15600 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 9:04pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concepts) Larry, > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:26 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana > > > Hi Kom, > > I've forgotten what our original question was but > I could comment on > these questions: > > "1) Is hardness paramatha dhamma or concept? > > 2) Is visible object paramatha dhamma or concept? > > 3) Is lobha paramatha dhamma or concept?" > > Hardness is just hardness, it would never be I think we agree on this one. Hardness is hardness. There is nothing beyond the hardness. Hardness is a paramatha dhamma with its own characteristics which is different from heat or cold, or tension, or visible object, or sound. > "table" unless one were > trying to identify by touch. So there is a > definite difference here > between sensation and concept. Whenever there is hardness that appears, there is a consciousness that cognizes this hardness. The hardness appears as the object to the consciousness. The hardness doesn't cognize, but the consciousness does. Both of these are paramatha dhamma. > However, there > *could* be a very subtle > concept involved in hardness sensation. I don't > know. I'd have to take a > closer look, somehow. Often, immediately after the hardness appears, the consciousness in the mind door often thinks of the object. When we see the visible object, we associate the object with shapes, with the different colors, with its being something (like a monitor, English letters), and finally we may associate it with a name. All these associations sometimes don't happen. We also experience visible objects through out the day without (much) thinking about the object. The visible object is paramatha dhamma: its characteristics are different from hardness, heat, or tangible object. The consciousness is paramatha dhamma: it sees the visible object. The associations are what we (in DSG) call thinking. The shape, the meaning of the visible object, the name all don't have their own characteristics and don't exist in the ultimate way (because they have no characteristics.) > Visual sensation usually (if not always) > identifies something but not > with name and meaning (concept). Concept is added > later but what is this > identity? Subtle concept? If so, how to separate > visual sensation and > concept? Even an unknown is identified as an > unknown. Let me know if what what is discussed above hasn't clarified this section. > Lobha is very interesting. Supposedly this is a > cetasika but it seems to > me it is more like rupa with concept. Vedana is > the same way. There are > bodily sensations involved with desire or > pleasant feeling, for example. > But they are more than body sensation; I can't > think what that 'more' > could be if not concept or "subtle concept". Lobha also has its own characteristics. Its characteristic is the attachment to its object. Do you feel the attachment toward something you like? That's the characteristics lobha. Lobha is nothing beyond its characteristics. It is not you: it is just a dhamma. Lobha toward a visible object is different from the visible object. It has the object as its aramana, where as the object has no cognition function, which is unlike lobha. Lobha is nama: its characteristic is the attachment toward its object. Lobha is not concept. Concept has no characteristics; the characteristic of lobha is the attachment. Do you have disagreement to what I said? Is there any part that is unclear? kom 15601 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 5:07pm Subject: Re: Hi from Aus - Question? >Why is it that so, so many of the >members of this group are from Australia? A wildly disproportionate >percentage... any theories? Perhaps it is something in the drinking >water :-) ? Creosote. metta, stephen ---Hello Christine ;-) 15602 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 9:15pm Subject: [dsg] Vitakka and concepts Larry, I am separating this thread out to keep things more manageable. > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 8:26 PM > By the way, how do you separate concept from > vitakka and vicara or > ditthi? Vitakka is a paramatha dhamma. Its characteristics is to touch its object. When the consciousness through the mind door thinks of something, vitakka touches that something. Vitakka can have concept as its aramana, but concept cannot have anything as aramana. Concept is not real: it is neither nama nor rupa, it doesn't exist, and it doesn't cognize anything. Vicara is a paramatha dhamma. Its characteristics is to follow its object. When the consciousness through the mind door thinks of something, vicara follows that something. Vicara, except in jhana cittas, always is con-ascent with vitakka. Therefore, vicara has the same aramana as the vitakka that it is con-ascent with. Vitaka is different from vicara: they both have their distinct characteristics that are not the same as one another. They are paramatha dhamma. I think it would be fruiful for us to keep at discussing the differences between paramatha dhamma and concept until this is clear. Otherwise, studying further teachings would just bring more confusions and mis-understanding. kom 15603 From: Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 9:55pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concepts) Hi Kom, I'm afraid I still don't understand how concepts don't have characteristics. How do we tell them apart if they don't have characteristics? I believe concepts are defined as name and meaning. Aren't name and meaning characteristics? Also, I'm not real sure what is attachment. Larry 15604 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Sep 9, 2002 10:14pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concepts) Dear Larry, > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Monday, September 09, 2002 9:56 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and > Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) > (realities/concepts) > > > Hi Kom, > > I'm afraid I still don't understand how concepts > don't have > characteristics. What's the difference between a hardness and a table? A visible object and a person? When you see a car on TV? What is truly there? What isn't? > How do we tell them apart if > they don't have > characteristics? The citta cognizes both realities and concepts. The function of the citta is to know the differences between what appears. > I believe concepts are defined > as name and meaning. > Aren't name and meaning characteristics? Name and meaning are concepts. Shape or form is also concept. Concept can be only cognized by the mind door. What are the characteristics of name and meaning? > > Also, I'm not real sure what is attachment. > Desire, lust, wanting, hope, wishful thinking, longing, greed, feeling toward a loved one. These are the different shades and degrees of attachment. kom 15605 From: Sarah Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 4:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hi from Aus Hi Deb, Thanks for sharing your intro and a few comments. I hope you find it useful reading and participating here. --- debanstis wrote: > > Hi, > My name is Deb, I am new to your group, I have always been interested > in Theravada Buddhism and travelled through Sri Lanka and Thailand. .... Interesting....perhaps we'll hear more in due course. ..... > I am a beginner to "terms", so I hope to gain a deeper understanding > of Theravada Buddhism from the interactive context of this group. > So, I may lurk for awhile before I post again. ..... Please don't be put off by the "terms" and ask for any clarification. We'd all prefer to have you participating in your 'own' language. There is a simple Pali glossary at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Pali_Glossary ..... > Thankyou in advance, > Deb from Australia ..... Whereabouts are you in Oz? I'm not sure there are more Australian members than Canadian ones, Rob M, but maybe the Aussies are a more vocal lot;-) Btw, Anthony, many thanks for sharing a little more about yourself. Perhaps we'll get together when we're next in Sydney. (...just thinking about when we arranged to meet Anthony B. there.....he was rather nervous about meeting beings from cyberspace -- no photos in those days -- and decided that the Town Hall steps would be a 'safe' and 'public' place. But unknown to him, on the assigned day the Town Hall was closed off to the public. Luckily he'd said he'd be wearing a red shirt and there weren't too many men in red shirts wandering around the area......). This reminds me, if you or Deb or Krishnan or anyone else cares to share a pic in the DSG photo album (click on photos on left side of home page), we'd all be very glad to 'see' you. Rob Ed, many thanks for sharing yours recently. This will help people not to get the 4 Robs mixed up. Sarah ====== 15606 From: abhidhammika Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 7:33am Subject: Re: Hi from Aus: Greeting From Another Aussie Dhamma Bloke Dear Deb How are you? Welcome to the DSG assembly of dhamma friends. Greeting from another Aussie Dhamma Bloke from Canberra! With kind regards, Suan Lu Zaw http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "debanstis" wrote: Hi, My name is Deb, I am new to your group, I have always been interested in Theravada Buddhism and travelled through Sri Lanka and Thailand. I am a beginner to "terms", so I hope to gain a deeper understanding of Theravada Buddhism from the interactive context of this group. So, I may lurk for awhile before I post again. Thankyou in advance, Deb from Australia 15607 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 10:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] DSG: Live in Niagara Dear Dan, I enjoyed reading your report, also about Matt, written with such sense of humor, I had a good time with your posts. This is priceless the way you described it: lobha as teacher instead of panna. Yes, we all have mostly lobha leading us. I am glad you found it worth while, and I hope Jim also had a fruitful time. You had kusala viriya, to take the efforts in traveling rather far and back again. A. Sujin wrote about an elderly person who had viriya to travel far to the Foundation. I do appreciate your kusala citta, and I quote: With much appreciation, Nina. op 09-09-2002 00:03 schreef onco111 op dhd5@c...: > > The long trip for such a short discussion was well worth it, > > The first taste of dsg Live was precious, 15608 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 10:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Mind-process Dear Rob M Thank you for your kind words and encouragement. But don't forget: whatever I learnt is due to A. Sujin. The end of your post is a good marana sati. Best wishes for success with your class and with appreciation, Nina. op 09-09-2002 00:51 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@j...: (snip) This > legacy will continue long after the nama-rupa named "Nina" is gone. > > Saddhu, Saddhu, Saddhu. > 15609 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 10:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] subtle point Dear Sarah Thank you very much. I have an older edition, less Pali. But I have the Pali of Fruits of Recluseship, and this is the same sort of passage. What is difficult for me: what is the monk conveying to himself here by kayavinnatti? I go forward with mindfulness? Nina. op 09-09-2002 08:47 schreef Sarah op sarahdhhk@y...: > I’m not sure how relevant this is and I know you’ll have read these > details before. Nina, do you have the ‘revised’ PTS edition of > Sammohavinodani? We have the 1996 edition which includes a lot of Pali > terms and is very user friendly. I note it was revised by Lance Cousins, > Nyanaponika and C. Shaw. > ***** > “But ‘clear comprehension through non-delusion’ is not being deluded as > regards moving forward and so on. That should be understood thus: here a > bhikkhu, when moving forward or moving backward, unlike the blind ordinary > man who deludes himself as regards moving forward, etc (by imagining;) ‘A > self moves forward, the moving forward is produced by a self’ or : ‘I move > forward, the moving forward is produced by me,’ is one who is not so > deluded; when the consciousness ‘I (will) move forward’ arises, together > with that same consciousness there arises the consciousness originated air > element, which produces (bodily) intimation (vi~n~natti). thus this > framework of bones called the body moves forward by means of the diffusion > of the air element due to the action of consciousness.” > 15610 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 1:07pm Subject: Re: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? Dear Herman, Comments inserted below: --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: Dear Christine, Herman: You asked for it:-) ---------------------------------- Chris: I'm quivering in terror, but claiming the parliamentary Right of Reply... :-) -------------------------------- "christine_forsyth" wrote: > > Recently on a number of lists, members have had differences about > the > > Buddha's teaching based on translations of the Tipitaka. It occurs > > to me that 21st century Buddhists are at the mercy of the vigilance, > > ethics, and competence of translators and of the translators > > interests and biases (unconscious or otherwise). --------------------------------- Herman: 21st century buddhists and non-buddhists alike are at the mercy of ignorance more than anything else. Not the type of ignorance that is mitigated by scholarship. More the ignorance that prevents the insight into what is happening right here, right now. --------------------------------- Chris: Why Herman! we agree completely (how can this have happened :-))..... You say: "insight into what is happening right here, right now" - like ... while I am sitting on a hard chair reading and typing a reply to your post, and inhaling the aroma while tasting some hot chamomile tea? And feeling my usual mixed emotions at your words :)? Not in a special place, on a special seat, in a special posture, doing a special activity.....? :-):-) --------------------------------- Herman: You are perhaps familiar with the Leunig cartoon of a man with his arm around his little son, sharing with him the delight of seeing the sunrise on TV, whilst the sun is seen to rise through a side window. --------------------------------- Chris: I'm a Leunig fan - at least of those cartoons a Buddhist lady will admit to appreciating :-) --------------------------------- Herman: The sun doesn't rise in books. If the book helps you to find the window, good and well. Perhaps the book may show you where the door is. But to go there, you need to leave the TV and the book behind. If you really want to find the truth, you have to be prepared to forsake everything, absolutely everything. The book says that too. ---------------------------------- Chris: Are you assuming that people who study the Tipitika have never lived life to the full and had other types of worldly and spiritual experiences and practices? That we sprang from our mother's wombs wrapped in cotton wool, wearing blinkers, reading glasses and ear muffs, and clutching a Pali dictionary :) I value the Tipitaka as something more than just old tomes, written by pious bushies who were somehow not quite as intelligent and perceptive as the average 'modern' person. I believe the Tipitaka to be the actual Teachings of the Buddha, meticulously preserved at great human cost. (Inexpressible thanks to those at Aluvihara, those before them and those since) I am not a naive bibliophile who hasn't had the experience of formal meditation (and if only I would 'try it', I would have the scales fall from my eyes....). ---------------------------------- Herman: Anatta for starters. ---------------------------------- Chris: Is that the one about there being no-self who can control consciousness, making mind-states happen at will? :-) ---------------------------------- A little, true story. I am greatly indebted to my father. At age 50, he discarded his entire theology/philosophy library. (He also was a minister of religion). Imagine the four walls of a roomy study, lined with shelves from the floor to the ceiling, not a vacant square centimetre, all the shelves jam-packed with hefty tomes on you-name- it, anything to do with spiritual quests. What happened? A small germ had taken root. God is not found in books. He quit the church, and his garden did better out of it, too. ------------------------------- Chris: Thanks for sharing about your father Herman - I too lived for many years with a devotion to God. I know what it is to be seduced by the rapture of mystical experience - better by far to know what is Real. I don't live in a 'nice' cocoon of how I imagine the world to be. There is no control, no safety, no protection for this bag of khandas.. I am immersed everyday in the depths of the misery humans are capable of inflicting on themselves and others - and deal constantly with beings blindly under the sway of their defilements - learning a little about the great breadth and depth of my own as well. Not through books or the TV news, but through the ever changing good and evil I witness in myself and in my daily work. The Dhamma-Vinaya is used as a tool, a roadmap, a way of heading for home out of the suffering and chaos of life. Not as a substitute for experience. ----------------------------- All the Best Herman ----------------------------- And also to you, Herman, Christine 15611 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 2:12pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Mind-process Hi Nina, Whereas money gets smaller when shared, appreciation is like merit (also like love); it grows bigger when shared. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > Dear Rob M > Thank you for your kind words and encouragement. But don't forget: whatever > I learnt is due to A. Sujin. The end of your post is a good marana sati. > Best wishes for success with your class and with appreciation, > Nina. > > op 09-09-2002 00:51 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@j...: > > (snip) > This > > legacy will continue long after the nama-rupa named "Nina" is gone. > > > > Saddhu, Saddhu, Saddhu. > > 15612 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 2:23pm Subject: RE: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (2) Dear Larry, Here's my take: > -----Original Message----- > From: LBIDD@w... [mailto:LBIDD@w...] > Sent: Tuesday, September 03, 2002 5:35 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 23 (2) > > > Dear Nina, thanks very much for this (below). However, I'm still not > clear on what A. Sujin is teaching with regard to satipatthana > meditation. I get the feeling she thinks it is a waste of time or it > would be better to contemplate the dhamma unencumbered by formalities of > meditation technique or the concept of satipatthana meditation is ill > conceived. Any light you could shed on this would be appreciated. > > I would like to see what Kom, Sarah, and Jon have to say on this as > well. Get sort of a consensus view. > > thanks, Larry > --------------- > Nina wrote: > > L: What is A. > Sujin's view on satipatthana meditation? Why doesn't she teach it? Does > she teach a similar discipline for developing detachment? > N: There should be development of satipatthana, that is, sati and panna, > development of direct awareness and understanding of the characteristics > of nama and rupa, very, very gradually. There may be a lot of thinking > involved, but there can also be a moment of noting a characteristic > without thinking. This may be seldom, but in this way the difference > between thinking and sati can be known. The development of satipatthana > will lead first to detachment from self, and later on from all namas and > rupas. But together with satipatthana all perfections should be > developed. They support panna. When the perfections are being developed > there is a degree of giving up of clinging: dana, sila, renunciation, > patience, metta, and the other perfections. > Best wishes > from Nina. > A. Sujin constantly teaches about Satipatthana and its "practice" (pati-pati). However, she does not encourage people to "practice" the way that many contemporary "meditation" teachers teach. She teaches that it is impossible to develop wisdom from ignorance, i.e., without first gaining understanding what the 4 noble truths really are. She doesn't encourage people to jump into "meditation" by following others, and making hasty conclusion about the benefits of such meditation based on their (or others') ignorance about realities, sati, and the objects of sati. This goes back to our previous discussion. Without understanding Paramatha dhamma and concepts, we may have the wrong idea that the Buddhas talk about concepts when he talks about Kandhas, Ayatnas, Dhatus, and objects of Satipatthana. Therefore, we must first understand the differences between paramatha dhamma and concepts; otherwise, we are bound to get confused. kom 15613 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 2:45pm Subject: Driving to the 'Middle Way' Hi All, I use Office XP on my computer and it has a feature called "Smart Tags" that tries to help me when it can. I was typing in a quote from a Sutta that included the words 'Middle Way' (capitalized, but no quotes). A smart tag box appeared and asked me if I wanted to: - Add this to my address book - Add this to my list of contacts - Display a map - Display driving instructions Oh, I wish it were that easy :-) Thanks, Rob M :-) 15614 From: Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 3:18pm Subject: ADL ch. 24 (2) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 24 (2) We read in the Kindred Sayings (V, Mahå-vagga, Book XII, Kindred Sayings about the Truths, chapter V, §5, The keyhole) that, when the Buddha was staying at Vesålí in Great Grove, Ånanda went into Vesålí on his rounds for almsfood. In Vesålí he saw the Licchavi youths practising archery. He then went to see the Buddha and said: ``Here, lord, robing myself in the forenoon and taking bowl and outer robe I set out for Vesålí on my begging rounds. Then, lord, I saw a number of Licchavi youths in the gymnasium making practice at archery, shooting even from a distance through a very small keyhole, and splitting an arrow, shot after shot, with never a miss. And I said to myself, lord: `Practised shots are these Licchavi youths! Well practised shots indeed are these Licchavi youths, to be able even at a distance to splinter an arrow through a very small keyhole, shot after shot, with never a miss!´ ´´ ``Now what think you, Ånanda? Which is the harder, which is the harder task to compass: To shoot like that or to pierce one strand of hair, a hundred times divided, with another strand?´´ ``Why, lord, of course to split a hair in such a way is the harder, much the harder task.´´ ``Just so, Ånanda, they who penetrate the meaning of: This is dukkha, this is the arising of dukkha, this is the ceasing of dukkha, this is the practice that leads to the ceasing of dukkha, pierce through something much harder to pierce. Wherefore, Ånanda, you must make an effort to realize: This is dukkha. This is the arising of dukkha. This is the ceasing of dukkha. This is the practice that leads to the ceasing of dukkha.'' One might feel discouraged when reading this sutta; it would seem that it is impossible to attain enlightenment. However, if one develops the right Path, not the wrong Path, one will realize the four noble Truths; one will attain enlightenment. The way to realize the four noble Truths is to be mindful of the realities which appear now: seeing, visible object, lobha, dosa or any other reality. We should not be discouraged when we do not seem to make rapid progress. Most people cling to a result and they become impatient when they do not notice an immediate result; clinging to a result, however, is not helpful for the development of wisdom, it is akusala. Some people feel that the development of samatha can give a more immediate result. Samatha, when it has been developed in the right way, has tranquillity as its result. When jhåna is attained, lobha, dosa and moha are temporarily eliminated. However, the attainment of jhåna is extremely difficult and many conditions have to be cultivated. If one develops samatha, the five hindrances are bound to arise: there will be sensuous desire, ill-will, sloth and torpor, restlessness, worry and doubt. until ``access-concentration´´ or jhåna have been attained. The aim of vipassanå is not tranquillity, but the eradication of wrong view and eventually of all defilements. This goal may seem far off, but each short moment of right awareness of nåma and rúpa is very fruitful; it will help to eliminate clinging to the concept of self. While one is mindful, there are no lobha, dosa or moha. Although tranquillity is not the aim of vipassanå, at the moment of right mindfulness there is kusala citta, and kusala citta is accompanied by calm. Vipassanå or insight is the development of right understanding of all nåmas and rúpas which present themselves in daily life. Insight is developed in different stages and in the course of its development the characteristics of nåma and rúpa will be understood more clearly, and their arising and falling away will be known through direct experience. When insight has been developed stage by stage, the nåma and rúpa which present themselves through the six doors can be clearly seen as impermanent, dukkha and non-self, anattå. When paññå has been developed to the degree that enlightenment can be attained, the unconditioned reality, nibbåna, is directly experienced. The direct experience of nibbåna is different from thinking about nibbåna. Nibbåna is directly experienced during a mind-door process of cittas. Nibbåna cannot be experienced through any of the five senses, it can be experienced only through the mind-door. In the process during which enlightenment is attained, the manodvåråvajjana-citta (the mind-door-adverting-consciousness) takes as its object one of the three characteristics of reality: impermanence, dukkha or anattå. This means that the reality presenting itself at that moment is seen either as impermanent, or as dukkha or as anattå. Anicca, dukkha and anattå are three aspects of the truth of conditioned realities. Thus, if one sees one aspect, one also sees the other aspects. However, the three characteristics cannot be experienced at the same time, since citta can experience only one object at a time. It depends on one's accumulations which of the three characteristics is realized in the process of cittas during which enlightenment is attained: one person views the reality appearing at that moment as impermanent, another as dukkha, and another again as non-self, anattå. The mano-dvåråvajjana-citta, mind-door-adverting-consciousness, of that process adverts to one of these three characteristics and is then succeeded by three or four cittas which are not yet lokuttara cittas, but mahå-kusala cittas (kusala cittas of the sense-sphere) accompanied by paññå. The first mahå-kusala citta, which is called parikamma or preparatory consciousness, still has the same object as the mano-dvåråvajjana-citta. Whichever of the three characteristics of conditioned realities the mano-dvåråvajjana-citta adverted to, the parikamma realizes that characteristic. The parikamma is succeeded by the upacåra or proximity consciousness which still has the same object as the mano-dvåråvajjana citta. This citta, the second mahå-kusala citta in that process, is nearer to the moment the lokuttara cittas will arise. The upacåra is succeeded by the anuloma, which means conformity or adaptation. This citta still has the same object as the mano-dvåråvajjana-citta. Anuloma is succeeded by gotrabhú which is sometimes translated as change of lineage. This citta is the last kåmåvacara citta in that process. There is gotrabhú in samatha and in vipassanå. Gotrabhú is the last kåmåvacara citta in a process before a citta of another plane of consciousness arises. The other plane of consciousness may be rúpåvacara, arúpåvacara or lokuttara. In samatha, gotrabhú is the last kåmåvacara citta before the rúpa-jhånacitta or the arúpa-jhånacitta arises. In vipassanå, gotrabhú is the last kåmåvacara citta of the non-ariyan before the lokuttara citta arises and he becomes an ariyan. The object of the gotrabhú arising before the lokuttara cittas is different from the object of gotrabhú in samatha; the gotrabhú preceding the lokuttara cittas experiences nibbåna. It is the first citta in that process which experiences nibbåna, but it is not lokuttara citta. At the moment of gotrabhú the person who is about to attain enlightenment is still a non-ariyan. Gotrabhú does not eradicate defilements. Gotrabhú is succeeded by the magga-citta which eradicates the defilements that are to be eradicated at the stage of the sotåpanna. The magga-citta is the first lokuttara citta in that process of cittas. When it has fallen away it is succeeded by two (or three) phala-cittas (fruition-consciousness) which are the result of the magga-citta and which still have nibbåna as the object. As we have seen, the magga-citta is succeeded immediately by its result, in the same process of citta. The magga-citta cannot produce vipåka in the form of rebirth, such as the kusala citta of the other planes of consciousness. The phala-cittas are succeeded by bhavanga-cittas. Some people do not need the moment of parikamma (preparatory consciousness) and in that case three moments of phala-citta arise instead of two moments. 15615 From: Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 2:40pm Subject: illogical? Hello all, Rob has raised some questions that I can't fully answer without exploring Buddhist logic. Buddhism has some interesting ways of classifying things (e.g., by characteristics, functions, manifestations, and proximate causes) that are very useful, and novel, but I'm not sure its logic makes much sense. Isn't it just borrowed? Rob has referred, in particular, to the Cula-Malunkovada where it's said that 4 (every?) possibilities of a Tathagata after death are wrong: that he exists, doesn't exist, both exists and doesn't exist, neither exists nor doesn't exist. Now I think it's always used this way: as meaning 'every possibility'. And then they are all rejected. Ignoring, for the moment, the special problems about existence (in passing, one needs to be cautious about regarding 'existence' as a predicate: The bird is blue, fast, *exists*.) what does this mean, as a logical structure—in itself? If the above is correct, that it simply means 'every possibility," then: x, not-x, both, neither. As such there's no reason to see it as anything but a 2 valued or bivalent logic with four possibilities. As such nothing remarkable; acceptable to Aristotle. Looking closer things become murky. We seem to have: x, not-x, x & not-x, not(x or not-x). (Or: All S is P, no S is P, S is P & not-P, S is not P nor not-P.) X or not-x is no problem, but what of the other two? The last, not x or not-x, can be seen as saying the predicate doesn't apply; S is neither P nor not-P because P is not applicable to S. Still 2 valued, no problem. But x & not-x appears to be a straightforward contradiction; so nonsense? But perhaps this can be read as: 'Every S is P' and 'No S is P' which are contraries, i.e., they both can't be true, but they can both be false. But now it can't be read as an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities. Let's stop and ask: anyone care to sort this out? Anyone see anything—KEY POINT—that suggests a more than 2 valued (T or F) logic here? (Some non-Aristotelian position on existence that suggests we do or don't and something else?) The thought also occurs that this is a poor adumbration of the square of opposition, and the use of "some" could sort things out. But here's a simpler way to put it: P is (all) x, P is (all) not-x, P is partly x and partly not-x, P is neither x nor not-x. So, for an example, (given rebirth) does my self (P) continue to exist after death (x)? To say yes (P is x) is eternalism, to say no (P is not-x) is annihilationism. Easy ;-) Now the other two. 'Both' would mean partly continues to exist and partly ceases to exist; e.g., that consciousness continues but the body dies. Sounds good (logically that is, not an overt contraction), and is also to be rejected. And the fourth: neither continues to exist (since there's no self to begin with to be reborn) nor ceases to exist (as the self didn't exist in the first place). But this last is confusing. It could also mean continues in some attenuated state between existence and nonexistence (so we're now in a 3 valued logic?). Since individuality continues but not as a self there's continuity, without identity. So we also have the well known neither the same nor different. If this just means 'doesn't apply' it seems relatively straightforward and 2 valued: T or F. But if it means something else is it at odds with Aristotelian logic? Are we into a 3 or 4 valued logic concerning existence? I'm more or less arguing not. (I'm using Aristotle because he's approximately contemporaneous, but also because there are also paraconsistent logics of more than 2 truth values, which I know essentially nothing about, and wonder if they may apply here.) If anyone actually read this far give yourself a chocolate. If anyone can actually reply I may give you one! metta, stephen 15616 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 6:59pm Subject: Re: illogical? --- Dear Stephen, Did the Tathagatha exist before death? Robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello all, > Rob has raised some questions that I can't fully answer without exploring > Buddhist logic. Buddhism has some interesting ways of classifying things > (e.g., by characteristics, functions, manifestations, and proximate causes) > that are very useful, and novel, but I'm not sure its logic makes much sense. > Isn't it just borrowed? > Rob has referred, in particular, to the Cula-Malunkovada where it's said that > 4 (every?) possibilities of a Tathagata after death are wrong: that he > exists, doesn't exist, both exists and doesn't exist, neither exists nor > doesn't exist. Now I think it's always used this way: as meaning 'every > possibility'. And then they are all rejected. Ignoring, for the moment, the > special problems about existence (in passing, one needs to be cautious about > regarding 'existence' as a predicate: The bird is blue, fast, *exists*.) what > does this mean, as a logical structureâ€"in itself? > > If the above is correct, that it simply means 'every possibility," then: x, > not-x, both, neither. As such there's no reason to see it as anything but a 2 > valued or bivalent logic with four possibilities. As such nothing remarkable; > acceptable to Aristotle. > > Looking closer things become murky. We seem to have: x, not-x, x & not-x, > not(x or not-x). (Or: All S is P, no S is P, S is P & not-P, S is not P nor > not-P.) X or not-x is no problem, but what of the other two? The last, not x > or not-x, can be seen as saying the predicate doesn't apply; S is neither P > nor not-P because P is not applicable to S. Still 2 valued, no problem. But x > & not-x appears to be a straightforward contradiction; so nonsense? But > perhaps this can be read as: 'Every S is P' and 'No S is P' which are > contraries, i.e., they both can't be true, but they can both be false. But > now it can't be read as an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities. > > Let's stop and ask: anyone care to sort this out? Anyone see anythingâ€"KEY > POINTâ€"that suggests a more than 2 valued (T or F) logic here? (Some > non-Aristotelian position on existence that suggests we do or don't and > something else?) > > The thought also occurs that this is a poor adumbration of the square of > opposition, and the use of "some" could sort things out. But here's a simpler > way to put it: P is (all) x, P is (all) not-x, P is partly x and partly > not-x, P is neither x nor not-x. So, for an example, (given rebirth) does my > self (P) continue to exist after death (x)? To say yes (P is x) is > eternalism, to say no (P is not-x) is annihilationism. Easy ;-) Now the other > two. 'Both' would mean partly continues to exist and partly ceases to exist; > e.g., that consciousness continues but the body dies. Sounds good (logically > that is, not an overt contraction), and is also to be rejected. And the > fourth: neither continues to exist (since there's no self to begin with to be > reborn) nor ceases to exist (as the self didn't exist in the first place). > But this last is confusing. It could also mean continues in some attenuated > state between existence and nonexistence (so we're now in a 3 valued logic?). > Since individuality continues but not as a self there's continuity, without > identity. > So we also have the well known neither the same nor different. If this just > means 'doesn't apply' it seems relatively straightforward and 2 valued: T or > F. But if it means something else is it at odds with Aristotelian logic? Are > we into a 3 or 4 valued logic concerning existence? I'm more or less arguing > not. (I'm using Aristotle because he's approximately contemporaneous, but > also because there are also paraconsistent logics of more than 2 truth > values, which I know essentially nothing about, and wonder if they may apply > here.) > > If anyone actually read this far give yourself a chocolate. If anyone can > actually reply I may give you one! > > metta, stephen 15617 From: Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 3:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi, Robert (and Stephen) - In a message dated 9/10/02 10:01:04 PM Eastern Daylight Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > Dear Stephen, > Did the Tathagatha exist before death? > Robert > ======================== Answer: No. (Except in a conventional sense.) Now that takes care of the 1st alternative. The third and fourth might be dismissed simply as logical contradictions. However, what is the basis for dismissing the 2nd altrnative: The Tathagata doesn't exist (after death(? At first reading one would take the denial of the 1st alternative to constitute the affirmation of the second. As I see it, the solution must lie in the meaning of the negation operator in combination with the meaning of existence. Perhaps 'to exist' means to exist intrinsically/essentially as a separate self-sufficient entity, and 'to not exist' is not the mere denial of the first, but, rather, means to not exist in any manner whatsoever. That is, the assertion is an extreme, and the denial is an opposite, antipodal extreme. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15618 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 8:08pm Subject: Re: illogical? Hi Stephen, Let me clarify my question a bit: I am intrigued that Malunkyaputta offered four options: - X - NOT X - X AND (NOT X) - NOT (X AND (NOT X)) I am asking if "traditional logic" usually limits itself to the first two options. This is of interest to me because logic in quantum theory makes use of the last two options. I am asking this question because I want to make the point that the Suttas had a wider perspective than "traditional logic". BTW, when asked this question, the Buddha did not say that all four options were wrong. He refused to answer. Thanks, Rob M :-) PS: So, do I get a chocolate? --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > Hello all, > Rob has raised some questions that I can't fully answer without exploring > Buddhist logic. Buddhism has some interesting ways of classifying things > (e.g., by characteristics, functions, manifestations, and proximate causes) > that are very useful, and novel, but I'm not sure its logic makes much sense. > Isn't it just borrowed? > Rob has referred, in particular, to the Cula-Malunkovada where it's said that > 4 (every?) possibilities of a Tathagata after death are wrong: that he > exists, doesn't exist, both exists and doesn't exist, neither exists nor > doesn't exist. Now I think it's always used this way: as meaning 'every > possibility'. And then they are all rejected. Ignoring, for the moment, the > special problems about existence (in passing, one needs to be cautious about > regarding 'existence' as a predicate: The bird is blue, fast, *exists*.) what > does this mean, as a logical structureâ€"in itself? > > If the above is correct, that it simply means 'every possibility," then: x, > not-x, both, neither. As such there's no reason to see it as anything but a 2 > valued or bivalent logic with four possibilities. As such nothing remarkable; > acceptable to Aristotle. > > Looking closer things become murky. We seem to have: x, not-x, x & not-x, > not(x or not-x). (Or: All S is P, no S is P, S is P & not-P, S is not P nor > not-P.) X or not-x is no problem, but what of the other two? The last, not x > or not-x, can be seen as saying the predicate doesn't apply; S is neither P > nor not-P because P is not applicable to S. Still 2 valued, no problem. But x > & not-x appears to be a straightforward contradiction; so nonsense? But > perhaps this can be read as: 'Every S is P' and 'No S is P' which are > contraries, i.e., they both can't be true, but they can both be false. But > now it can't be read as an exhaustive enumeration of possibilities. > > Let's stop and ask: anyone care to sort this out? Anyone see anythingâ€"KEY > POINTâ€"that suggests a more than 2 valued (T or F) logic here? (Some > non-Aristotelian position on existence that suggests we do or don't and > something else?) > > The thought also occurs that this is a poor adumbration of the square of > opposition, and the use of "some" could sort things out. But here's a simpler > way to put it: P is (all) x, P is (all) not-x, P is partly x and partly > not-x, P is neither x nor not-x. So, for an example, (given rebirth) does my > self (P) continue to exist after death (x)? To say yes (P is x) is > eternalism, to say no (P is not-x) is annihilationism. Easy ;-) Now the other > two. 'Both' would mean partly continues to exist and partly ceases to exist; > e.g., that consciousness continues but the body dies. Sounds good (logically > that is, not an overt contraction), and is also to be rejected. And the > fourth: neither continues to exist (since there's no self to begin with to be > reborn) nor ceases to exist (as the self didn't exist in the first place). > But this last is confusing. It could also mean continues in some attenuated > state between existence and nonexistence (so we're now in a 3 valued logic?). > Since individuality continues but not as a self there's continuity, without > identity. > So we also have the well known neither the same nor different. If this just > means 'doesn't apply' it seems relatively straightforward and 2 valued: T or > F. But if it means something else is it at odds with Aristotelian logic? Are > we into a 3 or 4 valued logic concerning existence? I'm more or less arguing > not. (I'm using Aristotle because he's approximately contemporaneous, but > also because there are also paraconsistent logics of more than 2 truth > values, which I know essentially nothing about, and wonder if they may apply > here.) > > If anyone actually read this far give yourself a chocolate. If anyone can > actually reply I may give you one! > > metta, stephen 15619 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 8:22pm Subject: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi Howard, In fact, the logic of quantum theory includes the last two options (both exists and not exists, neither exists nor not-exists). Let's not get caught up in the logic of quantum theory at the moment. My paper will explain this in more detail. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert (and Stephen) - > > In a message dated 9/10/02 10:01:04 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > Dear Stephen, > > Did the Tathagatha exist before death? > > Robert > > > ======================== > Answer: No. (Except in a conventional sense.) > Now that takes care of the 1st alternative. The third and fourth might > be dismissed simply as logical contradictions. However, what is the basis for > dismissing the 2nd altrnative: The Tathagata doesn't exist (after death(? At > first reading one would take the denial of the 1st alternative to constitute > the affirmation of the second. As I see it, the solution must lie in the > meaning of the negation operator in combination with the meaning of > existence. Perhaps 'to exist' means to exist intrinsically/essentially as a > separate self-sufficient entity, and 'to not exist' is not the mere denial of > the first, but, rather, means to not exist in any manner whatsoever. That is, > the assertion is an extreme, and the denial is an opposite, antipodal > extreme. > > With metta, > Howard 15620 From: Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 4:51pm Subject: Re: illogical? Hello Robert and Rob and Howard, The question, to me, wasn't about the Tathagata existing before death or after, but the logic of the 4 positions in themselves and what they mean; in abstraction from any content. With validity but not with truth. (I have no problems with Howard's reply; perhaps they can only be explicated as existential operations, and then not simply on the basis of for 'every' or 'some' x...) As Rob wrote, >Let me clarify my question a bit: >I am intrigued that Malunkyaputta offered four options: >- X >- NOT X >- X AND (NOT X) >- NOT (X AND (NOT X)) >I am asking if "traditional logic" usually limits itself to the >first two options. >This is of interest to me because logic in quantum theory makes use >of the last two options. Yes, I understand that. But is that true, and what is one to make of those last two options, especially the second which appears to be an outright contradiction. (Care to construct a truth table for the last two Howard? Somehow that seems to be missing the point?) Thus my convoluted post (which was partly to try and sort some of this out myself). >PS: So, do I get a chocolate? No, because you're the one who got me into this messy question ;-) But I'll give you this: Despite my earlier statement on existence having no graduations however quantum phenomena exist it ain't like *anything* in the world we live in. metta, stephen 15621 From: robmoult Date: Tue Sep 10, 2002 10:02pm Subject: Re: illogical? Hi Stephen, --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., oreznoone@a... wrote: > >PS: So, do I get a chocolate? > No, because you're the one who got me into this messy question ;-) > But I'll give you this: Despite my earlier statement on existence having no > graduations however quantum phenomena exist it ain't like *anything* in the > world we live in. Sorry, Stephen. Experiments have shown that quantum theory is a more accurate model of the world that we live in as compared to the model that 99.99% of the population perceive :-) If it makes you feel any better, Einstein objected to the probability elements of quantum theory as well; he said, "God does not play dice!" After reading the messages from Howard and yourself, I have come to the conclusion that the last two options have no place in "conventional" logic. This is what I suspected. Thanks, Rob M :-) 15622 From: abbott_hk Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 1:26am Subject: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Dear Christine, I've certainly given others plenty of time to add comments and I said I'd be slow on this;-) I appreciated the info you supplied (although I had thought you'd be supplying links for BOTH sides of the discussion - probably why I've delayed....hmmm;-)) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Sarah, and All, > > I am still reading around the first point of whether it is possible > to decide what are 'lesser and minor rules' ..... seems to me that if > the Arahats were not prepared to make a decision regarding this, that > the modern Sangha will not be prepared to either. (though "not > acting" IS a decision.) ..... I agree that "not acting" IS a decision and I think we've discussed the reasons for this. ..... > http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha184.htm > The second point of Prof. G. P. M. Malalasekara, for consideration > when assessing the possibility of restoring the order of Buddhist > nuns is: > > "Second, it is possible to make use of an injunction issued by the > Buddha that stipulates, "I permit you monks, to confer full > ordination on nuns."[25] There are references in the texts that show > that some regulations were amended, altered, or abrogated by the > Buddha himself on various occasions under special circumstances. The > absence of Bhikkhuniis in Theravaada clearly being a special > circumstance, these textual references should be sufficient cause for > granting monks the authority to ordain nuns with a clear conscience > that no transgression of the Vinaya rules has been committed. Those > who oppose the restoration of the Bhikkhunii Sa"ngha on the grounds > of Vinaya technicalities seem to ignore this relevant injunction." > > > It seems from my reading that, in the past, in the time of the > Buddha, there were eight methods of conferring higher ordination. In > the course of time, the eighth came to be regarded as the one and > only procedure for admitting a novice to Higher Ordination. What > would stand in the way of re-visiting each of these methods(apart > from the first)? And, in particular, the one quoted above? ...... I've put the 8 methods at the end of the post. Interesting, thank you. I'm having some trouble following the logic here, Chris. It's true that the rules were continually amended, altered and added to by the Buddha himself and we read the contexts and reasons for this. Infringements would lead to new rules and so on. Of course in the Buddha's case, this was always done with his omniscience and knowledge about what was necessary for the preservation and harmony of the Sangha and the endurance of the Teachings. I referred in the `courage' post to the previous 24 Buddha eras which the present Buddha could recall.He knew directly about the bhikkhuni orders and the impact on the preservation of the Dhamma in a way that even wise followers like Ananda could not comprehend. If the great arahats at the Ist Council did not feel qualified to make amendments, how would `we' be qualified to do so? As I remember, the 2nd Council (about 100yrs after the Buddha's parinibbana) was held because of a dispute over 10 minor rules which became a serious controversy. A very large number of monks, the Vajjians, refused to accept the Council's decisions and the schism almost `finished' the tradition of the Vinaya as left by the Buddha. We know that in other traditions there have been many changes to all parts of the Tipitaka and the strict adherence by the monks at all the Councils to the vinaya may seem extreme to us, but I think it is largely thanks to the Elder Yasa and the 700 monks who stood firm at this 2nd Council in not accepting amendments, that the entire Tipitaka, including the Vinaya has been preserved so very intact as it is `til today. I also question whether we really are only talking about "Vinaya technicalities" as Prof Malalasekera suggests. I'm sure the monks who raised the `ten points' would have also considered these as mere `technicalities' and in our ignorance, rules about not eating after midday and not using money may seem so, but I believe they were all made for very good reasons. Probably, if one cares to study the history, one will find that the Vajjians also thought there were `special circumstances' to make amendments with `clear conscience'. What do you think? Perhaps Betty or Azita or Deb may have comments too. Sarah ====== > http://www.thanhsiang.org/paper2/dip2-9.html > > "As recorded in the Bhikkhuni Khandhaka of the Cullavagga Pali, > Mahapajapati Gotami was conferred both Ordination and the Higher > Ordination by her mere acceptance of eight strict conditions (Attha > Garudhamma). Again with reference to Addhakasi, a former courtesan, > the Buddha even empowered the monks to confer Higher Ordination > through an emissary. Before the decentralisation of powers pertaining > to disciplinary matters there was an intermediate phase in the > monastic order of nuns where nuns were admitted to Higher Ordination > following the formal act of procedure by nuns as well as by monks. As > the motion and the announcement are pronounced eight times before > both communities, this particular method is called Atthavacika. > > ................. there were eight methods of conferring Higher > Ordination during the time of the Buddha: > > 1 . Ehi bhikkhu (Come, 0 Monk) > > 2 . Saranagamana (Taking refuge in the triple gem) > > 3 . Ovadapatiggahana (Acceptance of advice) > > 4. Panhabyakarana (Answering questions) > > 5. Atthagarudhamma (Acceptance of eight strict rules) > > 6 . Duta (Through an emissary) > > 7. Atthavacika (By the pronouncement of eight times) > > 8. Natticatuttha kamma (By three announcements)" 15623 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 1:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana Hi Larry, I think your discussion with Kom about concepts and realities is very helpful for everyone and really touches on the essentail aspects of satipatthana and meditation. If there isn’t an appreciation of what exactly paramattha dhammas are and the distinction between these and sammuti sacca (wordly truth), then there cannot be any development of satipatthana. You said: “I believe our question is why are concepts not realities. I thought about this for about two hours and could neither answer it nor disprove it. I found faults with reasons on both sides of the question. Ultimately I think my problem is in not understanding either. So.... I give up.” Don’t give up! I think you’re beginning to raise important questions for everyone to consider. I have little to add to Kom’s clear comments. Concepts can only be experienced by thinking (not necessarily in words as discussed). As they don’t *exist*, they don’t have characteristics to be known by sati and panna. Hardness can be known, but not a table. We can think about scientific theories and proofs or philosophies, we can think about the good deeds we’ll do tomorrow, we can think about hardness even. It may be conventionally wise or even wise-in-a-kusala sense of wise thinking, but it’s still only thinking about concepts. A moment of awareness of thinking at these times as just a nama experiencing its object, is far more precious. Only moments of direct awareness of paramatha dhammas (realities) takes us closer to the end of samsara. I hope you continue the discussion with Kom and remember that ideas about ‘giving up’ are just more moments of thinking about concepts too. I also recommend this small booklet by A.Sujin “Realities and Concepts” http://www.abhidhamma.org/sujin3.htm Sarah ====== 15624 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 2:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] Episode III: Samma this, samma that; miccha this, miccha that Hi Dan, Great to read these ‘episodes’...look forward to any more. --- onco111 wrote: > Episode III: Samma this, samma that; miccha this, miccha that > > Dan [full version of the Dhs. quote not given in the conversation]: > In Dhammasangani, I read that "right effort" is "...mental endeavor, > riddance of lethargy, exerting harder and harder, endeavoring higher > and higher, having sustained desire to strive, not relinquishing the > task, discharging the task well, endeavor as the faculty of endeavor, > power of endeavor, right effort." By contrast, I read that "wrong > effort" is "...mental endeavor, riddance olathargy, exerting harder > and harder, endeavoring higher and higher, having sustained desire to > strive, not relinquishing the task, discharging the task well, > endeavor as the faculty of endeavor, power of endeavor, wrong > effort." > > KS [without even hearing the question first]: Effort is effort. > Whether it is wrong effort or right effort depends on the other > cetasikas. > > [And Dan delighted in the words.] ..... Great quote and comment. Reminds me also of similar ones for chanda (zeal), samadhi (concentration) and other factors which can be wholesome or unwholesome. I also like your story and reminders at the end of the post (and KS's response;-)). I particularly liked this quote from it: >“Even the miccha-est of miccha > samadhi can feel very calm and clean and pure. The fruits of > concentration are alluring, and attachment to miccha samadhi grows > and grows.” .... I think you will appreciate some of the quotes I put in this post on similar themes if you didn’t read it before: Right and Wrong Path and Jhana factors http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/m11231.html Thanks so much for reporting back to us and I hope Lisa found it rewarding or at least ‘food for some wise thought’ as well. Sarah ===== > [I brought up an interview I heard on the radio. A man was given a > shotgun as a gift after never having owned any gun before. He'd > always thought it strange that people hunted and enjoyed killing > animals. But then, he practiced with his gun and learned. He talked > of how calm and focussed the mind had to be and how sharp the > concentration, in order to properly aim the gun at an animal, pull > the trigger, and hit the target. Even the miccha-est of miccha > samadhi can feel very calm and clean and pure. The fruits of > concentration are alluring, and attachment to miccha samadhi grows > and grows. KS seemed to have little comment on my stories. I'm glad -- > a reminder to me that I came to hear her, not to talk her ear off. > Better to turn on her voice again with questions about Dhamma.] 15625 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 3:32am Subject: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Dear Sarah, Your willingness to continue with this topic when you support the current Theravada position that restoration of a Bhikkhuni Sangha is impossible, is really appreciated. Thank you for persevering with this, but I feel the subject has been in abeyance too long to pick up again (672 posts ago) - I think the lack of response is probably a sign that the members aren't particularly interested in discussing the topic, or feel it is too contentious. As for myself, I don't know enough to maintain a worthwhile discussion and would rather reflect on other areas; I am not looking to debate the issue. As one of my original posts said "I have no particular barrow to push on this issue other than that I have never seen it explained comprehensively in such a way as to give understanding to those, like me, genuinely wondering" .....[how the present position came to be]. Hearing why the six points raised by Prof. G. P. Malalasekara are invalid and when, and whether, the eight methods of ordination previously used were specifically changed by the Buddha or just fell into disuse would have been valuable - but I don't have the contacts, time or the capacity to research the area. For anyone interested, the six points are at: http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha184.htm and the eight methods are at: http://www.thanhsiang.org/paper2/dip2-9.html Previous discussion can be traced from message http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/14735 Thanks again, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "abbott_hk" wrote: > Dear Christine, > > I've certainly given others plenty of time to add comments and I > said I'd be slow on this;-) 15626 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Episode III: Samma this, samma that; miccha this, miccha that Dear Dan , I liked your example about the shooter. I used to go hunting and it certainly took real concentration and calm (in the akusala way)to be proficient at it. I was also an amateur boxer (briefly) and the week or so before the fight was a very focused time - I think something that many boxers find compelling and even slightly addictive. Robert Dan:I brought up an interview I heard on the radio. A man was given a > > shotgun as a gift after never having owned any gun before. He'd > > always thought it strange that people hunted and enjoyed killing > > animals. But then, he practiced with his gun and learned. He talked > > of how calm and focussed the mind had to be and how sharp the > > concentration, in order to properly aim the gun at an animal, pull > > the trigger, and hit the target. Even the miccha-est of miccha > > samadhi can feel very calm and clean and pure. The fruits of > > concentration are alluring, and attachment to miccha samadhi grows > > and grows. KS seemed to have little comment on my stories. I'm glad -- > > a reminder to me that I came to hear her, not to talk her ear off. > > Better to turn on her voice again with questions about Dhamma.] > > > 15627 From: Egberdina Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:07am Subject: Re: Fwd: Would learning Pali really help? Hi there, Christine, I did a lot of cutting to arrive here. Some comments follow below what is left. > A little, true story. I am greatly indebted to my father. At age 50, > he discarded his entire theology/philosophy library. (He also was a > minister of religion). Imagine the four walls of a roomy study, lined > with shelves from the floor to the ceiling, not a vacant square > centimetre, all the shelves jam-packed with hefty tomes on you-name- > it, anything to do with spiritual quests. > > What happened? > > A small germ had taken root. God is not found in books. > > He quit the church, and his garden did better out of it, too. > ------------------------------- > Chris: Thanks for sharing about your father Herman - I too lived for > many years with a devotion to God. I know what it is to be seduced > by the rapture of mystical experience - better by far to know what > is Real. > I don't live in a 'nice' cocoon of how I imagine the world to be. > There is no control, no safety, no protection for this bag of > khandas.. I am immersed everyday in the depths of the misery humans > are capable of inflicting on themselves and others - and deal > constantly with beings blindly under the sway of their defilements - > learning a little about the great breadth and depth of my own as > well. Not through books or the TV news, but through the ever > changing good and evil I witness in myself and in my daily work. > The Dhamma-Vinaya is used as a tool, a roadmap, a way of heading for > home out of the suffering and chaos of life. Not as a substitute for > experience. I cannot make a judgement as to whether or not learning Pali would help you on your way out of suffering. I know one thing, which is what my initial reply was intended to convey. Whatever tools, roadmaps, practises, we employ, if they become things in themselves, for themselves, objects of clinging, then they will not help us, but hinder us. If we are not prepared to dispense with our various rafts when they are not serving a liberating purpose anymore, they have become millstones around our neck. All the Best Herman 15628 From: Egberdina Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:37am Subject: Re: illogical? Hi all, I would really like a chocolate. So I wish to add the following. The formulation - NOT (X AND (NOT X)) includes the negation of a negation (double negation). This is meaningless in some systems of logic. "Is the negation of the negation of A equivalent to A? That depends on what denial is, and hence what negative particles mean. In logic the classical answer is 'yes', and accordingly operations of eliminating and introducing double negatives are permitted. Intuitionist logic disallows the elimination." http://www.xrefer.com/entry/552921 I don't think I have not earned my chocolate :-) All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robmoult" wrote: > Hi Stephen, > > Let me clarify my question a bit: > > I am intrigued that Malunkyaputta offered four options: > - X > - NOT X > - X AND (NOT X) > - NOT (X AND (NOT X)) > > I am asking if "traditional logic" usually limits itself to the > first two options. > > This is of interest to me because logic in quantum theory makes use > of the last two options. > > I am asking this question because I want to make the point that the > Suttas had a wider perspective than "traditional logic". > > BTW, when asked this question, the Buddha did not say that all four > options were wrong. He refused to answer. > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > PS: So, do I get a chocolate? > > 15629 From: Egberdina Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:51am Subject: Negation in Pali /Abhidhamma Hi all, I would be interested to learn from those in the know how negation is obtained in Pali. In English we might prefix a word with a- or just use the word not. Is negation used at all in the Abhidhamma? What sort of mind object is a negated object? How is it classified, if at all? Would the construct "not nibbana" have any meaning at all? All the best Herman 15630 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 1:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi, Larry - In a message dated 9/10/02 12:57:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > Hi Kom, > > I'm afraid I still don't understand how concepts don't have > characteristics. How do we tell them apart if they don't have > characteristics? I believe concepts are defined as name and meaning. > Aren't name and meaning characteristics? > > Also, I'm not real sure what is attachment. > > Larry > > ============================ I'm not sure about Kom on this issue, but some folks here seem to use the word 'concept' not as a kind of thought, but rather as the (alleged) referent of a such a thought. I understand a concept to be a thought that is constructed from a number of (interrelated!) fundamental, direct elements of experience. There is nothing "behind" a concept except those elements from which it was constructed and the relations among them. The thought has characteristics (as a thought), but there is no single thing "behind" it to have characteristics. Now, a concept (for example, the concept of the boat 'Anicca' I had discussed, but you haven't commented on! ;-) is used as a template to overlay certain experiences which are then grasped as constituting a single, actually existing "thing" such as "the keyboard I'm typing on". Now, "the keyboard I'm typing on" does, in my estimation, have conventional existence - the "conventional" part being due to its dependence (as an apparent self-existing object) on the overlaying concept of 'keyboard' (whether named or not). The reality is that a multitude of direct experiences are currently compounded by the mind into a multlayered construct which sufficiently matches our general 'keyboard' template for us to "experience a keyboard". Now, that seemingly real object which is "the keyboard I'm typing on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does not truly have any characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: (groups of) the direct experiences which the mind compounds into this percept are viewed as its characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to say that both the general concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that which is the mind-constructed percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now both fall under the range of the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the former "concept" and the latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on DSG seem to *also* call the (only conventionally existing) intended *referents* of these by the name "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that creates confusion for those of us who do not use language that way. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15631 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 1:46am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi, Stephen (and all) - In a message dated 9/10/02 11:52:17 PM Eastern Daylight Time, oreznoone@a... writes: > > >- X > > >- NOT X > > >- X AND (NOT X) > > >- NOT (X AND (NOT X)) > ========================= Shouldn't the last of these be NOT (X OR (NOT X))? [In fact, the propositional formula NOT (X AND (NOT X)) is *true* - it is a tautology!! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15632 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 7:31am Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Dear Howard, > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > I'm not sure about Kom on this issue, but > some folks here seem to use > the word 'concept' not as a kind of thought, but > rather as the (alleged) > referent of a such a thought. I understand a > concept to be a thought that is > constructed from a number of (interrelated!) > fundamental, direct elements of > experience. There is nothing "behind" a concept > except those elements from > which it was constructed and the relations among > them. The thought has > characteristics (as a thought), but there is no > single thing "behind" it to > have characteristics. Now, a concept (for > example, the concept of the boat > 'Anicca' I had discussed, but you haven't > commented on! ;-) is used as a > template to overlay certain experiences which are > then grasped as > constituting a single, actually existing "thing" > such as "the keyboard I'm > typing on". Now, "the keyboard I'm typing on" > does, in my estimation, have > conventional existence - the "conventional" part > being due to its dependence > (as an apparent self-existing object) on the > overlaying concept of 'keyboard' > (whether named or not). The reality is that a > multitude of direct experiences > are currently compounded by the mind into a > multlayered construct which > sufficiently matches our general 'keyboard' > template for us to "experience a > keyboard". Now, that seemingly real object which > is "the keyboard I'm typing > on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does > not truly have any > characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: > (groups of) the direct > experiences which the mind compounds into this > percept are viewed as its > characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to > say that both the general > concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that > which is the mind-constructed > percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now > both fall under the range of > the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the > former "concept" and the > latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on > DSG seem to *also* call the > (only conventionally existing) intended > *referents* of these by the name > "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that > creates confusion for those of > us who do not use language that way. > > With metta, > Howard > Thanks for your clear explanation of realities and concepts. I have a few comments: 1) I believe the pali differentiates all what the mind cognizes into paramatha dhamma and pannatti (also sometimes called dhamma). Whatever is not paramatha is pannatti. The usage of pannatti or concept to describe concept, percept, its referrent, naming, etc. is just a one-to-one mapping from Pali usage. Although you may be right that it's confusing to some to use the word concept to describe all that is not paramatha, I think it is better for people who are not familiar with Pali. Also, we refer quite a bit to existing literature that uses the word concept in this manner. 2) All pannatti, when cognized by the mind---regardless of whether or not it is concept, percept, referent, naming---has no characteristics. The elements that we combine into (some) pannatti do, but pannatti doesn't. When the seeing consciousness sees a visible object, the visible object has the characteristics of impacting the eye, or appearance of visible object, or brightness, etc. The mind immediately afterward cognizes pannatti (based on repeated cognition of the visible object which has characteristics) which are shapes, forms, distinction of colors, meaning, names, and maybe stories: these don't have characteristics. 3) When we talk about all the vipassana nana (the clear comprehension of realities as they are), we see that they are all clear comprehension of things that exist in the paramatha sense, and not the pannatti sense. The Buddha encourages us to see the rising and falling away, the impermanence of all things: this happens (directly, instead of thinking about it) only with objects with paramatha characteristics. The pannatti, due to its absence of characteristics, cannot be a direct object of the ti-lakkhana: what rises and falls away if it doesn't have characteristics at the first place? kom 15633 From: robmoult Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 8:11am Subject: Re: Negation in Pali /Abhidhamma Hi Herman, As far as I know, in Pali one negates a word by adding an 'a': - Opposite of lobha is alobha - Opposite of dosa is adosa - Opposite of moha is amoha There are some gramatically rules to handle words starting with vowels, but I am not sure how they work. Nibanna is usually described using negatives (not conditioned, etc.) so negating one of these descriptive terms would be a double negative (which I think is a no-no). Does this answer your question? There are many other DSGrs with much better knowledge of Pali than I, so if you need more detail, I will probably not be able to help. Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Egberdina" wrote: > Hi all, > > I would be interested to learn from those in the know how negation is > obtained in Pali. In English we might prefix a word with a- or just > use the word not. > > Is negation used at all in the Abhidhamma? What sort of mind object > is a negated object? How is it classified, if at all? > > Would the construct "not nibbana" have any meaning at all? > > All the best > > Herman 15634 From: robmoult Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 8:20am Subject: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi Howard, Yes you are correct - unfortunately Herman wins the chocolate as he identified the same mistake three posts earlier :-) To stop this discussion from degenerating into a debate on logic (perhaps not appropriate for a Dhamma Study Group), let me quote the relevant Sutta: In the Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta, Malunkyaputta asked the Buddha to clarify if: 'After death a Tathagata exists', 'After death a Tathagata does not exist', 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist'. (This is the famous poison arrow sutta). Thanks, Rob M :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Stephen (and all) - > > In a message dated 9/10/02 11:52:17 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > oreznoone@a... writes: > > > > > > >- X > > > > >- NOT X > > > > >- X AND (NOT X) > > > > >- NOT (X AND (NOT X)) > > > ========================= > Shouldn't the last of these be NOT (X OR (NOT X))? [In fact, the > propositional formula NOT (X AND (NOT X)) is *true* - it is a tautology!! > > With metta, > Howard 15635 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 10:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] philosophy Hello Stephen, thank you for your nice post. You are most welcome to discuss Abhidhamma, and if you have disagreements as you say, it is good to hear different points. Best wishes from Nina. op 10-09-2002 06:02 schreef oreznoone@a... op oreznoone@a...: > Thanks for the post. Perhaps your sister can come over and explain quantum > physics to me! > I have numerous disagreements with the abhidhammic approach, some of which > are over rather basic premises. I hope you will be game to discuss some of > them with me as they crop up. I read your book ADL (among others) a few > summers back and found it a model of clarity. Despite our differences I > certainly have no hostility to the abhidhamma, finding in it a helpful > spiritual psychology. 15636 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 10:01am Subject: Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no 7 Perfections, Ch 5, Wisdom, no 7. As we read in the Commentary, paññå knows the characeristics of the dhammas that are low or exalted, dark or pure. We read further on: Again, the development of paññå with the aim to realize the four noble Truths is walking a very long way, namely traversing the cycle of birth and death. If paññå arises we can understand that the cycle of birth and death we have traversed thus far is extremely long. So long as paññå has not become accomplished, the path leading to the end of the cycle is still extremely long. Thus, as we read, for the development of paññå we have an extremely long way to go. We have to go to the further shore, into the direction of nibbåna, where, according to the Commentary, ³we never went yet, not even in our dreams². We need all ten perfections, because we have such an amount of defilements. It is not sufficient to only develop the perfection of paññå. If we do not understand what the perfections are and in what way we should develop them in our daily life, we cannot realize the four noble Truths, but we have merely vain expectations of achieving this. We do not know ourselves as we truly are and we do not understand that we need the perfections which are a supporting condition for the development of kusala and for the elimination of akusala dhammas. When we have understood that satipatthåna should be developed together with the perfections, there are conditions for the perfection of generosity, the giving away of things for the benefit of someone else, for the perfection of síla, the abstention from akusala kamma and the perfection of renunciation: detachment from visible object, sound and the other sense objects. This is a very gradual process, but at times someone may notice that he is inclined to become more detached from sense objects, that he has had already enough of them, and that he should not indulge in them too much. With regard to the perfection of paññå, most people are longing for paññå, but the perfection of paññå, that is, paññå that understands the characteristics of realities, cannot arise if one does not develop it. Generally people wish to know the truth of realities, but they should carefully investigate whether, at the moment of seeing, of the experience of the other sense objects or of thinking, they have the sincere desire (chanda) to know and to understand the characteristics of the realities that are appearing at those very moments. When someone really sees the benefit of paññå he needs to have energy and endurance, because the development of paññå is a difficult task which takes an endlessly long time. Understanding of the level of listening is only a foundation, it is not the perfection of paññå that is the condition for the realization of the four noble Truths. The perfection of paññå evolves with the development of the understanding of the characteristics of realities that are appearing. This includes the development of understanding of the level of listening, of considering realities, and also of the level of awareness of realities at this moment. 15637 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 3:49pm Subject: ADL ch. 24 (3) http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Abhidhamma In Daily Life Chapter 24 (3) Summarizing the cittas in the process during which enlightenment is attained, they are the following: mano-dvåråvajjana-citta parikamma (preparatory consciousness; for some people not necessary) upacåra (proximity consciousness) anuloma (conformity or adaptation) gotrabhú (change of lineage) magga-citta phala-citta (two or three moments, depending on the individual) Nibbåna can be the object of kåmåvacara cittas which arise after the lokuttara cittas have fallen away. Before someone becomes an ariyan there can only be speculation about nibbåna. For the ariyan, however, it is different. Since he has directly experienced nibbåna, he can review his experience afterwards. We read in the Visuddhimagga (XXII, 19) that the person who attained enlightenment reviews, after the lokuttara cittas have fallen away, the path, the fruition, the defilements which have been abandoned, the defilements which are still remaining and nibbåna. He reviews these things in different mind-door processes of citta. Some people think that enlightenment could not occur in daily life, they believe that it is necessary to be in a solitary place in order to attain nibbåna. The development of vipassanå is the development of right understanding of all realities occurring in daily life. When paññå has been developed to the degree that enlightenment can be attained, enlightenment can occur in the middle of one's daily activities. As we have seen, the attainment of enlightenment is only a few moments of citta which arise and fall away within split seconds. We read in the Discourse to Díghanakha (Middle Length Sayings II, no. 74) that the Buddha taught Dhamma to the wanderer Díghanaka on Vulture's Peak near Råjagaha. He taught him about the getting rid of wrong views and about the impermanence of conditioned realities. Såriputta, who was an ariyan but had not yet attained arahatship, was also present at the time of that discourse. We read: Now at that time the venerable Såriputta was standing behind the Lord, fanning the Lord. Then it occurred to the venerable Såriputta: ``The Lord speaks to us of getting rid of these things and those by means of super-knowledge, the Well-farer speaks to us of casting out these things and those by means of superknowledge´´. While the venerable Såriputta was reflecting on this, his mind was freed from the cankers without clinging. But to the wanderer Díghanakha there arose the stainless, spotless vision of dhamma, that whatever is of the nature to arise all that is of the nature to stop... Såriputta attained arahatship, but he did not go into solitude in order to attain it; he was fanning the Buddha. Díghanakha listened to the Buddha and then became a sotåpanna. We read in the Kindred Sayings (III, Khandhå-vagga, Middle Fifty, chapter 4, §89, Khema) that Khemaka, who was an anågåmí, attained arahatship while he was preaching and monks who were listening attained arahatship as well. We read: Now when this teaching was thus expounded the hearts of as many as sixty monks were utterly set free from the åsavas, and so was it also with the heart of the venerable Khemaka... If one is on the right Path, paññå can be developed, no matter what the circumstances are, even to the degree of enlightenment. People may wonder whether it would be possible to notice it when a person attains nibbåna. But can one see whether someone else is mindful or not mindful? Who knows the cittas of other people? We cannot know when someone else is mindful of nåma and rúpa or when he attains nibbåna. The question may arise whether all four stages of enlightenment (the stages of the sotåpanna, the sakadågåmí, the anågåmí and the arahat) can be attained in the course of one life. We read in the suttas about disciples of the Buddha who attained the ariyan state but not yet arahatship and realized arahatship later on in life. Ånanda, for example, did not attain arahatship during the Buddha's life, but he became an arahat after the Buddha had passed away, the evening before the first great council was to start (the ``Illustrator of Ultimate meaning´´, commentary to the ``Mangala-sutta´´ or ``Good Omen Discourse´´, Minor Readings, Khuddaka Nikåya). 15638 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 3:25pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi, Kom - I understand what you write below, and I agree with much of it. However, as I see it, thoughts, whether simple or mentally constructed from simpler ones, are mind-objects, and they have characteristics. A memory, for example, of a picture has visual characteristics; some thoughts are clear, some are fuzzy; a tune that "keeps going through ones head" is an auditory thought; the concept of a musical note is elementary; a concept of a symphony is compound; the concept of 'hardness' is "paramatthic" (to coin an adjective! ;-)) In any case, thoughts - and concepts are thoughts - have characteristics. Thoughts are just as much experienced as hardness is and as itches are. Thoughts are not imagined. What they represent very often are, but *they* are not. However, what is not imagined does not, perforce, have inherent existence. All dhammas are without core, being dependent on many conditions for their existence. With metta, Howard In a message dated 9/11/02 10:32:40 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kom@a... writes: > > Dear Howard, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > > I'm not sure about Kom on this issue, but > > some folks here seem to use > > the word 'concept' not as a kind of thought, but > > rather as the (alleged) > > referent of a such a thought. I understand a > > concept to be a thought that is > > constructed from a number of (interrelated!) > > fundamental, direct elements of > > experience. There is nothing "behind" a concept > > except those elements from > > which it was constructed and the relations among > > them. The thought has > > characteristics (as a thought), but there is no > > single thing "behind" it to > > have characteristics. Now, a concept (for > > example, the concept of the boat > > 'Anicca' I had discussed, but you haven't > > commented on! ;-) is used as a > > template to overlay certain experiences which are > > then grasped as > > constituting a single, actually existing "thing" > > such as "the keyboard I'm > > typing on". Now, "the keyboard I'm typing on" > > does, in my estimation, have > > conventional existence - the "conventional" part > > being due to its dependence > > (as an apparent self-existing object) on the > > overlaying concept of 'keyboard' > > (whether named or not). The reality is that a > > multitude of direct experiences > > are currently compounded by the mind into a > > multlayered construct which > > sufficiently matches our general 'keyboard' > > template for us to "experience a > > keyboard". Now, that seemingly real object which > > is "the keyboard I'm typing > > on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does > > not truly have any > > characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: > > (groups of) the direct > > experiences which the mind compounds into this > > percept are viewed as its > > characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to > > say that both the general > > concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that > > which is the mind-constructed > > percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now > > both fall under the range of > > the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the > > former "concept" and the > > latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on > > DSG seem to *also* call the > > (only conventionally existing) intended > > *referents* of these by the name > > "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that > > creates confusion for those of > > us who do not use language that way. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > Thanks for your clear explanation of realities and concepts. > I have a few comments: > > 1) I believe the pali differentiates all what the mind > cognizes into paramatha dhamma and pannatti (also sometimes > called dhamma). Whatever is not paramatha is pannatti. The > usage of pannatti or concept to describe concept, percept, > its referrent, naming, etc. is just a one-to-one mapping > from Pali usage. Although you may be right that it's > confusing to some to use the word concept to describe all > that is not paramatha, I think it is better for people who > are not familiar with Pali. Also, we refer quite a bit to > existing literature that uses the word concept in this > manner. > > 2) All pannatti, when cognized by the mind---regardless of > whether or not it is concept, percept, referent, > naming---has no characteristics. The elements that we > combine into (some) pannatti do, but pannatti doesn't. When > the seeing consciousness sees a visible object, the visible > object has the characteristics of impacting the eye, or > appearance of visible object, or brightness, etc. The mind > immediately afterward cognizes pannatti (based on repeated > cognition of the visible object which has characteristics) > which are shapes, forms, distinction of colors, meaning, > names, and maybe stories: these don't have characteristics. > > 3) When we talk about all the vipassana nana (the clear > comprehension of realities as they are), we see that they > are all clear comprehension of things that exist in the > paramatha sense, and not the pannatti sense. The Buddha > encourages us to see the rising and falling away, the > impermanence of all things: this happens (directly, instead > of thinking about it) only with objects with paramatha > characteristics. The pannatti, due to its absence of > characteristics, cannot be a direct object of the > ti-lakkhana: what rises and falls away if it doesn't have > characteristics at the first place? > > kom > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15639 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 3:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: illogical? Hi, Rob - In a message dated 9/11/02 11:21:24 AM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > Yes you are correct - unfortunately Herman wins the chocolate as he > identified the same mistake three posts earlier :-) > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: I missed that. Good! I'm getting too fat anyway!! --------------------------------------------------- > > To stop this discussion from degenerating into a debate on logic > (perhaps not appropriate for a Dhamma Study Group), let me quote the > relevant Sutta: > > In the Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta, Malunkyaputta asked the Buddha to > clarify if: 'After death a Tathagata exists', 'After death a > Tathagata does not exist', 'After death a Tathagata both exists & > does not exist' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does > not exist'. (This is the famous poison arrow sutta). > > Thanks, > Rob M :-) > > ================================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15640 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:26pm Subject: Re: illogical? Howard, Herman, Rob Howard: >Shouldn't the last of these be NOT (X OR (NOT X))? [In fact, the >propositional formula NOT (X AND (NOT X)) is *true* - it is a tautology!! Oops. That's what I had in the original post. Now as this is the Law of Excluded Middle it can almost be said to define "tautology." As you know it's possible to prove anything (literally) from a contradiction. So the Buddha's use of "Both exists and not exists" (x & not-x) is, on face value, nonsense. Consequently my musings on what it might mean (partly x and partly not-x is the best I can come up with). The form given just can't be the accurate formulation of the tetralemma. Herman, Ahhh, intuitionist logic. Brings back my student days; unfortunately not enough to actually recall what it means :-) (Problems with material implication as I dubiously recall.) Now as you can make this reference throw your hat in the ring: what are the last two statements if not the above and a virtual definition of "contradiction"? Can these two statements be subsumed under syllogistic logic or are they something new which the Buddha foresaw? >I don't think I have not earned my chocolate :-) I'd send one for sure but the moderators don't allow attachments ;-) metta, stephen Rob, just in passing: "Physics takes its start from everyday experience, which it continues by more subtle means. It remains akin to it, does not transcendent it generically; it cannot enter into another realm. Discoveries in physics cannot in themselves—so I believe—have the authority of forcing us to put an end to the habit of picturing the physical world as a reality." Edwin Schrodinger 15641 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 4:29pm Subject: An early Halloween treat Where is Ted Williams? Ted Williams is dead. Immediately upon dying his consciousness was reborn. His patisandhi / rebirth consciousness determined the character of some new being. But, possibly many such beings from today... Ted Williams is frozen. In a few hundred years he may be thawed out, repaired, brought back to life. But where's his consciousness then? Perhaps it waited around after all — but how did it know this would happen and revival wasn't a pipe dream? Does he get a clean bill of karmic health? Is he the zombie Ted Williams, apparently just the same but without some vital inner component? metta, stephen 15642 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 9:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi Sarah, Kom and Howard, Here are a couple of quotes. What is the meaning? Larry: from "A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma" Chapter VIII #29. Therein, the material phenomena are just the aggregate of matter. Consciousness and mental factors, which comprise the four immaterial aggregates, and Nibbana, are the five kinds that are immaterial. They are also called "name" [nama]. What remains are concepts, which are twofold: concept as that which is made known [atthapannatti], and concept as that which makes known [namapannatti]. #30. Concept as What is Made Known: How? There are such terms as "land," "mountain," and the like, so designated on account of the mode of transition of the respective elements; such terms as "house," "chariot," "cart," and the like, so named on account of the mode of formation of materials; such terms as "person," "individual," and the like, so named on account of the five aggregates; such terms as "direction," "time," and the like, named according to the revolution of the moon and so forth; such terms as "well," "cave," and the like, so named on account of the mode of non-imppact and so forth; such terms as kasina signs and the like, so named on account of respective elements and distinguished mental development. All such diffrerent things, though they do not exist in the ultimate sense, become objects of consciousness in the form of shadows of (ultimate) things. They are called concepts because they are thought of, reckoned, understood, expressed, and made known on account of, in consideration of, with respect to, this and that mode. This kind of concept is so called because it is made known. #31. Concept as What Makes Known Then, as it makes known, it is called concept. It is described as name, nomenclature, etc. It is sixfold: (1) a (direct) concept of the real; (2) a (direct) concept of the unreal; (3) a concept of the unreal by means of the real; (4) a concept of the real by means of the unreal; (5) a concept of the real by means of the real; (6) a concept of the unreal by means of the unreal. [real and unreal are translations of vijja and avijja] As, for instance, when it makes known what really exists in the ultimate sense by a term such as "matter," "feeling," and so forth, it is called a (direct) concept of the real. When it makes known what does not really exist in the ultimate sense by a term such as "land," "mountain," an so forth, it is called a (direct) concept of the unreal. The rest should be respectively understood by combining both as, for instance, "possessor of sixfold direct knowledge," "woman's voice," "eye-consciousness," and "king's son." #32 Summary By following the sound of speech through the process of ear-consciousness, and then by means of the concept conceived by (the process in the) mind-door that subsequently arises, meanings are understood. These concepts should be understood as fashioned by worldly convention. from"Paramattha-manjusa" Visuddhimagga Atthakatha (825) These modes, [that is, the three characteristics,] are not included in the aggregates because they are states without individual essence (asabhava-dhamma); and they are not separate from the aggregates because they are unapprehendable without the aggregates. But they should be understood as appropriate conceptual differences (pannatti-visesa) that are reason for differentiation in the explaining of the dangers in the five aggregates, which are allowable by common usage in respect of the five aggregates 15643 From: Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 5:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi, Larry (and Sarah and Kom) - In a message dated 9/12/02 12:10:44 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Sarah, Kom and Howard, > > Here are a couple of quotes. What is the meaning? > > Larry ============================= The best that I can say is that the text talks of two main kinds of concepts, the first being the intended referents of what I would actually call concepts [and I think these alleged referents should *not* be called concepts], and the second being the concepts proper. The latter category is further split into two subcategories: the concepts of paramattha dhammas, and the "compound concepts" whose alleged referents seem to be experienced only by virtue of superimposing the concepts on what is directly experienced. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 15644 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 11:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meditation and Satipatthana (parmatha dhamma) (realities/concep... Hi Larry, As Howard has just commented, there are various categories of pannatti (concepts) and as Kom has explained, whatever category they come under -- whether a concept of the real or the unreal or a combination of the two --, they do not exist in the ultimate sense. In addition to the excellent quotes you have provided from CMA c.8 and Vism, you may find these notes Jon posted (also from CMA) helpful. If not, let us know where the ‘sticking’ points are in them. Further useful posts from the archives can be found under Useful Posts -‘Concepts’ and ‘Concepts and Realities’ at: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ Sarah ===== ***** 1. Message 2918 Subject: Realities, concepts and dhammas The following are from the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi and published by the BPS. (Numbers preceded by # are the numbers of sections in the original text. ‘Guide’ refers to the commentarial writings on the original text. The short headings are mine.) Ultimate realities are what the Abhidhamma is all about- #2: The things contained in the Abhidhamma are fourfold from the standpoint of ultimate reality (paramatthato): consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), matter (rupa), and Nibbana. Ultimate realities are distinguished from so-called ‘conventional’ realities- #2 Guide: According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are 2 kinds of realities—the conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). What are ‘conventional realities’? #2 Guide: Conventional realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (pannatti) and conventional modes of expression (vohaara). They include such entities as living beings, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. How are conventional realities different from ultimate realities?- #2 Guide: The Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate validity, for the objects which they signify [ie. the living beings, men, women, animals etc] do not exist in their own right as irreducible realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are products of mental construction (parikappanaa), not realities existing by reason of their own nature. What are ultimate realities?- #2 Guide: Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their own extrinsic nature (sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Hence the word ‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived from ‘parama’ = ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing. ***** 2. Message 2932 Subject: Realities, concepts and dhammas - 2 Dear Friends Continuing a quick look at Ch I, section 2 from the Abhidhammata Sangaha on realities and concepts: ‘Ultimate’ has a second meaning – the ultimate objects of right knowledge- Guide to #2 Ultimate realities are not only the ultimate existents, they are also the ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional realities. Concepts do not possess ultimacy. It is the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs – the dhammas – that form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma. Ultimate realities are knowable only to wisdom- Guide to #2 Ultimate realities are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person cannot see them. His mind is obscured by concepts. Only by means of wise attention to things (yoniso manasikara) can one see beyond the concepts. Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the domain of ultimate or supreme knowledge. So to summarise this post and the previous one- There are 2 kinds of realities – conventional (sammuti) and ultimate (paramattha). It is the ultimate realities that the Abhidhamma is concerned with. Ordinary people like us see the world in terms of conventional realities (eg people and things). However, these are just concepts (pannatti) and expressions (voharaa), products of mental construction (parikappana). Ultimate realities have their own intrinsic nature (sahaava), they are the dhammas. They are ultimate in 2 senses. First, they cannot be reduced any further, and second, they are things that can be known only by the highest knowledge. As to whether concepts are 'dhammas', the word dhamma has many meanings. When classifying by way of objects of the 6 doorways, the objects of the mind-door are called 'dhammaarammana' (translated as 'mental objects'), and these include concepts. Abhidhammattha Sangaha, Ch III #16 Mental object (dhammarammana) is sixfold: Sensitive matter (pasaadarupa), subtle matter (sukhumarupa), consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), Nibbana, and concepts. Guide to #16 Concepts - the class of convential realities, things which do not exist in the ulitmate sense - also fall into the category of mental object. I hope this helps to clarify some of the references to realities and concepts in the posts on this list. Jonothan ********** 15645 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 11:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Time for a change (a long post) Hi Rob M. Well, you asked me for more quotes and this prompted me to pull out the texts to try and check a few of your comments from an earlier post of yours: --- robmoult wrote: > Hi All, > > I am reading a book, "Buddhist Psychology of Perception" by E. > Sarachchandra, ..... > There is a chapter of the book titled, "Developments in the Twelfth > Century", where the theory of moments was introduced into the > Abhidhamma, to merge/adapt/refute positions of the Yogacara and > Sautrantika schools which also had developed similar theories at > that time. ..... I don’t understand any ‘theory’ to have been introduced into the Abhidhamma in the 12th century. Sorry, this doesn’t make any sense to me or maybe I’m misunderstanding the statement. ..... > As I delve into the details of the thought process in preparation > for my class, I come to the conclusion that if I want anything more > than a very simple overview, I am wandering into the realm > of "speculative theories" put forth by philosophers. ..... When I read the Abhidhamma and commentaries, I don’t come across any ‘speculative theory’ by any ‘philosopher’. hmmm...I’ll leave this for now. ..... >The > philosophers can't agree; there is a different view of the > importance of the registration citta as explained in the Visuddhi > Magga (early concept; registration is an exceptional case, rarely > occurring), the Abhidhammatthasangaha (late concept; registration > occurs in most thoughts) and the Atthasalini (wavers between early > and late concepts). I even find that some of the "simple overview" > was added later into the Abhidhamma and is not clearly supported in > the Suttas. For example, it appears as though the registration citta > was introduced by Buddhaghosa. In brief, I am starting to lose faith > in the accuracy and authenticity of the Abhidhamma. ..... Yesterday Hong Kong closed down for a typhoon, so I took the chance to check most the many references and footnotes (often lengthy in Vism) to all these texts you mentioned with regard to tadarammana (registration) consciousness, as well as the very detailed notes in Sammohavinodani. It’s not that I have any great interest in the registration or determining cittas, but I wanted to try and understand your comments and the suggestions of these differences which are a condition for you to ‘lose faith...’. Frankly, I couldn’t find these differences and you’ll have to add more detail of where you found these comments in these texts. Furthermore, I didn’t come across any comments about ‘concepts’, ‘early or late’ or of ‘registration is an exceptional case’. Let me give a few brief references: 1.CMA (B.Bodhi’s Abid. Sangaha), 111 (8): “The word tadaaramma.na means literally “having that object”, and denotes the function of taking as object the object that had been apprehended by the javanas. This function is exercised for two mind-moments immediately after the javana phase in a sense-sphere cognitive process when the object is either very prominent to the senses or clear to the mind. When the object lacks special prominence or clarity, as well as in other types of cognitive process apart from the sense-sphere process, this function is not exercised at all. Following registration (or the javana phase when registration does not occur) the stream of consciousness again lapses back into the bhavanga” . Later it also refers to the 11 kinds of this vipaka citta. *** 2.Sammohavinodani, PTS, 699: It gives long details about when the same 11 kinds ‘do not take that object ‘(tadaramma.na.m na ga.nhanti)....It also gives more details about processes and so on. 3. Atthasalini, PTS, 264: “And it becomes a result as the registration (or retention) with respect to a vivid object at the six doors. How?..When a boat goes across a fierce current, the water is cleft and follows the boat a little distance, and then goes along with the current. So when at the six doors the vivid object, being deceitful, presents itself, apperception takes place; after this happens, there comes the turn for the subconscious life-continuum. But this consciousness, not allowing this turn, seizes the object which was seized by apperception, arises in the first or second conscious interval, and descends even into the life-continuum.Or similarly, when a herd of cattle cross a stream - so the simile might be expanded. Thus this element of mind-cognition, from seizing that object seized by apperception, results in an act of registration..” Later it also gives descriptive examples of where and when the object is ‘weak’ and ‘this is another occasion without effect’. 4.Visuddhimagga: at 1V, n13, there is a helpful long footnote for you: “An already-formed nucleus of the cognitive series, based on the Sutta Pitaka material, appears in the Abhidhamma Pitaka.” Quotations which follow show “how the commentary expands the Abhidhamma Pitaka treatment.” X1V, 122 - “if the object is a very vivid one in the five doors, or is clear in the mind door....” Again the 11 kinds of registration XV11,129 -2 names for registration (explained in detail in Sammohavinodani). “It is variable as to door and object, it is invariable as to physical basis, and it is variable as to position and function.” ***** > Here is another quote from the book, "... the Abhidhamma does not > make any attempt to explain the phenomenon of memory, for, having > postulated process without substance, they were without any known > equipment for explaining it, and were obliged to merely recognize it > as a fact." Why is it that the Abhidhamma does not give a clear > description on the function of memory? I think that memory is a very > important topic that deserves a detailed explanation. ..... The Abhidhamma is a detailed explanation of realities as expounded by the Buddha (at least some of us believe;-)). While we continue to think of a memory as a story and concept, it’s impossible to understand the underlying realities. There is no lack of 'equipment' or explanation, but there is considerable ignorance when we read the details about the various processes and about the namas and rupas which make up the experience. Like Herman mentioned with regard to Pali translations, the problem does not lie in the texts or translations so much as the accumulated ignorance. If we are interested to know about the reality and function of sanna or vitakka or vicara or other mental factors, it is quite different from wishing to understand the function of memory as explained by scientists and psychologists, for example. We can know all the mechanisms of the brain (or I dare I say of quantam theory) and not be a jot closer in absolute terms to understanding anything about paramattha dhammas being experienced now.(Of course the same can be said about the abhidhamma if it is merely studied as a thoretical subject or explanation;-)) Just a few thoughts. If you don’t have any of the texts and wish me to type out a particular reference (I don’t have access to a scanner). I’ll be happy to do so when I can. Thanks for the stimulating discussion, Rob and looking f/w to seeing you ‘live’ again next week. Hope you didn’t get caught in the typhoon here and in Southern China. Sarah ===== 15646 From: ven.yanatharo.bikkhu Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 11:39pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Ms Sara, As I said for the last two years no Theravada monk in Australia, I contacted all the temples 12 months ago) will participate or ordain a female as a monk. I will always oppose it. And to ordain a female monk you nedd a minimum of FIVE ORDAINED FEMALES MONKS, at the moment there is no even one. With all my respect you should close this debate because it will go no where. Metta. Venerable Yanatharo, Buddhist Chaplain University of Canberra -----Mensaje original----- De: abbott_hk [mailto:abbott_hk@y...] Enviado el: Miércoles, Septiembre 11, 2002 06:26 p.m. Para: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Asunto: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Dear Christine, I've certainly given others plenty of time to add comments and I said I'd be slow on this;-) I appreciated the info you supplied (although I had thought you'd be supplying links for BOTH sides of the discussion - probably why I've delayed....hmmm;-)) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Sarah, and All, > > I am still reading around the first point of whether it is possible > to decide what are 'lesser and minor rules' ..... seems to me that if > the Arahats were not prepared to make a decision regarding this, that > the modern Sangha will not be prepared to either. (though "not > acting" IS a decision.) ..... I agree that "not acting" IS a decision and I think we've discussed the reasons for this. ..... > http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebdha184.htm > The second point of Prof. G. P. M. Malalasekara, for consideration > when assessing the possibility of restoring the order of Buddhist > nuns is: > > "Second, it is possible to make use of an injunction issued by the > Buddha that stipulates, "I permit you monks, to confer full > ordination on nuns."[25] There are references in the texts that show > that some regulations were amended, altered, or abrogated by the > Buddha himself on various occasions under special circumstances. The > absence of Bhikkhuniis in Theravaada clearly being a special > circumstance, these textual references should be sufficient cause for > granting monks the authority to ordain nuns with a clear conscience > that no transgression of the Vinaya rules has been committed. Those > who oppose the restoration of the Bhikkhunii Sa"ngha on the grounds > of Vinaya technicalities seem to ignore this relevant injunction." > > > It seems from my reading that, in the past, in the time of the > Buddha, there were eight methods of conferring higher ordination. In > the course of time, the eighth came to be regarded as the one and > only procedure for admitting a novice to Higher Ordination. What > would stand in the way of re-visiting each of these methods(apart > from the first)? And, in particular, the one quoted above? ...... I've put the 8 methods at the end of the post. Interesting, thank you. I'm having some trouble following the logic here, Chris. It's true that the rules were continually amended, altered and added to by the Buddha himself and we read the contexts and reasons for this. Infringements would lead to new rules and so on. Of course in the Buddha's case, this was always done with his omniscience and knowledge about what was necessary for the preservation and harmony of the Sangha and the endurance of the Teachings. I referred in the `courage' post to the previous 24 Buddha eras which the present Buddha could recall.He knew directly about the bhikkhuni orders and the impact on the preservation of the Dhamma in a way that even wise followers like Ananda could not comprehend. If the great arahats at the Ist Council did not feel qualified to make amendments, how would `we' be qualified to do so? As I remember, the 2nd Council (about 100yrs after the Buddha's parinibbana) was held because of a dispute over 10 minor rules which became a serious controversy. A very large number of monks, the Vajjians, refused to accept the Council's decisions and the schism almost `finished' the tradition of the Vinaya as left by the Buddha. We know that in other traditions there have been many changes to all parts of the Tipitaka and the strict adherence by the monks at all the Councils to the vinaya may seem extreme to us, but I think it is largely thanks to the Elder Yasa and the 700 monks who stood firm at this 2nd Council in not accepting amendments, that the entire Tipitaka, including the Vinaya has been preserved so very intact as it is `til today. I also question whether we really are only talking about "Vinaya technicalities" as Prof Malalasekera suggests. I'm sure the monks who raised the `ten points' would have also considered these as mere `technicalities' and in our ignorance, rules about not eating after midday and not using money may seem so, but I believe they were all made for very good reasons. Probably, if one cares to study the history, one will find that the Vajjians also thought there were `special circumstances' to make amendments with `clear conscience'. What do you think? Perhaps Betty or Azita or Deb may have comments too. Sarah ====== > http://www.thanhsiang.org/paper2/dip2-9.html > > "As recorded in the Bhikkhuni Khandhaka of the Cullavagga Pali, > Mahapajapati Gotami was conferred both Ordination and the Higher > Ordination by her mere acceptance of eight strict conditions (Attha > Garudhamma). Again with reference to Addhakasi, a former courtesan, > the Buddha even empowered the monks to confer Higher Ordination > through an emissary. Before the decentralisation of powers pertaining > to disciplinary matters there was an intermediate phase in the > monastic order of nuns where nuns were admitted to Higher Ordination > following the formal act of procedure by nuns as well as by monks. As > the motion and the announcement are pronounced eight times before > both communities, this particular method is called Atthavacika. > > ................. there were eight methods of conferring Higher > Ordination during the time of the Buddha: > > 1 . Ehi bhikkhu (Come, 0 Monk) > > 2 . Saranagamana (Taking refuge in the triple gem) > > 3 . Ovadapatiggahana (Acceptance of advice) > > 4. Panhabyakarana (Answering questions) > > 5. Atthagarudhamma (Acceptance of eight strict rules) > > 6 . Duta (Through an emissary) > > 7. Atthavacika (By the pronouncement of eight times) > > 8. Natticatuttha kamma (By three announcements)" 15647 From: Sarah Date: Wed Sep 11, 2002 11:57pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Therevada Nun in Thailand Dear Ven Yanatharo, Firstly, welcome to DSG. I hope you are finding some of the other discussions more useful and we’ll be glad to hear more from you on them. I note that you are also based in Australia, in Canberra, like Suan. Thank you also for you concern about this topic. I understand it is an issue which people tend to feel very emotional about and agree with you and Christine that if it cannot be discussed rationally and calmly it’s better for it to be left aside. Thank you for your kind consideration. In any case, I only know a tad more about it than I do about quantum physics (about which I know nilch) and will happily leave both aside. Best wishes, Sarah ===== --- "ven.yanatharo.bikkhu" wrote: > Ms Sara, As I said for the last two years no Theravada monk in > Australia, I > contacted all the temples 12 months ago) will participate or ordain a > female > as a monk. 15648 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 1:38am Subject: [dsg] Thoughts / Realities / Concepts / Mind Objects Dear Howard, I have broken off this piece from the main paramatha/concepts discussions as this is becoming quite a bit more detailed. I don't think this discussion will come to a conclusion, but I want to relate some information that I received on K. Sujin's trip to you. > -----Original Message----- > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] > > I understand what you write below, and I > agree with much of it. Aren't your breaking your disagreement streak? ;-) > However, as I see it, thoughts, whether simple or > mentally constructed from > simpler ones, are mind-objects, and they have > characteristics. I am not sure if you differentiate the "thinking" and what is thought of or not. Thinking, the thinking conciousness, vitaka, vicara, and all the associated dhammas are paramatha (with characteristics). I think this we agree on. What is thought of we might not agree. I understand that when the mind combines repeated cognition of paramatha objects, even if it hasn't become an "entity" per se yet, what is cognized (but not the cognition itself) is already pannatti, as it has no characteristics as appearing to the consciousness at the moment. For example, when we see shape. Shapes and forms are pannatti, although cognition of such shapes and forms is possible only because of paramatha characteristics (visible object, brightness, what appears to the eyes, etc.) that appeared, but shapes and forms don't have paramatha characteristics themselves. > A memory, for > example, of a picture has visual characteristics; > some thoughts are clear, > some are fuzzy; a tune that "keeps going through > ones head" is an auditory > thought; the concept of a musical note is > elementary; a concept of a symphony > is compound; the concept of 'hardness' is > "paramatthic" (to coin an > adjective! ;-)) I discussed this specific point and some related points on the trip. An example that was given is that when we dream about something, we don't see in our dream the way that we see in our daily life while we are awake. When we actually see, something bright (characterisitis of visible object) appears through both the eye door and the mind door. When we dream (or think of what we see, even when we are awake), at that moment there is no such brightness: how we see in a dream (and when we think) is quite different from when we actually see when we are awake. This I readily agree because my dream is quite dark without any light, but somehow I perceive shapes (like people). The sound makes a tougher argument. I can understand your point more readily. I have had the experience of hearing (with the sound not actually there) Vivaldi's for 3 days, during which I wasn't able to get much sleep. But on the other hand, there was no loudness (characteristic of sound) that appeared. Only the mental image of high/low pitch sound appeared. I think this is concept. I experience no image of smell, taste, or tangible object in my dream. So I can count this out completely. The points that were related to me relating to this topic includes: 1) For the kandha that has fallen away, it has fallen away completely. The Buddha enumerates the 11 characteristics of the 5 kandhas, 3 of which are past, present, and future. The past is further explained (Kandha-vibhanga, in Vibhangha, Abhidhamma tipitaka) "to have gone over, extinguished, disappeared, completely changed, completely fallen away, that has become and then disappeared, to be past." [this is likely to be a rough translation]. What appeared in the past can never appear again as it was again, this is a fundamental characteristics of the kandhas. A sound that appears in the past cannot appear just because we think of it, because that sound has completely fallen away. What we can truly hear must be the sound that appears now. 2) This is an inferral on the non-appearance of paramatha dhamma just because we think about it. It is said that a non-ariyan arupa brahma cannot attain, even if they know the theory of the buddha's teaching correctly and thoroughly. The reason given is that it is because even the first vipassana nana, the distinction of nama rupa, cannot appear in that person, as there is no rupa within the arupa plane of existence. But if thinking about rupas causes the paramatha charactertics to appear, then it should be possible that the arupa brahma can attain the first vipassana nana. 3) The Buddha encourage us not to hold on to the past, not to worry about what hasn't come to be, and to let go [of self, of attachment, of mana, of dithi] of the present. If past objects (via thinking) can be objects of sati, why treat it any differently than the present? > However, what is not imagined does not, > perforce, have inherent > existence. All dhammas are without core, being > dependent on many conditions > for their existence. With appreciation, kom 15649 From: Robert Epstein Date: Thu Sep 12, 2002 6:39am Subject: Will the real concept please stand up (Re: Meditation and Satipatthana) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: Now, that seemingly real object which is "the keyboard I'm typing > on" cannot truly be found anywhere, and so does not truly have any > characteristics. Conventionally, however, it has: (groups of) the direct > experiences which the mind compounds into this percept are viewed as its > characteristics. Now, I think it is correct to say that both the general > concept of 'keyboard' and the instance of that which is the mind-constructed > percept of the keyboard I'm typing on right now both fall under the range of > the Pali term pa~n~natti, though I would call the former "concept" and the > latter "percept". The thing is, several folks on DSG seem to *also* call the > (only conventionally existing) intended *referents* of these by the name > "pa~n~natti" or "concepts", and I think that creates confusion for those of > us who do not use language that way. Hi Howard. The above is great and I love the details. Not quite sure why you would call something that is constructed of