thus, when I wrote "The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity 
of sentient existence." in my subcommentary, I meant that 
parinibbaana is free from any state of living being or any underlying 
beingness or awareness as you proposed.

Therefore, your arguments still need to take into consideration the 
meaning of the term "sentient existence" as used in my subcommentary 
in line with Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary.

Of course, I will consider your argumemts written from the 
perspective of the narrower limited meaning of the term "sentient" as 
sensory. I will also look forward to your arguments based on wider 
meaning of the term "sentient" covering both sensory and mental 
consciousnesses.

If I haven't answered them in my previous two parts of the 
subcommentary, I will respond to them in my subsequent 
subcommentaries. 

With regards,

Suan


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> Dear Suan,
> I did misread your comments to say 'sensual' rather than 'sensory' 
existence,
> which is very strange, because when I *read* it [I thought] I 
thought to myself
> 'well that is slightly odd, I'm sure he means the same as 
*sentient* existence,
> but in fact you didn't even write that. In any case, I assumed it 
meant something
> similar. Here is the dictionary on sentient: 
> 
> Having a faculty, or faculties, of sensation and perception.
> 
> and as a noun:
> 
> One who has the faculty of perception; a sentient being. 
> 
> In this context, that is what I assumed was meant by 'sensual', so 
in fact, my
> meaning in the argument below is exactly the same.
> 
> However, I apologize for misreading the word. And I look forward 
to your response
> when you have the chance.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ===================
> 
> --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Dear Robert
> > 
> > How are you? Thank you for your reply message.
> > 
> > I had a chance to read your reply just now. I missed my Internet 
> > sessions previous night due to technical problems in my ISP's 
servers.
> > 
> > You wrote:
> > 
> > "Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. 
Now 
> > to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous." 
> > 
> > Could you please check the spelling "sensual existence"?
> > 
> > In my post, I wrote "nullity of sentient existence", (not sensual 
> > existence).
> > 
> > So, if your arguments in the present post were based on "nullity 
of 
> > sensual existence", you now may need to rewrite your arguments 
based 
> > on "nullity of sentient existence."
> > 
> > I will read the rest of your present post, and other posts later. 
I 
> > am very sleepy now (2 a.m in Canberra).
> > 
> > With regards,
> > 
> > Suan
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
wrote:
> > > Dear Suan,
> > > Sorry to take so long to get back to you on this good 
subcommentary.
> > > My remarks are dispersed below:
> > > 
> > > --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > > > 
> > > > Dear Dhamma Friends
> > > > 
> > > > The following is the second part of Parinibbana Subcommentary 
> > written 
> > > > in response to the questions and statements of Upasaka 
Howard, 
> > Robert 
> > > > Epstein, and Mike Neace. In this second part of the 
> > subcommentary, I 
> > > > directly address the statements of Robert Epstein. Here, I 
also 
> > > > include the meaning of the last mind, which partly satisfies
> > > > Howard's desire to know the exact meaning of consciousness. 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 1. PARINIBBANA COMMENTARY PALI
> > > > 
> > > > "Parinibbutaa naama arahattapattito patthaaya 
kilesavattassa 
> > > > khepitattaa sa-upaadisesena, carimacittanirodhena 
> > khandhavattassa 
> > > > khepitattaa anupaadisesena caati dviihi 
parinibbaanehi 
> > > > parinibbutaa, anupaadaano viya padiipo apannattikabhaavaam 
> > gataati 
> > > > attho."
> > > > 
> > > > "`Parinibbutaa' is the ultimate cool by means of two-way 
complete 
> > > > extinguishments, one with the existential residues emptied of 
> > > > defilement machinery ever since attainment of Arahatta 
awakening, 
> > and 
> > > > the other without the existential residues emptied of 
> > psychophysical 
> > > > machinery by termination of the last mind (the dying 
> > consciousness). 
> > > > It has the meaning of reaching the state of the undefined 
reality 
> > > > like the lamp without fuel." 
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > Carimacittanirodho – termination of the last mind 
> > > > Apannattikabhaavo - the state of undefined reality
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > 2. PARINIBBANA SUBCOMMENTARY Part Two 

	
10092

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 3:47am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Mike -

In the following you inquire, first quoting me: 

> In that case, it
> becomes important whether 
> or not the content of a memory is considered an
> aramma.na, for if it is, then 
> there is more than one aramma.na per citta. 

Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept
(memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other
aarammana is present?
==============================
My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the 
current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, as 
different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current object 
with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or sati), 
and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be 
"present". If that is so - and to me it seems unavoidable, and if the 
remembered object is considered an arammana, then there are two arammanas 
present, the remembered one and the current one. Unless they are both present 
in mind, there is no way to compare. If both the previous object and its 
memory are gone, then the current citta does not know of that object!
Incidentally, subsequent to writing the post you quote below, I looked 
at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he also 
raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment of 
an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making here. 
(So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of how 
that effects the notion of one arammana per citta.
I have just re-thought the "unavoidablility" of the co-occurrence of 
the remembered object and the current. It *may* be avoidable after all, 
although I'm not at all certain on this issue. (Sorry to be doing my thinking 
"out loud", as it were.) One possibility that just occured to me is based on 
the time-sharing model: Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B is 
discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as 
condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" of 
the transition from object A to object B. This seems possible to me, thiugh a 
trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another currently 
observed object seems much simpler. However, what *is* the case is not always 
simpler than what one might imagine could be the case.
Just a clarification here with regard to my purpose in all this: I am 
neither trying to disprove nor vindicate Abhidhammic notions, but rather to 
understand them and their implications, to grasp the explanatory capability 
of Abhidhamma. The Buddha did say to accept something only after examining it 
and seeing that it accords with direct experience, and part of doing that is 
to see how it accounts for actual experience, not in a hand-waiving manner 
and not just by much use of Pali terms, but by really digging in and seeing 
what the implications are.

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/16/01 6:54:37 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> 
> Hi Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> 
> > At any time (from the Abhidhamma perspective)
> > there is a unique citta 
> > functioning, along with all the associated
> > cetasikas, and a unique arammana. 
> > All previous cittas are nonexistent, and no future
> > cittas have arisen. 
> > Moreover, there is no "observer" in the backgound
> > watching the flow of cittas 
> > as an audience member watches the film frames on a
> > screen. Yet, there is the 
> > sense of continuity, flow, and change. It seems to
> > me that this can only be 
> > due to the function of *memory*.There is then the
> > question of whether the 
> > content of a memory is considered to be an arammana
> > or not. In order for the 
> > experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary,
> > it seems to me, for the 
> > memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with
> > the current citta (else 
> > such memories are already gone). 
> 
> As I understand it, when a citta takes a memory as an
> aarammana, sa~n~naa remembers the aaramma.na (this
> citta is manovi~n~naa.na, which can take a concept as
> an aaramma.na). 
> 
> > In that case, it
> > becomes important whether 
> > or not the content of a memory is considered an
> > aramma.na, for if it is, then 
> > there is more than one aramma.na per citta. 
> 
> Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept
> (memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other
> aarammana is present?
> 
> > Side
> > question: Does the principle 
> > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma,
> > itself, or only in the 
> > commentaries?
> 
> Not sure about this, but I believe that the Theravaada
> considers some of the commentaries (those recited at
> the First Council) to be part of the Abhidhamma. I
> don't know if this idea occurs in the Abhidhamma
> outside the commentaries or not, though...
> 
> mike
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10093

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 4:12am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Sarah -

Thanks for the following. I don't see, however, where this implies 
only one object per citta. Where does it say that the object-relation is 
one-to-one?

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/17/01 1:42:08 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> >Side question: Does the principle 
> > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in the 
> 
> > commentaries? 
> 
> I believe both....Let me try to give a quote direct about object condition 
> from
> the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma (though I’d much
> rather have given one from the Comentaries;-):
> 
> “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element and its
> associated states by object condition.
> 
> (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to 
> cetasikas,
> I’m pretty sure,S.)
> 
> “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness and mental
> factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) states 
> by
> object condition.� PTS conditional Relations, p2
> > 
> From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the 6th
> cognizable object that it consists of:
> 
> “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 consciousness, 53
> mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, materiality,
> consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or future 
> but
> Nibbana and concept are time-freed.
> So int this object condition there is no state that cannot be an object of
> consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades the 
> teaching
> in the pali Canon.....�
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10094

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 4:24am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Some Thoughts on Continuity, Blurs, and Cittas

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/17/01 1:57:44 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> Dear Howard,
> 
> I thought there were many fine reflections and perceptive comments in your
> excellent post below (retained in full as you posted it a while ago now).
> 
> I'd just a couple of 'modifications'...:
> 
> 1.You refer in the middle to cittas and cetasikas (or mindstates) as 
> 'complex
> events'.....Doesn't 'event' suggest more than phenomena or momentary 
> namas..?
> 
------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Well, I don't know. I should think that the discerning of an object 
constitutes an event.
-------------------------------------------------

> 
> 2. At the end you suggest the theory about cittas and so on is only of use 
> to
> 'the very advanced practitioner...' May I suggest, as others have, that 
> again
> it is not the labels in themselves that are important, but the beginning to
> directly comprehend that what we take for self are these same cittas, 
> cetaskas
> and rupas, in other words the phenomena (I'm trying hard to avoid realities 
> for
> you, Howard;-) that experience an arammana and those phenomena which do not
> experience an arammana. 
> 
> Whatever language we use, if there is no direct understanding of these
> phenomena, then higher levels of wisdom which comprehend the impermanence 
> and
> passing nature of phenomena cannot be developed. in other words, the path 
> has
> to start 'right' from the very beginning.
> 
-------------------------------------------------
Howard:
My point was that given that the Abhidhammic notions are correct, they 
only become particularly useful when one's vipassana bhavana has proceeded to 
the level at which there can be direct experiencing of the phenomena detailed 
in Abhidhamma. Then it serves as a guidebook or map, but before that it is 
just interesting theory.
-------------------------------------------------

> 
> 3. I'm not so sure what the 'vast dynamic emptiness' in your last line is. 
> As
> mentioned in my last post, awareness can only be aware of specific 
> phenomena
> with characteristics. Surely, the above term is a concept rather than a 
> citta,
> cetasika or rupa?
> 
------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Consider my words to be a feeble attempt to guess at the mind of an 
arahant.
-----------------------------------------------------

> 
> Thanks for all the excellent points nonetheless;-))
> 
> Sarah
=============================
With metta,
Howard



/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10095

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:12am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually?

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/17/01 2:38:11 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> Hi, Howard,
> 
> (still me, I’m afraid ;-) 
--------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Always a pleasure, Sarah. :-)
--------------------------------------------------

> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:>
> ==============================
> > I've had a drop of experience in samatha bhavana, involving 
> > concentration practice focusing the mind on a single meditation subject, 
> and 
> > also some practice in vipassana bhavana, involving what is sometimes 
> called 
> > moment-to-moment concentration practice. In my experience these types of 
> > concentration are different, but, in their different ways, equally 
> powerful. 
> > In either of these cases, the concentration is, as you say, radically 
> > different from "the normal sort of samadhi that (may) arise in day-to-day 
> 
> > life through concentrating on random object arising through thes 
> > sense-doors".
> 
> These are interesting comments and a lot more challenging for me to respond 
> to
> than your last post;-)
> 
> Firstly, as most people here know, ekaggata cetasika (one-pointedness,
> concentration) arises at every moment with each citta. If it arises with a
> wholesome citta, then it is also wholesome, but most of the time it is 
> arising
> with unwholesome cittas (with ignorance, attachment or aversion) or with 
> vipaka
> cittas (result of kamma).
> 
> At each wholesome moment, whether it is sila, dana or bhavana, we can say 
> it is
> a moment of samatha in that the consciousness is calm and free from
> unwholesomeness. However, for it to be a moment of samatha or vipassana
> bhavana, the consciousness must not only be wholesome but there must also 
> be
> panna (rt understanding) at the respective level which knows what the 
> object
> is.
> 
> As I was trying to suggest in the ‘metta’ thread, when there is 
> concentration
> on a single object or what you describe as ‘moment-to-moment concentration
> practice’ is there not a ‘wish to concentrate’ and an attachment to a 
> certain
> result at these times?
----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
There are virtually always wishes for one thing or another. If we wait 
for no wishes we will wait forever!
----------------------------------------------------------

In other words, can we be sure the citta is really> 
> wholesome at these moments?
---------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
We can rarely be much sure of anything! The more carefully we look, 
with mindfulness and concentration, the greater the chance of having some 
certainty.
---------------------------------------------------------

Is this really the way that samatha and vipassana> 
> bhavana are developed?
---------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Calm created by observing sila supports concentration. Concentration 
is cultivated by concentrating. The more concentration (on an appropriate 
object), the more calm, and the more calm, the less craving and the greater 
concentration. These all feed into each other. I know this by having done it. 
Insight comes from clear seeing. Calm and concentration support the 
cultivation of insight, and insight supports calm and concentration. Again, I 
have directly seen this.
---------------------------------------------------------

> 
> d > The point of my post, however, was to inquire into the technical 
> 
> > question of what is actually occurring, at a microscopic level of detail, 
> 
> > when concentration has increased. My conjecture was that the switching 
> back 
> > and forth among various (instances of) objects from citta to citta to 
> citta 
> > typical of ordinary experience is reduced, in the extreme case to a 
> single 
> > object (or near-replicates identified as "the same object") which is the 
> > arammana in mental process after mental process. 
> 
> Howard, I understand very well what you are mentioning and also understand 
> your
> experience on the Goenka retreat (I had a similar experience on a Goenka
> retreat in India in the early 1970s).
> 
> Again, let me suggest that concentration can be of different levels and can
> have any object. It is usually unwholesome, but occasionally accompanies a
> wholesome citta. Whenever there is desire or intent to focus on a 
> particular
> object to get a certain result, I don’t believe it is skilful.
> 
------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
If one gets hung up on results while meditating, there won't be any. 
But the reason for meditating to begin with is the DESIRE to purify the mind. 
We begin where we are, not where we might *like* to be.
------------------------------------------------------------
The Goenka> 
> experience and what I consider now to be the ‘unblocking of energy flows’ 
> from
> a more Chinese perspective is rather similar to a kind of ‘sweeping’
> experienced in Tai Chi or after Tai Chi practice or whilst having 
> acupuncture
> which also works to ‘unblock’ the chi. I think it’s very, very useful, 
> but
> with all due respect I seriously question whether it has anything to do 
> with
> the development of right concentration as taught by the Buddha. 
> 
---------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Well, when engaged in such meditation, one is being mindful of the 
body and of sensation, as well as reactions (sankhara) and thoughts, and ones 
mindfulness, calm, and concentration become *very* strong. That doesn't 
strike me as half bad! ;-)) Incidentally, I have had "fallout" from my Goenka 
retreat, in terms of insight and in terms of dealing with adversity, that has 
been of *inestimable* value!
------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Actually, it may seem at these times that there is a ‘single arammana’ of 
> citta
> after citta, but I think this is only because there is so little awareness 
> of
> other objects being experienced at these times such as the attachment or
> aversion, the heat or cold, sounds and so on.
> 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Well, I think that reduction to a *single* arammana in citta after 
citta is an extreme of concentration. It occurs, if things go well, in 
samatha meditation, but not in vipassana meditation. I think that, most 
generally, concentration consists of a *reduction* of the number of different 
arammanas. It is a focussing of some degree. BTW, it is my experience that 
during a period of really deep concentration, both craving and aversion are 
suppressed - are temporarily inactive.
---------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> >Now, it seems almost certain 
> > to me that such a curtailing of the diversity of objects of awareness, 
> such 
> > focusing and stabilization, is due to some functional characteristic or 
> > cetasika within each mindstate becoming strengthened, in which case that 
> > cetasika, itself, might be called "concentration". I am asking those who 
> are 
> > well versed in Abhidhamma what their understanding of the Abhidhamma 
> "take" 
> > is on this subject.
> 
> I’m not at all confident of qualifying here, but until someone more 
> qualified
> responds, my question would be why one would want to curtail ‘the diversity 
> of
> objects of awareness’? Isn’t this still a wish to find a short-cut and an 
> idea
> of self that can find one? As i understand it, the development of both 
> samatha
> and vipassana is the develpment of detachment and understanding. So while, 
> what
> you describe above, may include ‘strengthened’ concentration or certain 
> objects
> being more likely to be taken as arammana, my question would be whether 
> this is
> ‘right’ concentration at either level.
> 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Concentration, right or wrong, is a focussing. Such focussing on one 
object, or on a small number of objects, when relatively free of hindrances, 
leads to calm and increased clarity, it and also makes investigation easier. 
Without such focussing, the mind is distracted.
-------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> OK, I’ll try to find one of your posts to agree with next, I think;-)
> 
> Sarah 
> 
> p.s Nina has a helpful chapter on concentration in 'Cetasikas', but I'm 
> sure
> you've read this and were not asking to have it re-quoted.
===============================
Thanks for your reply, Sarah.

With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10096

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/17/01 2:41:31 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> 
> Howard,
> 
> a real Howard day..but I'm running out of time now:--- upasaka@a... 
> wrote: 
> > =============================
> > While I cannot give you the reference, I recall with certainty 
> that 
> > the Buddha stated in a sutta that he uses conventional language! If I can 
> 
> > find it, I will give you the reference. (I will bet the Robert K can 
> provide 
> > it.)
> 
> DN9 recently quoted:
> 
> "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in 
> common
> use in the world, which the Perfect One uses without misapprehending them." 
> See
> also S.1.25 <from Nyantiloka dict>
> 
> S.
> 
=============================
Thank you! YES!! This is exactly what I had in mind!

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10097

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:24am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In part of the following you write:

> In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any 
> awareness
> of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes 
> for an
> understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual
> understanding. 
=========================
This I DO NOT GET! As I understand it, the essence of wisdom (short of 
path and fruition consciousness) is the direct apprehension of the three 
characteristics of anicca, dukkha, and anatta.

With metta,
Howard


In a message dated 12/17/01 3:02:28 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> 
> OK Howard,
> 
> last one you'll be glad to hear;-)
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all -
> > 
> > Just a couple comments on some more musings of mine: As 
> mindfulness 
> > practice starts to bear fruit, one (they say! ;-) becomes quite aware of 
> > beginnings and endings of mindstates, along with the observed object and 
> the 
> > accompanying cetasikas. 
> 
> Who says, I wonder?(no, not a pand q question, Victor, this time;-)
> 
> I would say, as panna and sati begin to develop, characteristics of 
> realities
> (sorry, but I'm speeding, Howard, so forgive any lack of niceties here) 
> begin
> to be apparent, one at a time and just occasionally in between all the 
> usual
> moha and the other 'junk'.
> 
> In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any 
> awareness
> of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes 
> for an
> understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual
> understanding. In other words, when someone knows a painful sensation 
> starts
> or finishes, this isn't sati of satipatthana which is aware of a 
> characteristic
> as a nama or rupa at that moment. The changing sensations in Tai Chi (which
> don't need a Buddha to explain) are not the highly developed panna as he
> taught, either.
> 
> >Again, the question occurs as to *how* the beginnings
> > 
> > and endings are observed, because there is no observer standing back 
> watching
> > 
> > the flow - each mindstate *is* "the observer". It occurs to me that the 
> > answer lies in the meaning of 'sati', which literally means 'memory'. It 
> > seems to me that via sati, each citta, besides observing its object, also 
> has
> > 
> > a more or less clear memory of just-passed cittas. The presence of such 
> fresh
> > 
> > memory together with the other content of the current citta constitutes a 
> 
> > "seeing" of change. This, then conditions subsequent cittas which involve 
> 
> > clear comprehension of that change, an instance of pa~n~na. It seems to 
> me 
> > that the memory aspect of sati is critical in all this. Thoughts, anyone?
> 
> OK, I agree that sati and panna are the key. The reason that it is taught 
> (in
> the Vism and texts) that the first stage is namarupa pariccheda-~nana ) is
> because first panna and sati have to know different namas and rupas very 
> very
> precisely over and over again as those realities experiencing objects 
> (seeing,
> hearing, thinking and mental factors) and those realities which are only 
> ever
> experienced (sounds, tastes and so on). All are known as they are, as
> conditioned phenomena and there is no confusion with concepts which cannot 
> be
> directly known. Only by understanding these phenomena, can the higher 
> levels of
> panna develop to know the arammana more deeply, more precisely and more 
> about
> the characteristics of them, such as the arising, 'staying' and falling 
> away of
> each.
> 
> Of course, memory is crucial in both right and wrong understanding, right 
> and
> wrong 'marking' and in making it possible to reflect on any understanding 
> that
> has or hasn't taken place.
> 
> This is rather (read very) rushed, so please let me know if it sounds 
> garbled
> and I'll try to do better later in the week.
> 
> Speak soon,
> Sarah
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10098

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:28am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard,

<<< There is then the question of whether the 
content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for the 
experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for the 
memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta (else 
such memories are already gone).

In that case, it becomes important whether 
or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, then 
there is more than one arammana per citta. >>>


Let me put in my two cent worth comments. As I understand, the sanna and 
citta in the same citta always have the same aramma. From the 4 characters 
of things, sanna manifest as registration (marking), retention, retrieval and 
recall. Citta is a leader in knowing and sanna is a leader in its subset of 
function. Sanna can mark and register pretty much every aramma paramattha, 
pannatti and from my reading nibbhana.


<<< My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the 
current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, as 
different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current object 

with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or sati), 

and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be 
"present". >>>


I don't know to me sanna is different from sati, sati is an awareness and 
sanna is a mark. Sati is aware of nama or rupa, sanna marks and registers it 
(nama or rupa), at the same time citta leads a role of knowing it all.


<<<<Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B is 
discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as 
condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" of 
the transition from object A to object B. This seems possible to me, thiugh a 

trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another currently 
observed object seems much simpler.>>>>>


Well, seemed to be this a long long complicated process both in sense of 
dhamma or neurocircuitry. ( I don't know I personally prefer to call 
abhidhamma as dhamma, to me it the same thing, thing that is going on in 
daily life, dhamma is complicate and hard to see, so is abhidhamma. Who sees 
dhamma sees abhidhamma as well, I think :) ) Sanna does its function by 
basically marking. Sanna marks everything paramattha (citta, cetasika, rupa 
and nibbhana), samuha-sanna (grouping or mass), atta-sanna(entity, 
aggregation-->kaya or self( roots from the previous two)), attha-sanna(memory 
of meaning), nama-sanna(memory of name) and so on.... So besides paramattha 
sanna marks pannatti.

Just my thought, when citta has sanna as an arammana, sanna marks the 
previous sanna as its objects as well. To compare or see the change of thing 
needs a lot of coordination between citta(vinnana-khandha), 
sanna(sanna-khandha), vedana(vedana-khandha), other 
cetasikas(sakhara-khandha) as well as rupa(rupa-khandha) at times. I think 
much later citta does the function of recognition of the difference or the 
meaning. Well, seem to me that this is an extremely rapid and complicated 
process.

Just my thought,


Num
	
10099

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 5:47am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 12/17/01 6:03:31 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same
> pitiful standard!!).
===========================
Always good to keep our standards low, Jon. Much easier to attain that way! 
;-))

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10100

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:39am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Howard
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > jonoabb@y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > 
> > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with
> > 'khandhas'. 
> > > Must be that khandha day.
> > > 
> > ==============================
> > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring
> > your 
> > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-))
> 
> I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same
> pitiful standard!!).
> 
> Good advice. I'll see to it.
>
Aiiiieeeeee! I just got it!!

It's skandhalous as we say in Maha neck of the woods.

Robert Ep.



	
10101

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:42am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> When I think I am having a moment of awareness, I am not aware of 
> phenomena as they are, but I am aware of phenomena as they are not.
> When the penny drops, I understand , this is not real. What I mean by 
> that is: When the penny drops, I understand, that what I thought I 
> was seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling (note five, not six 
> senses) is not what is out there, in reality, but in here , as 
> recreated by a complex series of interdependant processes, including 
> stimuli from very real, but very unknowable rupas.

Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about a week ago,
but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What makes a 'rupa'
'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a sensory/mental process?

Robert Ep.

PS. I apologize in advance if this has already been explained to me and I've
forgotten. I do have a slight feeling of deja vu.

=======================

> What exactly is a mental representation of a physical object but a 
> mental object? What is my point? Rupas are not known as rupas, they 
> are known as namas. Awareness can only be restricted to the content 
> of the mind, the outside world is always an interpreted 
> representation.
> 
> I read an interesting line the other day : "We live in a three pound 
> universe, the brain". If anyone doubts it, a visit to a mental 
> hospital or clinic for brain-injured people would be enlightening.
> 
> All the best
> 
> 
> Herman


	
10102

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:44am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> Please read Conclusion B carefully. I am not sure if you understand the
> logic here.
> 
> I am not sure what you mean by "Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]."

Well, I will admit to being equally uncertain about your equations! <g> It would
be more helpful to me at this point if you would discuss them in sentences rather
than in mathematical variables.

Best,
Robert Ep.



> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 1:29 AM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)
> 
> 
> > Victor,
> > I more or less understand your logic here, but I don't see how it leads to
> the
> > conclusion that form is being posited as self. I think the 'oneself' in
> the
> > statement is an undisclosed identity. Which is what makes it conventional
> speech.
> >
> > In any case, if you were right, and 'oneself' was really being implied to
> be the
> > same form that is being disqualified from being self, you would be saying
> that the
> > Buddha is making the equation, Self[Form] = Not-Self[Form]. I assume you
> are not
> > claiming this. Or X(Y) = -X(Y), or X = -X.
> >
> > Robert
> >
> > =============
> >
> > --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > > Hello Robert,
> > >
> > > It is confusing, and there is a very subtle point that you probably have
> > > noticed.
> > >
> > > Let's consider:
> > > Premise A1: If form is not self, then it is not possible for form to say
> > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > >
> > > and
> > >
> > > Premise A1': If form is not self, then it is not possible for one to say
> > > 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > >
> > > Premise A2: Form is not self.
> > >
> > > Conclusion A1: Therefore, it is not possible for form to say 'Let this
> form
> > > be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > >
> > > Conclusion A1': Therefore, it is not possible for one to say 'Let this
> form
> > > be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > >
> > > With Premise A1 and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1.
> > > With Premise A1' and Premise A2, we have Conclusion A1'.
> > >
> > > Conclusion A1' is basically saying that one can not control form.
> > > Premise A1 is true. Premise A1' seems to be true. However, Premise A1'
> has
> > > a very subtle, implicit assumption that form is self. (what do we
> replace
> > > in Premise A1 to make Premise A1'?)
> > >
> > >
> > > Let's consider another set of premises and conclusions.
> > > Premise B1: If form is self, then it is possible for form to say 'Let
> this
> > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > > Premise B1': If form is self, then it is possible for one to say 'Let
> this
> > > form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'
> > >
> > > Premise B2: It is not possible for form to say ''Let this form be thus.
> Let
> > > this form not be thus."
> > > Premise B2': It is not possible for one to say ''Let this form be thus.
> Let
> > > this form not be thus."
> > >
> > > Conclusion B: Therefore, form is not self.
> > >
> > > We can reach Conclusion B with Premise B1 and Premise B2, or we can
> reach
> > > the same Conclusion B with Premise B1' and Premise B2'.
> > >
> > > Premise B1 is true. Premise B1' seems to be very true. However,
> Premise
> > > B1' has the same subtle, implicit assumption as Premise A1' does, that
> form
> > > is self. This implicit assumption is what we would make in addition to
> the
> > > explicit assumption "form is self" in Premise B1'.
> > >
> > > Premise B2 is nothing more than Conclusion A1. Premise B2' is nothing
> more
> > > than Conclusion A1'.
> > >
> > > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with
> > > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'.
> However,
> > > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B.
> Both
> > > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is
> self.
> > >
> > > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self."
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Victor
> > >
> > >
> > >


	
10103

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:44am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What is Concentration Actually?

 	
Hi, Sarah (and all) -

In a message dated 12/17/01 1:14:24 PM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... 
writes:


> Concentration, right or wrong, is a focussing. Such focussing on one 
> object, or on a small number of objects, when relatively free of 
> hindrances, 
> leads to calm and increased clarity, it and also makes investigation 
> easier. 
> 
======================
Wow! How dyslexic can I get? When I wrote "it and" near the end of the 
2nd sentence, I should have written "and it". Sorry.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	

10105

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:51am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Thanks for this, Num. It seems that in your last paragraph you are 
somewhat giving assent to my "citta & object A, citta & object B, and citta 
C" scenario. Am I correct in that assessment?

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/17/01 1:28:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, srnsk@a... 
writes:


> Hi Howard,
> 
> <<< There is then the question of whether the 
> content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for 
> the 
> experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for the 
> 
> memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta 
> (else 
> such memories are already gone).
> 
> In that case, it becomes important whether 
> or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is, 
> then 
> there is more than one arammana per citta. >>>
> 
> 
> Let me put in my two cent worth comments. As I understand, the sanna and 
> citta in the same citta always have the same aramma. From the 4 characters 
> 
> of things, sanna manifest as registration (marking), retention, retrieval 
> and 
> recall. Citta is a leader in knowing and sanna is a leader in its subset 
> of 
> function. Sanna can mark and register pretty much every aramma paramattha, 
> 
> pannatti and from my reading nibbhana.
> 
> 
> <<< My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the 
> current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, 
> as 
> different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current 
> object 
> 
> with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or 
> sati), 
> 
> and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be 
> "present". >>>
> 
> 
> I don't know to me sanna is different from sati, sati is an awareness and 
> sanna is a mark. Sati is aware of nama or rupa, sanna marks and registers 
> it 
> (nama or rupa), at the same time citta leads a role of knowing it all.
> 
> 
> <<<<Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B is 
> discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as 
> condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" of 
> 
> the transition from object A to object B. This seems possible to me, thiugh 
> a 
> 
> trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another currently 
> 
> observed object seems much simpler.>>>>>
> 
> 
> Well, seemed to be this a long long complicated process both in sense of 
> dhamma or neurocircuitry. ( I don't know I personally prefer to call 
> abhidhamma as dhamma, to me it the same thing, thing that is going on in 
> daily life, dhamma is complicate and hard to see, so is abhidhamma. Who 
> sees 
> dhamma sees abhidhamma as well, I think :) ) Sanna does its function by 
> basically marking. Sanna marks everything paramattha (citta, cetasika, rupa 
> 
> and nibbhana), samuha-sanna (grouping or mass), atta-sanna(entity, 
> aggregation-->kaya or self( roots from the previous two)), 
> attha-sanna(memory 
> of meaning), nama-sanna(memory of name) and so on.... So besides 
> paramattha 
> sanna marks pannatti.
> 
> Just my thought, when citta has sanna as an arammana, sanna marks the 
> previous sanna as its objects as well. To compare or see the change of 
> thing 
> needs a lot of coordination between citta(vinnana-khandha), 
> sanna(sanna-khandha), vedana(vedana-khandha), other 
> cetasikas(sakhara-khandha) as well as rupa(rupa-khandha) at times. I think 
> 
> much later citta does the function of recognition of the difference or the 
> meaning. Well, seem to me that this is an extremely rapid and complicated 
> 
> process.
> 
> Just my thought,
> 
> 
> Num
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10106

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 1:25pm
Subject: what/who control what?

 	
Hello Robert and all,

Thank you for putting up with my tendency to put thing in a more 
abstract form. I will try not to use too many symbols.

First, one can control oneself. In other words, one can exercise 
self-control. There is a profound ethical and spiritual implication 
to self-control. With self-control, one can refrain from the 
unskillful. By refraining from the unskillful, one refrains from 
harming oneself. With self-control, one can strive and make an 
effort to attain the cessation of dukkha.

Secondly, form is not self implies that it is not possible for form 
not to lend itself to dis-ease. In other words:
Precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. 
Precisely because form is not self, form cannot control itself in the 
sense that it always lends itself to dis-ease.

HOWEVER,
form is not self DOES NOT imply that it is not possible for self not 
to lend form to dis-ease, NOR does it imply it is possible for self 
not to lend form to dis-ease.

In other words,
form cannot control itself DOES NOT imply self cannot control form, 
NOR does it imply self can control form. Why? Because form is not 
self. 

Form (or any other aggregate) cannot control itself. Why identify 
with form (or any other aggregate) by saying "one cannot control form 
(or any other aggregate)"? Why identify with form (or any other 
aggregate) by saying "one cannot control oneself"?


Regards,
Victor
	
10107

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 9:37am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard,

> It seems that in your last paragraph you are 
> somewhat giving assent to my "citta & object A, citta & object B, and citta 
> 
> C" scenario. Am I correct in that assessment?
> 

May I also say "somewhat" :) . I am not so clear of what did you try to say.

Num


10108

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:41pm
Subject: Fwd: Re: Another Question on Rebirth/Reincarnation

 	
--- In dhamma-list@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" 
<robertkirkpatrick@r...> wrote:
--- In dhamma-list@y..., Christian Patton <laughingcrane@y...> wrote:
> Dear list,
> > A lot of the stories I read about the Buddha have him
> remain silent regarding 'frivolous' (unanswerable,
> outside the realm of knowledge) questions. He also
> seems to place a great deal on experience and has a
> fairly scientific outlook (in the sense that something
> could be repeated over and over with the same
> results). With these two impressions, how can we
> really and truly 'know' that there is rebirth? It
> seems to have quite a large degree of faith involved.
> This is not necessarily a bad thing, just not
> scientific. The Eightfold Path seems to be an
> ++++++++++
Dear Christian,
Let us take a 'scientific' look at what you say. Can we know that 
the sun will arise tommorow? (Or in scientific terms keep going 
around the sun). Can science prove that 'gravity' will keep working? 
Maybe tonight it reverses and the earth flies out into space? I think 
science can't prove otherwise. 
You see scientists make huge assumptions on all sorts of things; 
primarily they assume that the universe follows certain laws that 
worked in the past and will continue to hold in the future. 
The Buddha, so his followers think, saw into the laws of the universe 
in a much deeper way than science. He claims that these laws are 
valid at all times and in all places: that all that arises by 
conditions ceases when those conditions cease. 
It is said that those who develop insight into what the Buddha taught 
can see that indeed it is because of certain conditions that this 
arises and because of other conditions that that arises. That 
craving, for instance, is a powerful force that provides the motor 
for future becoming and that this can be realised here and now.
If that stage is reached one would find it as likely that this 
process of becoming ceased at physical death - if that craving has 
not being utterly quenched- as for the sun, moon and stars to 
suddenly fall from the heavens as gravity fails.
But as you indicate it can't be absolutely proven that this won't 
happen, we go on faith.

robert
--- End forwarded message ---
	
10109

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 8:15pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Dear Rob Ep, Jon, Howard & Mike,


> > > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with
> > > 'khandhas'. 
> > > > Must be that khandha day.
> > > > 
> > > ==============================
> > > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring
> > > your 
> > > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-))
> > 
> > I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same
> > pitiful standard!!).
> > 
> > Good advice. I'll see to it.
> >
> Aiiiieeeeee! I just got it!!
> 
> It's skandhalous as we say in Maha neck of the woods.
> 
> Robert Ep.


At this rate we'll have to pack you guys off to Khandha-ha!

"What for?", you may ask.

"Oh...Samma hunting" would be my reply.

Egberdina's friend 
(a.k.a Sarah)

p.s apologies to all the other members and lurkers on dsg who may find too much
nitty-ditthi here for your rupees;-))


	
10110

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 9:13pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Dear Victor,

I have to admit I’m pretty lost at this point too....

--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > 
> It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with
> Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However,
> what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both
> Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self.
> 
> The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self."

I’m hoping to get back to discussing the Mulapariyaya sutta with you when I’ve
caught up. I’m just wondering, however, if you aren’t suggesting here that
while all the khandhas are not self and so on, that there is some other self
outside these which controls them? I may very well have misunderstood you, for
which I apologise if so. All that actually exists, as we’re told over and over
again, are the 5khandhas, all of which are anatta. So if there is any other
control or oneself or self, surely this is just a figment of the imagination? 

I’ll try to look at your other posts more closely in the next few days, but the
relief of having no students for a couple of weeks is having a bad effect
meanwhile as you’ll have seen from my last post and the following sign-off
which I hope doesn’t cause any offence;-)


Self=One -1 +Ax2 less elf + p +q +r (-p-q) not= +(h)= SARAH 


	
10111

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 4:50pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 12/17/01 2:43:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about a week 
> ago,
> but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What makes a 
> 'rupa'
> 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a sensory/mental 
> process?
> 
> Robert Ep.
> 
========================
A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory 
discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while it 
and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, neither is 
compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but also 
of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of 
consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR mental, 
but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed by 
mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my 
understanding. 

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10112

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Dear Robert
> 
> 
> How are you? Thank you for your clarification on your understanding 
> of the term "sentient".
> 
> However, I happened, and will continue, to use the term "sentient" 
> and the expression "sentient existence" to mean any living organism, 
> or a life form, which would be an equivalent Pali term "satta" or 
> Vedic Sanskrit term "sattva". 
> 
> Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary defines the term "Satta" 
> as a living being, creature, a sentient & rational being, a person. 
> Please see column 1, page 673 in the dictionary. 
> 
> I also used the term "sentient existence" as the equivalent Pali 
> term "bhava" or life.

I have no problem with your definition of 'sentient being', since it accords with
my understanding as well. I consider any living being to have a 'sensory'
existence of some kind. To me, to be alive is to have some form of consciousness.
If an amoeba is exposed to light, it will contract. A plant will respond to
noise, light, touch, etc. in various ways. Any living thing has a response to the
environment. If it is alive, it feels or perceives, or responds is some way. It
has a 'living experience'. The cittas may not be like ours. There may not be
what we call 'thoughts', but there is still some form of consciousness. Rocks do
not have this experience, as far as one knows, do not respond to stimuli, and do
not ordinarily qualify as sentient. So I think we have the same basic
understanding of what is being spoken of.

> I wrote the following in my Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part Two):
> 
> "The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava 
> means life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. 
> Thus, bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause of 
> sentient existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that makes 
> the sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates sentient 
> existence."
> 
> Therefore, the meaning of the term "sentient" in my subcommentary is 
> not limited to the five sensory consciousnesses only. In the language 
> of abhidhamma, the expression "sentient existence" covers both the 
> five sensory consciousnesses (pancadvaara viññaana) and the mental 
> consciousness (manodvaara viññaana).

That is fine. Please note that I do not consider the content-free awareness I
have proposed to be necessarily based in brain activity.

> Thus, when I wrote "The commentary suggests parinibbaana as nullity 
> of sentient existence." in my subcommentary, I meant that 
> parinibbaana is free from any state of living being or any underlying 
> beingness or awareness as you proposed.

I understand that this is your point of view. You have stated it even more
definitively above.

> Therefore, your arguments still need to take into consideration the 
> meaning of the term "sentient existence" as used in my subcommentary 
> in line with Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary.
> 
> Of course, I will consider your argumemts written from the 
> perspective of the narrower limited meaning of the term "sentient" as 
> sensory. I will also look forward to your arguments based on wider 
> meaning of the term "sentient" covering both sensory and mental 
> consciousnesses.

That is a good clarification. I will have to review the language of the Sutta to
see how this may change the meaning. However, I am still interested to hear more
about what the Buddha may have meant by saying that the Arahant in Parinibbana
enters an 'undefined reality'. This does seem like a statement of complete
cessation of all and every sort of existence to me, and I would like to know how
it illluminates the 'complete cessation of sentient existence'. You stated in
your subcommentary that you thought it meant that we could not define Parinibbana
'in terms of mind and matter'. I can certainly accept that. However, that either
suggests that it can be defined in some other way that we limited earthly beings
do not have access to, or else that it is a state truly beyond definition. There
is nothing 'beyond definition' or 'undefineable' about complete cessation. If the
lamp has not only gone out, but been utterly destroyed, what is there to say about
that? It is not undefineable, it is smashed, finished, burnt out, over, dead. 
Why does Buddha not say something this definite about the state of the Arahant if
that is the case? I cannot believe that the Buddha in his wisdom would substitute
uncertainty and undefineability for certainty and absolute clarity for no good
reason. Clearly to me, the state of 'undefined reality' is something more than
complete cessation of all existence. If indeed it is complete cessation of all
sentient existence as you propose, then there must be another form of existence
into which the Arahant enters which is truly 'undefineable', otherwise it just
makes no sense that the Buddha would use this term.

I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. One really needs
to deal with the term 'undefined reality' and account for its use in some way. Of
course, it is 'undefineable' in terms of mind and matter as you state, but it
still does not explain why the term is used at all, if you propose that it is
indeed merely pointing to a state of complete cessation of all life, all
existence, all experience, all consciousness, all awareness, nothing left but
absence.

Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of Parinibbana 'is
not one of darkness', but of light. And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is
luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at least, if not
to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas are only in a
state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It implies that
when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity to be
discovered.

To me, these clues to the state the Buddha points to cannot be ignored or somehow
explained away in terms that do not account for their actual usage. The Buddha
said these things for a reason, and there must be an accounting taken of why he
would possibly use terms that evoke such provocative possibilities if he were not
trying to point to the state beyond existence, and that this state is one of light
and freedom, not one of darkness and oblivion.

> If I haven't answered them in my previous two parts of the 
> subcommentary, I will respond to them in my subsequent 
> subcommentaries. 

I appreciate that, and while I review the translation with your latest good
information, I will await your further comments.

Best,
Robert Ep.

==================

> With regards,
> 
> Suan
> 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> > Dear Suan,
> > I did misread your comments to say 'sensual' rather than 'sensory' 
> existence,
> > which is very strange, because when I *read* it [I thought] I 
> thought to myself
> > 'well that is slightly odd, I'm sure he means the same as 
> *sentient* existence,
> > but in fact you didn't even write that. In any case, I assumed it 
> meant something
> > similar. Here is the dictionary on sentient: 
> > 
> > Having a faculty, or faculties, of sensation and perception.
> > 
> > and as a noun:
> > 
> > One who has the faculty of perception; a sentient being. 
> > 
> > In this context, that is what I assumed was meant by 'sensual', so 
> in fact, my
> > meaning in the argument below is exactly the same.
> > 
> > However, I apologize for misreading the word. And I look forward 
> to your response
> > when you have the chance.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> > ===================
> > 
> > --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Dear Robert
> > > 
> > > How are you? Thank you for your reply message.
> > > 
> > > I had a chance to read your reply just now. I missed my Internet 
> > > sessions previous night due to technical problems in my ISP's 
> servers.
> > > 
> > > You wrote:
> > > 
> > > "Later on you say that there is a 'nullity of sensual existence'. 
> Now 
> > > to me, experience and 'sensual existence' are not synonymous." 
> > > 
> > > Could you please check the spelling "sensual existence"?
> > > 
> > > In my post, I wrote "nullity of sentient existence", (not sensual 
> > > existence).
> > > 
> > > So, if your arguments in the present post were based on "nullity 
> of 
> > > sensual existence", you now may need to rewrite your arguments 
> based 
> > > on "nullity of sentient existence."
> > > 
> > > I will read the rest of your present post, and other posts later. 
> I 
> > > am very sleepy now (2 a.m in Canberra).
> > > 
> > > With regards,
> > > 
> > > Suan
> > > 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 


	
10113

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:19pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Dear Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> Thanks for the following. I don't see, however, where this implies 
> only one object per citta. Where does it say that the object-relation is 
> one-to-one?
> 

When I read it later, it also seemed rather unclear to me..


H: > > >Side question: Does the principle 
> > > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in the

S:> > from
> > the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma 
> > 
> > “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element and its
> > associated states by object condition.
> > 
> > (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to 
> > cetasikas,
> > I’m pretty sure,S.)
> > 
> > “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness and
> mental
> > factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) states
> 
> > by
> > object condition.�

Howard, by referring to visible object as arammana of seeing and associated
cetasikas, sound as arammana of hearing and cetasikas, ‘any state as object’ of
citta and cetasikas, it all suggests one object only of citta as I read it.
After all it is the singular ‘state’ that is used here.


S: >>> PTS conditional Relations, p2
> > > 
> > From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the 6th
> > cognizable object that it consists of:
> > 
> > “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 consciousness,
> 53
> > mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, materiality,
> > consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or future 
> > but
> > Nibbana and concept are time-freed.
> > So in this object condition there is no state that cannot be an object of
> > consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades the 
> > teaching
> > in the pali Canon.....�

Again as arammana, it is always the singular state (nama, rupa, nibbana or
concept) that is referred to. Nowhere have I ever seen any suggestion of more
than one arammana at a time.

I thought Num made some very useful points in his post on this thread. I agreed
with all his comments and look forward to any more discussion between you both.
As he said, ‘besides paramattha sanna marks pannatti’.It’s so very different
from our usual meaning of memory.

You wonder how 2 objects can be compared if they are not appearing together.
What about if you are house-hunting? Do you need to have all the houses in
front of you at the same time in order to compare them? I prefer your later
time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest that the occurrence of citta A
and citta B are a condition for citta C.

I think we all really appreciate your interest in understanding these
Abhidhamma points and in checking it out rather than in just accepting it
blindly. Let me know if the quotes still don't make the grade and I'll try to
do better.

Btw, your ‘dyslexic apology’ made me feel I should have sent half a dozen for
the many (mostly minor) errors I caught up with in my own posts when I read
them over later;-)

I woke up today and my first thought was ‘I bet I’ve now got lots of homework
from Howard’ and I was right..I’ll get back on the others sooner or later.

Sarah


10114

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:38pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Mike -
> 
> In the following you inquire, first quoting me: 
> 
> > In that case, it
> > becomes important whether 
> > or not the content of a memory is considered an
> > aramma.na, for if it is, then 
> > there is more than one aramma.na per citta. 
> 
> Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept
> (memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other
> aarammana is present?
> ==============================
> My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the 
> current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, as 
> different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current object 
> with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or sati), 
> and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be 
> "present". If that is so - and to me it seems unavoidable, and if the 
> remembered object is considered an arammana, then there are two arammanas 
> present, the remembered one and the current one. 

Is it possible, Howard, that sati or sanna are able to refer to the accumulated
storehouse of memory that is passed on from citta to citta and see both objects in
a comparative 'image' which is the knowledge of the objects? Would this image
qualify as an aaramaana which contained content of two object? Or do memories,
comparisions, images, etc., not qualify as aarammana?

Unless they are both present 
> in mind, there is no way to compare. If both the previous object and its 
> memory are gone, then the current citta does not know of that object!
> Incidentally, subsequent to writing the post you quote below, I looked 
> at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he also 
> raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment of 
> an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making here. 
> (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of how 
> that effects the notion of one arammana per citta.

Since knowledge and accumulations are passed on from one citta to the next, the
whole range of accumulations that are passed on, memories, etc., either are not
considered the 'one object' of the citta, or are not considered 'objects', or else
constitute an awful lot of different objects which are being passed on, no? Or do
I misunderstand how the system works?

> I have just re-thought the "unavoidablility" of the co-occurrence of 
> the remembered object and the current. It *may* be avoidable after all, 
> although I'm not at all certain on this issue. (Sorry to be doing my thinking 
> "out loud", as it were.) One possibility that just occured to me is based on 
> the time-sharing model: Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B is 
> discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as 
> condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" of 
> the transition from object A to object B. 

Can a citta arise in the transition between two other cittas? This seems to be
inviting an absolute infinite regress, as Citta C, whose object was the transition
between A and B, itself becomes a transitional citta *between A and B* since it
occurs in their transition, and also has its discernment of the transition become
the object passed on to Citta D, which only occurs after Citta B has terminated. 
The pattern becomes, A(C)B(D) with A giving over to B, while C somehow passes its
transitional sandwhich knowledge to D after B [and presumably it before B] has
subsided. If C lasts longer than the transition from A to B, then it is lasting
more than one moment and you have B and D necessarily existing at the same moment.
Two cittas at a time doesn't work.

Can cetasikas carry the comparative knowledge from one citta to the next? I
recall recently that Sarah advised that the cetasika died along with its citta. 
If I remember correctly, which is highly unlikely. <g>

Best,
Robert Ep.

=================

This seems possible to me, thiugh a 
> trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another currently 
> observed object seems much simpler. However, what *is* the case is not always 
> simpler than what one might imagine could be the case.
> Just a clarification here with regard to my purpose in all this: I am 
> neither trying to disprove nor vindicate Abhidhammic notions, but rather to 
> understand them and their implications, to grasp the explanatory capability 
> of Abhidhamma. The Buddha did say to accept something only after examining it 
> and seeing that it accords with direct experience, and part of doing that is 
> to see how it accounts for actual experience, not in a hand-waiving manner 
> and not just by much use of Pali terms, but by really digging in and seeing 
> what the implications are.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> In a message dated 12/16/01 6:54:37 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> mlnease@y... writes:
> 


 	 

	
10115

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:54pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who control what?

 	
Thank you Victor. I think that is a lot more clear.

Yes, it makes sense to refrain from identifying 'form' of any kind as 'self'. 
However when you say that 'one' can possibly control form, you are implying that
this 'one' is a 'self' that may or may not control form, although as you say,
'form' is not self. So this seems to me to be a contradiction of 'anatta', which
not only says that the kandhas are not self, but that *there is no self* period,
that the idea of self is an illusion. Do you agree with this, or do you think
that there is a self that is beyond form?

Best,
Robert Ep.

================

--- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert and all,
> 
> Thank you for putting up with my tendency to put thing in a more 
> abstract form. I will try not to use too many symbols.
> 
> First, one can control oneself. In other words, one can exercise 
> self-control. There is a profound ethical and spiritual implication 
> to self-control. With self-control, one can refrain from the 
> unskillful. By refraining from the unskillful, one refrains from 
> harming oneself. With self-control, one can strive and make an 
> effort to attain the cessation of dukkha.
> 
> Secondly, form is not self implies that it is not possible for form 
> not to lend itself to dis-ease. In other words:
> Precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. 
> Precisely because form is not self, form cannot control itself in the 
> sense that it always lends itself to dis-ease.
> 
> HOWEVER,
> form is not self DOES NOT imply that it is not possible for self not 
> to lend form to dis-ease, NOR does it imply it is possible for self 
> not to lend form to dis-ease.
> 
> In other words,
> form cannot control itself DOES NOT imply self cannot control form, 
> NOR does it imply self can control form. Why? Because form is not 
> self. 
> 
> Form (or any other aggregate) cannot control itself. Why identify 
> with form (or any other aggregate) by saying "one cannot control form 
> (or any other aggregate)"? Why identify with form (or any other 
> aggregate) by saying "one cannot control oneself"?
> 
> 
> Regards,
> Victor

	
10116

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:56pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep, Jon, Howard & Mike,
> 
> 
> > > > > This post, the previous one and the next 1 or 2 all deal with
> > > > 'khandhas'. 
> > > > > Must be that khandha day.
> > > > > 
> > > > ==============================
> > > > Argh!! I now insist that you, as list owner, commence monitoring
> > > > your 
> > > > own posts so that there be no further abuse of this sort!! ;-))
> > > 
> > > I thought to myself at the time, if anyone gets it, Howard will (same
> > > pitiful standard!!).
> > > 
> > > Good advice. I'll see to it.
> > >
> > Aiiiieeeeee! I just got it!!
> > 
> > It's skandhalous as we say in Maha neck of the woods.
> > 
> > Robert Ep.
> 
> 
> At this rate we'll have to pack you guys off to Khandha-ha!
> 
> "What for?", you may ask.
> 
> "Oh...Samma hunting" would be my reply.
> 
> Egberdina's friend 
> (a.k.a Sarah)
> 
> p.s apologies to all the other members and lurkers on dsg who may find too much
> nitty-ditthi here for your rupees;-))
>
ha ha, Sarah, you are a true pun-dit.

Robert Ep.



	
10117

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 10:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Victor,
> 
> I have to admit I’m pretty lost at this point too....
> 
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > 
> > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with
> > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'. However,
> > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B. Both
> > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is self.
> > 
> > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self."
> 
> I’m hoping to get back to discussing the Mulapariyaya sutta with you when I’ve
> caught up. I’m just wondering, however, if you aren’t suggesting here that
> while all the khandhas are not self and so on, that there is some other self
> outside these which controls them? I may very well have misunderstood you, for
> which I apologise if so. 

I had gotten the same impression. If true, I can always say 'it takes one to know
one' since I am still always hunting for the 'primordial Awareness' I have dragged
in from Mahayana. 

Robert Ep.

==============================


All that actually exists, as we’re told over and over
> again, are the 5khandhas, all of which are anatta. So if there is any other
> control or oneself or self, surely this is just a figment of the imagination? 
> 
> I’ll try to look at your other posts more closely in the next few days, but the
> relief of having no students for a couple of weeks is having a bad effect
> meanwhile as you’ll have seen from my last post and the following sign-off
> which I hope doesn’t cause any offence;-)
> 
> 
> Self=One -1 +Ax2 less elf + p +q +r (-p-q) not= +(h)= SARAH 
> 
> 


	
10118

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:01pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 12/17/01 2:43:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about a week 
> > ago,
> > but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What makes a 
> > 'rupa'
> > 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a sensory/mental 
> > process?
> > 
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> ========================
> A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory 
> discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while it 
> and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, neither is 
> compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but also 
> of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of 
> consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR mental, 
> but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed by 
> mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my 
> understanding. 

Hi Howard.
I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act of
perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it is possible,
that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of satipatthana? 
And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or reduces its
normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act?

Best,
Robert Ep.

========================

> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 


	
10119

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 11:13pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Dear Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > ==============================
>at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he also
> 
> raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment of 
> an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making here.
> 
> (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of how
> 
> that effects the notion of one arammana per citta.


I’ve just been prompted by your note here in a post to Mike to read the
appendix you refer to. Many thanks, it's an interesting article. 

I think Nyanaponika stresses the importance of sanna (perception) as a
‘universal’ cetasika. “So we may sum up: perception (sanna) is the taking up,
the making, and the remembering of the object’s distinctive marks. In this
connection it is noteworthy that ‘mark’ or ‘signal’ is also one of the
different meanings of the word sanna itself.”

On p121 he describes the “simple act of seeing a rose” which “is in reality a
very complex process composed of different phases, each consisting of numerous
smaller combinations of conscious processes (cittavithi), which again are made
up of several single moments of consciousness (cittakkhana) following each
other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. Among these phases there is
one that connects the present perception of a rose with a previous one, and
there is another that attaches to the present perception the name ‘rose’
remembered from previous experience...........Finally, the individual
contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be remembered
and coordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a rose.”

So sanna arises with every citta unlike sati. I assume you are using
‘discernment’ to refer to cognizing as that which every citta does (as opposed
to what sati does)? I don’t think there is any suggestion in this appendix of
more than one arammana per citta or even of more than one memory per citta.

It’s not an easy subject and sanna, like phassa and many other mental factors,
is so very different from how we’ve always viewed ‘memory’. Thanks for your
careful considerations.

Sarah


	
10120

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:34pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/18/01 1:21:27 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> > 
> > Thanks for the following. I don't see, however, where this implies 
> 
> > only one object per citta. Where does it say that the object-relation is 
> > one-to-one?
> > 
> 
> When I read it later, it also seemed rather unclear to me..
> 
> 
> H: > > >Side question: Does the principle 
> > > > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only in 
> the
> 
> S:> > from
> > > the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma 
> > > 
> > > “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element 
> and its
> > > associated states by object condition.
> > > 
> > > (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to 
> > > cetasikas,
> > > I’m pretty sure,S.)
> > > 
> > > “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness and
> > mental
> > > factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter) 
> states
> > 
> > > by
> > > object condition.�
> 
> Howard, by referring to visible object as arammana of seeing and associated
> cetasikas, sound as arammana of hearing and cetasikas, ‘any state as object’
> of
> citta and cetasikas, it all suggests one object only of citta as I read it.
> After all it is the singular ‘state’ that is used here.
------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I think that you are probably correct, Sarah.
-----------------------------------------------------------

> 
> 
> S: >>> PTS conditional Relations, p2
> > > > 
> > > From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the 
> 6th
> > > cognizable object that it consists of:
> > > 
> > > “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89 
> consciousness,
> > 53
> > > mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd, 
> materiality,
> > > consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or 
> future 
> > > but
> > > Nibbana and concept are time-freed.
> > > So in this object condition there is no state that cannot be an object 
> of
> > > consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades the 
> > > teaching
> > > in the pali Canon.....�
> 
> Again as arammana, it is always the singular state (nama, rupa, nibbana or
> concept) that is referred to. Nowhere have I ever seen any suggestion of 
> more
> than one arammana at a time.
> 
------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Mmm, hmm. Probably so.
------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> I thought Num made some very useful points in his post on this thread. I 
> agreed
> with all his comments and look forward to any more discussion between you 
> both.
> As he said, ‘besides paramattha sanna marks pannatti’.It’s so very 
> different
> from our usual meaning of memory.
> 
> You wonder how 2 objects can be compared if they are not appearing 
> together.
> What about if you are house-hunting? Do you need to have all the houses in
> front of you at the same time in order to compare them?
--------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
No. But what you *do* need is the memories of the houses.
--------------------------------------------------------------

I prefer your later> 
> time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest that the occurrence of citta 
> A
> and citta B are a condition for citta C.
> 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I prefer the idea of the 
memory of a past object being a concomitant of the current citta in which 
there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a past object need not be 
considered an object itself. So there could be the hearing of a current sound 
together with the memory of the immediately preceding slightly louder or 
softer sound, or even further back than the immediately preceding sound. 
After all, we can and do distinguish between a current object and a 
remembered preceding one. We never confuse a memory with a current 
discernment.
----------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> I think we all really appreciate your interest in understanding these
> Abhidhamma points and in checking it out rather than in just accepting it
> blindly. Let me know if the quotes still don't make the grade and I'll try 
> to
> do better.
> 
> Btw, your ‘dyslexic apology’ made me feel I should have sent half a dozen 
> for
> the many (mostly minor) errors I caught up with in my own posts when I read
> them over later;-)
> 
> I woke up today and my first thought was ‘I bet I’ve now got lots of 
> homework
> from Howard’ and I was right..I’ll get back on the others sooner or later.
> 
> Sarah
================================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10121

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 6:56pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Rob -

In a message dated 12/18/01 1:41:22 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> > Hi, Mike -
> > 
> > In the following you inquire, first quoting me: 
> > 
> > > In that case, it
> > > becomes important whether 
> > > or not the content of a memory is considered an
> > > aramma.na, for if it is, then 
> > > there is more than one aramma.na per citta. 
> > 
> > Not sure if I understand you here. If a concept
> > (memory) is aarammana for manovi~n~naa.na, what other
> > aarammana is present?
> > ==============================
> > My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the 
> > current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that matter, 
> as 
> > different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current 
> object 
> > with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or 
> sati), 
> > and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both be 
> 
> > "present". If that is so - and to me it seems unavoidable, and if the 
> > remembered object is considered an arammana, then there are two arammanas 
> 
> > present, the remembered one and the current one. 
> 
> Is it possible, Howard, that sati or sanna are able to refer to the 
> accumulated
> storehouse of memory that is passed on from citta to citta and see both 
> objects in
> a comparative 'image' which is the knowledge of the objects? Would this 
> image
> qualify as an aaramaana which contained content of two object? Or do 
> memories,
> comparisions, images, etc., not qualify as aarammana?
> 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Well, I'm now thinking that there might be dual rolls for memories. On 
the one hand, they might occur as mental concomitants to cittas, and could 
condition the experiencing the object of the citta. And on the other hand, a 
memory can, itself, serve as the arammana of a citta.
---------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Unless they are both present 
> > in mind, there is no way to compare. If both the previous object and its 
> > memory are gone, then the current citta does not know of that object!
> > Incidentally, subsequent to writing the post you quote below, I 
> looked 
> > at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he 
> also 
> > raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment 
> of 
> > an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making 
> here. 
> > (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of 
> how 
> > that effects the notion of one arammana per citta.
> 
> Since knowledge and accumulations are passed on from one citta to the next, 
> the
> whole range of accumulations that are passed on, memories, etc., either are 
> not
> considered the 'one object' of the citta, or are not considered 'objects', 
> or else
> constitute an awful lot of different objects which are being passed on, no? 
> Or do
> I misunderstand how the system works?

-----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Surely you're not asking ME!! ;-)) 
I do tend to think that memories frequently are concomitants and not 
objects. The memory of a previous sound will then condition the perception of 
the current sound, as a kind of "internal conditioning" within a citta.
----------------------------------------------------------

> 
> > I have just re-thought the "unavoidablility" of the co-occurrence 
> of 
> > the remembered object and the current. It *may* be avoidable after all, 
> > although I'm not at all certain on this issue. (Sorry to be doing my 
> thinking 
> > "out loud", as it were.) One possibility that just occured to me is based 
> on 
> > the time-sharing model: Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B 
> is 
> > discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as 
> > condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing" 
> of 
> > the transition from object A to object B. 
> 
> Can a citta arise in the transition between two other cittas? This seems 
> to be
> inviting an absolute infinite regress, as Citta C, whose object was the 
> transition
> between A and B, itself becomes a transitional citta *between A and B* 
> since it
> occurs in their transition, and also has its discernment of the transition 
> become
> the object passed on to Citta D, which only occurs after Citta B has 
> terminated. 
> The pattern becomes, A(C)B(D) with A giving over to B, while C somehow 
> passes its
> transitional sandwhich knowledge to D after B [and presumably it before B] 
> has
> subsided. If C lasts longer than the transition from A to B, then it is 
> lasting
> more than one moment and you have B and D necessarily existing at the same 
> moment.
> Two cittas at a time doesn't work.
> 
-------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I'm neither envisioning a squeezed-in citta, nor two cittas at a time. 
I'm thinking of citta C as a mental cognition of a transition. But even 
though Sarah has expressed some liking of it. I'm quite vague on this 
time-sharing scheme and a bit uneasy with it. I feel much better with the 
notion of memory-conditioned cittas.
-------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Can cetasikas carry the comparative knowledge from one citta to the next? 
> I
> recall recently that Sarah advised that the cetasika died along with its 
> citta.
> 
------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Actually, my understanding is that out of the bundle of cetasikas 
accompanying a citta, only some are removed or replaced, with others 
remaining (or, better said, recurring). 
--------------------------------------------------------
> 
> If I remember correctly, which is highly unlikely. <g>
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
==============================
With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10122

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 7:05pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi, Rob -

In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> Hi Howard.
> I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act of
> perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it is 
> possible,
> that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of 
> satipatthana? 
> And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or reduces 
> its
> normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act?
> 
============================
I'm afraid I will have to leave this to be answered by those folks who 
really know what they are talking about (with regard to Abhidhamma)! ;-))

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10123

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 17, 2001 7:14pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/18/01 2:15:25 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > ==============================
> >at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he 
> also
> > 
> > raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment 
> of 
> > an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making 
> here.
> > 
> > (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however, of 
> how
> > 
> > that effects the notion of one arammana per citta.
> 
> 
> I’ve just been prompted by your note here in a post to Mike to read the
> appendix you refer to. Many thanks, it's an interesting article. 
> 
> I think Nyanaponika stresses the importance of sanna (perception) as a
> ‘universal’ cetasika. “So we may sum up: perception (sanna) is the taking 
> up,
> the making, and the remembering of the object’s distinctive marks. In this
> connection it is noteworthy that ‘mark’ or ‘signal’ is also one of the
> different meanings of the word sanna itself.�
> 
> On p121 he describes the “simple act of seeing a rose� which “is in 
> reality a
> very complex process composed of different phases, each consisting of 
> numerous
> smaller combinations of conscious processes (cittavithi), which again are 
> made
> up of several single moments of consciousness (cittakkhana) following each
> other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. Among these phases 
> there is
> one that connects the present perception of a rose with a previous one, and
> there is another that attaches to the present perception the name ‘rose’
> remembered from previous experience...........Finally, the individual
> contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be 
> remembered
> and coordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a 
> rose.�
> 
> So sanna arises with every citta unlike sati. I assume you are using
> ‘discernment’ to refer to cognizing as that which every citta does (as 
> opposed
> to what sati does)? 
> 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Yes. I prefer the term 'discernment', which suggests a function, to 
'consciousness', which has a "substance sense" to it.
-------------------------------------------------------------
I don’t think there is any suggestion in this appendix of> 
> more than one arammana per citta or even of more than one memory per citta.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I agree.
--------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> It’s not an easy subject and sanna, like phassa and many other mental 
> factors,
> is so very different from how we’ve always viewed ‘memory’.
> 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I think the most important part of what Nyanaponika says with respect 
to this thread is "Finally, the individual contributions of all those 
different perceptual processes have to be remembered and coordinated in order 
to form the final and complete perception of a rose." So, memory is being 
used as a summing-up operation which makes non-co-occurring things co-occur.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Thanks for your> 
> careful considerations.
> 
> Sarah
> 
> 
==================================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10124

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 0:18am
Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who?

 	
Hello Robert,

I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby control form.

I will try to be more clear:

Form is not self implies that form cannot control itself.
Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control form.
Form is not self does not imply that one cannot be controlled by form.
Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control oneself.

One can control oneself.
One can control oneself does not imply that one can control form.
One can control oneself does not imply that one can be controlled by form.

Why identify form as self by saying "one can control form"?
Why identify form as self by saying "one can be controlled by form"?

Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control form"?
Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot be controlled by form"?
Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control oneself"?

I am not sure how you got the idea that 'anatta' means that "there is no
self"?

Thank you.

Regards,
Victor


----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 1:54 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who control what?


> Thank you Victor. I think that is a lot more clear.
>
> Yes, it makes sense to refrain from identifying 'form' of any kind as
'self'.
> However when you say that 'one' can possibly control form, you are
implying that
> this 'one' is a 'self' that may or may not control form, although as you
say,
> 'form' is not self. So this seems to me to be a contradiction of
'anatta', which
> not only says that the kandhas are not self, but that *there is no self*
period,
> that the idea of self is an illusion. Do you agree with this, or do you
think
> that there is a self that is beyond form?
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
>
> ================
>
> --- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert and all,
> >
> > Thank you for putting up with my tendency to put thing in a more
> > abstract form. I will try not to use too many symbols.
> >
> > First, one can control oneself. In other words, one can exercise
> > self-control. There is a profound ethical and spiritual implication
> > to self-control. With self-control, one can refrain from the
> > unskillful. By refraining from the unskillful, one refrains from
> > harming oneself. With self-control, one can strive and make an
> > effort to attain the cessation of dukkha.
> >
> > Secondly, form is not self implies that it is not possible for form
> > not to lend itself to dis-ease. In other words:
> > Precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease.
> > Precisely because form is not self, form cannot control itself in the
> > sense that it always lends itself to dis-ease.
> >
> > HOWEVER,
> > form is not self DOES NOT imply that it is not possible for self not
> > to lend form to dis-ease, NOR does it imply it is possible for self
> > not to lend form to dis-ease.
> >
> > In other words,
> > form cannot control itself DOES NOT imply self cannot control form,
> > NOR does it imply self can control form. Why? Because form is not
> > self.
> >
> > Form (or any other aggregate) cannot control itself. Why identify
> > with form (or any other aggregate) by saying "one cannot control form
> > (or any other aggregate)"? Why identify with form (or any other
> > aggregate) by saying "one cannot control oneself"?
> >
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
	
10125

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 1:55am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Dear Robert,

Sorry to you and anyone else, I had no idea this was already a point 
of discussion. 

Thank you for your reply all the same. I'll try to pay a bit more 
attention in future. 

All the best

Herman


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> 
> --- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote:
> > Hi all,
> > 
> > When I think I am having a moment of awareness, I am not aware of 
> > phenomena as they are, but I am aware of phenomena as they are 
not.
> > When the penny drops, I understand , this is not real. What I 
mean by 
> > that is: When the penny drops, I understand, that what I thought 
I 
> > was seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling (note five, not 
six 
> > senses) is not what is out there, in reality, but in here , as 
> > recreated by a complex series of interdependant processes, 
including 
> > stimuli from very real, but very unknowable rupas.
> 
> Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about 
a week ago,
> but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What 
makes a 'rupa'
> 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a 
sensory/mental process?
> 
> Robert Ep.
> 
> PS. I apologize in advance if this has already been explained to 
me and I've
> forgotten. I do have a slight feeling of deja vu.
> 
> =======================
> 
> > What exactly is a mental representation of a physical object but 
a 
> > mental object? What is my point? Rupas are not known as rupas, 
they 
> > are known as namas. Awareness can only be restricted to the 
content 
> > of the mind, the outside world is always an interpreted 
> > representation.
> > 
> > I read an interesting line the other day : "We live in a three 
pound 
> > universe, the brain". If anyone doubts it, a visit to a mental 
> > hospital or clinic for brain-injured people would be enlightening.
> > 
> > All the best
> > 
> > 
> > Herman
	
10126

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:06am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Dear Sarah and Howard,

Thanks for this great quotation. What is 
'Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma' exactly?

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:

> On p121 he describes the “simple act of seeing a
> rose” which “is in reality a
> very complex process composed of different phases,
> each consisting of numerous
> smaller combinations of conscious processes
> (cittavithi), which again are made
> up of several single moments of consciousness
> (cittakkhana) following each
> other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. 
> Among these phases there is
> one that connects the present perception of a rose
> with a previous one, and
> there is another that attaches to the present
> perception the name ‘rose’
> remembered from previous
> experience...........Finally, the individual
> contributions of all those different perceptual
> processes have to be remembered
> and coordinated in order to form the final and
> complete perception of a rose.”

Am I right in thinking that, by 'perception' (here),
he means concept?

> So sanna arises with every citta unlike sati. I
> assume you are using
> ‘discernment’ to refer to cognizing as that which
> every citta does (as opposed
> to what sati does)? I don’t think there is any
> suggestion in this appendix of
> more than one arammana per citta or even of more
> than one memory per citta.

Ven. Buddhadhatta defines aaramma.na as 'a
sense-object.' I'm not sure if it's 'abhidammically'
important (whether a citta can take more than one
aaramma.na ); provisionally I sidestep the issue by
thinking of it just as the object taken by a citta.

Whether I'm looking at one egg or a dozen eggs, the
singular/plural aspect is entirely conceptual. I'm
inclined to think of all mental and physical
impingements as being minute, contributing over time
to a constructed concept (as I think Howard described
better in an earlier post)--sort of like the pixels
projected one after another by the tube behind a
television screen seeming to form a complete picture
(thanks to Kom). Not sure if singularity/plurality is
really an issue at this level except for the
importance of the sequential nature of cittas
(mentioned by VN above) and the way in which this
contributes to the conventional experience of the
sense- and mind-fields.

> It’s not an easy subject and sanna, like phassa and
> many other mental factors,
> is so very different from how we’ve always viewed
> ‘memory’. Thanks for your
> careful considerations.

Actually, the more I understand (I think) about these
cetasikas, the more sense the way I've always viewed
memory seems to make, subjectively, intuitively,
logically and by way of the various expressions in the
Dhammavinaya. Otherwise I think I'd have lost
interest in abhidhamma long ago...

mike

	
10127

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:08am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na

 	
Hi, Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> In part of the following you write:
============================ 

S: > > In other words, as the practice starts to bear fruit, there isn't any 
> > awareness
> > of beginnings and endings of mindstates, as I understand. What one takes 
> > for an
> > understanding of impermanence is merely thinking and intellectual
> > understanding. 
> =========================

H: > This I DO NOT GET! As I understand it, the essence of wisdom (short
of
> 
> path and fruition consciousness) is the direct apprehension of the three 
> characteristics of anicca, dukkha, and anatta.
> 
=============================

Eventually, but when we’re talking about beginning to develop a little
understanding, I don’t think we should kid ourselves that it is the highly
developed wisdom which directly apprehends these characteristics as yet.
...................

We can read about the stages of insight in detail in the Visuddhimagga ch
XV111, starting with the clear understanding of nama and rupa.

At the end it says (37):

‘The correct view of mentality and materiality, which, after defining
mentality-materiality by these various methods, has been established on the
plane of non-confusion by overcoming the perception of a being, is what should
be understood as purification of view. Other terms for it are ‘defining of
mentality-materiality’ and ‘delimitation of formations’. <end quote>
....................

It may seem that there is clear understanding of the impermanence of sounds and
feelings, but is there really any understanding of hearing and sound when they
arise or of bodily feeling and heat or cold (as namas and rupas) at this
moment? 

The second stage of insight is the understanding the conditions for nama and
rupa. Understanding penetrates or knows the characteristics of these realities
even more deeply. It understands (directly) that without the arammana and other
conditions, the namas could not arise. Each one arises because of its own
conditions and is devoid of self.

Now we know that namas and rupas fall away rapidly, but the highly developed
wisdom of the third stage of insight that directly understands the rapid
succession can only be realized after the first two stages have been attained.
........................

In K.Sujin’s ‘Survey of Paramattha Dhammas’ (transl by Nina) and found at:
http://www.abhidhamma.org/Para12.htm

we read in Chapter 2.,The Stages of Vipassanå:

“.....Someone who does not even know the difference between the characteristics
of nama and rúpa may mistakenly believe that he has reached the third stage of
insight, the stage of comprehension by groups, sammasana ñåùa. He may think
that he can experience the arising and falling away of nåmas, one after the
other, and that that is the third stage of insight. However, if someone has not
developed satipaììhåna and has not been aware of the characteristics of
different kinds of nåma which appear, he does not realize nåma as the element
which experiences. He may believe that he experiences the arising and falling
away of nåma, but he does not clearly know what nåma is. He confuses nåma and
rúpa, he does not know that nåma is entirely different from rúpa. A person who
is impatient wishes that vipassanå ñåùa arises soon. He will try to do
something other than being aware of the characteristics of nåma and rúpa which
naturally appear and have arisen because of the appropriate conditions. It is
impossible to hasten the development of paññå. Paññå can only grow gradually
and there is no other condition for its growth but the development of
satipaììhåna in our ordinary daily life. If someone tries to do something else
he goes the wrong way and the wrong cause cannot bring the right result. If
someone hopes for a quick result of his practice, it is the wrong path, he does
not understand what the right Path is. Lobha-múla-citta accompanied by wrong
view motivates the development of the wrong path and this will lead to the
wrong release 23, not the right release which is freedom from defilements. 
The fourth vipassanå ñåùa is knowledge of the arising and falling away of nåma
and rúpa, udayabbaya ñåùa 24 .
Vipassanå ñåùa of the third stage realizes the rapid succession of nåmas and
rúpas as they arise and fall. However, at this stage paññå is not yet keen
enough to see the danger and disdavantages of the arising and falling away, so
that there can be detachment from them. The immediate arising of a new dhamma
after the falling away of the former dhamma covers up the danger of the arising
and falling away. Paññå should become keener so that the following stage of
insight can be reached. At the fourth stage paññå can penetrate more clearly
the arising and falling away of each kind of nåma and each kind of rúpa
separately....” <end quote>
.......................

Howard, I think you might find it interesting to read the full chapter here.
I’m looking forward to the day when the full Visuddhimagga is on line as there
are some useful parts in the section on ‘knowledge of rise and all’ in ch XX.
93f. 

Just a couple of short quotes here:

(98) ‘..when he thus sees rise and fall in the two ways, according to condition
and according to instant, the several truths, aspects of the dependent
origination, methods, and characteristics become evident to him.

'When he sees the arising of aggregates with the arising of ignorance and the
cessation of aggregates with the cessation of ignorance, this is his seeing of
rise and fall according to condition. when he sees the rise and fall of
aggregates by seeing the characteristic of generation and the characteristic of
change, this is his seeing of rise and fall according to instant. For it is
only at the instant of arising that there is the characteristic of generation,
and only at the instant of dissolution that there is the characteristic of
change.'

and (103):
'The characteristic of not-self becomes evident to him through seeing rise
according to condition owing to his discovery that states have no curiosity and
that their existence depends upon conditions. The characteristic of
impermanence becomes evident to him through seeing rise and fall according to
instant owing to his discovery of non-existence after having been and owing to
his discovery that they are secluded from past and future....' <end quotes>
.....................

I’m getting carried away again as I read out loud here.;-)

I think the point I started out with was that it’s tempting to think that there
is some direct understanding of the impermanence of realities, especially when
the desire for results in our practice is strong. Certainly when I was a keen
meditator, it seemed very simple and very obvious from direct experience. Only
when I began to consider more carefully and develop a little more understanding
about namas and rupas did it become apparent that many of these results and
insights were mere wishful thinking.

Sarah
=============================

	
10128

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:22am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Dear Howard, 

Thank you up front for all the issues you raise and fruitful 
discussions that you initiate. I regret not being able to participate 
to the extent that I would like. My non-participation is not a 
statement about what I perceive the value of matters raised to be, 
more a statement of how I am currently allocating my time. And the 
big winners are the really mundane issues like work, work, work. Many 
people (sorry again, Rob Ep) have raised really interesting and 
important discussions that I would have like to contribute to, but it 
just didn't happen. I am especially sorry that I have not replied to 
Frank Kuan's recent posts. Sorry, Frank.

Anyway, Howard, thank you for reading this introduction.

Are you saying that what is perceived is not "tempered" by the 
process of perception, by the organs of perception, by the quality of 
the medium through which particular qualities of the rupa are 
transmitted? Does a mosquito see the same as a snail ? 

I have many more questions , but this'll do for starters :-)


All the best

Herman

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 12/17/01 2:43:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' 
about a week 
> > ago,
> > but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What 
makes a 
> > 'rupa'
> > 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a 
sensory/mental 
> > process?
> > 
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> ========================
> A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of 
sensory 
> discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and 
while it 
> and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, 
neither is 
> compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, 
but also 
> of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of 
> consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR 
mental, 
> but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are 
constructed by 
> mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This 
is my 
> understanding. 
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

10129

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:22am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard,

Hope you don't mind my butting in again...

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Sarah -

> sarahdhhk@y... writes:
>
--------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> I prefer your later> 
> > time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest
> that the occurrence of citta 
> > A
> > and citta B are a condition for citta C.
> > 
>
-----------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I
> prefer the idea of the 
> memory of a past object being a concomitant of the
> current citta in which 
> there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a
> past object need not be 
> considered an object itself. So there could be the
> hearing of a current sound 
> together with the memory of the immediately
> preceding slightly louder or 
> softer sound, or even further back than the
> immediately preceding sound. 

I think you're starting to lose me here. If I may
turn off the TV and go back to the movie metaphor,
isn't this like seeing more than one frame at a time? 
It makes more sense to me that whatever is compounded
of more than one moment's experience is concept, not
experience itself--of course I may be wrong about
this.

> After all, we can and do distinguish between a
> current object and a 
> remembered preceding one. 

Awareness (or is it understanding?) can and maybe does
do this, but--

> We never confuse a 
> memory with a current discernment.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding you--but in fact, I think
this kind of confusion is the normal state of
things--'I' ceaselessly confuse, for example, 'my'
concept (memory) of 'this computer' with the
experience of present phenomena. A moment of truly
making this distinction is a very rare one, I think.

My apologies if I've misconstrued your comments!

mike

	
10130

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Sarah,

Thank you for replying and tending to my message.
I have to admit that I might get carried away with using expressions like
"Premise", "Conclusion", "If p, then q. p. Therefore, q" etc. too much all
at once in a message. I smiled when I saw your sign-off.

You questioned that:
If all aggregates are not self, then is there self outside of the aggregate
that controls them?

All aggregate are not self implies that all aggregates cannot control
themselves, that they lend themselves to dis-ease, to afflication.
Please try to examine very carefully if all aggregate are not self implies
whether or not there is a self outside of the aggregate that controls them.
And please consider the questions: (they are not trick questions)
"Can I control myself? Can I refrain from doing the unskillful that harms
myself?"

I am interested in knowing how you get the idea that I might be suggesting
here that while all the khandhas are not self and so, there is some other
self outside these which controls them.

And I look forward to discussing Mulapariyaya Sutta.

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "Sarah" <sarahdhhk@y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 12:13 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)


> Dear Victor,
>
> I have to admit I'm pretty lost at this point too....
>
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: >
> > It seems that we can "prove" that form is not self in Conclusion B with
> > Premise B1 and Premise B2, or with Premise B1' and Premise B2'.
However,
> > what we do is nothing more than restating Premise A2 in Conclusion B.
Both
> > Premise B1' and Premise B2' have the implicit assumption that form is
self.
> >
> > The pronoun "oneself" is a variation of the pronoun "self."
>
> I'm hoping to get back to discussing the Mulapariyaya sutta with you when
I've
> caught up. I'm just wondering, however, if you aren't suggesting here
that
> while all the khandhas are not self and so on, that there is some other
self
> outside these which controls them? I may very well have misunderstood you,
for
> which I apologise if so. All that actually exists, as we're told over and
over
> again, are the 5khandhas, all of which are anatta. So if there is any
other
> control or oneself or self, surely this is just a figment of the
imagination?
>
> I'll try to look at your other posts more closely in the next few days,
but the
> relief of having no students for a couple of weeks is having a bad effect
> meanwhile as you'll have seen from my last post and the following sign-off
> which I hope doesn't cause any offence;-)
>
>
> Self=One -1 +Ax2 less elf + p +q +r (-p-q) not= +(h)= SARAH
	
10131

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 6:46am
Subject: Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard

 	
Dear Robert Epstein And Howard

How are you?

Thank you for your kind responses to the Parinibbaana Subcommentary 
Part Two.

I have read all your responses including Howard's post (10007) 
regarding Robert's first reply.

As your responses contain very profound and interesting issues and 
statements, I will have to analyse them carefully before I respond to 
them. I may even need to go to other parts of the Tipitaka to get 
more information, even though my experience with Tipitaka tells me 
that statements and interpretations on nibbana, like any other topic, 
are very consistent. 

In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to 
me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I 
would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have 
you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems 
that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife 
Parinibbaana.

Apparantly, I may end up serializing Parinibbaana Subcommentaries. So 
please be patient with the waiting periods.

By the way, I do not forget to write something as well in response to 
Howard's "nonconceptual state of being."

With best wishes,

Suan

http://www.bodhiology.org



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> 
> --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Dear Robert
> > 
> > 
> > How are you? Thank you for your clarification on your 
understanding 
> > of the term "sentient".
> > 
> > However, I happened, and will continue, to use the 
term "sentient" 
> > and the expression "sentient existence" to mean any living 
organism, 
> > or a life form, which would be an equivalent Pali term "satta" or 
> > Vedic Sanskrit term "sattva". 
> > 
> > Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary defines the 
term "Satta" 
> > as a living being, creature, a sentient & rational being, a 
person. 
> > Please see column 1, page 673 in the dictionary. 
> > 
> > I also used the term "sentient existence" as the equivalent Pali 
> > term "bhava" or life.
> 
> I have no problem with your definition of 'sentient being', since 
it accords with
> my understanding as well. I consider any living being to have 
a 'sensory'
> existence of some kind. To me, to be alive is to have some form of 
consciousness.
> If an amoeba is exposed to light, it will contract. A plant will 
respond to
> noise, light, touch, etc. in various ways. Any living thing has a 
response to the
> environment. If it is alive, it feels or perceives, or responds is 
some way. It
> has a 'living experience'. The cittas may not be like ours. There 
may not be
> what we call 'thoughts', but there is still some form of 
consciousness. Rocks do
> not have this experience, as far as one knows, do not respond to 
stimuli, and do
> not ordinarily qualify as sentient. So I think we have the same 
basic
> understanding of what is being spoken of.
> 
> > I wrote the following in my Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part Two):
> > 
> > "The term `bhavanga' is made up of two words `bhava+anga'. Bhava 
> > means life or sentient existence. Anga means component or cause. 
> > Thus, bhavanga means life-cause or life-component, or the cause 
of 
> > sentient existence. Bhavanga cittam is the consciousness that 
makes 
> > the sentient existence possible. It causes and perpetuates 
sentient 
> > existence."
> > 
> > Therefore, the meaning of the term "sentient" in my subcommentary 
is 
> > not limited to the five sensory consciousnesses only. In the 
language 
> > of abhidhamma, the expression "sentient existence" covers both 
the 
> > five sensory consciousnesses (pancadvaara viññaana) and the 
mental 
> > consciousness (manodvaara viññaana).
> 
> That is fine. Please note that I do not consider the content-free 
awareness I
> have proposed to be necessarily based in brain activity.
> 
> > Thus, when I wrote "The commentary suggests parinibbaana as 
nullity 
> > of sentient existence." in my subcommentary, I meant that 
> > parinibbaana is free from any state of living being or any 
underlying 
> > beingness or awareness as you proposed.
> 
> I understand that this is your point of view. You have stated it 
even more
> definitively above.
> 
> > Therefore, your arguments still need to take into consideration 
the 
> > meaning of the term "sentient existence" as used in my 
subcommentary 
> > in line with Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary.
> > 
> > Of course, I will consider your argumemts written from the 
> > perspective of the narrower limited meaning of the 
term "sentient" as 
> > sensory. I will also look forward to your arguments based on 
wider 
> > meaning of the term "sentient" covering both sensory and mental 
> > consciousnesses.
> 
> That is a good clarification. I will have to review the language 
of the Sutta to
> see how this may change the meaning. However, I am still 
interested to hear more
> about what the Buddha may have meant by saying that the Arahant in 
Parinibbana
> enters an 'undefined reality'. This does seem like a statement of 
complete
> cessation of all and every sort of existence to me, and I would 
like to know how
> it illluminates the 'complete cessation of sentient existence'. 
You stated in
> your subcommentary that you thought it meant that we could not 
define Parinibbana
> 'in terms of mind and matter'. I can certainly accept that. 
However, that either
> suggests that it can be defined in some other way that we limited 
earthly beings
> do not have access to, or else that it is a state truly beyond 
definition. There
> is nothing 'beyond definition' or 'undefineable' about complete 
cessation. If the
> lamp has not only gone out, but been utterly destroyed, what is 
there to say about
> that? It is not undefineable, it is smashed, finished, burnt out, 
over, dead. 
> Why does Buddha not say something this definite about the state of 
the Arahant if
> that is the case? I cannot believe that the Buddha in his wisdom 
would substitute
> uncertainty and undefineability for certainty and absolute clarity 
for no good
> reason. Clearly to me, the state of 'undefined reality' is 
something more than
> complete cessation of all existence. If indeed it is complete 
cessation of all
> sentient existence as you propose, then there must be another form 
of existence
> into which the Arahant enters which is truly 'undefineable', 
otherwise it just
> makes no sense that the Buddha would use this term.
> 
> I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. 
One really needs
> to deal with the term 'undefined reality' and account for its use 
in some way. Of
> course, it is 'undefineable' in terms of mind and matter as you 
state, but it
> still does not explain why the term is used at all, if you propose 
that it is
> indeed merely pointing to a state of complete cessation of all 
life, all
> existence, all experience, all consciousness, all awareness, 
nothing left but
> absence.
> 
> Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of 
Parinibbana 'is
> not one of darkness', but of light. And elsewhere he has said 
that 'mind is
> luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at 
least, if not
> to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas 
are only in a
> state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It 
implies that
> when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity 
to be
> discovered.
> 
> To me, these clues to the state the Buddha points to cannot be 
ignored or somehow
> explained away in terms that do not account for their actual 
usage. The Buddha
> said these things for a reason, and there must be an accounting 
taken of why he
> would possibly use terms that evoke such provocative possibilities 
if he were not
> trying to point to the state beyond existence, and that this state 
is one of light
> and freedom, not one of darkness and oblivion.
> 
> > If I haven't answered them in my previous two parts of the 
> > subcommentary, I will respond to them in my subsequent 
> > subcommentaries. 
> 
> I appreciate that, and while I review the translation with your 
latest good
> information, I will await your further comments.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ==================
> 
> > With regards,
> > 
> > Suan
> > 
> > 

	
10132

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 7:42am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard

 	
Hi all,

there is a paragraph in the book titled "Abhidhamma Studies" by Ven
Nyanaponika Thera 

Quote
"When in the above passage, the quality of a "real thing" is denied to the
attainment of cessation, this certainly does not mean that this state is
"unreal" in the sense of hallucinations or a figment of imagination. We
should therefore better speak of it as being "different real" because all
the data of our experience of reality and even of the most sublime states
of absorption are absent in the that state. In the same way, Nibbana may
be said to have no "existence" in terms of the khandhas world, but by
denying its reality we would fall into the error of annihilationism
(ucchedaditthi)." unquote.

Howard, in the appendix 2 of this book, it said abt memory, maybe the next
few days, I will type it out for your perusal. 

I would say this book is like a dissertation, a very interesting book to
read for those who are interested in understanding of Abhidhamma. I
personally think it is very refreshing. It also talk abt the time factor
of the present moment.




Kind regards
Ken O



--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote: > 
> 
> 
> Dear Robert Epstein And Howard
> 
> How are you?
> 
> Thank you for your kind responses to the Parinibbaana Subcommentary 
> Part Two.
> 
> I have read all your responses including Howard's post (10007) 
> regarding Robert's first reply.
> 
> As your responses contain very profound and interesting issues and 
> statements, I will have to analyse them carefully before I respond to 
> them. I may even need to go to other parts of the Tipitaka to get 
> more information, even though my experience with Tipitaka tells me 
> that statements and interpretations on nibbana, like any other topic, 
> are very consistent. 
> 
> In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to 
> me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I 
> would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have 
> you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems 
> that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife 
> Parinibbaana.
> 
> Apparantly, I may end up serializing Parinibbaana Subcommentaries. So 
> please be patient with the waiting periods.
> 
> By the way, I do not forget to write something as well in response to 
> Howard's "nonconceptual state of being."
> 
> With best wishes,
> 
> Suan
> 
> http://www.bodhiology.org
> 
> 


	
10133

From: Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 8:49am
Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Dear Robert,

Sorry to just drop in here. I may have missed earlier
dicussions but I thought this point was interesting. Normal
disclaimer: this is my understanding only!

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...]
> Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 11:01 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa
>
> Hi Howard.
> I guess this comes down to whether the mind is
> capable of a direct act of
> perception without forming a concept. I guess
> you would say that it is possible,
> that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is
> this at the level of satipatthana?
> And are there any recorded details as to how the
> mind functions or reduces its
> normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act?
>

By the model presented by the Abhidhamma, the mind
constantly cognizes, mostly without Sati and Panna,
different realities all the time. However, after the
cognition of realities fall away, the cognition of concept
virtually immediately arises, regardless of whether or not
Satipatthana is arising or not.

I think there are at least two follow-on questions from this
discussion:
1) What is satipathanna, and how is it different from the
mind that cognizes the realities but is not satipatthana?
2) Is cognizing concepts unpure? Does this mean people
developing Satipathanna have no concept?

I bet you have heard the answer to the first question
already. Satipatthana is citta and cetasikas rising to
cognize a reality as it truly is. Satipatthana always
arises with Panna (wisdom), and always has a reality, and
never concepts, as its object. Satipatthana is the *only*
way that panna can develop to the point of the
enlightenment. It is *impossible* to develop Satipatthana
without hearing from a Sammasam Buddha, unless one is a
self-englightened one (a Buddha). Satipatthana is different
from other cittas that arise to cognize realities as
discussed: by co-arising namas, by the object, by its
function, by result, and the proximity of how it arises.

It is possible for unskillful cittas to mistake something
not Satipatthana to be Satipatthana. As you can see, other
kinds of cittas (including those with attachments and
ignorance) can also have realities as their objects. A.
Sujin mentioned on the India trip that some people mistake
that they are developing Satipatthana because they have
moments that they experience one reality at a time.

As for the second question, you may be able to guess what I
am about to say. The "purity" of the mind more or less
totally depends on the qualities of the co-arising factors.
Regardless of the objects (realities or concepts), the mind
is unpure if there are akusala factors co-arising with it.
The mind is "pure" if there are kusala factors arising with
it. The interesting part, even if we are thinking about a
concept that appears like wisdom (thinking about the true
dhamma, for example), the mind that thinks about the concept
maybe in fact unpure if attachments or ignorance are
co-arising with the mind. Cognizing realities, or thinking
about the "right" concepts are no guarantee that the mind is
pure (you can see why chanting or memorizing Satipatthana
sutta may not help very much if there are no
understandings). In all cases, realities rise and fall by
their conditions, are non-self and uncontrollable, anatta.
Realities rule!

An arahat, someone whose mind is completely pure, also
cognize concepts. However, their minds (roughly) rise with
only sobhana (beautiful, pure) factors. They never mistake
concepts as realities or realities as concepts, a far cry
from someone who hasn't accumulated wisdom to tell the
differences.

kom
	
10134

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 4:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Sarah, Rob, and all -

I had written the following to you, Rob:

> Howard:
> Well, I'm now thinking that there might be dual rolls for memories. 
> On 
> the one hand, they might occur as mental concomitants to cittas, and could 
> condition the experiencing the object of the citta. And on the other hand, 
> a 
> memory can, itself, serve as the arammana of a citta.
> 
Also, You, Sarah, in replying to my post about Nyanaponika Thera's 
writing about the need for memory, posted the following material from his 
appendix on memory:
" On p121 he describes the 'simple act of seeing a rose' which 'is in 
reality a
very complex process composed of different phases, each consisting of 
numerous
smaller combinations of conscious processes (cittavithi), which again are 
made
up of several single moments of consciousness (cittakkhana) following each
other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. Among these phases there 
is
one that connects the present perception of a rose with a previous one, and
there is another that attaches to the present perception the name "rose"
remembered from previous experience...........Finally, the individual
contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be 
remembered
and coordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a 
rose.' "
I'd like to add a drop more from Ven Nyanaponika which points to my 
idea of memory as concomitant instead of object. In that same appendix, 
shortly after the rose example, he writes the following:
"Apart from what, in common usage, is called 'remembering,' the 
reminiscent function of perception in general operates also: (a) in the 
imperceptably brief phases of a complete perceptual process, the sequence of 
which is based on the connecting function of 'grasping the past phases'; (b) 
in the consecutive train of thoughts where this 'grasping of the past' is so 
habitual, and refers to an event so close to the present, that in normal 
parlance it is not called 'memory,' though it is not essentially different 
from it."
The view that I am tentatively adopting is that the function of 
memory, be it an aspect of sa~n~na or sati or both or somethings else, is 
constantly operative, in all cittas, as a concomitant, conditioning the citta 
(an internal conditioning), and generally serving as a summing-up feature, as 
a continuity provider, and as a comparison enabler, and, in addition, as with 
other concomitants, a memory may, itself, serve as an arammana for a citta. 
Now, this analysis, being based on mere deductive and inductive 
reasoning (as an attempt to make plausible the Abhidhammic scheme) has to be 
taken as mere conjecture. The only way to know for sure what the facts are is 
to develop the microscopic mindfulness and clear comprehension required to 
directly "see" what the facts are, or, lacking that, to be persuaded of the 
testimony of another who has done so.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10135

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:50am
Subject: FW: three rounds

 	
----------
Van: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...>
Datum: Mon, 17 Dec 2001 19:18:31 +0100
Aan: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...>
Onderwerp: three rounds

Jon wrote to Rob Ep:

I would like to fine-tune your 4 factors a little. I would state them as
follows:
1/ The study of the texts
2/ Ascertaining as surely as possible the intended meaning of the texts
(and this I believe requires association with someone who understands them
correctly)
3/ Considering and reflecting on what has been read and heard
4/ Understanding how that relates to the experience of the present moment

Consider the difference between these 2 statements:
(1) If you do A, B and C, then you will experience D.
(2) D can only be experienced if factors A, B and C have been developed.

The difference between the 2, which I'm sure you can appreciate, Rob, is
an important one. It is my attempt at distinguishing between the factors
being seen as 'things-to-do' and the same factors being regarded as things
of value in their own right, worth developing, and about which we have
confidence that, properly developed, will lead us in the right direction
but the fruit of which will only become apparent as and when conditions
that are peculiar to us allow.

What I am trying to say is that there is no *perceptible, immediately
obvious* connection between the necessary factors properly developed and
the understanding for which these factors are an indispensible
pre-condition (but then who said it was a '4-steps-to-understanding' kind
of thing?). The simile given in the suttas is that of the grip marks that
gradually get worn into the wooden handle of a carpenter's tool: no
wearing away is ever apparent at the time, only over time and after
continued use (this is the 'adze handle' simile).

This lack of immediate feedback by which 'progress' can be seen and
'practice' thereby verified makes it all the more important that we have a
proper understanding in the first place of what the path is as taught.

Nina: Dear Jonothan, I was so happy with your post here. This refers to what
I wrote before to you about A. Sujin stressing very much in India (and
before): sacca ~naa.na, firm foundation knowledge of the truth that has to
be realized, kicca ~naa.na, the task that is development, kata ~naa.na, the
fruit that becomes apparent, but many degrees of these three.
I want to write about it in my India impressions but this subject is very
difficult, so I am waiting for more details when you are in Bgk. It is
wonderful Jaran will be there too, he studies commentaries in Thai. I give
you the location in the Thai co : Co to Dhammacakkaa pavattana sutta,
Mahåvagga, in Thai part 2, p. 426: I got stuck where it states about the 12
aspects, three rounds for four Truths.
I like your stressing that we should first have a proper understanding of
what the Path is. 
Nina. 


	
10136

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 0:19pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard,
I've been loosely peeking in at your recent discussion, and I like 
the questions and investigations you are doing. I've been quite 
tempted to join in the discussion, and I couldn't hold back any 
longer. Brief comments below.

> The view that I am tentatively adopting is that the function 
of 
> memory, be it an aspect of sa~n~na or sati or both or somethings 
else, is 
> constantly operative, in all cittas, as a concomitant, conditioning 
the citta 
> (an internal conditioning), and generally serving as a summing-up 
feature, as 
> a continuity provider, and as a comparison enabler, and, in 
addition, as with 
> other concomitants, a memory may, itself, serve as an arammana for 
a citta. 

Patthana also has sañña as a concommitant (cetasika), conditioning 
the citta (conascence). I like your "summing-up feature" idea, but 
I'm not sure about this "continuity provider". What is this 
continuity? Is it a sense of continuity? A real continuity? And what 
exactly IS a comparison? Holding two objects at the same time and 
weighing them, like on a scale? Or holding one, "marking" it, and 
then holding another with sañña again marking, i.e. giving an 
impression of change, difference, similarity? Once the old object is 
gone, it's gone. What is there in the remembering? Nothing, really, 
just a sense of similarity, no?

Very scattered thinking, but maybe I'll get some time next March to 
think more clearly about this all.

Whew!

Dan
	
10137

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 1:31pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginnings, Endings, Sati, and Pa~n~na

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/18/01 5:10:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> Howard, I think you might find it interesting to read the full chapter here.
> I’m looking forward to the day when the full Visuddhimagga is on line as 
> there
> are some useful parts in the section on ‘knowledge of rise and all’ in ch 
> XX.
> 93f. 
> 
===========================
Well, I've just gotta sit myself down and really study it. I happen to 
own the work.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10138

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 1:51pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi, Herman -

In a message dated 12/18/01 5:34:44 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
hhofman@d... writes:


> Dear Howard, 
> 
> Thank you up front for all the issues you raise and fruitful 
> discussions that you initiate. I regret not being able to participate 
> to the extent that I would like. My non-participation is not a 
> statement about what I perceive the value of matters raised to be, 
> more a statement of how I am currently allocating my time. And the 
> big winners are the really mundane issues like work, work, work. Many 
> people (sorry again, Rob Ep) have raised really interesting and 
> important discussions that I would have like to contribute to, but it 
> just didn't happen. I am especially sorry that I have not replied to 
> Frank Kuan's recent posts. Sorry, Frank.
> 
> Anyway, Howard, thank you for reading this introduction.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
A pleasure! Thanks for saying what you said.
-----------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Are you saying that what is perceived is not "tempered" by the 
> process of perception, by the organs of perception, by the quality of 
> the medium through which particular qualities of the rupa are 
> transmitted? Does a mosquito see the same as a snail ? 
> 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I'm not saying that at all. In fact, since my take on matters is 
phenomenological (rather than materialist, or objectivist), from my 
perspective it is *all* about perception, though there are commonalities 
among "perceivers" which provide an inter-subjectivity (as opposed to an 
objectivity).
No, what I was saying was, for example, that there is a difference 
between hearing a sound and hearing a melody. When we hear a sound, it is a 
simple percept which is heard. When we "hear" a melody we actually cognize a 
mental construct composed by the mind from a sequence of heard sounds. (A 
single sound, as heard, however, while not such a composition, is nonetheless 
influenced (conditioned) by numerous mental concomitants including 
dispositions and also by previous sounds. For example, a sound may be heard 
as quiet following a very loud sound, but may be heard as loud following a 
very soft sound.)
----------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> I have many more questions , but this'll do for starters :-)
> 
> 
> All the best
> 
> Herman
> 
===================================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10139

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:00pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Mike -

In a message dated 12/18/01 5:47:19 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> Hi Howard,
> 
> Hope you don't mind my butting in again...
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> > sarahdhhk@y... writes:
> >
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > I prefer your later> 
> > > time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest
> > that the occurrence of citta 
> > > A
> > > and citta B are a condition for citta C.
> > > 
> >
> -----------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> > Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I
> > prefer the idea of the 
> > memory of a past object being a concomitant of the
> > current citta in which 
> > there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a
> > past object need not be 
> > considered an object itself. So there could be the
> > hearing of a current sound 
> > together with the memory of the immediately
> > preceding slightly louder or 
> > softer sound, or even further back than the
> > immediately preceding sound. 
> 
> I think you're starting to lose me here. If I may
> turn off the TV and go back to the movie metaphor,
> isn't this like seeing more than one frame at a time? 
> It makes more sense to me that whatever is compounded
> of more than one moment's experience is concept, not
> experience itself--of course I may be wrong about
> this.
> 
---------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
No, I'm not thinking, in this context, of a memory as providing an 
object in addition to the current object. I'm thinking of the memory as a 
subliminal memory *trace* which conditions the current object by its presence 
and is a mental concomitant of the current citta. For example, the "memory" 
of the immediately preceding very soft sound may cause the current sound to 
appear very loud. But it is only the current sound that is the object of the 
current citta. At other times, a memory may not be subliminal, but may be the 
unique object of the current citta.
---------------------------------------------------------

> 
> > After all, we can and do distinguish between a
> > current object and a 
> > remembered preceding one. 
> 
> Awareness (or is it understanding?) can and maybe does
> do this, but--
> 
> > We never confuse a 
> > memory with a current discernment.
> 
> Maybe I'm misunderstanding you--but in fact, I think
> this kind of confusion is the normal state of
> things--'I' ceaselessly confuse, for example, 'my'
> concept (memory) of 'this computer' with the
> experience of present phenomena. A moment of truly
> making this distinction is a very rare one, I think.
> 
> My apologies if I've misconstrued your comments!
> 
> mike
> 
===============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10140

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:22pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Dan -

In a message dated 12/18/01 3:22:08 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
dalthorp@o... writes:


> Hi Howard,
> I've been loosely peeking in at your recent discussion, and I like 
> the questions and investigations you are doing. I've been quite 
> tempted to join in the discussion, and I couldn't hold back any 
> longer. Brief comments below.
> 
> > The view that I am tentatively adopting is that the function 
> of 
> > memory, be it an aspect of sa~n~na or sati or both or somethings 
> else, is 
> > constantly operative, in all cittas, as a concomitant, conditioning 
> the citta 
> > (an internal conditioning), and generally serving as a summing-up 
> feature, as 
> > a continuity provider, and as a comparison enabler, and, in 
> addition, as with 
> > other concomitants, a memory may, itself, serve as an arammana for 
> a citta. 
> 
> Patthana also has sañña as a concommitant (cetasika), conditioning 
> the citta (conascence). I like your "summing-up feature" idea, but 
> I'm not sure about this "continuity provider". What is this 
> continuity? Is it a sense of continuity? A real continuity?
> 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
It's a *sense* of continuity, and it would be due to the summing-up 
feature.
-------------------------------------------------------------
And what > 
> exactly IS a comparison? Holding two objects at the same time and 
> weighing them, like on a scale? Or holding one, "marking" it, and 
> then holding another with sañña again marking, i.e. giving an 
> impression of change, difference, similarity? Once the old object is 
> gone, it's gone. What is there in the remembering? Nothing, really, 
> just a sense of similarity, no?
> 
---------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Perhaps that is enough. But I have to plead major ignorance on this 
question.
---------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Very scattered thinking, but maybe I'll get some time next March to 
> think more clearly about this all.
> 
> Whew!
> 
> 
============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10141

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 2:44pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard and everyone,

<<---------------------------------------------------------------
I think the most important part of what Nyanaponika says with respect 
to this thread is "Finally, the individual contributions of all those 
different perceptual processes have to be remembered and coordinated in 
order 
to form the final and complete perception of a rose." So, memory is being 
used as a summing-up operation which makes non-co-occurring things co-occur.
----------------------------------------------------------------- >>

I still have a hard time to understand what you tried to say.

Let me try to say something from different way. I have to repeat some 
statements.

My understanding is sanna, vedana, sakara (other cetasikas) and vinnana 
(citta) always coarise. In the same citta, all four arise simultaneously, 
have exactly the same arammana, one arammana at a time and then fall away 
together completely.

Sanna (memory, recognition, perception....) is namadhamma which have a nature 
of marking, noting, registering, retention, recall.

Sati (mindfulness, awareness, at times memory!!) is another namadhamma which 
has character of not-floting away, functions as not-confusing(from what is 
kusala, akusala, nama , rupa), its manifestation as facing or attending its 
arammana and has firm rememberance as its proximate cause.

So sanna co-occur with every citta, while sati co-occur only in every 
good(sobana) citta.

Sanna mainly has two main kinds, sacca-sanna and attasanna (at times called 
nanatta-sanna, including kana (samuha)-sanna(moha-based),, kama-sanna 
(lobha-based), patika-sanna (dosa-based)

My understanding is citta is so fast reality is hard to see b/c atta-sanna 
always disguises what is real(sacca). Sacca sanna will gradually develop as 
sati-patthana developing. Sarah mentioned about Udayappaya-~nana , which is a 
wisdom level that can really see sacca b/c kana-sanna is eradicated by wisdom 
that can clearly see anatta. 

It always happens in daily life but hard to really, if the previous rupa or 
arammana does not cease, there will be no sucessive arammana. But b/c the 
citta and aramana are completely fallen away so new citta and sanna can 
recognize new stimulus and later on become a continuity or story.

I cannot imagine how to live in this world without sanna. I agree with the 
last part of your statements above. Sanna is pervasive. Sound to me that your 
whole statement and topic refer to a very long long citta process, and of 
course sanna occur all along in that process. I don't think I can come up 
exactly with a mechanism of continuity. But let me share some experience. 

I went to Universal Studio in LA many years ago. I'd seen "Back to the 
Future", I do not remember how to call this type of movie but it's all 
simulated. I sat in a car-like theatre. Well, in a movie, there was a scene 
that make me feel like the car is falling down into a crater. I really felt 
that I was falling down. My perception was the dinosaurs are becoming bigger 
and bigger, the the crater's wall is moving upward (by cinematography 
technique) and I was about to fall in to a mouth of a dinosaur. The sound 
effects of gusty blowing wind, also the theatre was made that it can drop 
down and rotate (it can drop only a foot oor two). The combination of the 
visual perception, sound effect, the my physical sensation (positional sense, 
muscle tone that I try to counteract my sense of falling, heart rate, and so 
on) and definitely my sanna, my citta and other cetasikas was working in an 
extremely well organized manner, so my mind perceived that I was falling into 
a crater into a mouth of a dinosaur. When I stepped out of the theatre, I 
looked back at the car and a thought came to me that it was all an illusion. 
In that 15 minutes, definitely there was a series of long rapid successive 
moments of nama-rupa perception-->color/seeing, sound/hearing, 
kaya-arammana/physical sensation and concept(pannatti)/mano-dvara. Sanna is 
there all along, definitely atta-sanna, kana-sanna, attha-sanna. It's me who 
was falling, dinosaur was going to eat me. Sucessive perception and mental 
processes become story. It was fun. I can recall that pretty clearly, 
definitely with sanna, citta and other conditions as well. 

Num
	
10142

From: azita gill <gazita2002@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 9:00pm
Subject: chatgroup

 	
Hi all, Azita is my name, and I have benn reading
very interesting Dhamma via the dsg. However I am
having difficulty sending mail to the group. Is there
a code i should know about or ..... I am lost and
would love to comment on some of what I read. 
Azita.

http://greetings.yahoo.com.au - Yahoo! Greetings
- Send your festive greetings online!
	
10143

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 10:03pm
Subject: Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5>

 	
Dear Friends,

********************
Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by Buddhaghosa

Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the
introductory chapter to the Smp. which I'm quoting from
********************

Just to recap, in the Baahiranidaana, Buddhaghosa is establishing the
authenticity of the Vinaya, Suttanta and Abhidhamma. The ‘Dhamma and the
Vinaya’ took 7 months to rehearse at the 1st Council held in Rajagaha, 2 months
after the Buddha’s Parinibbana.

Just to repeat from last week’s final paragraph from this text:

‘ The word of the Buddha which should be known as uniform in sentiment, twofold
as the Dhamma and the Vinaya, threefold according to the first, intermediate,
and last words, and similarly as Pitakas (Baskets), fivefold according to the
Nikayas (Collections), ninefold according to the Angas (Factors), and forming
84,000 divisions according to the Units of the Dhamma.’
......

To continue:
‘How is it twofold as the dhamma and the vinaya? All this, in its entirety, is
reckoned as the dhamma and the Vinaya. Herein the Basket of the Discipline is
the Vinaya, the rest of the word of the Buddha is the Dhamma. Hence was it
stated: “Let us, friends, rehearse the Dhamma and the Vinaya,” and :I shall
question Upali on the Vinaya and Ananda on the dhamma.” Thus it is twofold as
the Dhamma and the Vinaya.’ <end quote.
.....

A little later we read:

‘How is it threefold according to the Pitakas? Indeed, all this, in its
entirety, has the three divisions as the Vinaya-pitaka, the suttantapitaka, and
the Abhidhammapitaka. Therein, having brought together all that has been both
rehearsed and not at the First convocation, both Patimokkha, the two Vibhanga,
the 22 Khandhaka, and the 16 Parivara, it is called the Vinayapitaka.

‘The collection of the 34 suttas beginning with Brahmajala called the
Dighanikaya, that of 152 suttas beginning with Mulapariyaya called the
Majjhimanikaya, that of 7,762 suttas beginning with Oghataranasutta called the
Samyuttanikaya, that of 9.557 suttas beginning with the Cittapariyadanasutta,
called the Anguttaranikaya, and the Khuddakanikaya consisting of the 15 works:
Khuddakapatha, Dhammapada, Udana, Itivuttaka, Suttanipata, Vimanavatthu,
Petavatthu, Thera and Therigatha, Jataka, Niddesa, Patisambhida, Apadana,
Buddhavamsa, and Cariyapitaka, are called Suttantapitaka.

Dhammasangani, Vibhanga, dhatukatha, Puggalapannatti, Kathavattu, Yamaka, and
Patthana constitute the Abhidhammapitaka.’ <end quote>
.....

With regard to the term, Abhidhamma, it says: 

‘Since here are found conditions which possess growth and their own
characteristics, are revered and differentiated and said to be excellent- on
account of these it is called Abhidhamma.’ <end quote>.
.....

A little later, there is a description of the 3 Pitakas, Vinaya, suttanta and
Abhidhamma:

‘Here follows the explanation and elucidation. These three Pitakas, indeed,
according to formal analyses are said to be the authoritative injunctions, the
popular teachings, and the ultimate truth respectively; or they are the
discourses necesitated by transgressions, those adapted to circumstances, and
those set out in acordance with reality respectively; or again, discourses on
the various categories of restraint, on the refutation of heresies, and on the
distinction between Name and Form <i.e. nama and rupa>, respectively. Herein,
the Vinayapitaka is called the exposition of injunctions as it has been
preached with a preponderance of authority by the Exalted One in whom all
authority is vested; the suttapitaka, the exposition of popular teachings as
it has beem preached with great emphasis on popular ethics by the Exalted One
who was proficient in popular ethics; and the Abhidhammapitaka, the exposition
of ultimate truth as it has been preached with great leanings on absolute truth
by the Exalted One who is adept in the absolute truths.

‘Likewise, the first is called the teaching necessitated by transgressions
wherin those beings who are given to many misdeeds are admonished in accordance
with the nature of their offences; the second, that adapted to circumstances
wherein beings who are given to divers dispositions, latent tendencies, and
traits of character are admonished in accordance with their adaptability; and
the third, that set out in accordance with reality wherein bengs who conceive
of an ego and what pertains to it, only in the presence of a pile of
conditions, are instructed in terms of the absolute truth.......’ <end quote>

********************

So we have in these quotes the emphasis on ‘uniform sentiment’ in the 3 Pitakas
and the different emphasis, according to circumstances, of which language or
‘style’ is used.

In the Atthasalini (The Expositor), we also find references to the
Abhidhamma-Pitaka being included in the Khuddaka Nikaya (as rehearsed at the
First Council) and also references to the Abhidhamma in one or two suttas which
Rob K kindly brought to my/our attention *. I may refer to these next time.
.....

Meanwhile, I promised Ken O to check Buddhaghosa’s sources more carefully for
this ‘episode’. Buddhaghosa himself makes it clear in Smp. that, as with all
his commentaries, this is ‘a re-compiled commentary’ of the Siiha.la
A.t.thakathaa. which was first recited under Mahinda. According to
Jayawickrama’s introduction to the Baahiranidaana: 

‘Evidence is not lacking for the survival of the Sihala Atthakatha even after
Buddhaghosa and the other commentators that followed, though they finally went
into oblivion in due course. The statement that they burned in a huge bonfire
is merely a figurative way of stating that they no longer served any purpose.
The disappearance of the Sihala Atthkatha is looked upon by writers as a great
blow to the development of Sinhalese literature. However that may be, it is
decidedly the fruits of the endeavours of the ‘teachers of yore’ in some
finalized form that were available to Buddhaghosa when he started compiling his
commentaries and paved the way for the perfet commentarial literature in Pali
available today.....’ 
.....

I mentioned before that according to Buddhaghosa, the origin of the Mahavihara
commentarial tradition goes back to the time of the First Coucil. The
commentaries were, he writes:

‘....rehearsed at the very outset, for the purpose of elucidating the meaning,
by the 500 (who were) endowed with self-mastery, and were likewise rehearsed
even afterwards were subsequently brought to the island of the Sihalas by
Maha-Mahinda (who was) endowed with self-mastery...’ 
.....

I quoted last time that sometimes the Buddha preached ‘a sermon in concise
form’ and then one of the chief disciples would explain in greater detail.
Malalasekera continues (The Pali Literature of Ceylon);

‘When later the text of the canon came to be compiled, arranged, and edited,
some of the expositions found their way into the Pitakas and were given a
permanent place therein. Thus we have the Sangiti-suttanta of the Digha
Nikaya, ascribed to Sariputta and forming a complete catechism of terms and
passages of exegetical nature. Such was also the Sacca-vibhanga (an exposition
of the four Noble Truths) of the Majjhima, which later found its proper place
in the second book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, and also the Madhu-pindika-sutta
of Maha-Kaccayana, included in the Majjhima Nikaya. It sometimes happened that
for a proper understanding of the text, explanations of a commentarial nature
were quite essential; and in such cases the commentary was naturally
incorporated into the text and formed part of the text itself.......Then there
is the Niddesa, a whole book of commentary on texts now included in the
Sutta-nipata; and there are passages clearly of a commentarial nature
scattered throughout the Nikayas.’ <end all quotes>

********************

This is a really just a little fun exercise for me and a bit of a balancing act
between the historical information, present relevance, abhidhamma vs
commentaries, Baahiranidaana vs other texts and so on. Of course there is more
that could have been included on the early schisms, linguistic traditions,
arrival of Mahinda, Indian commentaries and so on.....Mainly I’ll drift on with
the passages I find of most interest unless anyone 'shouts', like Ken O. 

Sarah

*http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


10144

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 10:10pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] chatgroup

 	
Hi Azita,

I'm glad to hear you're following dsg.

Certainly this post of yours has been sent Ok, so just keep doing whatever you
did with this one;-)

To reply to a particular post, you could try hitting the 'reply' tag above the
message, then editing the message and adding your note and when it's done, hit
the 'send' tag.

Very best wishes to you and all our other old dsg friends Down Under.....must
be nice and warm in Queensland right now.....

Look forward to all those saved up comments. 

xxSarah

p.s maybe you could let Jon know off-list if you're still having any trouble
replying.

--- azita gill <gazita2002@y...> wrote: > Hi all, Azita is my
name, and I have benn reading
> very interesting Dhamma via the dsg. However I am
> having difficulty sending mail to the group. Is there
> a code i should know about or ..... I am lost and
> would love to comment on some of what I read. 
> Azita.
> 


	

 	 

	
10145

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 5:44pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard

 	
Hi, Suan -

In a message dated 12/18/01 9:49:45 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
abhidhammika@y... writes:


> In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to 
> me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I 
> would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have 
> you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems 
> that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife 
> Parinibbaana.
> 
===========================
What I mean by 'nihilism' is the belief that nothing exists at all, in 
any manner. What I mean by 'annihilationism' is the belief that there are 
things which truly exist, but then cease to exist in any sense at all, are 
annihilated. 
I understand Buddhism to teach that conditioned dhammas exist 
dependently, contingently, lacking own-being, and not as independent 
"things", but only things-in-relation. Because of such (contingent) 
existence, nihilism is false. Because of the lack of *independent* existence, 
both substantialism and annihilationism are false. And because of 
impermanence of all conditioned dhammas, eternalism is also false.
As far as nibbana is concerned, at least nibbana without remnant, I 
see it as consciousness of absence of objects: a luminous, timeless reality, 
permanent in the double sense of being timeless, and of being available at 
all times from within the temporal realms. Nibbana with remnant, the ordinary 
state of the living arahant, I see as based on the luminous, timeless 
nibbana, but with an overlay of conditions which are seen through as empty, 
fleeting shadows. (I have no way of expressing this except in a semi-poetic 
way.)

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10146

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 10:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who?

 	
--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert,
> 
> I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby control form.

Hi Victor,
No, the idea that I got is just that you are saying there is a self beyond form,
beyond the khandas.

So my question to you is: Do you think there is a self beyond form, and what is
the nature of that self?

You say below that anatta does not mean there is no self. I believe most
Theravadins here would say that anatta means that nothing that can be pointed to
in the world of form qualifies as self, and that nothing beyond the world of form
can be called 'self' either.

What, if anything, would you say qualifies as a definition of self or a 'true
self', as opposed to the false self of the khandas?

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

==========================

> I will try to be more clear:
> 
> Form is not self implies that form cannot control itself.
> Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control form.
> Form is not self does not imply that one cannot be controlled by form.
> Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control oneself.
> 
> One can control oneself.
> One can control oneself does not imply that one can control form.
> One can control oneself does not imply that one can be controlled by form.
> 
> Why identify form as self by saying "one can control form"?
> Why identify form as self by saying "one can be controlled by form"?
> 
> Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control form"?
> Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot be controlled by form"?
> Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control oneself"?
> 
> I am not sure how you got the idea that 'anatta' means that "there is no
> self"?
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Robert Epstein" <epsteinrob@Y...>
> To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 1:54 AM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who control what?
> 
> 
> > Thank you Victor. I think that is a lot more clear.
> >
> > Yes, it makes sense to refrain from identifying 'form' of any kind as
> 'self'.
> > However when you say that 'one' can possibly control form, you are
> implying that
> > this 'one' is a 'self' that may or may not control form, although as you
> say,
> > 'form' is not self. So this seems to me to be a contradiction of
> 'anatta', which
> > not only says that the kandhas are not self, but that *there is no self*
> period,
> > that the idea of self is an illusion. Do you agree with this, or do you
> think
> > that there is a self that is beyond form?
> >
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> >
> > ================
> >
> > --- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote:


	
10147

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:00pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote:
> Dear Robert,
> 
> Sorry to you and anyone else, I had no idea this was already a point 
> of discussion. 
> 
> Thank you for your reply all the same. I'll try to pay a bit more 
> attention in future. 
> 
> All the best
> 
> Herman
> 

=========
Dear Herman,
Oh, I didn't think you were being redundant. I was glad you brought it up, since
it still seems to be unresolved for me.

Robert Ep.

=========


> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> > 
> > --- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote:
> > > Hi all,
> > > 
> > > When I think I am having a moment of awareness, I am not aware of 
> > > phenomena as they are, but I am aware of phenomena as they are 
> not.
> > > When the penny drops, I understand , this is not real. What I 
> mean by 
> > > that is: When the penny drops, I understand, that what I thought 
> I 
> > > was seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling (note five, not 
> six 
> > > senses) is not what is out there, in reality, but in here , as 
> > > recreated by a complex series of interdependant processes, 
> including 
> > > stimuli from very real, but very unknowable rupas.
> > 
> > Well, I raised this question as to the distinction of 'rupas' about 
> a week ago,
> > but since you mention it, I'll join in raising it again. What 
> makes a 'rupa'
> > 'directly seen'. Is it not still transmitted through a 
> sensory/mental process?
> > 
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> > PS. I apologize in advance if this has already been explained to 
> me and I've
> > forgotten. I do have a slight feeling of deja vu.
> > 
> > =======================
> > 
> > > What exactly is a mental representation of a physical object but 
> a 
> > > mental object? What is my point? Rupas are not known as rupas, 
> they 
> > > are known as namas. Awareness can only be restricted to the 
> content 
> > > of the mind, the outside world is always an interpreted 
> > > representation.
> > > 
> > > I read an interesting line the other day : "We live in a three 
> pound 
> > > universe, the brain". If anyone doubts it, a visit to a mental 
> > > hospital or clinic for brain-injured people would be enlightening.
> > > 
> > > All the best
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Herman

	
10148

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:09pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard

 	
Dear Suan,
I will of course be happy to wait until your next subcommentary, and will be very
happy when it arrives. I also want to re-read your Subcommentary part II which I
find has some fascinating elements. It seems to me that you have written an
argument there that actually agrees with my sense of the 'undefined reality' of
the Arahant in Parinibbana, but I may very well be deluded. I will go back to it
and hopefully be able to say something more about it in the near future, while
waiting for your next message.

Regards,
Robert Ep.

===============================

--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Dear Robert Epstein And Howard
> 
> How are you?
> 
> Thank you for your kind responses to the Parinibbaana Subcommentary 
> Part Two.
> 
> I have read all your responses including Howard's post (10007) 
> regarding Robert's first reply.
> 
> As your responses contain very profound and interesting issues and 
> statements, I will have to analyse them carefully before I respond to 
> them. I may even need to go to other parts of the Tipitaka to get 
> more information, even though my experience with Tipitaka tells me 
> that statements and interpretations on nibbana, like any other topic, 
> are very consistent. 
> 
> In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to 
> me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I 
> would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have 
> you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems 
> that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife 
> Parinibbaana.
> 
> Apparantly, I may end up serializing Parinibbaana Subcommentaries. So 
> please be patient with the waiting periods.
> 
> By the way, I do not forget to write something as well in response to 
> Howard's "nonconceptual state of being."
> 
> With best wishes,
> 
> Suan
> 
> http://www.bodhiology.org
> 


	
10149

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard

 	
--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> there is a paragraph in the book titled "Abhidhamma Studies" by Ven
> Nyanaponika Thera 
> 
> Quote
> "When in the above passage, the quality of a "real thing" is denied to the
> attainment of cessation, this certainly does not mean that this state is
> "unreal" in the sense of hallucinations or a figment of imagination. We
> should therefore better speak of it as being "different real" because all
> the data of our experience of reality and even of the most sublime states
> of absorption are absent in the that state. In the same way, Nibbana may
> be said to have no "existence" in terms of the khandhas world, but by
> denying its reality we would fall into the error of annihilationism
> (ucchedaditthi)." unquote.

This is a great quote, Kenneth, and I hope Suan will note the Pali {?} here for
'annihilationism' {ucchedaditthi}, which may put the idea into a better context.

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

=================================

> Howard, in the appendix 2 of this book, it said abt memory, maybe the next
> few days, I will type it out for your perusal. 
> 
> I would say this book is like a dissertation, a very interesting book to
> read for those who are interested in understanding of Abhidhamma. I
> personally think it is very refreshing. It also talk abt the time factor
> of the present moment.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote: > 
> > 
> > 
> > Dear Robert Epstein And Howard
> > 
> > How are you?
> > 
> > Thank you for your kind responses to the Parinibbaana Subcommentary 
> > Part Two.
> > 
> > I have read all your responses including Howard's post (10007) 
> > regarding Robert's first reply.
> > 
> > As your responses contain very profound and interesting issues and 
> > statements, I will have to analyse them carefully before I respond to 
> > them. I may even need to go to other parts of the Tipitaka to get 
> > more information, even though my experience with Tipitaka tells me 
> > that statements and interpretations on nibbana, like any other topic, 
> > are very consistent. 
> > 
> > In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain to 
> > me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, I 
> > would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? Have 
> > you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems 
> > that these terms play important roles in understanding the afterlife 
> > Parinibbaana.
> > 
> > Apparantly, I may end up serializing Parinibbaana Subcommentaries. So 
> > please be patient with the waiting periods.
> > 
> > By the way, I do not forget to write something as well in response to 
> > Howard's "nonconceptual state of being."
> > 
> > With best wishes,
> > 
> > Suan
> > 
> > http://www.bodhiology.org
> > 


	
10150

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:18pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Dear Kom,
Thank you very much for 'dropping in'!

I take it that what you are saying is that the mind of the Arahant will still have
concepts arising, but that they will never be confused with arising realities. 
Therefore in the moment that a 'rupa' is the object of discernment the 'rupa' will
be seen by sati and panna for what it truly is, and this is direct perception of
'rupa'? I take it that 'nama' can also be directly perceived as what it is by the
Arahant?

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

=============

--- Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> wrote:
> Dear Robert,
> 
> Sorry to just drop in here. I may have missed earlier
> dicussions but I thought this point was interesting. Normal
> disclaimer: this is my understanding only!
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...]
> > Sent: Monday, December 17, 2001 11:01 PM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa
> >
> > Hi Howard.
> > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is
> > capable of a direct act of
> > perception without forming a concept. I guess
> > you would say that it is possible,
> > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is
> > this at the level of satipatthana?
> > And are there any recorded details as to how the
> > mind functions or reduces its
> > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act?
> >
> 
> By the model presented by the Abhidhamma, the mind
> constantly cognizes, mostly without Sati and Panna,
> different realities all the time. However, after the
> cognition of realities fall away, the cognition of concept
> virtually immediately arises, regardless of whether or not
> Satipatthana is arising or not.
> 
> I think there are at least two follow-on questions from this
> discussion:
> 1) What is satipathanna, and how is it different from the
> mind that cognizes the realities but is not satipatthana?
> 2) Is cognizing concepts unpure? Does this mean people
> developing Satipathanna have no concept?
> 
> I bet you have heard the answer to the first question
> already. Satipatthana is citta and cetasikas rising to
> cognize a reality as it truly is. Satipatthana always
> arises with Panna (wisdom), and always has a reality, and
> never concepts, as its object. Satipatthana is the *only*
> way that panna can develop to the point of the
> enlightenment. It is *impossible* to develop Satipatthana
> without hearing from a Sammasam Buddha, unless one is a
> self-englightened one (a Buddha). Satipatthana is different
> from other cittas that arise to cognize realities as
> discussed: by co-arising namas, by the object, by its
> function, by result, and the proximity of how it arises.
> 
> It is possible for unskillful cittas to mistake something
> not Satipatthana to be Satipatthana. As you can see, other
> kinds of cittas (including those with attachments and
> ignorance) can also have realities as their objects. A.
> Sujin mentioned on the India trip that some people mistake
> that they are developing Satipatthana because they have
> moments that they experience one reality at a time.
> 
> As for the second question, you may be able to guess what I
> am about to say. The "purity" of the mind more or less
> totally depends on the qualities of the co-arising factors.
> Regardless of the objects (realities or concepts), the mind
> is unpure if there are akusala factors co-arising with it.
> The mind is "pure" if there are kusala factors arising with
> it. The interesting part, even if we are thinking about a
> concept that appears like wisdom (thinking about the true
> dhamma, for example), the mind that thinks about the concept
> maybe in fact unpure if attachments or ignorance are
> co-arising with the mind. Cognizing realities, or thinking
> about the "right" concepts are no guarantee that the mind is
> pure (you can see why chanting or memorizing Satipatthana
> sutta may not help very much if there are no
> understandings). In all cases, realities rise and fall by
> their conditions, are non-self and uncontrollable, anatta.
> Realities rule!
> 
> An arahat, someone whose mind is completely pure, also
> cognize concepts. However, their minds (roughly) rise with
> only sobhana (beautiful, pure) factors. They never mistake
> concepts as realities or realities as concepts, a far cry
> from someone who hasn't accumulated wisdom to tell the
> differences.
> 
> kom


	
10151

From: azita gill <gazita2002@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:18pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] contact [ not Phassa]

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote: > Hi Azita,
> 
> I'm glad to hear you're following dsg.
> 
> Certainly this post of yours has been sent Ok, so
> just keep doing whatever you
> did with this one;-)
> 
> To reply to a particular post, you could try hitting
> the 'reply' tag above the
> message, then editing the message and adding your
> note and when it's done, hit
> the 'send' tag.
> 
> Very best wishes to you and all our other old dsg
> friends Down Under.....must
> be nice and warm in Queensland right now.....
> 
> Look forward to all those saved up comments. 
> 
> xxSarah
> 
> p.s maybe you could let Jon know off-list if you're
> still having any trouble
> replying.
> 
> --- azita gill <gazita2002@y...> wrote: > 
> Hi all, Azita is my
> name, and I have benn reading
> > very interesting Dhamma via the dsg. However I
> am
> > having difficulty sending mail to the group. Is
> there
> > a code i should know about or ..... I am lost and
> > would love to comment on some of what I read. 
> 
> > Azita.
> > yes Sarah, it's meltingly hot here in Cairns. No
questions yet, this is another test run to see if I've
got it yet. Azita
> 
> 
>
	
10152

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:24pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Dear Dan,
You seem to raise the interesting possibility that comparisions regarding a
remembered object and another object may in fact not be real, but only be
conceptual. As I look at this, it seems very possible that the reality of memory
is necessarily selective, and not actual, since there is no longer a true and
detailed object to be observed.

Best,
Robert Ep.

=========================

--- onco111 <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> Hi Howard,
> I've been loosely peeking in at your recent discussion, and I like 
> the questions and investigations you are doing. I've been quite 
> tempted to join in the discussion, and I couldn't hold back any 
> longer. Brief comments below.
> 
> > The view that I am tentatively adopting is that the function 
> of 
> > memory, be it an aspect of sa~n~na or sati or both or somethings 
> else, is 
> > constantly operative, in all cittas, as a concomitant, conditioning 
> the citta 
> > (an internal conditioning), and generally serving as a summing-up 
> feature, as 
> > a continuity provider, and as a comparison enabler, and, in 
> addition, as with 
> > other concomitants, a memory may, itself, serve as an arammana for 
> a citta. 
> 
> Patthana also has sañña as a concommitant (cetasika), conditioning 
> the citta (conascence). I like your "summing-up feature" idea, but 
> I'm not sure about this "continuity provider". What is this 
> continuity? Is it a sense of continuity? A real continuity? And what 
> exactly IS a comparison? Holding two objects at the same time and 
> weighing them, like on a scale? Or holding one, "marking" it, and 
> then holding another with sañña again marking, i.e. giving an 
> impression of change, difference, similarity? Once the old object is 
> gone, it's gone. What is there in the remembering? Nothing, really, 
> just a sense of similarity, no?
> 
> Very scattered thinking, but maybe I'll get some time next March to 
> think more clearly about this all.
> 
> Whew!
> 
> Dan

	
10153

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:32pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5>

 	
Dear Sarah,
Just want to apologize for not responding to recent contributions to your Vinaya
Commentary posts.

I am very interested and I am collecting them, trying to look through them, and
hopefully will comment at some point in the near future.

Thanks for continuing this series.

Best,
Robert Ep.

======================

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Friends,
> 
> ********************
> Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by Buddhaghosa
> 
> Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the
> introductory chapter to the Smp. which I'm quoting from
> ********************
> 
> Just to recap, in the Baahiranidaana, Buddhaghosa is establishing the
> authenticity of the Vinaya, Suttanta and Abhidhamma. The ‘Dhamma and the
> Vinaya’ took 7 months to rehearse at the 1st Council held in Rajagaha, 2 months
> after the Buddha’s Parinibbana.
> 
> Just to repeat from last week’s final paragraph from this text:
> 
> ‘ The word of the Buddha which should be known as uniform in sentiment, twofold
> as the Dhamma and the Vinaya, threefold according to the first, intermediate,
> and last words, and similarly as Pitakas (Baskets), fivefold according to the
> Nikayas (Collections), ninefold according to the Angas (Factors), and forming
> 84,000 divisions according to the Units of the Dhamma.’
> ......
> 
> To continue:
> ‘How is it twofold as the dhamma and the vinaya? All this, in its entirety, is
> reckoned as the dhamma and the Vinaya. Herein the Basket of the Discipline is
> the Vinaya, the rest of the word of the Buddha is the Dhamma. Hence was it
> stated: “Let us, friends, rehearse the Dhamma and the Vinaya,” and :I shall
> question Upali on the Vinaya and Ananda on the dhamma.” Thus it is twofold as
> the Dhamma and the Vinaya.’ <end quote.
> .....
> 
> A little later we read:
> 
> ‘How is it threefold according to the Pitakas? Indeed, all this, in its
> entirety, has the three divisions as the Vinaya-pitaka, the suttantapitaka, and
> the Abhidhammapitaka. Therein, having brought together all that has been both
> rehearsed and not at the First convocation, both Patimokkha, the two Vibhanga,
> the 22 Khandhaka, and the 16 Parivara, it is called the Vinayapitaka.
> 
> ‘The collection of the 34 suttas beginning with Brahmajala called the
> Dighanikaya, that of 152 suttas beginning with Mulapariyaya called the
> Majjhimanikaya, that of 7,762 suttas beginning with Oghataranasutta called the
> Samyuttanikaya, that of 9.557 suttas beginning with the Cittapariyadanasutta,
> called the Anguttaranikaya, and the Khuddakanikaya consisting of the 15 works:
> Khuddakapatha, Dhammapada, Udana, Itivuttaka, Suttanipata, Vimanavatthu,
> Petavatthu, Thera and Therigatha, Jataka, Niddesa, Patisambhida, Apadana,
> Buddhavamsa, and Cariyapitaka, are called Suttantapitaka.
> 
> Dhammasangani, Vibhanga, dhatukatha, Puggalapannatti, Kathavattu, Yamaka, and
> Patthana constitute the Abhidhammapitaka.’ <end quote>
> .....
> 
> With regard to the term, Abhidhamma, it says: 
> 
> ‘Since here are found conditions which possess growth and their own
> characteristics, are revered and differentiated and said to be excellent- on
> account of these it is called Abhidhamma.’ <end quote>.
> .....
> 
> A little later, there is a description of the 3 Pitakas, Vinaya, suttanta and
> Abhidhamma:
> 
> ‘Here follows the explanation and elucidation. These three Pitakas, indeed,
> according to formal analyses are said to be the authoritative injunctions, the
> popular teachings, and the ultimate truth respectively; or they are the
> discourses necesitated by transgressions, those adapted to circumstances, and
> those set out in acordance with reality respectively; or again, discourses on
> the various categories of restraint, on the refutation of heresies, and on the
> distinction between Name and Form <i.e. nama and rupa>, respectively. Herein,
> the Vinayapitaka is called the exposition of injunctions as it has been
> preached with a preponderance of authority by the Exalted One in whom all
> authority is vested; the suttapitaka, the exposition of popular teachings as
> it has beem preached with great emphasis on popular ethics by the Exalted One
> who was proficient in popular ethics; and the Abhidhammapitaka, the exposition
> of ultimate truth as it has been preached with great leanings on absolute truth
> by the Exalted One who is adept in the absolute truths.
> 
> ‘Likewise, the first is called the teaching necessitated by transgressions
> wherin those beings who are given to many misdeeds are admonished in accordance
> with the nature of their offences; the second, that adapted to circumstances
> wherein beings who are given to divers dispositions, latent tendencies, and
> traits of character are admonished in accordance with their adaptability; and
> the third, that set out in accordance with reality wherein bengs who conceive
> of an ego and what pertains to it, only in the presence of a pile of
> conditions, are instructed in terms of the absolute truth.......’ <end quote>
> 
> ********************
> 
> So we have in these quotes the emphasis on ‘uniform sentiment’ in the 3 Pitakas
> and the different emphasis, according to circumstances, of which language or
> ‘style’ is used.
> 
> In the Atthasalini (The Expositor), we also find references to the
> Abhidhamma-Pitaka being included in the Khuddaka Nikaya (as rehearsed at the
> First Council) and also references to the Abhidhamma in one or two suttas which
> Rob K kindly brought to my/our attention *. I may refer to these next time.
> .....
> 
> Meanwhile, I promised Ken O to check Buddhaghosa’s sources more carefully for
> this ‘episode’. Buddhaghosa himself makes it clear in Smp. that, as with all
> his commentaries, this is ‘a re-compiled commentary’ of the Siiha.la
> A.t.thakathaa. which was first recited under Mahinda. According to
> Jayawickrama’s introduction to the Baahiranidaana: 
> 
> ‘Evidence is not lacking for the survival of the Sihala Atthakatha even after
> Buddhaghosa and the other commentators that followed, though they finally went
> into oblivion in due course. The statement that they burned in a huge bonfire
> is merely a figurative way of stating that they no longer served any purpose.
> The disappearance of the Sihala Atthkatha is looked upon by writers as a great
> blow to the development of Sinhalese literature. However that may be, it is
> decidedly the fruits of the endeavours of the ‘teachers of yore’ in some
> finalized form that were available to Buddhaghosa when he started compiling his
> commentaries and paved the way for the perfet commentarial literature in Pali
> available today.....’ 
> .....
> 
> I mentioned before that according to Buddhaghosa, the origin of the Mahavihara
> commentarial tradition goes back to the time of the First Coucil. The
> commentaries were, he writes:
> 
> ‘....rehearsed at the very outset, for the purpose of elucidating the meaning,
> by the 500 (who were) endowed with self-mastery, and were likewise rehearsed
> even afterwards were subsequently brought to the island of the Sihalas by
> Maha-Mahinda (who was) endowed with self-mastery...’ 
> .....
> 
> I quoted last time that sometimes the Buddha preached ‘a sermon in concise
> form’ and then one of the chief disciples would explain in greater detail.
> Malalasekera continues (The Pali Literature of Ceylon);
> 
> ‘When later the text of the canon came to be compiled, arranged, and edited,
> some of the expositions found their way into the Pitakas and were given a
> permanent place therein. Thus we have the Sangiti-suttanta of the Digha
> Nikaya, ascribed to Sariputta and forming a complete catechism of terms and
> passages of exegetical nature. Such was also the Sacca-vibhanga (an exposition
> of the four Noble Truths) of the Majjhima, which later found its proper place
> in the second book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, and also the Madhu-pindika-sutta
> of Maha-Kaccayana, included in the Majjhima Nikaya. It sometimes happened that
> for a proper understanding of the text, explanations of a commentarial nature
> were quite essential; and in such cases the commentary was naturally
> incorporated into the text and formed part of the text itself.......Then there
> is the Niddesa, a whole book of commentary on texts now included in the
> Sutta-nipata; and there are passages clearly of a commentarial nature
> scattered throughout the Nikayas.’ <end all quotes>
> 
> ********************
> 
> This is a really just a little fun exercise for me and a bit of a balancing act
> between the historical information, present relevance, abhidhamma vs
> commentaries, Baahiranidaana vs other texts and so on. Of course there is more
> that could have been included on the early schisms, linguistic traditions,
> arrival of Mahinda, Indian commentaries and so on.....Mainly I’ll drift on with
> the passages I find of most interest unless anyone 'shouts', like Ken O. 
> 
> Sarah
> 
> *http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


	
10154

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 18, 2001 11:51pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] contact [ not Phassa]

 	
Hi again Azita,

--- azita gill <gazita2002@y...> wrote:

> > > yes Sarah, it's meltingly hot here in Cairns. No
> questions yet, this is another test run to see if I've
> got it yet. Azita
> > 

You're almost getting it right..we're all hearing you loud and clear;-)

Perhaps you can put your new message at the top where we can see it, delete
some of the old stuff no longer needed in your reply (including the yahoo blurb
at the bottom so we don't re-read it all), and I'm not quite sure how your new
message ends up in these .>>quote marks, but you'll work all that out. If you
don't have any questions, we look forward to some answers!

Hope you don't melt before we hear back from you,
Sarah

p.s Some of us will be in Bkk over New Year (28th Dec til 1st Jan) if you're
able to join us;-)

	
10155

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 0:30am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5>

 	
Hi Sarah

thanks for the commentary. I keeping them just like Rob Ep.


Kind regards
Ken O (whispering)


--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote: > Dear Friends,
> 
> ********************
> Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by
> Buddhaghosa
> 
> Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the
> introductory chapter to the Smp. which I'm quoting from
> ********************
> 
> Just to recap, in the Baahiranidaana, Buddhaghosa is establishing the
> authenticity of the Vinaya, Suttanta and Abhidhamma. The ‘Dhamma and the
> Vinaya’ took 7 months to rehearse at the 1st Council held in Rajagaha, 2
> months
> after the Buddha’s Parinibbana.
> 
> Just to repeat from last week’s final paragraph from this text:
> 
> ‘ The word of the Buddha which should be known as uniform in sentiment,
> twofold
> as the Dhamma and the Vinaya, threefold according to the first,
> intermediate,
> and last words, and similarly as Pitakas (Baskets), fivefold according
> to the
> Nikayas (Collections), ninefold according to the Angas (Factors), and
> forming
> 84,000 divisions according to the Units of the Dhamma.’
> ......
> 
> To continue:
> ‘How is it twofold as the dhamma and the vinaya? All this, in its
> entirety, is
> reckoned as the dhamma and the Vinaya. Herein the Basket of the
> Discipline is
> the Vinaya, the rest of the word of the Buddha is the Dhamma. Hence was
> it
> stated: “Let us, friends, rehearse the Dhamma and the Vinaya,” and :I
> shall
> question Upali on the Vinaya and Ananda on the dhamma.” Thus it is
> twofold as
> the Dhamma and the Vinaya.’ <end quote.
> .....
> 
> A little later we read:
> 
> ‘How is it threefold according to the Pitakas? Indeed, all this, in its
> entirety, has the three divisions as the Vinaya-pitaka, the
> suttantapitaka, and
> the Abhidhammapitaka. Therein, having brought together all that has
> been both
> rehearsed and not at the First convocation, both Patimokkha, the two
> Vibhanga,
> the 22 Khandhaka, and the 16 Parivara, it is called the Vinayapitaka.
> 
> ‘The collection of the 34 suttas beginning with Brahmajala called the
> Dighanikaya, that of 152 suttas beginning with Mulapariyaya called the
> Majjhimanikaya, that of 7,762 suttas beginning with Oghataranasutta
> called the
> Samyuttanikaya, that of 9.557 suttas beginning with the
> Cittapariyadanasutta,
> called the Anguttaranikaya, and the Khuddakanikaya consisting of the 15
> works:
> Khuddakapatha, Dhammapada, Udana, Itivuttaka, Suttanipata, Vimanavatthu,
> Petavatthu, Thera and Therigatha, Jataka, Niddesa, Patisambhida,
> Apadana,
> Buddhavamsa, and Cariyapitaka, are called Suttantapitaka.
> 
> Dhammasangani, Vibhanga, dhatukatha, Puggalapannatti, Kathavattu,
> Yamaka, and
> Patthana constitute the Abhidhammapitaka.’ <end quote>
> .....
> 
> With regard to the term, Abhidhamma, it says: 
> 
> ‘Since here are found conditions which possess growth and their own
> characteristics, are revered and differentiated and said to be
> excellent- on
> account of these it is called Abhidhamma.’ <end quote>.
> .....
> 
> A little later, there is a description of the 3 Pitakas, Vinaya,
> suttanta and
> Abhidhamma:
> 
> ‘Here follows the explanation and elucidation. These three Pitakas,
> indeed,
> according to formal analyses are said to be the authoritative
> injunctions, the
> popular teachings, and the ultimate truth respectively; or they are the
> discourses necesitated by transgressions, those adapted to
> circumstances, and
> those set out in acordance with reality respectively; or again,
> discourses on
> the various categories of restraint, on the refutation of heresies, and
> on the
> distinction between Name and Form <i.e. nama and rupa>, respectively. 
> Herein,
> the Vinayapitaka is called the exposition of injunctions as it has been
> preached with a preponderance of authority by the Exalted One in whom
> all
> authority is vested; the suttapitaka, the exposition of popular
> teachings as
> it has beem preached with great emphasis on popular ethics by the
> Exalted One
> who was proficient in popular ethics; and the Abhidhammapitaka, the
> exposition
> of ultimate truth as it has been preached with great leanings on
> absolute truth
> by the Exalted One who is adept in the absolute truths.
> 
> ‘Likewise, the first is called the teaching necessitated by
> transgressions
> wherin those beings who are given to many misdeeds are admonished in
> accordance
> with the nature of their offences; the second, that adapted to
> circumstances
> wherein beings who are given to divers dispositions, latent tendencies,
> and
> traits of character are admonished in accordance with their
> adaptability; and
> the third, that set out in accordance with reality wherein bengs who
> conceive
> of an ego and what pertains to it, only in the presence of a pile of
> conditions, are instructed in terms of the absolute truth.......’ <end
> quote>
> 
> ********************
> 
> So we have in these quotes the emphasis on ‘uniform sentiment’ in the 3
> Pitakas
> and the different emphasis, according to circumstances, of which
> language or
> ‘style’ is used.
> 
> In the Atthasalini (The Expositor), we also find references to the
> Abhidhamma-Pitaka being included in the Khuddaka Nikaya (as rehearsed at
> the
> First Council) and also references to the Abhidhamma in one or two
> suttas which
> Rob K kindly brought to my/our attention *. I may refer to these next
> time.
> .....
> 
> Meanwhile, I promised Ken O to check Buddhaghosa’s sources more
> carefully for
> this ‘episode’. Buddhaghosa himself makes it clear in Smp. that, as with
> all
> his commentaries, this is ‘a re-compiled commentary’ of the Siiha.la
> A.t.thakathaa. which was first recited under Mahinda. According to
> Jayawickrama’s introduction to the Baahiranidaana: 
> 
> ‘Evidence is not lacking for the survival of the Sihala Atthakatha even
> after
> Buddhaghosa and the other commentators that followed, though they
> finally went
> into oblivion in due course. The statement that they burned in a huge
> bonfire
> is merely a figurative way of stating that they no longer served any
> purpose.
> The disappearance of the Sihala Atthkatha is looked upon by writers as
> a great
> blow to the development of Sinhalese literature. However that may be,
> it is
> decidedly the fruits of the endeavours of the ‘teachers of yore’ in some
> finalized form that were available to Buddhaghosa when he started
> compiling his
> commentaries and paved the way for the perfet commentarial literature in
> Pali
> available today.....’ 
> .....
> 
> I mentioned before that according to Buddhaghosa, the origin of the
> Mahavihara
> commentarial tradition goes back to the time of the First Coucil. The
> commentaries were, he writes:
> 
> ‘....rehearsed at the very outset, for the purpose of elucidating the
> meaning,
> by the 500 (who were) endowed with self-mastery, and were likewise
> rehearsed
> even afterwards were subsequently brought to the island of the Sihalas
> by
> Maha-Mahinda (who was) endowed with self-mastery...’ 
> .....
> 
> I quoted last time that sometimes the Buddha preached ‘a sermon in
> concise
> form’ and then one of the chief disciples would explain in greater
> detail.
> Malalasekera continues (The Pali Literature of Ceylon);
> 
> ‘When later the text of the canon came to be compiled, arranged, and
> edited,
> some of the expositions found their way into the Pitakas and were given
> a
> permanent place therein. Thus we have the Sangiti-suttanta of the Digha
> Nikaya, ascribed to Sariputta and forming a complete catechism of terms
> and
> passages of exegetical nature. Such was also the Sacca-vibhanga (an
> exposition
> of the four Noble Truths) of the Majjhima, which later found its proper
> place
> in the second book of the Abhidhamma-Pitaka, and also the
> Madhu-pindika-sutta
> of Maha-Kaccayana, included in the Majjhima Nikaya. It sometimes
> happened that
> for a proper understanding of the text, explanations of a commentarial
> nature
> were quite essential; and in such cases the commentary was naturally
> incorporated into the text and formed part of the text itself.......Then
> there
> is the Niddesa, a whole book of commentary on texts now included in the
> Sutta-nipata; and there are passages clearly of a commentarial nature
> scattered throughout the Nikayas.’ <end all quotes>
> 
> ********************
> 
> This is a really just a little fun exercise for me and a bit of a
> balancing act
> between the historical information, present relevance, abhidhamma vs
> commentaries, Baahiranidaana vs other texts and so on. Of course there
> is more
> that could have been included on the early schisms, linguistic
> traditions,
> arrival of Mahinda, Indian commentaries and so on.....Mainly I’ll drift
> on with
> the passages I find of most interest unless anyone 'shouts', like Ken O.
> 
> 
> Sarah
> 
> *http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

	
10156

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 1:07am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Dear Victor,

Back to the Mulapariyaya Sutta and anatta...

--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Sarah,
> 
> This is a question for consideration: What does pronoun "I" in the
> statement "Panna sees panna as it actually is with right discernment thus:
> 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" refer to?
> 
> Again, for reference,
> "He directly knows water as water... fire as fire... wind as wind... beings
> as beings... gods as gods... Pajapati as Pajapati... Brahma as Brahma... the
> luminous gods as luminous gods... the gods of refulgent glory as gods of
> refulgent glory... <snip>
... the All as the All..."
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn001.html
> 
> In the passage above it is said that "He directly knows water as water..."
> Is it panna that directly knows water as water?
> 
> Reply in context below

********************

I’ll do my best, Sir!

There is a useful translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi of this sutta with its
commentary and subcommentaries, published by BPS under the title 'The
Discourse on the Root of Existence'. 
.....

I think we need to understand, as others have commented before, that in this
sutta we are looking at how the world is perceived and understood by the
worldling, the learner, the arahat and finally by the Buddha.

With regard to the worldlings, we read in the commentary notes (p34) that ‘they
have not destroyed the multiple forms of personality view’. 

From the sutta it says:
‘..he perceves earth as earth; having perceived earth as earth, he conceives (
himself as ) earth; he conceives (himself) in earth; he conceives (himself
apart) from earth; he conceives ‘earth as mine’; he delights in earth. What
is the reason? Because it has not been fully understood by him, I
declare.......water as water ....’<end quote.
.....

Do we take earth for self? We may think not. We know surely, that earth is not
me, I am not earth and so on. However, when we consider the commentary notes
more carefully, it can help us to understand how very deep-rooted the idea of
self is:

<p39 com.>’..he perceives through a perversion of perception, seizing upon the
conventional expression (and thinking) “it is earth’ (lokavohaara”m gahetvaa
sa~n~naavipallaasena sa~njaanaati). Or, without releasing such a segment of
earth, he perceives it as a being (satta) or as belonging to a being. Why does
he perceive it in this way? This should not be asked, for the worldling is
like a madman. he seizes upon anything he can in whatever way he can......”
.....

We may think that this just refers to those fighting over land or terrorists,
but what about this moment? Do we take the computer for being some-thing? Is
there any awareness that all that is seen at this moment is visible object with
no thing or self in it? As soon as there is the perversion with the idea of
‘thing’ in it, there is the madness being referred to, as I understand.
.....

A little later in the commentary (p.40) we read:

‘Objection: If the conventional expression is applied, what is the fault? 
Don’t ariyans also make use of the conventional expression, as when they say: 
“This, venerable sir, is the great earth,” etc?

‘Reply: It is not the mere employment of the expression that is intended here,
but the wrong adherence which occurs through the conventional expression. Thus
he says: “he perceives through a perversion of perception.” This is his
meaning: He perceives it as beautiful, etc., through a perverted perception
springing from unwise reflection. By this, weak conceiving through craving,
conceit, and views is shown.’
.....

The commentary notes continue with all the many ways earth is perceived as
self. the reason for this is ‘because it has not been fully understood by
him..’ 

We read (p46) that ‘He who fully understands the earth understands it by the
three types of full understanding: the full understanding of the known
(~naataparin~n~na), the full understanding of scrutinization
(tiira.napari~n~naa), and the full understanding of abandoning
(pahaanapari~n~naa)............Or, alternatively, the defining of
mentality-materiality (naamaruupa vavatthaana) is the full understanding of the
known; from insight-comprehension of the groups (kalaapasammasana) as far as
conformity knowledge (anuloma) is the full understanding by scrutinization; 
and the knowledge of the ariyan path is the full understanding by abandoning.’
.....

The subcy adds (p47): ‘therein, the “full understanding of the known” is the
wisdom of full understanding by which one fully understands, delimits
(paricchhindati), the plane of insight (vipassanaabhuumi)....’

********************
Victor, one reason I’ve added some of these quotes is because I think they’re
also relevant to other discussions too. As we discussed on the ultimate and
conventional truth thread, it’s not so much a question of the words we use, but
the understanding that lies behind them. When we say we touch earth or the
computer, is there any understanding of only hardness which is experienced at
that moment or do we have the idea of touching a thing? 

As understanding begins to grow, the language doesn’t change in conventional
usage but what the arahat or Buddha understand by ‘earth’, ‘water’, ‘Gods’ or
‘Brahma’ is not what is understood by us in our madness. In the same way, we
can say ‘form is not self’ as many times as we like, but it doesn’t mean there
is necessarily any understanding of any rupa or form appearing at this moment.

You wondered why I had got the idea (like Rob Ep, I think) that you were
suggesting a self outside the khandhas. I think this was because, although you
quote excellent lines about anatta from excellent suttas, the idea of
controlling the various realities, suggests a deep-rooted clinging to self
rather than an understanding of conditions that determines these same khandhas.
If we say ‘Yes, one can control oneself’ (to quote from another post of yours)
and know this is merely conventional usage, that’s fine. However, if we cling
to an idea that this is possible in truth, it shows the perversity of view at
that moment.

Thanks for all your challenging posts

metta,
Sarah

p.s I’m so glad you smiled at my last sign-off. Actually, I’m sorry to say the
detailed formula was quite lost on Jon, so we may just have to give up our
formulas as being too profound for dsg;-) 
.................................................................................
	
10157

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 5:53am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote (to Rob Ep): 
> ========================
> A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory 
> discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while it 
> and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, neither is
> 
> compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but also 
> of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of 
> consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR mental, 
> but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed by 
> mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my 
> understanding. 
************

This is very clear, accurate and articulate summary, I think. How many rupees
do I owe?

However, I have a question (of course) about the following note in another post
to me:
.....
> -----------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I prefer the idea of the 
> memory of a past object being a concomitant of the current citta in which 
> there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a past object need not be 
> considered an object itself. So there could be the hearing of a current sound
> 
> together with the memory of the immediately preceding slightly louder or 
> softer sound, or even further back than the immediately preceding sound. 
> After all, we can and do distinguish between a current object and a 
> remembered preceding one. We never confuse a memory with a current 
> discernment.
> ----------------------------------------------------------------

I just question whether there isn’t some mixing up of concepts and sanna
(perception)? Sanna is the concomitant or conascent cetasika of the current
citta, but the memory of the past object (i.e. the concept) is its object. Thus
it is not the concept that accompanies the citta, but the sanna. The concept,
of course, is present arammana, but as discussed last time, it can be a concept
about anything, past, present or future.

At the moment of hearing sound, the hearing is also accompanied by sanna which
marks the sound (just as it is) in the ear door process at that moment. The
memory (sanna) of the immediately preceding sound would accompany the cittas in
the mind-door process taking concept as object (or maybe marking it directly
in either the previous ear door or mind door process, but not at the same time
as the marking of the present sound). Any perception of louder or softer or any
other comparison suggests a concept as object at that moment, I think as Dan
was suggesting.

As Mike suggested, I also think there is plenty of confusing, but even when
there isn’t any confusion, the curent hearing with sanna just hears and marks
the present sound. Any memory of a previous sound must be by thinking of
concept (as in the rose scenario). Remember ear-door, eye-door, mind-door and
other door processes are changing all the time. Thinking of concepts is so fast
and not in words as we usually have the idea.

Hope I haven’t confused the issue even more with my ramblings and very limited
abhidhamma understanding.

Sarah
...................................................................................
	
10158

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 6:03am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Hi Rob,

> >
> ha ha, Sarah, you are a true pun-dit.
> 
> Robert Ep.

....and you out-pun-ed us all with your skandhalous pundit humour;-)

Reminds me of the clowns in Shakespeare...good to have the contrasts and a
little light relief too;-)

Sarah


	
10159

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 6:06am
Subject: Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein And Howard

 	
Dear Howard, Robert Epstein, and Ken Ong

How are you? I have read all your responses to my request previous 
night. 

Thank you for your further clarification of the terms "nihilism" 
and "annihilationism". 

I have also taken note of Robert's suggestion that the Pali term for 
annihilationism might be "ucchedaditthi".

I will carefully consider your clarifications and suggestions when I 
write my next and future subcommentaries.

With regards,

Suan


http://www.bodhiology.org



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Suan -
> 
> In a message dated 12/18/01 9:49:45 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> abhidhammika@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > In the meantime, if both or either of you could define or explain 
to 
> > me the terms "nihilism" and "annihilationism" used in your psots, 
I 
> > would be very grateful to you. In what sense do you use them? 
Have 
> > you come across their equivalent Pali or Sanskrit terms? It seems 
> > that these terms play important roles in understanding the 
afterlife 
> > Parinibbaana.
> > 
> ===========================
> What I mean by 'nihilism' is the belief that nothing exists 
at all, in 
> any manner. What I mean by 'annihilationism' is the belief that 
there are 
> things which truly exist, but then cease to exist in any sense at 
all, are 
> annihilated. 
> I understand Buddhism to teach that conditioned dhammas 
exist 
> dependently, contingently, lacking own-being, and not as 
independent 
> "things", but only things-in-relation. Because of such (contingent) 
> existence, nihilism is false. Because of the lack of *independent* 
existence, 
> both substantialism and annihilationism are false. And because of 
> impermanence of all conditioned dhammas, eternalism is also false.
> As far as nibbana is concerned, at least nibbana without 
remnant, I 
> see it as consciousness of absence of objects: a luminous, timeless 
reality, 
> permanent in the double sense of being timeless, and of being 
available at 
> all times from within the temporal realms. Nibbana with remnant, 
the ordinary 
> state of the living arahant, I see as based on the luminous, 
timeless 
> nibbana, but with an overlay of conditions which are seen through 
as empty, 
> fleeting shadows. (I have no way of expressing this except in a 
semi-poetic 
> way.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

10160

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 6:10am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5>

 	
Hi Ken O and Rob Ep,

Thanks, I heard;-)

I have some pasages marked for next week that are specially selected for you
both....They may answer a few questions. It'll be my Xmas gift. it's fun for me
too.

Sarah

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Sarah
> 
> thanks for the commentary. I keeping them just like Rob Ep.
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O (whispering)


	
10161

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 1:33am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Rob (and Dan) -

In a message dated 12/19/01 2:25:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> Dear Dan,
> You seem to raise the interesting possibility that comparisions regarding a
> remembered object and another object may in fact not be real, but only be
> conceptual. As I look at this, it seems very possible that the reality of 
> memory
> is necessarily selective, and not actual, since there is no longer a true 
> and
> detailed object to be observed.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep
===========================
It doesn't seem to me that memories are concepts, but, rather, 
varyingly defective clones of the original experience, with elements 
missing, unclear, or, at times, transfromed. Sometimes memories are near 
perfect. In any case, I suspect that the memory *traces* are more typically 
close to perfect, but with conscious activations of them varying in 
faithfulness. 
My concept of 'rose', forged from the many memories of roses and 
pictures of roses, is different from an actual memory of a rose, and that, in 
turn, is different from the train of cittas which constitutes the "seeing" of 
a rose (and which, itself, involves "close memories" of just-passed cittas, 
plus recognition).

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10162

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 2:02am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi, Sarah -

It seems that in the following you are saying that all memories are 
concepts. Perhaps so. I won't deny that as a strong possibility. I'm just not 
certain.

With metta,
Howard



In a message dated 12/19/01 8:54:38 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> Hi Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote (to Rob Ep): 
> > ========================
> > A rupa, be it a sight, sound, touch, etc, is an object of sensory 
> > discernment. It is the objective pole of an act of discernment, and while 
> it 
> > and the vi~n~nana discerning it arise in dependence on conditions, 
> neither is
> > 
> > compounded by the mind. This is true not only of rupas, and cittas, but 
> also 
> > of feelings, desires, etc. Each of them is discerned by an act of 
> > consciousness, visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, OR 
> mental, 
> > but none of them is *constructed* by mind. Only concepts are constructed 
> by 
> > mind, being mental compounds of the "directly seen" dhammas. This is my 
> > understanding. 
> ************
> 
> This is very clear, accurate and articulate summary, I think. How many 
> rupees
> do I owe?
> 
> However, I have a question (of course) about the following note in another 
> post
> to me:
> .....
> > -----------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> > Yes, it's not too bad. Actually, though, I prefer the idea of the 
> > memory of a past object being a concomitant of the current citta in which 
> 
> > there is a new object. After all, the *memory* of a past object need not 
> be 
> > considered an object itself. So there could be the hearing of a current 
> sound
> > 
> > together with the memory of the immediately preceding slightly louder or 
> > softer sound, or even further back than the immediately preceding sound. 
> > After all, we can and do distinguish between a current object and a 
> > remembered preceding one. We never confuse a memory with a current 
> > discernment.
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> I just question whether there isn’t some mixing up of concepts and sanna
> (perception)? Sanna is the concomitant or conascent cetasika of the current
> citta, but the memory of the past object (i.e. the concept) is its object. 
> Thus
> it is not the concept that accompanies the citta, but the sanna. The 
> concept,
> of course, is present arammana, but as discussed last time, it can be a 
> concept
> about anything, past, present or future.
> 
> At the moment of hearing sound, the hearing is also accompanied by sanna 
> which
> marks the sound (just as it is) in the ear door process at that moment. The
> memory (sanna) of the immediately preceding sound would accompany the 
> cittas in
> the mind-door process taking concept as object (or maybe marking it 
> directly
> in either the previous ear door or mind door process, but not at the same 
> time
> as the marking of the present sound). Any perception of louder or softer or 
> any
> other comparison suggests a concept as object at that moment, I think as 
> Dan
> was suggesting.
> 
> As Mike suggested, I also think there is plenty of confusing, but even when
> there isn’t any confusion, the curent hearing with sanna just hears and 
> marks
> the present sound. Any memory of a previous sound must be by thinking of
> concept (as in the rose scenario). Remember ear-door, eye-door, mind-door 
> and
> other door processes are changing all the time. Thinking of concepts is so 
> fast
> and not in words as we usually have the idea.
> 
> Hope I haven’t confused the issue even more with my ramblings and very 
> limited
> abhidhamma understanding.
> 
> Sarah
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10163

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 7:54am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Dear Sarah,
Trivial request:
I missed your sign-off, and I'm curious. Can you repost it?
Put this in the 'ridiculously minute unimportant requests department'.

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

===============

> metta,
> Sarah
> 
> p.s I’m so glad you smiled at my last sign-off. Actually, I’m sorry to say the
> detailed formula was quite lost on Jon, so we may just have to give up our
> formulas as being too profound for dsg;-) 


	
10164

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 2:56am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi again, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/19/01 10:04:28 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
upasaka@a... writes:


> 
> 
> It seems that in the following you are saying that all memories are 
> concepts. Perhaps so. I won't deny that as a strong possibility. I'm just 
> not 
> certain.
> 
==========================
Just to add a drop more: We do have sense memories, for example the 
smell of a rose. Such a rose-smell memory appears to be a perfect replica of 
a direct olfactory discernment except for its clarity. Moreover, the smell of 
a rose in a dream, which I presume is the activation of an olfactory memory 
trace, is virtually indistinguishable from "the real thing". So, I think that 
to view all memories as concepts may go too far.
The thing about our theories, as I see it, whether personal or taken 
from Abhidhamma, is that they must be able to *explain* our experience in 
order to be adequate. This is what has been motivating my recent "musings". 

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10165

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 7:58am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Hi Rob,
> 
> > >
> > ha ha, Sarah, you are a true pun-dit.
> > 
> > Robert Ep.
> 
> ....and you out-pun-ed us all with your skandhalous pundit humour;-)
> 
> Reminds me of the clowns in Shakespeare...good to have the contrasts and a
> little light relief too;-)
> 
> Sarah

: )

Regards,
Robert Ep.



	
10166

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 8:04am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <5>

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Hi Ken O and Rob Ep,
> 
> Thanks, I heard;-)
> 
> I have some pasages marked for next week that are specially selected for you
> both....They may answer a few questions. It'll be my Xmas gift. it's fun for me
> too.
> 
> Sarah

Oh goodie! Well Ken O. and I are definitely looking forward! There's nothing
like a Dhamma gift for Christmas!

[Do we have our 'religions' all mixed up? I'm a Jewish Buddhist with Hindu
tendencies celebrating Christmas with my family.......

[My parents are slightly mystically-minded atheists, my wife is a former Baptist
who has her own form of spirituality these days, and my daughter happens to be
going to a Jewish pre-school, where she comes home and sings "Shabbat Sholom"]

Regards,
Robert Ep.

=======================


> --- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Sarah
> > 
> > thanks for the commentary. I keeping them just like Rob Ep.
> > 
> > 
> > Kind regards
> > Ken O (whispering)


	
10167

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 8:08am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard,
This raises another interesting question to me. It may not be the thing most
needed for progressing in Dhamma, but it occurs to me that the concept is the only
way we ever get a 'complete' view of an object. Of course, this concept may not
be real, but very useful to be able to review a rose from a variety of imagined
angles and have an overall sense of what it 'is' [even if it really isn't]. When
concepts are seen as concepts rather than realities, I suppose they can be
employed even more usefully, with mindfulness.

Best,
Robert Ep.

============

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Rob (and Dan) -
> 
> In a message dated 12/19/01 2:25:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Dear Dan,
> > You seem to raise the interesting possibility that comparisions regarding a
> > remembered object and another object may in fact not be real, but only be
> > conceptual. As I look at this, it seems very possible that the reality of 
> > memory
> > is necessarily selective, and not actual, since there is no longer a true 
> > and
> > detailed object to be observed.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep
> ===========================
> It doesn't seem to me that memories are concepts, but, rather, 
> varyingly defective clones of the original experience, with elements 
> missing, unclear, or, at times, transfromed. Sometimes memories are near 
> perfect. In any case, I suspect that the memory *traces* are more typically 
> close to perfect, but with conscious activations of them varying in 
> faithfulness. 
> My concept of 'rose', forged from the many memories of roses and 
> pictures of roses, is different from an actual memory of a rose, and that, in 
> turn, is different from the train of cittas which constitutes the "seeing" of 
> a rose (and which, itself, involves "close memories" of just-passed cittas, 
> plus recognition).
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 
> 


	
10168

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 3:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Robert -

I agree completely. Concepts are what are used to function in the 
world. Even the Buddha used concepts. But he also understood exactly what's 
what.

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/19/01 11:09:57 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> 
> Hi Howard,
> This raises another interesting question to me. It may not be the thing 
> most
> needed for progressing in Dhamma, but it occurs to me that the concept is 
> the only
> way we ever get a 'complete' view of an object. Of course, this concept 
> may not
> be real, but very useful to be able to review a rose from a variety of 
> imagined
> angles and have an overall sense of what it 'is' [even if it really isn't]. 
> When
> concepts are seen as concepts rather than realities, I suppose they can be
> employed even more usefully, with mindfulness.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10169

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 3:57am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi again, Robert -

In a message dated 12/19/01 11:15:38 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
upasaka@a... writes:


> Hi, Robert -
> 
> I agree completely. Concepts are what are used to function in the 
> world. Even the Buddha used concepts. But he also understood exactly what's 
> 
> what.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
===========================
Let me add the following metaphorical thoughts: Without concepts we 
can't see the forest for the trees. Without wisdom we can't see the trees for 
the forest. Moreover, without wisdom we can't see that the trees are not 
self-existent, but are parts of an interconnected web which includes the 
earth, the sun, and the clouds.
In the foregoing, trees, the earth, the sun, and the clouds represent 
the "paramattha dhammas," forests represent (the presumed referents) of 
concepts, and *all* of these, each existing in a sense, are empty.
One more point as to the knowledge-giving character of concepts: It 
would seem that one of their functions is to serve as a shorthand summing up 
of the relations among various dhammas. In a single representational unit, a 
concept codifies a complex relational structure obtaining among dhammas, it 
seems to me.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10170

From: Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 8:59am
Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Dear Robert,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...]
> Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 11:18 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa
>
>
> Dear Kom,
> Thank you very much for 'dropping in'!
>
> I take it that what you are saying is that the
> mind of the Arahant will still have
> concepts arising, but that they will never be
> confused with arising realities.
> Therefore in the moment that a 'rupa' is the
> object of discernment the 'rupa' will
> be seen by sati and panna for what it truly is,
> and this is direct perception of
> 'rupa'? I take it that 'nama' can also be
> directly perceived as what it is by the
> Arahant?
>
Yes, a consciousness of the arahat may have a concept as its
object. This would make sense. Otherwise, how does the
Buddha call anybody by name, as name is a concept? An
arahat has no confusion regarding to concept/realities,
nama/rupa, anicca (impermanence)/nicca, dukkha (not
enduring)/ sukkha, and anatta/atta. Therefore, in the
moment that a 'rupa' is the object of discernment ***of the
consciousness co-arising with wisdom***, the 'rupa' will
be seen by sati and panna as it truly is. 'Nama' can also
be
directly perceived as it is, but not only by an arahat, but
for any consciousness with wisdom that has the nama as the
object. It is just that for somebody not an arahat, there
will be *other* moments where the consciousness will be
confused about the realities, whereas an arahat is never
confused.

kom
	
10171

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 9:33am
Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who?

 	
Hello Robert and all,

Robert, I will not answer your question about whether there is self 
beyond form and what the nature of that self is.

The reason why I will not answer your question is that both the 
view "there is a self" and the view "there is no self" are 
speculative, and so is defining, delineating what self is.

Please consider very carefully about whether form (or feeling, 
perception, mental formations, consciousness) is not self implies 
there is no self.

Here are two discourses that might be of interest to you:

Digha Nikaya 15, Maha-Nidana Sutta, The Great Causes Discourse
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn15.html

Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html

Thank you.

Regards,
Victor

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> 
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> > 
> > I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby 
control form.
> 
> Hi Victor,
> No, the idea that I got is just that you are saying there is a self 
beyond form,
> beyond the khandas.
> 
> So my question to you is: Do you think there is a self beyond 
form, and what is
> the nature of that self?
> 
> You say below that anatta does not mean there is no self. I 
believe most
> Theravadins here would say that anatta means that nothing that can 
be pointed to
> in the world of form qualifies as self, and that nothing beyond the 
world of form
> can be called 'self' either.
> 
> What, if anything, would you say qualifies as a definition of self 
or a 'true
> self', as opposed to the false self of the khandas?
> 
> Thanks,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ==========================
> 
> > I will try to be more clear:
> > 
> > Form is not self implies that form cannot control itself.
> > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control form.
> > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot be controlled by 
form.
> > Form is not self does not imply that one cannot control oneself.
> > 
> > One can control oneself.
> > One can control oneself does not imply that one can control form.
> > One can control oneself does not imply that one can be controlled 
by form.
> > 
> > Why identify form as self by saying "one can control form"?
> > Why identify form as self by saying "one can be controlled by 
form"?
> > 
> > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control form"?
> > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot be controlled by 
form"?
> > Why identify self as form by saying "one cannot control oneself"?
> > 
> > I am not sure how you got the idea that 'anatta' means 
that "there is no
> > self"?
> > 
> > Thank you.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
	
10172

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:07am
Subject: Re: what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who?

 	
Hello Robert and all,

Robert, I am not sure how you get the idea the I am saying there is a 
self beyond form, beyond the khandas?

Thank you.

Regards,
Victor


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> 
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Robert,
> > 
> > I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby 
control form.
> 
> Hi Victor,
> No, the idea that I got is just that you are saying there is a self 
beyond form,
> beyond the khandas.
[snip]
	
10173

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:19am
Subject: Concept

 	
Hello all,

I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by 
concept? How does concept come to be?

Thank you.

Regards,
Victor
	
10174

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 3:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Hello Sarah,

Please understand that the view "there is a self" and the view "there is no
self" are both speculative.
Why discuss whether there is a self or there is no self outside the
khandhas?

Regards,
Victor


> You wondered why I had got the idea (like Rob Ep, I think) that you were
> suggesting a self outside the khandhas. I think this was because, although
you
> quote excellent lines about anatta from excellent suttas, the idea of
> controlling the various realities, suggests a deep-rooted clinging to self
> rather than an understanding of conditions that determines these same
khandhas.
> If we say 'Yes, one can control oneself' (to quote from another post of
yours)
> and know this is merely conventional usage, that's fine. However, if we
cling
> to an idea that this is possible in truth, it shows the perversity of view
at
> that moment.
>
> Thanks for all your challenging posts
>
> metta,
> Sarah
>
> p.s I'm so glad you smiled at my last sign-off. Actually, I'm sorry to say
the
> detailed formula was quite lost on Jon, so we may just have to give up our
> formulas as being too profound for dsg;-)
	

 	 

	
10175

From: rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 5:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Sarah,
> 
> Please understand that the view "there is a self" and the 
view "there is no
> self" are both speculative.
> Why discuss whether there is a self or there is no self outside the
> khandhas?

But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned to), 
is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. So 
while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it stands to 
reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, i.e. 
independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of 
speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self."
	
10176

From: Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 8:12pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Hello,

Please understand that the very definition/delineation of self as
independent exisitence is speculative view.

Regards,
Victor

----- Original Message -----
From: "rikpa21" <rikpa21@y...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, December 19, 2001 8:11 PM
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta


> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Sarah,
> >
> > Please understand that the view "there is a self" and the
> view "there is no
> > self" are both speculative.
> > Why discuss whether there is a self or there is no self outside the
> > khandhas?
>
> But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned to),
> is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. So
> while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it stands to
> reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, i.e.
> independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of
> speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self."

	
10177

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 4:27pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
Hi Nina and Jon,


I don't know this will be any helpful to you or not. From my Thai 
Abhidhammattha-sagaha, those 3 ~nana were mentioned under anul~om~nana. I am 
going to change into a parrot, OK.

---------------------------

Anul~om~nana is a pa~n~na that acknowledge that one have to give in/follow 
ariyasacca, so one can be detached. Ariyasacca is dukkhasacca, samutayasacca, 
nirodhasacca and maggasacca.


Sacca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha is nama and rupa which 
are lokiya. Samutaya is tanha, nirodha is nibbana and magga is 8 ariya-magga. 
Knowledge at this level is knowing according to the truth:sacca~nana.

Kicca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha should be known, 
samutaya should be let go, nirodha should be enlighten and magga should be 
developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to 
responsiblity:kicca~nana.

Kata~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha which should be known, 
is known. Samutaya which should be let go, is let go. Nirodha which should 
be enlighten, is enlighten and all 8 magga which should be developed, is 
developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to what has been 
done:kata~nana.


Sacca~nana and kicca~nana is ~nana in lokiya level. Kata~nana is 
lokuttara~nana. The two lokiya~nanas have been already perfected in 
sakarupekka~nana. So ano~loma~nana is named pa~n~na which knows clearly in 
following through, through ariyasacca. Then nibbana will be an arammana in 
next ~nana, kotarabhu~nana.

-----------------------------

Hope further information from other sources will help more.


Num
	
10178

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:02pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Rob Ep,

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. One really
> needs
> to deal with the term 'undefined reality' 

I’ll leave these references in Suan’s capable hands.


> Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of Parinibbana
> 'is
> not one of darkness', but of light. 

Would you give the reference for this? 

>And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is
> luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at least, if
> not
> to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas are only in
> a
> state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It implies
> that
> when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity to be
> discovered.

Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We
clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind’
is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but since
(in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I
think. 

Meanwhile I’m enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don’t mean to
interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we should try to
‘account for their actual usage.’

Thanks,

Sarah

p.s I’ll try to show some self-moderation and send that other silly sign-off
you missed off-list.

All - Pls try to remember to cut off those parts of old posts which are not
necessary for our replies....we all forget sometimes, but many people take the
posts in ‘digest’ form and it does help them.

==================


	
10179

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:23pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The noble nine fold path - Erik

 	
Dear Joe,

Great to hear you’re still reading in after a long silence. Are you in Thailand
or in one of your other exotic locations right now? I hope the writing and
publishing is going well. 

--- lpjoe <jcummings@p...> wrote: > Sarah & Erik
> 
> I've been following your volley with interest, while reading some short 
> works by Upasika Kee Nanayon (1902-1978), one of the most respected 
> women dhamma teachers in Thailand. I was wondering if the following 
> excerpts from Upasika's LOOKING INWARD: Observations on the Art of 
> Meditation, bear on the discussion at all. 

Thanks for showing us this article. It starts with ‘we have to catch sight
of....’ 

How do you understand this phrase, Joe? Does it suggest any idea of self and
control and ‘should do’ to you? Is this how you understand the Satipathana
Sutta? I’m not trying to be tricky, I am sincerely interested to hear more
about your considered understanding.

Btw, you have another chance to catch us and Erik ‘all in one’ in Bkk over new
Year if you’re around. Let me know off-list if so.

Sarah


> THE PURE PRESENT
> 
> We have to catch sight of the sensation of knowing when the mind 
> gains knowledge of anything and yet isn't aware of itself, to see how 
> it latches onto things -- physical form, feeling, perceptions, 
> thought-formations, and consciousness. We have to probe on in and 
> look 
> on our own. We can't use the teachings we've memorized to catch 
> sight 
> of these things. That won't get us anywhere at all. We may remember, 
> "The body is inconstant," but even though we can say it, we can't see 
> it.
> 
<snip>

	
10180

From: Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:59pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Dear Robert,

Sorry if this a duplicate. My email doesn't seem to reach
egroups too well.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...]
> Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 11:18 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa
>
>
> Dear Kom,
> Thank you very much for 'dropping in'!
>
> I take it that what you are saying is that the
> mind of the Arahant will still have
> concepts arising, but that they will never be
> confused with arising realities.
> Therefore in the moment that a 'rupa' is the
> object of discernment the 'rupa' will
> be seen by sati and panna for what it truly is,
> and this is direct perception of
> 'rupa'? I take it that 'nama' can also be
> directly perceived as what it is by the
> Arahant?
>
Yes, a consciousness of the arahat may have a concept as its
object. This would make sense. Otherwise, how does the
Buddha call anybody by name, as name is a concept? An
arahat has no confusion regarding to concept/realities,
nama/rupa, anicca (impermanence)/nicca, dukkha (not
enduring)/ sukkha, and anatta/atta. Therefore, in the
moment that a 'rupa' is the object of discernment ***of the
consciousness co-arising with wisdom***, the 'rupa' will
be seen by sati and panna as it truly is. 'Nama' can also
be
directly perceived as it is, but not only by an arahat, but
for any consciousness with wisdom that has the nama as the
object. It is just that for somebody not an arahat, there
will be *other* moments where the consciousness will be
confused about the realities, whereas an arahat is never
confused.

kom
	
10181

From: Purnomo . <purnomo9@h...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 10:59pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our experiences and we 'just' 
make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How about you ? I am guarantee 
that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' for me. And That's true 
for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth.

purnomo--

>From: "yuzhonghao" <victoryu@s...>
>Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
>To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
>Subject: [dsg] Concept
>Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2001 18:19:28 -0000
>
>Hello all,
>
>I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by
>concept? How does concept come to be?
>
>Thank you.
>
>Regards,
>Victor


	
10182

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:13pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi again, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 12/19/01 11:15:38 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> upasaka@a... writes:
> 
> 
> > Hi, Robert -
> > 
> > I agree completely. Concepts are what are used to function in the 
> > world. Even the Buddha used concepts. But he also understood exactly what's 
> > 
> > what.
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard
> > 
> ===========================
> Let me add the following metaphorical thoughts: Without concepts we 
> can't see the forest for the trees. Without wisdom we can't see the trees for 
> the forest. Moreover, without wisdom we can't see that the trees are not 
> self-existent, but are parts of an interconnected web which includes the 
> earth, the sun, and the clouds.
> In the foregoing, trees, the earth, the sun, and the clouds represent 
> the "paramattha dhammas," forests represent (the presumed referents) of 
> concepts, and *all* of these, each existing in a sense, are empty.
> One more point as to the knowledge-giving character of concepts: It 
> would seem that one of their functions is to serve as a shorthand summing up 
> of the relations among various dhammas. In a single representational unit, a 
> concept codifies a complex relational structure obtaining among dhammas, it 
> seems to me.

which perhaps cannot be perceived directly, although it does exist?

Nice metaphor in any case.

Robert Ep.



	
10183

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:15pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
--- Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> wrote:
> Dear Robert,
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Robert Epstein [mailto:epsteinrob@y...]
> > Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2001 11:18 PM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa
> >
> >
> > Dear Kom,
> > Thank you very much for 'dropping in'!
> >
> > I take it that what you are saying is that the
> > mind of the Arahant will still have
> > concepts arising, but that they will never be
> > confused with arising realities.
> > Therefore in the moment that a 'rupa' is the
> > object of discernment the 'rupa' will
> > be seen by sati and panna for what it truly is,
> > and this is direct perception of
> > 'rupa'? I take it that 'nama' can also be
> > directly perceived as what it is by the
> > Arahant?
> >
> Yes, a consciousness of the arahat may have a concept as its
> object. This would make sense. Otherwise, how does the
> Buddha call anybody by name, as name is a concept? An
> arahat has no confusion regarding to concept/realities,
> nama/rupa, anicca (impermanence)/nicca, dukkha (not
> enduring)/ sukkha, and anatta/atta. Therefore, in the
> moment that a 'rupa' is the object of discernment ***of the
> consciousness co-arising with wisdom***, the 'rupa' will
> be seen by sati and panna as it truly is. 'Nama' can also
> be
> directly perceived as it is, but not only by an arahat, but
> for any consciousness with wisdom that has the nama as the
> object. It is just that for somebody not an arahat, there
> will be *other* moments where the consciousness will be
> confused about the realities, whereas an arahat is never
> confused.
> 
> kom

Thanks, Kom. That's very clear and helpful.

Best,
Robert Ep.


	
10184

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:16pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Who made up this cute thread name by the way?

Robert Ep.





	
10185

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:18pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] what/who can control what/who? what/who cannot control what/who?

 	
Well, Victor,
If you are saying that you yourself do not speculate about whether there is a self
beyond form, I will accept that.

But I take it that you are indeed saying that the statements regarding the khandas
as non-self do not imply that there is no self.

Best,
Robert Ep.

========

--- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hello Robert and all,
> 
> Robert, I will not answer your question about whether there is self 
> beyond form and what the nature of that self is.
> 
> The reason why I will not answer your question is that both the 
> view "there is a self" and the view "there is no self" are 
> speculative, and so is defining, delineating what self is.
> 
> Please consider very carefully about whether form (or feeling, 
> perception, mental formations, consciousness) is not self implies 
> there is no self.
> 
> Here are two discourses that might be of interest to you:
> 
> Digha Nikaya 15, Maha-Nidana Sutta, The Great Causes Discourse
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn15.html
> 
> Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda 
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> > 
> > --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > > Hello Robert,
> > > 
> > > I am not sure how you got the idea that I said one can possiby 
> control form.
> > 
> > Hi Victor,
> > No, the idea that I got is just that you are saying there is a self 
> beyond form,
> > beyond the khandas.
> > 
> > So my question to you is: Do you think there is a self beyond 
> form, and what is
> > the nature of that self?
> > 
> > You say below that anatta does not mean there is no self. I 
> believe most
> > Theravadins here would say that anatta means that nothing that can 
> be pointed to
> > in the world of form qualifies as self, and that nothing beyond the 
> world of form
> > can be called 'self' either.
> > 
> > What, if anything, would you say qualifies as a definition of self 
> or a 'true
> > self', as opposed to the false self of the khandas?
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> > ==========================


	
10186

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 19, 2001 11:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
--- rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> wrote:
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hello Sarah,
> > 
> > Please understand that the view "there is a self" and the 
> view "there is no
> > self" are both speculative.
> > Why discuss whether there is a self or there is no self outside the
> > khandhas?
> 
> But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned to), 
> is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. So 
> while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it stands to 
> reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, i.e. 
> independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of 
> speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self."

unless there is a self that is not a composed entity, or separate being.

Robert Ep.



	
10187

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. One really
> > needs
> > to deal with the term 'undefined reality' 
> 
> I’ll leave these references in Suan’s capable hands.
> 
> 
> > Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of Parinibbana
> > 'is
> > not one of darkness', but of light. 
> 
> Would you give the reference for this? 

It may be hard for me to find the reference, but it was in one of the threads in
this group a few weeks ago or less. It may have been one of the Suttas that Gayan
translated. If I can find it I will.

> >And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is
> > luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me at least, if
> > not
> > to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas are only in
> > a
> > state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. It implies
> > that
> > when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying luminosity to be
> > discovered.
> 
> Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We
> clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind’
> is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but since
> (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I
> think. 

I hate to do this, but so many discussions come up here, it is easy to get lost. 
Yes, I may be 'reverting' to my former interpretation -- Could you do me a favor
and tell me, if you remember, where the quote is from the commentaries on this
subject? I know it's in the archives and I'd like to review it so I can review my
own 'view' and what the commentaries say on the 'luminosity' being of the
'bhavanga cittas'. Although I remember that point, I don't quite 'get it' and not
sure I totally got it then. So if I can read those passages maybe it would help
me with that one.

Still, there is the 'undefined reality' of parinibbana to deal with, and the
reference I can't give you at the moment of nibbana being 'not of darkness'. 
There were a couple of other stanzas quoted in the last couple of weeks too, but I
unfortunately may not have saved them. I will look back through my saved posts.

> Meanwhile I’m enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don’t mean to
> interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we should try to
> ‘account for their actual usage.’

You are of course not interrupting. It is a most interesting area, and it's
always great to hear your view on things. 

Regards,
Robert Ep.


	
10188

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
DEar Purnomo,

I haven't seen your name for a long time! Nice to hear from you again.
A question for you. I understand that seeing colour is seeing visible 
object as it is. Today I had to help a customer who thought his 
computer monitor was not working. When a monitor is properly 
connected it has a little green light showing, when the monitor is 
not receiving video signal the light is orange. I asked the 
customer, "Is the light green or orange" he said "I don't know,
I'm colour blind"

So is colour absolute? And when/how do you know that you are seeing 
the absolute colour?

All the best


Herman




--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Purnomo ." <purnomo9@h...> wrote:
> 
> If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our experiences and 
we 'just' 
> make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How about you ? I am 
guarantee 
> that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' for me. And 
That's true 
> for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth.
> 
> purnomo--
> 
> >From: "yuzhonghao" <victoryu@s...>
> >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@y...
> >To: dhammastudygroup@y...
> >Subject: [dsg] Concept
> >Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2001 18:19:28 -0000
> >
> >Hello all,
> >
> >I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by
> >concept? How does concept come to be?
> >
> >Thank you.
> >
> >Regards,
> >Victor
	
10189

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:25am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Found some interesting stanzas on a cambodian buddhism website.
Here's a couple:

Dabba Sutta (Ud VIII.10) -- About Dabba Mallaputta (2) 

The Blessed One said, "When Dabba Mallaputta rose up into the air and, sitting
cross-legged in the sky, in space, entered the fire property
and then emerged from it and was totally unbound, his body burned and was consumed
so that neither ashes nor soot could be discerned.
Just as when ghee or oil is burned and consumed, neither ashes nor soot can be
discerned, in the same way, when Dabba Mallaputta rose
up into the air and, sitting cross-legged in the sky, in space, entered the fire
property and then emerged from it and was totally unbound,
his body burned and was consumed so that neither ashes nor soot could be
discerned." 

Then, on realizing the significance of that, the Blessed One on that occasion
exclaimed: 

Just as the destination of a glowing fire
struck with a [blacksmith's] iron hammer,
gradually growing calm,
is not known:

Even so, there's no destination to describe
for those who are rightly released
-- having crossed over the flood
of sensuality's bond -- 
for those who have attained
unwavering bliss. 

I find the 'unwavering bliss' of interest here re. the idea that there is nothing
but cessation in parinibbana and nothing remaining.

Next:
We have talked about this one before.

Nibbana Sutta (Ud VIII.1) -- Total Unbinding (1) 

There is that sphere where there is neither earth, nor water, nor fire, nor wind;
neither sphere of the infinitude of space, nor sphere of the infinitude of
consciousness, nor sphere of nothingness, nor sphere of neither perception nor
non-perception; neither this world, nor the next world, nor sun, nor moon. And
there, I say, there is neither coming, nor going, nor stasis; neither passing away
nor arising: without stance, without foundation, without support (mental object).
This, just this, is the end of stress. 

I like 'nor sphere of nothingness', and 'nor sphere of neither perception nor
non-perception'. Seems to suggest to me something other than 'nothingness', which
would be the result of total cessation of all existence.

This may have been the one that in one translation said 'neither light nor
darkness'. Not sure.

Regards,
Robert Ep.


	
10190

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:05am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard,

This topic is interesting, IMHO, my theory is sounds quite similar to
yours,

Taking panna as the conclusion object of citta 6.

Citta 1 take the object of p, p is transfer to Citta 2 (through the
ability of sanna to mark), the object has became "pa" which I imply that
Citta 2 is "p + a" and not "p" and "a" as my basis is that since memory
is accumulative. It adds on until citta 6 as panna but that does not end,
bc we only known as panna without real meaning or definition thats we are
so used to it. Then citta 7 will maybe infer panna literally as wisdom in
English language. (this is again, starts another round the process of
cittas).

In such a way, memory of any sense object, is first mark by sanna in the
first citta, then accumulated by sanna in the series of process of cittas
before it make any sense to the present moment (the concluding citta). 
Similarly we would not have known panna without in our early childhood
days where we learn alphabets. We take some time to remember P with is
the combinations of marks of "|" and the mirror image of "c".



Kind regards
Ken O



> ==============================
> My point was the following: Any time there is the "seeing" of the
> 
> current object as a continuation of a previous one, or, for that
> matter, as 
> different from a previous one, it requires a comparison of the current
> object 
> with the previous one (presumably via memory, i.e., via sa~n~na and/or
> sati), 
> and that requires the current object and the remembered object to both
> be 
> "present". If that is so - and to me it seems unavoidable, and if the 
> remembered object is considered an arammana, then there are two
> arammanas 
> present, the remembered one and the current one. Unless they are both
> present 
> in mind, there is no way to compare. If both the previous object and its
> 
> memory are gone, then the current citta does not know of that object!
> Incidentally, subsequent to writing the post you quote below, I
> looked 
> at Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma. In an appendix on memory, he
> also 
> raises the need for memories of objects to co-occur with the discernment
> of 
> an object in a given citta. He makes the very same point as I am making
> here. 
> (So, I'm not in bad company! ;-)) He doesn't raise the issue, however,
> of how 
> that effects the notion of one arammana per citta.
> I have just re-thought the "unavoidablility" of the co-occurrence
> of 
> the remembered object and the current. It *may* be avoidable after all, 
> although I'm not at all certain on this issue. (Sorry to be doing my
> thinking 
> "out loud", as it were.) One possibility that just occured to me is
> based on 
> the time-sharing model: Object A is discerned by citta A, then object B
> is 
> discerned by citta B, and the occurrence of these two cittas serves as 
> condition for the later arising of citta C whose object is the "knowing"
> of 
> the transition from object A to object B. This seems possible to me,
> thiugh a 
> trifle weak. The co-ocurrence of an object of memory with another
> currently 
> observed object seems much simpler. However, what *is* the case is not
> always 
> simpler than what one might imagine could be the case.
> Just a clarification here with regard to my purpose in all this:
> I am 
> neither trying to disprove nor vindicate Abhidhammic notions, but rather
> to 
> understand them and their implications, to grasp the explanatory
> capability 
> of Abhidhamma. The Buddha did say to accept something only after
> examining it 
> and seeing that it accords with direct experience, and part of doing
> that is 
> to see how it accounts for actual experience, not in a hand-waiving
> manner 
> and not just by much use of Pali terms, but by really digging in and
> seeing 
> what the implications are.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard


	
10191

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:25am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Howard & Rob

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Hi Howard.
> > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act
> of
> > perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it
> is 
> > possible,
> > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of 
> > satipatthana? 
> > And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or
> reduces 
> > its
> > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act?
> > 
> ============================
> I'm afraid I will have to leave this to be answered by those
> folks who 
> really know what they are talking about (with regard to Abhidhamma)!
> ;-))
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

This question has been discussed before (no surprise!), and you may find
interesting the passage below from a very useful post of Kom's (#7300 in
the archives)

Jon

[Q]: > We don't get an experience of an outer object without a mental
> interpretation of impressions which are put together by the mind to form

an image.

[A]: When one of the 5 sense objects impinges on the sense organ, and
there 
is a process of consciousness (the sense-door process) (A) rising to 
cognize the object, the process of consciousness is said to be
experiencing 
the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the object. The mind-door process 
of consciousness that rises immediately afterward (B), interrupted only by

some "life-continuity" consciousness, also experience the sabhava of the 
object. It is only some processes later (extremely short) (C) that the 
consciousness starts to make an interpretation of the sense object, such 
as "shapes", "persons", "Robert", etc. 

The abhidhamma teaching indicates that the consciousness and the 
mental factors (in your terminology, the mind) at (A) and (B) are 
cognizing the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the reality (perhaps 
without thorough penetration), and the consciousness at (C) is cognizing 
concept (pannatti) of that reality. (A) and (B) cognize the
characteristics 
(sabhava) of actual realities, where as (C) cognizes the concept which has

no sabhava. For us who may not have accumulated enough wisdom, it 
may appear that (A), (B), and (C) are cognizing the same thing, where as 
they are actually not.

This is the brief explanation of how the mind can cognize both what is
real 
(with sabhava) and what is unreal (without sabhava) and appear to the 
person that the dhamma with and without sabhava are ones and the same 
(while they are not).


	
10192

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 0:32am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We
> clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind
> ’
> is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but 
> since
> (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I
> think. 
> 
===========================
Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular importance, 
I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To me, 
it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is luminous but 
for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud 
cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking in 
shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its 
capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as bhavanga 
cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that the 
Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are* such 
things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are not 
mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few leaves of 
knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.)

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10193

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:29am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard and Sarah

My intepretation why object is one at time for citta is that our mind
could only think at one thing at a time. I believe we could not think two
things at one go in our mind.

Similarly in my intepretation of Satipatthana Sutta, the objects of
mindfullness is always one at a time in the present moment to suit the
normal behaviour of our mind.

Hence in this way, I conclude that a cittas could only grasp one object at
time. 



Kind regards
Ken O






--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote: > Dear Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> > 
> > Thanks for the following. I don't see, however, where this
> implies 
> > only one object per citta. Where does it say that the object-relation
> is 
> > one-to-one?
> > 
> 
> When I read it later, it also seemed rather unclear to me..
> 
> 
> H: > > >Side question: Does the principle 
> > > > of one arammana per citta occur in the Abhidhamma, itself, or only
> in the
> 
> S:> > from
> > > the Pa.t.thaana (Conditional Relations) book of Abhidhamma 
> > > 
> > > “ (i) visible object-base is related to eye-consciousness element
> and its
> > > associated states by object condition.
> > > 
> > > (and so on for sound, odour etc... associated states will refer to 
> > > cetasikas,
> > > I’m pretty sure,S.)
> > > 
> > > “ (viii) Taking any state as object, these states, consciousness
> and
> > mental
> > > factors, arise; those (former) states are related to those (latter)
> states
> > 
> > > by
> > > object condition.�
> 
> Howard, by referring to visible object as arammana of seeing and
> associated
> cetasikas, sound as arammana of hearing and cetasikas, ‘any state as
> object’ of
> citta and cetasikas, it all suggests one object only of citta as I read
> it.
> After all it is the singular ‘state’ that is used here.
> 
> 
> S: >>> PTS conditional Relations, p2
> > > > 
> > > From U Narada’s Guide to conditional Relations, it says under the
> 6th
> > > cognizable object that it consists of:
> > > 
> > > “......the remaining twenty-one states of materiality, 89
> consciousness,
> > 53
> > > mental factors, Nibbana and concept. Of these latter objectd,
> materiality,
> > > consciousness and mental factors are either of the past, present or
> future 
> > > but
> > > Nibbana and concept are time-freed.
> > > So in this object condition there is no state that cannot be an
> object of
> > > consciousness and mental factors. This object condition pervades
> the 
> > > teaching
> > > in the pali Canon.....�
> 
> Again as arammana, it is always the singular state (nama, rupa, nibbana
> or
> concept) that is referred to. Nowhere have I ever seen any suggestion of
> more
> than one arammana at a time.
> 
> I thought Num made some very useful points in his post on this thread. I
> agreed
> with all his comments and look forward to any more discussion between
> you both.
> As he said, ‘besides paramattha sanna marks pannatti’.It’s so very
> different
> from our usual meaning of memory.
> 
> You wonder how 2 objects can be compared if they are not appearing
> together.
> What about if you are house-hunting? Do you need to have all the houses
> in
> front of you at the same time in order to compare them? I prefer your
> later
> time-sharing model (to Mike) where you suggest that the occurrence of
> citta A
> and citta B are a condition for citta C.
> 
> I think we all really appreciate your interest in understanding these
> Abhidhamma points and in checking it out rather than in just accepting
> it
> blindly. Let me know if the quotes still don't make the grade and I'll
> try to
> do better.
> 
> Btw, your ‘dyslexic apology’ made me feel I should have sent half a
> dozen for
> the many (mostly minor) errors I caught up with in my own posts when I
> read
> them over later;-)
> 
> I woke up today and my first thought was ‘I bet I’ve now got lots of
> homework
> from Howard’ and I was right..I’ll get back on the others sooner or
> later.
> 
> Sarah
> 

	
10194

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 0:53am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 12/20/01 2:14:36 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> > Let me add the following metaphorical thoughts: Without concepts we 
> 
> > can't see the forest for the trees. Without wisdom we can't see the trees 
> for 
> > the forest. Moreover, without wisdom we can't see that the trees are not 
> > self-existent, but are parts of an interconnected web which includes the 
> > earth, the sun, and the clouds.
> > In the foregoing, trees, the earth, the sun, and the clouds 
> represent 
> > the "paramattha dhammas," forests represent (the presumed referents) of 
> > concepts, and *all* of these, each existing in a sense, are empty.
> > One more point as to the knowledge-giving character of concepts: 
> It 
> > would seem that one of their functions is to serve as a shorthand summing 
> up 
> > of the relations among various dhammas. In a single representational 
> unit, a 
> > concept codifies a complex relational structure obtaining among dhammas, 
> it 
> > seems to me.
> 
> which perhaps cannot be perceived directly, although it does exist?
----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I think that the relations are every bit as real as the 
things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly knowable by 
some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. For us ordinary 
mortals (a.k.a. worldlings), however, the indirect, representational, bundled 
knowledge of concepts is usually needed for the task. In any case, I readily 
agree that concepts are knowledge-giving, essentially so for all but arahants 
(and useful even for them). Also, however, for us run-of-the-mill worldlings, 
concepts are a source of fundamental error and had best be dealt with 
cautiously.
-----------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Nice metaphor in any case.
----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Thanks. :-)
==========================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10195

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 0:54am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
It was Sarah, I think!

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/20/01 2:17:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> Who made up this cute thread name by the way?
> 
> Robert Ep.
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10196

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:52am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Howard and Sarah,

I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html

Quote
Note
1. This statement has engendered a great deal of controversy over the
centuries. The commentary maintains that "mind" here refers to the
bhavanga-citta, the momentary mental state between periods when the mental
stream adverts to objects, but this statement raises more questions than
it answers. There is no reference to the bhavanga-citta or the mental
stream in any of the suttas (they appear first in an Abhidhamma treatise,
the Patthana); and because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
deep sleep, why is it called luminous? And why would the perception of its
luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind? And further, if
"mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to
develop the bhavanga-citta? 

Another interpretation equates the luminosity of the mind with the
"consciousness without feature," desribed as "luminous" in MN 49 and DN
11, but this interpretation also has problems. According to MN 49, that
consciousness partakes of nothing in the describable world, not even the
"Allness of the All," so how could it possibly be defiled? And, because it
is not realized until the goal of the practice is reached, why would the
perception of its luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?
And again, if "mind" here means consciousness without feature, how could
the sutta talk of its development? 

A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived
from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are
not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness.
Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice. With this
understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing
defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in
terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: "And
furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier
disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth
jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He
sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. Just as if a man
were sitting covered from head to foot with a white cloth so that there
would be no part of his body to which the white cloth did not extend; even
so, the monk sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness.
There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by pure, bright awareness."
From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only
cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to
ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those
acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized.
Unquote



Kind regards
Ken O


--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> sarahdhhk@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang.
> Nikaya. We
> > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the
> ‘luminous mind
> > ’
> > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but
> 
> > since
> > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the
> commentaries, I
> > think. 
> > 
> ===========================
> Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular
> importance, 
> I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To
> me, 
> it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is
> luminous but 
> for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud 
> cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking
> in 
> shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its 
> capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as
> bhavanga 
> cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that
> the 
> Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are*
> such 
> things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are
> not 
> mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few
> leaves of 
> knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

	
10197

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 1:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Ken -

Thank you for this. It, of course, pleases me since it accords with my 
understanding! ;-)) [I would be even happier, however, had the notes been by, 
say, Bhikkhu Bodhi.]

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/20/01 9:08:05 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
ashkenn@y... writes:


> 
> Hi Howard and Sarah,
> 
> I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10198

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:49am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi again, Rob -

In a message dated 12/20/01 8:55:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... 
writes:


> I think that the relations are every bit as real as the 
> things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly knowable by 
> 
> some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. 
=========================
I'd like to add a clarification to this. When I say that "relations 
are every bit as real as the things-in-relation," I should add that they are 
also just as "unreal". ;-)) What I'm emphasizing here is that we are not 
going to find any "things" anywhere which are relations. For example, one 
event may immediately precede another. This can be directly observed. We 
speak of this as the relation of direct precedence holding between the 
events. But nowhere will anyone find the "direct-precedence relation"! ;-) 
Relations are "mere" relations, and the "things" which are related are mere 
things-in-relation. Neither of these is a complete fiction, the referent of 
an ungrounded concept, but, likewise, neither of these is an entity. Reifying 
relations is an even stranger hobby, I think, than reifying 
things-in-relation.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10199

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 8:04am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
It was Herman.


Kind regards
Ken O

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > It was Sarah, I think!
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 2:17:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Who made up this cute thread name by the way?
> > 
> > Robert Ep.
> >