15200 From: egberdina Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 0:59am Subject: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi guys and gals, As a reminder to myself (oh, that word again :-), I sometimes use the following phrase to discount the idea of self. I think this phrase is valid and can be verified as such at which ever level one is investigating. There is no thing which is it's own cause. All the best Herman BTW I am relishing the spirit in which the many discussions in this forum are taking place. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Robert > > k: It always nice to see u here :) > > > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. > > Not = no. No self. Atta is > > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You > > can argue that anatta is > > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's > > personal self, but if that is > > the case there is really no difference between > > Hinduism and Buddhism. > > k: If you argue in this way, there will be no end. > Just like impermenance is the opposite of permanent. > Anatta is applied to everything not just objects. By > the way when you mention about Hinduism, are these > Hinduism concepts exist before when Buddha is around > or evolve after Buddha enters Nibbana. I don't think > earlier Hindusim (Vedaism - hope I get the spelling > right) talks abt non-clinging. It is more likely, > these concepts abt non clinging are borrowed from > Buddhism (no offense please). > > > Hinduism > > also teaches total non-clinging and > > non-identification with external objects of > > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of > > the mind leads to cessation of > > the continued round of birth and death. The > > non-existence of Atta or Atman [the > > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] > > is the radical difference > > between most schools of Hinduism and all of > > Buddhism. > > > k: Why "non-clinging and non-identification with > external objects of desire", since everything is > inside. If Hinduism taught that by non clinging to > external objects is the way then they have a big > problem bc I dont believe in blaming external things > for my weaknesses. It is all inside :). But I dont > think I know Hinduisim concepts very well, even if it > is similar, we should not be worry :). But there is > one thing Hinduisim dont talk as much as Buddha, the > consistent method in the eradication of moha. > > > > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a > > different moment right now? Or do > > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? > > Answer according to your > > actual experience, and you will have a hard time > > finding where you can choose. In > > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? > > When you make the final > > decision, is there some way in which you finally > > decide, or does it just happen > > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is > > actually an illogical conceptual > > construct. > > > > k: Good questions and difficult to answer :). As I > said before, if there is no choice why are you reading > DSG mails :). If you said you are conditioned by your > lobha or panna (to learn more), your actions are > conditined by other cetasikas - you are not wrong. > But if there is no power to choice then we might as > well dont learn Buddhism at all since there is nothing > we could choose to change our present and future state > > R: Do we choose to choose > > K: Definitely we choose to choose :) Is that a self > that choose, if we are conditioned by moha yes there > is a self, if we are conditoined by pana, there is no > self involved (just like Arahats) :) > > R: Who chooses freely? > > k: We cannot choose freely bc we are conditioned, > but remembers that does not imply we cannot choose to > choose :) Dont take cetana as a self, bc it takes > many more cetasikas before cetana could decide. Maybe > I should said there is no such thing as free will but > there is such a thing as the power of choice/volition. > As I said b4, it is a wonderful paradox :). > > > > > kind rgds > Ken O 15201 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 1:10am Subject: Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Thanks Rob - The Bhumija Sutta is a great sutta. I can really relate to trying to get milk out of a newly calved cow the Wrong way :), and the churning of butter and the starting of a fire in both the Right and Wrong ways as well. I can see that the Buddha would have had an impact when he explained things to people using the everyday happenings in their lives. Everyone would know that you could try those things forever in the Wrong Way and they would never produce a good result. Whereas whether you wanted a result or not, if it was done in the Right Way, a good result would inevitably follow. metta, Chris --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear Group, > >Mostly, I don't aim at anything but eliminating my defilements - but > > maybe I should get more organised and have a Grand Plan with an > > Expected Date of Completion. > > Dear Chris, > This sort of thinking is very normal. It is what the mind does: > desire and plan and intend. If the thinking is underlaid with lobha > (looking fwd to being a sotapanna) then it will be associated with > pleasant or neutral feeling and if it is associated with dosa(fear of > rebirth or worry about how long it will take) then it will come with > unpleasant feeling. I think as far as the path is concerned whatever > type of thinking arises doesn't make that much difference; the crux > is whether it is seen as thinking. If it is not then the concepts > that are object of the thinking may be given more importance > and 'reality' than they deserve. While if they are seen as concept > then they may still occur but there will be less attachment to them. > ) > > "For any priests or contemplatives endowed with wrong view, wrong > resolve, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong effort, > wrong mindfulness, & wrong concentration: If they follow the holy > life even when having made a wish [for results], they are incapable > of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when having > made no wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. If they follow > the holy life even when both having made a wish and having made no > wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. If they follow the > holy life even when neither having made a wish nor having made no > wish, they are incapable of obtaining results. Why is that? Because > it is an inappropriate way of obtaining results... > > "But as for any priests or contemplatives endowed with right view, > right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right > effort, right mindfulness, & right concentration: If they follow the > holy life even when having made a wish, they are capable of obtaining > results. If they follow the holy life even when having made no wish, > they are capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life > even when both having made a wish and having made no wish, they are > capable of obtaining results. If they follow the holy life even when > neither having made a wish nor having made no wish, they are capable > of obtaining results. Why is that? Because it is an appropriate way > of obtaining results." > Robert 15202 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Stephen Thanks for sharing your views. Lots to talk about here. I am going to be selective, otherwise I'll never get a reply finished! << I don't find talk of 'reality' useful; in fact I find it goofy and mysterious. It's a confusing way of speaking.>> You are not alone in having difficulty with the terms 'reality' and 'paramattha dhamma'. However, we don't all have to use the same particular term. It is what is being referred to that is important. Here, the point being made is that, according to the teachings, what we perceive as being 'real' or 'the world' at the present moment is in fact not the way that the world is actually experienced, and that our misconception of the way things really are is attributable to our accumulated ignorance and wrong view. At any given moment, according to the teaching, the world as experienced is merely a moment of consciousness arising at one or other of the sense-doors or the mind door. The truth of this proposition can be tested by anyone over time. I'm sure there is nothing new to you so far. Now, the object experienced at any of the sense-doors is, as Herman pointed out in his recent post to you, irreducible in terms of that moment of experience (or any other moment of experience). This also is something that can be verified by each person for themselves in due course. The *apparent* reducibility in conventional terms of these sense-door objects is beside the point. Experientially, they are not capable of further reduction. As soon as you start to talk about the component parts of a sense-object it is no longer the sense-object as object of a moment of consciousness, but it is a concept/mental construct of the conventional idea of that sense-object. It is useful to have some generic term to refer to these 'things' that, in terms of moment-to-moment experience, are 'ultimates' or 'absolutes' or whatever you like to call them. We can use the more neutral term 'dhammas', which occurs frequently in the suttas, and which some find more acceptable than 'realities'. Do you have a preferred term? <> It's my understanding that in the suttas the terms khandhas, ayatanas and dhatus all refer to the same dhammas, and that these are the same dhammas that are referred to by the term 'paramattha dhamma'. << Paramattha dhammas are supposed to be elementary, "ultimate constituents of a whole"; but none of these are, each is further reducible. ... Consider vedana. It can be analyzed into endless types or classifications: 2 (bodily or mental), 3 (pleasant, painful, neutral), 5, 6, 18 in 3 subgroups, 36 in 6 subgroups, even 108! (Bahuvedaniya Sutta). Isn't it clear that the Buddha wasn't interested in ultimate categories or realties? That it was provisional, dependent on context? That it's a strategy to disengage from seeing things in personal ways by breaking them down into impersonal categories, not a search for ultimates?>> As far as the different enumerations of feeling are concerned, I think you'll find if you examine the texts carefully that this is simply different ways of classifying the same dhammas, for the benefit of listeners with different propensities for understanding. Stephen, the rest of your message deals with the Mulapariyaya and other suttas, so if you don't mind, I'll leave that for a later post, as I will need to do some reading before I can comment on your points. I hope you find something of interest in the discussion so far. Jon PS BTW, the question (also discussed in your post) of whether things exist or don't exist etc addresses a different point to the true nature of the present moment of experience, and is not directly relevant to the discussion on that topic. The nature of the present moment of experience is common to all, and can be discussed independently of any view of existence, being or the like. --- oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello Christine, Jon > I don't find talk of 'reality' useful; in fact I find it goofy and > mysterious. It's a confusing way of speaking. For instance, the Buddha > rejected both being and non-being. ("...'everything exists' is one > extreme, > and 'nothing exists' is another extreme. The Tathagata expresses the > MIddle > Way that does not adhere to these two extremes..." S.III.134-35 [The > passage > then goes on to reference paticcasamuppada.]) > In itself, this is nonsense: something either exists or it does not > (there > are no shades or graduations of reality). What it means, in context, is > that > he saw that the world consists of becoming, or processes (things exist > in an > interrelated way, depend on conditions, are impermanent, don't exist as > independent substances or selves), not static/unchanging ('being' > rejected) > or somehow not real ('non-being' rejected). So it makes sense in the > context > of debate with contemporary opposing views of static realism or > eternalism > and nihilism; but 'being' is used here in a special sense. The processes > of > the world exist, are quite real, just not real in some odd, eternalist > sense. > (So the Buddha says: "When dukkha arises, it really arises; and when > dukkha > is extinguished, it is really extinguished." ibid.) The relevance of > this is > that perhaps we may agree, we're simply using "paramattha" and "reality" > and > such terms in different senses. > > I'll begin by noting that not one* of your many references refers to the > word > "paramattha." You do make many references to khandha, ayatana, the 18 > dhathus, the 4 elements and such. If this is what paramattha means we > agree, > and it's merely a peccadillo that I don't use the word. > >...the suttas nevertheless contain numerous references to the > importance of > >developing direct knowledge of paramattha dhammas as referred to by > other > names, >such as 'khandhas'. > (& a second quote from Nyanatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary so using the > term.) > No problem for me here, but > > Paramattha dhammas are supposed to be elementary, "ultimate constituents > of a > whole"; but none of these are, each is further reducible. So I believe > he's > misusing the word, in order to find it in the suttas. In this sense we > don't > agree. > [This further potential for reduction may not be true of the 4 elements. > Here > I suggest that if the Buddha meant by element certain experiential > properties > —e.g., earth = hardness— then good; but if it was meant as a theory > of > matter it's wrong, as persons are made of carbon, nitrogen, and such. > This, > of course, would pose no problem; the Buddha's meaning is unchanged, > just > that the body breaks down into in fact different items, still > impersonal, > than he supposed. So Dhamma can't be entirely separated from physics.] > Consider vedana. It can be analyzed into endless types or > classifications: 2 > (bodily or mental), 3 (pleasant, painful, neutral), 5, 6, 18 in 3 > subgroups, > 36 in 6 subgroups, even 108! (Bahuvedaniya Sutta). Isn't it clear that > the > Buddha wasn't interested in ultimate categories or realties? That it was > > provisional, dependent on context? That it's a strategy to disengage > from > seeing things in personal ways by breaking them down into impersonal > categories, not a search for ultimates? 15203 From: Sarah Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:33am Subject: “People....People who need People.......” Dear All, In the Brahmajaala Sutta (and commentaries) we read in detail about all the possible wrong views. We read that the idea of an ‘existent being’ is the real crux of the various views. For example, this is the first of the annihilationist views (which I quoted in an earlier post): ..... (p.79 B.Bodhi trans.) “ ‘Herein, bhikkhus, some recluse or brahmin asserts the following doctrine and view: ‘The self, good sir, has material form; it is composed of the four primary elements and originates from father and mother. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way some proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.’” ..... The other 6 kinds of annihilation view all end with the same last sentence about the belief in the ‘extermination of an existent being’. ..... In the sub-commentary notes (p.182), we read: “Since the destruction of the non-existent (asato) is impossible, the words ‘(annihilation) of an existent being’ are given signifying annihilation based on existence (atthibhaavanibandhano upacchedo). The word ‘being’ (sattassa) is used in order to show the following. The specific-natured dhammas occurring as causes and effects included in a single (multi-life) continuum exhibit a certain distinction as they may belong to different (individual life) continuities (within that single multi-life continuum). Misapplying the method of diversity (naanattanaya), these theorists misapprehend the real differentiatiation between the causes and the effects, and arrive at the conclusion that the differentiation is absolute, as though (the causal and resultant continuities) belonged to completely different continua (bhinnasantaana)...........” ..... A little later (p.183): “..For the assumption of a being arises when the compact of aggregates occurring in the form of a coninuum is not dissected (into its components). And since it is held that ‘the self exists so long as it is not annihilated,’ the assumption of annihilationism is based on the asumption of a being.’ “ (“Santaanavasena hi vattamaanesu khandhesu ghanavinibbhogaabhaavena sattagaaho, sattassa ca atthibhaavagaahanibandhano ucchedagaaho yaavaaya”m attaa na ucchijjati, taavaaya”m vijjati yevaa ti gaha.nto.”) ***** Victor quoted from the excellent Satta Sutta, SN,Khandhavagga, p985 (Bodhi transl) “One is stuck, Radha, tightly stuck, in desire, list, delight, and craving for form; therefore one is called a being.” In a footnote here, B,Bodhi explains this is a pun between satta, meaning ‘being’ and also ‘attached’ from ‘sajati’. . “One is stuck, tightly stuck, in desire, lust, delight, and craving for feeling...for perception...for volitional formations...for consciousness; therefore one is called a being....” ***** Back to the Brahmajala Sutta and the question of killing which has been discussed recently on DSG. We read in the sutta: “ “Having abandoned the destruction of life, the recluse gotama abstains from the destruction of life....” Commentary. The word ‘life’ (paa.na) signifies, in conventional discourse, a living being (satta); in the ultimate sense, it is the faculty of life (jivitindriya). the ‘destruction of life” (paa.naatipaata) is the volition of killing in one who perceives a living being as such, when this volition issues forth through the door of either body or speech and occasions an act cutting off the life-faculty of that living being...... “Sub.Cy. query: when formations are subject by nature to constant cessation from moment to moment, who kills and who is killed?..... ‘Reply: the ‘killer’ is the assemblage of formations (sankhaaraana”m pu~nja) conventionally called a ‘being’, containing the aforementioned volition of killing. That which ‘is killed’ by him is the aggregation of material and immaterial dhammas that would have been capable of arising (in continued succession) if the aforementioned means of killing had not been applied, but which now continues as a bare procession (of material dhammas) conventionally termed ‘dead’, deprived of vital warmth, consciousness, and the life-faculty due to the application of the means of killing by the killer...........................Though formations lack personal initiative, nevertheless the conventional designation of agency is applicable to causes which are effective through their contiguity, and are fixed in their capacity to give results adequate to themselves, just as in the statements ‘the lamp illuminates’ and ‘the moon brings in the night’ (agency is ascribed to the lamp and to the moon). “The act of destroying life must be recognized to pertain not only to the aggregation of consciousness and mental concomitants existing simultaneously with the intention of killing, but must also be admitted to apply to the (entire sequence of states) which endures by way of (the unity and the indiviuality of) the continuum. Just as the accomplishment of activity is senen in the case of lamps, etc, which likewise exist by way of continuity, so too there certainly does exist one who is bound by the kamma of destroying life.” ***** In the commentary and sub commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta, we read in detail about what is meant by conventional terms when it is said “in looking straight on” or “in wearing the shoulder-cloak” and so on. We can see from the following detail, how useful some understanding of abhidhamma is when we read the suttas and these conventional terms. Clear comprehension (sati and panna) should be developed at any time. The following is from Soma Thera’s translation: “Within, it is said, there certainly is no self or soul which looks straight on or looks away from the front. Still, at the arising of the thought "I shall look straight on," and with that thought the process of oscillation (vayo dhatu) originating from mind, [citta samutthana] bringing into being bodily expression [viññatti] arises. Thus owing to the diffusion of the process of oscillation born of mental activity [cittakiriyavayodhatu vipphara], the lower eyelid goes down and the upper eyelid goes up. Surely there is no one who opens with a contrivance. "Thereupon, eye-consciousness arises fulfilling the function of sight [tato cakkhu viññanam dassana kiccam sadhentam uppajjati], it is said. Clear comprehension of this kind here is indeed called the clear comprehension of non-delusion [evam sampajananam panettha asammoha sampajaññam nama]. Further, clear comprehension of non-delusion should be also understood, here, through accurate knowledge of the root (mula pariñña), through the casual state (agantuka bhava) and through the temporary state [tavakalika bhava]. First (is the consideration) by way of the accurate knowledge of the root: -- "There is (first) the mental state of the life-continum, And (then) there are adverting, seeing, receiving, Considering, determining, and impulsion Which is seventh (in cognition's course). [bhavangavajjanañceva dassanam sampaticchanam santiranam votthapanam javanam bhavati sattamam]. " ***** During our stay in Koh Samui, I was reading Nina’s “Conditions”, an introduction to the Patthana (the last book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka) more carefully and considering further the interplay of the various paccaya and paccayupana (conditioning and conditioned dhammas). Understanding more about conditions helps us to understand that what we take for people are a variety of conditioned namas and rupas. “Each reality which arises does so because of a concurrence of different conditions which operate in a very intricate way” For example, under jhana paccaya, we learn that the jhana factors may be wholesome or unwholesome: “When someone commits an unwholesome deed, such as killing, nåma and rúpa which arise because of conditions perform their functions. The dosa-múla-citta is accompanied by vitakka which is in this case thought of violence, by vicåra which is occupied with the object, by unpleasant feeling and by concentration which causes the citta to be firmly fixed on the object. The akusala citta and the accompanying cetasikas and also the mind-produced rúpa are conditioned by akusala jhåna-factors,“strength-givers” or intensifying factors, by way of jhåna-condition. When we perform a generous deed, the kusala citta and accompanying cetasikas and also the mind produced rúpa are conditioned by sobhana jhåna-factors by way of jhåna-condition. These dhammas are also conditioned by root-condition, by faculty-condition and by several other conditions. Thus, as we have seen, jhåna-factors are not only operating while one cultivates jhåna, they are conditions which function time and again in daily life, no matter whether we perform wholesome or unwholesome deeds.” We also learn how rupa -jivitindriya (physical life faculty) maintains rupas produced by kamma “as a wet-nure does a prince” (Vism X1V,59). As Nina writes: “Life faculty is a condition for distinguishing kamma-produced rupa from other kinds of rupa. We cling to the body which is alive, we cling to eyesense and earsense and take them for self. they are only elements maintained by life faculty, a kind of rupa which is not self.” Nama-jivitindriya is also life faculty, but in this case a cetasika (mental factor) arising with every citta, controlling and maintaining the life of the other namas and rupas. While there is life faculty, there will be feelings. In other words, by understanding more about the various dhammas we learn more about what ‘people’ really are. I find the following comments in the last chapter of Nina’s book very helpful and I apologise for making a long post longer (though I've just reduced it by half;-)): ..... “We are so used to the idea of seeing living beings, people and animals, and we do not realize that we are deluded about reality because of our accumulated ignorance and wrong view. When we watch T.V. and we see people moving, we know that there are no people there. There are rapidly changing projected images on a screen and this gives us the illusion that there are people who are acting. These images are merely different colours which appear through the eyesense and then we know the meaning of what we see, we think of concepts on account of what we see. The same happens in real life. There is seeing of visible object and then we take what we see for people or things which last. Persons are not real in the ultimate sense, no matter whether we see them on a screen or in the world around us............ “The Buddha and the arahats also thought of concepts but they were not deluded about them, they had no defilements on account of them. If we cling to concepts and take them for things which really exist, which are permanent or self, we are deluding ourselves. Clinging to concepts of person or self leads to many other kinds of defilements, it leads to a great deal of sorrow. When someone has lost a person who was dear to him he seems to live with his memories of the person he loved, he lives with his dreams, with an illusion. However, also when a beloved person is still alive we live with our dreams; we take the person we believe we see, hear or touch for reality. Someone who is in love with another person is actually in love with his own concept of that person, with an idealized image he has of that person. He does not have understanding of realities, of the different cittas which arise because of their approriate conditions. When he finds out that the image he has of another person is completely different from reality he may experience disillusion. We may have idealized images of other people and have expectations about them which cannot be realised. We have learnt about nåma and rúpa and about the conditions for their arising, but theoretical understanding is not enough. We should consider ultimate realities in daily life. We tend to forget that seeing is only a conditioned reality and that visible object is only a conditioned reality, and therefore we are easily carried away by sense impressions..... “ If there can be mindfulness of one reality as it appears through one of the six doors, we will know the difference between the moments of mindfulness of a reality and the moments there is thinking of an image of a “whole”, a person or a thing. By being mindful of just visible object or sound we learn to distinguish between the objects appearing through the five sense-doors and the mind-door. When there is right understanding of a reality as it appears one at a time, we do not expect other people to behave according to an idealized image. Someone may insult us, but if we can see that there is nobody who can hurt us we will be less inclined to take unjust treatment personally. When words of praise and blame are spoken to us, the hearing is result produced by kusala kamma or akusala kamma. When we think about the meaning of the words which were spoken to us defilements tend to arise. We take what we hear very seriously and we forget that what is experienced by hearing is only sound. Depending on our accumulations we may be afflicted on account of what is heard, we think about it for a long time. We are so affected by what others say or do to us because of clinging to ourselves. Life is short, a moment of experiencing an object is very short. If there were no citta which experiences an object the world and everything in it would not appear. The sotåpanna who has no more wrong view about person or self understands that there are only conditioned nåma and rúpa, no people.” ***** The song (from memory) says that “People who need people are the luckiest people alive”.....We can see that the study of paramatha dhammas goes against the conventional flow of ideas and this is why the Buddha reminded us that the truth is so very ‘hard to see’. Sarah ==== 15204 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 6:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Putting the Anapanasati Sutta into practice Hi Jon, I would be glad to discuss with you on any issue you have regarding anapanasati after you have started developing the mindfulness of in-&- out breathing. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Victor > > --- yuzhonghao wrote: > Hi Jon, > > > > Again, the Buddha pointed out the benefit of developing the > > mindfulness of in-&-out breathing and gave the instruction on it in > > Anapanasati Sutta. It is up to one to put the instruction into > > practice. > > > > If you don't see that you can put the instruction into practice, then > > perhaps you might want to find out what hinders you from developing > > the mindfulness of in-&-out breathing. > > > > I look forward to discussing with you on any issue you have regarding > > anapanasati after you start developing the mindfulness of in-&- out > > breathing. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > Thanks for offering to discuss this sutta further, from the point of view > of 'putting the instruction into practice'. > > You will have seen the post I just sent to Howard, and you may have > already anticipated my question. It relates to the very beginning of the > 'instruction' on mindfulness of breathing: > "Now how is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing developed & pursued so as to > bring the four frames of reference to their culmination? > "There is the case where a monk, having gone to the wilderness, to the > shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs > crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. > Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out. ..." > > My question is, how does a person get to be within the ambit of this > introductory passage, i.e. of being a person who -- > (a) having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty > building, has sat down folding his legs crosswise and holding his body > erect, > (b) has *set mindfulness to the fore*, and > (c) is *always mindful* as he breathes in…" > > I would be interested to hear your thoughts on each of these factors as > prerequisites to the actual 'practice' of mindfulness of breathing. > Thanks. > > Jon 15205 From: Sarah Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 7:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi Stephen, I've really appreciated yours and all the other posts while we've been away. Like Herman, 'relishing the spirit...' (Ken O, good to see you around again....) --- oreznoone@a... wrote: > I don't find talk of 'reality' useful; in fact I find it goofy and > mysterious. It's a confusing way of speaking. ..... Reminds me of Alice turning up at the Mad Hatter's tea party;-) ..... >For instance, the Buddha > rejected both being and non-being. ("...'everything exists' is one > extreme, > and 'nothing exists' is another extreme. The Tathagata expresses the > MIddle > Way that does not adhere to these two extremes..." S.III.134-35 ..... SN 111 is Khandhavagga....What is the name of the sutta? I'm having trouble finding the reference. Thanks. Sarah ===== [The > passage > then goes on to reference paticcasamuppada.]) > In itself, this is nonsense: something either exists or it does not > (there > are no shades or graduations of reality). What it means, in context, is > that > he saw that the world consists of becoming, or processes (things exist > in an > interrelated way, depend on conditions, are impermanent, don't exist as > independent substances or selves), not static/unchanging ('being' > rejected) > or somehow not real ('non-being' rejected). So it makes sense in the > context > of debate with contemporary opposing views of static realism or > eternalism > and nihilism; but 'being' is used here in a special sense. The processes > of > the world exist, are quite real, just not real in some odd, eternalist > sense. > (So the Buddha says: "When dukkha arises, it really arises; and when > dukkha > is extinguished, it is really extinguished." ibid.) The relevance of > this is > that perhaps we may agree, we're simply using "paramattha" and "reality" > and > such terms in different senses. 15206 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 7:21am Subject: Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Hi Christine, One becomes a stream enterer not by eliminating the first three fetter. The elimination of the first three fetter is a mark of stream entry. How is one a stream enterer? You might want to refer to http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an05-179.html I hope it is helpful to your Grand Plan, and I hope that after checking for your self with the discourse, you will realize you are already a stream enterer, and if you are not one yet, you are not far from being one. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Group, > > As an ordinary person (puthujjana), still possessing all of the ten > fetters, and so bound to the round of rebirths, from time to time I > get a little concerned about the shortness and uncertainty of life, > particularly after the death of someone I know. Most people seem > totally unprepared for death, even those of great age, seem shocked > if they know about it in advance. Many people say that they are not > concerned with death, but with the dying - whether they will die in > unrelieved pain, or alone. My concern, when it arises, is with the > fact that those of us who are not Sotapannas (Stream Enter-ers) are > in grave danger when it comes - firstly to death at any time, and > secondly to where Rebirth will occur. It is only Stream Entry > that ensures that there is no more to rebirth in woeful states, and > human birth being so very rare. > > Entry into the Stream is marked by the elimination of three > fetters. 1. Sakkaya-ditthi (Personality Belief) 2. Vicikiccha > (Doubt) 3. Silabbata-paramasa.(Attachment to mere Rule and Ritual). > Stream Entry also ensures that there will be (a maximum of) seven > more cycles through the round of rebirths. Given that these laws > are relentless and inexorable, and are not nullified by lack of > believing in rebirth, it seems like a good thing to energetically > follow the Path to safety. > > To me, it seems the hardest fetters to eliminate are the first two - > understanding of Anatta, and the elimination of Doubt.... Could it be > that they are not as hard as portrayed? or could it be that I am > deceiving myself by thinking the other eight fetters are easier (at > least, seven of them)? It seems that the first two concern > understanding the Dhamma - realising about not-self, and developing > unquestioning confidence in the Word of the Buddha, while the next > seven involve working away at behavioural characteristics. And then > there is Avijja ..... > > The Ten Fetters that bind us to the wheel of becoming: > > Doubt (vicikiccha) > Attachment to mere Rule and Ritual (siilabbata-paraamasa) > Sensual Lust (kamaraga) > Ill-Will (vyapada) > Craving for Fine-Material Existence (rupa-raga) > Craving for Immaterial Existence (arupa-raga) > Conceit (mana) > Restlessness (uddhacca) > Ignorance (avijja). > > Mostly, I don't aim at anything but eliminating my defilements - but > maybe I should get more organised and have a Grand Plan with an > Expected Date of Completion. > > metta, > > Christine 15207 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 7:24am Subject: Perfections, Ch 4, Renunciation, no 7 Perfections, Ch 4, Renunciation, no. 7. We read in the Commentary to the ³Susíma Jåtaka²: This thought occurred to the Bodhisatta during a past life when King Brahmadatta was reigning in Vårånasí. The Bodhisatta was at that time the son of the King¹s priest and his name was young Susíma. The King¹s son was named young Brahmadatta. The two boys grew up together and learnt all sciences at Takkasíla, and when they had accomplished their studies they came home again. Young Brahamadatta became viceroy, and at his father¹s death he became King and made young Susíma his advisor and priest. One day the King went around the city in procession seated on the shoulder of an elephant while he made the priest sit on the back of the elephant. The queen- mother, when she stood and looked out from the royal window, saw the priest sitting behind the King. She fell in love with him and did not want to eat anymore. The King went to see her and asked what ailed her, but the queen- mother did not want to tell him because she was ashamed. Thereupon the King sent his chief queen, and the queen-mother spoke about what had happened. The King entreated the priest to become King and he made the queen-mother his chief queen while he himself became the viceroy. From then on the Bodhisatta was disenchanted with the household life. The queen spoke to him in many ways and used several tricks with him so that he would enjoy his reign, but the Bodhisatta taught Dhamma, he showed the delight and the misery of the sense pleasures, and he returned the kingdom to the viceroy. He became an ascetic sage and cultivated the attainments of jhåna and the supranatural powers, so that he became destined for the Brahma world. At the end of this Jåtaka the Buddha explained that the chief queen was Råhula¹s mother, the king was Ånanda and king Susíma was the Buddha himself. The Buddha explained by relating his past lives that nobody can know the force of lobha, nor in what way it will arise in each life. Renunciation from sense pleasures is most difficult, and going forth from the household life to become a monk is even more difficult, because the monk should take careful consideration of the rules of the Vinaya. But anyway, if one wishes to give up sense pleasures, clinging to the sense objects, it is necessary to renounce them by the development of pannå. One should know the characteristics of realities as not a being, not a person, not self. There may be attachment, aversion, seeing, hearing, jealousy, conceit or thinking of the importance of self, all these phenomena are realities that we refer to as different cittas and cetasikas, as different conditions, as realities that through their arising condition one another. All this is complex and deep in meaning. Pannå should be able to penetrate the true nature of dhammas at this very moment and realize them as not a being and not self. ***** 15208 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 7:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: miccha sati and Path of Discrimination. Dear Ken O, It is good to have you back. We all agree that sati can only be sobhana cetasika. But, when the Buddha taught what is the wrong Path he referred to each of the eight factors as miccha. We know that there is not a cetasika which is miccha sati, but, this term represents what people mistakenly take for sati. One can be deluded as to the right Path. Num, in his second report on the Path of Discrimination (you were not there, Ken) wrote: that right understanding according to the P. of D. knows each of the right factors as right (samma) and each of the wrong factors as wrong (miccha). That knowledge is sammaditthi, right understanding. Thus, it is most important to know when one is on the wrong Path, to know exactly when one is on the wrong Path and when on the right Path. Both may be possible within one minute, or less! Ken, I like what you wrote to Kom at the end: op 24-08-2002 17:38 schreef Kenneth Ong op ashkenn2k@y...: > > there is no such thing as wrong sati or wrong > compassion. If we start distinguishing kusala as > right or wrong, to me is not the correct notion and > could lead to confusion. Any kusala cetasika that > associated with lobha is moha bc sati and panna is not > at work to know it. We should be cautioned not to > associated sati or any kusala by an akusala and not > abt right or wrong. > Anyway, the quest for a shortcut is already has lobha > as paccaya. 15209 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 3:49am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi, Robert (and Kenneth) - In a message dated 8/25/02 2:01:10 AM Eastern Daylight Time, epsteinrob@Y... writes: > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Hi Christine, > > > > To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of > > Buddhism. It always leads to difficult questions, > > like "is there a free will and if there is no free > > will how do we practise in the first place." > > > > Pple who believe in no free will is I said b4 a few > > months ago is extremist. > > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. Not = no. No self. > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, there are differences of opinion among scholars and among real Buddhists (just kidding, any Buddhist scholars out there!) on that. Some say that 'anatta' is just an adjective meaning 'not self' in the sense of 'impersonal' and 'insubstantial' which gets applied to all dhammas and thus, to me, inasmuch as all dhammas are all there is, implies that there is *no* self - but, somehow, not everyone agrees with that last conclusion. -------------------------------------------------- Atta is > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You can argue that > anatta is > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's personal self, but if > that is > the case there is really no difference between Hinduism and Buddhism. > Hinduism > also teaches total non-clinging and non-identification with external > objects of > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of the mind leads to > cessation of > the continued round of birth and death. The non-existence of Atta or Atman > [the > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] is the radical > difference > between most schools of Hinduism and all of Buddhism. > > Remember there is always a > > choice. > > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a different moment right now? > Or do > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? Answer according to > your > actual experience, and you will have a hard time finding where you can > choose. In > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? When you make the final > decision, is there some way in which you finally decide, or does it just > happen > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is actually an illogical > conceptual > construct. > > If there is no choice, the power to choose > > then Budhha will be wasting his time teaching us. We > > might as well sit below the bodhi tree and do nothing > > :). > > who's to say that's not the right thing to do? > > > I don't understand why free will must be associated > > with a self. > > If there is no self, who needs the concept of free will? Who chooses > freely? > When consciousness arises and engages in an act it is spontaneous. Where's > the > will? It is unnecessary to postulate 'will' unless one wants to add a > separate > moment in which the self makes a separate decision about what to do. If > there is > only consciousness arising there is not only no free will, but will itself > is > redundant of the act of consciousness itself. If the will to do x or y > arises in > the moment as it is acted upon with no intervening self, it does not make > much > sense to talk about whether it is 'willed' or not, since there is nothing > else > that could possibly be taking place, and there is no decision of any kind. --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't understand the notion of *free* will, but volition (cetana) is admitted by the Buddha in the Sutta Pitaka (it is the chief sankhara) and most certainly it is countenanced in the Abhidhamma. Evidently, cetana serves as kind of a needed motive force (but only in the sense of a necessary condition, not as a substantial "force"). It seems to be the vehicle by which craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma. (In the case of an arahant, the cetana is replaced by a kind of neutral functional consciousness (kiriya citta) expressing neutral chanda and which is condition for an ensuing kammically neutral action.) In fact, cetana (and kiriya citta for an arahant) seems to be close to synonymous with 'chanda'. Nyanatiloka defines cetana as follows: > cetaná: 'volition', will, is one of the seven mental factors (cetasika, > q.v.) inseparably bound up with all consciousness, namely sensorial or > mental impression (phassa), feeling (vedaná), perception (saññá), volition > (cetaná), concentration (samádhi), vitality (jívita), advertence > (manasikára). Cf. Tab. II, III. Now, I myself have, from time to time, puzzled over the "need" for cetana, inasmuch it only arises when the conditions for its arising have all appeared. (Why not go directly from those conditions to the action, without the intervening cetana?) But this question could arise for *every* link in a "causal stream" - it seems that links cannot be skipped. It seems to me that conditionality is a far more complex matter than we think, a much deeper one. As a matter of fact, our notion of 'causal stream' as the direct source of causality is faulty. The reality is probably closer to a causal network which is a complex confluence of causal streams inasmuch as no dhamma arises with a single precondition. --------------------------------------------------------- > > I think this is a concept developed by > > the West (no offence please). We always forget that > > there is a cetana that acts who itself is anatta. > > Isn't this a wonderful paradox :). > > 'who itself is anatta' sounds like it is a kind of self-concept to me. > ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Sounds like a Freudian slip to me, Ken! ;-)) --------------------------------------------- > > Best, > Robert Ep. > ========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15210 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 8:14am Subject: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi all, "Body is not self" means that "Body is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" "Feeling is not self" means that "Feeling is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" "Perception is not self" means "Perception is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" "Fabrications are not self" means "Fabrications are to be seen as they actually are with right discernment thus: 'These are not mine. These I am not. These are not my self.'" "Consciousness is not self" means "Consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" Seeing thus, one grows disenchanted with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted with perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with consciousness. Be very careful about the specious reasoning that since every dhamma is not self, thus there is no self. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert (and Kenneth) - > > In a message dated 8/25/02 2:01:10 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > epsteinrob@Y... writes: > > > > --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > > Hi Christine, > > > > > > To me anatta is the *most* difficult concept of > > > Buddhism. It always leads to difficult questions, > > > like "is there a free will and if there is no free > > > will how do we practise in the first place." > > > > > > Pple who believe in no free will is I said b4 a few > > > months ago is extremist. > > > > Anatta is pretty extreme too. It means 'not self'. Not = no. No self. > > > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, there are differences of opinion among scholars and among real > Buddhists (just kidding, any Buddhist scholars out there!) on that. Some say > that 'anatta' is just an adjective meaning 'not self' in the sense of > 'impersonal' and 'insubstantial' which gets applied to all dhammas and thus, > to me, inasmuch as all dhammas are all there is, implies that there is *no* > self - but, somehow, not everyone agrees with that last conclusion. > -------------------------------------------------- > Atta is > self. An-atta is the negation of this entity. You can argue that > > anatta is > > applied only to objects of clinging and not to one's personal self, but if > > that is > > the case there is really no difference between Hinduism and Buddhism. > > Hinduism > > also teaches total non-clinging and non-identification with external > > objects of > > desire. Hinduism also teaches that liberation of the mind leads to > > cessation of > > the continued round of birth and death. The non-existence of Atta or Atman > > [the > > inner spiritual self residing within the gross form] is the radical > > difference > > between most schools of Hinduism and all of Buddhism. > > > > Remember there is always a > > > choice. > > > > Why must there be a choice. Can you choose a different moment right now? > > Or do > > you merely experience what arises as consciousness? Answer according to > > your > > actual experience, and you will have a hard time finding where you can > > choose. In > > the moment of choosing, do you choose to choose? When you make the final > > decision, is there some way in which you finally decide, or does it just > > happen > > when it does? Choice apart from what happens is actually an illogical > > conceptual > > construct. > > > > If there is no choice, the power to choose > > > then Budhha will be wasting his time teaching us. We > > > might as well sit below the bodhi tree and do nothing > > > :). > > > > who's to say that's not the right thing to do? > > > > > I don't understand why free will must be associated > > > with a self. > > > > If there is no self, who needs the concept of free will? Who chooses > > freely? > > When consciousness arises and engages in an act it is spontaneous. Where's > > the > > will? It is unnecessary to postulate 'will' unless one wants to add a > > separate > > moment in which the self makes a separate decision about what to do. If > > there is > > only consciousness arising there is not only no free will, but will itself > > is > > redundant of the act of consciousness itself. If the will to do x or y > > arises in > > the moment as it is acted upon with no intervening self, it does not make > > much > > sense to talk about whether it is 'willed' or not, since there is nothing > > else > > that could possibly be taking place, and there is no decision of any kind. > > --------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't understand the notion of *free* will, but volition (cetana) is > admitted by the Buddha in the Sutta Pitaka (it is the chief sankhara) and > most certainly it is countenanced in the Abhidhamma. Evidently, cetana serves > as kind of a needed motive force (but only in the sense of a necessary > condition, not as a substantial "force"). It seems to be the vehicle by which > craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma. (In > the case of an arahant, the cetana is replaced by a kind of neutral > functional consciousness (kiriya citta) expressing neutral chanda and which > is condition for an ensuing kammically neutral action.) In fact, cetana (and > kiriya citta for an arahant) seems to be close to synonymous with 'chanda'. > Nyanatiloka defines cetana as follows: > > > cetaná: 'volition', will, is one of the seven mental factors (cetasika, > > q.v.) inseparably bound up with all consciousness, namely sensorial or > > mental impression (phassa), feeling (vedaná), perception (saññá), volition > > (cetaná), concentration (samádhi), vitality (jívita), advertence > > (manasikára). Cf. Tab. II, III. > > Now, I myself have, from time to time, puzzled over the "need" for > cetana, inasmuch it only arises when the conditions for its arising have all > appeared. (Why not go directly from those conditions to the action, without > the intervening cetana?) But this question could arise for *every* link in a > "causal stream" - it seems that links cannot be skipped. It seems to me that > conditionality is a far more complex matter than we think, a much deeper one. > As a matter of fact, our notion of 'causal stream' as the direct source of > causality is faulty. The reality is probably closer to a causal network which > is a complex confluence of causal streams inasmuch as no dhamma arises with a > single precondition. > --------------------------------------------------------- I'm a seeking a Enter city or ZIP Age: to Show only profiles with photos 15211 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 4:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? Hi, Ken (and Stephen) - In a message dated 8/25/02 2:38:54 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: > Hi Stephen, > > I asked: > >>Did the Buddha teach anything you don't already > know? > to which you replied: > ---------------- > > Three things that come immediately to mind are > anatta (and the fact that it's now widely accepted in > psychology and possibly quantum physics, as you note, > is a fairly recent confirmationâ€"a good thing, > wouldn't we agree?); > -------------------- > Well, I'm not sure we do agree. Anicca, dukkha and > anatta are characteristics of paramattha dhammas. > The objects known to science are concepts (pannatti), > not parramattha dhammas, they don't have > characteristics (sabhava) -- they aren't anicca, > dukkha, anatta. > ----------------------------------------------- Howard: They do have characteristics in the same way that they exist - conventionally. Trees have bark, and roots, and leaves. They grow, old leaves drop off and new ones appear. Well, I could go on and on - these are characteristics of trees. (Of course, there is no static, unitary thing which is a tree - not really, but conventionally there is, and it is quite nice to sit in the shade of one of these conventioanl trees. There *are* different levels of discourse and of "reality".) ----------------------------------------------- (I must admit though, that even> > concepts are to be understood as anatta. This was > explained on dsg a few months ago, I forget the exact > reasoning.) So when scientists say that matter lasts> > only a trillionth of a second and is devoid of > substance, they are, `so close and yet so far.' > ---------------------- > > thinking in terms of a/kusala or un/skillful actions > instead of rights, duties, etc.; > ------------------------ > What's ground-breakingly different about thinking in > this way? Couldn't any philosopher come up with that? > (I'd suggest many have.) > ------------------------ > > and a method, or methods (meditation, guarding the > senses, etc.). > -------------------------- > A method that is practiced by paramattha dhammas (by, > e.g., samma-ditthi, samma-sati,), can be attributed to > the Buddha, all other methods were `old hat' even back > then. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: What do you mean by a "method that is practiced by paramattha dhammas"? The notion of practice is a conventional one. People practice. Moments of discernment, hardness, aversion, etc do not. --------------------------------------------------- > ---------------------- > > I could go on: Right Livelihood pushes forward, > --------------------- > You'd have to say more on that for me. > ------------------ > > paticcasamuppada... > --------------------- > Yes, perhaps,but I wonder -- without the understanding of how it > operates in absolute reality, how is it different from other, merely > clever, theories? > --------------------- > >(Of course there's knowing, then there's actual > insight.) > --------------------- > Insight can be explained as consciousness (citta), in > which certain rare, precious, mental factors > (cetasikas), arise, all of which cognise another nama > or rupa. How else can satiaptthana be seen as > fundamentally different from ordinary knowing? > > I'll steer clear of your bit on "paramattha dhamma" > being a commentorial innovation. I'm out of my depth > there, but I see Jon has answered it. > > And I'll snip my bit on anatta (re quantum science), > to which you replied: > ----------------------- > > This is the core, and possibly only, utterly new > idea, of Buddhadhamma. > ------------------ > Once we have begun to accept anatta -- that is, once > we can intellectually agree that reality is only the > present nama and rupa, then the whole Buddhadhamma is > brilliant and like nothing else we've ever heard. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: Anatta is not (merely) the fact that there is only the present nama and rupa. Anatta is the emptiness of all dhammas, their impersonality and insubstantiality (their lack of core). All conditioned dhammas arise in dependence on other equally empty dhammas, making them thoroughly empty, and the one unconditioned dhamma, nibbana, is the ultimate emptiness, being empty of all conditions. -------------------------------------------------------- On> > the day when we directly know these Dhammas -- > i.e., when we have entered the Eightfold Path of the > Ariyans, then I think we really will feel the cosmos > shake. > > I asked my opening question again but in a different > way: >>Without the explanation of absolute reality, > what is there in the Buddha's teaching that is, even > remotely, ground-breaking? > to which you replied: > ------------------ > > How about: absolute reality is all around us but we > can't see it, can't see things as they are, because of > self-view and its entailed defilements of lobha/dosa? > > ------------------ > Exactly what I've been saying! Who's side are you > on? :-) > ----------------- > >Which has nothing to do with concepts, or not. > ------------------- > Oh, I see. Well, yes it has (according to the Pali > Canon), because miccha-ditthi, atta-sanna, lobha and > dosa are paramattha dhammas, they are not those things > we worldlings know as wrong view, perception of self, > greed and hate. These conventional counterparts are > just a lot of thinking(concepts, pannatti), they are > not real and they can't be objects of satipatthana > -- the Middle Way. > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: One thing bothers me about this. How can there be *anything* that is unknowable by wisdom? How would a Buddha know the relative unreality of pa~n~natti without being able to examine pa~n~natti with insight? In fact, when we investigate the breath, for example, and our mindfulness and focus intensify, we can detect the elements that comprise the breath - the softness, the motion, the "texture" (relative roughness and smoothness), the warmth, the moisture. The breath is pa~n~natti. Insight into it amounts to directly seeing its components/aspects (and their having the tilakkhana). ----------------------------------------------------- > > Kind regards > Ken H > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15212 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:26am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi, all - In a message dated 8/25/02 10:50:49 AM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Howard: > I don't understand the notion of *free* will, but volition (cetana) > is > admitted by the Buddha in the Sutta Pitaka (it is the chief sankhara) and > most certainly it is countenanced in the Abhidhamma. Evidently, cetana > serves > as kind of a needed motive force (but only in the sense of a necessary > condition, not as a substantial "force"). It seems to be the vehicle by > which > craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma. (In > the case of an arahant, the cetana is replaced by a kind of neutral > functional consciousness (kiriya citta) expressing neutral chanda and which > > is condition for an ensuing kammically neutral action.) In fact, cetana > (and > kiriya citta for an arahant) seems to be close to synonymous with 'chanda'. > > =============================== In the foregoing I wrote "It seems to be the vehicle by which craving and aversion, and, more generally express themselves as kamma." That unintelligible sentence was the result of changing horses in midstream. Please ignore the middle section of it, and take it to just read "It seems to be the vehicle by which craving and aversion express themselves as kamma." Sorry. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15213 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:31am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi, Victor - In a message dated 8/25/02 11:15:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > Be very careful about the specious reasoning that since every dhamma > is not self, thus there is no self. > > ========================= There is nothing specious in that reasoning if one also takes as a premiss "Everything is a dhamma." If there is nothing but dhammas and no dhammas are self, then nothing is self. (And "a self", by ordinary use of language, means something that is self. So, to say that nothing is self is the same as saying that there is no self.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15214 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:41am Subject: Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? (Sarah) Hello Sarah, >SN 111 is Khandhavagga....What is the name of the sutta? I'm having >trouble finding the reference. Thanks. Well, at least one question / response that I can actually answer! I took the reference from Payutto's "Buddhadhamma," so it was Grant Olsen's translation (p.137). Here are two web references: Neither Existence Nor Non-Existence and Project South Asia This is from Henry Clark Warren's "Buddhism in Translations" which I think has some problems. There are probably better sources but at least it's a clearer reference. metta, stephen 15215 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 5:53am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? (Sarah) Hi, Stephen (and Sarah) - In a message dated 8/25/02 12:42:18 PM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > Hello Sarah, > >SN 111 is Khandhavagga....What is the name of the sutta? I'm having > >trouble finding the reference. Thanks. > Well, at least one question / response that I can actually answer! > I took the reference from Payutto's "Buddhadhamma," so it was Grant Olsen's > > translation (p.137). > Here are two web references: > Neither Existence > Nor Non-Existence > and > > > > HREF="http://www.mssc.edu/projectsouthasia/religions/primarydocs/Buddhism/Midd > > leDoctrine.htm">Project South Asia > This is from Henry Clark Warren's "Buddhism in Translations" which I think > has some problems. There are probably better sources but at least it's a > clearer reference. > metta, stephen > > ============================== Ahh, I recognize the sutta. It is the Kaccayanagotta Sutta, one of my very favorites, and a probable primary input to the work of Nagarjuna. The link to it on Access to Insight is http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-015.html With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15216 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 1:03pm Subject: Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Hi Victor, and all, Thank you for this post and the reference. It is very comforting. I have read the Gihi Sutta, and will look at the suttas and Stream Entry Study Guide (I don't know why that makes me smile:)) listed at the foot of the page as soon as possible. I am surprised. Stream Entry always seemed such a significant step - like conquering Mt. Everest. Could it be this simple? Shouldn't one 'know' if one had entered the Stream - feel different in some way? .... you know, sort of ... enlightened? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > One becomes a stream enterer not by eliminating the first three > fetter. The elimination of the first three fetter is a mark of > stream entry. > > How is one a stream enterer? You might want to refer to > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an05-179.html > > I hope it is helpful to your Grand Plan, and I hope that after > checking for your self with the discourse, you will realize you are > already a stream enterer, and if you are not one yet, you are not far > from being one. > > Metta, > Victor > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear Group, > > > > As an ordinary person (puthujjana), still possessing all of the ten > > fetters, and so bound to the round of rebirths, from time to time > I > > get a little concerned about the shortness and uncertainty of life, > > particularly after the death of someone I know. Most people seem > > totally unprepared for death, even those of great age, seem shocked > > if they know about it in advance. Many people say that they are > not > > concerned with death, but with the dying - whether they will die in > > unrelieved pain, or alone. My concern, when it arises, is with the > > fact that those of us who are not Sotapannas (Stream Enter-ers) are > > in grave danger when it comes - firstly to death at any time, and > > secondly to where Rebirth will occur. It is only Stream Entry > > that ensures that there is no more to rebirth in woeful states, > and > > human birth being so very rare. > > > > Entry into the Stream is marked by the elimination of three > > fetters. 1. Sakkaya-ditthi (Personality Belief) 2. Vicikiccha > > (Doubt) 3. Silabbata-paramasa.(Attachment to mere Rule and > Ritual). > > Stream Entry also ensures that there will be (a maximum of) seven > > more cycles through the round of rebirths. Given that these laws > > are relentless and inexorable, and are not nullified by lack of > > believing in rebirth, it seems like a good thing to energetically > > follow the Path to safety. > > > > To me, it seems the hardest fetters to eliminate are the first > two - > > understanding of Anatta, and the elimination of Doubt.... Could it > be > > that they are not as hard as portrayed? or could it be that I am > > deceiving myself by thinking the other eight fetters are easier (at > > least, seven of them)? It seems that the first two concern > > understanding the Dhamma - realising about not-self, and > developing > > unquestioning confidence in the Word of the Buddha, while the next > > seven involve working away at behavioural characteristics. And then > > there is Avijja ..... > > > > The Ten Fetters that bind us to the wheel of becoming: > > > > Doubt (vicikiccha) > > Attachment to mere Rule and Ritual (siilabbata-paraamasa) > > Sensual Lust (kamaraga) > > Ill-Will (vyapada) > > Craving for Fine-Material Existence (rupa-raga) > > Craving for Immaterial Existence (arupa-raga) > > Conceit (mana) > > Restlessness (uddhacca) > > Ignorance (avijja). > > > > Mostly, I don't aim at anything but eliminating my defilements - > but > > maybe I should get more organised and have a Grand Plan with an > > Expected Date of Completion. > > > > metta, > > > > Christine 15217 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 9:49am Subject: Duration of Dhammas Hi, all - I have, possibly erroneously, gotten the impression that conditioned dhammas (cittas, cetasikas, and rupas) are supposed to have no duration, to be instantaneous point-events. But I question this: It seems to me that all experience (not counting the experience of the unconditioned) requires duration. For example, the air element is sometimes described as the principle of motion. But motion requires being in different positions or states at different times. Comments anyone? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15218 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 10:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Stream Entry (Sotapanna) Hi, Christine - In a message dated 8/25/02 4:07:46 PM Eastern Daylight Time, cforsyth@v... writes: > Hi Victor, and all, > > Thank you for this post and the reference. It is very comforting. I > have read the Gihi Sutta, and will look at the suttas and Stream > Entry Study Guide (I don't know why that makes me smile:)) listed at > the foot of the page as soon as possible. > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Reminds you of The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Universe? (Only in this case it is a guide to the end of the universe? ;-)) ------------------------------------------------------ > I am surprised. Stream Entry always seemed such a significant step - > like conquering Mt. Everest. Could it be this simple? Shouldn't > one 'know' if one had entered the Stream - feel different in some > way? .... you know, sort of ... enlightened? > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I suspect that stream entry is not as "hard" as is often thought, but is also not as easy as a cursory reading of this sutta might suggest. The " four pleasant mental abidings" mentioned are to be obtained "at will, without difficulty, without hardship". How does that come about? Moreover, the fourth of these is to be "endowed with virtues that are appealing to the noble ones: untorn, unbroken, unspotted, unsplattered, liberating, praised by the wise, untarnished, leading to concentration." Exactly what are these "virtues"? This is not stated. In other places in the Sutta Pitaka, there is mentioned the path and fruit of stream entry, but that is not discussed here. This sutta seems to make it appear that stream entry might be easier for a layperson than is usually indicated for a monk! Something strikes me as "fishy" here. > > metta, > Christine > > ================================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15219 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 10:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Duration of Dhammas In a message dated 8/25/2002 1:50:39 PM Pacific Daylight Time, upasaka@a... writes: > Hi, all - > > I have, possibly erroneously, gotten the impression that conditioned > dhammas (cittas, cetasikas, and rupas) are supposed to have no duration, to > be instantaneous point-events. But I question this: It seems to me that all > experience (not counting the experience of the unconditioned) requires > duration. For example, the air element is sometimes described as the > principle of motion. But motion requires being in different positions or > states at different times. > Comments anyone? > > With metta, > Howard > Hi Howard, The idea that things arise and immediately pass away (as if by some sort of independent nature) to me is a misunderstanding of impermanence and I see no support for that notion in the suttas. The Buddha said that things arise, persist while altering, then cease. This threefold description of the nature of change might apply to something for a fraction of a second or billions of years. A conscious moment might be something that occurs over a minute fraction of a second; while an asteroid floating in space may maintain a similar form for billions of years. Although things are changing moment by moment, at least in a positional sense, to say that they arise and immediately afterward cease seems over stated and phenomenologically useless. I think it is the relative interaction of the Four Great Elements that causes things to alter. In short, contacts between the forces and structures of nature (the Four Great Elements) alters form and wears things away. The speed by which things (objects or states) alter depends on the current dynamic interactions of the Four Great Elements affecting those things. TG 15220 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 3:08pm Subject: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi all, "Every dhamma is not self" means that "Every dhamma is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self.'" Seeing thus, one grows disenchanted with every dhamma. Metta, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Victor - > > In a message dated 8/25/02 11:15:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > Be very careful about the specious reasoning that since every dhamma > > is not self, thus there is no self. > > > > > ========================= > There is nothing specious in that reasoning if one also takes as a > premiss "Everything is a dhamma." If there is nothing but dhammas and no > dhammas are self, then nothing is self. (And "a self", by ordinary use of > language, means something that is self. So, to say that nothing is self is > the same as saying that there is no self.) > > With metta, > Howard 15221 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 11:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Duration of Dhammas Hi, TG - In a message dated 8/25/02 5:32:22 PM Eastern Daylight Time, TGrand458@a... writes: > > In a message dated 8/25/2002 1:50:39 PM Pacific Daylight Time, > upasaka@a... writes: > > > > Hi, all - > > > > I have, possibly erroneously, gotten the impression that > conditioned > > dhammas (cittas, cetasikas, and rupas) are supposed to have no duration, > to > > be instantaneous point-events. But I question this: It seems to me that > all > > experience (not counting the experience of the unconditioned) requires > > duration. For example, the air element is sometimes described as the > > principle of motion. But motion requires being in different positions or > > states at different times. > > Comments anyone? > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > Hi Howard, > > The idea that things arise and immediately pass away (as if by some sort of > > independent nature) to me is a misunderstanding of impermanence and I see > no > support for that notion in the suttas. > ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Then, at least in this respect, you and I read the suttas in the same way. The suttas seem to suggest a continuity to experience, whereas (a certain reading of) the Abhidhamma seems to paint a pointillist picture. -------------------------------------------------- The Buddha said that things arise, > > persist while altering, then cease. This threefold description of the > nature > of change might apply to something for a fraction of a second or billions > of > years. > -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. It seems that Abhidhamma pays obeisance to this to some extent in its dividing a citta into three stages, arising, maintaining, and ceasing (if I have that right). ------------------------------------------------- A conscious moment might be something that occurs over a minute > > fraction of a second; while an asteroid floating in space may maintain a > similar form for billions of years. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. I agree. I mainly am directing my question toward the so-called paramattha dhammas instead of conventional objects, and my motivation is phenomenological. It seems to me that, as Kalupahana and William James (before him) suggest, our moments of consciousness are not truly moments, but more like "saddle points". So the so-called present, the empirical present, is not a single point, but is closer to being a fuzzy interval. -------------------------------------------------- Although things are changing moment by > > moment, at least in a positional sense, to say that they arise and > immediately afterward cease seems over stated and phenomenologically > useless. > ------------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I tend to agree. ----------------------------------------------------------- > > I think it is the relative interaction of the Four Great Elements that > causes > things to alter. In short, contacts between the forces and structures of > nature (the Four Great Elements) alters form and wears things away. The > speed by which things (objects or states) alter depends on the current > dynamic interactions of the Four Great Elements affecting those things. > > TG ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15222 From: yuzhonghao Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 3:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Duration of Dhammas Hi TG and all, The notion of arising and immediately passing away is not the characteristic of being impermanent is about. Eye is impermanent. Ear is impermanent. Nose is impermanent. Tongue is impermanent. Body is impermanent. Mind is impermanent. It is impermanent in the sense that it is decaying, disintegrating. So, yes, the idea that things arise and immediately pass away is a misunderstanding of impermanence. The idea of, say, citta arising and passing away millions (or billions) times in a second is meaningless. Metta, Victor > The idea that things arise and immediately pass away (as if by some sort of > independent nature) to me is a misunderstanding of impermanence and I see no > support for that notion in the suttas. The Buddha said that things arise, > persist while altering, then cease. This threefold description of the nature > of change might apply to something for a fraction of a second or billions of > years. A conscious moment might be something that occurs over a minute > fraction of a second; while an asteroid floating in space may maintain a > similar form for billions of years. Although things are changing moment by > moment, at least in a positional sense, to say that they arise and > immediately afterward cease seems over stated and phenomenologically useless. > > I think it is the relative interaction of the Four Great Elements that causes > things to alter. In short, contacts between the forces and structures of > nature (the Four Great Elements) alters form and wears things away. The > speed by which things (objects or states) alter depends on the current > dynamic interactions of the Four Great Elements affecting those things. > > TG 15223 From: Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 11:36am Subject: Re: What is Anatta? (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Let go) Hi, Victor - Please explain to me how the following constitutes a response to what I wrote, and also what it is about your reply that is not already well understood by most of us here. To me this post of yours appears cryptic and uninformative. Are you unwilling to say more? Won't you expound on this to the point that we actually get what you are driving at? Are you saying that there may really be an "I" or "self", but that nothing we can ever know *is* that thing? Are you saying that 'not self' is merely a "liberation strategy"? Or are you saying something totally different from each of these? I ask, because I truly do not know. With metta, Howard In a message dated 8/25/02 6:10:04 PM Eastern Daylight Time, victoryu@s... writes: > > Hi all, > > "Every dhamma is not self" means that "Every dhamma is to be seen as > it actually is with right discernment thus: 'This is not mine. This > I am not. This is not my self.'" > > Seeing thus, one grows disenchanted with every dhamma. > > Metta, > Victor > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Victor - > > > > In a message dated 8/25/02 11:15:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > > victoryu@s... writes: > > > > > > > Be very careful about the specious reasoning that since every > dhamma > > > is not self, thus there is no self. > > > > > > > > ========================= > > There is nothing specious in that reasoning if one also > takes as a > > premiss "Everything is a dhamma." If there is nothing but dhammas > and no > > dhammas are self, then nothing is self. (And "a self", by ordinary > use of > > language, means something that is self. So, to say that nothing is > self is > > the same as saying that there is no self.) > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15224 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 6:04pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Dear Rob, First of all, my apology for having assumed that you authored most sections (pages 94-101) in your class note. I see that a lot of materials come from B. Buddharakkhita's translation of the pali, his telling of the details from the commentaries, and his analysis on the particular topic. I have studied the Karaniya Metta sutta from the note and from the Thai Tipitaka with the commentaries, with the questions that I asked you in mind, plus other questions including: 1) Is radiation of Metta real? What does the text mean when the word "radiation" is used? 2) I was told (not by you) that the radiation of metta is only possible in the Jhana absorption, so as long as one isn't there, then such radiation is impossible. I haven't studied the specific practices that B. Buddharakkhita listed, which I assumed he took from Vissuddhimagga (Chapter IX, on Metta meditation). Unfortunately, what I have studied so far don't conclusively answer the questions, but it was an interesting reading, so I would like to share some of it with you, and also to ask you some other clarifications. a) (paragraph 1, from note) "The mind becomes universal by identifying its own interest with the interest of all". I wondered what he meant by this. The mind can't be universal except in the Jhanic states. Even the Buddha's mind isn't universal in being constant in having metta toward others. He also had karuna, mudita, and upekkha, which are distinct states from Metta. I think if one doesn't read this statement carefully, it is easy to mistake that if one develops metta (meditation) alone, the mind can become liberated and "universal". b) (paragraph 2) "Today, metta is a pragmatic necessity". Necessity for whom? There are many who don't develop metta! c) I think it is important to keep in mind that the Buddha gave this teaching in the following contexts: i) For forrest-dwelling Bikkhus who are inclined towards tranquil meditation ii) Given the teachings for two purposes: for protection from the deva, and for being Kammathana for the bikkhus. d) (from the hym) Who seeks to promote his welfare. The Thai version and the commentaries explain this to be "for those kula-putta (generally means bikkhus and bikkhunis) who are skilled in what is beneficial/useful". One is skilled if one upholds the sila with abstention, upholds the patimokkha with saddha, guards the 5 senses with sati, develops metta via samadhi, and at *foremost* becomes liberated from knowing that the jhana states as what they are: as sankhara dhammas. e) "Having glimpsed" the state of "perfect peace". Having glimpsed is explained to be i) seeking nibbana ii) knowing nibbana with mundane wisdom and develop the different factors to reach it. Perfect peace is nibbana. f) "Should be able". The Thai version says one should develop the tri-sikkha (sila, samadhi, and panna. And besides being honest and upright, one should also be malleable (teachable, advisable...). g) "let him be prudent". The commentaries explained this to be wisdom in keeping sila, in using the daily pacaya, etc. h) "weak or strong". The comentaries explaine dthis to be the contrast between "those not well established, and those well established", those not having reached the arahatship and those having. i) The born and those seeking rebitrh. The born means the arahats since they were born but is not longer seeking rebirth. j) "Let all-embracing thoughts for all beings be yours". Yours here means those who is skilled in what is beneficial/useful. k) As you stand walk, sit, or lie. You here means those kula-putta (bikkhus) are are developing metta. l) It is deemed the Divine State here. Here means in the dhamma vinyya of the Ariyans. k) The last 4 stanzas here are the most intersting because B. Buddharakkhita doesn't stress it. It appears to me that that he implies that these are the benefits of developing metta. However, the commentaries clearly say that, because it is easy to have wrong views (sattata dithi --- the view of permanence) as a result of metta development, the Buddha added this to prevent such wrong views. This last part, I think, specifically means satipathana development which is in addition to metta development. The buddha gave the advice to the particular bikkhus to develop *both* samatha (metta meditation) and vipassana (to eliminate wrong views, to have vision for the ultimate, to overcome all sensual desire, and the never become born in a womb again) The tellings of the background of the metta more or less matches the commentaries. Comparing to that told in the Thai commentaries (which explained the Karaniya Metta Sutta, I didn't look elsewhere which may have more details), it is more embellished than the Thai versions. For example, the exact wordings such as "Each monk selected a tree to meditate" under is not ever mentioned in the Thai version, although it says that the monks sat under the trees putting forth the efforts, although it does not say specifically what the effort is. The second one is "As the monks neared their forest dwellings reciting the Metta Sutta". This also doesn't appear in the Thai version. The commentaries mentioned that the Buddha advised the monk to recite this sutta 8 times a month, and to keep in mind the development of metta always. There is no explicit implication that one should develop metta by *reciting* the sutta, as I have got the impression from B. Buddharakkhita's telling of the story. "They materialized themselves in human from": this also isn't in the Thai commentaries. "Made sure that they place was comletely free from any noise. Enjoying perfect silence". This is not in the commentaries either. B. Buddharakkhita's analysis brings up more questions for me. He mentioned lines 3 to 10 cover the aspects which require a thorough and systematic application of loving kindess. I somehow don't see that those particular aspects are completely in the realm of metta development. For example, one should be able, honest and upright. The thai translation puts "able" as "persevere". Honest and upgright means for both others and for oneselves. I think the meaning of being honest and upright are even more subtle than what the commentaries allude to. For me, it also means being honest with what appears, so that we don't take akusala as kusala, don't take anatta for atta. He said line 11-20 express loving-kindeness as distinct technique. I see them as enumerating the objects of the metta development. The commentaries mentioned 3 different sets of objects: some are limited, and some are unlimited. I don't think the specific "techniques" are explicitly mentioned until the texts from Vissudhimagga. He said line 20-40 underline a total commitment to the philosophy of universal love ... For me, it seems that the Buddha encouraged the monks in questions to develop both metta bhavana and vipassana as their way toward liberation, not just metta development. The last paragraph in the "Three Aspects of Metta" seems on the first glance as rather broadly sweeping to me. I would reather see more references that allow one to come to this conclusion rather than taking this conclusion at face values. I found the paragraph "Ability is not just mere efficiency or skil..." quite to my liking... This doesn't mean if it is any more right or wrong than the other paragraphs, of course. Living a simple life as an expression of metta. Again I found this lacking in specifics. I seems to me that one lives a simple life because one knows that attachments toward complicated living only brings more troubles. I don't see how he comes to this conclusion. "Mental cuture through meditation for such a person becomes natural and effortless: hence the attribute "tranquil in his senses." My thought in this area is how he comes to this relationship (between metta development) and tranquil in his senses. Tranquil in his senses, (Indariya samvara), appears to be a function of sati and panna. How is it related to metta? He interpreted "not brazen, nor fawning on families" as a warning against self-righteousness. The commentaries have very detailed explanation about this part, both on being blazen, and being involved/attached to a family, and it doesn't have anything to do with self-righteousness. "Transformed by metta, the mind is no longer haunted by greed, hatred, lust, jealousy...". Only lokuttara magga can do this function, and the leading factor to lokkuttara magga is wisdom, not metta. "Objectively, metta as a thought force...." is the first part ever that "radiation" is specifically discussed. In the sutta, all those different types of sattas are mentioned as objects of the meditations. There is no mention of somebody doing specific "radiation" for the benefits of others. He mentioned that the recitation of paritta can help one cure diseases and misfortunes. I found this to be quite troubling... What happened to the "one receives what one sowns", and the law of kamma? "Metta is a "solvent" that "melts" not only one's own psychic pollutants of angers..., but also those of others...". I found this to be quite dangerous to simply believe in . We can see the effects of metta in one's own mind, but how do we see it in others except through bodily/verbal expressions and inferences? Making a jump to this conclusion, and to develop metta so that it "melts" other people's resentment is a dangerous belief. I am not saying that this isn't true, but one should take this carefully... The ultimate purpose of metta is to attain transcental insight. I again am not sure how he comes to this conclusion. Metta development and samatha bhavana's ultimate goal is to reside in the devine abode. Only the path and satipatthana can brings one to the "transcental insight". His conclusion that metta development brings about "holding no more to wrong beliefs" are simply not supported in the commentaries, where it appears that the Buddha explicitly added the last 4 stanzas to correct the normal mich-dithi that can come with samatha bhavana: the wrong view of permanence. "The remote enemy can easily be distinguished so one need not be afraid of it, but one should overcome it by projecting a higher force, that of love." I think this statement understates the latency, the dangers, and the difficulities in getting rid of attachments and ignorance. The remote enemy is easier to spot in relatives to the near enemy, but for an ignorant fool, like some of us are, the remote enemy might as well be near enemies, because our ignorance are so thick that we sometimes take being "righteous", being "straight-forward", and being "truthful" as kusala while in fact they are anger and resentment. "The buddha taught that the entire mental world is developed...." I found this again to be broadly sweeping (or not having enough info/specifics). Would love to see a reference on this. "Made the foundation of one's life"....making one's refuge in the Dhamma reality. I personally think, truly, wisdom, kusala dhammas, and ultimately the 9 lokkutara dhammas can only be one's refuge. There is no "psychic lightning" that jumps from the meditating mind that impacts another person. After all these dicussions, I am actually not sure if there isn't some sort of psychic force! Seriously, thought, I think it would benefit one to develop metta, with limited and unlimited objects, but one shouldn't worry to much about "radiating" the metta to other beings and environments. Developing metta has clear benefits to oneself, trying to effect others and the surroundings via radiation can be just wishful thinkings and can lead to all sort of problems, such as believing in one's "supernormal" power even if there isnt' one. You know, some people thinks of some Thais as highly superstitious. There is the practice of asking the Emeral Buddha for things, and sometimes when their wishes come true, they offer eggs to the emerald Buddhas as a return. So if I radiate metta through this recitation, and it happens to work in that particular circumstance, is it because of the metta "radiation", or is it because of something else? The section on planning the response in Metta in daily life wouldn't work too well if one bakes the cookies with the thoughts that I am doing this out of my metta, or because I need to show the worlds that I am a person with metta. Unless one knows oneself (with sati and wisdom), then it is really hard to respond to situations with kusala intentions. To seriously develop kusala dhammas, panna must lead first. Otherwise, we may be just following rules and rituals that doesn't bring the results (gasp! more lobha!) that we would like... After the Reponse: remembering the pleasant feeling... Now, I remember plenty of pleasant feelings mostly akusala, and some kusala. I think it is best to remember the benefits of kusala and the disadvantages of akusala! I will work on the third reference you gave some more. As far as vissudhimagga and the specific practices, that seems a bit farther away at the moment. kom > -----Original Message----- > From: robmoult [mailto:rob.moult@j...] > Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2002 2:46 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States > > > Hi Kom, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Kom Tukovinit" > wrote: > > Dear Rob M, > > I would be interested in hearing more about the > practice of > radiating metta > > and karuna (etc) to other beings. What do you > think are relevant > > references? When can we do it? Why would we > want to do? How do > we do it? > > What are the causes and conditions for such events? > > > > kom > > I summarized the writings in a BPS Wheel > publication 365 on the > subject of Metta in my class notes (available in > the Files section) > pages 94-101 and added some of my own ideas on > page 102 of my class > notes. The full Wheel publication is at: > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/wheels/whee l365.html 15225 From: dark knight Date: Sun Aug 25, 2002 11:16pm Subject: Hi ! Hi, Iam a new member of this group. Iam from India. I was lucky to get an oppurtunity to read the Budda's words.I am interested in learing more and diving deep into His Wisdom. I look forward this an oppurtunity to do so. With Metta, Krishnan. 15226 From: Sarah Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 0:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hi ! Hi Krishnan, Welcome to DSG and like you, I think we're all very fortunate to have a chance to read and learn more here. We'll look forward to any of your comments or questions. I don't think there are any other active members from India and I'd be glad to hear whereabouts you're from sometime and anything else you care to share about how you became interested in Buddhism. Best wishes, Sarah ===== --- dark knight wrote: > Hi, > Iam a new member of this group. Iam from India. > I was lucky to get an oppurtunity to read the Budda's > words.I am interested in learing more and diving deep > into His Wisdom. I look forward this an oppurtunity to > do so. 15227 From: Sarah Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 0:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma without abhidhamma? (Sarah) Hi Stephen (& Howard), > Ahh, I recognize the sutta. It is the Kaccayanagotta Sutta, one > of my > very favorites, and a probable primary input to the work of Nagarjuna. > The > link to it on Access to Insight is > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-015.html Thanks, Howard. I was confused by the first reference and not sure if this sutta was intended. Stephen, as I mentioned in my marathon post, all the wrong views are included in the Brahmajala sutta, in the ‘net of views’, including those concerned with annhihilation and eternalism. Both views are inherently wrapped up in an idea of ‘self’ or identity in the ‘uninterrupted continuum’. In an earlier post I quoted some Sutta and commentary notes from B.Bodhi’s translation of the Kaccaanagotta Sutta (SN 11, Nidaanavagga, 15(5) . I’ll just repeat 2 paragraphs here which I think clearly clarify this point and put the more detailed notes at the end of the post as you may find them interesting and may not have read them before: ..... > Com notes (Spk-p.t): > “The annihilationist view might arise in regard to the world of formations > thus: ‘On account of the annihilation and perishing of beings right where > they are, there is no persisting being or phenomenon.’ It also includes > the wrong view, having these formations as its object, which holds: ‘There > are no beings who are reborn.’ That view does not occur in him; for one > seeing with right understanding the production and origination of the > world of formations in dependence on such diverse conditions as kamma, > ignorance, craving, etc, that annihilationist view does not occur, since > one sees the uninterrupted production of formations.” > Com notes (Spk-p.t): > “The eternalist view mght arise in regard to the world of formations, > taking it to exist at all times, owing to the apprehension of identity in > the uninterrupted coninuum occurring in a cause-effect relationship. But > that view ‘does not occur in him’; because he sees the cessation of the > successively arisen phenomena and the arising of succesively new > phenomena, the eternalist view does not occur.” ..... As you point out, the Kaccanagotta talks about the middle way, avoiding these wrong views with regard to ‘being’ or ‘identity’. You wrote: ..... >The > passage > then goes on to reference paticcasamuppada.]) > In itself, this is nonsense: something either exists or it does not > (there > are no shades or graduations of reality). What it means, in context, is > that > he saw that the world consists of becoming, or processes (things exist > in an > interrelated way, depend on conditions, are impermanent, don't exist as > independent substances or selves), not static/unchanging ('being' > rejected) > or somehow not real ('non-being' rejected) ..... I think we’re in agreement (hopefully not on the dark side;-)). We can talk about the momentary ‘existence’ of eye consciousness, visible ofject or other realities (without shades or graduations), but these ‘existing realities’ are dependent on conditions, interrelated and anatta as you say. Slowly, by understanding more about all the various namas and rupas (mental and physical phenomena) i.e paramattha dhammas, gradually ‘we’ can begin to understand a little more about paccaya (conditions) and paticca samuppada (dependent origination), even if it’s mostly intellectual understanding in the beginning. We read in the Visuddhimagga about the understanding of the conditioned nature of dhammas: ..... "After discerning the material body's conditions in this way, he again discerns the mental body in the way beginnng: 'due to eye and to visible object eye-consciousness arises' (Sii72, Mi,111). When he has thus seen that the occurrence of mentality-materiality is due to conditions, then he sees that, as now, so in the past too its occurrence was due to conditions, and in the future too its occurrence will be due to conditions. When he sees it in this way, all his uncertainty is abandoned, that is to say, the five kinds of uncertainty about the past stated thus: "Was I in the past.......... and also the five kinds of uncertainty about the future stated thus: "Shall I be in the future?...., and also the six kinds of uncertainty about the present stated thus: "Am I?..."(Mi,8) (end quote from Vism XIX,5) ***** Sarah ==== Notes from B.Bodhi’s translation of the Kaccaanagotta Sutta : ..... From the Sutta (SN 11, Nidaanavagga, 15(5) )we read: “This world, Kaccaana, for the most part depends upon a duality - upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence “ (Dvayanissito khvaaya.m Kaccaana loko yebhuyyena atthita~n c’eva natthita~n ca.) ..... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘For the most part’ (yebhuyyena) means for the great multitude, with the exception of the noble individuals (ariyapuggala). The notion of existence (atthitaa) is eternalism (sassata); the notion of nonexistence (natthitaa) is annihilationism (uccheda).” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The notion of existence is eternalism because it maintains that the entire world (of personal existence) exists forever. The notion of nonexistence is annihilationism because it maintains that the entire world does not exist (forever) but is cut off.” ..... Back to the Sutta: “ But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.” .... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘The origin of the world’: the production of the world of formations. ‘There is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world’: there does not occur in him the annihilationist view that might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding ‘They do not exist.” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The annihilationist view might arise in regard to the world of formations thus: ‘On account of the annihilation and perishing of beings right where they are, there is no persisting being or phenomenon.’ It also includes the wrong view, having these formations as its object, which holds: ‘There are no beings who are reborn.’ That view does not occur in him; for one seeing with right understanding the production and origination of the world of formations in dependence on such diverse conditions as kamma, ignorance, craving, etc, that annihilationist view does not occur, since one sees the uninterrupted production of formations.” ..... Com notes (Spk): “ ‘The cessation of the world’: the dissolution (bhanga) of formations. ‘There is no notion of existence in regard to the world’; There does not occur in him the eternalist view which might arise in regard to phenomena produced and made manifest in the world of formations, holding ‘They exist’.” ..... Com notes (Spk-p.t): “The eternalist view mght arise in regard to the world of formations, taking it to exist at all times, owing to the apprehension of identity in the uninterrupted coninuum occurring in a cause-effect relationship. But that view ‘does not occur in him’; because he sees the cessation of the successively arisen phenomena and the arising of succesively new phenomena, the eternalist view does not occur.” ******* 15228 From: egberdina Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 0:52am Subject: Re: Duration of Dhammas Hi Howard and everybody, My two pennies worth :-) There are no absolute measurements. Measures of size, speed, duration etc require at least one other point of reference. So that would negate the possibility of any kind of measured state being a parramattha dhamma. The description of a single state cannot include it's arising, being and passing. Only the description of a state relative to another one can. Medieval theology had two notions of the present moment - nunc fluens and nunc stans. The flowing now and the static now. They are both valid, but from the nunc stans one cannot see the nunc fluens, and vice versa. As to motion, could I be Victoresque and ask: Would you ascribe motion to what is seen on a TV screen? I'll now revert to being Hermanesque and give you my take on this question. There is no motion, just the arising and passing of the pixels. Now see what happens when you just go willy-nilly asking for comments ? :-) All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, all - > > I have, possibly erroneously, gotten the impression that conditioned > dhammas (cittas, cetasikas, and rupas) are supposed to have no duration, to > be instantaneous point-events. But I question this: It seems to me that all > experience (not counting the experience of the unconditioned) requires > duration. For example, the air element is sometimes described as the > principle of motion. But motion requires being in different positions or > states at different times. > Comments anyone? > > With metta, > Howard 15229 From: egberdina Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 1:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] wrong view Hi Larry, Running throughout your post I read the following argument. "There has to be ethics, there just has to be ethics." Have I read this correctly, and if I have then I ask why do there have to be ethics? As an aside, I read all DSG posts on the web, not as email. For the last few weeks all the messages have been adorned with some advertising which includes an image of a very caucasian Jesus in a white robe. But today we have the following promise : Enlarge your penis in just three weeks. Doctor discovers pill to enlarge your penis. I think it is hilarious :-). All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > All, > > I'd like to point out that the passages that outline the Buddha's > position on nihilism (vibhava) are implicitly anti phenomenalism and pro > free will. There is no point in preserving the integrity of ethics if > there is no free will, and if we say because of impermanence there are > no khandhas, then there is nothing to be ethical with. Or if we say the > khandas exist relatively because of impermanence, then we have to say > the 'self' exists relatively because of impermanence. The consequence of > that is there is no end of suffering and we have again lost ethics. > > I fully agree there are other passages that support phenomenalism and no > free will. So how to resolve this dilemma? We could go down the road of > relative and absolute truth, but absolute truth is relativity. And > "relativity" sounds a lot like "relative truth". This brings us back to > phenomenalism and no ethics. > > So the question is, how to establish an ontological basis for ethics. > Any ideas? Did the Buddha offer a solution? > > Larry 15230 From: robmoult Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 2:19am Subject: [dsg] Re: Four Sublime States (long message) Hi Kom, Wow!! What a message. :-) Just as it is important to place each of the Suttas in context (who the Buddha was speaking to, etc.), it is important to put my "Class Notes" into context as well. I am teaching a beginners' class of non- academics. Each week, I have to research and prepare a 75 minute lecture that will inspire and educate the class (in addition to my roles as employee, husband and father). I am now going through each of the kusala cetasikas. Each week, I locate an on-line publication (typically, though not always, from Bhikkhu Bodhi and BPS). I download the publication and edit it down to a size that my audience would be willing to read (they don't like to read). I typically delete non-familiar Pali words and Sutta references to make the material faster to read (I don't want to create an impression of academic rigour). It is extremely important to me that I do not mislead the class, but I do not consider strict scriptural adherence a must. You have obviously gone through this subject quite thoroughly. This is great! I welcome your advice on what should be changed in Bikkhu Buddharakkhita's text if you feel that it may mislead the class. I define "misleading the class" as meaning "leading to wrong view"; not merely a poor translation or inadequate commentary. At some point in the future, I hope to develop myself to the point that I can freely quote from the Suttas, Vissudhimagga, etc. (perhaps even in Pali!). For the moment, this is where I am - editing downloaded stuff from the Internet (though I try to be selective). It is my intention to update the "Class Notes" document each month as I add in new material and fix mistakes found in the exisiting material. In other words, my "Class Notes" is a living, evolving document. I welcome input from you (and all DSGrs) on any changes to the "Class Notes" that may be necessary to prevent wrong view. I am particularly interested in comments on stuff that I wrote myself (did not download). You asked a number of questions in your message. Here are my humble opinions (without references to the scriptures :-) ): 1) Is radiation of Metta real? What does the text mean when the word "radiation" is used? In daily life (kamavacara), I see "radiation" as a metaphor; I visualize sending metta to a person or group that I also visualize. 2) I was told (not by you) that the radiation of metta is only possible in the Jhana absorption, so as long as one isn't there, then such radiation is impossible. Actual "radiation" (i.e. psychic lightning) might be possible as a supramundane power in a jhanic state; I don't know and it is not of great concern to me at the moment because my focus is on daily life. 3) "The mind becomes universal by identifying its own interest with the interest of all". I wondered what he meant by this. At times, I visualize myself as a "black box". Bad stuff happens to me (vipaka) as an input. My reaction to what happens to me is the output. When I think in terms of "When bad happens to me and I react badly, I am perpetuating bad, both for my kammic stream and those whom I may influence. When bad happens to me and I do not react, I am stopping the progression of bad, not only for me, but also for those whom I may influence. When bad happens to me and I react with good, then I am changing a bad current into a good current, for me and for those whom I may influence. In other words, I make the WORLD a better place when I exercise wise attention. What I say/do has a direct influence on my kammic stream and an indirect influence on the rest of the world, starting with those closest to me and emanating outwards (like ripples when a stone is dropped in a pond) as those closest to me influence other people." When I think in this way (I don't always), my mind becomes universal by identifying its own interest with the interest of all. 4) "Today, metta is a pragmatic necessity". Necessity for whom? There are many who don't develop metta! I agree 100%. Normally, I try to edit out all social commentary from what I download. (Bhikkhu Bodhi isn't too bad on this, many others are terrible). This slipped by. Sorry about that. As it probably doesn't lead to "wrong view", I may leave it in. 5) The section on planning the response in Metta in daily life wouldn't work too well if one bakes the cookies with the thoughts that I am doing this out of my metta, or because I need to show the worlds that I am a person with metta. Why did I volunteer to teach the beginners' Abhidhamma class? There were two main factors: - I felt it would be a great way for me to learn the Dhamma (and Abhidhamma) much better (this is kusala) - I felt that I could do a better job of it than my classmates (conceit - definitely akusala) What motivates me each week to put in the hours of preparation required for the class? There are two main factors: - I am inspired by a genuine love of the Dhamma (this is kusala) - I am afraid of looking foolish in front of the class if I am not prepared (fear and conceit - definitely akusala) Akusala is so pervasive in our lives. If we use the energy from akusala to start us on a kusala path, then so much the better. I still have to pay for all that akusala, but at least I also have some kusala as well. At my stage of development, it is not practical to insist that my thoughts must be PURE kusala. I accept that there is some akusala as well. As one bakes the cookies, etc. it is unavoidable that akusala thoughts may arise. But the kusala thoughts "outweigh" them. Did you see the movie, "Monsters Inc."? At the end, the monsters discovered that laughter has ten times the energy of screams. I used that analogy in class and my kids (aged 10 and 12) loved it. 6) After the Response... I think it is best to remember the benefits of kusala and the disadvantages of akusala! Agreed. I will tweak the document to include remembering the disadvantages of akusala. Kom, my friend, I sincerely appreciate your input. I have not copied your entire message: your long message + my long reply = too much. Please let me know if I have inadvertently skipped one of your questions that you wanted me to reply to. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15231 From: Sarah Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 2:44am Subject: Anders, are you still there? Hi Anders, Sorry or the delay and hope you’re still around;-) Actually, I have a few posts in front of me and I’m going to try and just extract the main points where we have a different understanding, trying to spare everyone from another marathon..... 1.”..if we had never heard of the Buddhadhamma, our understanding would still be in accord with the Buddha’s Dhamma.” ..... As I mentioned before, all but the Buddhas need to hear the dhamma. In the case of a few particular disciples such as Sariputta or Bahiya, a few lines were sufficient. I don’t think there are many details about Bahiya, but in the case of Sariputta, his previous lives are written about extensively in the Jatakas and in them we read about the development of noble qualities and lives after lives spent with the Bodhisattva (I could give you a dozen references easily). In other words, there were special conditions to be born in the time and place of the Buddha and these disciples were ‘ripe’ for enlightenment. We read in the texts that now there are only be those types of individual who need to hear a lot of detail (neyya) to become enlightened or who cannot attain even with this detail (padaparama). Anders, this is my experience and observation, i.e. without hearing a lot of detail, there is no way anyone’s understanding will be “in accord with the Buddha’s Dhamma”. 2. “True understanding of the dhamma relies on neither , it is free of concepts and words.” While it is true that at a moment of panna at the level of satipatthana which directly knows reality, there are no concepts or words involved, there are many levels and degrees of panna. In the first place, there has to be clear intellectual right understanding and this certainly involves words. This is why we are encouraged to listen, hear and consider over and over again. Without pariyatti (intellectual right view) there won’t be any patipatti (direct rt understanding). You suggest that this is not my “direct experience” but rather my “faith” in what the Buddha said in this regard. I’d say it’s a combination of both. Saddha (confidence) in the Teachings grows along with the develpment of panna, even from the very beginning. 3. “Then what is your understanding.......It is just this understanding that needs to be examined, observed, released, and through that, comprehended, in order to move forward.” Any understanding now is not mine or yours. It’s anatta. It arises very briefly and knows a characteristic of reality and then it’s gone. It’s not anything lasting that can be released. If it’s merely at the intellectual level, the momentary thinking can also be known as a nama distinct from the concepts. You suggest that those who talk about anatta are “taking up the notion of not-self, adding another delusional layer”. On the contrary, I think that even when there is wise consideration of realities as anatta it is a beginning step to direct understanding of realities at this moment. 4. “You shouldn’t believe that you have no self......You make the effort to be mindful of notions of self associated with the khandhas, mindful of letting them go...” Anders, this sounds like more ‘self’ belief when you suggest doing X and not doing Y. Who is there to believe anything, to make an efoort or be mindful? I think that if we both have a different experience of the taste of an apple, we should look at what a detailed textbook (in our case the Tipitaka and commentaries) say about the taste. If you introduce any such texts in support of your comments, I’d be happy to discuss them. 5. Right view vs Wrong view. We’ve discussed many of the (wrong) views mentioned in Sutta Nipata and I’ve been writing about further wrong views in recent posts. Larry recently quoted from the Apannaka Sutta (MN 60) and Mahacattarisaka Sutta (MN117) about wrong views and right views and about mundane and supramundane right views. The Buddha only talks about wrong views with regard to danger and need for abandoning. As we know, wrong views arise with lobha and can be very enticing. Only panna can see them as wrong. I also agree that any clinging to the Teachings or any kind of views is unwholesome and to be seen for what it is. You suggest that we “have not seen the Dhamma directly for yourself, yet cling to the belief that your Dhamma is right, cling to it as your understanding and thus it becomes delusional”. In the end, Anders, only panna can know the reality at this moment and know whether it is lobha or ditthi or thinking that is arising. I agree that it’s important not to overestimate the level of understanding and to see the dangers of wrong view. I also think that by underestimating the value of the Teachings available to us and determining that all views are wrong views and to be discarded along with any Scriptures not directly understood, is a very unhelpful approach. 6. “Maintain a humble attitude towards your understanding, not clinging to your understanding as ‘right’, not craving for your understanding to be right......Better test it through practising the Dhamma.” Agreed as long as there isn’t any suggestion here of ‘own’ understanding. I still have very little idea of what you mean by ‘practising the Dhamma’. I certainly agree the Teachings are there to be tested and proved. You also ask how I know the ‘Buddha is enlightened’. All I can say is that the more testing and proving there is, the more confidence and the less doubt there is about the Teachings. Also, I’d say, the more testing and proving the less distinction I find in the suttanta, vinaya, abhidhamma or commentaries. Whatever I read reflects the Buddha’s Teaching on anatta and the development of satipatthana. This may seem to prove some delusional views or misguided blind faith, but I think in this case we’ll need to look at the references for the tastes of the ‘apples’ again. 7. “*I* do not distinguish an Absolute reality, because ignorance is still present.....I may infer an absolute reality based on my own experience, but this is not seeing actual absolute reality.” I’d really be glad to discuss more on absolute realities which can be known at this moment, which can be tested and proved at this moment. I think this is far more useful than trying to analyse others blind faith;-) Firstly, realities don’t last. Although there is the latent tendency of ignorance at each moment, when there is any level of understanding, there is no ignorance arising with the citta (consciousness). Inferring is thinking and as you say, not the same as directly understanding an absolute reality. So what are the absolute realities which can be known right now? No need to think of ‘own’ or ‘other’ experience. 8. You asked where the Buddha’s ‘realisation came from’. I understand that the answer is they have heard the Teachings from the previous Buddha and in countless lifetimes develop the parami (Perfections) before the life in which they become the Buddha. I don’t know these details very well at all, but in ‘The Birth Stories of the Ten Bodhisattas’ we read about the Elder Ajita and the Bodhisattas in the future. The Elder Ajita will be the next Buddha named Metteya. We also read about his previous lives, back to former Buddha eras, I believe. Someone else, like Rob K, would be able to give you more details or I could check later. 9. Finally, you always stress that you only ever ‘speak according to my (i.e. your) own understanding’ and that if one day I or we taste the apple (i.e Buddha’s Dhamma) and know the taste for myself or ourselves, we will know it is exactly as you described. With all due respect, Anders, when there is ignorance or a need to understand better, I prefer to look at how the Buddha describes the taste whilst appreciating any explanations from you or anyone else here. If I find your explanations different or unusual, then I like to consider the ancient commentaries. Having said that, I know you are very sincere in your concern and offers of assistance and the emphasis you put on really testing what is understood and what is just being repeated blindly. I also think you’d benefit tremendously by considering the texts and particularly the abhidhamma in more detail. Look forward to any further suttas or Pali Canon texts you wish to discuss or to hearing any further comments on these points. Sarah ===== 15232 From: Date: Mon Aug 26, 2002 4:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Duration of Dhammas Hi, Herman - In a message dated 8/26/02 3:53:15 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofman@t... writes: > > Hi Howard and everybody, > > My two pennies worth :-) > > There are no absolute measurements. Measures of size, speed, duration > etc require at least one other point of reference. So that would > negate the possibility of any kind of measured state being a > parramattha dhamma. The description of a single state cannot include > it's arising, being and passing. Only the description of a state > relative to another one can. ----------------------------------------------------- Howard: Mmm. I get your point. I agree that duration is only relative. I guess the point is more a question of discreteness vs continuity when I speak of points vs intervals. But this leads back to another problem - *where* is the observing done? For example, where is the counting of rupas done: Up to 17 cittas for a given object I believe the rule is; but there is nothing outside of or "standing behind" the cittas to count their passage! It is said that cittas pass quickly. The appropriate response seems to me to be "As compared to what, and as measured from where?" Perhaps a later single process of cittas, using memory, can review and analyze (and count!), but it cannot be done by "looking on" as one looks at a movie or television screen, because there is no onlooker or outside vantage point. Of course, perhaps the Abhidhammic analysis is of only limited correctness in that maybe more than one rupa (or one rupa-kalapa) can actually arise at a time and parallel processing of multiple dhammas is possible. But to presume that is to give up on the "Abhidhamma enterprise". I would sooner press on to see what defenses can be brought to the fore within the principles of Abhidhamma itself. Much of the *detail* of Abhidhamma raises many more questions for me than answers, and I have much doubt about that detail, but the general