10200

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 8:03am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Sarah

I am not buying the idea that bhavanga citta as said in the commentary is
the luminious mind bc first the objects of bhavanga citta is not known. 


"Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming
defilements." 

On this statement, we could said that it is similar to bhavanga cittas.

"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements."

"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming defilements.
The uninstructed run-of-the-mill person doesn't discern that as it
actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the uninstructed
run-of-the-mill person -- there is no development of the mind." 

"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the
mind." 


If bhavanga citta is indeed the luminious mind, that mean the practise of
panna should be on bhavanga citta and not on kusala cittas as indicated by
this sutta. How do we practise bhavanga cittas which in the first place
the object is not known and it purpose is only life continual and
furthermore it is a vipaka citta. Hence the my view the interpretation of
Bhavanga citta is not correct. The commentary, takes on the first
statement as assuming it as bhavanga citta which I also initially thought.
Further reading of this sutta, leave me doubting that bhavanga citta as
luminious mind. 

If we assume that bhavanga cittas as indeed the luminous indeed, then it
would imply Nibbana is bhavanga cittas as I infered from the last
paragraph of the sutta. Then this leave us the problem of cessation of
all khandhas after parinibbana



Kind regards
Ken O



--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> sarahdhhk@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang.
> Nikaya. We
> > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the
> ‘luminous mind
> > ’
> > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but
> 
> > since
> > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the
> commentaries, I
> > think. 
> > 
> ===========================
> Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular
> importance, 
> I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To
> me, 
> it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is
> luminous but 
> for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud 
> cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking
> in 
> shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its 
> capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as
> bhavanga 
> cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that
> the 
> Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are*
> such 
> things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are
> not 
> mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few
> leaves of 
> knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 

	
10201

From: rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 9:21am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:

> > But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned 
to), 
> > is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. 
So 
> > while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it 
stands to 
> > reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, 
i.e. 
> > independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of 
> > speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self."
> 
> unless there is a self that is not a composed entity, or separate 
being.

Hi Robert,

Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind 
that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan 
logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of 
an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such 
a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without 
having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and 
conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other 
words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it 
is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to 
as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a 
logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could 
appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine 
a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!)

Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could 
not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply 
dependence on those composed entities via the facility of 
interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other 
words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent 
entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it 
would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! 

So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely 
meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I 
are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity 
someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could 
never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to 
interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent 
arising, like all other dependent arisings.

I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by 
this too you're implying that there is something that can exist 
separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any 
examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how 
it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once 
and for all?

I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a 
view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, 
production from other, and production from both self and other.

Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested 
that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its 
subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any 
more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan 
Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point 
you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more 
detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the 
opint's I've raised with you here:

http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html
	
10202

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 4:23am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi, Ken -

Thank you! Apologies to Herman. I guess he's cute, too! ;-))

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/20/01 11:28:52 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
ashkenn@y... writes:


> 
> It was Herman.
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > It was Sarah, I think!> 
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/20/01 2:17:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > Who made up this cute thread name by the way?
> > > 
> > > Robert Ep.
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10203

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:10am
Subject: a pitfall

 	
Kom wrote: 

It is possible for unskillful cittas to mistake something
not Satipatthana to be Satipatthana. As you can see, other
kinds of cittas (including those with attachments and
ignorance) can also have realities as their objects. A.
Sujin mentioned on the India trip that some people mistake
that they are developing Satipatthana because they have
moments that they experience one reality at a time.

N: Dear Kom, thank you for this reminder. What a pitfall it can be: we
think, Ha! now the object is not a concept but a reality such as hardness,
and thus I am developing satipatthana. Oh no, lobha tricks us again. A
paramattha dhamma experienced with lobha. Or maybe there is a moment of sati
and then quickly after that again trying to hold the object. Cittas arise
and pass away so fast. Pa~n~naa must be very keen to discern all those
different moments. 
We had many pertinent, pointed reminders from A. Sujin during this trip,
didn't we? Jaran asked how one is sincere (phu trong),and A. Sujin explained
many times how important it is to be sincere as to one's own development,
what one knows or does not know yet.
It is interesting that everybody highlights the points that most impressed
him. Jonothan mentioned several other points. If you have time (and Jaran
also) perhaps you could say more about your own observations and feelings
with regard to what you learnt in India? You inspire me to write more!
Best wishes, Nina. 


10204

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:12am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Hi, Erik -

Erik, with regard to your post (quoted below), are you saying that you 
don't accept the notion of the unconditioned dhamma, nibbana, as described, 
for example, in the Udana?
In this regard, I'd be interested in knowing your take on the 
following which I wrote to Suan:
"As far as nibbana is concerned, at least nibbana without remnant, I 
see it as consciousness of absence of objects: a luminous, timeless reality, 
permanent in the double sense of being timeless, and of being available at 
all times from within the temporal realms. Nibbana with remnant, the ordinary 

state of the living arahant, I see as based on the luminous, timeless 
nibbana, but with an overlay of conditions which are seen through as empty, 
fleeting shadows."
Incidentally, discernment of an absence can't be said to be 
conditioned by anything, unless one considers an absence to be a thing. On 
the other hand, being a discernment, it is not a nullity either.

With metta,
Howard



In a message dated 12/20/01 12:25:29 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
rikpa21@y... writes:


> Hi Robert,
> 
> Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind 
> that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan 
> logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of 
> an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such 
> a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without 
> having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and 
> conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other 
> words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it 
> is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to 
> as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a 
> logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could 
> appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine 
> a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!)
> 
> Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could 
> not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply 
> dependence on those composed entities via the facility of 
> interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other 
> words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent 
> entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it 
> would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! 
> 
> So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely 
> meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I 
> are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity 
> someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could 
> never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to 
> interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent 
> arising, like all other dependent arisings.
> 
> I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by 
> this too you're implying that there is something that can exist 
> separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any 
> examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how 
> it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once 
> and for all?
> 
> I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a 
> view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, 
> production from other, and production from both self and other.
> 
> Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested 
> that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its 
> subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any 
> more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan 
> Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point 
> you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more 
> detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the 
> opint's I've raised with you here:
> 
> http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	

 	 

	
10205

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:54am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Thanks Jon, good explanation. Although it is hard for me to understand how the
process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object is 'perfect' enough to
apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is the idea that
the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to directly 'copy'
the object?

In a related question, how does this theory account for the characteristic of the
sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this type of sense
organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is perceived? It
is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' in actually
taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that has evolved
through a physical process to become gradually more refined but still imperfect
and which is also subject to individual variation, take in the 'actual'
characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who is enlightened
is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', no? There is
no direct perception according to this idea. Which is why normally I would think
that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, rather than a
true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. 

Best,
Robert Ep.

=======================

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Howard & Rob
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob -
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > Hi Howard.
> > > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act
> > of
> > > perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it
> > is 
> > > possible,
> > > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of 
> > > satipatthana? 
> > > And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or
> > reduces 
> > > its
> > > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act?
> > > 
> > ============================
> > I'm afraid I will have to leave this to be answered by those
> > folks who 
> > really know what they are talking about (with regard to Abhidhamma)!
> > ;-))
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard
> 
> This question has been discussed before (no surprise!), and you may find
> interesting the passage below from a very useful post of Kom's (#7300 in
> the archives)
> 
> Jon
> 
> [Q]: > We don't get an experience of an outer object without a mental
> > interpretation of impressions which are put together by the mind to form
> 
> an image.
> 
> [A]: When one of the 5 sense objects impinges on the sense organ, and
> there 
> is a process of consciousness (the sense-door process) (A) rising to 
> cognize the object, the process of consciousness is said to be
> experiencing 
> the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the object. The mind-door process 
> of consciousness that rises immediately afterward (B), interrupted only by
> 
> some "life-continuity" consciousness, also experience the sabhava of the 
> object. It is only some processes later (extremely short) (C) that the 
> consciousness starts to make an interpretation of the sense object, such 
> as "shapes", "persons", "Robert", etc. 
> 
> The abhidhamma teaching indicates that the consciousness and the 
> mental factors (in your terminology, the mind) at (A) and (B) are 
> cognizing the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the reality (perhaps 
> without thorough penetration), and the consciousness at (C) is cognizing 
> concept (pannatti) of that reality. (A) and (B) cognize the
> characteristics 
> (sabhava) of actual realities, where as (C) cognizes the concept which has
> 
> no sabhava. For us who may not have accumulated enough wisdom, it 
> may appear that (A), (B), and (C) are cognizing the same thing, where as 
> they are actually not.
> 
> This is the brief explanation of how the mind can cognize both what is
> real 
> (with sabhava) and what is unreal (without sabhava) and appear to the 
> person that the dhamma with and without sabhava are ones and the same 
> (while they are not).


	
10206

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:57am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Sarah,
I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of
view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary
explanation either. I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what I
was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for which I
apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out over
and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important
discussions.

Robert Ep.

===========

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Sarah -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> sarahdhhk@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We
> > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind
> > ’
> > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but 
> > since
> > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I
> > think. 
> > 
> ===========================
> Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular importance, 
> I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To me, 
> it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is luminous but 
> for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud 
> cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking in 
> shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its 
> capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as bhavanga 
> cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that the 
> Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are* such 
> things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are not 
> mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few leaves of 
> knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 
> 
> 
> 
> 


	
10207

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:04am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Very good, Kenneth. Thank you.

Robert Ep.

=======

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Howard and Sarah,
> 
> I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html
> 
> Quote
> Note
> 1. This statement has engendered a great deal of controversy over the
> centuries. The commentary maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> bhavanga-citta, the momentary mental state between periods when the mental
> stream adverts to objects, but this statement raises more questions than
> it answers. There is no reference to the bhavanga-citta or the mental
> stream in any of the suttas (they appear first in an Abhidhamma treatise,
> the Patthana); and because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> deep sleep, why is it called luminous? And why would the perception of its
> luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind? And further, if
> "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to
> develop the bhavanga-citta? 
> 
> Another interpretation equates the luminosity of the mind with the
> "consciousness without feature," desribed as "luminous" in MN 49 and DN
> 11, but this interpretation also has problems. According to MN 49, that
> consciousness partakes of nothing in the describable world, not even the
> "Allness of the All," so how could it possibly be defiled? And, because it
> is not realized until the goal of the practice is reached, why would the
> perception of its luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?
> And again, if "mind" here means consciousness without feature, how could
> the sutta talk of its development? 
> 
> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived
> from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
> meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are
> not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness.
> Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice. With this
> understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing
> defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in
> terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: "And
> furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier
> disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth
> jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He
> sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. Just as if a man
> were sitting covered from head to foot with a white cloth so that there
> would be no part of his body to which the white cloth did not extend; even
> so, the monk sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness.
> There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by pure, bright awareness."
> From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only
> cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to
> ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those
> acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized.
> Unquote
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O


	
10208

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:07am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi again, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 8:55:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... 
> writes:
> 
> 
> > I think that the relations are every bit as real as the 
> > things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly knowable by 
> > 
> > some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. 
> =========================
> I'd like to add a clarification to this. When I say that "relations 
> are every bit as real as the things-in-relation," I should add that they are 
> also just as "unreal". ;-)) What I'm emphasizing here is that we are not 
> going to find any "things" anywhere which are relations. For example, one 
> event may immediately precede another. This can be directly observed. We 
> speak of this as the relation of direct precedence holding between the 
> events. But nowhere will anyone find the "direct-precedence relation"! ;-) 
> Relations are "mere" relations, and the "things" which are related are mere 
> things-in-relation. Neither of these is a complete fiction, the referent of 
> an ungrounded concept, but, likewise, neither of these is an entity. Reifying 
> relations is an even stranger hobby, I think, than reifying 
> things-in-relation.

And yet so easy to do.

Just to take a prosaic one:

"We're married". Turning the relation of 'marriage' into an object does what to a
relationship which is an ongoing act of moment-to-moment relationship? Notice the
rising worldwide divorce rate.

Robert Ep.



	
10209

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:10am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Very good, Kenneth.
You are in excellent form today.
I think I'll sit back and watch you and Howard for a while.

Sarah, care for popcorn?

Best,
Robert Ep.

==============

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Sarah
> 
> I am not buying the idea that bhavanga citta as said in the commentary is
> the luminious mind bc first the objects of bhavanga citta is not known. 
> 
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming
> defilements." 
> 
> On this statement, we could said that it is similar to bhavanga cittas.
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements."
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming defilements.
> The uninstructed run-of-the-mill person doesn't discern that as it
> actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the uninstructed
> run-of-the-mill person -- there is no development of the mind." 
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
> The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
> actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
> well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the
> mind." 
> 
> 
> If bhavanga citta is indeed the luminious mind, that mean the practise of
> panna should be on bhavanga citta and not on kusala cittas as indicated by
> this sutta. How do we practise bhavanga cittas which in the first place
> the object is not known and it purpose is only life continual and
> furthermore it is a vipaka citta. Hence the my view the interpretation of
> Bhavanga citta is not correct. The commentary, takes on the first
> statement as assuming it as bhavanga citta which I also initially thought.
> Further reading of this sutta, leave me doubting that bhavanga citta as
> luminious mind. 
> 
> If we assume that bhavanga cittas as indeed the luminous indeed, then it
> would imply Nibbana is bhavanga cittas as I infered from the last
> paragraph of the sutta. Then this leave us the problem of cessation of
> all khandhas after parinibbana
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
> 
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > sarahdhhk@y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang.
> > Nikaya. We
> > > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the
> > ‘luminous mind
> > > ’
> > > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> > > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but
> > 
> > > since
> > > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> > > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the
> > commentaries, I
> > > think. 
> > > 
> > ===========================
> > Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular
> > importance, 
> > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To
> > me, 
> > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is
> > luminous but 
> > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud 
> > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking
> > in 
> > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its 
> > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as
> > bhavanga 
> > cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that
> > the 
> > Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are*
> > such 
> > things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are
> > not 
> > mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few
> > leaves of 
> > knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.)


	
10210

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Dear Eric,
I will just make a last comment and go read your essay.

If there were such an uncaused and causeless existent, it would as you say have to
be pre-existingly present, unchanging and not interact or change with form. Such
a formless form could only be a core awareness, which would be aware without being
affected by anything, an underlying impersonal field of a kind. You say that one
is a caused and form-ful being, but isn't the point that such a one is not a self,
and not actually a being? Enlightenment would then consist of awakening to this
underlying impersonal state, which shouldn't rightly be called a self, since it is
not personal. The only way in which this relates to Theravada, is that it is a
plausible explanation of the luminous mind temporarily obscured or defiled by
worldly defilements, but not actually affected by them.

Robert Ep.

=============

--- rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> wrote:
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> 
> > > But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned 
> to), 
> > > is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. 
> So 
> > > while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it 
> stands to 
> > > reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, 
> i.e. 
> > > independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of 
> > > speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self."
> > 
> > unless there is a self that is not a composed entity, or separate 
> being.
> 
> Hi Robert,
> 
> Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind 
> that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan 
> logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of 
> an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such 
> a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without 
> having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and 
> conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other 
> words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it 
> is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to 
> as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a 
> logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could 
> appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine 
> a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!)
> 
> Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could 
> not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply 
> dependence on those composed entities via the facility of 
> interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other 
> words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent 
> entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it 
> would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! 
> 
> So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely 
> meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I 
> are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity 
> someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could 
> never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to 
> interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent 
> arising, like all other dependent arisings.
> 
> I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by 
> this too you're implying that there is something that can exist 
> separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any 
> examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how 
> it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once 
> and for all?
> 
> I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a 
> view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, 
> production from other, and production from both self and other.
> 
> Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested 
> that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its 
> subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any 
> more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan 
> Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point 
> you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more 
> detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the 
> opint's I've raised with you here:
> 
> http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html
> 


	
10211

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:26pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Dear Robert,

I wholeheartedly second these questions.

Your photograph simile is an interesting one. In abhidhamma type-
thinking the photo says something about reality, to my way of thinking
(and yours as well, from the sound of it), the photo says something 
about the camera and the process of development of the photo.

All the best


Herman

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> Thanks Jon, good explanation. Although it is hard for me to 
understand how the
> process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object 
is 'perfect' enough to
> apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is 
the idea that
> the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to 
directly 'copy'
> the object?
> 
> In a related question, how does this theory account for the 
characteristic of the
> sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this 
type of sense
> organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is 
perceived? It
> is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' 
in actually
> taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that 
has evolved
> through a physical process to become gradually more refined but 
still imperfect
> and which is also subject to individual variation, take in 
the 'actual'
> characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who 
is enlightened
> is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', 
no? There is
> no direct perception according to this idea. Which is why normally 
I would think
> that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, 
rather than a
> true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. 
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> =======================
> 
> --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > Howard & Rob
> > 
> > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob -
> > > 
> > > In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
	
10212

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:45pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Ken,

Just to clarify, does there need to be awareness of a thought, before 
it is a thought? 

I can certainly agree that there is only awareness of any one thing 
at any time, but that doesn't mean there isn't a whole lot going on 
in the background.

Thank you for your very clear and well-reasoned recent discussions re 
luminous mind.

All the best

Herman


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Howard and Sarah
> 
> My intepretation why object is one at time for citta is that our 
mind
> could only think at one thing at a time. I believe we could not 
think two
> things at one go in our mind.
> 
> Similarly in my intepretation of Satipatthana Sutta, the objects of
> mindfullness is always one at a time in the present moment to suit 
the
> normal behaviour of our mind.
> 
> Hence in this way, I conclude that a cittas could only grasp one 
object at
> time. 
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
	
10213

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 3:01pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Dear Howard,

Would it be reasonable to say that relationships only come into play 
through observation of the relationships, and that this is where the 
observing self comes in, or an observing citta, which in effect, is 
the same thing. And an unobserved relationship could be a way of 
describing a concept, perhaps?

All the best

Herman

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi again, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 8:55:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
upasaka@a... 
> writes:
> 
> 
> > I think that the relations are every bit as real as the 
> > things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly 
knowable by 
> > 
> > some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. 
> =========================
> I'd like to add a clarification to this. When I say 
that "relations 
> are every bit as real as the things-in-relation," I should add that 
they are 
> also just as "unreal". ;-)) What I'm emphasizing here is that we 
are not 
> going to find any "things" anywhere which are relations. For 
example, one 
> event may immediately precede another. This can be directly 
observed. We 
> speak of this as the relation of direct precedence holding between 
the 
> events. But nowhere will anyone find the "direct-precedence 
relation"! ;-) 
> Relations are "mere" relations, and the "things" which are related 
are mere 
> things-in-relation. Neither of these is a complete fiction, the 
referent of 
> an ungrounded concept, but, likewise, neither of these is an 
entity. Reifying 
> relations is an even stranger hobby, I think, than reifying 
> things-in-relation.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

10214

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 1:39pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Herman -

In a message dated 12/20/01 6:05:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
hhofman@d... writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> 
> Would it be reasonable to say that relationships only come into play 
> through observation of the relationships, and that this is where the 
> observing self comes in, or an observing citta, which in effect, is 
> the same thing.
> 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
From my perspective, nothing exists in any sense outside of the 
*possibility* of being observed. For me, 'to exist' and 'to be observable' 
are one and the same, whether we're talking about relations or anything else.
--------------------------------------------------------------
And an unobserved relationship could be a way of > 
> describing a concept, perhaps?
--------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I'm not completely clear on your meaning here. But what you write does 
engender several thoughts in my mind. It seems to me that we can distinguish 
between "active concepts" and "inactive concepts", and we can also 
distinguish between "grounded concepts" and "ungrounded concepts". 
By an "inactive concept" I mean the mental structure passed along by 
the mind that serves as the base for an "active concept". For example, we 
have the inactive concept of 'tree' which becomes activated at the time of 
(to speak conventionally) the observing of a tree, the remembering of a tree, 
or the picturing of a tree.
By a "grounded concept" I mean one which is constructed from (usually 
many) similar trains of mindstates involving objects experienced as 
interrelated in various (and often complex) ways. An "ungrounded concept" is 
one not based entirely on possible experience . One case of that, I would 
think would be where the objects subsumed by the concept have been observed 
(or, at least, are observable), but the relations among them, forming the 
mental "glue" of the concept, have not been observed and are not observable 
as holding among the objects. An example of the latter might be the concept 
of 'unicorn'. Horses exist, and horns exist, but, so far as I know, there is 
no instance of a horn growing from the head of a horse. So, the relation, 
while imaginable, is not observable, and the concept 'unicorn' is ungrounded. 
Likewise, the concept of 'person' as a changing assemblage is grounded, but 
the concept of 'self' as a unitary and permanent core associated in some way 
with that changing assemblage is ungrounded.
--------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> All the best
> 
> Herman
> 

==============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10215

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 9:15pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Rob Ep (and comrades),

I’m beginning to regret <sigh> re-opening the ‘luminous’ can of worms
again......especially now I see all your reinforcements joined in during the
night (more sighs)....however, they (the worms) were beginning to wriggle out
anyway;-(

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of
> view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary
> explanation either. 

Hmmm, sounds like you’re more heartened than you care to admit..

> I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what
> I
> was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for
> which I
> apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out
> over
> and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important
> discussions.

I know, in addition to shirking all homework assignments, you’d like me to be
your filing system of what you’re talking about... that’s OK, Rob, but we’ll
just put it on record;-)

These are three posts I wrote on the subject <Luminous mind/bhavanga cittas>
(out of many):

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8281
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8336 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8337

The third one should give you a good reminder of what you were talking about;-)
To find other old posts of yours on the topic, I’d suggest you go to escribe
and type in ‘metta’:
http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/

Once there, you can type in a key word like ‘luminous’ in the search section
and see what you find. 

OK, now I’ll sit back with the popcorn while you go on a revision course.

Sarah 
.........................................................................................................................

	
10216

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:19pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote:
> Dear Robert,
> 
> I wholeheartedly second these questions.
> 
> Your photograph simile is an interesting one. In abhidhamma type-
> thinking the photo says something about reality, to my way of thinking
> (and yours as well, from the sound of it), the photo says something 
> about the camera and the process of development of the photo.

Yes, I think you've put that well. That doesn't mean the camera isn't recording
something of reality, but it is doing it in the form that camera is capable of.

Best,
Robert Ep.



	
10217

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:33pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Sarah.
Comments at bottom.

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Hi Rob Ep (and comrades),
> 
> I’m beginning to regret <sigh> re-opening the ‘luminous’ can of worms
> again......especially now I see all your reinforcements joined in during the
> night (more sighs)....however, they (the worms) were beginning to wriggle out
> anyway;-(
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of
> > view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary
> > explanation either. 
> 
> Hmmm, sounds like you’re more heartened than you care to admit..
> 
> > I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what
> > I
> > was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for
> > which I
> > apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out
> > over
> > and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important
> > discussions.
> 
> I know, in addition to shirking all homework assignments, you’d like me to be
> your filing system of what you’re talking about... that’s OK, Rob, but we’ll
> just put it on record;-)
> 
> These are three posts I wrote on the subject <Luminous mind/bhavanga cittas>
> (out of many):
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8281
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8336 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8337
> 
> The third one should give you a good reminder of what you were talking about;-)
> To find other old posts of yours on the topic, I’d suggest you go to escribe
> and type in ‘metta’:
> http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/
> 
> Once there, you can type in a key word like ‘luminous’ in the search section
> and see what you find. 
> 
> OK, now I’ll sit back with the popcorn while you go on a revision course.
> 
> Sarah 

Dear Sarah,
Thanks for all your clues, and for accepting the popcorn. I feel guilty for being
a mutineer, but knowing that guilt is probably akusala, I am trying to discern it
as an empty reality!

Yes, I have been very bad about my homework. I am duly chastened......I'll do my
homework on this one. As you know, luminosity is my holy grail! <g>

With affection,
Robert Ep.

================


	
10218

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:47pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Ken O and Howard,

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah,
> 
> I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html
> 

Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered comments and
notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I’ll just add a few notes to those
earlier posts I just gave the links for:
*****

1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the ancient
Pali commentary:
> maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> bhavanga-citta..
*****

2. Without any doubt, very few ‘Buddhists’ are interested in these same
commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their value when
the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them or disagree
when they don’t.
*****

3. There are a few of us ‘dinosaurs’ left who, on the other hand, have every
confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and
explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and Abhidhamma. We
fully realise we’re a dying breed, but actually agree with the quote I gave
from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is ‘uniform in sentiment’.
*****

4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is consistent
with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), Questions of
K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself.
*****

5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks:
>“....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> deep sleep, why is it called luminous?”
.....

As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the sleep, but
whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without sense-door or
mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there are no
defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my earlier quotes
from K.Milinda (1V,8.36):
.....

“When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
(has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a 
mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. Just,
O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall
even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has
returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive
knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream.”
*****

6. T.B. asks: 
“And why would the perception of its
> luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?”
.....

As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding the mind (i.e
the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome states
which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects experienced
with bhavanga cittas in between.

In one of those other posts I wrote:
.....
“In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing cittas and
the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the value of
skilful states even ‘if for just the lasting of a finger-snap’.I think it’s
important to appreciate the context when we read the following:

‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the mind:
insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change it is.

‘This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come from
without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints that come
from without.’ “
.....

In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in theory) helps
us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure state, but
rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways.
.....

I wrote before:

“In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that:

‘Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever there
is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of consciousness is
most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs momentarily during
waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.’ 
*****

7. T.B. asks: “And further, if
> "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to
> develop the bhavanga-citta?”
.....

There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I understand. Bhavanga
citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis in the
suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing kusala states.
the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of abhidhamma is
essential in this regard.
*****

8. T.B. says:
‘> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived
> from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
> meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are
> not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness.
> Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.’
.....

On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very clear that
the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of ‘greed, aversion, or delusion’.
Without these core roots, there is no ‘becoming’ and no dukkha. Of course they
have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so often, only
arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If there is
not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-rising skilful
state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a ‘finger-snap’), it
would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). 

I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that explained not only
in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma.
*****

9.T.B. continues to add that:
> ‘With this
> understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing
> defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in
> terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: 
.....

On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a permanent
mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to their
‘uniform sentiment’. The purity of the states of awareness and concentration
referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state of
wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any bhavanga
cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case).
*****

10. T.B. adds:
> From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only
> cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to
> ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those
> acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized.
.....

This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this highest level
of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of defilements. I
truly don’t wish to re-open this can of worms too;-)
*****

Howard and Ken O, please know that I’m not asking you to ‘buy’ any idea, but
merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down by the Sangha
since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all would admit).

I don’t want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your other points
(from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please send them back
to me again because you’ve considered carefully, I know.

Sarah

............................................................................................................




	
10219

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:05pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] a pitfall

 	
Dear Nina,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...]
> Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2001 10:11 AM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [dsg] a pitfall
>
> We had many pertinent, pointed reminders from A.
> Sujin during this trip,
> didn't we?

I did. Hearing the dhamma and the reminders (and a chance
for questions!) from many learned people is probably the
most worthwhile activities that I did in India. Hearing
some of the pertinent points (like anatta, for example)
again and again seems to help quite a bit. I have even
started to hear new angles of explanations about Anatta from
K. Jack. Most worthwhile.

The points that came to mind immediately that I really
appreciated hearing:
1) Anattaness: what is anattaness?
2) How panna becomes developed
3) The purpose of hearing about the dhamma, learning the
dhamma, and noticing the dhamma.
4) How long the road is...

The point that I haven't yet deciphered yet was the
discussions about "understanding". A. Sujin kept mentioning
about understanding until it "lies next to your bone". I
think I kept asking about it in conventional terms what she
meant by that. Sort of a reminder to me what I must go
through everytime when there is no understanding of
realities.

kom
	
10220

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:38pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Rob Ep,

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: 

> Dear Sarah,
> Thanks for all your clues, and for accepting the popcorn. I feel guilty for
> being
> a mutineer, but knowing that guilt is probably akusala, I am trying to
> discern it
> as an empty reality!

Yes, well, that’s a bit how I felt about the regret in re-opening this thread
;-)

> Yes, I have been very bad about my homework. I am duly chastened......I'll
> do my
> homework on this one. As you know, luminosity is my holy grail! <g>

At this rate, Anders will be paying us his Xmas thread and we’ll still be
discussing the same thread as when he left....<yikes>

Just a couple of BRIEF notes on the Udana quotes from the Cambodian website you
mention:

1. Dabba sutta (Ud V111.10) (2)

You ‘find the ‘unwavering bliss’ of interest here re. the idea that there is
nothing but cessation in parinibbana and nothing remaining’.

Masefield translates the last few lines as;

‘Just as, for that hammered with an iron-hammer that has progressively died
down, though the fire continues to blaze, a destiny is not known, so for those
who are properly liberated, for those who have crossed the flood that is the
bond of sense-desires, for those who have reached the happiness that is
undisturbed, there is not to be made known a destiny.’

brief com notes:
‘That has progressively died down’ (anupubbuupasantassa); ‘that has, in due
course, died down, burnt itself out, ceased’

‘Just as a destiny is not known (yathaa na ~naayate gati): ‘....or likewise for
some sound that has arisen, that has, in due course, died down, fully subsided,
a destiny is made known nowhere in the ten directions, on account of its having
ceased in a non-relinking fashion due to the cessation of the conditions (that
gave rise to it) 

‘the happiness’, the dying down of all formations reckoned as that nibbana that
is without remnant of substrate,

> ================

For the 2nd Nibbana Sutta (Ud V111, 1)

This is the other one I discussed at length (essential reading for you;-). See
posts:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8895
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8908
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9035
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9038

Firstly, let me remind you that this sutta is about nibbana and not about
parinibbana (you tend to mix them together, I think) Also you’ll see the
phrases you refer to and like are references to other arupa planes of
existence....showing that not only do the conditioned khandhas of the sense
realms not existing in nibbana, but also the non-rupa conditioned realities of
other realms. 

The references to light and so on were to nibbana, not parinibbana. I’ve run
out of steam and need to take care of some office work, otherwise I’d re-check
myself. Maybe you can re-quote the commentary notes on these references that I
gave before;-))))

Thanks Rob,
Sarah
..........................................................................................


	
10221

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 0:23am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Victor and Purnomo,

--- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello all,
> 
> I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by 
> concept? How does concept come to be?

I was also very glad to see Purnomo's comments.
.....

I just have a few more suggestions:

A. It may be useful to read some of the posts under ‘concepts and realities’ in
‘Useful Posts’ at:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts

B. I recommend the book ‘Realities and Concepts’ by Sujin Boriharnwanaket to be
found on:
http://www.abhidhamma.org/

C. In particular, this extract on the various kinds of concept may help:
http://www.abhidhamma.org/sujin3.htm
.....
<quote>
*****
The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes between six kinds of
concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). 

        1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what is real, for
example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or sanna (perception) 10.

         2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what is not real,
such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts do not represent absolute
realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and rupa. Thai or foreigner are
not real in the absolute sense, they are conventional realities, sammutti
dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome consciousness) be Thai or foreign?
Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it is a dhamma which has its
own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign.

         3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of the non-existent
based on the existent. There is the expression "the person with the six
abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is not real. Thus this
concept stands for what is real and for what is not real.

         4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of the existent based on
the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's voice". The sound is real,
but the woman is not real.

         5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of what is real based on
what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu
(eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa (eyesense, a reality
sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana (consciousness) is also a
reality, namely the reality which experiences.

         6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of what is not real
based on what is not real. There is the expression "the kings son". Both king
and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas, conventional realities. 

<end quote>
*****

Sarah
..................................................................................................


	
10222

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 0:36am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Sarah,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...]
> Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2001 11:39 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary
> (Part Two) To Robert
> Epstein
>
> At this rate, Anders will be paying us his Xmas
> thread and we’ll still be
> discussing the same thread as when he left....<yikes>

Thank you bringing in the quote about bhavanga from Milinda
panha and others. You probably know this already, A Survey
of Paramatha Dhammas in Thai as well as Nina's explains the
concepts of cittta (bhavanga) being "Pantara" the same way.
From Nina's version (http://www.abhidhamma.org/Para3.htm), a
long quote:

*******
In the “Dhammasangaùi” the citta is called “pure” or
“luminous” (paùèara), and according to the “Atthasåliní”
this refers to the “life-continuum”, bhavanga-citta.
Citta is a reality which arises and then falls away
immediately. The falling away of the preceding citta is a
condition for the arising of the succeeding citta. The citta
which sees arises and falls away, there is not continuously
a citta which sees. Neither is there continuously a citta
which hears, a citta which experiences tangible object or a
citta which thinks. When we are fast asleep and not
dreaming, there are cittas arising and falling away,
succeeding one another. However, at such moments citta does
not experience an object through the eyes, the ears, the
nose, the tongue, the bodysense or the mind-door. The citta
which does not experience an object through any of the six
doors is the bhavanga-citta. This citta keeps one alive, it
maintains the continuity in one’s life as this particular
person. Bhavanga-cittas are arising and falling away until
there is another type of citta arising which experiences an
object through the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the
bodysense or the mind-door. The bhavanga-cittas arise in
between the processes of cittas which experience objects
through the six doors 5 and this goes on continuously until
the end of one’s lifespan as this particular person.

The “Atthasåliní” (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140)
states: “Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of
‘exceedingly pure’ with reference to the bhavanga-citta.”
The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience
an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
bodysense or mind. Everybody who is fast asleep looks
innocent, pure, he does not experience like or dislike, he
is not jealous, stingy, conceited, he has no loving kindness
nor compassion; thus, unwholesome or wholesome qualities do
not arise because he does not see, hear, experience tangible
object or think. However, it should be known that whenever
the citta which arises experiences an object through one of
the six doors, citta is not pure. The reason is that many
different defilements have been accumulated in the citta and
these condition the arising of pleasure and attachment when
one sees something pleasant, and the arising of displeasure
and annoyance when one sees something unpleasant.

*** end quote ***

Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or
luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do
we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or
dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something
that we consider good, desirable, or something that we
consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a
pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the
reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those
likings for ages.

kom
	
10223

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 1:12am
Subject: Luminous mind

 	
Hi Sarah,

First of all, I deeply respected and highly value the commentaries and
Abhidhamma. This portion of the commentary which I feel is inadequate to
address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious mind on
the basis of the first two statements of the suttas.

Let us revisit the last statement of the sutta
"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the
mind." 

We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing using
bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these
well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory that it
is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga cittas
could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly believe
that all cittas could be discern.

What TB sayings is not implying luminious mind as a permanent self. My
reading is that he is equating it with Nibbana or the attainment of
cessation. Even though we do not know what Nibbana is like.

There are two ways to look at it, 

From the Abhidhamma stand point, it could be bhavanga cittas as they could
be possibly be discerned for those who are highly developed disciples.

For the Sutta stand point, it could be pointing to Nibbana or the state of
mind in the attainment of cessation. (there is no implication of a
"permanent self). 

It sounds like I am backtracking on my previous email. He he :) I think my
position is rather neutral now after a new more reread of suttas and
rethinking :).

A bit off track to the Mahayana traditions. Luminous mind is more common
in Mahayana rather than the Thervada. Thervada is more cautious of this
approach due to the subtle implication of a permanent self. In one
Mahayana sutta, the Buddha said that defilement to the mind is very
difficult to discern, only highly developed disciples will know how the
mind (which is luminious) is being defiled. In my view, the Mahayana
traditions tend to equate the luminious mind as Nibbana or enlightement
which I find acceptable as long as there is no notion of a permanent self.

Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how
does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its objects
(a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says
that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any
commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details
will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound greedy
:))



Kind regards
Ken O

P.S. - I don't think TB agree that luminoius mind is bhavanga cittas or
not he will not make such a note. 



> Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered comments
> and
> notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I’ll just add a few notes to those
> earlier posts I just gave the links for:
> *****
> 
> 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the
> ancient Pali commentary: maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> > bhavanga-citta..
> *****
> 
> 2. Without any doubt, very few ‘Buddhists’ are interested in these same
> commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their
> value when
> the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them or
> disagree
> when they don’t.
> *****
> 
> 3. There are a few of us ‘dinosaurs’ left who, on the other hand, have
> every
> confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and
> explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and
> Abhidhamma. We
> fully realise we’re a dying breed, but actually agree with the quote I
> gave
> from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is ‘uniform in sentiment’.
> *****
> 
> 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is
> consistent
> with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), Questions
> of
> K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself.
> *****
> 
> 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks:
> >“....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?”
> .....
> 
> As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the sleep,
> but
> whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without
> sense-door or
> mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there are
> no
> defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my earlier
> quotes
> from K.Milinda (1V,8.36):
> .....
> 
> “When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
> (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act,
> and a 
> mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who
> knows
> not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.
> Just,
> O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will
> fall
> even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his
> mind has
> returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind
> inactive
> knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream.”
> *****
> 
> 6. T.B. asks: 
> “And why would the perception of its
> > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?”
> .....
> 
> As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding the
> mind (i.e
> the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome
> states
> which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects
> experienced
> with bhavanga cittas in between.
> 
> In one of those other posts I wrote:
> .....
> “In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing
> cittas and
> the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the value
> of
> skilful states even ‘if for just the lasting of a finger-snap’.I think
> it’s
> important to appreciate the context when we read the following:
> 
> ‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the
> mind:
> insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change it
> is.
> 
> ‘This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come
> from
> without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints
> that come
> from without.’ “
> .....
> 
> In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in
> theory) helps
> us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure state,
> but
> rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways.
> .....
> 
> I wrote before:
> 
> “In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that:
> 
> ‘Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever
> there
> is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of consciousness
> is
> most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs momentarily
> during
> waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.’ 
> *****
> 
> 7. T.B. asks: “And further, if
> > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to
> > develop the bhavanga-citta?”
> .....
> 
> There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I understand.
> Bhavanga
> citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis in
> the
> suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing kusala
> states.
> the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of abhidhamma
> is
> essential in this regard.
> *****
> 
> 8. T.B. says:
> ‘> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be
> derived
> > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
> > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion
> are
> > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness.
> > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.’
> .....
> 
> On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very
> clear that
> the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of ‘greed, aversion, or
> delusion’.
> Without these core roots, there is no ‘becoming’ and no dukkha. Of
> course they
> have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so
> often, only
> arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If
> there is
> not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-rising
> skilful
> state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a
> ‘finger-snap’), it
> would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). 
> 
> I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that explained
> not only
> in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma.
> *****
> 
> 9.T.B. continues to add that:
> > ‘With this
> > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing
> > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in
> > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: 
> .....
> 
> On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a
> permanent
> mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to
> their
> ‘uniform sentiment’. The purity of the states of awareness and
> concentration
> referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state
> of
> wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any
> bhavanga
> cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case).
> *****
> 
> 10. T.B. adds:
> > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not
> only
> > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them
> to
> > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those
> > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized.
> .....
> 
> This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this highest
> level
> of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of
> defilements. I
> truly don’t wish to re-open this can of worms too;-)
> *****
> 
> Howard and Ken O, please know that I’m not asking you to ‘buy’ any idea,
> but
> merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down by the
> Sangha
> since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all would
> admit).
> 
> I don’t want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your other
> points
> (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please send
> them back
> to me again because you’ve considered carefully, I know.
> 
> Sarah


	
10224

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 1:20am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Kom,

It is such a relief to have you back. You obviously realised I needed your
assistance;-)) 

Kom>>>>Thank you bringing in the quote about bhavanga from Milinda
panha and others. You probably know this already, A Survey
of Paramatha Dhammas in Thai as well as Nina's explains the
concepts of cittta (bhavanga) being "Pantara" the same way.
From Nina's version (http://www.abhidhamma.org/Para3.htm), a
long quote:

Thanks so much for adding the quotes from Survey. They helped me a lot and I’m
glad to be reminded. I may have quoted it before, but not in the posts I sent
Rob ep to review. 

I find it very sobering and a condition for calm to reflect how it’s just on
account of the sense-door activity that the kilesa arrise....as soon as there
is seeing or hearing or other sense-door activity, immediately it’s a condition
for lobha and the other defilements to arise so very fast. We think these
sense-door activities last, but when there are bhavanga cittas, there is no
sense door experiencing. In the same way, when there is the sense door
activity, there is no world of concepts.....The abhidhamma helps a lot, doesn’t
it?

I was trying to strictly limit my re-quotes in the post, but let me give you
the full K.Milinda one which you may have missed last time and also the
Atthasalini one:

**********
Qs of K.Milinda, 1V,8,36, Max Muller’s transl:

‘Ven Nagasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?’
‘Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. But when his sleep has become
light, and he is not yet fully conscious, in that interval it is that dreams
are dreamt. When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
(has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a 
mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. Just,
O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall
even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has
returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive
knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it
is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. As the miror, O king, are
you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind.’

**********

“Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of ‘exceedingly pure,’ with
reference to the subconscious life-continuum. So the Buddha has said;-
‘bhikkhus, the mind is luminous, but is corrupted by adventitious corruptions.’
Though immoral, it is called ‘clear’ because it issues (from subconscious vital
conditions) just as a tributary of the Ganges is like the Ganges and a
tributary of the Godhaavarii is like the Godhaavarii” (Atth, 140, p.185 PTSed)

*** end quote ***

Kom>>>>>Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or
luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do
we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or
dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something
that we consider good, desirable, or something that we
consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a
pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the
reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those
likings for ages.
......

Great comments, Kom..you’re in really good form.

Sarah
....................

p.s. Jaran, take note of Kom's good example.... maybe with your Thai and pali
skills, you could help translate that passage from the Thai commentary for
Nina;-)

...and Dan, I’ve marked March in my diary, but let me tell you that we just
can’t wait that long ;-( 
...............................................................................................................................


	
10225

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:48am
Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Sarah,

Is it a property of all dinosaurs that they avoid / reject jhana 
approach to insight? Rejecting an idea because it may be construed as 
having some notion of self in it sounds like control to me. As long 
as we remember that it is cittas that think self , and not self that 
thinks cittas, we should be right :-)


Hope you are getting some time of over the silly season :-)

Herman



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Hi Ken O and Howard,
> 
> --- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah,
> > 
> > I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" 
at
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html
> > 
> 
> Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered 
comments and
> notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I'll just add a few notes to 
those
> earlier posts I just gave the links for:
> *****
> 
> 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the 
ancient
> Pali commentary:
> > maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> > bhavanga-citta..
> *****
> 
> 2. Without any doubt, very few `Buddhists' are interested in these 
same
> commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their 
value when
> the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them 
or disagree
> when they don't.
> *****
> 
> 3. There are a few of us `dinosaurs' left who, on the other hand, 
have every
> confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and
> explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and 
Abhidhamma. We
> fully realise we're a dying breed, but actually agree with the 
quote I gave
> from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is `uniform in sentiment'.
> *****
> 
> 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is 
consistent
> with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), 
Questions of
> K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself.
> *****
> 
> 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks:
> >"....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?"
> .....
> 
> As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the 
sleep, but
> whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without 
sense-door or
> mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there 
are no
> defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my 
earlier quotes
> from K.Milinda (1V,8.36):
> .....
> 
> "When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
> (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not 
act, and a 
> mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he 
who knows
> not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are 
dreamt. Just,
> O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow 
will fall
> even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep 
his mind has
> returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind 
inactive
> knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not 
dream."
> *****
> 
> 6. T.B. asks: 
> "And why would the perception of its
> > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?"
> .....
> 
> As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding 
the mind (i.e
> the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome 
states
> which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects 
experienced
> with bhavanga cittas in between.
> 
> In one of those other posts I wrote:
> .....
> "In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing 
cittas and
> the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the 
value of
> skilful states even `if for just the lasting of a finger-snap'.I 
think it's
> important to appreciate the context when we read the following:
> 
> `Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as 
the mind:
> insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change 
it is.
> 
> `This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that 
come from
> without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of 
taints that come
> from without.' "
> .....
> 
> In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in 
theory) helps
> us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure 
state, but
> rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways.
> .....
> 
> I wrote before:
> 
> "In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that:
> 
> `Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life 
whenever there
> is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of 
consciousness is
> most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs 
momentarily during
> waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.' 
> *****
> 
> 7. T.B. asks: "And further, if
> > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean 
to
> > develop the bhavanga-citta?"
> .....
> 
> There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I 
understand. Bhavanga
> citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis 
in the
> suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing 
kusala states.
> the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of 
abhidhamma is
> essential in this regard.
> *****
> 
> 8. T.B. says:
> `> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be 
derived
> > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
> > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or 
delusion are
> > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of 
awareness.
> > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.'
> .....
> 
> On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very 
clear that
> the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of `greed, aversion, or 
delusion'.
> Without these core roots, there is no `becoming' and no dukkha. Of 
course they
> have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so 
often, only
> arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If 
there is
> not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-
rising skilful
> state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for 
a `finger-snap'), it
> would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). 
> 
> I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that 
explained not only
> in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma.
> *****
> 
> 9.T.B. continues to add that:
> > `With this
> > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away 
existing
> > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 
calls "purity in
> > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth 
jhana: 
> .....
> 
> On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a 
permanent
> mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary 
to their
> `uniform sentiment'. The purity of the states of awareness and 
concentration
> referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high 
state of
> wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with 
any bhavanga
> cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case).
> *****
> 
> 10. T.B. adds:
> > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that 
not only
> > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for 
them to
> > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on 
those
> > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be 
realized.
> .....
> 
> This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this 
highest level
> of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of 
defilements. I
> truly don't wish to re-open this can of worms too;-)
> *****
> 
> Howard and Ken O, please know that I'm not asking you to `buy' any 
idea, but
> merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down 
by the Sangha
> since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all 
would admit).
> 
> I don't want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your 
other points
> (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please 
send them back
> to me again because you've considered carefully, I know.
> 
> Sarah
>
	
10226

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 6:38am
Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah

 	
Dear Sarah (and Kom)

How are you? Thank you for raising the issues of the luminous mind. 
As both Robert Epstein and Howard used this beautiful statement of 
Gotama the Buddha when they introduced the concept of an underlying 
being (Robert) or 'a consciousness without objects'(Howard) remaining 
after the Parinibbaana of an Arahant in response to Parinibbana 
Subcommentary (Part Two), I will have to deal with this statement of 
the Buddha when I write my next Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part 
Three). 

As your posts and Kom's post addressed this issue in advance, you 
have taken off some of my burdens. 

Your analysis of Thanissaro Bhikkhu's misconceptions and 
misinterpretations is remarkably good, and freed me of considerable 
workload. 

Well, sorry about my being workload-conscious! You know what I mean.

Sarah, you wrote:

"I'll leave these references in Suan's capable hands."

It is very kind of you to have confidence in me. I will try my best 
to offer academically reliable posts here. 

You also wrote:

"Meanwhile I'm enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don't mean 
to interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we 
should try to `account for their actual usage.'"

You are not interrupting the Parinibbana discussion at all. Your 
contributions are very welcome. 

Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three) coming soon, with a new 
treatment of the luminous mind! 


With best wishes,

Suan

http://www.bodhiology.org

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. 
One really
> > needs
> > to deal with the term 'undefined reality' 
> 
> I'll leave these references in Suan's capable hands.
> 
> 
> > Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of 
Parinibbana
> > 'is
> > not one of darkness', but of light. 
> 
> Would you give the reference for this? 
> 
> >And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is
> > luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me 
at least, if
> > not
> > to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas 
are only in
> > a
> > state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. 
It implies
> > that
> > when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying 
luminosity to be
> > discovered.
> 
> Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. 
Nikaya. We
> clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that 
the `luminous mind'
> is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door 
and
> mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, 
but since
> (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the 
commentaries, I
> think. 
> 
> Meanwhile I'm enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don't mean 
to
> interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we 
should try to
> `account for their actual usage.'
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Sarah
> 
> p.s I'll try to show some self-moderation and send that other silly 
sign-off
> you missed off-list.
> 
> All - Pls try to remember to cut off those parts of old posts which 
are not
> necessary for our replies....we all forget sometimes, but many 
people take the
> posts in `digest' form and it does help them.
> 
> ==================
> 
	
10227

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 7:07am
Subject: Re: Luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong

 	
Dear Ken 

How are you?

You wrote:

"This portion of the commentary which I feel is inadequate to
address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious 
mind on the basis of the first two statements of the suttas."

As I need to respond to Robert Epstein and Howard in my Parinibbana 
Subcommentary Series, I have to study the statements of the Buddha 
that mention 'pabassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam' and the commentary.

The commentary is very short, yet requires considerable research 
background to understand it, let alone translate it meaningfully in 
natural English. As I will be translating the essential portions of 
it, I also feel the need to write some technical notes on it because 
the translation on its own would not be enough to make sense for 
those who haven't some background in abhidhamma.

As far as I am concerned, the commentary on 'pabassaramidam, 
Bhikkhave, cittam' is not only very adequate, but also very deep and 
involving. You will know this very soon when Parinibbana 
Subcommentary (Part Three) is posted here. You will also see that 
some of your questions:

"how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says
that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any 
commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual 
details will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I 
sound greedy.." 

will also be automatically solved. The commentary in question is that 
adequate and that involving!


With best wishes

Suan

http://www.bodhiology.org



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Sarah,
> 
> First of all, I deeply respected and highly value the commentaries 
and
> Abhidhamma. This portion of the commentary which I feel is 
inadequate to
> address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious 
mind on
> the basis of the first two statements of the suttas.
> 
> Let us revisit the last statement of the sutta
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming 
defilements.
> The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
> actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
> well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development 
of the
> mind." 
> 
> We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing 
using
> bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these
> well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory 
that it
> is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga 
cittas
> could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly 
believe
> that all cittas could be discern.
> 
> What TB sayings is not implying luminious mind as a permanent 
self. My
> reading is that he is equating it with Nibbana or the attainment of
> cessation. Even though we do not know what Nibbana is like.
> 
> There are two ways to look at it, 
> 
> From the Abhidhamma stand point, it could be bhavanga cittas as 
they could
> be possibly be discerned for those who are highly developed 
disciples.
> 
> For the Sutta stand point, it could be pointing to Nibbana or the 
state of
> mind in the attainment of cessation. (there is no implication of a
> "permanent self). 
> 
> It sounds like I am backtracking on my previous email. He he :) I 
think my
> position is rather neutral now after a new more reread of suttas and
> rethinking :).
> 
> A bit off track to the Mahayana traditions. Luminous mind is more 
common
> in Mahayana rather than the Thervada. Thervada is more cautious of 
this
> approach due to the subtle implication of a permanent self. In one
> Mahayana sutta, the Buddha said that defilement to the mind is very
> difficult to discern, only highly developed disciples will know how 
the
> mind (which is luminious) is being defiled. In my view, the 
Mahayana
> traditions tend to equate the luminious mind as Nibbana or 
enlightement
> which I find acceptable as long as there is no notion of a 
permanent self.
> 
> Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation 
how
> does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its 
objects
> (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It 
simply says
> that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any
> commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual 
details
> will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound 
greedy
> :))
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
> 
> P.S. - I don't think TB agree that luminoius mind is bhavanga 
cittas or
> not he will not make such a note. 
> 
> 
> 
> > Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered 
comments
> > and
> > notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I'll just add a few notes 
to those
> > earlier posts I just gave the links for:
> > *****
> > 
> > 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that 
the
> > ancient Pali commentary: maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> > > bhavanga-citta..
> > *****
> > 
> > 2. Without any doubt, very few `Buddhists' are interested in 
these same
> > commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound 
their
> > value when
> > the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore 
them or
> > disagree
> > when they don't.
> > *****
> > 
> > 3. There are a few of us `dinosaurs' left who, on the other hand, 
have
> > every
> > confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations 
and
> > explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and
> > Abhidhamma. We
> > fully realise we're a dying breed, but actually agree with the 
quote I
> > gave
> > from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is `uniform in sentiment'.
> > *****
> > 
> > 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas 
is
> > consistent
> > with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), 
Questions
> > of
> > K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself.
> > *****
> > 
> > 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks:
> > >"....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> > > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?"
> > .....
> > 
> > As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the 
sleep,
> > but
> > whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without
> > sense-door or
> > mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, 
there are
> > no
> > defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my 
earlier
> > quotes
> > from K.Milinda (1V,8.36):
> > .....
> > 
> > "When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
> > (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does 
not act,
> > and a 
> > mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and 
he who
> > knows
> > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are 
dreamt.
> > Just,
> > O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no 
shadow will
> > fall
> > even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep 
his
> > mind has
> > returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind
> > inactive
> > knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not 
dream."
> > *****
> > 
> > 6. T.B. asks: 
> > "And why would the perception of its
> > > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?"
> > .....
> > 
> > As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding 
the
> > mind (i.e
> > the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and 
unwholesome
> > states
> > which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects
> > experienced
> > with bhavanga cittas in between.
> > 
> > In one of those other posts I wrote:
> > .....
> > "In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing
> > cittas and
> > the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the 
value
> > of
> > skilful states even `if for just the lasting of a finger-snap'.I 
think
> > it's
> > important to appreciate the context when we read the following:
> > 
> > `Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change 
as the
> > mind:
> > insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to 
change it
> > is.
> > 
> > `This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that 
come
> > from
> > without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of 
taints
> > that come
> > from without.' "
> > .....
> > 
> > In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in
> > theory) helps
> > us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure 
state,
> > but
> > rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways.
> > .....
> > 
> > I wrote before:
> > 
> > "In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that:
> > 
> > `Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life 
whenever
> > there
> > is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of 
consciousness
> > is
> > most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs 
momentarily
> > during
> > waking life countless times between occasions of active 
cognition.' 
> > *****
> > 
> > 7. T.B. asks: "And further, if
> > > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it 
mean to
> > > develop the bhavanga-citta?"
> > .....
> > 
> > There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I 
understand.
> > Bhavanga
> > citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire 
emphasis in
> > the
> > suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing 
kusala
> > states.
> > the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of 
abhidhamma
> > is
> > essential in this regard.
> > *****
> > 
> > 8. T.B. says:
> > `> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can 
be
> > derived
> > > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that 
the
> > > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> > > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or 
delusion
> > are
> > > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of 
awareness.
> > > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.'
> > .....
> > 
> > On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it 
very
> > clear that
> > the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of `greed, aversion, or
> > delusion'.
> > Without these core roots, there is no `becoming' and no dukkha. Of
> > course they
> > have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed 
so
> > often, only
> > arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. 
If
> > there is
> > not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-
rising
> > skilful
> > state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a
> > `finger-snap'), it
> > would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). 
> > 
> > I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that 
explained
> > not only
> > in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma.
> > *****
> > 
> > 9.T.B. continues to add that:
> > > `With this
> > > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away 
existing
> > > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 
calls "purity in
> > > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> > > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth 
jhana: 
> > .....
> > 
> > On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and 
a
> > permanent
> > mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite 
contrary to
> > their
> > `uniform sentiment'. The purity of the states of awareness and
> > concentration
> > referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high 
state
> > of
> > wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not 
with any
> > bhavanga
> > cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case).
> > *****
> > 
> > 10. T.B. adds:
> > > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that 
not
> > only
> > > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential 
for them
> > to
> > > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow 
on those
> > > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be 
realized.
> > .....
> > 
> > This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this 
highest
> > level
> > of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of
> > defilements. I
> > truly don't wish to re-open this can of worms too;-)
> > *****
> > 
> > Howard and Ken O, please know that I'm not asking you to `buy' 
any idea,
> > but
> > merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down 
by the
> > Sangha
> > since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all 
would
> > admit).
> > 
> > I don't want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your 
other
> > points
> > (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please 
send
> > them back
> > to me again because you've considered carefully, I know.
> > 
> > Sarah

	
10228

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 8:56am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Herman

--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote: > Ken,
> 
> Just to clarify, does there need to be awareness of a thought, before 
> it is a thought? 

k: You got to excuse me for my amateurish explanation. Furthermore, I
kind of lazy person who do not like to get into too much details studies. 
I assuming that a present thought moment we have are series of cittas that
form it. For pple like me, yes :). For highly developed disciples, every
citta is being discern even before it became the present thought moment (a
series of citta)


> I can certainly agree that there is only awareness of any one thing 
> at any time, but that doesn't mean there isn't a whole lot going on 
> in the background.

k: that is true, there is a whole lot of noise in our background. The
Abhidhamma point is that they are serial process and not simutlaneous
process. All such noises in the background is also a serial process (as
explain in my earlier email). There is a logic to the background noise bc
there are billions of citta in a twinkle of an eye, just imagine of much
brain cells interactions we have just to breath, listen, see....(without
we knowing it). Thus such speed give us an impression when we observe
one thought moment but in the back ground seems that all our senses
happened simultaneously. Similarily like light owes its speed to be of
one colour, but in fact the background of the light is a combination of
seven colours. Furthermore, my assumption is that speed is relative. A
fly speed will mean differently to us and to the fly itself. Speed is a
controlling factor for pple like me but for those highly developed
disciple, I think it is not an issue at all.



Kind regards
Ken O




	
10229

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:13am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kom

> The “Atthasåliní” (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140)
> states: “Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of
> ‘exceedingly pure’ with reference to the bhavanga-citta.”
> The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience
> an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
> bodysense or mind. 

On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding pure
since to me it also does not experience any sense object. 



Kind regards
Ken O

	
10230

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:26am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Sarah,

Franking speaking by posting this passage it developed more confusion.


> I was trying to strictly limit my re-quotes in the post, but let me give
> you
> the full K.Milinda one which you may have missed last time and also the
> Atthasalini one:
> 
> **********
> Qs of K.Milinda, 1V,8,36, Max Muller’s transl:
> 
> ‘Ven Nagasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?’
> ‘Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. 

k: To me, this statement will imply that when a man dreams he is neither
sleeping or awake. 



>But when his sleep has become light, and he is not yet fully conscious,
in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep
sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into
Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in
its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
> not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.

> Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow
will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep
sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act,
and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not
does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.
As the miror, O king,
> are
> you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind.’


k: Returned home? Return to itself? - sounds like bhavanga citta a
permanent dwelling for the mind. Subtely it would imply a permanent self.



Kind regards
Ken O

	
10231

From: tikmok <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:28am
Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Ken O,

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Kom
> 
> > The "Atthasåliní" (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140)
> > states: "Mind also is said to be `clear' in the sense of
> > `exceedingly pure' with reference to the bhavanga-citta."
> > The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience
> > an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
> > bodysense or mind. 
> 
> On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding pure= 

> since to me it also does not experience any sense object. 

There are 19 possible types of citta that are said to perform patisandhi 
function. For the entire life of a being, the patisanthi, the bhavanga, an= 
d 
the cutti citta are of the same type. In a single life-time, the co-arisi= 
ng 
cetasikas and the object (aramana) of patisandhi, bhavanga, and cuti citta = 

are "identical", although each citta performs a different function.

kom
	
10232

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:41am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kom,

> Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or
> luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do
> we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or
> dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something
> that we consider good, desirable, or something that we
> consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a
> pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the
> reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those
> likings for ages.


k: I belive investigating is a pre-requsite for seeing reality as it is.
Without examine and ascertain concepts for congruity and interpolating
between Sutta and Abhidhamm, then the meaningful purpose of Abhidhamma
will weaken considerably. When we are studying such concepts, I believe
we are not desiring that we prefer a luminious mind than a defile mind, we
are trying to make sense out of its meaning of the sutta in its relation
to Abhidhamma. We are still investigation and learning and not yearning
that luminious mind is our goal, similarily to our investigating of
Nibbana or PariNibbana.



Kind regards
Ken O


	
10233

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
op 20-12-2001 06:27 schreef srnsk@a... op srnsk@a...:

Num: From my Thai 
> Abhidhammattha-sagaha, those 3 ~nana were mentioned under anul~om~nana.
> ---------------------------
> 
> Anul~om~nana is a pa~n~na that acknowledge that one have to give in/follow
> ariyasacca, so one can be detached. Ariyasacca is dukkhasacca, samutayasacca,
> nirodhasacca and maggasacca.
> 
> 
> Sacca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha is nama and rupa which
> are lokiya. Samutaya is tanha, nirodha is nibbana and magga is 8 ariya-magga.
> Knowledge at this level is knowing according to the truth:sacca~nana.
> 
> Kicca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha should be known,
> samutaya should be let go, nirodha should be enlighten and magga should be
> developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to
> responsiblity:kicca~nana.
> 
> Kata~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha which should be known,
> is known. Samutaya which should be let go, is let go. Nirodha which should
> be enlighten, is enlighten and all 8 magga which should be developed, is
> developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to what has been
> done:kata~nana.
> 
> 
> Sacca~nana and kicca~nana is ~nana in lokiya level. Kata~nana is
> lokuttara~nana. The two lokiya~nanas have been already perfected in
> sakarupekka~nana. So ano~loma~nana is named pa~n~na which knows clearly in
> following through, through ariyasacca. Then nibbana will be an arammana in
> next ~nana, kotarabhu~nana.
> 
> Hope further information from other sources will help more.
>
> Num
> 
>Dear Num, thank you very much for this info. I tried to look it up in the Co to
Abhidhammattha Sangaha, translated by A. Somporn, but I have an incomplete
edition in booklets and could not find it.
Now, I used to think that kata ~naa.na must be lokuttara but in India I
learnt differently. A. Sujin said, when speaking about the highest level
(doy ukkrit, in Pali ugghati is to lift up) kata ~naa.na is lokuttara, but
there are other levels, when vipassana ~naa.na realizes the impermanence and
thus dukkha of dhammas that arise and fall away. It is all so detailed and
subtle. We have to look at the context: you mention the level of anuloma,
arising before gotrabhu, which is followed by lokuttara citta. This is
already "doy ukkrit", according to the highest level.
Also she said, when there is kata~naa.na there are still sacca ~naa.na and
kicca ~naa.na, they develop on and on. One realizes more and more the Truths
that should be known (sacca) and the Truths that are known through the
development of vipassana ~naa.na (kicca), and then there will be the fruit,
kata ~naa.na according to the level that has been reached.
Would you perhaps have time to also look at the Thai Co. I mentioned?
It makes sense to me that she deals with these three in such a dynamic way,
because they are not static, not abstract texbook terms.
I still have on my computer your q. about pakatupanissaya p. from before I
went to India, but I think Sarah answered these?
Then I want to know whether your hand got cured completely? Can you type
without pain? 
Thank you again for the texts, Nina.

	

10234

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:11am
Subject: Concept

 	
Hi Purnomo. Nice to hear from you again. You explained in a very concise way
the difference between concept and paramattha, in a way understandanble to
everybody. I like the way you formulated this,
best wishes, Nina.
	

 	 

	
10235

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:17am
Subject: A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi, all -

I expect that some of you may find the title of this post to be 
somewhat displeasing. If so, you have my apologies. Let me explain what I 
mean.
The Abhidhamma, itself, views a stream of consciousness as continuous 
in the sense of being unbroken, without gaps. But that stream is analyzed 
into processes, and the processes into cittas. As I see it, that parsing of 
experience into processes and cittas, while not ungrounded, is still 
conventional. As I understand it, a boundary between processes occurs on the 
occasion of one arammana being replaced by another - a cessation and an 
origination. Within a process, a boundary between cittas occurs on the 
occasion of a cetasika ceasing and/or a new cetasika originating. This sort 
of conceptual parsing is well grounded inasmuch as differences among 
arammanas are discernable as are differences among cetasikas. There is no 
mistaking hardness with warmth or feeling with volition, for example. But 
what differences are considered significant is a matter of convention. I see 
the parsing of experience into processes, and of those into cittas, as not 
different in kind, for example, from our isolating certain groups of 
experiences called 'tables' from out of the entire range of experience. One 
could imagine [and this idea is not original with me - I read it somewhere, 
but have embellished it a bit] a person from some remote tropical island 
coming upon a table for the first time and thinking how odd it is that four 
perfectly useful wooden sticks (or, as his people would call them, "coconut 
smashers") should have been attached to a perfectly serviceable "hut floor".
Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* 
to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, 
nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in reifying 
them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there is 
even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are *mere* 
concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. After all, how many of 
us can "see" cessations or originations of cetasikas and arammanas?

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10236

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 5:45pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kom,

What you have done is describing what is patisandhi citta and I believe
has not answered my question. If we based on the commentary as excerpt
below to describe bhavanga citta as exceeding pure bc it experience no
sense object, then I would said that the first citta of our life continual
will also be exceeding pure bc it also does not experience any sense
object. My hunch is that the commentaries explanation on exceeding pure
just bc it experiences no sense object is not satisfactory. Then this
would infer that Nibbana will also be exceeding pure since it also
experience no sense object. It will then equate Nibbana to luminious
mind.


Kind regards
Ken O





--- tikmok <tikmok@y...> wrote: > Dear Ken O,
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> > Hi Kom
> > 
> > > The "Atthasåliní" (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140)
> > > states: "Mind also is said to be `clear' in the sense of
> > > `exceedingly pure' with reference to the bhavanga-citta."
> > > The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience
> > > an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
> > > bodysense or mind. 
> > 
> > On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding
> pure=
> 
> > since to me it also does not experience any sense object. 
> 
> There are 19 possible types of citta that are said to perform patisandhi
> 
> function. For the entire life of a being, the patisanthi, the bhavanga,
> an=
> d 
> the cutti citta are of the same type. In a single life-time, the
> co-arisi=
> ng 
> cetasikas and the object (aramana) of patisandhi, bhavanga, and cuti
> citta =
> 
> are "identical", although each citta performs a different function.
> 
> kom

	
10237

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:00pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi Howard,

> Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* 
> to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, 
> nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in reifying 
> them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there 
> is 
> even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are 
> *mere* 
> concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. 

I really appreciate your input here. I completely agree with your point. May 
I add that the same apply to suttanta/vinaya pitaka, the budhism as a whole 
or even to sciences, medicine and into daily life. Concept (pannatti) is 
concept, reality is reality.

Reminded me of Kom and Nina's posts about pitfall. There is an analogy in 
suttanta pitaka, sangyutta-nikaya, tayana-sutta, the Buddha said to an 
luminous god regarding a bhikkhu who enters into a monkshood but does not 
practice any good and do bad things, like a man grasping a ka-grass-leaf (a 
kind of grass with a sharp edge leaf), if he not holds the grass-leaf firmly 
enough. The leaf will make a painful cut on his hand. So good thing can turn 
into double-edge sword if we do not hold it firmly or correctly.



Num


	
10238

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:10pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi, Num -

In a message dated 12/21/01 10:02:55 PM Eastern Standard Time, srnsk@a... 
writes:


> 
> Hi Howard,
> 
> > Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* 
> > to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, 
> > nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in 
> reifying 
> > them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there 
> 
> > is 
> > even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are 
> > *mere* 
> > concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. 
> 
> I really appreciate your input here. I completely agree with your point. 
> May 
> I add that the same apply to suttanta/vinaya pitaka, the budhism as a whole 
> 
> or even to sciences, medicine and into daily life. Concept (pannatti) is 
> 
> concept, reality is reality.
> 
> Reminded me of Kom and Nina's posts about pitfall. There is an analogy in 
> suttanta pitaka, sangyutta-nikaya, tayana-sutta, the Buddha said to an 
> luminous god regarding a bhikkhu who enters into a monkshood but does not 
> practice any good and do bad things, like a man grasping a ka-grass-leaf (a 
> 
> kind of grass with a sharp edge leaf), if he not holds the grass-leaf 
> firmly 
> enough. The leaf will make a painful cut on his hand. So good thing can 
> turn 
> into double-edge sword if we do not hold it firmly or correctly.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of holding a snake to 
get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the head, you can get the 
snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake will get the person 
instead!
-------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> 
> Num
> 
================================
With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10239

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 0:58am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah

 	
Dear Suan and Ken O,

Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O.

Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short extracts from
the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and Jim) worked
quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which I think you
both may find it interesting to review at:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386
commentary notes translation

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408
sutta translation

Suan, I'll look forward to your next set of Parinibbana sub-com notes (3) and
your analysis. Ken O, you may wish to quote back some of Nina's translation
with further comments in the meantime for Nina or Kom or myself.

Sarah
..........................................................................................................

--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote: > 
> 
> 
> Dear Sarah (and Kom)
> 
> How are you? Thank you for raising the issues of the luminous mind. 
> As both Robert Epstein and Howard used this beautiful statement of 
> Gotama the Buddha when they introduced the concept of an underlying 
> being (Robert) or 'a consciousness without objects'(Howard) remaining 
> after the Parinibbaana of an Arahant in response to Parinibbana 
> Subcommentary (Part Two), I will have to deal with this statement of 
> the Buddha when I write my next Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part 
> Three). 
> 
> As your posts and Kom's post addressed this issue in advance, you 
> have taken off some of my burdens. 
> 
<snip>

	
10240

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 1:51am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind

 	
Dear Ken O,

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Sarah,

> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
> The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
> actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
> well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the
> mind." 
> 
> We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing using
> bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these
> well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory that it
> is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga cittas
> could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly believe
> that all cittas could be discern.