55200 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jan 28, 2006 11:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, TG (and Jon) - In a message dated 1/28/06 4:42:04 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Jon > > In a message dated 1/28/2006 7:43:28 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, > jonabbott@... writes: > > For some reason I usually hesitate to come in on your threads, but I > think I'm being invited to here, so here goes ;-)). > > TG: I can only figure that your hesitation is due to wisdom. ;-) > > > > My understanding of sabhava as used in the commentaries is that it > refers to the uniqueness of each kind of dhamma. To give a simple > example, audible object ('sound') has a uniqueness, as does visible > object, as does hearing consciousness, and so on. This uniqueness is > not something that is in the eye of the beholder, whether wholly or > partly (if this were not the case, then the same dhamma would not appear > the same to different individuals even where no ignorance or wrong view > was arising). I see it as central to the teaching that dhammas of the > same kind appear to panna as just that: dhammas of the same kind. > > I think so far there would be no disagreement from you? > > TG: Well I partly agree and I partly disagree. Phenomena exhibit > distinguishable qualities. Qualities are not "in" the object" or > phenomena, but > qualities are exhibited by conditions. Those qualities/conditions are > continually > changing. ------------------------------------------- Howard: Actually, TG, this is where I think it is important to distinguish conventional objects from paramattha dhammas. A cube of sugar may be hard, and after being powdered it is soft - so "it" has changed. In fact, there are different dhammas arising later than earlier. The "powdered sugar" is a concept/percept superimposed on a collection of dhammas, and those are different dhammas than those that underlay the earlier "sugar cube". But a hardness that arises on some occasion does not become something other than hardness. On the occasion that there is no hardness, there then arises with increasing intensity a hardness which then peaks, levels off, recedes, and finally ceases. But aside from intensity it is, throughout, the same quality, the same dhamma - hardness. ---------------------------------------------- > > Within certain limitations, those qualities will probably appear similarly > to human beings. But, what I might find to be a soft jacket, someone else > might find to be a hard jacket. > --------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, other than one's personal definition of what constitutes hard or soft, if what person A feels is actually a soft texture, and what B feels is a hard texture, I'd say that they are experiencing different rupas. In fact, even if they were conventionally speaking touching the same jacket and both felt it as soft, I would not literally say they felt the same rupa, but *corresponding* rupas. ---------------------------------------------- Someone else might find it a repulsive > > phenomena, I might find it an attractive phenomena. > > I might think a certain temperature is hot, someone else might think the > same temperature is cold. The conditons/qualities of the mind perceiving > are > also at play. ----------------------------------------- Howard: From my perspective, it is the actual sensa that they feel, not some external something-or-other, and these sensa differ.That is my phenomenalist perspective. So, if A and B feel "the same sensation", but one finds it pleasant and the other unpleasant, they are *not*, on my view, the same rupa, but two different ones, one pleasant and the other unpleasant. And even if they were both pleasant, they would be different but corresponding rupas. (Of course, if they are equivalent in all respects except for one being experienced by A and the other by B, then we can and do informally *speak* of them as "being the same rupa".) ----------------------------------------- > > Contact (phassa) intergrates all the factors/qualities involved in that > contact. Such qualities do not "stand alone." This is one Principle of > Conditionality. --------------------------------------- Howard: I'm thinking that what you mean here is that at any moment, the state of mind consists of a number of co-occurring and mutually conditioning factors, and they form a "whole", with no aspect independent of the others, and that the mind grasps the entire state by means of a cognitive integration operation. Is that close? --------------------------------------- > > > > Now whether this uniqueness is properly called a 'characteristic', a > 'quality' or something else again is to me not the fundamental issue. > However, the texts use the term 'characteristic' and I see no great > problem with that. I take it as just a convenient label. There are > many terms used in the teachings that really only approximate the dhamma > to which they refer. I think the reason for this is the vast gap > between the conventional and the 'real'. > > TG: If the writers on this subject would have merely used the term > "characteristic," I would have never commented on it. There seems to me to > be a > subtle attempt to describe "dhammas" as things that exist unto themselves. > Hence > "own characteristic." "Own characteristic" was already a softening from > "individual essence." Although I prefer "quality," I can live with > "characteristic." ----------------------------------------- Howard: It is that 'own' which bothers me as well! ---------------------------------------- > > Again, the terms don't bother me nearly as much as what I see as a subtle > viewpoint of seeing things with their own essence. This viewpoint runs > counter > to conditionality insight IMO. > > The way "dhammas," ultimate realities," and own characteristics" are used > in > conjunction with each other reinforces my feeling. Its actually a larger > issue than what's been addressed so far but one thing at a time. > > > > > I applaud you and Robert K for standing up for what you think is right. > > > >Of course, since I believe the term to be counter the Buddha's teaching, > it > > >follows that I would find fault with its use when it claims to present the > > >teachings of the Buddha. > > > > > > Can a 'term' be 'counter to the Buddha's teaching'? In the Dhammapada > verses there are some references to 'self' that in another context might > be considered 'counter to the teachings'. In my view it would be more > fruitful to be discussing passages rather than individual terms, and > indeed the underlying meaning of the passages rather than their > superficial word-meaning. > > TG: Well, a term can be used in a way to counter the meaning of the > Buddha's teaching. When the Dhammapada uses the term "self" in a > translation, it > doesn't bother me in the slightest because I detect no sense that the > Dhammapada is trying to say that states have their "own characteristics," > "individual > essence," etc. I get no sense that the Dhammapada is trying to state a > "reality judgement." I take it that the Dhammapada is just talking about > an > individual human being for sake of communication. > > When the term "own characteristic" is being used, it IS being used to make > a > judgement about ultimate reality. Therefore its standard of accuracy must > reach a much higher level and is subject to more critical scrutiny IMO. > > > Appreciating your spirited posts on this issue, TG. > > Jon > (standing up to be counted ;-)) > > > TG: Thanks Jon. Appreciate the comments. They force me to re-evaluate > things more than you might think. > > TG > > ======================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55201 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jan 28, 2006 0:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 1/28/06 5:30:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Thanks for coming in here. I've been enjoying reading your posts on > this thread. > > upasaka@... wrote: > > >Hi, Jon (and TG) - > > > > John, I marvel at the calm and ease I detect underlying this post of > >yours. It seems that the fruit of your India visit remains with you! How > really > >delightful! > > > > > > Kind of you to say so. Come to think of it, I've noticed a certain > mellowness in your own posts of late, Howard. Could be the fruit of > retirement (semi-retirement in my case)? ;-)) ------------------------------------------- Howard: No, actually (seriously) it's my regular formal meditation practice! ( Hi, Ken! ;-)) -------------------------------------------- > > >>My understanding of sabhava as used in the commentaries is that it > >>refers to the uniqueness of each kind of dhamma. To give a simple > >>example, audible object ('sound') has a uniqueness, as does visible > >>object, as does hearing consciousness, and so on. This uniqueness is > >>not something that is in the eye of the beholder, whether wholly or > >>partly (if this were not the case, then the same dhamma would not appear > >>the same to different individuals even where no ignorance or wrong view > >>was arising). I see it as central to the teaching that dhammas of the > >>same kind appear to panna as just that: dhammas of the same kind. > >> > >> > > > >------------------------------------------ > >Howard: > > Sure, even to ordinary folks without special wisdom. > > > > Well I'm not so sure about this. Without some understanding of the > teachings at a more-than-intellectual level, the experiencing of visible > object as just visible object or sound as just audible object, as > distinct from paying attention to shape and form (people and things), > will not occur. To my understanding, the experiencing that comes from > directing one's attention to these dhammas is not in fact the > experiencing of the dhammas (that is to say, that what is being attended > to in that situation is not in fact a dhamma). > > >(However, I would > >differ on your use of 'same' in "the same dhamma would not appear the same > to > >different individuals even where no ignorance or wrong view was arising," > >prefering to use "the corresponding dhamma" to "the same dhamma," because > of my > >phenomenalist perspective. That, of course, isn't the primary matter of > >discussion here, though.) > >----------------------------------------- > > > > > > Yes, I think your comment applies regardless of whether one's > perspective is phenomenalist or not. To be more precise, I should have > said: "(if this were not the case, then dhammas of the same kind would > not appear the same to different individuals even where no ignorance or > wrong view was arising)". > > >>I think so far there would be no disagreement from you? > >> > >>Now whether this uniqueness is properly called a 'characteristic', a > >>'quality' or something else again is to me not the fundamental issue. > >> > >> > > > >------------------------------------------------- > >Howard: > > Not much of a difference. I think that 'characteristic' somewhat more > >strongly suggests an underlying something-or-other (literal "substance") > that > >*has* the characteristic than does 'quality', but both have that > connotation, > >because people normally apply them to conventional objects. You see, in > >ordinary usage, conventional objects are what people talk about, and their > >"properties" or "characteristics" are typically paramattha dhammas! For > example, when > >folks say that a table is hard, they think of the table as a thing and > hardness > >as a characteristic or quality or feature *of* that thing. That's fine > >conventional usage so long as one understands the reality behind the words, > but it > >is confusing when one extrapolates that usage to paramattha dhammas, > looking > >for *their* qualities, because they *are* their qualities. > >------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > Yes, but there is no getting away from the use of conventional language > to talk about dhammas, and the potential for 'confusion' that you > mention here applies to each and every reference to dhammas. Even > 'sound' for the dhamma that is experienced by hearing consciousness is > potentially 'confusing' because it is so far from the reality of audible > object. We use it because it is a convenient label. But it is open to > just the same objection as the use of 'characteristic' for the > uniqueness we are now talking about. To me such objections are not to > the point, and are a distraction from the main task. > > >>Can a 'term' be 'counter to the Buddha's teaching'? > >> > >> > >------------------------------------------- > >Howard: > > It can be misleading. In the case of 'sabhava', I think it has not > >only been misleading, but, due to a misunderstanding of how it is used in > the > >commentarial tradition differently from its syntactic meaning, it has > provided an > >opening of a door for opponents of Theravada to walk right through and > >misrepresent Theravada, whether innocently due to misunderstanding or, in > some > >cases, intentionally. > >------------------------------------------- > > > > > > Yes, I understand your concern on this, but I truly think it is > misplaced. In my view this sort of thing will happen regardless of how > carefully terms are chosen. There is no way of speaking about dhammas > that leaves no opening for wrong view to misrepresent the teachings. It > happened in the time of the Buddha, and it has happened ever since.;-)) -------------------------------------------- Howard: Sure, but why make it easy! ;-) -------------------------------------------- > > > In the Dhammapada > > > > > > >>verses there are some references to 'self' that in another context might > >>be considered 'counter to the teachings'. > >> > >> > >------------------------------------------ > >Howard: > > Yes, that was unfortunate, and it caused confusion. And that was a > >matter of using 'self' in an everyday, ordinary fashion. But the use of a > word > >like 'sabhava' in a fashion that is novel and contrary to the form of the > word > >is even more serious in its repercussions. > >------------------------------------------ > > > > > > Yes, but even if we were to all agree that 'sabhava' was not a good > choice, we still need to be discussing what it is that the commentators > were talking about in using that term, namely, the uniqueness of dhammas > as classified in the suttas. So what's the point of discussing whether > or not it was a good choice (and what term do we use instead)? --------------------------------------------- Howard: If nothing else, it clarifies, I think. Also, it provides "ammunition" for talking with "opponents" of Theravada. -------------------------------------------- > > Jon > > PS Gung Hei Fat Choi! to all (the Chinese New Year begins today) > > ------------------------------------------- Howard: Ah, good you mention it! I didn't realize that. A good year to all from me as well! Which animal is associated with this year, Jon. Do you know? ======================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55202 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jan 28, 2006 0:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 1/28/06 6:21:33 PM Eastern Standard Time, kenhowa@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > > Before I read this paragraph of yours, it had never occurred to me > (as it evidently has to you) that "mental objects" could be taken to > mean, "objects comprised of mentality." I have always assumed > (correctly as it turns out) the term to mean, "objects cognisable by > the mind." ---------------------------------- Howard: Actually, I find this matter a drop confusing. After all, *all* objects are objects cognizable by the mind, including rupas. Doesn't that upset the definition somewhat? ---------------------------------- > > --------------------- > H: >(BTW, the translation of 'dhammas' as "mental objects" > in the fourth foundation is, IMO, a very poor choice, because all the > aggregates, including rupas, are objects of discernment in the fourth > foundation of mindfulness.) > --------------------- > > I believe the fourth foundation includes all possible objects of > satipatthana that do not fall into one of the other three > foundations. --------------------------------------- Howard: But there is clear overlap, Ken. :-( --------------------------------------- > The Pali word is "dhammanupasana," which means > contemplation of "paramattha dhammas cognisable by the mind," as > distinct from "dhammarammana-anupapasana," which (if there is such a > word) would mean "contemplation of everything (paramattha-dhammas and > pannatti-dhammas) cognisable by the mind". ----------------------------------------- Howard: I *think* that you are saying here that the 4th foundation of mindfulness is dhammanupasana, which is contemplation of paramattha dhammas, and that is what I also think the 4th foundation is about. So we seem to be in agreement on that. Do I misunderstand you on this? ----------------------------------------- > > Ken H > > ===================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55203 From: Maya Putra Date: Sat Jan 28, 2006 9:01pm Subject: Stream Entrant vvhite_illusion Dear Dhamma Friends, I would like to share with you all something I learnt from Abhidhamma Class led by Bhante Sujiva. As most of you know a stream entrant (sotapanna) will at most be reborn 7 more lives. What this actually means is 7 more (realms of) existence. So supposing one is born as a human 3 times, this still counts as 1 existence. The reason why it's 7 more existence is because there's 1 human realm and 6 celestial realms. So being a sotapanna or stream entrant just guarantees one to NOT be reborn in the woeful states (Hell, animals,..etc..). But of course all depends on how much effort one puts into the practice, if one practices seriously, it is possible for anyone (or a stream entrant) to be reborn within 1 or 2 lives. With Metta, []\/[]aya []Dutra "I am nothing but the constituents of the clinging aggregates that is subject to change, decay, and unsatisfaction." -mp 55204 From: "Charles" Date: Sat Jan 28, 2006 9:52pm Subject: Re: Stream Entrant cherry_avium Hi, thank you for the sharing. By the way, (unimportant question :P) is there any story about a sotapanna baby (ie a sotapanna being reborn again in the human world? --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Maya Putra wrote: > Dear Dhamma Friends, > > I would like to share with you all something I learnt > from Abhidhamma Class led by Bhante Sujiva. As most > of you know a stream entrant (sotapanna) will at most > be reborn 7 more lives. 55205 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sat Jan 28, 2006 11:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA kenhowardau Hi Larry, ----- L: > I don't understand it myself but it is the case that upadanakhandhas are the only objects of clinging in the suttas. Notice Vism.XIV,218: "And this is the extreme limit as the basis for the assumption of self and what pertains to self, that is to say, the five beginning with materiality." This is about self clinging but I think it would apply to any clinging. Perhaps the key word is "basis". We might say the basis of any concept is a reality. There is no concept of a car without visible data, etc. Or there might be another meaning. I'm still thinking about it. Any ideas? ---------------------------- I am sure you are on the right track. Isn't the quote you have given yet another elucidation of 'the All?' I think explanations of the All are found, expressly or impliedly everywhere throughout the suttas. Illusions (people, places, events etc.) are constantly becoming the objects of consciousness, but the entire world is, "in truth and reality," just the five khandhas. BTW, I believe "in truth and reality" is recognised as one of the sutta terms for "in ultimate reality" (paramattha-sacca). It seems to me that "In brief" is another such term. E.g., in the First Sermon (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta): "Birth is suffering, decay is suffering, disease is suffering, death is suffering, to be united with the unpleasant is suffering, to be separated from the pleasant is suffering, not to get what one desires is suffering. In brief the five aggregates of clinging are suffering." Ken H 55206 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sat Jan 28, 2006 7:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... TGrand458@... Hi Howard My time's a little tight today and I'm falling behind so responses below won't be elaborate. In a message dated 1/28/2006 5:53:43 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Hi, TG (and Jon) - In a message dated 1/28/06 4:42:04 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Jon > > In a message dated 1/28/2006 7:43:28 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, > jonabbott@... writes: > > For some reason I usually hesitate to come in on your threads, but I > think I'm being invited to here, so here goes ;-)). > > TG: I can only figure that your hesitation is due to wisdom. ;-) > > > > My understanding of sabhava as used in the commentaries is that it > refers to the uniqueness of each kind of dhamma. To give a simple > example, audible object ('sound') has a uniqueness, as does visible > object, as does hearing consciousness, and so on. This uniqueness is > not something that is in the eye of the beholder, whether wholly or > partly (if this were not the case, then the same dhamma would not appear > the same to different individuals even where no ignorance or wrong view > was arising). I see it as central to the teaching that dhammas of the > same kind appear to panna as just that: dhammas of the same kind. > > I think so far there would be no disagreement from you? > > TG: Well I partly agree and I partly disagree. Phenomena exhibit > distinguishable qualities. Qualities are not "in" the object" or > phenomena, but > qualities are exhibited by conditions. Those qualities/conditions are > continually > changing. ------------------------------------------- Howard: Actually, TG, this is where I think it is important to distinguish conventional objects from paramattha dhammas. A cube of sugar may be hard, and after being powdered it is soft - so "it" has changed. In fact, there are different dhammas arising later than earlier. The "powdered sugar" is a concept/percept superimposed on a collection of dhammas, and those are different dhammas than those that underlay the earlier "sugar cube". But a hardness that arises on some occasion does not become something other than hardness. On the occasion that there is no hardness, there then arises with increasing intensity a hardness which then peaks, levels off, recedes, and finally ceases. But aside from intensity it is, throughout, the same quality, the same dhamma - hardness. ---------------------------------------------- TG: This isn't the way I view phenomena arising and ceasing. I view phenomena as continually transforming. I therefore believe "qualities" are continuously changing...some slowly and some fast...depending on conditions. I believe that an "experience" is also changing during that experience. > > Within certain limitations, those qualities will probably appear similarly > to human beings. But, what I might find to be a soft jacket, someone else > might find to be a hard jacket. > --------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, other than one's personal definition of what constitutes hard or soft, if what person A feels is actually a soft texture, and what B feels is a hard texture, I'd say that they are experiencing different rupas. In fact, even if they were conventionally speaking touching the same jacket and both felt it as soft, I would not literally say they felt the same rupa, but *corresponding* rupas. ---------------------------------------------- TG: I see experience as having numerous and complex variables. In actuality, two people cannot experience the same "rupa" (phenomena) because they cannot be in the same place at the same time, nor are the conditional parameters of their minds identical. This may be what you're saying above too. Someone else might find it a repulsive > > phenomena, I might find it an attractive phenomena. > > I might think a certain temperature is hot, someone else might think the > same temperature is cold. The conditons/qualities of the mind perceiving > are > also at play. ----------------------------------------- Howard: From my perspective, it is the actual sensa that they feel, not some external something-or-other, and these sensa differ.That is my phenomenalist perspective. So, if A and B feel "the same sensation", but one finds it pleasant and the other unpleasant, they are *not*, on my view, the same rupa, but two different ones, one pleasant and the other unpleasant. And even if they were both pleasant, they would be different but corresponding rupas. (Of course, if they are equivalent in all respects except for one being experienced by A and the other by B, then we can and do informally *speak* of them as "being the same rupa".) ----------------------------------------- TG: I believe there is a Sutta where the Buddha says something like -- "An object to be experienced as hot is experienced as hot. An object to be experienced as cold is experienced as cold." Its something like that but not exact. At any rate, I think I'm still comfortable believing that an experience is a combination of object, sense base, and "the mental instrument that generates conscious" as the three come together. > > Contact (phassa) intergrates all the factors/qualities involved in that > contact. Such qualities do not "stand alone." This is one Principle of > Conditionality. --------------------------------------- Howard: I'm thinking that what you mean here is that at any moment, the state of mind consists of a number of co-occurring and mutually conditioning factors, and they form a "whole", with no aspect independent of the others, and that the mind grasps the entire state by means of a cognitive integration operation. Is that close? --------------------------------------- TG: Once again I view contact as object, sense base, and mentality. Pretty sure we differ in our view here. Also pretty sure mine is well aligned with the suttas. I don't find your phenomenology objectionable, because from what I detect, I don't think it detracts a bit from detaching the mind from phenomena. Its your own bent and the Buddha taught many bents. I don't think your phenomenology is the outlook the Buddha presented regarding objects and experience, on the other hand, I can't say he would have had a problem with it. "The doctrines, Upali, of which you may know: `These doctrines lead not to complete weariness (of the world), nor to dispassion, nor to ending, nor to calm, nor to knowledge, nor to the awakening, nor to the cool´ - regard them definitely as not Dhamma, not the discipline, not the word of the teacher. But the doctrines of which you may know: `These doctrines lead one to complete weariness, dispassion, ending, calm, knowledge, the awakening, the cool´ - regard them unreservedly as Dhamma, the discipline, the word of the teacher." (The Buddha . . . GS, vol. 4, pg. 96 - 97) TG 55207 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 5:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... jonoabb Hi TG TGrand458@... wrote: >Hi Jon > >In a message dated 1/28/2006 7:43:28 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, >jonabbott@... writes: > >For some reason I usually hesitate to come in on your threads, but I >think I'm being invited to here, so here goes ;-)). > >TG: I can only figure that your hesitation is due to wisdom. ;-) > > If only that were true ... ;-)) >TG: Well I partly agree and I partly disagree. Phenomena exhibit >distinguishable qualities. Qualities are not "in" the object" or phenomena, but >qualities are exhibited by conditions. Those qualities/conditions are continually > changing. > >Within certain limitations, those qualities will probably appear similarly >to human beings. But, what I might find to be a soft jacket, someone else >might find to be a hard jacket. Someone else might find it a repulsive >phenomena, I might find it an attractive phenomena. > > I can see that our differences lie deeper than choice of terminology ;-)). The uniqueness spoken of in the texts is not, to my understanding, something that is to any extent dependent on the individual's perceptin of the experience. In the case of, for example, audible object, it is the 'characteristic' (for want of a better word) that is peculiar to, *and common to*, all instances of audible object regardless of whether in a particular case the audible object is perceived as loud or soft, pleasant or unpleasant, clear or indistinct, etc. This 'characteristic' is the same for each instance of audible object. This is what is being discussed in the texts. > I might think a certain temperature is hot, someone else might think the >same temperature is cold. The conditons/qualities of the mind perceiving are >also at play. > > The conditions/qualities of the mind perceiving are themselves dhammas with different 'characteristics', and these have no bearing on the 'characteristic' of the object being experienced. Thus temperature has a unique 'characteristic' that is independent of the degree of temperature involved. It is this 'characteristic' that distinguishes temperature from, say, audible object. Differences in perception of the 'same' dhammas are a different subject altogether. >Contact (phassa) intergrates all the factors/qualities involved in that >contact. Such qualities do not "stand alone." This is one Principle of >Conditionality. > > This is quite a departure from the standard 'model' assumed by the texts, I believe. The idea of the 'Principles of Conditionality' is new to me. >TG: If the writers on this subject would have merely used the term >"characteristic," I would have never commented on it. There seems to me to be a >subtle attempt to describe "dhammas" as things that exist unto themselves. Hence >"own characteristic." "Own characteristic" was already a softening from >"individual essence." Although I prefer "quality," I can live with >"characteristic." > >Again, the terms don't bother me nearly as much as what I see as a subtle >viewpoint of seeing things with their own essence. This viewpoint runs counter >to conditionality insight IMO. > >The way "dhammas," ultimate realities," and own characteristics" are used in >conjunction with each other reinforces my feeling. Its actually a larger >issue than what's been addressed so far but one thing at a time. > > Is it possible you have not fully appreciated the context in which the commentarial passages are to be read? They are not of course saying that the same sound is perceived as equally loud or pleasant by every individual, only that there is a 'characteristic' to sound that is both unique to and common to all instances of sound. Does this really sound substantialist (no pun intended)? >TG: Well, a term can be used in a way to counter the meaning of the >Buddha's teaching. > Ah, but then it is the *particular use* of the term, and not the term itself that is the 'problem' ;-)) >When the term "own characteristic" is being used, it IS being used to make a >judgement about ultimate reality. Therefore its standard of accuracy must >reach a much higher level and is subject to more critical scrutiny IMO. > > Yes, but we need to understand exactly what is being asserted (and what is not). Jon 55208 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 6:05am Subject: Alone with Dhamma, Ch 4, no 5 nilovg Alone with Dhamma, Ch 4, no 5 When we were in India, we were sometimes sick, we had a fever or violent pains due to water, food or climate. Acharn Sujin reminded us then to know the characteristic of the present reality, for when there is thinking about tonight or tomorrow or worrying about it obviously there is too much interest in Œself¹. She also felt sick, mostly from a severe cold, and exhausted at times but she did not show it. She never thinks of herself. When we read the many suttas about dhammas appearing through the six doors we can be reminded of the truth. The Buddha taught all the time about the dhammas appearing through the six doors. There is only the dhamma of this moment, nothing else, this is the truth. Nobody can cause the arising of specific dhammas. When feeling sick, that is the dhamma at this moment. There are only dhammas, not me who feels sick. We cling to our feeling, we are commiserating with ourselves, and also that is a dhamma. We cannot escape nåma and rúpa, so long as we are living in this world. Acharn Sujin said that there can be understanding of the dhamma that has already arisen because of conditions. If we understand dhamma as dhamma we know that nobody can interfere with what arises because of the appropriate conditions. We may have intellectual understanding of anattå, but we should come to understand the reality that is anattå. She said: ³There is always an idea of I who is reflecting, but actually, citta and cetasikas are performing their functions and then they fall away immediately.² Acharn Sujin reminded us that it is not sufficient to think that everything is anattå. Precisely at this very moment we must try to understand anattå. We are alone, only dhammas appear one at a time through the senses and the mind-door. We think time and again of people we love, we find our thoughts about them very important. But what we take for people are dhammas arising and falling away immediately. What has fallen away never returns. We have to develop paññå at this moment so that we shall understand the truth of anattå. There is seeing at this moment and very gradually we can learn that it is a dhamma that sees. ****** Nina. 55209 From: "Maya Putra" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 6:27am Subject: Re: Stream Entrant / Charles vvhite_illusion Well a sotapanna can be reborn again in the human world if he so wishes. he can be reborn in any of the 7 states: human and 6 celestial realms. =) -Maya- 55210 From: "Larry" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 7:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA lbidd2 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > Hi Larry, > > ----- > L: > I don't understand it myself but it is the case that > upadanakhandhas are the only objects of clinging in the suttas. > Notice Vism.XIV,218: > > "And this is the extreme limit as the basis for the assumption of > self and what pertains to self, that is to say, the five beginning > with materiality." > > This is about self clinging but I think it would apply to any > clinging. Perhaps the key word is "basis". We might say the basis of > any concept is a reality. There is no concept of a car without > visible data, etc. Or there might be another meaning. I'm still > thinking about it. > Any ideas? > ---------------------------- > > I am sure you are on the right track. Isn't the quote you have given > yet another elucidation of 'the All?' > > I think explanations of the All are found, expressly or impliedly > everywhere throughout the suttas. Illusions (people, places, events > etc.) are constantly becoming the objects of consciousness, but the > entire world is, "in truth and reality," just the five khandhas. > > BTW, I believe "in truth and reality" is recognised as one of the > sutta terms for "in ultimate reality" (paramattha-sacca). It seems to > me that "In brief" is another such term. E.g., in the First Sermon > (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta): > > "Birth is suffering, decay is suffering, disease is suffering, death > is suffering, to be united with the unpleasant is suffering, to be > separated from the pleasant is suffering, not to get what one desires > is suffering. In brief the five aggregates of clinging are suffering." > > Ken H > Hi Ken, I,m sure you're right. A concept, such as a name, can be the basis for the assumption of self but I guess it doesn't fall into the "extreme limit" category (ultimate realities). Larry 55211 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 2:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, TG - In a message dated 1/29/06 3:06:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Howard > > My time's a little tight today and I'm falling behind so responses below > won't be elaborate. > > In a message dated 1/28/2006 5:53:43 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, > upasaka@... writes: > > Hi, TG (and Jon) - > > In a message dated 1/28/06 4:42:04 PM Eastern Standard Time, > TGrand458@... writes: > > >Hi Jon > > > >In a message dated 1/28/2006 7:43:28 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, > > jonabbott@... writes: > > > >For some reason I usually hesitate to come in on your threads, but I > >think I'm being invited to here, so here goes ;-)). > > > >TG: I can only figure that your hesitation is due to wisdom. ;-) > > > > > > > >My understanding of sabhava as used in the commentaries is that it > >refers to the uniqueness of each kind of dhamma. To give a simple > >example, audible object ('sound') has a uniqueness, as does visible > >object, as does hearing consciousness, and so on. This uniqueness is > >not something that is in the eye of the beholder, whether wholly or > > partly (if this were not the case, then the same dhamma would not appear > > >the same to different individuals even where no ignorance or wrong view > >was arising). I see it as central to the teaching that dhammas of the > >same kind appear to panna as just that: dhammas of the same kind. > > > >I think so far there would be no disagreement from you? > > > >TG: Well I partly agree and I partly disagree. Phenomena exhibit > > distinguishable qualities. Qualities are not "in" the object" or > >phenomena, but > >qualities are exhibited by conditions. Those qualities/conditions are > >continually > > changing. > > ------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Actually, TG, this is where I think it is important to distinguish > conventional objects from paramattha dhammas. > A cube of sugar may be hard, and after being powdered it is soft - so > "it" has changed. In fact, there are different dhammas arising later than > earlier. The "powdered sugar" is a concept/percept superimposed on a > collection of > dhammas, and those are different dhammas than those that underlay the > earlier > "sugar cube". But a hardness that arises on some occasion does not become > something other than hardness. On the occasion that there is no hardness, > there > then arises with increasing intensity a hardness which then peaks, levels > off, > recedes, and finally ceases. But aside from intensity it is, throughout, > the > same quality, the same dhamma - hardness. > ---------------------------------------------- > > TG: This isn't the way I view phenomena arising and ceasing. I view > phenomena as continually transforming. I therefore believe "qualities" are > > continuously changing...some slowly and some fast...depending on > conditions. I > believe that an "experience" is also changing during that experience. ----------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I follow you. Our pictures are a bit different here. What we agree on, though, and is most important, is that nothing remains as is. (Im-permananence, a-nicca!) ---------------------------------------------- > > > > > > >Within certain limitations, those qualities will probably appear similarly > > > >to human beings. But, what I might find to be a soft jacket, someone else > > > >might find to be a hard jacket. > > > --------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, other than one's personal definition of what constitutes hard or > soft, if what person A feels is actually a soft texture, and what B feels > is > a hard texture, I'd say that they are experiencing different rupas. In > fact, > even if they were conventionally speaking touching the same jacket and both > > felt it as soft, I would not literally say they felt the same rupa, but > *corresponding* rupas. > ---------------------------------------------- > TG: I see experience as having numerous and complex variables. In > actuality, two people cannot experience the same "rupa" (phenomena) because > they > cannot be in the same place at the same time, nor are the conditional > parameters > of their minds identical. This may be what you're saying above too. ----------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, it is. ----------------------------------------------- > > > > Someone else might find it a repulsive > > >phenomena, I might find it an attractive phenomena. > > > >I might think a certain temperature is hot, someone else might think the > >same temperature is cold. The conditons/qualities of the mind perceiving > > >are > >also at play. > > ----------------------------------------- > Howard: > From my perspective, it is the actual sensa that they feel, not some > external something-or-other, and these sensa differ.That is my > phenomenalist > perspective. So, if A and B feel "the same sensation", but one finds it > pleasant > and the other unpleasant, they are *not*, on my view, the same rupa, but > two > different ones, one pleasant and the other unpleasant. And even if they > were > both pleasant, they would be different but corresponding rupas. (Of course, > > if > they are equivalent in all respects except for one being experienced by A > and > the other by B, then we can and do informally *speak* of them as "being the > > same rupa".) > ----------------------------------------- > > TG: I believe there is a Sutta where the Buddha says something like -- "An > > object to be experienced as hot is experienced as hot. An object to be > experienced as cold is experienced as cold." Its something like that but > not > exact. At any rate, I think I'm still comfortable believing that an > experience > is a combination of object, sense base, and "the mental instrument that > generates conscious" as the three come together. > > > > > > >Contact (phassa) intergrates all the factors/qualities involved in that > >contact. Such qualities do not "stand alone." This is one Principle of > > Conditionality. > > --------------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm thinking that what you mean here is that at any moment, the state > of mind consists of a number of co-occurring and mutually conditioning > factors, and they form a "whole", with no aspect independent of the others, > > and that > the mind grasps the entire state by means of a cognitive integration > operation. Is that close? > --------------------------------------- > > TG: Once again I view contact as object, sense base, and mentality. > Pretty > sure we differ in our view here. Also pretty sure mine is well aligned > with > the suttas. ---------------------------------------- Howard: I don't view contact as the package of these three, but as the event/occurrence of the three co-arising. (As an aside, I would use 'consciousness' instead of 'mentality'.) ----------------------------------------- > > I don't find your phenomenology objectionable, because from what I detect, > I > don't think it detracts a bit from detaching the mind from phenomena. Its > your own bent and the Buddha taught many bents. I don't think your > phenomenology is the outlook the Buddha presented regarding objects and > experience, on > the other hand, I can't say he would have had a problem with it. -------------------------------------------- Howard: I think that the Dhamma is phenomenological, especially as stated in such suttas as the Bahiya Sutta and the Kalakamara (or Kalaka) Sutta. But if that's not so, well, so be it. I could be wrong. ------------------------------------------ > > > "The doctrines, Upali, of which you may know: `These doctrines lead not to > > complete weariness (of the world), nor to dispassion, nor to ending, nor to > > calm, nor to knowledge, nor to the awakening, nor to the cool´ - regard > them > definitely as not Dhamma, not the discipline, not the word of the teacher. > > But the doctrines of which you may know: `These doctrines lead one to > complete > weariness, dispassion, ending, calm, knowledge, the awakening, the cool´ - > > regard them unreservedly as Dhamma, the discipline, the word of the teacher. > " > (The Buddha . . . GS, vol. 4, pg. 96 - 97) > > TG > ========================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55212 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 7:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA nilovg Hi TG, It is deeper than what you suggest. The aim is not merely thinking of foulness or impermanence. The real aim is bringing people to clearly understand nama and rupa appearing right now as a dhamma. When we think of a corpse, thinking can be understood as a dhamma, arisen because there are conditions for such thinking. No 'I' who thinks, only a type of nama. What is seen is not a corpse, only colour or visible object. When we can be aware of dhammas one at a time, we do not mind about terms, or how they are called. In this way it will be clearer what it means that different dhammas can be distinguished from one another. At this moment we may say that we have understood, but the point is, have we understood this by direct awareness? That is more convincing than reasoning about it. It takes along time before we have right understanding of the dhammas appearing through the sense-doors and the mind-door. Nina. op 28-01-2006 22:55 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > I thought viewing or reflecting on corpses was meant to highlight > impermanence and suffering and to detach the mind from states. > > The Buddha explains (paraphrasing)...understand that your body will become > like this, that it will achieve this (bloated, festered, etc.) state. This > to > me seems to be a "present mindfulness of imaginary states." 55213 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 3:13am Subject: Re: [dsg] Stream Entrant upasaka_howard Hi, Maya - In a message dated 1/29/06 12:03:57 AM Eastern Standard Time, vvhite_illusion@... writes: > Dear Dhamma Friends, > > I would like to share with you all something I learnt > from Abhidhamma Class led by Bhante Sujiva. As most > of you know a stream entrant (sotapanna) will at most > be reborn 7 more lives. What this actually means is 7 > more (realms of) existence. So supposing one is born > as a human 3 times, this still counts as 1 existence. > The reason why it's 7 more existence is because > there's 1 human realm and 6 celestial realms. So > being a sotapanna or stream entrant just guarantees > one to NOT be reborn in the woeful states (Hell, > animals,..etc..). But of course all depends on how > much effort one puts into the practice, if one > practices seriously, it is possible for anyone (or a > stream entrant) to be reborn within 1 or 2 lives. > > With Metta, > > []\/[]aya []Dutra ========================== This is very interesting! I've never heard this before, but I find it fascinating. It seems, though, that one could then make similar statements with regard to once returners, non-returners, and arahants. I suppose that a once returner would have but one realm into which further rebirths are possible. (What would that realm be?) And would a non-returner not have any further rebirths in any realm? That makes no sense, for that is the case for an arahant. This business seems confusing. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55214 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 9:30am Subject: [dsg] Re: Never enough about knowing nama from rupa, eh? ( was Atta -sa~n~na scottduncan2 Dear Nina, Thank you very much. "Jhanafactors can also be taken in a wider sense. Specific cetasikas performing their functions while accompanying citta, also citta of the sense sphere, even akusala citta. They condition citta by way of jhana-paccaya. Here we touch on the meaning of thinking closely of an object." ----- S: Jhana-paccaya is therefore applicable irrespective of the nature of a given citta. As cetasika they simply arise with a given citta and perform their functions; this is thinking closely of any object in any way (kusala or akusala). Is this correct? ----- "Also the pathfactors that can also be taken in a wider sense and condition citta by way of magga-paccaya." ----- S: In this case jhana, as pathfactor, performs a specific function of establishing the path? ----- "We can also view jhana as bhavana, mental development. There are two types: Jhana in the sense of absorption concentration, and this has as subject one of the meditation subjects which are concepts. Or it can mean: Contemplation of the three lakkhanas. This last distinction has been dealt with in the Commentaries." Thank you, the distinction seems clear now. Sincerely, Scott. 55215 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 5:30am Subject: Re: [dsg] ENTITY associated TERMS vs more NEUTRAL TERMS TGrand458@... Hi Nina In a message dated 1/28/2006 12:12:04 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi TG, But nibbaana is the fourth paramattha dhamma and it is not a conditioned but an unconditioned dhamma. What about using just the Pali terms? As Htoo said, the more simple terms are not too hard. They can be learnt. Nina. op 27-01-2006 20:55 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > Compare the two following sentences. Let's say the subject is -- the 5 > aggregates... > > 1) These Dhammas are Ultimate Realities with [their] Own Characteristics. > > 2) These Conditioned States are Actualities with Discernable Qualities. > Hi again Nina I believe in my original post I comment below these two above examples that I am not using Nibbana in the above sample due to "its" having "discernable qualities" as being controversial. I am doubtful Nibbana has a "discernable quality." Many Sutta sources seem to suggest it does not. If Nibbana indisputably had a "discernable quality," I'd gladly change the term -- "condition states" to "phenomena" in the above example. The term "dhammas" at this point is so heavily laden with controversial preconceived notions about the nature of phenomena ... "own characteristics," "ultimate realities," as well as a view of "arising/ceasing mechanics" ... that the term no longer refers strictly to rupa, nama, citta, and Nibbana in a pure way. If I were to use the terms "dhammas," many, if not most, people would tend to infuse a lot of "characteristics" into that term that I would not mean or support. Not with you, but I have notice people using English ... and then when they get to a key term with multi layered meanings, they put in the Pali term as if that somehow legitimizes and or clarifies the issue. Often , if not usually, I find it does not. That being said, using English probably has just as many if not more ways to "mis-read" it. Whatever language is used, the truth will have to be "figured out" through knowledge garnered both by ideas and by direct realization. The real test of correctness is in nature and is unencumbered by language. :-) Hope this clarifies "where I'm coming from." TG 55216 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 5:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/28/2006 12:12:25 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi TG, Of course we cling also to concepts. Nina Hi Nina I agree. A lot seem to think concepts are not real and that they cannot be clinged to. I think concepts are "mental formations" and therefore there is no problem in clinging to them. ;-) TG 55217 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 11:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] ENTITY associated TERMS vs more NEUTRAL TERMS nilovg Hi TG, op 29-01-2006 19:30 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > If Nibbana indisputably had a "discernable quality," I'd gladly change the > term -- "condition states" to "phenomena" in the above example. ------- N: yes, as Howard suggested. Nibbaana is the unconditioned element that is experienced by lokuttara citta. But for worldlings it is not discerned. ---------- TG: Whatever language is used, the truth will have to be > "figured out" through knowledge garnered both by ideas and by direct > realization. > > The real test of correctness is in nature and is unencumbered by language. ------- N: Here we see eye to eye. Nina. 55218 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 11:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA nilovg Hi TG< The term mental formations is usually reserved for sankhaarakkhandha, the khandha of cetasikas, other than feeling and remembrance. Perhaps you mean: created by the mind. Clinging clings to anything, indeed, it is no problem for clinging to cling. That is its specific quality! Nina. op 29-01-2006 19:34 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > I think concepts are "mental formations" and therefore there is > no problem in clinging to them. ;-) 55219 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 11:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Stream Entrant nilovg Dear Maya, thank you for your post. I translated a study about this from Thai some years ago and will repost part of it, thinking that it may interest you. Because of the expression, he goes from clan to clan I think that he is also reborn as a human, but in wealthy families. <1. We read in the ³Saddhammappakåsiní², Commentary to the ³Path of Discrimination² about three types of sotåpanna: 1. The sotåpanna who is reborn seven times at most, sattakkhattuparama. 2. The sotåpanna who goes from clan to clan, kolaòkola. 3. The sotåpanna with a single seed, ekabíjin. We read: ³As to the words, of the person who is reborn seven times at most (sattakkhattuparamassa), this means that seven times is the most, and that he will not assume an eighth rebirth after he became this person. Thus he is a sotåpanna who is reborn seven times at most, sattakkhattuparama. As to the words, of the goer from clan to clan (kolaòkolassa), this means that he is not born in a lower clan, but only in a wealthy family so that he can realize the fruition of the sotåpanna. This is the sotåpanna who goes from clan to clan, kolaòkola. As to the words, with a single seed, ekabíjin, it is said that seed means the seed of the khandhas. This sotåpanna germinates the khandhas only once more. He has to assume only one more existence and thus he is called ³single seeded². The Buddha created these different names for these sotåpannas. The person who is called ³seven times at most², sattakkhattuparama, has reached just this status. The person who is called ³who goes from clan to clan², kolaòkola, has reached just this status. The person who is called ³with a single seed², ekabíjin, has reached just this status. These are the names the Buddha gave to those persons. Truly, the Buddha knew what status such and such people would reach and thus he created the appropriate names for them. It is true that the sotåpanna whose understanding is weak will be reborn seven times, and he is called, ³who will be reborn seven times at most². The sotapanna whose understanding is of medium degree will not be reborn after the sixth existence, and he is called ³who goes from clan to clan². The sotåpanna who has strong understanding will only be reborn once, and he is called ³single seeded². The fact that sotåpannas have different degrees of understanding, weak, medium and strong, is determined by conditions stemming from the past. These three kinds of sotåpanna have been referred to as having rebirth in the sensuous planes. However, many of them were reborn also in the planes of rúpa brahmas and arúpa brahmas.² It can be concluded that the sotåpanna does not have an eighth rebirth. He will not be reborn more than seven times, no matter whether he is reborn in the sense planes, in the planes of the rúpa brahmas or arúpa brahmas. 2. The ³Dispeller of Delusion², Ch 16, Classification of Knowledge, Decads, 2162, explains about the remaining rebirths of each class of sotåpannas, and in particular about the sotåpanna who is attached to life in the process of existence (vatta, the cycle of birth and death). We read: ³For the Master, after judging with the Buddha¹s judgement, after defining with omniscient knowledge that: ŒThis person has the greatest understanding of all and keen insight and he will grasp Arahatship after producing one existence more only,¹ created the name ŒOne with a single seed¹ (ekabíjin); [knowing] that: ŒThis person will grasp Arahatship after producing a second, a third, a fourth, a fifth, a sixth existence,¹ he created the name ŒOne who goes from clan to clan¹ (kolaòkola); [knowing] that: ŒThis person will grasp Arahatship after producing the seventh existence,¹ he created the name Œseven times at most¹ (sattakkhattuparama). But there is no person who is certain of seven existences. But the Noble Disciple attains complete extinction before the eight existence in whatever way his understanding is slow. He only goes to a seventh existence, even if he enjoys the process [of existence] as much as Sakka. In the seventh existence, even if he lives in all negligence, his insight knowledge comes to ripen. Feeling revulsion for even the smallest object, he arrives at peace.² 3. The ³Pañcappakaraùatthakathå², Commentary to the ³Puggalapaññatti², ³Human Types², Ch I, by One, 39, ³single-seeded², ekabíjin, explains about the sotåpanna who enjoys the cycle of birth and death: ³Some sotåpannas are inclined to life in the cycle, they enjoy the process of existence and they traverse different lives. The following people had this inclination: Anåthapindika the layfollower Visåkhå Cúlaratha deva Mahåratha deva Anekavanna deva Sakka, King of the devas Någadatta deva All these people had attachment to life in the cycle of birth and death. They were born in the six classes of deva worlds, beginning with the lowest class, and they purified their minds in those deva worlds. They were established in the plane of akanittha and then attained parinibbåna. ... The sotåpannas who were reborn in the human world and were there reborn again, were reborn not more than seven times and then attained arahatship. The sotåpannas who were reborn in the deva worlds were there reborn again, but they were reborn not more than seven times and then attained arahatship. ......² The ³Sumangalavilåsinií², Commentary to the ³Dialogues of the Buddha², Commentary to the ³Questions of Sakka² (II, no 21), gives an additional explanation about the rebirth of Sakka, the King of Devas: ³It is said that after departing from this existence as Sakka, he will go upwards in the stream of life to the plane of akaniììha, because of his attainment to the stage of anågåmí. After his birth in the Aviha plane and so on he will finally be born as a brahma of the akaniììha plane.² We see from the texts that even the sotåpanna who was attached to life in the cycle, such as King Sakka, would only be reborn seven times. Therefore, sotåpannas will not be reborn more than seven times, no matter whether they are reborn only in the human world, or only in the deva planes, or in both kinds of planes. Or even if they are reborn in the devaplane until they attain the stage of the anågåmí and are then reborn in five classes of the Pure Abodes and attain arahatship in the akanittha plane, they will not be reborn more than seven times. ****** Nina. Nina. op 29-01-2006 06:01 schreef Maya Putra op vvhite_illusion@...: > I would like to share with you all something I learnt > from Abhidhamma Class led by Bhante Sujiva. As most > of you know a stream entrant (sotapanna) will at most > be reborn 7 more lives. 55220 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 11:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Never enough about knowing nama from rupa, eh? ( was Atta -sa~n~na nilovg Dear Scott, No. For instance, akusala viriya, wrong effort is also a Path factor, namely of the wrong Path. It is important to know whether viriya is kusala or akusala, but this is not always clear. One may mislead oneself. Nina. op 29-01-2006 18:30 schreef Scott Duncan op scduncan@...: > In this case jhana, as pathfactor, performs a specific function of > establishing the path? 55221 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 6:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... TGrand458@... Hi Jon In a message dated 1/29/2006 6:53:11 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: Hi TG TGrand458@... wrote: >Hi Jon > >In a message dated 1/28/2006 7:43:28 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, >jonabbott@... writes: > >For some reason I usually hesitate to come in on your threads, but I >think I'm being invited to here, so here goes ;-)). > >TG: I can only figure that your hesitation is due to wisdom. ;-) > > If only that were true ... ;-)) >TG: Well I partly agree and I partly disagree. Phenomena exhibit >distinguishable qualities. Qualities are not "in" the object" or phenomena, but >qualities are exhibited by conditions. Those qualities/conditions are continually > changing. > >Within certain limitations, those qualities will probably appear similarly >to human beings. But, what I might find to be a soft jacket, someone else >might find to be a hard jacket. Someone else might find it a repulsive >phenomena, I might find it an attractive phenomena. > > I can see that our differences lie deeper than choice of terminology ;-)). The uniqueness spoken of in the texts is not, to my understanding, something that is to any extent dependent on the individual's perceptin of the experience. In the case of, for example, audible object, it is the 'characteristic' (for want of a better word) that is peculiar to, *and common to*, all instances of audible object regardless of whether in a particular case the audible object is perceived as loud or soft, pleasant or unpleasant, clear or indistinct, etc. This 'characteristic' is the same for each instance of audible object. This is what is being discussed in the texts. TG: 1) In the case of audible-object, what is the characteristic that is unique to it? Is it compaction/rarefaction? 2) If a living thing could see audible-objects, would it still be the same characteristic? Sounds to me like you're saying yes. PS, I'm not trying to trap you with either of these questions. (Wish I was.) ;-) > I might think a certain temperature is hot, someone else might think the >same temperature is cold. The conditons/qualities of the mind perceiving are >also at play. > > The conditions/qualities of the mind perceiving are themselves dhammas with different 'characteristics', and these have no bearing on the 'characteristic' of the object being experienced. Thus temperature has a unique 'characteristic' that is independent of the degree of temperature involved. It is this 'characteristic' that distinguishes temperature from, say, audible object. TG: Did you know that sounds waves cause temperature changes? These temperature changes are integral aspects of audible-objects. Interesting eh? This being the case, would it make sense to say that audible-objects are devoid of a "temperature quality"? Remember now, you said the "receiver" was a non-factor. Still interested in what the "unique characteristics" of audible-object are. All bets are off. Looks like I'm going for a trap now. And I was trying to be so good. ;-) Differences in perception of the 'same' dhammas are a different subject altogether. >Contact (phassa) intergrates all the factors/qualities involved in that >contact. Such qualities do not "stand alone." This is one Principle of >Conditionality. > > This is quite a departure from the standard 'model' assumed by the texts, I believe. The idea of the 'Principles of Conditionality' is new to me. TG: Thank you. ...Blushing with modesty... >TG: If the writers on this subject would have merely used the term >"characteristic," I would have never commented on it. There seems to me to be a >subtle attempt to describe "dhammas" as things that exist unto themselves. Hence >"own characteristic." "Own characteristic" was already a softening from >"individual essence." Although I prefer "quality," I can live with >"characteristic." > >Again, the terms don't bother me nearly as much as what I see as a subtle >viewpoint of seeing things with their own essence. This viewpoint runs counter >to conditionality insight IMO. > >The way "dhammas," ultimate realities," and own characteristics" are used in >conjunction with each other reinforces my feeling. Its actually a larger >issue than what's been addressed so far but one thing at a time. > > Is it possible you have not fully appreciated the context in which the commentarial passages are to be read? They are not of course saying that the same sound is perceived as equally loud or pleasant by every individual, only that there is a 'characteristic' to sound that is both unique to and common to all instances of sound. Does this really sound substantialist (no pun intended)? TG: Is it possible that I have not FULLY understood some of the most brilliant minds in the history of humankind? ............. maybe a chance in a million. LOL More seriously though... is the unique quality of sound under water the same unique quality that we have in the air? I do expect a yes answer but I'm not sure. Substantialist sounding? ... maybe. Its so so depending on where you're coming from. It may not be substantialist. It is a different way in understanding conditionality than I understand it. >TG: Well, a term can be used in a way to counter the meaning of the >Buddha's teaching. > Ah, but then it is the *particular use* of the term, and not the term itself that is the 'problem' ;-)) TG: Generally Agreed. It is how the term is used. However, a term like sabhava, that is flatly denied as applying to "realities" in the Patisambhidamagga, seems like a poor choice to claim what "realities" have. ;-) >When the term "own characteristic" is being used, it IS being used to make a >judgement about ultimate reality. Therefore its standard of accuracy must >reach a much higher level and is subject to more critical scrutiny IMO. > > Yes, but we need to understand exactly what is being asserted (and what is not). TG: Yes. Jon TG 55222 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 11:58am Subject: [dsg] Re: Never enough about knowing nama from rupa, eh? ( was Atta -sa~n~na scottduncan2 "No. For instance, akusala viriya, wrong effort is also a Path factor, namely of the wrong Path. It is important to know whether viriya is kusala or akusala, but this is not always clear. One may mislead oneself." Nina. Dear Nina, Thanks again. I'll get the right straight from wrong if its the last thing I do (melodrama for purposes of humour only, of course). Sincerely, Scott. 55223 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 2:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA upasaka_howard Hi, Ken (and Larry) - In a message dated 1/29/06 2:42:54 AM Eastern Standard Time, kenhowa@... writes: > > Hi Larry, > > ----- > L: >I don't understand it myself but it is the case that > upadanakhandhas are the only objects of clinging in the suttas. > Notice Vism.XIV,218: > > "And this is the extreme limit as the basis for the assumption of > self and what pertains to self, that is to say, the five beginning > with materiality." > > This is about self clinging but I think it would apply to any > clinging. Perhaps the key word is "basis". We might say the basis of > any concept is a reality. There is no concept of a car without > visible data, etc. Or there might be another meaning. I'm still > thinking about it. > Any ideas? > ---------------------------- > > I am sure you are on the right track. Isn't the quote you have given > yet another elucidation of 'the All?' > > I think explanations of the All are found, expressly or impliedly > everywhere throughout the suttas. Illusions (people, places, events > etc.) are constantly becoming the objects of consciousness, but the > entire world is, "in truth and reality," just the five khandhas. > > BTW, I believe "in truth and reality" is recognised as one of the > sutta terms for "in ultimate reality" (paramattha-sacca). It seems to > me that "In brief" is another such term. E.g., in the First Sermon > (Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta): > > "Birth is suffering, decay is suffering, disease is suffering, death > is suffering, to be united with the unpleasant is suffering, to be > separated from the pleasant is suffering, not to get what one desires > is suffering. In brief the five aggregates of clinging are suffering." > > Ken H > ========================= Ken, I applaud what you said here and how you expressed it. I think you are right on target. I would only add that I think it is also very important to remember that the multitude of elements of the all are not isolated, stand-alone, and self-existent phenomena, but are mutually dependent within a huge, dynamic, patterned network of interrelationships and subnetworks of interrelationships. By keeping that in mind, we not only avoid missing the trees for the forest, but also avoid missing the forest for the trees. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55224 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 9:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... TGrand458@... Hi Howard Just two responses... In a message dated 1/29/2006 8:46:06 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: > TG: Once again I view contact as object, sense base, and mentality. > Pretty > sure we differ in our view here. Also pretty sure mine is well aligned > with > the suttas. ---------------------------------------- Howard: I don't view contact as the package of these three, but as the event/occurrence of the three co-arising. (As an aside, I would use 'consciousness' instead of 'mentality'.) ----------------------------------------- TG: Yes, we see that differently. I would say that the structures/energies/conditions of a sense-object and eye-base are the forces that affectuate mentality or mental responses of consciousness and its associations. I would not see them as "co-arisng" ... unless you mean "co-ariseing" of the experience. Then I would agree with you. I've posted this sutta before and I'll post it again... "Monks, consciousness comes to be in dependence on a dyad. And how, monks, does consciousness come to be in dependence on a dyad? In dependence on eye and forms there arises eye-consciousness. The eye is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise; forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Thus this dyad is moving and tottering, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. "Eye-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness is also impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. When, monks, eye-consciousness has arisen in dependence on a condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent? "The meeting, the encounter, the occurrence of these three things is called eye-contact. Eye-contact too is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause and condition for the arising of eye-contact is also impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. When, monks, eye-contact has arisen in dependence on a condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent? "Contacted, monks, one feels, contacted one intends, contacted one perceives. Thus these things too are moving and tottering, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. [The Buddha proceeds to analyze the ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness in the same manner and finishes with...] "It is in such a way, monks, that consciousness comes to be in dependence on a dyad." (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 2, pg. 1172) > > I don't find your phenomenology objectionable, because from what I detect, > I > don't think it detracts a bit from detaching the mind from phenomena. Its > your own bent and the Buddha taught many bents. I don't think your > phenomenology is the outlook the Buddha presented regarding objects and > experience, on > the other hand, I can't say he would have had a problem with it. -------------------------------------------- Howard: I think that the Dhamma is phenomenological, especially as stated in such suttas as the Bahiya Sutta and the Kalakamara (or Kalaka) Sutta. But if that's not so, well, so be it. I could be wrong. TG: The Buddha's teaching in my view are speaking about a 'world condition' in a much more far reaching way than mere phenomenology. Phenomenology is an important aspect of those teachings. But it limits the scope of the Buddha's teaching to narrow it down to that. Because that outlook is so crucial for you, it may serve you well to focus right there. Again, all this said and yet there is no full way I know exactly what you're talking about and probably vice versa. I don't make decisions about dhamma based on one or two suttas but from what I hope is a common sense and sensible extraction from all of them...at least the 4 Great Nikayas. I suspect that's true for you as well. TG 55225 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 10:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, TG - In a message dated 1/29/06 5:21:31 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Just two responses... > > > In a message dated 1/29/2006 8:46:06 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, > upasaka@... writes: > > > TG: Once again I view contact as object, sense base, and mentality. > >Pretty > >sure we differ in our view here. Also pretty sure mine is well aligned > >with > > the suttas. > > ---------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't view contact as the package of these three, but as the > event/occurrence of the three co-arising. (As an aside, I would use > 'consciousness' > instead of 'mentality'.) > ----------------------------------------- > > TG: Yes, we see that differently. I would say that the > structures/energies/conditions of a sense-object and eye-base are the forces > that affectuate > mentality or mental responses of consciousness and its associations. I > would > not see them as "co-arisng" ... unless you mean "co-ariseing" of the > experience. Then I would agree with you. I've posted this sutta before > and I'll post > it again... --------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not at all sure I follow what you are saying here, TG, but in the sutta you quote below there is the following: "The meeting, the encounter, the occurrence of these three things is called eye-contact." The meeting, the encounter, the occurrence : that is what I mean. It is that meeting, that encounter, that occurrence of the three that I consider to be the contact, not the three-member aggregate. Contact is an event, not a set. --------------------------------------------- > > > "Monks, consciousness comes to be in dependence on a dyad. And how, monks, > > does consciousness come to be in dependence on a dyad? In dependence on > eye > and forms there arises eye-consciousness. The eye is impermanent, > changing, > becoming otherwise; forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. > Thus this dyad is moving and tottering, impermanent, changing, becoming > otherwise. > "Eye-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause > > and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness is also impermanent, > changing, becoming otherwise. When, monks, eye-consciousness has arisen in > dependence on a condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent? > "The meeting, the encounter, the occurrence of these three things is called > > eye-contact. Eye-contact too is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. > > The cause and condition for the arising of eye-contact is also impermanent, > > changing, becoming otherwise. When, monks, eye-contact has arisen in > dependence on a condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent? > "Contacted, monks, one feels, contacted one intends, contacted one > perceives. Thus these things too are moving and tottering, impermanent, > changing, > becoming otherwise. > [The Buddha proceeds to analyze the ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, > > tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness in the same > > manner and finishes with...] > "It is in such a way, monks, that consciousness comes to be in dependence > on > a dyad." > (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 2, pg. 1172) > > > > > > >I don't find your phenomenology objectionable, because from what I detect, > > > >I > >don't think it detracts a bit from detaching the mind from phenomena. > Its > >your own bent and the Buddha taught many bents. I don't think your > >phenomenology is the outlook the Buddha presented regarding objects and > > experience, on > >the other hand, I can't say he would have had a problem with it. > > -------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I think that the Dhamma is phenomenological, especially as stated in > such suttas as the Bahiya Sutta and the Kalakamara (or Kalaka) Sutta. But > if > that's not so, well, so be it. I could be wrong. > > > TG: The Buddha's teaching in my view are speaking about a 'world condition' > > in a much more far reaching way than mere phenomenology. Phenomenology is > an > important aspect of those teachings. But it limits the scope of the > Buddha's teaching to narrow it down to that. Because that outlook is so > crucial for > you, it may serve you well to focus right there. --------------------------------------------- Howard: My perspective is not to restrict the range of the Buddha's teaching to something less than the entire world. It is a perspective on what according the Buddha *is* the world. Look at how the Buddha defined it. I don't know the sutta, but it says that the world is found in this very body and mind! The whole world is nothing but sight, sound, taste, smell, touch, and mentality. (Perhaps someone else here has the reference.) ------------------------------------------------- > > Again, all this said and yet there is no full way I know exactly what > you're > talking about and probably vice versa. > > I don't make decisions about dhamma based on one or two suttas but from > what > I hope is a common sense and sensible extraction from all of them...at > least > the 4 Great Nikayas. I suspect that's true for you as well. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. ------------------------------------------------ > > TG > > ======================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55226 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 3:59pm Subject: Re: Never enough about knowing nama from rupa, eh? ( was Atta -sa~n~na kenhowardau Hi Scott, To recap my understanding of this issue: All kusala consciousness is accompanied by mental calm and either pleasant or neutral feeling. However, ordinary people find it hard to know kusala from akusala (e.g., kindness from affection), and it doesn't help that some akusala consciousness is accompanied by pleasant or neutral feeling (that can be easily mistaken for kusala feeling and mental calm). People with the necessary accumulated wisdom can know the difference. And that gives them the opportunity to develop kusala calm without accidentally developing its near enemy. When they are really, really good at knowing the difference between kusala and akusala, they can know the difference between concentrating on an inanimate object (e.g., a kasina) with detachment and mental calm and concentrating on an inanimate object with attachment and akusala feeling. There are no shortcuts: if the necessary wisdom (panna cetasika) has not been developed then it is useless (or even harmful) to be staring at a kasina, or concentrating on any meditation object, hoping for, or imagining (being attached to the idea of), mental calm. ----------------------------- S: > You state that "jhana has a concept as its object." What do you mean exactly? Again from Abhidhamma in Daily Life: ". . . jhaanacittas do not have as their object, visible object, sound, or any other sense door impression. Jhaanacittas arise in a process of cittas experiencing a meditation subject through the mind door." Which of the "mind objects" are paramattha dhammas and which are not? I do need some help here. Citta is a paramattha dhamma. Jhaanacitta is citta. Jhaanacitta is a paramattha dhamma. Is "meditation subject through the mind door" a paramattha dhamma? I would guess so (since I'd guess it would be nama) but I don't know. ----------------------------- Ideally, this is the place to start Dhamma study. It is good if we can regularly forget about our special interests (jhana, nibbana or whatever) and start again from the beginning - learning the difference between concepts and realities (paramattha dhammas and pannatti). I'd better not ramble on too long, but to give one example; visible object is an absolute reality. It is a rupa, and it is the paramattha dhamma that is experienced by seeing-consciousness (and later by mind-door consciousness). On the other hand; tables, people and other things that we think we can see are not rupas - they are mere concepts. They are ultimately illusory and they are experienced only by the mind-door consciousness that creates them. Various kinds of concepts can be suitable objects for jhana, but the Buddha taught an entirely new and better form of mental development - vipassana. Vipassana is kusala consciousness, accompanied by insight, which takes a paramattha dhamma as its object. ---------------------------- <. . .> S: > In AN IV.170 (Yuganaddha Sutta), four paths are outlined. One is "insight preceded by tranquility;" two is "tranquility preceded by insight;" three is tranquility in tandem with insight; and four is a difficult passage regarding something I don't quite understand involving "control over the corruptions of insight leading to the path being born in one." (This latter is beyond me, I'm afraid.) At any rate, again, jhaana needs accompaniment by insight (vipassana). ----------------------------- I think this sutta is vital for all Dhamma students. The fourth path is the way of the sukkhavipassaka (one who is freed by vipassana alone). The third path is the way of the most exceptional of all beings - the arahant who was released both ways (by jhana and vipassana). Those arahants have great powers (abhinnas). The first and second paths, I'm not too sure of. I believe the first path leads to particularly intense experiences of nibbana (at the moment of enlightenment) with concentration at the level of the second jhana or higher. As for the second path, all I know is it gives an arahant the option of a more "pleasant abiding" than would have been the case had he not developed jhana. As you can see, I don't know the details, but I still think this sutta is important. It plainly verifies the many other indications throughout the suttas that jhana is not necessary for enlightenment. Ken H 55227 From: "Christine Forsyth" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 4:15pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... christine_fo... --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > --------------------------------------------- > Howard: > My perspective is not to restrict the range of the Buddha's teaching > to something less than the entire world. It is a perspective on what according > the Buddha *is* the world. Look at how the Buddha defined it. I don't know the > sutta, but it says that the world is found in this very body and mind! The > whole world is nothing but sight, sound, taste, smell, touch, and mentality. > (Perhaps someone else here has the reference.) > ------------------------------------------------- Hello Howard, TG, all, Sa.myutta Nikaaya IV The ook of the Six Sense Bases (Sa.laayatanavagga) 35. Sa.laayatansa.myutta III The All 23 (1) The All At Saavatthi. "Bhikkhus, I will teach you the all. [6] Listen to that .... "And what,bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all. "If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: 'Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all' - that would be a mere empty boast on his part. [7] If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain." [8] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Note [6] Spk: The all (sabba) is fourfold: (i) the all- inclusive all (sabbasabba), i.e. everything knowable, all of which comes into range of the Buddha's knowledge of omniscience; (ii) the all of the sense bases (aayatanasabba), i.e. the phenomena of the four planes; (iii) the all of personal identity (sakkaayasabba), i.e. the phenomena of the three planes; and (iv) the partial all (padesasabbba), i.e. the five physical sense objects. Each of these, from (i) to (iv), has a successively narrower range than its predecessor. In this sutta the all of the sense bases is intended. The four planes are the three mundane planes and the supramundane plane (the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbaana). Note [7] Tassa vaaacaavatthur ev' assa. Spk: It would be just a mere utterance. But if one passes over the twelve sense bases, one cannot point out any real phenomenon. Note [8] Yathaa ta.m bhikkhave avisayasmi.m. Spk: People become vexed when they go outside their domain. Just as it is outside one's domain to cross a deep body of water while carrying a stone palace on one's head, or to drag the sun and moon off their course, and one would only meet with vexation if one makes the attempt, so too in this case. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ metta Chris ---The trouble is that you think you have time--- 55228 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 11:19am Subject: Samvega/Urgency upasaka_howard Hi, all - This coming Wednesday I will be attending the third funeral within a 2-week period. This one is for a lovely woman, the mother of a good friend, who led a fulfilling and long life. (We just attended her 90th birthday a couple months ago.) One of the previous two funerals was for a woman we know who was only in her 60's when she died after much sufferering from cancer, and the other was for a dear friend of ours, also a woman, who died at 74 after an unexpected cerebral hemorrhage. Death will come to us all, that is a certainty. It also can come at any time, and we cannot know when that moment will arrive. The time to practice the Dhamma is now, right now. We must do no harm, do good, and purify the mind. In his very last sutta, the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, the Buddha, before passing away, admonished us as follows: "Behold now, bhikkhus, I exhort you: All compounded things are subject to vanish. Strive with earnestness!" I copy below excerpts from two suttas that further point out the urgency of not wasting a precious moment. With metta, Howard From SN III.25: The Simile of the Mountains Like massive boulders, mountains pressing against the sky, moving in from all sides, crushing the four directions, so aging and death come rolling over living beings: noble warriors, priests, merchants, workers, outcastes, & scavengers. They spare nothing. They trample everything. Here elephant troops can hold no ground, nor can chariots or infantry, nor can a battle of wits or wealth win out. So a wise person, seeing his own good, steadfast, secures confidence in the Buddha, Dhamma, & Sangha. One who practices the Dhamma in thought, word, & deed, receives praise here on earth and after death rejoices in heaven. ___________________________ From MN 131: An Auspicious Day You shouldn't chase after the past or place expectations on the future. What is past is left behind. The future is as yet unreached. Whatever quality is present you clearly see right there, right there. Not taken in, unshaken, that's how you develop the heart. Ardently doing what should be done today, for - who knows? - tomorrow death. There is no bargaining with Mortality & his mighty horde. Whoever lives thus ardently, relentlessly both day & night, has truly had an auspicious day: so says the Peaceful Sage. 55229 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 11:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, Chris - Thank you for this. Yes, the Sabba Sutta captures it. There is also another sutta that speaks not of the all but of the world. It speaks of the world being found right here in this very body with mentality, or something along those lines. I simply can't recall the sutta! :-( With metta, Howard In a message dated 1/29/06 7:16:19 PM Eastern Standard Time, cforsyth1@... writes: > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > > >--------------------------------------------- > >Howard: > > My perspective is not to restrict the range of the Buddha's > teaching > >to something less than the entire world. It is a perspective on > what according > >the Buddha *is* the world. Look at how the Buddha defined it. I > don't know the > >sutta, but it says that the world is found in this very body and > mind! The > >whole world is nothing but sight, sound, taste, smell, touch, and > mentality. > >(Perhaps someone else here has the reference.) > >------------------------------------------------- > Hello Howard, TG, all, > > Sa.myutta Nikaaya IV The ook of the Six Sense Bases > (Sa.laayatanavagga) 35. Sa.laayatansa.myutta III The All > 23 (1) The All > > At Saavatthi. "Bhikkhus, I will teach you the all. [6] Listen to > that .... > "And what,bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and > sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and > tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the > all. > "If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: 'Having rejected this all, > I shall make known another all' - that would be a mere empty boast > on his part. [7] If he were questioned he would not be able to reply > and, further, he would meet with vexation. For what reason? > Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain." [8] > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Note [6] Spk: The all (sabba) is fourfold: (i) the all- > inclusive all (sabbasabba), i.e. everything knowable, all of which > comes into range of the Buddha's knowledge of omniscience; (ii) the > all of the sense bases (aayatanasabba), i.e. the phenomena of the > four planes; (iii) the all of personal identity (sakkaayasabba), > i.e. the phenomena of the three planes; and (iv) the partial all > (padesasabbba), i.e. the five physical sense objects. Each of > these, from (i) to (iv), has a successively narrower range than its > predecessor. In this sutta the all of the sense bases is intended. > The four planes are the three mundane planes and the > supramundane plane (the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbaana). > > Note [7] Tassa vaaacaavatthur ev' assa. Spk: It would be just a > mere utterance. But if one passes over the twelve sense bases, one > cannot point out any real phenomenon. > > Note [8] Yathaa ta.m bhikkhave avisayasmi.m. Spk: People become > vexed when they go outside their domain. Just as it is outside > one's domain to cross a deep body of water while carrying a stone > palace on one's head, or to drag the sun and moon off their course, > and one would only meet with vexation if one makes the attempt, so > too in this case. > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > metta > Chris > ---The trouble is that you think you have time--- > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55230 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 4:28pm Subject: Re: Stream Entrant / Charles scottduncan2 "Well a sotapanna can be reborn again in the human world if he so wishes..." Dear Maya, If I may, a question. I would like to know more regarding the assertion that a sotapanna can choose rebirth in a particular plane of existence. Without wishing to be contentious, I had thought this was more of a Mahayana doctrine. If it is not then I'd like to know more . . . Thank you for your kind consideration. Sincerely, Scott. > 55231 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 11:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, Chris and all - Here it is: "Friend, that there is a world's end where one is neither born nor ages nor dies, nor passes away nor reappears, which is to be known or seen or reached by traveling there - that I do not say. Yet I do not say that there is ending of suffering without reaching the world's end. Rather it is in this fathom-long carcass with its perceptions and its mind that I describe the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world, and the way leading to the cessation of the world."- S. II. 36, A. IV. 46, trans, Ven. Ñanamoli With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55232 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 4:44pm Subject: Re: Samvega/Urgency scottduncan2 "Death will come to us all, that is a certainty." Dear Howard, Much thanks for your excellent post. Totally true. Now is the time. Sincerely, Scott 55233 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 0:06pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA TGrand458@... Hi Nina In a message dated 1/29/2006 8:56:07 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Nina. op 28-01-2006 22:55 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > I thought viewing or reflecting on corpses was meant to highlight > impermanence and suffering and to detach the mind from states. > > The Buddha explains (paraphrasing)...understand that your body will become > like this, that it will achieve this (bloated, festered, etc.) state. This > to > me seems to be a "present mindfulness of imaginary states." Hi TG, It is deeper than what you suggest. The aim is not merely thinking of foulness or impermanence. The real aim is bringing people to clearly understand nama and rupa appearing right now as a dhamma. TG: It is much deeper than either of us have described. "Whatever is felt is included within suffering. That has been stated by me with reference to the impermanence of formations. That has been stated by me with reference to formations being subject to destruction ... to formations being subject to vanishing ... to formations being subject to fading away ... to formations being subject to cessation ... to formations being subject to change. " (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 2, pg. 1271) "...when the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it eliminates all sensual lust, it eliminates all lust for existence, it eliminates all ignorance, it uproots all conceit `I am.´" (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 1, pg. 961) As the Sutta above shows, impermanence never lacks depth. When we think of a corpse, thinking can be understood as a dhamma, arisen because there are conditions for such thinking. No 'I' who thinks, only a type of nama. What is seen is not a corpse, only colour or visible object. TG: I strongly disagree. I don't think this is at all what the Buddha is talking about in the 'corpse mindfulness passage' of the Satipatthana Sutta. If you are going to interpret this passage like this...why pay any attention to what the Buddha is saying? If this is the way to approach the Suttas, any topic and any discourse would just resolve to this same analysis. Many discourses give ample opportunity to interpret the Buddha "somewhat" along 'your' lines of nama/rupa analysis. This very sutta is loaded with such examples. This particular passage is not one of them. I don't believe the Buddha is in any way trying to say -- "this is not a corpse, only color or visible object." In fact, such an interpretation takes all the power out of the passage!!! The Buddha wants you to know VERY CLEARLY -- YOU WILL DIE...IMAGINE YOU BEING LIKE THIS CORPSE. I think its sad to take that message out and replace it with -- the corpse is only color, etc. Where's the Dukkha in color? When we can be aware of dhammas one at a time, we do not mind about terms, or how they are called. In this way it will be clearer what it means that different dhammas can be distinguished from one another. At this moment we may say that we have understood, but the point is, have we understood this by direct awareness? That is more convincing than reasoning about it. It takes along time before we have right understanding of the dhammas appearing through the sense-doors and the mind-door. TG: Yes I understand about direct knowledge. Its Buddhism 102. (maybe 202) Direct knowledge is a means-to-an-end. It is NOT the end. "...you should clearly see the eye...ear...nose...tongue...body...mind as it really is with correct wisdom thus: `This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.´ This itself is the end of suffering." (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 2, pg. 1156) Notice the Buddha tells us to clearly understand these elements...and he tells us HOW to understand them...as not mine, etc. He does not tells us to understand them as ultimate realities with their own characteristics. That means he knows his audience already understands that and is teacher here at a higher level. "The topmost achievement is the release-without-grasping, by seeing as it really is the arising and the ceasing, the attraction, the danger, and the escape from the six spheres of contact." [Visual, audible, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental] (The Buddha . . . GS vol. 5, pg. 45) "...without directly knowing and fully understanding the eye, without developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying suffering. Without directly knowing and fully understanding the ear ... nose ... tongue ... body ... mind, without developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying suffering. But by directly knowing and fully understanding the eye ... mind, by developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one is capable of destroying suffering." (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 2, pg. 1186) These passages deal with direct knowledge. The direct knowledge is a means to actually ABANDON the actualities of nama and rupa. Abandoning them is a higher achievement than "paying attention to them." What you keep stressing is an intermediate level of Buddhist practice IMO. Yet the way you stress it makes me thing you think its the highest level. Its really just "one piece" of a vast network of related knowledge the Buddha taught and I respectfully think you're a little over obsessed with it. I also think that such 'focused vision' takes away from the broad spectrum of understanding found in the Discourses. Hate to sound so critical, don't want to, but it is meant to be clear communication of important ideas. Best Wishes, TG 55234 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 0:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/29/2006 12:28:47 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi TG< The term mental formations is usually reserved for sankhaarakkhandha, the khandha of cetasikas, other than feeling and remembrance. Perhaps you mean: created by the mind. Clinging clings to anything, indeed, it is no problem for clinging to cling. That is its specific quality! Nina. op 29-01-2006 19:34 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > I think concepts are "mental formations" and therefore there is > no problem in clinging to them. ;-) Hi Nina Yes I know and that was what I was referring to. Since that isn't what you had in mind, and you also think concepts can be clung to ... what is it that you think is clung to? TG 55235 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 0:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] ENTITY associated TERMS vs more NEUTRAL TERMS TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/29/2006 12:28:55 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: The real test of correctness is in nature and is unencumbered by language. ------- N: Here we see eye to eye. Nina. YES! :-) 55236 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 0:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... TGrand458@... Hi Howard Two comments below... In a message dated 1/29/2006 4:11:36 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Hi, TG - In a message dated 1/29/06 5:21:31 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Just two responses... > > > In a message dated 1/29/2006 8:46:06 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, > upasaka@... writes: > > > TG: Once again I view contact as object, sense base, and mentality. > >Pretty > >sure we differ in our view here. Also pretty sure mine is well aligned > >with > > the suttas. > > ---------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't view contact as the package of these three, but as the > event/occurrence of the three co-arising. (As an aside, I would use > 'consciousness' > instead of 'mentality'.) > ----------------------------------------- > > TG: Yes, we see that differently. I would say that the > structures/energies/conditions of a sense-object and eye-base are the forces > that affectuate > mentality or mental responses of consciousness and its associations. I > would > not see them as "co-arisng" ... unless you mean "co-ariseing" of the > experience. Then I would agree with you. I've posted this sutta before > and I'll post > it again... --------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not at all sure I follow what you are saying here, TG, but in the sutta you quote below there is the following: "The meeting, the encounter, the occurrence of these three things is called eye-contact." The meeting, the encounter, the occurrence : that is what I mean. It is that meeting, that encounter, that occurrence of the three that I consider to be the contact, not the three-member aggregate. Contact is an event, not a set. --------------------------------------------- TG: I'm not sure what you're saying either, but I agree with the sutta word for word. LOL However, even though we both agree with the sutta, I have a feeling we apply it differently to two different models of thought. Or perhaps we just have a "failure to communicate." LOL > > > "Monks, consciousness comes to be in dependence on a dyad. And how, monks, > > does consciousness come to be in dependence on a dyad? In dependence on > eye > and forms there arises eye-consciousness. The eye is impermanent, > changing, > becoming otherwise; forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. > Thus this dyad is moving and tottering, impermanent, changing, becoming > otherwise. > "Eye-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause > > and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness is also impermanent, > changing, becoming otherwise. When, monks, eye-consciousness has arisen in > dependence on a condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent? > "The meeting, the encounter, the occurrence of these three things is called > > eye-contact. Eye-contact too is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. > > The cause and condition for the arising of eye-contact is also impermanent, > > changing, becoming otherwise. When, monks, eye-contact has arisen in > dependence on a condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent? > "Contacted, monks, one feels, contacted one intends, contacted one > perceives. Thus these things too are moving and tottering, impermanent, > changing, > becoming otherwise. > [The Buddha proceeds to analyze the ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, > > tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness in the same > > manner and finishes with...] > "It is in such a way, monks, that consciousness comes to be in dependence > on > a dyad." > (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 2, pg. 1172) > > > > > > >I don't find your phenomenology objectionable, because from what I detect, > > > >I > >don't think it detracts a bit from detaching the mind from phenomena. > Its > >your own bent and the Buddha taught many bents. I don't think your > >phenomenology is the outlook the Buddha presented regarding objects and > > experience, on > >the other hand, I can't say he would have had a problem with it. > > -------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I think that the Dhamma is phenomenological, especially as stated in > such suttas as the Bahiya Sutta and the Kalakamara (or Kalaka) Sutta. But > if > that's not so, well, so be it. I could be wrong. > > > TG: The Buddha's teaching in my view are speaking about a 'world condition' > > in a much more far reaching way than mere phenomenology. Phenomenology is > an > important aspect of those teachings. But it limits the scope of the > Buddha's teaching to narrow it down to that. Because that outlook is so > crucial for > you, it may serve you well to focus right there. --------------------------------------------- Howard: My perspective is not to restrict the range of the Buddha's teaching to something less than the entire world. It is a perspective on what according the Buddha *is* the world. Look at how the Buddha defined it. I don't know the sutta, but it says that the world is found in this very body and mind! The whole world is nothing but sight, sound, taste, smell, touch, and mentality. (Perhaps someone else here has the reference.) ------------------------------------------------- TG: No such Sutta (pretty darn sure). The closest one is where the Buddha calls the six sense-bases AND the six sense-objects -- "The All." I suspect this is what you are referring to. Connected Discourses, vol 2, pg 1140. Now, the six sense-bases are nama or rupa? The six sense-objects are nama or rupa? Comments? And if this is the Sutta you are remembering, I don't think it supports your point. Somehow I think you might disagree though. ;-) TG [end] > > Again, all this said and yet there is no full way I know exactly what > you're > talking about and probably vice versa. > > I don't make decisions about dhamma based on one or two suttas but from > what > I hope is a common sense and sensible extraction from all of them...at > least > the 4 Great Nikayas. I suspect that's true for you as well. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. ------------------------------------------------ > > TG > > ======================= With metta, Howard 55237 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 1:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/29/2006 5:32:20 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Hi, Chris and all - Here it is: "Friend, that there is a world's end where one is neither born nor ages nor dies, nor passes away nor reappears, which is to be known or seen or reached by traveling there - that I do not say. Yet I do not say that there is ending of suffering without reaching the world's end. Rather it is in this fathom-long carcass with its perceptions and its mind that I describe the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world, and the way leading to the cessation of the world."- S. II. 36, A. IV. 46, trans, Ven. Ñanamoli With metta, Howard Hi Howard A different Sutta than what I thought you meant. I don't believe it supports your point but I'm sure you do. ;-) Here the Buddha is saying the "world" is -- "this fathom-long carcass with its perceptions and its mind that I describe the world," Fathom long carcass is obviously a reference to "body" and to past bodies. That means it is not mere experiential phenomena the Buddha is talking about. But being that he says..."with its perceptions" I'll grant the possibility that it could be a phenomenological statement. In this particular Sutta the Buddha's point is about overcoming suffering. He is also taking about innumerable rebirths of the past. This sutta is spoken to an individual who thinks sufferings end is found by traveling to the end of the physical world/universe or the like. The Buddha points out to him that suffering is not ended that way, but by putting an end to the 5 aggregates. Are we to take this one sutta, dealing specifically an issue of specific misunderstand, as the summation of what the Buddha's thinks is a full account of actuality? ... and to therefore forfeit the hundreds of Suttas where the Buddha talks about "external things"? I think not. I think in this case, the Buddha is speaking semi-metaphorically to an individual to re-direct the way that individual is considering overcoming suffering. If we accept the purely phenomenological view of this sutta, we will need to resolve how it conflicts with hundreds or thousands of others. As well as "The All" mentioned earlier which is purely a statement by the Buddha and not a response to a questioner. BTW You recently agreed with my following comment in a previous post... TG: I don't make decisions about dhamma based on one or two suttas but from > what > I hope is a common sense and sensible extraction from all of them...at > least > the 4 Great Nikayas. I suspect that's true for you as well. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes. TG: To me this sutta is very debatable evidence of a strict phenomenology. Keep in mind, I consider the Buddha's teaching to be partly phenomenology... I consider it -- science, psychology, phenomenology/introspection, and spirituality/religion in that order. Why science so high you might ask? Because above all, it deals with how phenomena work....conditions. And I suppose that's my "bent." TG 55238 From: "Charles" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 6:38pm Subject: Paramattha dhamma and reality cherry_avium Hi, Is paramattha dhamma concepts or reality? When talking about anicca, dukkha, anatta shouldn't it better be in the context of samutti sacca? Because what is the use of washing a clean cloth, paramattha dhamma are reality as they are, samutti sacca is the fake truth, but what is accepted as real truth by beings. Thinking that the 28 rupa as impermanence, painful, and anatta would not make beings enlightened. Like washing a clean cloth would not make it cleaner. Beings have false view on samutti sacca, so it is the place where the cleaning should be done. When we have transcend the samutti sacca and see the paramattha sacca, our false view will be destroyed, because we cannot have false view on paramattha sacca. 55239 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 2:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, TG - In a message dated 1/29/06 8:33:48 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > TG: I'm not sure what you're saying either, but I agree with the sutta > word > for word. LOL However, even though we both agree with the sutta, I have a > > feeling we apply it differently to two different models of thought. Or > perhaps we just have a "failure to communicate." LOL > > =================== Disagree, maybe, maybe not! ;-) Ca ne faire rien dire! ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55240 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 7:03pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA kenhowardau Hi Howard, ------------------------ KH: > > I have always assumed > (correctly as it turns out) the term to mean, "objects cognisable by > the mind." ----- Howard: > Actually, I find this matter a drop confusing. After all, *all* objects are objects cognizable by the mind, including rupas. Doesn't that upset the definition somewhat? ------------------------- I'm sorry, I have lost track - I don't know exactly what we are talking about. :-) You suggested that the translation "mental objects" was a poor one because it was meant to include physical objects (rupas) as well as mental ones (namas). Until then, it had never occurred to me that "mental objects" could be taken to mean objects that were "mental." That is quite an obvious meaning to give the term, but it had never occurred to me. As I said, I had always assumed (correctly as it turns out) that 'mental objects' were any objects (nama or rupa [and in some contexts, pannatti]) that were "cognisable by the mind." I think we both agree that rupas are included in the objects of the fourth classification of satipatthana. So I don't see what the problem is. Why do you say this "upsets the definition?" -------------------------------------- . . . KH: > > > I believe the fourth foundation includes all possible objects of > satipatthana that do not fall into one of the other three > foundations. --------- Howard: > But there is clear overlap, Ken. :-( --------------------------------------- Yes, there is. Actually, I don't know why I came into this because I don't have any strong opinions about the four classifications. ---------------------------------------------------------- KH: > > ---- Howard: > I *think* that you are saying here that the 4th foundation of mindfulness is dhammanupasana, which is contemplation of paramattha dhammas, and that is what I also think the 4th foundation is about. So we seem to be in agreement on that. Do I misunderstand you on this? --------------------------------------------------------- I wasn't disagreeing with anything you said. Having made my point about the word "mental" I thought I might say something about the fourth foundation of mindfulness - while I had the floor. :-) Ken H 55241 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 7:34pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA lbidd2 Vism.XIV,218: "And this is the extreme limit as the basis for the assumption of self and what pertains to self, that is to say, the five beginning with materiality." Hi Ken H., I've been thinking about this and remembered what was bothering me. There's no official remedy for attachment to concepts. No insight knowledge into the true nature of concepts. Here is a summary of some ideas in a book called "Emptiness Yoga" by Jeffrey Hopkins (on Tibetan Madhyamaka): There are 20 wrong views on the assumption of a self based on the 5 khandhas: rupa is I, I possess rupa, I am in rupa, rupa is in me, and the same for the other khandhas. The Buddha refuted each one of these but did not address the question of what if the I is assumed to be other than the khandhas. Nagarjuna did address this issue by arguing that the I could not be assumed on the basis of anything but the khandhas. In other words we can't and don't assume the self to be based on a concept. Hence, concepts are not an object of clinging (my conclusion). This doesn't follow abhidhamma but it's something to think about [and it does conform to a literal reading of the above quote from Vism.]. Larry 55242 From: "Maya Putra" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 7:47pm Subject: Re: Stream Entrant/ Howard vvhite_illusion Howard, Frankly I don't have a clue myself, but I'll try to find out for you. We'll discuss it in my Dhamma Study class on Saturday. Hopefully we'll come up with more enlightening answers. Metta, Maya 55243 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 2:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 1/29/06 10:18:02 PM Eastern Standard Time, kenhowa@... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > ------------------------ > KH: >>I have always assumed > >(correctly as it turns out) the term to mean, "objects cognisable > by > >the mind." > ----- > Howard: >Actually, I find this matter a drop confusing. After all, > *all* objects are objects cognizable by the mind, including rupas. > Doesn't that upset the definition somewhat? > ------------------------- > > I'm sorry, I have lost track - I don't know exactly what we are > talking about. :-) > ----------------------------------------------- Howard: LOL! That happens to me too! (More and more as time goes by! LOL!) ---------------------------------------------- > > You suggested that the translation "mental objects" was a poor one > because it was meant to include physical objects (rupas) as well as > mental ones (namas). Until then, it had never occurred to me > that "mental objects" could be taken to mean objects that > were "mental." -------------------------------------------- Howard: For the most part, that's the way I think about mental objects, as "objects of a mental sort". Of course, according to Abhidhamma, rupas are included among the dhammas known though mind-door processes. And I do think it that it is true that, for example, a hardness is also known as a mind-door object, after the fact. I suspect, however, that the hardness known through the mind door is no longer the original "physical" hardness, but is a mental replica of it - a sankhara. ------------------------------------------- > > That is quite an obvious meaning to give the term, but it had never > occurred to me. As I said, I had always assumed (correctly as it > turns out) that 'mental objects' were any objects (nama or rupa [and > in some contexts, pannatti]) that were "cognisable by the mind." > > I think we both agree that rupas are included in the objects of the > fourth classification of satipatthana. So I don't see what the > problem is. Why do you say this "upsets the definition?" ------------------------------------------ Howard: Now I'm confused. ;-) Let's skip that matter. What I said above is clearer I think. ----------------------------------------- > > -------------------------------------- > . . . > KH: >>>I believe the fourth foundation includes all possible > objects of > >satipatthana that do not fall into one of the other three > >foundations. > > --------- > Howard: >But there is clear overlap, Ken. :-( > --------------------------------------- > > Yes, there is. Actually, I don't know why I came into this because I > don't have any strong opinions about the four classifications. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Funny, neither do I! (But, hey, why let that stop us!! ;-)) ------------------------------------------ > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > KH: >> > ---- > Howard: >I *think* that you are saying here that the 4th foundation > of mindfulness is dhammanupasana, which is contemplation of > paramattha dhammas, and that is what I also think the 4th foundation > is about. So we seem to be in agreement on that. Do I misunderstand > you on this? > --------------------------------------------------------- > > I wasn't disagreeing with anything you said. Having made my point > about the word "mental" I thought I might say something about the > fourth foundation of mindfulness - while I had the floor. :-) ------------------------------------------------------------- Howard: :-) ------------------------------------------------------------ > > Ken H > > > ============================= With metta, Howard P.S. What a pleasant conversation, Ken! :-) /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55244 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 2:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Stream Entrant/ Howard upasaka_howard Hi, Maya - In a message dated 1/29/06 10:49:13 PM Eastern Standard Time, vvhite_illusion@... writes: > Howard, > > Frankly I don't have a clue myself, but I'll try to find out for you. We'll > discuss it in my > Dhamma Study class on Saturday. Hopefully we'll come up with more > enlightening answers. > > Metta, > Maya > ========================= Thanks! I'll be curious to hear whatever you find out. I find this an interesting matter. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55245 From: "Maya Putra" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 8:04pm Subject: Re: Stream Entrant/ Nina vvhite_illusion Thank you so much Nina, Well I'm really not sure which is right. Though I too have always thought 7 as lives and not realms of existence. Too bad I won't be able to meet this monk who told me of this bit of information until next month. But I will ask him when I get the chance and perhaps show him this email. =) Metta, Maya 55246 From: "Maya Putra" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 8:10pm Subject: Re: Stream Entrant / Scott vvhite_illusion Well Scott, I'm not an expert in Sutras or buddhist texts but as far as I was taught, one can make strong determinations at the time of death. Of course there's not guarantee but it is possible if conditions are met. The fact that the Buddha wishes to be reborn as a human being in order to spread dhamma is one example. Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong. With Metta, Maya 55247 From: Suchamda D Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 7:14pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Sahetuka Akusala Kamavacara Citta dhammasurya Thankyou Nina for the answer, I have to digest what you have been written. In my understanding, vipaka is a consciousness that we have when had an effect of impending karma. As you said, vipaka is not reprehensible. So I still can't get a clear understanding, why for sobhana citta there are vipaka with a 'root' as it is surely should be irreprehensible too. Do you mean that kusala citta needs effort so that it would be resulted in sahetuka kusala vipaka, whence akusala citta doesn't need any effort, so that it would be rootless? Sorry, if my understanding is not going into the right direction that you mean. Daniel On 1/28/06, nina van gorkom wrote: > > Dear Daniel, > Welcome here. Your question is good. Some time ago Joop also asked a > similar > question. > The Visuddhimagga goes into this. I checked some texts. > > First about mahaavipaakacittas of the sense sphere: > Visuddhimagga Ch XIV, 100: > Vis. text: And while there is no difference in the associated states, the > resultant should be understood as passive like the reflection of a face > in a looking-glass while the profitable is active like the face. > ========================================== > N: The Tiika explains the difference between active (ussaaha or with > effort) > and passive (nirussaaha, without effort). <....> 55248 From: Suchamda D Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 8:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Paramattha dhamma and reality dhammasurya Hello Cherry, I think you should define first what reality is by your definition. Further, do you mean paramattha dhamma is equated as concepts stated in Abhidhamma? Let us clear first about this. What I got from my insight when doing meditation is that Abhidhamma too is in fact, a mere concept purposed for us to realize paramattha dhamma. It is a tool for contemplation purposes (not for a scientific discourses) which also should be abandoned when we know things such as is. By looking directly at our mind when doing satipatthana , we actually only 'see' the emerge - falling of phenomena derivated into our SUBMODALITIES of our 6 senses (NLP termed). Therefore, it is unavoidable that an "I" as an observer still exist. Even if we are trying to define consciousness of this or that in the mindful observation, its is also a reflection of our discursive thinking. By using Abhidhamma as a tool for dissecting our inner thinking mechanism and relatedness to outer phenomenas, we would lead into realizing of emptiness (inter-relatedness and anicca) off everything. Those realization is the only proper one that would be called paramattha dhamma. That is my opinion, sorry for my ignorance. Hope that other members can give their opinions too. Regards, Daniel On 1/30/06, Charles wrote: > > Hi, > > Is paramattha dhamma concepts or reality? > > When talking about anicca, dukkha, anatta shouldn't it better be in > the context of samutti sacca? Because what is the use of washing a > clean cloth, paramattha dhamma are reality as they are, samutti sacca > is the fake truth, but what is accepted as real truth by beings. <....> 55249 From: "Charles" Date: Sun Jan 29, 2006 9:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Paramattha dhamma and reality cherry_avium Hi Daniel, When we think about consciousness it is concept What we refer when we write about consciousness is the reality When we think about a house it is a concept What we refer when we write about a house is illusion The difference is because consciousness has its own sabhava while a house does not. The view that the house exist is the atta ditthi. I guess that's my definition on reality :D There is a nice quote here http://www.triplegem.plus.com/pandit11.htm --------------------------------------------- Sabhava, Sankhata, Samanna, - the trio of Lakkhanas, Note at the very moment, only then theSabhava Lakkhanas are sure to be known. Only when Sabhava Lakkhanas are seen, Sankhata Lakkhanas will become evident. Only when Sankhata Lakkhanas become evident, Samanna Lakkhanas will be seen. Only when Samanna Lakkhanas are seen, Vipassana Nana arises. Only when Vipassana Nana matures, Magga Naya realizes. Only when Magga Nana realizes, Nibbana is seen. Only when Nibbana is seen, one is delivered from Apaya. --------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Suchamda D wrote: > > Hello Cherry, > I think you should define first what reality is by your definition. 55250 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 0:48am Subject: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 368- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (g) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ==========================================[Ch22 -Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 contd] Someone may take the khandha of feeling for self, but feeling changes all the time. Feeling which arises now is not the same as feeling a moment ago. The khandha of perception or remembrance (saññå) is different each moment, but one may be inclined to take it for self. When we recognize or remember something, it is not self who does so, but saññå. Saòkhårakkhandha, the khandha of “formations” or “activities” (all cetasikas other than feeling and saññå), changes all the time; sometimes akusala cetasikas arise, sometimes kusala cetasikas, but one may still be inclined to take cetasikas for self. Viññåùakkhandha, consciousness, changes all the time; there are seeing, hearing and thinking of concepts atdifferent moments, but there can be a deep-rooted belief of “I see”, “I hear”, “I think”. In reality the seeing sees, the hearing hears, and another citta again thinks of concepts, they are all different cittas which are not self. There are different cittas which arise and fall away, one at a time, and each of them experiences just one object. There may be theoretical understanding of the truth, but wrong view is deeply rooted; it cannot be eradicated by thinking. Wrong view can be eradicated only by developing right understanding of the reality which appears at the present moment. ***** (Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 to be continued) Metta, Sarah ====== 55251 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Samvega/Urgency nilovg Hi Howard, thank you very much for your post on death and the most appropriate texts. See below for some elaboration. op 30-01-2006 01:19 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: > Death will come to us all, that is a certainty. It also can come at > any time, and we cannot know when that moment will arrive. The time to > practice > the Dhamma is now, right now. We must do no harm, do good, and purify the > mind. In his very last sutta, the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, the Buddha, before > passing away, admonished us as follows: "Behold now, bhikkhus, I exhort you: > All > compounded things are subject to vanish. Strive with earnestness!" > > From MN 131: An Auspicious Day > > You shouldn't chase after the past > or place expectations on the future. > What is past > is left behind. > The future > is as yet unreached. > Whatever quality is present > you clearly see right there, > right there. > Not taken in, > unshaken, > that's how you develop the heart. -------- N: B.B. translates: see each presently arisen state. I translate: developing insight of what appears now here, now there. The Pali has: tattha..tattha. I find this very consoling, but in times of sorrow and loss it is hard to apply. It really seems that unhappy feeling stays. But in reality it does not. When seeing arises, there is no unhappy feeling at the same time but indifferent feeling. This sutta I can never consider enough. Nina. 55252 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Stream Entrant / Scott nilovg Dear Maya and Scott, Kamma produces rebirth. There is nobody who can make a determination or choose where to be reborn. It is all dependent on different conditions. The Buddha's determination was a different case. He had to fulfill particular condiitons, such as making his vow in the presence of a living Buddha, like when he was Sumedha and he met the Buddha Dipankara. Maya, I think it is useful for many people here if you can share now and then your discussions in your Abhidhamma class. I go to Thailand on Thursday for almost three weeks, so I cannot react during that time. As to birth and plane of existence, when looking at the sutta texts and the Pali one can find out that birth or becoming, bhava, is different from plane, bhumi. When we study texts it is good to consider how we can apply them to our life now. We can see that listening and considering the Dhamma is never enough, even the sotaapanna who has listened a great deal, considered a great deal, developed insight and eradicated wrong view, still has to continue developing right understanding. He still likes pleasant objects and he is attached to life. Sotapannas have different degrees of understanding, depending on accumulated conditions in past lives.We see that the right cause brings its appropriate effect. When they have strong understanding, they only need to have one more life. But a sotapanna will not have an unhappy rebirth anymore. When we consider that some sotapannas have seven more rebirths we can see that the process of developing understanding takes a long, long time. How much more so for us worldlings. It shows that it is impossible to hasten the development of paññaa. We can never listen enough, consider enough.The development of understanding of what appears now is never enough. Nina. op 30-01-2006 05:10 schreef Maya Putra op vvhite_illusion@...: > I'm not an expert in Sutras or buddhist texts but as far as I was taught, one > can make strong > determinations at the time of death. Of course there's not guarantee but it > is possible if > conditions are met. The fact that the Buddha wishes to be reborn as a human > being in order > to spread dhamma is one example. 55253 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Paramattha dhamma and reality nilovg Dear Cherry, op 30-01-2006 03:38 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > > Is paramattha dhamma concepts or reality? N: Realities. -------- Ch: When talking about anicca, dukkha, anatta shouldn't it better be in > the context of samutti sacca? -------- N: These are the three characteristics inherent in all conditioned realities and do not pertain to concepts. Concepts do not have these three characteristics. ---------- Ch: Because what is the use of washing a > clean cloth, paramattha dhamma are reality as they are, samutti sacca > is the fake truth, but what is accepted as real truth by beings. --------- N: Also the Buddha used conventional reality to explain paramattha dhammas. We do not have to avoid conventional reality, it is useful, even necessary for our social life. But it is beneficial to see the difference between paramatthas and concentional reality, so that understanding of paramatthas can be developed. --------- > Ch Thinking that the 28 rupa as impermanence, painful, and anatta would > not make beings enlightened. ------- N: I agree, thinking does not lead to enlightenment, but development of vipassana surely does. As to the 28 rupas, as the Visuddhimagga said, not all of them are fit for contemplation. It explains that the coarse rupas are the sense objects and the sensedoors. Understanding can be developed of the rupas that appear now. Not all of them appear now. Hardness, visible object, sound, these are rupas the Buddha spoke of many times in the suttas. If there is no awareness, we are overcome by Mara, the defilements. We take nama and rupa as a mass, a whole, and this is wrong view. Nama and rupa are to be distinguished as different dhammas, otherwise we shall continue taking them for self.Nama experiences an object, rupa does not experience anything. ---------- Ch: Like washing a clean cloth would not > make it cleaner. Beings have false view on samutti sacca, so it is > the place where the cleaning should be done. When we have transcend > the samutti sacca and see the paramattha sacca, our false view will > be destroyed, because we cannot have false view on paramattha sacca. -------- N: As worldlings we have wrong view about paramattha sacca. We have all the perversities. I quote from my Visuddhimagga study: I would not compare rupa to a clean cloth, it is foul. But to begin with we should know that the object of right understanding is not a concept such as a person or thing, but nama and rupa. Nina. 55254 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:25am Subject: Visuddhimagga 229 and Tiika. nilovg Visuddhimagga 229. Intro: This section deals with the mental nutriment that is viññåna or citta. Citta is the chief in cognizing an object, it is the "leader". Without citta cetasikas could not arise and experience an object. Thus, citta supports and maintains the accompanying cetasikas, it conditions them by way of nutriment-condition. When citta produces rúpa it also conditions that rúpa by way of nutriment-condition. Thus, at each moment the three mental nutriments of contact, volition and citta support and maintain the dhammas arising together with them. As we have seen, the mental nutriments can be considered according to the method of the Patthåna (Conditional Relations) and also according to the method of the "Dependent Origination" (Paticca samuppåda), the chain of conditionally arisen phenomena which cause the continuation of the cycle of birth and death. When viññåna (consciousness) is considered under the aspect of the Dependent Origination, it is vipåkacitta which arises at rebirth and also in the course of life. As a link of the Dependent Origination it is conditioned by sankhåra, kamma-formations. Because of kamma there will be the vipåka which is the patisandhi-citta and also vipåka arising throughout our life. ------- Text Vis. 229: On who sees consciousness as impermanent fully understands nutriment consisting of consciousness. ------ N: The Tiika adds that he also applies the three contemplations (anupassana) with endeavour and that he by means of the three pariññas fully understands the nutriment that is consciousness. He contemplates the three characteristics of impermanence, dukkha and anattaa. As regards the three pariññas, these have to be applied in the course of the development of insight. They are: full understanding of the known, ñaata pariñña, which begins at the first stage of insight, full understanding as investigation, tiira.na pariñña, which begins at the fourth stage of insight (or the first stage of principal insight), when the arising and falling away of naama and ruupa is realized, and full understanding as abandoning, pahaana pariñña, which begins at the stage of insight which is knowledge of dissolution, bhanga ñaa.na, up to Path knowledge when enlightenment is attained. ------- Text Vis.: He abandons the perversion of perceiving permanence in the impermanent. He crosses the flood of ignorance. He is loosed from the bond of ignorance. ------- N: The Tiika states that here in particular it is said that he abandons the perversion of seeing permanence in what is impermanent. It explains that because of ignorance one is greatly obsessed by the idea of permanence and therefore holds on to a compact (ghana) of viññaa.na, but when one has resolved the compact he realises the impermanence of citta and he crosses the flood of ignorance. ------ Text Vis.: He breaks the bodily tie of holding to rites and rituals. He does not [cling with false-] view clinging. ____ N: The Tiika also states that he is liberated from the yoke of ignorance and from the intoxicant of ignorance. This refers to the arahat. The bodily tie of holding to rites and rituals is wrong practice which is eradicated by the sotaapanna. The Tiika adds that one clings to such practice by the power of moha, ignorance. As to the expression, he does not [cling with false-] view clinging, the Tiika refers to the ³Kindred Sayings² (II,Kindred Sayings on Cause, Ch VII, the Great Chapter, § 61, The Untaught) where the Buddha said: ³Yet this, monks, what we call citta, what we call mano (mind), what we call viññaa.na (consciousness), by this the untaught manyfolk are not able to feel repelled, they are not able to cease fancying it or to be freed from it. Why so? For many a long day monks, has it been for the untaught manyfolk, that to which they cleave, that which they call Œmine¹, that which they wrongly conceive, thinking:- that is mine; this I am; this is myself.¹ ² By seeing permanence in viññaa.na one clings with wrong view, but when one sees impermanence he does not have such clinging, the Tiika explains. --------- Conclusion: Because of ignorance and wrong view one sees citta as a lasting mind. It seems that a self sees, thinks of what is seen and clings to what is seen. However, through the development of insight the idea of a whole or compact of consciousness is resolved into elements. One comes to see that citta arises and then falls away immediately to be succeeded by the following citta. As the Visuddhimagga states: ŒOne who sees consciousness as impermanent fully understands nutriment consisting of consciousness.¹ One comes to understand the disadvantage and danger of the nutriment that is viññaa.na. Through mindfulness and understanding of nama and rupa one will have a clearer understanding of what citta is: a type of nama that experiences an object. One will learn through the development of direct understanding that citta is different from rupa that does not experience anything. One will learn that seeing visible object is different from thinking of persons and possessions. One will learn that citta that experiences an object through the eye-door is different from the citta that experiences an object through the ear-door, or through one of the other doorways. We read in the "Kindred Sayings" (II, Kindred Sayings on Cause, Ch VII, the Great Chapter, § 63, Child¹s Flesh) that the Buddha taught the simile of a robber who is punished by the King; the King lets him be smitten with hundred spears in the morning, hundred at noon and hundred in the evening. The nutriment which is consciousness should be regarded as sorrowful as the pain suffered by that robber. We read that the Buddha said: ŒEven so, monks, do I declare that the food called consciousness should be regarded. When consciousness, monks, is well understood, nåma and rúpa are well understood. When naama and ruupa are well understood, I declare that there is nothing further that the ariyan disciple has to do.¹ The Commentary explains that the king represents kamma, the criminal the worldling and the three hundred spears the rebirth-consciousness which is suffering. The danger of the cycle of birth and death is demonstrated by this simile. So long as there is rebirth-consciousness, there will be ageing, sickness and death. ******* Nina. 55255 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:25am Subject: Alone with Dhamma, Ch 4, no 6 nilovg Alone with Dhamma, Ch 4, no 6 Jonothan remarked that one should be honest with regard to one¹s defilements. Truthfulness, sacca, is one of the perfections that the Bodhisatta developed during countless lives. Lodewijk said that he found the perfection of Truthfulness essential, but very difficult to develop. When he reads in the Sutta that the Buddha said, ŒAbandon evil... it can be done...¹ he feels that he is insincere, since he clings to all the pleasant things of life and does not want to give them up. He said that before one realizes it, one is misleading oneself as to kusala and akusala. Jonothan said that there are moments of understanding dhammas, and moments of ignorance. When there is awareness and right understanding of a dhamma one is on the Path the Buddha taught. Actually, being on the Path is momentary, and when understanding does not arise, which happens most of the time, the Path is not developed. However, he said, this is not a cause for concern. Even when the moments of developing the Path are very few, it is a great gain hearing the right Dhamma and listening to it with sincere interest. There can be moments of reflecting, considering, moments of kusala and paññå. We may reflect on the Path leading to enlightenment, but Acharn Sujin always says: ³But what about this moment?² I find it very helpful to remember that citta and the Path-factors which are cetasikas arise for a moment and then fall away. This is in conformity with real life. Lodewijk said that it seemed to him that he had more understanding when in India, visiting the holy places. But now it seems that the little understanding he had is lost when he is back in the routine of life in Holland. I reminded him of what Jonothan had said to him in India about the Path being momentary. It is good to be reminded that the moments of sati and paññå arise and fall away and that we cannot keep them. The understanding that arises is never lost, it is accumulated and it can grow. Acharn Sujin reminded us: ³The Buddha explained what is kusala and what akusala, but can he force anyone? He could show the way leading to the end of defilements. Someone may like to have sati, but who can have it if there are no conditions for it? One may want the dhammas that arise to be different, but instead of such clinging there should be detachment. One may try very hard to make sati arise, but if there is no understanding of it as a conditioned reality that arises and falls away it is useless. And on the other hand, when there are conditions for sati nobody can prevent its arising. This shows us that there is no need to try to have sati. The entire Tipitaka explains the nature of anattå of realities. The arising of direct awareness and understanding depends on the right conditions and they cannot arise even if one is told a hundred times.² ****** Nina. 55256 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:37am Subject: Complete audio of the Erik Series uploaded and available - Kung Hei Fat Choi! sarahprocter... Dear Friends, Kung Hei Fat Choi! (A Happy and Prosperous Chinese New Year!) At this time of year in Hong Kong, families get together and we all give out red packets (with notes inside) or gifts to children and staff at restaurants, in offices, in our apartment buildings and other places we frequently visit. In short it’s a time for a lot of giving and celebration together. I can hear the drum beats, laughter and lion dances in the distance as I type. We’re glad to say that we’ve finally finished editing and uploading what we’ve been referring to as the ‘Erik Series’ of audio discussions onto www.dhammastudygroup.org. When you get to the website, scroll down a little way to ‘audio’ and it’s the first set you come to, under ‘Bangkok, July 2001’. Many of you listened to the 2 tracks that were uploaded before. The track sizes are now all in approx. 20min segments for downloading purposes, so you may find you’ve listened to the first 3 segments now – I forget. For any Newbies, these are edited discussions with A.Sujin, Erik and other friends. Highly recommended for all here! For those without broadband or who have difficulty in downloading, we’re happy to send you a a cd in mp3 format. Please send me your address off-list for this and we’ll try to send them off before we go on our trip. Please share your comments (agreements and disagreements, discussions or debates!!) and pick up on any of the points of interest. (Phil, the India 06 series will be next, we promise......!) Metta, Sarah (& Jon) p.s Howard – it’s the year of the Dog! ================= 55257 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:03am Subject: Devoted to Wakefulness ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: Any Self-Control starts with Guarding the 6 Doors of the Senses!!! The Blessed Buddha once said: Bhikkhus by possessing three qualities, one lives in this very life full of pleasure & joy! Furthermore, one has thereby prepared the elimination of the mental fermentations... What are these three advantageous qualities? One guards the doors of the senses, One is moderate in eating, and One is devoted to wakefulness... How, Bhikkhus, is a Bhikkhu devoted to wakefulness? During daytime, while doing either walking or sitting meditation, any Bhikkhu purifies his mind of detrimental states... In the first watch of the night, while walking back & forth & sitting, he also purifies his mind of obstructive states.... In the middle watch of the night, he lies down on the right side in the lion's posture, with one foot lying right upon the other, aware and clearly comprehending, determining when to rise again. After rising, in the last watch of the night, while walking back & forth & sitting, he cleans out any disadvantageous mental state again. It is in this way, Bhikkhus, that a Bhikkhu is fully devoted to wakefulness! Bhikkhus, it is by possessing these three qualities, that a Bhikkhu lives full of happiness and joy in this very life, and he has prepared for the destruction of the mental fermentations... Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book IV [176-7] Section 35: The 6 Senses. Salayatana. The Horse-Wagon. Rato 239. http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=948507 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/index.html -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PS: Please include the word Samahita in any comment, since then will my automatic mail filters pick it up and I will see it & respond!! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. Friendship is the Greatest ... Let there be Calm & Free Bliss !!! <....> 55258 From: "matheesha" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 5:03am Subject: Re: Samvega/Urgency matheesha333 Hi Howard, I'm back from sri lanka, and by some coincidence the buddha's last statement was something i discussed there. Another participant mentioned that the buddha said to practice like one's hair was on fire. There is a big difference in the view that we have and that of the buddha. We have no/little of such urgency. What is it that we are not seeing? I think our views need to be 'straightened' a bit more. Perhaps our belief in rebirth is very little. Perhaps we dont see it as a chasm spreading out beyond us. Perhaps we dont really believe we will be subject to sickness, old age and death. It is easier to deny these, limit it to theoretical understanding, and just live life. I'm also reminded of the 'thoroughbread' sutta in the AN. metta Matheesha 55259 From: "matheesha" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 5:11am Subject: Re: [dsg] Stream Entrant matheesha333 Hi Howard, Maya, H: > This is very interesting! I've never heard this before, but I find it > fascinating. It seems, though, that one could then make similar statements > with regard to once returners, non-returners, and arahants. I suppose that a once > returner would have but one realm into which further rebirths are possible. > (What would that realm be?) And would a non-returner not have any further > rebirths in any realm? That makes no sense, for that is the case for an arahant. > This business seems confusing. M: Once returners will have one realm -obviously nothing lower than a human realm. Perhaps in higher realms. Non-reuterners dont return to human realms -hence they are non-returners. They are born in 'suddhavaasa' a type of brhama realm populated by anagamins! They become arahaths there. Apparently if i remember right, they progress through several levels of suddhavasa to reach the goal. Suddhavasa is said to be one of the places a bodisattva never goes to, as they become buddhas in a human plane. metta Matheesha 55260 From: "Charles" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 6:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Paramattha dhamma and reality cherry_avium Hi Nina, Thank you for your answer :]. There is actually another aspect of my question that I haven't found the answer. An analogy would help maybe. There is a jigsaw. Someone with bad sight sees the jigsaw, but unable to see that little parts that make it. This person thinks that it is a painting, and so the person hang it on the wall. Another person with good sight see the jigsaw, and knowing that the first person has wrong perception, tell him to see the 'fake painting' very close so that he can see the parts that make the jigsaw. Now after the first person see it, the person is freed from wrong perception. It does not reveal the truth if the second person give the first person the 100 types of paper forms that make up the jigsaw. It would help if the first person looks closely on the 'painting' to see the paper parts. If there are two statements: - this parts of paper are jigsaw - this paintings which is composed by parts of paper is actually a jigsaw The first statement is true, but it does not solve the problem. The second statement is true, and it solves the problem. Saying - hardness, color, teste are impermanent, unpleasant, and suffering is like the first statement - beings are composed of hardness, color, taste, consciousness, and all others and is actually a formation (not a being per se) is like the second statement My simple question is, is it like this or is it another way? --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > N: These are the three characteristics inherent in all conditioned realities > and do not pertain to concepts. Concepts do not have these three > characteristics. > ---------- I agree. But paramattha sacca is clean (in context of wrong views), giving it detergent :D would not make it cleaner. Samutti sacca is dirty by wrong views, giving it detergent would make it clean. The result after cleaning samutti sacca would be the paramattha sacca. 55261 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 2:37am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Samvega/Urgency upasaka_howard Hi, Matheesha - In a message dated 1/30/06 8:08:07 AM Eastern Standard Time, dhammachat@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > I'm back from sri lanka, > ---------------------------------------- Howard: Welcome back! --------------------------------------- and by some coincidence the buddha's last > > statement was something i discussed there. Another participant > mentioned that the buddha said to practice like one's hair was on > fire. --------------------------------------- Howard: Yes! For that to be so, of course, a degree of understanding is already needed. Most folks, and probably all of us on occasion, just don't realize the urgency. :-) --------------------------------------- > > There is a big difference in the view that we have and that of the > buddha. We have no/little of such urgency. What is it that we are > not seeing? I think our views need to be 'straightened' a bit more. > Perhaps our belief in rebirth is very little. Perhaps we dont see it > as a chasm spreading out beyond us. Perhaps we dont really believe > we will be subject to sickness, old age and death. > ------------------------------------------ Howard: I think that is a major part of it. We have blinders on! ----------------------------------------- It is easier to > > deny these, limit it to theoretical understanding, and just live > life. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Exactly! ---------------------------------------- > > I'm also reminded of the 'thoroughbread' sutta in the AN. -------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, a good sutta: the Ajaniya Sutta, found on Access to Insight at http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/anguttara/an03-094.html -------------------------------------------- > > metta > > Matheesha > > ======================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55262 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 8:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Sahetuka Akusala Kamavacara Citta nilovg Dear Daniel, op 30-01-2006 04:14 schreef Suchamda D op dhammasurya@...: > In my understanding, vipaka is a consciousness that we have when had an > effect of impending karma. ------- N: It arises all the time, for example, seeing or hearing now are results of kamma. When seeing is kusala vipaakacitta, the result of kusala kamma it is ahetuka vipaakacitta. When it is akusala vipaakacitta, it is ahetuka vipaakacitta. Kusala kamma can produce ahetuka vipaakacittas and sahetuka vipaakacittas. Akusala kamma can produce only ahetuka vipaakacittas. -------- D: As you said, vipaka is not reprehensible. So I > still can't get a clear understanding, why for sobhana citta there are > vipaka with a 'root' as it is surely should be irreprehensible too. > -------- N: The rebirth-consciousness that is the result of kusala kamma can be sahetuka vipaaka. If it is ahetuka kusala vipaaka, it is a poor vipaaka. It is the rebirth-consciousness of those who are handicapped from birth. As to the rebirth-consciousness in unhappy plane, this is ahetuka akusala vipaaka. It is result, not active as akusala citta with akusala hetus that commit ill deeds, and thus it is not blamable, merely an unpleasant result. ------- D: > Do you mean that kusala citta needs effort so that it would be resulted in > sahetuka kusala vipaka, whence akusala citta doesn't need any effort, so > that it would be rootless? ------- N: Also akusala citta is accompanied by viriya, effort. And do not forget that also seeing which is always ahetuka, can be kusala vipaakacitta. Sahetuka kusala vipaakacitta is also passive, but it is rich. When one is born with a vipaakacitta accompanied by three sobhana hetus, including paññaa one can attain enlightenment in that life provided paññaa is developed. I understand if this is not yet clear. Dhammas proceed according to conditions, nobody can change the law of kamma and vipaaka. With regard to cittas of the sense sphere, kusala kamma produces eight sahetuka vipaakacittas and eight ahetuka vipaakacittas. Akusala kamma produces seven ahetuka vipaakacittas. **** Nina. 55263 From: "kelvin_lwin" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 11:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] Stream Entrant kelvin_lwin Hello Howard (Maya) > > of you know a stream entrant (sotapanna) will at most > > be reborn 7 more lives. What this actually means is 7 > > more (realms of) existence. Nina replied to this already but still there's some confusion. Above interpretation is wrong since rebirth and realms are two different things. The names only make sense in reference to sensual realms. Stream-enterer will have at most 7 rebirths in sensual realms. Once-returner will have at most 1 rebirth in sensual realms. Non-returner will not be reborn into sensual realms. There's no limit for rebirths in rupa and arupa realms before arahathood. It's pretty much a short-hand when people say sotapanna have 7 more lives, it's not completely accurate. Matheesha mentioned 'suddhavaasa' realms where only non-returners lives (or arahats in their last life). This doesn't mean non- returners can only be reborn into those realms. The implication only goes one way. There's a complete listing of the type of person and the kind of rebirth and realm possible. If you look at that then there should be less confusion. - Kel 55264 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 6:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Stream Entrant upasaka_howard Hi, Kel (and Maya & Matheesha) - In a message dated 1/30/06 2:33:17 PM Eastern Standard Time, kelvin_lwin@... writes: > Nina replied to this already but still there's some confusion. > Above interpretation is wrong since rebirth and realms are two > different things. The names only make sense in reference to sensual > realms. Stream-enterer will have at most 7 rebirths in sensual > realms. Once-returner will have at most 1 rebirth in sensual > realms. Non-returner will not be reborn into sensual realms. > There's no limit for rebirths in rupa and arupa realms before > arahathood. It's pretty much a short-hand when people say sotapanna > have 7 more lives, it's not completely accurate. > ====================== Ah, this is so very clear!! Thank you. So, it is both a matter of realms *and* of number of times, specifically a matter of the maximum number of rebirths in the sensual realms. Crystal clear! :-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55265 From: "Christine Forsyth" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 11:52am Subject: [dsg] Re: Samvega/Urgency christine_fo... --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, Matheesha -> > In a message dated 1/30/06 8:08:07 AM Eastern Standard Time, > dhammachat@h... writes:> > and by some coincidence the buddha's last > > > statement was something i discussed there. Another participant > > mentioned that the buddha said to practice like one's hair was on > > fire. > > --------------------------------------- > Howard: > Yes! For that to be so, of course, a degree of understanding is > already needed. Most folks, and probably all of us on occasion, just don't realize > the urgency. :-) > --------------------------------------- > > > > > There is a big difference in the view that we have and that of the > > buddha. We have no/little of such urgency. What is it that we are > > not seeing? I think our views need to be 'straightened' a bit more. > > Perhaps our belief in rebirth is very little. Perhaps we dont see it > > as a chasm spreading out beyond us. Perhaps we dont really believe > > we will be subject to sickness, old age and death. > > > ------------------------------------------ > Howard: > I think that is a major part of it. We have blinders on! > ----------------------------------------- > It is easier to > > > deny these, limit it to theoretical understanding, and just live > > life. Hello Mateesha, Howard, all, I agree - I think that most of us (buddhist or non-buddhist) live in the delusion of the 'eternal now'. Not realising that we, ourselves, may not live until we are seventy or eighty or ninety or a hundred years. Mostly when we read of the deaths of others, we assume it is just happening to the 'bit' players in the movie of life - but that it won't happen to us, the Stars. We do not realise that death may come suddenly and without warning to the 'so very precious me' - well before planned goals and experiences are achieved. It is good to remind ourselves: "I am of the nature to grow old. I have not gone beyond old age" is to be recollected daily. "I am of the nature to become ill, I have not gone beyond sickness" is to be recollected daily. "I am of the nature to die. I have not gone beyond death" is to be recollected daily. "All that is dear and delightful to me will change and vanish" is to be recollected daily. "I am of owner of my actions, heir to my actions, born of my actions, related to my actions, abide supported by my actions, whatever actions I do, whether good or evil, of that I will become heir" is to be recollected daily. metta Chris ---The trouble is that we think we have time--- 55266 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 0:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA nilovg Hi Larry, the sotapanna has eradicated attachment with wrong view to the idea of a person who exists. The arahat has eradicated all attachment, to paramatthas and to concepts. There is one remedy: the development of insight. Nina. op 30-01-2006 04:34 schreef LBIDD@... op LBIDD@...: > Vism.XIV,218: "And this is the extreme limit as the basis for the > assumption of self and what pertains to self, that is to say, the five > beginning with materiality." > > Hi Ken H., > > I've been thinking about this and remembered what was bothering me. > There's no official remedy for attachment to concepts. No insight > knowledge into the true nature of concepts 55267 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 0:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" sound and temperature. nilovg Hi TG, It is somewhat more complicated. Indeed, sound is a rupa that does not arise alone, it is accompanied by hardness, cohesion, temperature (you mention it!), motion, and other rupas which support it. But, hearing only hears sound, or audible object, it cannot hear temperature. Temperature is not the object of hearing. So now we see that characteristic is after all a better word. Characteristic is what is experienced, that is all. Nina. op 29-01-2006 20:35 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > Did you know that sounds waves cause temperature changes? These > temperature changes are integral aspects of audible-objects. Interesting eh? > This > being the case, would it make sense to say that audible-objects are devoid > of a "temperature quality"? Remember now, you said the "receiver" was a > non-factor. 55268 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 0:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA nilovg Hi TG, op 30-01-2006 02:06 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > > > ³Whatever is felt is included within suffering. That has been stated by me > with reference to the impermanence of formations. That has been stated by me > with reference to formations being subject to destruction Š to formations > being subject to vanishing Š to formations being subject to fading away Š to > formations being subject to cessation Š to formations being subject to > change. > ² > (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 2, pg. 1271) > ³Šwhen the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it > eliminates all sensual lust, it eliminates all lust for existence, it > eliminates > all ignorance, it uproots all conceit ŒI am.¹² > (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 1, pg. 961) > As the Sutta above shows, impermanence never lacks depth. ------------- N: Good sutta quotes. The Visuddhimagga and tiika are quite in line with it. TG quotes Nina: When we think of a corpse, thinking can be understood as a dhamma, arisen > because there are conditions for such thinking. No 'I' who thinks, only a > type of nama. What is seen is not a corpse, only colour or visible object. > > TG: I strongly disagree. I don't think this is at all what the Buddha is > talking about in the 'corpse mindfulness passage' of the Satipatthana Sutta. > ... I don't believe the > Buddha is in any way trying to say -- "this is not a corpse, only color or > visible object." In fact, such an interpretation takes all the power out of > the > passage!!! The Buddha wants you to know VERY CLEARLY -- YOU WILL > DIE...IMAGINE YOU BEING LIKE THIS CORPSE. I think its sad to take that > message out and > replace it with -- the corpse is only color, etc. Where's the Dukkha in > color? --------- N: Both i strue. As that copse is so I will be, it instills a sense of urgency, samvega. urgency for what? To develop right now, without a minute's delay mindfulness and understanding of whatever appears through one of the six doors. Nobody can order or regulates what appears to mindfulness in the case of this or that individual, not even the Buddha. It may be colour, it may be seeing, it may be thinking. What is the purpose: to see the body in the body, not a self, to see feeling in the feeling, not a self... etc. That is the reason why he developed the perfections for innumerable aeons and became the Sammasambuddha. So that we, even now, can dveelop right understanding. TG: Yes I understand about direct knowledge. Its Buddhism 102. (maybe 202) > Direct knowledge is a means-to-an-end. It is NOT the end. ------- N: I completely agree. > > ³Šyou should clearly see the eyeŠearŠnoseŠtongueŠbodyŠmind as it really > is with correct wisdom thus: ŒThis is not mine, this I am not, this is not my > self.¹ This itself is the end of suffering.² > (The Buddha . . . CDB, vol. 2, pg. 1156) > > Notice the Buddha tells us to clearly understand these elements...and he > tells us HOW to understand them...as not mine, etc. He does not tells us to > understand them as ultimate realities with their own characteristics. That > means he knows his audience already understands that and is teacher here at a > higher level. ------ N: See what I said above, we agree. Only this; to understand seeing as nama, not a person who sees, amount to the same: understanding it as not self. > > ³The topmost achievement is the release-without-grasping, by seeing as it > really is the arising and the ceasing, the attraction, the danger, and the > escape from the six spheres of contact.² [Visual, audible, olfactory, > gustatory, tactile, and mental] > (The Buddha . . . GS vol. 5, pg. 45) > ³Šwithout directly knowing and fully understanding the eye, without > developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable of > destroying > suffering. ... The direct knowledge is a means > to actually ABANDON the actualities of nama and rupa. Abandoning them is a > higher achievement than "paying attention to them." ------- N: I did not say paying attention, but beginning to understand. Think of the three pariññas, levels of full understanding, that are developed in the course of insight. In order to abandon one has to understand first what dhammas exactly are. *What* has to be abandoned. ------- TG: What you keep stressing > is an intermediate level of Buddhist practice IMO. Yet the way you stress it > makes me thing you think its the highest level. ------- N: Not intermediate, but beginning. I am a beginner and like to keep busy with what is beginning only. ------- TG: Hate to sound so critical, don't want to, but it is meant to be clear > communication of important ideas. ------ N: I really enjoyed this discussion, it makes me think over things. Regret that I am packing, almost going on my way and cannot continue the thread. In three weeks. Be as critical as you like, it is good. Nina. 55269 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 0:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... nilovg Hi Howard, someone wanted to go to the world's end. He took very long strides. The Buddha said: in this fathom long body with consciousness is the end of the world. I have to search but no time.Yes, Chris has it. Rohitassa, the Skywalker. Nina. op 30-01-2006 01:25 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: > There is also > another sutta that speaks not of the all but of the world. It speaks of the > world being found right here in this very body with mentality, or something > along > those lines. I simply can't recall the sutta! :-( 55270 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 0:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Paramattha dhamma and reality nilovg Hi Cherry, The second one: beings are composed of...etc. involves so much thinking! I do not quite understand the jigsaw simile. Why not being aware directly of hardness, visible object, etc, so that you begin to understand what paramattha dhammas are. Nina. op 30-01-2006 15:19 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > If there are two statements: > - this parts of paper are jigsaw > - this paintings which is composed by parts of paper is actually a > jigsaw > The first statement is true, but it does not solve the problem. > The second statement is true, and it solves the problem. > > Saying > - hardness, color, teste are impermanent, unpleasant, and suffering > is like the first statement > - beings are composed of hardness, color, taste, consciousness, and > all others and is actually a formation (not a being per se) is like > the second statement > > My simple question is, is it like this or is it another way? 55271 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 0:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA nilovg Hi TG, everything, paramattha dhammas and concepts. Nina. op 30-01-2006 02:10 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > Yes I know and that was what I was referring to. Since that isn't what you > had in mind, and you also think concepts can be clung to ... what is it that > you think is clung to? 55272 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 8:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/30/2006 1:13:07 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi TG, everything, paramattha dhammas and concepts. Nina. op 30-01-2006 02:10 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > Yes I know and that was what I was referring to. Since that isn't what you > had in mind, and you also think concepts can be clung to ... what is it that > you think is clung to? Hi Nina Thanks. Seems like there's at least three ideas on this...1) some think only paramattha dhammas can be clung to and that concepts are not paramattha dhammas. 2) Some, such as yourself, also believe concepts are not paramattha dhammas but that they can be clung to. 3) I'm in a more minority position of believing that one cannot cling to what does not exist, I agree with you that concepts can be clung to, and therefore believe concepts exist. TG 55273 From: "Maya Putra" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:34pm Subject: Re: Stream Entrant / Scott & Nina vvhite_illusion Dear Scott & Nina, Well the monk who teaches my Abhidhamma class mentioned the sotapanna having 7 existence as a "on the side" context. He didn't dwell on it much further. He said that a sotapanna will at most be born 7 more lives, but he also emphasized that what is meant by 7 more lives is 7 more existence, thus he gives the example that if one was born 3 times in the human realm that is still considered as 1 existence. Other people in class were also taken back by what he said because all of us have always heard of a sotapanna being reborn at most 7 lives not 7 existence. That's all he mentioned regarding this subject. I also have another Abhidhamma teacher, but it won't be until this Saturday that I will get to see him. Sorry, but that's all that I can say about this subject at this point, until maybe this Saturday, when I have more input. -Maya 55274 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 8:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" sound and ... TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/30/2006 1:13:16 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi TG, It is somewhat more complicated. Indeed, sound is a rupa that does not arise alone, it is accompanied by hardness, cohesion, temperature (you mention it!), motion, and other rupas which support it. But, hearing only hears sound, or audible object, it cannot hear temperature. Temperature is not the object of hearing. So now we see that characteristic is after all a better word. Characteristic is what is experienced, that is all. Nina. Hi Nina Good Point!!! But I'm not throwing in the towel yet. ;-) TG 55275 From: "Maya Putra" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:44pm Subject: Re: Stream Entrant / Matheesha vvhite_illusion Matheesha, Ok so let me get this straight. Your take on this is that a sotapanna will be reborn at most 7 more lives in the human realm. A sakadagami will be reborn 1 more life in the human realm, and an anagami will not be reborn at all in the human realm? See, my understanding before all this and before my Abhidhamma class was, that a sotapanna will at most be reborn 7 more lives (nothing lower as a human), either as a human or in one of the 6 celestial realms. A sakadagami will be reborn one more time (nothing lower as a human), either as a human or in one of the 6 celestial realms. An anagami will attain nibbana in the next life I suppose. Again I was never too clear on this subject before the Abhidhamma Class. And now I'm just confused and unsure which interpretation is correct. -Maya 55276 From: "Maya Putra" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 1:50pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Stream Entrant vvhite_illusion Thanks Kelvin, That makes a lot more sense now =). -Maya 55277 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 2:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Samvega/Urgency sarahprocter... Hi Howard, Thank you for your touching and beautiful letter with the apt quotes. I know that you will be offering great strength and sympathy to the families involved and will also be passing on your helpful reflections in whatever language (or non-language) is appropriate. I think your message really 'catches' samvega (sense of urgency) without any of the grief/fear/worry/anxiety which people so often associate with such reflections. Finally, I'd like to express my sympathy to the families and to you and Rita over these 3 losses. Metta, Sarah p.s I have some of your posts to respond to - hopefully before we go away. I'd also be glad if you have a chance to listen and comment on the rest of the 'Erik Series' audio. If it's easier for you to listen to a cd, pls let us know. ======== --- upasaka@... wrote: > From SN III.25: The Simile of the Mountains > > Like massive boulders, > mountains pressing against the sky, > moving in from all sides, > crushing the four directions, > so aging and death > come rolling over living beings: > noble warriors, priests, merchants, > workers, outcastes, & scavengers. > They spare nothing. > They trample everything. 55278 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 2:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... jonoabb Hi TG I'm finding our exchange a good one. It's making me consider things very carefully. I have collected together your comments/questions on audible object. "1) In the case of audible-object, what is the characteristic that is unique to it? Is it compaction/rarefaction?" The characteristic unique to audible object is that it is what can be experienced by hearing consciousness through the ear-door. Now you might think this is just stating the obvious, or perhaps not really saying anything much at all. But actually it is a very meaningful statement. Audible object is that which is experienced by hearing consciousness before there is any idea of there being the hearing of a person's voice or other source of sound, of any meaning in the sound (e.g, as words spoken), of any like or dislike of the sound. So what normally appears to us as sound is in fact the concept that is created after there has been attending to the 'shape and form' of the audible object by the many thinking processes that follow each moment of actual experience of audible object. Audible object cannot be known by focusing on the sound(s) now being heard, because the object of the focusing would be these concepts arising from thinking about the shape and form of audible object, i.e, words spoken by someone, sound of something, pleasant or unpleasant sound, etc, or the concept of (conventional) sound appearing at the (conventional) ear. The characteristic of being just audible object, properly understood, can be directly experienced only by awareness/panna. "2) If a living thing could see audible-objects, would it still be the same characteristic? Sounds to me like you're saying yes." As you will appreciate from the comments above, the situation of audible object being the object of seeing consciousness could not arise, any more than could the situation of visible object being the object of hearing consciousness. "3) Did you know that sounds waves cause temperature changes? These temperature changes are integral aspects of audible-objects. Interesting eh? This being the case, would it make sense to say that audible-objects are devoid of a "temperature quality"?" Although it may be said that (conventional) sound is not devoid of (conventional) temperature quality, the same cannot be said regarding the dhammas of audible object and temperature. This is because, as I understand the texts, at the moment of one dhamma (of any kind) being experienced, no other dhamma can be the object of consciousness. Even where 2 rupas arise simultaneously as part of the same group of rupas (kalapa), only one of those rupas can ever be the object of awareness at a given time. "4) Is the unique quality of sound under water the same unique quality that we have in the air? I do expect a yes answer but I'm not sure." Yes you're right. Audible object has the same unique quality whenever it is experienced. Hoping this helps put the commentarial position in a slightly different light for you. Jon PS Just a short comment on 'sabhava': "TG: Generally Agreed. It is how the term is used. However, a term like sabhava, that is flatly denied as applying to "realities" in the Patisambhidamagga, seems like a poor choice to claim what "realities" have. ;-)" I think the question of whether or not 'sabhava' was a 'poor choice' is of limited benefit to us. Far better is the question of exactly what is being conveyed by the passages where 'sabhava' is mentioned. TGrand458@... wrote: >Hi Jon > >... > > >TG: 1) In the case of audible-object, what is the characteristic that is >unique to it? Is it compaction/rarefaction? > >2) If a living thing could see audible-objects, would it still be the same >characteristic? Sounds to me like you're saying yes. > >PS, I'm not trying to trap you with either of these questions. (Wish I >was.) ;-) > > >... > > >[J:] The conditions/qualities of the mind perceiving are themselves dhammas >with different 'characteristics', and these have no bearing on the >'characteristic' of the object being experienced. Thus temperature has >a unique 'characteristic' that is independent of the degree of >temperature involved. It is this 'characteristic' that distinguishes >temperature from, say, audible object. > >TG: Did you know that sounds waves cause temperature changes? These >temperature changes are integral aspects of audible-objects. Interesting eh? This >being the case, would it make sense to say that audible-objects are devoid >of a "temperature quality"? Remember now, you said the "receiver" was a >non-factor. > >Still interested in what the "unique characteristics" of audible-object are. > >All bets are off. Looks like I'm going for a trap now. And I was trying to >be so good. ;-) > > >... > > >[J:] Is it possible you have not fully appreciated the context in which the >commentarial passages are to be read? They are not of course saying >that the same sound is perceived as equally loud or pleasant by every >individual, only that there is a 'characteristic' to sound that is both >unique to and common to all instances of sound. Does this really sound >substantialist (no pun intended)? > >TG: Is it possible that I have not FULLY understood some of the most >brilliant minds in the history of humankind? ............. maybe a chance in a >million. LOL > >More seriously though... is the unique quality of sound under water the same >unique quality that we have in the air? I do expect a yes answer but I'm >not sure. > >Substantialist sounding? ... maybe. Its so so depending on where you're >coming from. It may not be substantialist. It is a different way in >understanding conditionality than I understand it. > > > >... >[J:] Ah, but then it is the *particular use* of the term, and not the term >itself that is the 'problem' ;-)) > >TG: Generally Agreed. It is how the term is used. However, a term like >sabhava, that is flatly denied as applying to "realities" in the >Patisambhidamagga, seems like a poor choice to claim what "realities" have. ;-) > > > > 55279 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 3:32pm Subject: Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 368- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (g) htootintnaing --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > Dear Friends, > > 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom > > http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html > http://www.zolag.co.uk/ > > Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) > ==========================================[Ch22 -Different Groups of > Defilements Part 2 contd] > > Someone may take the khandha of feeling for self, but feeling > changes all the time. Feeling which arises now is not the same as > feeling a moment ago. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Sarah, Nina and all, Thanks for this post of groups of defilements. Aggregates or khandha is an intresting topic. Anattalakkhana sutta focuses on five khandhaa or aggregates. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ There may be theoretical understanding of the truth, but wrong view is deeply rooted; it cannot be eradicated by thinking. Wrong view can be eradicated only by developing right understanding of the reality which appears at the present moment. ***** (Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 to be continued) Metta, Sarah ====== ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Htoo: True. Even though there may exist theoretical understanding of the truth still there is wrong view deeply rooted. Yes. It cannot be eradicated by thinkin. Wrong view can be eradicated only by 'developing right understanding of the reality which appears at the present moment'. Again 'this development of right understanding' is only possible where there is *doing* or *practice*, :-)) Without *doing* or *practice* or *pa.tipatti* 'this development of right understanding will never arise'. With Metta, Htoo Naing 55280 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 4:01pm Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 643 ) htootintnaing Dear Dhamma Friends, 'Vi~n~naana paccayaa naama-ruupam'. There are 19 'vinnaanas' that serve as pa.tisandhi cittas or linking consciousness. When they arise they support or condition 'naama- ruupam' to arise. 2 pa.tisandhi cittas have been discussed. There left 17 pa.tisandhi cittas. They are a) 8 mahaa-vipaaka cittas b) 5 ruupa-vipaaka cittas c) 4 aruupa-vipaaka cittas ---------- ++17 pa.tisandhi cittas These cittas are resultant consciousness. The first 8 cittas in a) are the direct results of 8 mahaa-kusala cittas. The second 5 cittas in b) are the direct results of 5 ruupa-kusala cittas which are 5 ruupa-jhaanas. The third 4 cittas in c) are the direct results of 4 aruupa-kusala cittas which are 4 aruupa-jhaanas. These 17 cittas have to arise because when the corresponding kusala cittas were done there had not eradicated avijjaa and so there had done 'sankhaara'. Because of those '17 sankhaara' these 17 vinnaana have to arise. But if avijjaa has been eradicated then instead of arising of 17 kusala cittas there arise 17 kiriya cittas. Kiriya cittas are free of kamma and they never give rise to any further rebirth-consciousness or linking consciousness or pa.tisandhi cittas. So there have to exist 3 sets. A. kusala cittas (avijjaa has not been eradicated and so kamma arise) B. vipaka cittas(cooked result and there won't be any further effect) C. kiriyaa cittas(functional and there is not retained kamma) A.17 kusala cittas a) 8 mahaa-kusala cittas (kaama kusala) b) 5 ruupa-kusala cittas (ruupa kusala_5 ruupa jhaana) c) 4 arupa-kusala cittas (aruupa kusala_4 aruupa jhaana) B.17 vipaaka cittas ( the results of A.) a) 8 mahaa-vipaaka cittas (kaama vipaaka) b) 5 ruupa-vipaaka cittas (ruupa vipaaka) c) 4 arupa-vipaaka cittas (aruupa vipaaka) C.17 kiriya cittas (like in A. but without retained kamma) a) 8 mahaa-kiriya cittas (arahats' kaama kiriyaa or actions) b) 5 ruupa-kiriya cittas(arahats' rupa kiriya or arahats' rupa-jhana) c) 4 arupa-kiriya cittas(arahats' arupa kiriya or arahats' arupajhana) There are 3 sets of 17 cittas. All these 51 cittas are vinnaanas or cittas. But only the middle set that is vipaaka cittas are 'vinnaana' or Dependent Origination. The first set of cittas are 'sankhaara'. But 'sankhaara' here is not cittas themselves but cetana cetasikas in those 17 cittas. The 3rd set of 17 cittas are also vinnaanas. But they are not 'vinnaanas' of D.O. Because when these 17 cittas arise there is no avijjaa and so there is no sankhaara and so there is no vinnaana (vipaaka or effect or results). Again the middle set of 17 vipaaka cittas can give rise to 2 sets of implication. One is more aggressive. Because it stamps for the whole life while the other set is like writing on the surface of water. That is as soon as they arise they fall away. The stamping set of vipaaka is giving rise to pa.tisandhii. 17 vipaaka cittas can give rise to pa.tisandhii while they also give rise to non-pa.tisandhi results or effects. May you be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts on Dhamma Thread. Any adding, any correction, any support will be very helpful for all. 55281 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 4:09pm Subject: Re: Dhamma Thread ( 643 ) htootintnaing --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "htootintnaing" wrote: > > Dear Dhamma Friends, > > 'Vi~n~naana paccayaa naama-ruupam'. > > There are 19 'vinnaanas' that serve as pa.tisandhi cittas or linking > consciousness. When they arise they support or condition 'naama- > ruupam' > to arise. 2 pa.tisandhi cittas have been discussed. > > There left 17 pa.tisandhi cittas. They are > > a) 8 mahaa-vipaaka cittas > b) 5 ruupa-vipaaka cittas > c) 4 aruupa-vipaaka cittas > ---------- > ++17 pa.tisandhi cittas > > These cittas are resultant consciousness. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Dhamma Friends, Not only on the internet but also in personal atmosphere I have been said to be Mr Number, :-)) There is only 1 way to nibbana. There are 2 things that are original; Dhamma and Sammaasambuddha. There are 3 things that are uncomparable: Triplegem There are 4 things that are truths: Noble Truths There are 5 things that are not self: Panca-kkhandhaa There are 6 things ... ... ... 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14, ... and .. _ :-)) With Metta, Htoo Naing 55282 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 11:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... TGrand458@... Hi Jon In a message dated 1/30/2006 3:31:58 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: Hi TG I'm finding our exchange a good one. It's making me consider things very carefully. TG: Agreed! I have collected together your comments/questions on audible object. "1) In the case of audible-object, what is the characteristic that is unique to it? Is it compaction/rarefaction?" The characteristic unique to audible object is that it is what can be experienced by hearing consciousness through the ear-door. TG: Is it that an audible-object "can be heard"? or that it "is being heard"? This brings to mind an old question... If a tree falls in a forest and there is no one to hear it, does it make a sound? Or other example questions... Lets say a deaf person and a hearing able person are in the same room. Music is loudly playing in the room. The deaf person cannot hear it but he can feel the vibrations. The other person can hear it and is unaware of the vibrations. Questions: 1) Is the audible-object simultaneously a tactile-object? 2) Although the two peoples experience is different, Is the sensory-object the same? 3) Is vibrating air both a tactile-object and audible-object in a separate way ... even if the source is identical? 4) If the audible-object is simultaneously a tactile-object, what unique quality does the sense-object in question have? One thing I'm not clear on is whether you believe an audible-object has a quality independent of the actual hearing of it. Or another way of saying it...Does an audible-object have a physical reality even if it is not being heard? Seems to me maybe sense-object and sense-experience are dependent upon each other and the qualities are as well. In other words...if ears did not exist, it no being in the history of the universe ever developed the ability to hear, does this change the quality of a "potential sense-object"? Does the audible-object lose the quality of "being able to be heard" simply because it is not being heard? (This is where I have out phenomenologized Howard. However, in a current discussion he is kicking the phenomenology out of me.) ;-) Now you might think this is just stating the obvious, or perhaps not really saying anything much at all. But actually it is a very meaningful statement. Audible object is that which is experienced by hearing consciousness before there is any idea of there being the hearing of a person's voice or other source of sound, of any meaning in the sound (e.g, as words spoken), of any like or dislike of the sound. So what normally appears to us as sound is in fact the concept that is created after there has been attending to the 'shape and form' of the audible object by the many thinking processes that follow each moment of actual experience of audible object. Audible object cannot be known by focusing on the sound(s) now being heard, because the object of the focusing would be these concepts arising from thinking about the shape and form of audible object, i.e, words spoken by someone, sound of something, pleasant or unpleasant sound, etc, or the concept of (conventional) sound appearing at the (conventional) ear. TG: I follow you here. The characteristic of being just audible object, properly understood, can be directly experienced only by awareness/panna. "2) If a living thing could see audible-objects, would it still be the same characteristic? Sounds to me like you're saying yes." As you will appreciate from the comments above, the situation of audible object being the object of seeing consciousness could not arise, any more than could the situation of visible object being the object of hearing consciousness. TG: I'm still not sure how you would answer my above questions. So if you wouldn't mind indulging me I'd appreciate it. :-) BTW, Think I saw something about Bats are very possibly able to see sound. "3) Did you know that sounds waves cause temperature changes? These temperature changes are integral aspects of audible-objects. Interesting eh? This being the case, would it make sense to say that audible-objects are devoid of a "temperature quality"?" Although it may be said that (conventional) sound is not devoid of (conventional) temperature quality, the same cannot be said regarding the dhammas of audible object and temperature. TG: Can't understand you here? This is because, as I understand the texts, at the moment of one dhamma (of any kind) being experienced, no other dhamma can be the object of consciousness. Even where 2 rupas arise simultaneously as part of the same group of rupas (kalapa), only one of those rupas can ever be the object of awareness at a given time. TG: This sounds to me more like you think that a sense-object is only a sense-object at the time of experience. That makes sense from an experiential point of view. I'm still not sure if you'd think that there is rupa, with characteristics, that are independent from the actual act of experience. In other words..."potential sense-object" such as light and audible vibrations that are part of the world without necessarily being part of experience? "4) Is the unique quality of sound under water the same unique quality that we have in the air? I do expect a yes answer but I'm not sure." Yes you're right. Audible object has the same unique quality whenever it is experienced. TG: The thought just crossed my mind that this is sort of a "human centrist" point of view. That's cool since we are humans and that's where we have to work from. However, I believe other life forms probably experience the same phenomena in different ways. At any rate, and even though I'm still waiting on those new questions, it sounds like from your viewpoint it would have to be conceded that Abhidhamma is unable to make judgements about physical realities other than from a "subjective human being sensory oriented" point of view. And perhaps that's the most we could hope for. I'm really still unclear whether or not you believe there is an external reality outside of sense experience. Thanks for the replies Jon. TG Hoping this helps put the commentarial position in a slightly different light for you. Jon PS Just a short comment on 'sabhava': "TG: Generally Agreed. It is how the term is used. However, a term like sabhava, that is flatly denied as applying to "realities" in the Patisambhidamagga, seems like a poor choice to claim what "realities" have. ;-)" I think the question of whether or not 'sabhava' was a 'poor choice' is of limited benefit to us. Far better is the question of exactly what is being conveyed by the passages where 'sabhava' is mentioned. 55283 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 4:15pm Subject: Vism.XIV,230 lbidd2 "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga) Ch. XIV 230. Such blessings there will be From seeing them as murderers and otherwise, Therefore the wise should see The aggregates as murderers and otherwise. The fourteenth chapter called 'The Description of the Aggregates' in the Treatise on the Development of Understanding in the "Path of Purification" composed for the purpose of gladdening good people. ************************** 230. eva.m mahaanisamsa.m, vadhakaadivasena dassana.m yasmaa. tasmaa khandhe dhiiro, vadhakaadivasena passeyyaati.. iti saadhujanapaamojjatthaaya kate visuddhimagge pa~n~naabhaavanaadhikaare khandhaniddeso naama cuddasamo paricchedo. 55284 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 11:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, TG (and Jon) - In a message dated 1/30/06 7:16:38 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Or other example questions... Lets say a deaf person and a hearing able > person are in the same room. Music is loudly playing in the room. The > deaf > person cannot hear it but he can feel the vibrations. The other person can > hear > it and is unaware of the vibrations. > > Questions: 1) Is the audible-object simultaneously a tactile-object? > 2) Although the two peoples experience is different, Is the sensory-object > > the same? > 3) Is vibrating air both a tactile-object and audible-object in a separate > > way ... even if the source is identical? > 4) If the audible-object is simultaneously a tactile-object, what unique > quality does the sense-object in question have? > ===================== Here's my phenomenalist take on this. I'll be interested to see how it compares with the Abhidhammic understanding: 1) No. They are two different rupas of two different sorts. 2) No. There are two different sensory objects, within two different expariential streams. 3) Vibrating air is neither. It is a story, a concept. 4) Previous answers render this unanswerable. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55285 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 4:46pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA kenhowardau Hi Larry, ------------------- L: > Vism.XIV,218: "And this is the extreme limit as the basis for the assumption of self and what pertains to self, that is to say, the five beginning with materiality." I've been thinking about this and remembered what was bothering me. There's no official remedy for attachment to concepts. No insight knowledge into the true nature of concepts. ------------------- How would that sort of insight knowledge be taught? What is the true nature of things that do not exist, have never existed, and will never exist? :-) The way I see it, the Dhamma assumes from the very beginning that there is no need to deny the ultimate reality of concepts: it is a contradiction in terms and not worth spending any time over. The Sabba Sutta, for example, does not address any such silliness. I think the concluding remarks to that sutta address the possibility of someone proclaiming a reality - not a concept - apart from the All. ------------------------ L: > Here is a summary of some ideas in a book called "Emptiness Yoga" by Jeffrey Hopkins (on Tibetan Madhyamaka): Hence, concepts are not an object of clinging (my conclusion). This doesn't follow abhidhamma but it's something to think about [and it does conform to a literal reading of the above quote from Vism.]. ----------------------- It is fair (though superfluous) to say that concepts are not among the realities that can be clung to. But it would be plainly wrong to say they cannot be clung to. The Abhidhamma explains the mechanics of it: I don't see the problem. Ken H 55286 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 4:54pm Subject: clinging to concepts lbidd2 Hi Nina and all, Here's one way to look at it. A concept always refers to something else, so when there is clinging to a concept there is clinging to that something else, or clinging to the intimation rupa that intimates the concept. For example, when there is clinging to a name there may be clinging to conceit or clinging to the intimation rupa that is the name (the sound of the name). If there is the liking of a tree, that liking is not a liking of the concept of the tree but rather the liking of particular visible data. Clinging to an idea is clinging to view (ditthi). Clinging to money could be clinging to several different realities. In this approach the idea is to look for the reality behind the concept. That is what we are actually clinging to. Otherwise, there has to be a fifth foundation of mindfulness: mindfulness of concept. Perhaps we don't have to change abhidhamma. Concept could be an object of consciousness but its "nature" is not what is clung to. It is merely a tool, a pointer. And instead of dismissing concept as non-existent maybe we should look for the reality behind it. Reality is the object of insight, not concept, so it makes sense that only reality is clung to. Larry 55287 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 5:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations of the SATIPATTHANA SUTTA lbidd2 KenH: "It is fair (though superfluous) to say that concepts are not among the realities that can be clung to. But it would be plainly wrong to say they cannot be clung to. The Abhidhamma explains the mechanics of it: I don't see the problem." Hi Ken, Maybe so, but let's not jump to any hasty conclusions;-) Larry 55288 From: "Charles" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 5:33pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Paramattha dhamma and reality cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > > Hi Cherry, > The second one: beings are composed of...etc. involves so much thinking! I > do not quite understand the jigsaw simile. > Why not being aware directly of hardness, visible object, etc, so that you > begin to understand what paramattha dhammas are. > Nina. Hi Nina, Like in the recollection of four elements, This body is composed by earth element, is impermanant, suffering, and not self :D I feel that only saying that earth element is impermanent, suffering, and not self is not enough to produce right view. 55289 From: "Charles" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 5:49pm Subject: Re: clinging to concepts cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, LBIDD@w... wrote: > a tool, a pointer. And instead of dismissing concept as non-existent > maybe we should look for the reality behind it. Reality is the object of > insight, not concept, so it makes sense that only reality is clung to. Hi Larry, People still cling with their house in the past or in the future. Isn' t this concept of a house without reality? Also I am in double on what is concept and what is reality, pannati lacks sabhava, while hardness for example has its own sabhava, so is hardness a concept or else? 55290 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 6:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: clinging to concepts lbidd2 Charles: "Hi Larry, People still cling with their house in the past or in the future. Isn' t this concept of a house without reality? Also I am in double on what is concept and what is reality, pannati lacks sabhava, while hardness for example has its own sabhava, so is hardness a concept or else?" Hi Charles, House is a concept but clinging to a house could be as simple as clinging to warmth. I'm not sure what reality is behind "ownership", maybe self view, thinking a rupa is mine. As for what is concept and what is reality, I think you explained it yourself. Hardness the experience or hardness the rupa (depending on how you look at it) has its own nature (sabhava). "Hardness" the word is a concept. It is essentially a social agreement and as such doesn't have a "nature". But, it is a good question. We are still debating this and trying to understand it. Larry 55291 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 4:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... TGrand458@... Hi Howard In a message dated 1/30/2006 5:53:33 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Questions: 1) Is the audible-object simultaneously a tactile-object? > 2) Although the two peoples experience is different, Is the sensory-object > > the same? > 3) Is vibrating air both a tactile-object and audible-object in a separate > > way ... even if the source is identical? > 4) If the audible-object is simultaneously a tactile-object, what unique > quality does the sense-object in question have? > ===================== Here's my phenomenalist take on this. I'll be interested to see how it compares with the Abhidhammic understanding: 1) No. They are two different rupas of two different sorts. 2) No. There are two different sensory objects, within two different expariential streams. 3) Vibrating air is neither. It is a story, a concept. 4) Previous answers render this unanswerable. With metta, Howard Hi Howard Interesting answers. The whole point of my questions was to get an answer as to whether phenomena exist independent from sense experience. Still not clear from your answers. Nor are you obliged to make it clear. I was disappointed with answer # 3 though. It doesn't really get us anywhere to call it a story. If we could do away with the conventional/ultimate thing, maybe you could tell me if you believe that -- air exists externally from mere human experience? Am I setting the bar too high? ;-) Come to think of it, isn't air considered one of the 4 Great Elements? If that's "a story" isn't anything we write "a story"? Perhaps there's a "non-story way" to define the 4 Great Elements? I think the other answers clarified your viewpoint to me regarding those questions. Thanks. TG 55292 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 5:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: clinging to concepts TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/30/2006 7:16:00 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, LBIDD@... writes: Charles: "Hi Larry, People still cling with their house in the past or in the future. Isn' t this concept of a house without reality? Also I am in double on what is concept and what is reality, pannati lacks sabhava, while hardness for example has its own sabhava, so is hardness a concept or else?" Hi Charles and Larry Clinging can only cling to what is present. What is past is no longer experience-able. What is present regarding the concept of a past house? The memory is present, the mental formations are present. These are the things being clung to. TG 55293 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 5:03pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/30/2006 5:56:20 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, LBIDD@... writes: Hi Nina and all, Here's one way to look at it. A concept always refers to something else, so when there is clinging to a concept there is clinging to that something else, or clinging to the intimation rupa that intimates the concept. For example, when there is clinging to a name there may be clinging to conceit or clinging to the intimation rupa that is the name (the sound of the name). If there is the liking of a tree, that liking is not a liking of the concept of the tree but rather the liking of particular visible data. Clinging to an idea is clinging to view (ditthi). Clinging to money could be clinging to several different realities. In this approach the idea is to look for the reality behind the concept. That is what we are actually clinging to. Otherwise, there has to be a fifth foundation of mindfulness: mindfulness of concept. Perhaps we don't have to change abhidhamma. Concept could be an object of consciousness but its "nature" is not what is clung to. It is merely a tool, a pointer. And instead of dismissing concept as non-existent maybe we should look for the reality behind it. Reality is the object of insight, not concept, so it makes sense that only reality is clung to. Larry Hi Larry A cut-in if you don't mind... Wouldn't clinging to the concept of tree be clinging to the memory of a tree? Wouldn't the memory be a mental formation? Would not the mental formation be a real thing? Therefore, wouldn't the clinging to a concept be clinging to a real thing? TG 55294 From: "Charles" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 10:44pm Subject: Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium Hi, As we know the word dhamma has multiple meanings. Dhamma in abhidhamma has analytical meaning. But the word sabbe dhamma anatta is mostly in the sutta context. Below is an interesting quote(s) ----------------------------------------------- sabbe dhamma anatta All compounds are devoid of self. Some translate the phrase sabbe dhamma literally as "all phenomena" (both compound and non-compound). This is not true. According to Lord Buddha's Teaching in the Dhammapada Pali text, as interpreted by the original arahant commentators and by the most recent translators (Carter and Palihawadana 1987) 2, the words sabbe dhamma , in this context, refer only to the Five Aggregates . These are sankhara or compounds. Thus, the reference excludes pure, non-compound aspects of nature such as nibbana. =============================================== From: http://www.concentration.org/_insight.html Comparing to Ven. Ledi Sayadaw's explanation in Sammaditthi Dipani This is atta ditthi ----------------------------------------------- * A being is composed of the sensation-group and has this group as his essence or substance. What has this group as its essence or substance is called a being. * A being is composed of the perception-group and has this group as his essence or substance. What has this group as its essence or substance is called a being. * A being is composed of the mental-formation-group and has this group as his essence or substance. What has this group as its essence or substance is called a being. * A being is composed of the consciousness-group and has this group as his essence or substance. What has this group as its essence or substance is called a being. * In brief, every being is composed of the five constituent groups of existence and has them as his essence or substance. Some maintain the following view: 'So long as the five constituent groups of existence last, do not decay or dissolve, beings last, do not decay nor dissolve. They live up to one hundred or one thousand years without decay, death and dissolution, and for such periods of time the constituent groups of existence which are their essence or substance do not decay nor dissolve.' This view is soul-belief. =============================================== How atta ditthi is eliminated (in this analogy wood is the essence of wooden bowl, wood refers to the pancakkhandha and bowl refer to being) ----------------------------------------------- Some people understand that the essence or substance of the wooden bowl is wood, but they cannot penetrate the truth and discern that this piece of wood comprises an immense number of atthakalapa-rupa.[8] So they can only superficially understand that the essence or substance of the wooden bowl is wood. Some people penetrate the truth and realise that the essence or substance of the wood is but a collection of corporeal groups and that these are also causally-conditioned, arising-and-vanishing physical phenomena. They realise in the following manner: The state of extension is conspicuous in a piece of wood which assumes the shape of a bowl and these elements of extension are undoubtedly the ultimate truth of pathavi-dhatu (the element of extension), and not ' wood' at all. In the same way, the state of cohesion found conspicuously in that form or shape is the characteristic of apo-dhatu (the element of cohesion); the state of heat or cold found in that shape is the characteristic of tejo-dhatu (the element of kinetic energy), and the state of support or motion found in that shape is the characteristic of vayo-dhatu (the element of motion). These four elements are known as the four great primaries or the four great essentials (maha-bhuta). ... When they have realised in this manner they clearly understand that there is no wood apart from these physical elements. Now, when the wood itself does not exist in the ultimate sense, how can the wood possess the essence or substance of the bowl? How can momentarily arising-and passing-away corporeal groups become the essence or substance of the wood? Thus they penetrate to the truth. Here, the conventional term of 'bowl' resembles the conventional term of 'being'. The corporeal groups contained in the wood resemble the five constituent groups of existence. This is the analogy. ----------------------------------------------- More quotes :D ----------------------------------------------- Ye hi keci bhikkhave samaná vá bráhmaná va anekavihitam attánam samanupassamáná samanupassanti, sabbe te pañcupádánakkhandhe samanupassanti, etesam vá aññataram. (Khandha Samyutta 47) Whatever ascetics or recluses, monks, there may be who consider self in various forms, they are all considering the five aggregates of clinging or one of them. All thoughts about self are necessarily, whether the thinker is aware of it or not, thoughts about the five aggregates of clinging; and to think of nibbána as attá is to think of nibbána as consisting of one or more of these five aggregates. =============================================== From: http://www.geocities.com/Athens/9366/nibban1.htm http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn22-047.html 55295 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 11:37pm Subject: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 369- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (h) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== [Ch22 -Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 contd] Among the ways of clinging, clinging to wrong view has been classified as threefold: as clinging to wrong view (speculative theories), as clinging to wrong practice and as clinging to personality belief. Each of these three classifications shows a different aspect of wrong view. The magga-citta of the sotåpanna eradicates the three ways of clinging which are clinging to wrong view. He still has the first way of clinging, sensuous clinging. Even the sakadågåmí and the anågåmí have the first way of clinging. The anågåmí has no more clinging to sensuous objects, but he still has clinging to rebirth which is the result of jhåna, and this form of clinging is in this classification included in the first way of clinging. The magga-citta of the arahat eradicates the first way of clinging (Visuddhimagga, XVII, 245). ***** (Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 to be continued) Metta, Sarah ====== 55296 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jan 30, 2006 11:55pm Subject: Question for A. Sujin philofillet Hi Sarah Sneaking on to a computer at work to ask a question for Acharn Sujin. I have read this, "we can't understand panna until we understand sila and dana" or words to that effect. Could you ask her to talk about that a bit? I tend to think, prematurely, that panna takes care of everything. (No need to ask the other question I mentionned in a post to Nina, about how understanding helps us to deal with dosa.) Thanks. Phil 55297 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:10am Subject: All members from Indonesia (was:Sahetuka Akusala Kamavacara Citta) sarahprocter... Firstly, welcome to DSG, Daniel, I'm very impressed by your deep questions and reflections. Recently the members from Indonesia seem to be taking the list by storm:-) You all seem to have really studied the Abhidhamma. At Xmas it seemed to be the Canadians out in full force, but you've all taken over. Where do you live, Daniel? Is there anything else you'd like to share about your background. --- Suchamda D wrote: > Thankyou Nina for the answer, > I have to digest what you have been written. > In my understanding, vipaka is a consciousness that we have when had an > effect of impending karma. As you said, vipaka is not reprehensible. So > I > still can't get a clear understanding, why for sobhana citta there are > vipaka with a 'root' as it is surely should be irreprehensible too. .... S: I don't have anything now to add to Nina's comments... Do you have B.Bodhi's translation and guide to the Abhidamattha Sangaha (CMA)? If so, look in ChV, Results of Kamma, p210f. Or see Narada's translation on line. It may help. It goes into detail distinguishing superior wholesome kamma, inferior, etc and the 'greatness' of superior wholesome kamma bringing results with 3 roots etc. More in the commentary too. A friend, Ranil also asked a related question to A.Sujin. You can hear her response on the last track (or last but one track) of the audio discussions in Sri Lanka on www.dhammastudygroup.org. .... Selamat, it's always good to know you're reading the list and I'm glad to hear of your group's discussions. If you would like us to send a cd (mp3) format with discussions with A.Sujin (and also Nina) for your friend you've mentioned before who can no longer read but would like to listen to Abhidhamma, pls let me know. I have your address kept aside. You can email me off-list if you prefer for this. ..... Cherry, please keep up your excellent questions and replies. I thought your one to Daniel on reality and sabhava (#55249) was excellent. ..... Maya, good to see you posting after a long break. I seem to remember that you're also from Indonesia. Please correct me if I'm mistaken. Also, others might appreciate it if you introduce yourself again a little....:-) ... Anyone else from Indonesia that I've forgotten....welcome too! Metta, Sarah ========= 55298 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. nilovg Hi TG, we have to distinguish different types of concepts. Concepts may be terms and some terms represent what is real and some what is not real. Further, they are ideas represented by terms. You believe that they exist: I add: they are shadows of what is real. This is stated in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha. Here is the text (Survey, Concepts and Realities, taken from Rob K's web): There are many kinds of concepts and they can be classified in different ways. One way of classifying them is the following (see Abhidhammattha Sangaha Ch VIII, section 4, on pannattis): i) formal concept (santhana pannatti corresponding to the form of things, such as land, mountain or tree, which are so designated on account of the mode of transition of the elements. ii) collective concept (samuha pannatti), corresponding to modes of construction of materials, to a collection of things, such as a vehicle or a chariot. iii) conventional concept (sammutti pannatti), such as person or individual, which is derived from the five khandhas. iv) local concept (disa pannatti), a notion or idea de rived from the revolving of the moon, such as the directions of East or West. v) concept of time (kala pannatti), such as morning, evening. vi) concept of season (masa pannatti), notions corresponding to seasons and months. The months are designated by names, such as Vesakha. vii) concept of space (akasa), such as a well or a cave. It is derived from space which is not contacted by the four Great Elements. viii) nimitta pannatti, the mental image which is acquired through the development of samatha, such as the nimitta of a kasina. We read in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha: All such different things, although they do not exist in the ultimate sense, become objects of thought in the form of shadows of ultimate things. They are called pannatti be cause they are thought of, reckoned, understood, expressed, and made known on account of, in consideration of, with respect to, this or that mode. This kind of pannatti is so called because it is made known. As it makes known, it is described as name concept, name, name-made. ***** Nina. op 30-01-2006 22:21 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > .1) some think > only paramattha dhammas can be clung to and that concepts are not paramattha > dhammas. 2) Some, such as yourself, also believe concepts are not paramattha > dhammas but that they can be clung to. 3) I'm in a more minority position of > believing that one cannot cling to what does not exist, I agree with you that > concepts can be clung to, and therefore believe concepts exist. 55299 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:16am Subject: Alone with Dhamma, Ch 4, no 7 nilovg Alone with Dhamma, Ch 4, no 7 When we were in India we had many opportunities to rejoice in other people¹s kusala, their generosity and readiness to help others. Jonothan performed kusala all day long, without interruption, in recording the Dhamma discussions. He applied a great deal of effort to hold the microphone close to Acharn Sujin. When Lodewijk said that he was distracted by this, I said to him that Jonathan develops all the perfections while doing this. He performs dåna, he gives the great gift of Dhamma. He performs síla while helping many people by bodily acts, while holding the microphone so that people all over the world can hear our dhamma discussions. He develops renunciation since he renounces his own comfort while he has little time for relaxation. He develops wisdom while listening with understanding, and asking questions that are useful to all. He applies energy since he is not inert to perform wholesome deeds. He has patience and endurance which is needed day after day in order to continue to perform kusala. He develops truthfulness to perform the kusala he has determined to do: acting according to what he has promised he would do. He has determination to perform kusala and continue with it. He has mettå because he thinks of many people's benefit and welfare. He has equanimity because even when he is tired he continues with equanimity in all circumstances. This shows that all the perfections can be developed together, at the same time. We do not have to think about the perfections; they are developed while we perform kusala through body, speech and mind without thinking of our own gain or profit. Jonothan and Sarah are always working hard to edit all the recordings of Dhamma discussions just for our benefit. They even listened to them and edited them during our long bus drives. At the beginning of this pilgrimage Lodewijk stated categorically that this would be his last trip to India. At the end of the trip, however, on the houseboat in Srinagar, he said just as categorically that he would definitely go on the next pilgrimage. Why? The holy places, the discussions and the recollection of the Buddha had inspired him to go back to India in order better to be able to understand the Truth, wherever we go and live. And so it should be for all of us. The end. ******* Nina. 55300 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Paramattha dhamma and reality nilovg Hi Cherry, op 31-01-2006 02:33 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > This body is composed by earth element, is impermanant, suffering, > and not self :D > > I feel that only saying that earth element is impermanent, suffering, > and not self is not enough to produce right view. -------- N: Only *saying* it is not enough. I agree. Many great philosophers realized that life is impermanent, the body is impermanent. They looked at corpses and meditated about them. The Buddha's teaching of impermanence is unique. He taught the development of paññaa that directly realizes the momentary impermanence of nama and rupa, as well as the condions for the arising of phenomena and their ceasing in the cycle of birth and death, and this is the teaching of the Dependent Origination. We cannot immediately realize the three characteristics. Paññaa has to be developed that knows precisely what nama is and what rupa is. Not through thinking about them, but through direct understanding of them when they appear. Thus, when we speak about the three characteristics we have to remember that paññaa has to be developed on and on so that they are directly and clearly realized. Nina 55301 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts nilovg Hi Larry, See my post to TG on concepts. Rob K posted this before and also reminded people that concepts are shadows of realities. You say something similar here. Only, we cling to all objects, also concepts. We cling to peace in the woorld, for example. Nina. op 31-01-2006 01:54 schreef LBIDD@... op LBIDD@...: > And instead of dismissing concept as non-existent > maybe we should look for the reality behind it. Reality is the object of > insight, not concept, so it makes sense that only reality is clung to. 55302 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:16am Subject: Visuddhimagga Ch IV, 230 and Tiika. nilovg Visuddhimagga Ch IV, 230. Text Vis.: Such blessings there will be From seeing them as murderers and otherwise, Therefore the wise should see The aggregates as murderers and otherwise. ------- N: ŒBlessing¹ is the translation of mahaanisa.msa, great benefit. The Tiika adds that there is an abundant gain in developing the way to destroy the perversities and all defilements in the aforesaid manner. As to the expression, as murderers and otherwise, the Tiika adds: as murderers with drawn swords. We should remember the ŒTo be devoured Sutta¹ and the ŒYamaka Sutta¹ (as referred to in Vis. 222, 223) which show the danger of clinging to the khandhas. One will be a prey to the khandhas, and be deceived by the khandhas who are like a foe in disguise of a friend. When one keeps on clinging to them one will not be liberated from the cycle of birth and death. The Tiika adds to the expression, ŒTherefore the wise should see the aggregates as murderers and otherwise¹, he should see them with Œknowledge and vision¹ (ñaa.nadassana), by direct realization (paccakkhato). Paccakkha means evident, clear, and this refers to direct realization of the truth. Knowledge and vision refers to lokuttara paññaa that arises after insight has been developed stage by stage. In all the previous sections the Visuddhimagga exhorts people to develop insight so that naama and ruupa which are classified as five khandhas are seen as impermanent, dukkha, not-self. Text Vis.: The fourteenth chapter called 'The Description of the Aggregates' in the Treatise on the Development of Understanding in the "Path of Purification" composed for the purpose of gladdening good people. ------- N: The Tiika adds that the explanation of the Description of the Khandhas is finished and that this was the explanation of the fourteenth chapter. --------- Conclusion: In the preceding sections it was explained that the understanding of the khandhas leads to full understanding of the nutriments and the abandoning of the perversions. Summarizing: Vis. 226: ³One who sees internal materiality (ruupas of the body) as foul fully understands nutriment consisting of physical nutriment. He abandons the perversion [of perceiving] beauty in the foul ...² Vis. 227: ³One who sees feeling as dukkha fully understands nutriment consisting of contact. He abandons the perversion of perceiving pleasure in the painful.² Vis. 228: ³One who sees perception and formations as not-self fully understands nutriment consisting of mental volition. He abandons the perversion of perceiving self in not-self.² Vis. 229: ³On who sees consciousness as impermanent fully understands nutriment consisting of consciousness. He abandons the perversion of perceiving permanence in the impermanent.² We gain great benefit from the texts only if they are applied at this moment, if insight is developed. There is no other way to see ruupa as a lump of foam, feeling as a bubble of water, to see all khandhas as coreless, as non-self. The Visuddhimagga emphasizes the three pariññas which are to be applied in the course of the development of insight. Without the first pariñña, full understanding of the known, there cannot be the third pariññaa, full understanding of abandoning. Only when clear understanding of nama and rupa is developed, there can eventually be detachment from them. All these texts are not abstract theory. They pertain to this moment. The end of the fourteenth chapter on the khandhas. ****** Nina. 55303 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta nilovg Hi Cherry, It is said: sabbe sankhaara anicca sabbe sankhaara dukkha sabbe dhamma anattaa. Sankhaara are condiitoned phenomena or compounds. But dhamma includes also nibbaana. That is the difference. Nina. op 31-01-2006 07:44 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > sabbe dhamma anatta > > All compounds are devoid of self. 55304 From: "Joop" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 2:05am Subject: Concepts and other irrealities (Was:Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts jwromeijn In 'Insight Journal' of Fall 2005 I read an essay about 'The emptiness of concepts'. That reminds me to the remark (I forgot of whom) that we should understand 'concepts' better exactly for not clinging to them. So I have some reflections on it. 1. ONE OR TWO REALITIES ? Sometimes in DSG or other Abhidhamma-texts one reads about two realities: pannatti and paramattha (Bhikkhu Bodhi does it on page 25 of the CMA). And sometimes only paramattha are called realities: ultimate; only a dhamma is a reality. Sujin does that more or less in her "Survey". I think there is no problem talking about two levels of reality: the conventional and the absolute. "Conventional language" and "concepts" are most times used as synonyms: a language is a set of symbols that makes it possible to make reflection and communication possible. I said above "more or less" because Sujin (as far as I know) does not talk about conventional or conceptual reality but she does use the expression "conventional truth". 2. REALITIES OR TRUTHS ? That brings me to the topic if it isn't better to talk about the two truths in stead of realities? I think it is better but we then should take some precautions, otherwise Howard will have his phenomenologist critics on it. I do not write 'truth" with capitals, that should be idealistic ontology. "Truth" is a model of occurring realities, (a "model" is - to me - the same as a theory" and "occurring" is the same as "experiencing"). There is a second reason for the preference of the term "two truths": it make it easier to compare Abhidhamma with Mahayana ideas of two truths (for example Nagarjuna). 3. HISTORY OF THE TWO TRUTHS The logical next step then is the question: where did it start? I agree that already in the Suttas, in the teachings of the Buddha one can read (in other terms) about the two truths. But it toke some centuries before it really got a cornerstone of Buddhism (Theravada and Mahayana) Karunada (Hi, Larry; now it get difficult) for example describes this evolution (in a Wheel publication so it can not be far from orthodoxy). 4. NO AWAKENING WITHOUT CONCEPTS It's in my opinion not because the Sutta Pitaka is for spiritual dummies that the Buddha most times used conventional language (concepts) to explain the Dhamma (with a capital). It's simply impossible to do without. If we should count the Abhidhamma-texts or the 'Survey' 99% of the words are not paramattha terms. The core doctrines of the Dhamma are formulated in conventional language; some simply do not fit in the dichotomy pannatti - paramattha; for example the famous "accumulations"-term and the still more important term "conditions". 5. CONCLUSION Of course we should not cling to concepts; and especially not to the concept "atta". But still concepts can be very important, even indispensable, tools. Metta Joop Appendix: Conclusion of Kasturirangan's essay So let me try to restate my basic idea. Cognitive science has changed enough that we have gone from thinking of concepts symbolically to things that are embodied, but we still don 't have a theory of concepts. I think this is because we don 't even know what the problem is, nor do we understand the phenomenon we are studying. We don 't have a clue of what something could be if it ned. The reason I find the Buddhist analysis of emptiness so interesting in this regard is because it is precisely a theory of what things could be if they 're not isolated and de . nable. Th ere is a profound literature in Buddhism that addresses the question, "Why is it that everything is empty?" And it has been applied to all domains: "Th ings are empty of causes, things are empty of self-nature, causality is empty, de . nitions are empty, this is empty, that is empty. "Within this language lies a logic of emptiness that drives our understanding of why is it that things are empty. What I 'd like to do is to bring that logic into cognitive science and use it to help provide a new way of understanding concepts. We need to recognize there are no longer independent, artificial things living in isolation which are definable and which can be studied mathematically. Rather, there are interdependent entities that have specific structures and follow a certain logic, but the logic is not the ordinary logic of yes and no. It is a different logic, an empty logic. I think the logic of concepts is a logic that accepts contradictions. When I say concepts are empty, it is not that the particular content of an individual concept like "cup " is without meaning, but it is saying something important about the relational structure that underlies them. My guess is that reality itself is contradictory, and that ordinary logic is just the wrong logic for understanding reality. We are at a stage where even to understand the world we embody in concepts, we will have to bring in forms of logic that are currently seen as mistaken. 55305 From: "Charles" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 2:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > Sankhaara are condiitoned phenomena or compounds. > But dhamma includes also nibbaana. That is the difference. Hi Nina, That's the definition of dhamma in abhidhamma. The word dhamma itself has many definitions. Why dont we try to look it from another side. The Buddha Himself always give the long exposition of anatta in connection with beings. The whole satipatthana itself has as the object the pancakkhanda. 55306 From: Suchamda D Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Paramattha dhamma and reality dhammasurya I agree with Nina. She give absolutely correct answer. For Cherry, the detailed descriptions of insight on how to 'say' about impermanence of nama-rupa, might be beyond our mundane words. Therefore, it is not surprisingly that there are so much debates on how to dissect the experiences, but finally it should be end on the same 'rasa' -- the rasa of liberation (vimutti). I think, the debates should also be mindfully grounded on those rasa in order to be relevant ones. Regards, Daniel On 1/31/06, nina van gorkom wrote: <...> > N: Only *saying* it is not enough. I agree. > Many great philosophers realized that life is impermanent, the body is > impermanent. They looked at corpses and meditated about them. > The Buddha's teaching of impermanence is unique. He taught the development > of paññaa that directly realizes the momentary impermanence of nama and > rupa, as well as the condions for the arising of phenomena and their > ceasing > in the cycle of birth and death, and this is the teaching of the Dependent > Origination. > We cannot immediately realize the three characteristics. Paññaa has to be > developed that knows precisely what nama is and what rupa is. Not through > thinking about them, but through direct understanding of them when they > appear. Thus, when we speak about the three characteristics we have to > remember that paññaa has to be developed on and on so that they are > directly > and clearly realized. > Nina <...> 55307 From: "Charles" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 3:04am Subject: Re: Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium This would enough to explain why Nibbana is anatta IMO "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found; The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there; Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it; The path is, but no traveler on it is seen." Vis.M. XVI Not because Nibbana lacks essence. Essence is what makes it, and Nibbana is just Nibbana, it is not something else. The case is different with a being which is composed of pancakkhanda, and the pancakkhandha are not theirselves, they are composed by something else. Thus the pancakkhanda lacks essence. 55308 From: "Charles" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 3:30am Subject: Re: Paramattha dhamma and reality cherry_avium Hi Nina, Thanks for your explanation, but that's not the point I'm in. Beings do not see hardness, etc. They do not have the false view of permanence on hardness. They have false view on the pancakkhandhas, because it is what they think is their atta. But when they learn about the hardness in the pancakkhanda, they see that it is impermanent, and so the pancakkhandha are. When we want to show someone that a tree is green in colour, it is not enough to tell the person that a leaf is green, but we would also need to thell the person that a tree is composed by leaves. Saying that a leaf is green does not make the person realize that a tree is green. --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > N: Only *saying* it is not enough. I agree. 55309 From: "Charles" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 3:38am Subject: Re: Paramattha dhamma and reality cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Suchamda D wrote: > For Cherry, the detailed descriptions of insight on how to 'say' about > impermanence of nama-rupa, might be beyond our mundane words. It is, but if someone going the wrong way, the person may just in fact never know the real meaning. By the way, my name is Charles. Are you the Daniel is millis samaggiphala? 55310 From: Suchamda D Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 3:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] All members from Indonesia (was:Sahetuka Akusala Kamavacara Citta) dhammasurya Hello Sarah, I think I am still novice in understanding the Abhidhamma, just beginning only 2 years ago. Beforehand I was a protestant. I live in a town called Semarang in Central Java, Indonesia; and studying dhamma mostly by autodidact from books and discussion in the buddhist mailist. What my concern is, it is getting more scarce recently to find buddhist here. Therefore, it is also very difficult here to look for somebody who could teach abhidhamma comprehensively, let alone to look a kalyanamitta who would like to discuss it. I am very impressed by you all of your seriousness to study Dhamma. So, what I hope is that this mailist would get more capable member who can share their understanding. Moreover, it is a happiness to know you all and share together. But pls your understanding for my bad english. Hopefully it would not be an enormous barrier for us to communicate. Hopefully the seriousness of all members to discuss dhamma also reflects their seriousness to practice dhamma. Mettacitena, Daniel On 1/31/06, sarah abbott wrote: > > Firstly, welcome to DSG, Daniel, > > I'm very impressed by your deep questions and reflections. Recently the > members from Indonesia seem to be taking the list by storm:-) You all seem > to have really studied the Abhidhamma. <....> 55311 From: "Joop" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 3:52am Subject: Concepts and other irrealities (Was:Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts jwromeijn A short addition otherwise we get a 'technical discussion': --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Joop" wrote: > > ... > 1. ONE OR TWO REALITIES ? > Sometimes in DSG or other Abhidhamma-texts one reads about two > realities: pannatti and paramattha (Bhikkhu Bodhi does it on page > 25 of the CMA). Of course BB used the term "sammuti", I better quote him on p 25: 'According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are two kind of realities - the comventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (pannatti) and conventional modes of expression (vohara) ... Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are products of mental construction (parikappana), not realities existing of their own nature." A second quot about about nagarjuna's use of the Two Truths idea: "8. The teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths: truth relating to worldly convention and truth in terms of ultimate fruit. 9. Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths do not understand the profound truth embodied in the Buddha's message. 10. Without relying upon convention, the ultimate truth is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained." Mulamadhyamakakarika, chapter 24, translation David Kalupahana If one is interested, I will quote the relevant parts of Karunadasa too. Metta Joop 55312 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 0:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, TG - In a message dated 1/31/06 1:00:16 AM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Interesting answers. The whole point of my questions was to get an answer > as to whether phenomena exist independent from sense experience. Still not > > clear from your answers. Nor are you obliged to make it clear. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Well, you were asking Jon - to get his perspective and his understanding of the Abhidhammic perspective. I was answering your specific questions, but I assumed you knew that my belief is that no, phenomena do not exist independent of sense experience, and if they did, which, of course, I cannot disprove, there would, in principle, be no way of knowing it, for, by definition, all that we experience are elements of experience. ---------------------------------------------- > > I was disappointed with answer # 3 though. It doesn't really get us > anywhere to call it a story. If we could do away with the > conventional/ultimate > thing, maybe you could tell me if you believe that -- air exists externally > from > mere human experience? Am I setting the bar too high? ;-) ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Nope, not too high. Please see my earlier assertion of belief. --------------------------------------------- > > Come to think of it, isn't air considered one of the 4 Great Elements? > -------------------------------------------- Howard: You can rest assured that that "air" is not O2 or a mix of that with N and other gases. It is most definitely a phenomenological "thingy"! ;-) ------------------------------------------- If > > that's "a story" isn't anything we write "a story"? Perhaps there's a > "non-story way" to define the 4 Great Elements? > > I think the other answers clarified your viewpoint to me regarding those > questions. ----------------------------------------- Howard: I'll bet it's even clearer (and more upsetting! ;-) now! LOLOL! ----------------------------------------- > > Thanks. > > TG > ======================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55313 From: Suchamda D Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 3:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Paramattha dhamma and reality dhammasurya Hello Charles Cherry, Sorry for calling you cherry because there are already other Charles (da costa) here. It was intended for clearer addressing. Yes, I am daniel on the samaggiphala mailist, and I know this DSG from you :p Mettacitena, Daniel > It is, but if someone going the wrong way, the person may just in > fact never know the real meaning. > > By the way, my name is Charles. Are you the Daniel is millis > samaggiphala? > > > 55314 From: Suchamda D Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 4:31am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Stream Entrant / Scott & Nina dhammasurya Hi Maya, If you don't mind, would you pls ask your teacher about his reference from the sutta / abhidhamma / VM? On 1/31/06, Maya Putra wrote: > > Dear Scott & Nina, > > Well the monk who teaches my Abhidhamma class mentioned the sotapanna > having 7 > existence as a "on the side" context. He didn't dwell on it much > further. He said that a > sotapanna will at most be born 7 more lives, but he also emphasized that > what is meant by 7 > more lives is 7 more existence, thus he gives the example that if one was > born 3 times in the > human realm that is still considered as 1 existence. 55315 From: Suchamda D Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 4:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Paramattha dhamma and reality dhammasurya It is, but if someone going the wrong way, the person may just in > fact never know the real meaning. Charles, I think the difference would be implied in their comments. Therefore, I repeatedly pointing out that the 'rasa' should be well contemplated as the discussion would not lead to empty intellectual debate. The difficulty for me is to decipher which one is really a wisdom and which one is merely an intellectual junk. Daniel 55316 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 3:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/31/2006 2:17:45 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi TG, we have to distinguish different types of concepts. Concepts may be terms and some terms represent what is real and some what is not real. Further, they are ideas represented by terms. You believe that they exist: I add: they are shadows of what is real. This is stated in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha. Hi Nina If truth were to be told...I believe all conditioned phenomena are "shadows of shadows." As for what is real, those are shadows too. As far as all the catagories of concepts listed, they all fall into the "mental formations" category as far as I can tell. I don't believe in this "sub-culture of reality" that seems to be suggested. I don't believe in different levels of reality. However, I do believe in different levels of insight. Delusion is a cetasika correct? Wouldn't any concept be a "real delusion"? Even a correct concept? TG 55317 From: "Charles" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 7:53am Subject: [dsg] Re: Paramattha dhamma and reality cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Suchamda D wrote: > Charles, I think the difference would be implied in their comments. > Therefore, I repeatedly pointing out that the 'rasa' should be > well contemplated as the discussion would not lead to empty > intellectual debate. I think the rasa is to be known after practicing it and gaining the result (if any) :D. Contemplating will result in perception only. I do not mind about any debate, after all it's like learning a formula. The formula does not solve problems, but it can be used to solve problems. The same with abhidhamma, it is a tool to solve the problems, the problem itself would be sakkaya-ditthi, and other miccha ditthi. 55318 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 4:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. upasaka_howard Hi, TG (and Nina) - In a message dated 1/31/06 11:53:45 AM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Nina > > If truth were to be told...I believe all conditioned phenomena are "shadows > > of shadows." As for what is real, those are shadows too. > > As far as all the catagories of concepts listed, they all fall into the > "mental formations" category as far as I can tell. I don't believe in this > > "sub-culture of reality" that seems to be suggested. I don't believe in > different > levels of reality. However, I do believe in different levels of insight. > > Delusion is a cetasika correct? Wouldn't any concept be a "real delusion"? > > Even a correct concept? > > TG > ====================== TG, I see the matter as follows: When we actually experience warmth per se, not conceptualize about it after the fact, but experience the unconceptualized, unembellished sensation, this is, as I see it, a basic, single (though conditioned and utterly dependent and empty) experiential phenomenon that we observe. When, however, there occurs what we call "the seeing of a tree", there is no single experiential event that this is. There is, instead, a complex sequence of interleaved periods of seeing and conceptual processing, and nowhere in that can one point to "the" percept/concept of "the tree seen". So, not only is there no single, precisely delimitable "thing out there" that is "the tree we see," but even the alleged internal mental phenomenon that is the percept/concept of that tree cannot be found. Likewise for memories. There are processes of remembering, but there are no memories except so-to-speak. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55319 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 5:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... TGrand458@... Hi Howard In a message dated 1/31/2006 6:07:46 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Hi, TG - In a message dated 1/31/06 1:00:16 AM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Interesting answers. The whole point of my questions was to get an answer > as to whether phenomena exist independent from sense experience. Still not > > clear from your answers. Nor are you obliged to make it clear. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Well, you were asking Jon - to get his perspective and his understanding of the Abhidhammic perspective. I was answering your specific questions, but I assumed you knew that my belief is that no, phenomena do not exist independent of sense experience, and if they did, which, of course, I cannot disprove, there would, in principle, be no way of knowing it, for, by definition, all that we experience are elements of experience. ---------------------------------------------- TG: This clarifies it. This is what I thought you believed but I was confused when I believe you said that -- sense-objects have a quality independent of the experiencing. I don't understand how this could be known if an "external reality" is not admitted? (Probably best not to try to answer that or we'll never end this.) LOL > > I was disappointed with answer # 3 though. It doesn't really get us > anywhere to call it a story. If we could do away with the > conventional/ultimate > thing, maybe you could tell me if you believe that -- air exists externally > from > mere human experience? Am I setting the bar too high? ;-) ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Nope, not too high. Please see my earlier assertion of belief. --------------------------------------------- TG: Got it. > > Come to think of it, isn't air considered one of the 4 Great Elements? > -------------------------------------------- Howard: You can rest assured that that "air" is not O2 or a mix of that with N and other gases. It is most definitely a phenomenological "thingy"! ;-) ------------------------------------------- TG: I view the 4 Great Elements arise internally and externally (well supported by the Buddha I might add)...and are not mere phenomenological experience. That being said, I also believe that we can only experience what comes in contact with out body/mind. We cannot experience anything outside of that. But, I believe we can interpret from experience, within acceptable accuracy, events occurring outside of experience. If not, we couldn't survive, travel, go to the moon, etc. "Bhikkhu, any kind of material form whatever, whether past or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near -- one sees all material form as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: This is not mine, this I am not, this is not myself." Buddha, Middle Length Pg 890. The above is the normal way the Buddha deals with the issue. Doesn't seem to have any problem -- "considering material form outside of experience." Not only that, but considering it as "insight fodder." If > > that's "a story" isn't anything we write "a story"? Perhaps there's a > "non-story way" to define the 4 Great Elements? > > I think the other answers clarified your viewpoint to me regarding those > questions. ----------------------------------------- Howard: I'll bet it's even clearer (and more upsetting! ;-) now! LOLOL! ----------------------------------------- TG: I'm not upset Howard...no no no. I'm INFURIATED! LOL > > Thanks. > > TG > ======================= With metta, Howard TG 55320 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 5:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/31/2006 10:24:52 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: TG, I see the matter as follows: When we actually experience warmth per se, not conceptualize about it after the fact, but experience the unconceptualized, unembellished sensation, this is, as I see it, a basic, single (though conditioned and utterly dependent and empty) experiential phenomenon that we observe. When, however, there occurs what we call "the seeing of a tree", there is no single experiential event that this is. There is, instead, a complex sequence of interleaved periods of seeing and conceptual processing, and nowhere in that can one point to "the" percept/concept of "the tree seen". So, not only is there no single, precisely delimitable "thing out there" that is "the tree we see," but even the alleged internal mental phenomenon that is the percept/concept of that tree cannot be found. Likewise for memories. There are processes of remembering, but there are no memories except so-to-speak. With metta, Howard Hi Howard Very interesting. However, I think when seeing a tree there is the initial visual experience which is every bit as directly real as the "warmth experience." TG 55321 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 11:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. nilovg Hi TG, op 31-01-2006 17:36 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > Delusion is a cetasika correct? Wouldn't any concept be a "real delusion"? > Even a correct concept? -------- N: Yes, the cetasika moha, ignorance, accompanying each akusala citta. A concept is an object of citta, of kusala citta or akusala citta, depending on conditions. Concept is neither kusala nor akusala, thus, it is not delusion or ignorance, strictly speaking. But in conventional language people say some are an illusion or a delusion. Here we come too much in the field of speculating, I find this not so useful. I rather discuss paramattha dhammas, and if one has understanding of what these are, one will know that they are not concepts or created by one's thinking. Nina. 55322 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 11:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Paramattha dhamma and reality nilovg Hi Cherry, op 31-01-2006 12:30 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > Beings do not see hardness, etc. They do not have the false view of > permanence on hardness. They have false view on the pancakkhandhas, > because it is what they think is their atta. > > But when they learn about the hardness in the pancakkhanda, they see > that it is impermanent, and so the pancakkhandha are. -------- N: Hardness is rupa, and as such it is classified as rupakkhandha. We take hardness for sellf or mine. We think that it lasts, at least for a while. When we touch something that is hard, it seems that it was there already for some time. In reality it arises and falls away immediately and then it is replaced by another hardness. That is why it seems to last. I would not separate hardness and hardness as khandha, it is the same. One can have think with wrong view or with right view of hardness or rupakkhandha. Hardness is rupakkhandha no matter there is wrong view or right view about it. Nina. 55323 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 11:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta nilovg Hi Cherry, op 31-01-2006 11:40 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > That's the definition of dhamma in abhidhamma. The word dhamma itself > has many definitions. Why dont we try to look it from another side. N: you are right. Recently we mentioned in the Pali list about 23 meanings of dhamma, I had made a study of this, and also posted it here before. But the text I gave is from Dhammapada: Ch XX, vs 279. Thus, in this context also nibbaana is included. Nibbaana is called the unconditoned element in the Abhidhamma. Asankhata dhaatu. Why dhaatu? Because it is devoid of self. Ch: The whole satipatthana itself has as the object the pancakkhanda. N: The reason is that satipatthana does not have nibbaana as object, it is mundane, not lokuttara. Nina. 55324 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 6:53am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/31/2006 12:48:12 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: A concept is an object of citta, of kusala citta or akusala citta, depending on conditions. Concept is neither kusala nor akusala, thus, it is not delusion or ignorance, strictly speaking. But in conventional language people say some are an illusion or a delusion. Here we come too much in the field of speculating, I find this not so useful. I rather discuss paramattha dhammas, and if one has understanding of what these are, one will know that they are not concepts or created by one's thinking. Nina. Hi Nina Thanks for the replies. But since I think it is impossible for consciousness to have an object that isn't a paramattha dhamma, I continue to think that this discussion is revolving around that issue. :-) TG 55325 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 7:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] CORRECTION -- SUTTA source DENIES "Own Characteristic" in 5 Aggre... upasaka_howard Hi, TG - In a message dated 1/31/06 1:12:19 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > This is what I thought you believed but I was > confused when I believe you said that -- sense-objects have a quality > independent > of the experiencing. I don't understand how this could be known if an > "external reality" is not admitted? (Probably best not to try to answer > that or > we'll never end this.) LOL > ===================== I'll explain anyway LOL! : A sense object, which, as I see it, *is* a quality, doesn't *exist* independent of the experience, but nonetheless, that quality is what it is. So, for example, what is actually heard at some moment doesn't exist independently of being heard, but what is heard is what is heard and not something else. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55326 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 6:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. upasaka_howard Hi, TG - In a message dated 1/31/06 1:36:56 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Very interesting. However, I think when seeing a tree there is the initial > > visual experience which is every bit as directly real as the "warmth > experience." > > TG > ====================== Not when we see "the tree", for that "seeing" is more than just seeing. When we open our eyes, the visual object does not involve a tree - there is just a color palette. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55327 From: "m. nease" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 2:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Paramattha dhamma and reality mlnease Hi Charles and Nina, May I add that the Buddha also taught that 'this is mine' is wrong--that is, that the earth (or hardness element--or any other of the elements or aggregates) can be mistaken for 'mine' as well as for 'myself'. This is the same whether classifying a dhamma as an element (dhaatu) or as an aggregate (khandha) as I understand it. mike ----- Original Message ----- From: "nina van gorkom" To: Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2006 11:43 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Paramattha dhamma and reality > Hi Cherry, > > op 31-01-2006 12:30 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > >> Beings do not see hardness, etc. They do not have the false view of >> permanence on hardness. They have false view on the pancakkhandhas, >> because it is what they think is their atta. >> >> But when they learn about the hardness in the pancakkhanda, they see >> that it is impermanent, and so the pancakkhandha are. > -------- > N: Hardness is rupa, and as such it is classified as rupakkhandha. We take > hardness for sellf or mine. We think that it lasts, at least for a while. > When we touch something that is hard, it seems that it was there already > for > some time. In reality it arises and falls away immediately and then it is > replaced by another hardness. That is why it seems to last. > I would not separate hardness and hardness as khandha, it is the same. > One can have think with wrong view or with right view of hardness or > rupakkhandha. Hardness is rupakkhandha no matter there is wrong view or > right view about it. > Nina. 55328 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 10:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/31/2006 2:10:28 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Not when we see "the tree", for that "seeing" is more than just seeing. When we open our eyes, the visual object does not involve a tree - there is just a color palette. With metta, Howard Agreed TG 55329 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 3:53pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts lbidd2 TG: "Wouldn't clinging to the concept of tree be clinging to the memory of a tree? Wouldn't the memory be a mental formation? Would not the mental formation be a real thing? Therefore, wouldn't the clinging to a concept be clinging to a real thing?" Hi TG, Me and the Buddha :-) don't think there is any clinging to concepts but there could well be clinging to memories and mental formations (volitions). Larry 55330 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 4:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts lbidd2 Nina: "Hi Larry, See my post to TG on concepts. Rob K posted this before and also reminded people that concepts are shadows of realities. You say something similar here. Only, we cling to all objects, also concepts. We cling to peace in the world, for example." Hi Nina, I would say clinging to peace is clinging to tranquility and "the world" is self view. I think this question relates to the problem of what is the object of thirst we discussed several days ago. Is the object of thirst the sensation that conditions the arising of thirst or the sensation that satisfies the thirst? In this case we have a situation in which the object condition that conditions the arising of desire is different from what is desired. Similarly a concept could condition the arising of desire but it would not be what is desired. The concept "home" might condition desire for the comfort of pleasant feelings. When the Buddha implied (my interpretation) that the object of clinging is only the upadanakhandas he meant "object" in the sense of what is desired; he didn't mean "object" in the more technical sense of object condition. This can be difficult to see because the worldly life is so full of concepts, but I think if you look carefully you will find that the objects of all your desires (what you want) are realities. I think this is an important point that we should consider carefully. Larry 55331 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 5:02pm Subject: Thank you Nina lbidd2 Hi all, On July 23, 2003 we began a comprehensive discussion of chapter XIV in "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga). And today we have finished the chapter. Throughout this whole process Nina has summarized and sometimes translated for us the Aacariya Dhammapaala's Commentary to all 230 paragraphs (with the exception of only 3 or 4 which didn't have a commentary). In order to do this she had to translate the whole Commentary just so she could summarize it. This was really a very big project and we and all future dhamma students owe her a great debt of gratitude. Thank you very much, Nina. Anumodana! Larry ps: Nina will begin the 'Detailed Exposition' of Dependent Origination (Vism.XVII,58) when she returns from Thailand. 55332 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 5:12pm Subject: Vism.XIV,Index lbidd2 Hi all, Here is an index of paragraph numbers and message numbers of the text of chapter XIV of the Visuddhimagga and of Nina's summary and/or translation of Dhammapaala's Commentary on that text. Text: paragraph number and message number 1 (23597), 2 (23759), 3 (23932), 4 (24080), 5 (24082), 6 (24083), 7 (24246), 8 (24532), 9 (24663), 10 (24744), 11 (24900), 12 (25025), 13 (25130), 14 (25195), 15 (25229), 16,17,18 (25353), 19 (25575), 20 (25867), 21 (25910), 22,23 (25993), 24 (26122), 25 (26210), 26 (26252), 27 (26281), 28,29,30,31 (26330), 32,33 (26483), 34,35,36 (26638), 37 (26794), 38-41 (26900), 42 (26972), 43 (26972), 44, 45 (27034, 27036), 46 (27662), 47, 48 (27783), 49-53 (27867), 54-57 (28036), 58 (28196), 59 (28409), 60 (28721, 28754, 28825, 28955), 61 (30134, 30135, 30266, 30513), 62 (30682), 63 (31087), 64, 65 (31307), 66 (31496), 67 (31553), 68 (31596), 69 (31630), 70 (31760), 71 (31865), 72, 73 (31983), 74 (32137), 75 (32189), 76 (32489), 77 (32948), 78 (33027), 79 (33348), 80 (33521), 81 (33675), 82 (33866), 83 (34045), 84 (34219), 85 (34437), 86 (34544), 87 (34583), 88 (34677), 89 (34726), 90 (34801), 91 (34914), 92 (35038), 93 (35184), 94, 95 (35353), 96 (35625), 97 (35818), 98 (36006), 99 (36167), 100 (36261), 101 (36488), 102 (36773), 103 (36947, 104 (36984), 105 (37113), 106 (37444), 107 (37495), 108 (37602), 109 (37688), 110 (37746), 111 (37806), 112 (37915), 113 (37969), 114 (38342), 115 (38618), 116 (38777), 117, 118 (38944), 119, 120 (39091), 121 (39204), 122 (39535), 123 (39714), 124 (39836), 125 (39953), 126 (40125), 127 (40325), 128 (40495), 129 (40664), 130 (40883), 131 (41088), 132 (41156), 133 (41245), 134 (41359), 135 (41574), 136 (41724), 137 (41941), 138 (42092), 139 (42402), 140 (42551), 141 (42799), 142 (42932), 143 (43042), 144 (43191), 145 (43306), 146 (43342), 147 (43499), 148 (43621), 149 (43863), 150 (43891), 151 (44211), 152 (44408), 153 (44582), 154, 155 (44720), 156 (44868), 157 (45068), 158 (45554), 159 (45758), 160 (45942), 161, 162 (46030), 163 (46264), 164 (46370), 165 (46471), 166 (46683), 167 (46799), 168 (47014), 169 (47149), 170 (47266), 171 (47381), 172 (47635), 173 (47867), 174, 175 (48054), 176 (48270), 177 (48361), 178 (48483), 179, 180 (48542), 181 (48681), 182, 183 (48746), 184 (48848), 185 (49017), 186 (49186), 187 (49336), 188 (49480), 189 (49600), 190 (49764), 191 (49913), 192 (50117), 193 (50274), 194 (50470), 195 (50592), 196 (50741), 197 (52273), 198 (52372), 199 (52520), 200 (52652), 201 (52789), 202 (52900), 203 (53033), 204 (53151), 205 (53192), 206 (53301), 207 (53483), 208 (53626), 209 (53798), 210 (53888), 211 (54013), 212 (54148), 213 (54200), 214 (54278), 215 (54362), 216, 217 (54479), 218 (54542), 219 (54548), 220 (54617), 221 (54690), 222, 223 (54758), 224 (54828), 225 (54901), 226 (54947), 227 (55019), 228 (55112), 229 (55199), 230 (55283). Nina's trans. and/or exposition of tika: 1 (23628), 2 (23851), 3 (24135), 4 (24406), 5 (24484), 7 (24600), 8 (24687, 24811, 25085), 14 (25221, 25347, 25421, 25510), 15 (25257), 16, (25548), 17 (25689), 18 (25803), 20 (25907), 21 (26130), 22 (26246), 23 (26320), 24 (26478), 25 (26505), 34 (26700,26701), 35 (26728), 36 (26861, 26988, 27021, 27147), 37 (27364, 27482), 47-54 (27808, 27958, 27977, 28057), 58 (28216), 59 (28681), 60/2 (28775, 28817), 60/3 (28862, 28896, 28944), 60/4 (28999, 29032), 61/2 (30309), 61/3 (30445), 62 (30884), 63 (31207), 65 (31388), 66 (31628), 68 (31695), 70 (31858), 71 (31948), 72 (32012, 32062), 73 (32127), 74 (32173), 75 (32233, 33330), 76 (32567), 77 (32986), 78 (33091), 79 (33396, 33398), 80 (33543, 33546), 81 (33759, 33761), 82 (33919, 33948, 33968, 33970), 83 (34078, 34150, 34174, 34176), 84 (34276, 34394, 34397), 85 (34499, 34520, 34521), 86, 87 (34598, 34618, 34619), 88 (34705, 34706), 89 (34763), 90 (34862, 34863), 91 (34972, 34973), 92 (35124, 35125), 93 (35315, 35316), 94, 95 (35459, 35460, 35461), 96 (35775, 35776, 35777), 97 (35956, 35957), 98 (36043, 36044, 36111), 99 (36218), 100 (36390), 101 (36671), 102 (36858), 103, 104 (37050), 105 (37306), 106 (37444), 107 (38080), 108 (38107), 109, 110 (38124, 38153), 111 (38154), 112, 113 (38208), 114 (38463), 115 (38708), 116 (38880), 117, 118 (39020), 119, 120 (39120), 121 (39460), 122 (39646), 123 (39765), 124 (39883), 125 (40043), 126 (40258), 127 (40387, 40408), 128 (40583), 129 (40794), 130 (41029), 131 (41128), 132 (41193), 133 (41310), 134 (41496), 135 (41670), 136 (41856), 137 (42007), 138 (42235), 139 (42505), 140 (42740), 141 (42882), 142 (42991), 143 (43094, 43125), 144 (43280), 145, 146 (43422), 147 (43568), 148 (43765), 149 (43876), 150 (43963), 151 (44353), 152 (44507), 153 (44675), 154, 155 (44823), 156 (44996), 157 (45146), 158 (45633), 159 (45880), 160 (46015), 161, 162 (46101), 163 (46310), 164 (46431), 165 (46522), 166 (46734), 167 (46879), 168 (47111), 169 (47224), 170 (47330), 171 (47558), 172 (47769), 173 (47985), 174, 175 (48218), 176 (48408), 177 (48442), 178 (48509), 179, 180 (48649), 181 (48696), 182 (48760), 183 (48782), 184 (48911), 185 (49099), 186 (49262), 187 (49415), 188 (49544), 189 (49679), 190 (49838), 191 (49994, 50057), 192 (50187), 193 (50418), 194 (50520), 195 (50671), 196 (50789), 197 (52279), 198 (52422), 199 (52584), 200 (52700), 201 (52801), 202 (52997), 203 (53080), 204, 205 (53240), 206 (53395), 207 (53541), 208 (53706), 209 (53835), 210 (53943), 211 (54074), 212 (54171), 213 (54242), 214 (54330), 215 (54457), 216, 217 (54527), 218, 219 (54595), 220 (54677), 221 (54737), 222, 223 (54806), 224 (54892), 225 (54983), 226 (55006), 227 (55084), 228 (55175), 229 (55254) 230 (55302). Larry 55333 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 0:45pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts TGrand458@... In a message dated 1/31/2006 4:58:04 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, LBIDD@... writes: Hi TG, Me and the Buddha :-) don't think there is any clinging to concepts but there could well be clinging to memories and mental formations (volitions). Larry Hi Larry Any references where the Buddha says concepts cannot be clung to? TG 55334 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 1:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts upasaka_howard Hi, TG & Larry - In a message dated 1/31/06 8:51:59 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > Hi TG, > > Me and the Buddha :-) don't think there is any clinging to concepts but > there could well be clinging to memories and mental formations > (volitions). > > Larry > > > > Hi Larry > > Any references where the Buddha says concepts cannot be clung to? > > TG > ====================== Obviously people cling to life, to their status, to their family, etc, etc, and the Buddha surely agreed with that. (Just read the suttas.;-) Whatever it is that is going on when we say we are clinging to "thes e", even if, as I think, these do not exist first-class phenomena, but only in a manner of speaking, we are, indeed, still clinging! Perhaps there need not be some actuality that is clung to when we are in a clinging mode. Perhaps it is sufficient for us to think so! But if indeed a real object of clinging is required, not just an imagined one, perhaps we can say that we cling to the emotions that arise when engaged in thought processes we call "thinking about or remembering these conventional things". With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55335 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 8:14pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts lbidd2 Howard: "Obviously people cling to life, to their status, to their family, etc, etc," Hi Howard, Life is a rupa and a cetasika, status is conceit, and family is self view. All realities. The tricky one is mathematics;-), but there could be a psychological solution, as you suggest. Ultimately the only thing we want is pleasant or no feeling. Larry 55336 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 8:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts lbidd2 TG: "Hi Larry Any references where the Buddha says concepts cannot be clung to?" Hi TG, Only inferential. When the Buddha talks about upadanakhandhas there is no mention of clinging to concepts. And, as far as I know, there is no mention of clinging to concepts as such anywhere. Plus there is an interesting shift in perspective, for me, when I take the view that only upadanakhandas are the objects of desire. Tends to simplify things quite a bit. And, of course, there is no insight knowledge of concepts. They hardly matter. Larry 55337 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 8:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Thank you Nina sarahprocter... Hi Larry & Nina, As you say, this was a very big project and I know that even on holiday, Nina would continue to work on it. Thanks for your nice message, Larry and I'd also like to 'anumodana' to Nina and also to you for 'leading' this work and all the discussions on it. I'll look forward to ch XV11 on D.O. after the break. Knowing Nina, she'll already be working on the translations:-)). As you say, these works are not just for ourselves but also for the benefit of any future dhamma students who may benefit. Metta, Sarah p.s Larry, good to see your keen participation (and humour!!) in various other threads too. ============================= --- LBIDD@... wrote: > Hi all, > > On July 23, 2003 we began a comprehensive discussion of chapter XIV in > "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga). And today we have finished > the chapter. Throughout this whole process Nina has summarized and > sometimes translated for us the Aacariya Dhammapaala's Commentary to > all 230 paragraphs (with the exception of only 3 or 4 which didn't have > a commentary). In order to do this she had to translate the whole > Commentary just so she could summarize it. This was really a very big > project and we and all future dhamma students owe her a great debt of > gratitude. Thank you very much, Nina. Anumodana! > > Larry > > ps: Nina will begin the 'Detailed Exposition' of Dependent Origination > (Vism.XVII,58) when she returns from Thailand. 55338 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 4:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 1/31/06 11:37:11 PM Eastern Standard Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Howard: "Obviously people cling to life, to their status, to their > family, etc, etc," > > Hi Howard, > > Life is a rupa and a cetasika, status is conceit, and family is self > view. All realities. > ---------------------------------------- Howard: Nonsense, Larry! Good try, but no cigar!! ;-)) First of all. you're welcome to believe in lifeforce if you wish [I don't], but that's not what people mean when they talk about their life. The life they talk about is a concept, a vast concept, too big to even begin to describe what is included. Also, status is an abstraction pertaining a person, what s/he does, and how others think about him/her. And what people mean by family is father, mother, sister, brother, wife, husband, son, daughter, and much more. The bottom line is that these are not paramattha dhammas in the slightest! Perhaps you were only kidding about this anyway. (The more I think about it, the more I think you probably were kidding[!], in which case aren't *I* the silly one!! ;-)) -------------------------------------- The tricky one is mathematics;-),> > but there could be a psychological solution, as you suggest. Ultimately > the only thing we want is pleasant or no feeling. -------------------------------------- Howard: Directly so, that's exactly right! :-) -------------------------------------- > > Larry > =================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55339 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 8:11pm Subject: The Charcoal Pit ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: Any even latent Sense-Desire induce repeated Death!!! And how, Bhikkhus, are sense desires regarded by a Bhikkhu so that he weakens the latent tendency to sense desire, to lust for sensing, to sense mania, to sense infatuation, to sense addiction, and to sensual obsession? Imagine a Charcoal Pit deeper than a man's height, filled with red glowing coals without flame or smoke. A man who wishes life & not death, who wants happiness & not suffering, would pass by... Then two strong men would grab him firmly by both his arms and drag him towards that burning charcoal pit... In panic, that man would indeed wriggle & try to resist with all his might! For what reason? Because he understands: If I fall into this charcoal pit, then I will surely meet a terrible death or deadly pain! Exactly & even so, Bhikkhus, when a Bhikkhu has seen & comprehended, that any & all sense desire is similar to a Charcoal Pit, then the latent tendency to sense desire, to sensual lust, to sense mania, to sense infatuation, to mad sense addiction, & the deeply embedded latent tendency to sensual obsession fades away... Comment: The Two Strong Men of evil force are similar to Ignorance & Craving, which are the evil forces, that induce & reinforce disadvantageous sensual greed... The resulting craving is the cause & origin of all Suffering = 2nd Noble Truth! Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book IV [188-] 35: 6 Senses. Salayatana. States that entail Suffering. Dukkha-Dhamma 244. http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=948507 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/index.html -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PS: Please include the word Samahita in any comment, since then will my automatic mail filters pick it up and I will see it & respond!! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. Friendship is the Greatest ... Let there be Calm & Free Bliss !!! <....> 55340 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jan 31, 2006 10:45pm Subject: Dukkha (was 5th anniversary of DSG - Audio discussion between Erik & A.Suji...) sarahprocter... Hi Howard, You raised very good points on dukkha here: --- upasaka@... wrote: S:> > Note 274: The three types are explained at Vism 499, 14-21 (Ppn. > > 16:34-35). Briefly, suffering due to pain (dukkha-dukkhataa) is > > painful bodily and mental feeling; suffering due to the formations > > (sankhaaradukkhataa) is all conditioned phenomena of the three planes, > > because they are oppressed by rise and fall; and suffering due to > change > > (viparinaamadukkhataa) is pleasant feeling, which brings suffering > when it > > comes to an end." > > ***** > > > > I hope this helps. > > > ========================= H> My questioning pertains to the latter two forms of dukkha: " ... > suffering due to the formations(sankhaaradukkhataa) is all conditioned > phenomena of > the three planes, because they are oppressed by rise and fall; and > suffering > due to change > (viparinaamadukkhataa) is pleasant feeling, which brings suffering when > it > comes to an end." > I have the following questions: 1) What precisely is intended by > 'oppressed' in "oppressed by rise and fall"? There is no "problem" in > terms of rise > & fall in and of themselves any more than there would be in stasis. The > problem lies in our craving, aversion, and attachment in an environment > of change > (i.e., rise & fall). But other than this in what sense are conditioned > phenomena of the three planes oppressed? What can that mean? Those > phenomena do indeed > arise & cease. So what? That is just as it is. What *inherent* problem > is > there with that? .... S: All conditioned dhammas are inherently dukkha because of being ‘afflicted by’ impermanence. Therefore they are not worthy of being clung to. In the text it says there is even ‘likewise oppression even in the paths and fruitions, therefore these states [also] should be understood to be called ‘suffering of the formations;, by their being included in the Truth of Suffering’. The wisdom of the ariyans has fully comprehended the ‘oppression’ or bad nature of all conditioned dhammas and thus turned away to the unconditioned dhamma, nibbana. So it is by the understanding of the nature of dukkha and the ‘oppression’ of all conditioned dhammas that ‘one’ is freed from the bondage. Even when freed, the characteristics of those conditioned dhammas remains the same. .... 2) What is rise & fall if not change? The first of > these two > forms of dukkha pertains to all conditioned dhammas, to all sankhara. > But what is > specifically pointed to as their dukkha is their rise & fall, their > change. > There simply is no indication given there as to why that change is > dukkha. > There is just used the word 'oppressed'. It seems to me that the next > form of > dukkha, referred to as "suffering due to change" is actually not itself > a separate > form of dukkha but is one of the reasons for "suffering due to the > format > ions" being dukkha. ..... S: Good questions. Rise and fall is change, but the nature of dukkha as rise and fall refers to the deeper truth relating to the direct understanding of the impermanence of conditioned dhammas appearing now. When we refer to change in a conventional sense, such as the change of tastes as we pursue our pleasant feelings, it is not the deep understanding of the ti-lakkhana which only a Buddha can teach. This is why the understanding of the dukkha of all conditioned dhammas is the deepest sense of dukkha. As I’ll be going away, you may like to look at many more posts on this topic under ‘Dukkha’ in U.P. or raise further points for further discussion with others or with me when I return. Metta, Sarah p.s I meant to say some time ago that I thought your reflections on ‘accumulations’ such as in your post to Joop (#54562) were very good and well considered. I liked the analogy of the casting of the die and the supporting conditions etc.Very deep. ======== 55341 From: sarah abbott Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 0:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: 5th anniversary of DSG - Audio discussion between Erik & A.Suji... sarahprocter... Hi Howard (Matheesha & all), Firstly, welcome back Matheesha*. I’m just getting round to responding to a post of Howard’s addressed to us both before you went away! --- upasaka@... wrote: > > S: More on nibbana to come in the next audio sections. > > > > I think the point is that all that can ever be known (yes, by > panna:-)) > > are the namas and rupas appearing now. Nibbana is not apparent and so > all > > we can do is to speculate about it now. It won’t help us realize it > at > > all. Such realization will only come about by highly developed > > understanding and detachment from the presently conditioned dhammas > > appearing. > > ------------------------------------------ > Howard: > The foregoing troubles me a bit, Sarah, on several accounts. For > one > thing, it seems to me that paramattha dhammas are known by many, if not > all, of > our mental operations, including, among others, vi~n~nana (most > especially), > sa~n~na (possibly taking second place), and vedana. .... S: Yes, of course there has to be citta (vi~n~naana) experiencing the object and sa~n~naa and other mental factors performing their functions too. But as in the passage Larry recently posted made clear, pa~n~naa is what illuminates the object, like when the money-changer assesses the value of the coins. Here’s another translation of a similar passage in the commentary to the Abhidhamattha Sangaha (PTS), Ch2, Mentalities: “Wisdom (pa~n~naa) is what knows the way (pakaarena) [of things]; it understands them as impermanent, etc. As it is suited to predominance in understanding the true nature [of things] it is a controlling faculty, the faculty of wisdom (pa~n~nindriya). “Now what is the difference between the recognition, consciousness and wisdom? Recognition (S: sa~n~naa) only does the job of recognizing (something) as blue, etc; it is not able to penetrate its characteristics. Consciousness (S: vi~n~naana or citta) is capable of penetrating the characteristics, but having performed this task, it is not able to bring about attainment of the path. Wisdom, however, can do all three. The relevant illustration is the way a child, villager, and a goldsmith [respectively] understand a coin. And here, when recognition is dissociated from knowledge at the time it arises byway of apprehending the appearance [of the object], consciousness is nominal; and at other times it is strong. Associated with knowledge, both [recognition and consciousness] are assimilated to it.” ..... H:>Also, what exactly > *is* > pa~n~na? It is made to sound like a "God dhamma" that can be all, see > all, and > be everywhere. But to me, when our mental faculties function properly, > unobscured by defilement, with ignorance out of the way if not uprooted, > we *say* that > they operate with wisdom. .... S: When we are in deep sleep, there are no defilements arising and no wisdom either. Wisdom or pa~n~naa is not merely what occurs when there is no ignorance. At moments of seeing or hearing or other vipaka cittas arising, there is no ignorance, for example too. Pa~n~naa is a specific mental factor which arises when there are the right conditions and ‘illuminates’ the object being experienced. Even when there are wholesome states arising, such as when we show generosity or kindness, there usually isn’t any pa~n~naa arising which knows or determines anything. .... H:>What is right understanding, for example, if > not an > unobscured, rightly operating recognition (sa~n~na)? .... S: We can say there is ‘rightly operating recognition’ or sa~n~naa whenever the experiencing of an object is pure or wholesome (as opposed to when there is perversion of sa~n~naa arising). However, this doesn’t mean there is necessarily any right understanding at such moments as I indicated in the example of showing generosity or kindness. .... H:> Also, the terminology, so common in the writings of Khun Sujin > and her > students, long the lines of "It is panna which knows, fully understands > and > eventually abandons such dhammas and realizes the 4 Noble Truths" is > very > troublesome to me. Even if wisdom is not just the absence of > obscuration, even if > it is a distinct mental operation, it is not an agent that does things - > it is > the doing! To say that pa~n~na knows and understands is to reify an > operation! .... S: It is to point out that there is an element, a dhatu, which is pa~n~naa which performs the particular function of illuminating. Again “Wisdom (pa~n~naa) is what knows the way (pakaarena) [of things]; it understands them as impermanent, etc.” By stressing that it’s an element, a cetasika which performs this function, it becomes apparent that there is no self or person of any kind involved. However, different elements do arise, do exist momentarily, do perform their functions momentarily and do fall away. In AN, Bk of 3s, 35 ‘Three Sectarian Tenets’(Bodhi transl), there is an account of the elements. In the commentary note which Bodhi gives, it says: “The four mental aggregates are ‘name’ (or ‘mentality’, naama)and the aggregate of form is ‘form’(or matter, ruupa). Thus there are only these two things: name and form (naamaruupa). Beyond that, there is neither a substantial being (satta) nor a soul (jiiva). In this way one should understand in brief the meditation subject of the six elements that leads up to arahantship.” S: With respect, when we appreciate more and more that everything we find so important are merely elements, merely naamaruupa, there is no question of there being any substantial being involved. We may have to agree to disagree here for now. This doesn’t mean that these elements do not exist right now and do not perform their functions or are not experienced by naama elements. I think you may have mentioned before that even ‘element’ sounds substantialist to you. But elements are not only found throughout the Abhidhamma, but also throughout the Sutta Pitaka. There is a whole section on elements in the Dhatu Samyutta. In his preface to his translation of the Dhaatu-Kathaa (Discourse on Elements, PTS), U Narada states that this text “was expounded by the Buddha in order to dispel wrong views of attaa, i.e of substantiality, ego-entity, self, soul, I, being, person, man, woman, and life. It deals with the states (dhammas) which are the only things to be found, under the categories of aggregates, bases and elements which are all anattaa, ie not attaa. Therefore there is no attaa but only the arising and ceasing of states that are either aggregates, bases or elements. Being, person, self, I, etc are mere concepts expressed in conventional terms which the vast majority believe correspond with reality.” S: Anyway, I know you agree with all this. He also indicates that “The 5 sense-consciousness elements and the mind element are conscious of sense objects which are material elements. Mind-consciousness element, however, is conscious of objects of thought which are either of the past, present, or future, material or mental, real or imaginary. All these consciousness elements occur in mental processes.” S: There is lots more here and under ‘Elements’ in U.P. The point is that rather than ‘reifying’ or ‘making such dhammas substantialist’, such appreciation of elements as namas (which may experience objects) or as rupas (which can never experience objects) leads to an appreciation of dhammas as anatta. On the contrary, as I see it, by looking for an understanding of ‘an event’, there will not be the growth of right understanding which clearly sees the distinction between these various elements. So finally, to really set the cat among the pigeons here, U Narada writes: “An element is defined as that which bears its own intrinsic nature. It cannot be split up or transformed into another.” S: You wrote a good post on sabhava, so I know you appreciate there is no sense of ‘atta’ here. Whether we refer to sound or hearing as having its ‘own intrinsic nature’ or ‘particular characteristics or qualities’, the point is merely that the qualities of sound or hearing can never be merged, can never be understood as ‘an event’, but are distinct and can be known one at a time. ..... H:> The terminology is harmful and misleading, I believe. Pa~n~na, in that > sentence, sounds like "the Lord, God," an omniscient being who knows, > understands, > and not only that, also *abandons*(!), a non-cognitive acting. Pa~n~na > is > presented as a little divine being. Where is anatta here? .... S: :-) Without pa~n~naa there is no way out of samsara, there is no path, there is no Dhamma. Yes, it is pa~n~naa which realizes the 4 Noble Truths and which abandons what should be abandoned. Pahaana pari~n~naa (full understanding as abandoning) is the pa~n~naa which realizes the 3 characteristics of anicca, dukkha and anatta, overcoming or abandoning the ideas of permanence, satisfactoriness and self for good. This is the particular quality or nature of pa~n~naa. You might like to look at the suttas on Abandonment in Sa.laayatansa.myutta, SN, 24 and 25. The second one starts with the Buddha saying: “Bhikkhus, I will teach you the Dhamma for abandoning all through direct knowledge and full understanding(sabba.m abhi~n~naa pari~n~naa pahaanaaya)”. It goes on to indicate how all dhammas are abandoned through the highly developed pa~n~naa only. Howard, I’ve probably said too much, but will look forward to any further discussion with you on return from our trip. I’ve been enjoying all your recent threads and if that’s the result of your mediation, keep it up:-)). (I also shared your samvegga post with our N.Y. friend I mentioned, Neil, who recently lost his wife. I’m trying to encourage him to join us here). Metta, Sarah * Btw, Matheesha, I recently replied to Tep on some of your discussions together you may wish to look for them, see subject ‘Tep(3)’ and ‘Tep(4)’, a few days before you returned I think.)Perhaps you can encourage Tep to continue your good discussions while I'm away:). ============= 55342 From: "Charles" Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 1:00am Subject: Re: Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium Hi Nina, Then how about this passage ------------------------------------------- At Savatthi. There the Blessed One said, "Monks, whatever contemplatives or priests who assume in various ways when assuming a self, all assume the five clinging-aggregates, or a certain one of them. =========================================== http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn22-047.html Atta or anatta, all come from ditthi. If atta-ditthi only comes in connection with pancakkhandha, then I would not reject that nibbana is anatta, but I disagree when it is said that nibbana is anatta because it is lacking its own essence. I can know that I have the view this body and mind is the atta of my being, but as to whether hardness is empty of their own, I do not even know what hardness is, how can I have any wrong view on them. Or maybe it is different things, this atta and sakkaya-ditthi? --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: 55343 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 1:26am Subject: Re: [dsg] Thanks and appreciation nilovg Hi Larry, Sarah and Connie, op 01-02-2006 02:02 schreef LBIDD@... op LBIDD@...: Thank you very much, Nina. Anumodana! ------- Thank you Larry and Sarah for your kind words. Larry, it was such a pleasure to cooperate so smoothly with you during all this time. We owe you thanks for typing out the Visuddhimagga texts, and for the way you have led this project. Had you not continued posting these texts about twice a week, I might not have managed to keep up with this project. I realize how important such a balanced leadership is with a long project like this. Anumodana for all you have done and will do. Connie, I owe you thanks, because you helped me enormously getting all these Pali Tiika texts and decoding them which is difficult for me. Also thanks for the typing out of the Pe Maung Tin translation of the Visuddhimagga. It is always useful to compare more than one translation as I learnt from Jim. Anumodana. We owe Jim thanks who in the beginning helped giving us the Pali of the Visuddhimagga texts and giving me Tiika texts. A good beginning is essential. Sarah, I am grateful that you from the beginning reminded me to apply the texts and point out the relevance of the texts for our life now. This inspired me to 'meditate' on these texts and add a conclusion at the end of the relevant paragraph. Larry's index is also very useful and I shall mention it to the Pali list, to Jim, to the PTS in case they are interested. Lodewijk suggested this, but I am well aware that my translations are not up to standard and with mistakes. The sentences of the Tiika that I could not understand I skipped, using only those that I could understand. Nina. 55344 From: sarah abbott Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 1:39am Subject: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 370- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (i) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== [Ch22 -Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 contd] The Hindrances or Nívaraùas are another group of defilements. In the Dhammasangaùi (§1152-1163) the hindrances are classified as sixfold: * sensuous desire (kåmacchanda) ill-will (vyåpåda) sloth and torpor (thína-middha) restlessness and regret (uddhacca-kukkucca) doubt (vicikicchå) ignorance (avijjå)(1) * In the suttas and in the Visuddhimagga (IV, 104, 105) the hindrances are classified as fivefold; ignorance is not among them. However, this should not be seen as a discrepancy. Classifications are not rigid, their aim is to remind us of reality. *** 1) For sensuous desire see Chapter, 15, for ill-will Chapter 18, for sloth and torpor Chapter 20, for restlessness Chapter 14, for regret Chapter 19, for doubt ***** (Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 to be continued) Metta, Sarah ====== 55345 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 2:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta nilovg Hi Charles Ch, op 01-02-2006 10:00 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > At Savatthi. There the Blessed One said, "Monks, whatever > contemplatives or priests who assume in various ways when assuming a > self, all assume the five clinging-aggregates, or a certain one of > them. > =========================================== N: Yes, the text is very good, we have personality belief with regard to the five khandhas, in detail even twenty kinds: he identifues himself with the khandhas, or thinks that he possesses them, or contains them or he is contained in them. This is sakkaya di.t.thi. -------- Ch: Atta or anatta, all come from ditthi. If atta-ditthi only comes in > connection with pancakkhandha, then I would not reject that nibbana > is anatta, but I disagree when it is said that nibbana is anatta > because it is lacking its own essence. ------- N: How could nibbaana be a self or person? I find it obvious that nibbaana is also anattaa. ----------- Ch: I can know that I have the > view this body and mind is the atta of my being, but as to whether > hardness is empty of their own, I do not even know what hardness is, > how can I have any wrong view on them. Or maybe it is different > things, this atta and sakkaya-ditthi? ------ N: Sakkayaditthi is belief in a self. We can learn what the rupa of hardness is. When touching, hardness appears, but we do not realize it yet as only a rupa, not a thing, not a chair or a body. When sati arises there can be mindfulness of just the characteristic of hardness, and at that short moment there is no thing that is hard. But when there is no awareness, we cling to the idea of a thing or body that is hard. There is ignorance. And when we firmly believe that there is a thing or body that is hard there is also wrong view. We take things for self. The word attaa has a wider meaning than what we in conventional sense mean by myself. Atta means: what has a core, an essence, what is lasting and not impermanent. Perhaps your difficulty is the way all this is expressed in language. I think that you do not believe that nibbaana is a person, thus, it is non-self. I will not be able to continue this thread now, since I am going away tomorrow, but after my return I am looking forward to continue. Nina. 55346 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 2:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. nilovg Hi TG and Larry, So both of you think the same. I shall try to think of something to say:-)) But I go away tomorrow, so it is not much. op 31-01-2006 20:53 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > But since I think it is impossible for > consciousness to have an object that isn't a paramattha dhamma, I continue to > think that > this discussion is revolving around that issue. :-) --------- N: Perhaps you mean by consciousness awareness, satipatthana? True, only paramatthas are object of which understanding is being developed. But I take consciousness to be citta. Citta that arises in a mind-door process can think of anything true or not true. Rob K gave the example of a pink elephant. Anything odd can be the object of thinking. Or, a paramattha dhamma, even nibbaana can be the object of citta. Larry, you said that even when we believe we think of a conceot it amounts to paramattha dhammas. Howard thought you were kidding, but I do not think you are joking so often, only keeping this for rare occasions. His tone is serious here. Larry writes: When the Buddha implied (my interpretation) that the object of clinging is only the upadanakhandas he meant "object" in the sense of what is desired; he didn't mean "object" in the more technical sense of object condition. ------- N: In the Patthana, concepts are also under object-condition, thus concept can be an object. Concepts are not under object predominance-condiiton, that is true. -------- L: This can be difficult to see because the worldly life is so full of concepts, but I think if you look carefully you will find that the objects of all your desires (what you want) are realities. I think this is an important point that we should consider carefully. -------- N: Since cittas arise and fall away so extremely fast, succeeding one another, it is difficult to find out what we are thinking. At one moment it is a conceot, and immediately after that it can be a paramattha dhamma. Khun Sujin said in India, when we ask someone what he is thinking it is difficult to find out, the thinking has fallen away already. Only through awareness and direct understanding it can be known what the object of citta is. Indeed, we have to consider carefully. Nina. 55347 From: sarah abbott Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 2:26am Subject: Sort of Sign off (was:Re: [dsg] Vism.XIV,Index) sarahprocter... Hi Larry & All, --- LBIDD@... wrote: > Hi all, > > Here is an index of paragraph numbers and message numbers of the text of > chapter XIV of the Visuddhimagga and of Nina's summary and/or > translation of Dhammapaala's Commentary on that text. .... S: This is a very useful piece of work, thx a lot Larry, for all your hard work. Apart from a couple more installments from Cetasikas, I'm going to be pretty much signing off until our return (in a little over 2 weeks) as I have some chores which I have to attend to before we go and I'll be busy with my mother in Thailand when we're not having discussions. If I can, of course I'll try to pop in and give brief updates... Jon will probably have more chance to post and we'll both be following and reading everything as usual. There are a few people inc. Dan, CharlesD and Joop who I'd planned to respond to.....maybe by the time you pop back next Xmas, Dan:-)). I will get back to anyone who addressed posts, esp any questions to me. Phil, thx for the 'Greatest Hits' post:-)) and I'm sure one of us will raise your questions. When you get to listen to India 05, you'll hear K.Sujin at one point saying: 'Any more questions from Phil?'. Looking forward to reading all the posts while we're away and raising various points from the list in our discussions. Metta, Sarah ======= 55348 From: "seisen_au" Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 4:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta seisen_au Hi Nina, Charles and All, - Ch: The whole satipatthana itself has as the object the pancakkhanda. N: The reason is that satipatthana does not have nibbaana as object, it is mundane, not lokuttara. Nina. - I believe this is why the commentators limit `sabbe dhamma' in the context of the Dhammapada verse to just the five aggregates. Taking the whole verse into consideration it seems to be about vipassana leading to purity. The way to purity being seeing the mundane aggregates as anicca, anatta and dukkha. Dhammapada Commentary on the verse: Tattha sabbe dhammaati pa~ncakkhandhaa eva adhippetaa. There (in that place) 'sabbe dhammaa' means the five aggregates. The following is from Mahasi Sayadaw's `NIBBINDĀ ÑĀNA DEVELOPED WHEN NOT-SELF IS SEEN' Sabbe dhammā anattāti yadā paññāya passati atha nibbindati dukkhe esa maggo visuddhiyā. Dhamma in this verse has the same purpose as sankhārā of the previous two verses, meaning mundane mentality and corporeality as perceived by insight knowledge. Anattā is dhamma and dhamma, phenomena, thus means anattā. In order to bring out more clearly the meaning of sankhārā as nonself, the word dhamma is employed here. This is the explanation given in the Commentary and we believe it is quite appropriate and acceptable. Steve 55349 From: "Charles" Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 4:19am Subject: [dsg] Re: Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > Perhaps your difficulty is the way all this is expressed in language. > I think that you do not believe that nibbaana is a person, thus, it is > non-self. > I will not be able to continue this thread now, since I am going away > tomorrow, but after my return I am looking forward to continue. > Nina. Hi Nina, Thanks for all your responses. Maybe I confused by languange, maybe by its meaning. I usually read atta-ditthi in the sutta-context, therefore there is the being concept, and atta-ditthi is caused by false perception on it. But in the abhidhamma context, I do not think of any being, so how could there be any atta-ditthi. Only kilesa, citta, rupa, cetasika. And I think atta-ditthi is one of those kilesa. Thinking about rupa, citta, cetasika, nibbana itself in my view is already (an effort of) cutting the perception of a being itself. Because when thinking about abhidhamma, the perception of a being is eradicated. Thinking about the parts of the paramattha dhamma itself I think is a way too far. I can thinking about breaking a piece of plastic into its molecules, and its molecules into their hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon atoms, but I don't think about breaking atoms into their parts again, because at the time I can see the atoms, I do not even think about any plastic anymore. See you when you get back :D 55350 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 6:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta nilovg Hi Steve, thanks for giving the Co and Pali, it is clear. Ven. Narada who translated the Dhammapada gave the footnote about nibbaana, but as you say, here the focus is on the five khandhas. But if we consider nibbaana as also included in the dhaatus, elements, as asankhata dhaatu, in the Dhammasangani, it is clear that nibbana is also anattaa, devoid of self. Nina. op 01-02-2006 13:05 schreef seisen_au op seisen_@...: > > I believe this is why the commentators limit `sabbe dhamma' in the > context of the Dhammapada verse to just the five aggregates. Taking > the whole verse into consideration it seems to be about vipassana > leading to purity. The way to purity being seeing the mundane > aggregates as anicca, anatta and dukkha. > > > Dhammapada Commentary on the verse: > > Tattha sabbe dhammaati pa~ncakkhandhaa eva adhippetaa. > There (in that place) 'sabbe dhammaa' means the five aggregates. > The following is from Mahasi Sayadaw's `NIBBINDĀ ÑĀNA DEVELOPED WHEN > NOT-SELF IS SEEN' > > Sabbe dhammā anattāti > yadā paññāya passati > atha nibbindati dukkhe > esa maggo visuddhiyā. > > Dhamma in this verse has the same purpose as sankhārā of the > previous > two verses, meaning mundane mentality and corporeality as perceived > by insight knowledge. Anattā is dhamma and dhamma, phenomena, thus > means anattā. In order to bring out more clearly the meaning of > sankhārā as nonself, the word dhamma is employed here. > > This is the explanation given in the Commentary and we believe it is > quite appropriate and acceptable. 55351 From: "Charles" Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 6:34am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "seisen_au" wrote: > Dhammapada Commentary on the verse: > > Tattha sabbe dhammaati pa~ncakkhandhaa eva adhippetaa. > There (in that place) 'sabbe dhammaa' means the five aggregates. Hi Steve, Thanks for giving the text from the Dhammapada commentary and from Ven. Mahasi book. I am not really sure myself about the text that I quoted before about the Dhammapada commentary said dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta refers to the pancakkhandha, because I don't have the commentary. This would be something good to investigate. In my opinion, the discrimation of the khandhas into its constituents of the paramattha dhammas is the way to eliminate atta-ditthi (for example the catudhatuvavatthana). The paramattha dhamma is the medicine, while tha pancakkhandha is the disease. It is completely useful to understand about the medicine, but to think about the medicine as being diseased is inappropriate. That is why they are being put into different context, ultimate and fake reality. 55352 From: "Charles" Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 7:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > Hi Steve, > thanks for giving the Co and Pali, it is clear. > Ven. Narada who translated the Dhammapada gave the footnote about nibbaana, > but as you say, here the focus is on the five khandhas. > But if we consider nibbaana as also included in the dhaatus, elements, as > asankhata dhaatu, in the Dhammasangani, it is clear that nibbana is also > anattaa, devoid of self. Hi Nina, The problem is that there are different views on anatta. 1. being-centric, that is nibbana is neither I not mine, thus it is always connected with the concept of a being. Nibbana is not the essence of a being, thus it is anatta. 2. essence-centric, that is nibbana is without essence (without any influence of the concept of a being). Nibbana is without (its own) essence, thus it is anatta. Can there be the notion of atta without the notion of a being? In other words, the problem appears when the Buddha's teaching about anatta is viewed from the context of paramattha dhamma and failed to find the concept of a being, people create the concept of element- essence that is the elements are empty of their own essence. Does atta in anatta refer to the essence of a being or to the general essence of elements? The Buddha Himself, I believe, did not refer to the elements theirselves when He's teaching the anatta, but He's refering to a being. 55353 From: "Charles" Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 7:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "seisen_au" wrote: > The following is from Mahasi Sayadaw's `NIBBINDĀ ÑĀNA DEVELOPED WHEN > NOT-SELF IS SEEN' Hi Nina and Steve, here's longer quote from Ven. Mahasi's text --------------------------------------------------------------- NIBBINDĀ ÑĀṆA DEVELOPED WHEN NOT-SELF IS SEEN Sabbe dhammā anattātiyadā paññāya passatiatha nibbindati dukkheesa maggo visuddhiyā. Dhamma in this verse has the same purpose as saṅkhārā of the previous two verses, meaning mundane mentality and corporeality as perceived by insight knowledge. Anattā is dhamma and dhamma, phenomena, thus means anattā. In order to bring out more clearly the meaning of saṅ khārā as nonself, the word dhamma is employed here. This is the explanation given in the Commentary and we believe it is quite appropriate and acceptable. But there are other views which hold that the word dhamma is purposely used here to include the supramundane Path, Fruition and the unconditioned Nibbāna as well. We believe this interpretation is not quite tenable. The ordinary person perceives saṅkhārā, such as acts of seeing and hearing, as permanent and pleasant, whereas the meditator sees them as transient and suffering. Likewise, what the ordinary person regards as self, namely mundane mentality and corporeality, the meditator sees as not-self, anattā. The meditator need not and cannot note supramundane things. They cannot be objects of contemplation and he could thus have no attachments for them. Thus it must be taken that dhamma here means just mundane saṅkhārā, mentality and corporeality, which can form the objects of vipassanā contemplation. =============================================================== From: http://www.saigon.com/~anson/ebud/mahasi-anat/anat08.htm Still I think that mundane here is in the context of samutti-sacca, that is it is under the notion of a being. A notion that must be eliminated by comprehension to the paramattha sacca. 55354 From: TGrand458@... Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 4:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. TGrand458@... In a message dated 2/1/2006 3:35:49 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: > But since I think it is impossible for > consciousness to have an object that isn't a paramattha dhamma, I continue to > think that > this discussion is revolving around that issue. :-) --------- N: Perhaps you mean by consciousness awareness, satipatthana? True, only paramatthas are object of which understanding is being developed. But I take consciousness to be citta. Citta that arises in a mind-door process can think of anything true or not true. Rob K gave the example of a pink elephant. Anything odd can be the object of thinking. Or, a paramattha dhamma, even nibbaana can be the object of citta. Larry, you said that even when we believe we think of a conceot it amounts to paramattha dhammas. Howard thought you were kidding, but I do not think you are joking so often, only keeping this for rare occasions. His tone is serious here. Larry writes: When the Buddha implied (my interpretation) that the object of clinging is only the upadanakhandas he meant "object" in the sense of what is desired; he didn't mean "object" in the more technical sense of object condition. ------- N: In the Patthana, concepts are also under object-condition, thus concept can be an object. Concepts are not under object predominance-condiiton, that is true. -------- L: This can be difficult to see because the worldly life is so full of concepts, but I think if you look carefully you will find that the objects of all your desires (what you want) are realities. I think this is an important point that we should consider carefully. -------- N: Since cittas arise and fall away so extremely fast, succeeding one another, it is difficult to find out what we are thinking. At one moment it is a conceot, and immediately after that it can be a paramattha dhamma. Khun Sujin said in India, when we ask someone what he is thinking it is difficult to find out, the thinking has fallen away already. Only through awareness and direct understanding it can be known what the object of citta is. Indeed, we have to consider carefully. Nina. 55355 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 5:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. upasaka_howard Hi, TG - Did you forget to add your own comments in the following? (I had to look back to see whom your post was by! ;-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 2/1/06 12:37:47 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > > In a message dated 2/1/2006 3:35:49 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, > vangorko@... writes: > > >But since I think it is impossible for > >consciousness to have an object that isn't a paramattha dhamma, I continue > > to > >think that > >this discussion is revolving around that issue. :-) > --------- > N: Perhaps you mean by consciousness awareness, satipatthana? True, only > paramatthas are object of which understanding is being developed. > But I take consciousness to be citta. Citta that arises in a mind-door > process can think of anything true or not true. Rob K gave the example of a > pink elephant. Anything odd can be the object of thinking. Or, a paramattha > dhamma, even nibbaana can be the object of citta. > Larry, you said that even when we believe we think of a conceot it amounts > to paramattha dhammas. Howard thought you were kidding, but I do not think > you are joking so often, only keeping this for rare occasions. His tone is > serious here. > > Larry writes: When the Buddha > implied (my interpretation) that the object of clinging is only the > upadanakhandas he meant "object" in the sense of what is desired; he > didn't mean "object" in the more technical sense of object condition. > ------- > N: In the Patthana, concepts are also under object-condition, thus concept > can be an object. Concepts are not under object predominance-condiiton, > that > is true. > -------- > L: This can be difficult to see because the worldly life is so full of > concepts, but I think if you look carefully you will find that the > objects of all your desires (what you want) are realities. I think this > is an important point that we should consider carefully. > -------- > N: Since cittas arise and fall away so extremely fast, succeeding one > another, it is difficult to find out what we are thinking. At one moment it > is a conceot, and immediately after that it can be a paramattha dhamma. > Khun Sujin said in India, when we ask someone what he is thinking it is > difficult to find out, the thinking has fallen away already. > Only through awareness and direct understanding it can be known what the > object of citta is. Indeed, we have to consider carefully. > Nina. > > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55356 From: TGrand458@... Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 5:26am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. TGrand458@... In a message dated 2/1/2006 11:17:54 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Hi, TG - Did you forget to add your own comments in the following? (I had to look back to see whom your post was by! ;-) With metta, Howard Hi Howard. No ... I just figured this way I wouldn't make any mistakes. LOL Actually yes, sorry...accidentally hit send button. Re-posted "real" commentary to Nina. Please check out. Thanks. TG 55357 From: TGrand458@... Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 5:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. TGrand458@... In a message dated 2/1/2006 3:35:49 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: > But since I think it is impossible for > consciousness to have an object that isn't a paramattha dhamma, I continue to > think that > this discussion is revolving around that issue. :-) --------- N: Perhaps you mean by consciousness awareness, satipatthana? True, only paramatthas are object of which understanding is being developed. But I take consciousness to be citta. Citta that arises in a mind-door process can think of anything true or not true. Rob K gave the example of a pink elephant. Anything odd can be the object of thinking. Or, a paramattha dhamma, even nibbaana can be the object of citta. Larry, you said that even when we believe we think of a conceot it amounts to paramattha dhammas. Howard thought you were kidding, but I do not think you are joking so often, only keeping this for rare occasions. His tone is serious here. Hi Nina Its funny because in this discussion I would say that I am more "in tune" with the "realities" that consciousness is aware of. When it thinks about a "flying pink elephant," citta takes for its object mental formations, largely in the form of stored perceptions/memories, as its object If it can be experienced, it most assuredly is real. What isn't real cannot be experienced. A "flying pink elephant" is not real and there is no experience of such a thing. Only the "mentality" behind that idea is real...and indeed we do experience THAT mentality. In your above response you have traded your normal "reality" with the word "true." These two words do not mean the same thing. I think you are just confusing yourself by this "exchange." Of course we can think of things that aren't true. Every thought is ultimately "not true." But reality is a different matter. Reality MUST actually happen. CITTA, A REALITY, CANNOT BE CO-STRUCTURED BY SOMETHING THAT IS NOT REAL. I.E., A NON-REALITY CANNOT BE ITS OBJECT. It would be like saying that a tripod, with only two actual legs and one imaginary leg, could stand upright in that condition. Stand on what? TG 55358 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 10:59am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. nilovg Hi TG, When I am back we have to go over: truth, reality, citta, object. Nina. op 01-02-2006 19:23 schreef TGrand458@... op TGrand458@...: > > In your above response you have traded your normal "reality" with the word > "true." These two words do not mean the same thing. I think you are just > confusing yourself by this "exchange." Of course we can think of things that > aren't true. Every thought is ultimately "not true." But reality is a > different matter. Reality MUST actually happen. CITTA, A REALITY, CANNOT BE > CO-STRUCTURED BY SOMETHING THAT IS NOT REAL. I.E., A NON-REALITY CANNOT BE > ITS > OBJECT. It would be like saying that a tripod, with only two actual legs and > one imaginary leg, could stand upright in that condition. Stand on what? 55359 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 1:35pm Subject: Re: Vism.XIV,Index htootintnaing --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, LBIDD@... wrote: > > Hi all, > > Here is an index of paragraph numbers and message numbers of the text of > chapter XIV of the Visuddhimagga and of Nina's summary and/or > translation of Dhammapaala's Commentary on that text. > > Text: paragraph number and message number > > 1 (23597), 2 (23759), 3 ----------------------------------- Dear Larry, Thank you very very much indeed. With respect, Htoo Naing 55360 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 1:33pm Subject: Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 370- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (i) htootintnaing Dear Sarah, What is defintion of hindrance? Can hindrance arise without meditation? With regards, Htoo Naing ----------------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > Dear Friends, > > 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom > > http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html > http://www.zolag.co.uk/ > > Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) > ========================================== > [Ch22 -Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 contd] > > The Hindrances or Nívaraùas are another group of defilements. > In the Dhammasangaùi (§1152-1163) the hindrances are classified > as sixfold: > * > sensuous desire (kåmacchanda) > ill-will (vyåpåda) > sloth and torpor (thína-middha) > restlessness and regret (uddhacca-kukkucca) > doubt (vicikicchå) > ignorance (avijjå)(1) > * > In the suttas and in the Visuddhimagga (IV, 104, 105) the hindrances are > classified as fivefold; ignorance is not among them. However, this should > not be seen as a discrepancy. Classifications are not rigid, their aim is > to remind us of reality. > *** > 1) For sensuous desire see Chapter, 15, for ill-will Chapter 18, for sloth > and torpor Chapter 20, for restlessness Chapter 14, for regret Chapter 19, > for doubt > ***** > (Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 to be continued) > > Metta, > > Sarah > ====== > 55361 From: sarah abbott Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 3:48pm Subject: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 371- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (j) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== [Ch22 -Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 contd] The hindrances are obstructions, overwhelming the mind, weakening insight(1). The hindrances obstruct the development of what is wholesome. When we are attached to pleasant sights and sounds, to people or to particular places, there is the hindrance of sensuous desire. At the moment of attachment we do not realize that it obstructs the arising of kusala citta, but we should know that at such a moment there cannot be generosity or loving kindness. Ill-will is another akusala dhamma which is one of the hindrances. The hindrance of ill-will is dosa cetasika and it comprises all shades and degrees of aversion. Even a moment of slight annoyance is a hindrance, it obstructs kusala. When there is ill-will there is no loving-kindness, no compassion, no understanding of nåma and rúpa. However, some moments later mindfulness can arise and be aware of any reality which appears, even of annoyance. Sloth and torpor are two akusala cetasikas which are classified as a pair among the hindrances. When they arise there is mental indisposition and unwieldiness. They have the same proximate cause, namely, unwise attention. When there are sloth and torpor there is no energy, no vigour for kusala, and thus they obstruct kusala. When there are sloth and torpor one has no confidence in the development of right understanding. Restlessness and regret (uddhacca-kukkucca) is another pair among the hindrances. When there is restlessness and regret the citta is not peaceful. As we have seen, restlessness accompanies each akusala citta and regret accompanies only dosa-múla-citta. The omission of kusala and the commission of akusala are the objects of regret. Restlessness and regret obstruct the performing of kusala, and at such moments there cannot be mindfulness of nåma and rúpa. Doubt (vicikicchå) is another akusala dhamma which is a hindrance. Doubt about the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha, doubt about realities, all these kinds of doubt are a hindrance to the development of kusala, a hindrance to the development of right understanding. We need courage to continue to develop satipaììhåna, so that doubt can eventually be eradicated. Doubt is a reality and thus it can be the object of sati. The citta which is accompanied by mindfulness is kusala citta, but mindfulness can have as its object any reality which appears, even akusala dhamma. Ignorance ( avijjå) can, as we have seen, also be classified as a hindrance. There is ignorance with each akusala citta, ignorance is the root of all evil. Ignorance blinds us, it is a hindrance to kusala and to right understanding. We may see the danger of lobha and of dosa, but we may not see the danger of ignorance. If we see its danger we will develop right understanding so that ignorance can eventually be eradicated. In samatha the hindrances can be temporarily subdued by the jhåna-factors which accompany the jhåna-cittas of the different stages of jhåna, but they cannot be eradicated. They can be eradicated only by the right understanding which is developed in vipassanå. *** 1) Atthasåliní, II, Book II, Part II, Chapter II, 382. ***** (Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 to be continued) Metta, Sarah ====== 55362 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 11:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. upasaka_howard Hi, TG - In a message dated 2/1/06 1:36:11 PM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > In a message dated 2/1/2006 11:17:54 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, > upasaka@... writes: > > Hi, TG - > > Did you forget to add your own comments in the following? (I had to > look back to see whom your post was by! ;-) > > With metta, > Howard > > > > Hi Howard. No ... I just figured this way I wouldn't make any mistakes. > > LOL > > ========================== LOLOL! You have discovered the true significance of emptiness! With metta, Howard P.S. With regard to your last post about pink elephants, I agree with you that when thinking about pink elephants, what we are actually aware of is a thought process, which is sankhara (or a sankharic stream) - mental formations. My only exception I take to the analyses you give in this regard is that, IMO, nowhere within this process is to be found any single mental element that can properly be called a pink-elephant idea or concept or thought. There is just a complex mental process, and the apparent pink-elephant-thought, per se, as an individual mental construct, is, in actuality, nowhere to be found, though we *think* it is. What do occur are bits and pieces of mental images and story elements, possibly capped by an internal labeling. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55363 From: TGrand458@... Date: Wed Feb 1, 2006 11:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness Conceptualizations , Concepts. TGrand458@... In a message dated 2/1/2006 5:07:51 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: My only exception I take to the analyses you give in this regard is that, IMO, nowhere within this process is to be found any single mental element that can properly be called a pink-elephant idea or concept or thought. There is just a complex mental process, and the apparent pink-elephant-thought, per se, as an individual mental construct, is, in actuality, nowhere to be found, though we *think* it is. What do occur are bits and pieces of mental images and story elements, possibly capped by an internal labeling. With metta, Howard Hi Howard Yea, but how are you going to communicate that to folks? Maybe you can find 3. ;-) I talked about thought...but I don't think I claimed it was a "single mental element." Perhaps my writing is too sloppy, but I think you sometimes assume meanings in my posts that aren't implied. I only have myself to blame. I just try stating things so folks can understand. Everyone here is so entrenched in their own way of thinking about it...its hard to know which avenue to take. In some people those levels seem to constantly vary ... even within a single sentence. So its hard to know what "cord" will strike a successful communication. When you say you disagree with me, you really disagree with the way I phrased it. On many occasions you disagree with me on things that I would also disagree with me on. LOL This would be true regarding or exchange on "seeing trees vs color palate." (I like the palate comment.) Other times, we probably have a genuine difference of view... But probably not in terms of what constitutes "self-viewpoint." The level of specificity that we are dealing with generally far beyond that dealt with in the Suttas. Maybe even more specific than any of them...at best a handful are close. This makes me think, along with my own insights, that it really isn't the crux of the issue. I believe conditionality insight ONLY needs to be as deep as necessary to see impermanence, emptines, and dukkha enough to uproot attachment. That level of depth will vary from person to person. I sometimes think, and you might agree with this, that too much focus and 'depth of view' into realities, may become a grasping task in and of itself...and that detachment not only does not get applied, it wanes. Again, it depends on the individual. At any rate, I like your tough feedback! TG 55375 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 0:52am Subject: [dsg] Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 370- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (i) htootintnaing --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > > Dear Htoo, > They are defilements arising time and again in daily life. They obstruct the > development of kusala. They can be temporarily subdues by the jhanafactors, > but only the development of insight leads to their eradication, and that is, > when lokuttara maggacitta arises. > Nina. > op 01-02-2006 22:33 schreef htootintnaing op htootintnaing@...: > > > What is defintion of hindrance? > > > > Can hindrance arise without meditation? --------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Nina, I think Sarah is busy with the trip and programmes. My question is not for this answer. Daily life has many akusalas. I do know these. But are these akusala called 'hindrances' without discrimination? With respect, Htoo Naing 55376 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 0:56am Subject: Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 372- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (k) htootintnaing --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > Dear Friends, > > 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom > > http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html > http://www.zolag.co.uk/ > > Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) > ========================================== > [Ch22 -Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 contd] > > We read in the Kindred Sayings (V, Mahå-vagga, Book II, Kindred > Sayings on the Limbs of Wisdom, Chapter IV, §5) about the > condition for the arising of the hindrances: > * > "Monks, in him who practises unsystematic attention, sensual desire, if > not already arisen, arises; and, if already arisen, sensual desire > conduces to the more-becoming and growth thereof. > So also malevolence, sloth and torpor, excitement and flurry, doubt and > wavering, if not yet arisen, do arise; and, if arisen, conduce to the > more-becoming and growth thereof." > * > ***** > (Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 to be continued) > > Metta, > > Sarah > ====== --------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Sarah and Nina, What is 'unsystematic attention'? [questions, comments, & different views are welcome_you said] If I write on 'systematic attention' will you both be saying I am promoting 'self'? There are 2 questions. I will be looking forward to seeing 2 answers and more explanation on these matters. With much respect, Htoo Naing 55377 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 0:58am Subject: [dsg] Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 370- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (i) htootintnaing --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, LBIDD@... wrote: > > Htoo: "Dear Sarah, > What is defintion of hindrance? > Can hindrance arise without meditation?" > > Hi Htoo, > > Sarah may have logged out in preparation for 2 weeks in Thailand. > > Hindrance is niivara.na. A full definition can be found here: > http://www.urbandharma.org/udharma2/dictionary/bdindex.html Hindrance can only arise without meditation, I would say. Larry ---------------------------------- Dear Larry, You said 'Hindrance can *only arise* without meditation.' Did you mean 'Hindrance cannot arise with meditation'? With respect, Htoo Naing 55378 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 2:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 372- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (k) sarahprocter... Hi Htoo, Nina may well have left already -she'll have no internet at all while she's away. I will, but won't be able to post much if at all. Thx v.much for all yr comments - I'll be v.glad if anyone else can chip in with any wild or non-wild ideas:-). --- htootintnaing wrote: > What is 'unsystematic attention'? > > [questions, comments, & different views are welcome_you said] .... S: most welcome, I'm just trying to finish the chapter:-) ayoniso manasikaara lots in U.P. under 'Manasikaara'. Referrring to the unwholesome mind door processes when there is no sati arising, no 'guarding' .... > > If I write on 'systematic attention' will you both be saying I > am promoting 'self'? .... S: Quite likely:-))) ... > > There are 2 questions. I will be looking forward to seeing 2 answers > and more explanation on these matters. ... S: 1, 2, yes, I've given 2. Loved yr post about being called 'Mr Numbers':-) If you'd like any further explanation, can I ask others to chip in? Metta, Sarah p.s I'm going to ask Sukin to help me by sending out copies of the Erik series cds to DSG friends, so if anyone would like a copy of this, pls ask him or me. ============== 55379 From: "Joop" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 2:21am Subject: Concepts and other irrealities (Was:Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts jwromeijn --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > Hi Joop, > > I have been trying to follow the essay extracts that you have quoted. > Quite possibly, I have misunderstood them. (Some of your typos have > added to the difficulty.) ... Hallo KenH, (and others interested in the two levels of truth) Thanks for your reaction; I don't agree with all of it but this can bring more clearness. KenH: "But it does seem that the author (Kasturirangan) has overlooked the distinction between concepts and realities." Joop: I don't think he has overlooked it, because it was one of the topics of his essay, but perhaps he has a partly not-Theravada view on that distinction. KenH: "To my understanding, concepts are empty only in the sense that they are mere illusions - empty of reality - whereas paramattha dhammas are empty by virtue of their inherent anatta-characteristic." Joop: Let's be careful in the term "reality", as I quoted, Bikkhu Bodhi speaks in the first chapter of the MCA about the two levels of reality: conceptual and ultimate. That "concepts" are illusions, that's my view too; maybe Kasturirangan is to vague about that aspect. KenH: "Without an appreciation of the distinction between concepts and realities there is bound to be unwise contemplation of the Dhamma and nonsensical conclusions must ensue." Joop: I think you are interested in some quotes of Karunadasa about that topic in a DSG-message I just send. Kasturirangan concludes, "My guess is that reality itself is contradictory, and that ordinary logic is just the wrong logic for understanding reality." KenH: "I don't think reality is contradictory; do you, Joop? And I would say that ordinary logic is perfectly adequate for a correct theoretical understanding of paramattha dhammas." Joop: Kasturirangan could better not have used the term "reality" here because it's not clear he talks about the conceptual/conventional reality or the ultimate reality. Perhaps the part of his essay I quoted was not so clear, his intention was to elaborate on the "concept"-issue And your question about ordinary logic is a difficult one: I believe the doctrines of anicca, anatta and dukkha are true but they (and my belief in them) are not the result of logic; life is not logic to me. Metta Joop PS The typos were not of my fingers but the result of Adobe converting a .pdf file to flat text; still apologies for my lack of corrections. 55380 From: "Joop" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 2:19am Subject: Concepts and other irrealities (3) jwromeijn To all, interested in the two levels of truth In the first message of this serie about the two levels of realities I only mentioned the essay of Karunadasa. (#55304 and #55311) But after reading it again I'm convinced that the Dhamma Study in the DSG can use texts of other Pali and Abhidhamma scholars than usually are quoted. For that reason in this and the next message parts of the essay "The Dhamma Theory; Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma" by Y. Karunadasa (Wheel Publication No. 412/413) www.abhidhamma.org/dhamma_theory_philosophical_corn.htm Metta Joop "… III. PANNATTI AND THE TWO TRUTHS What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognizes the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that owe their being to the act of cognition itself. How does this doctrine interpret the "common-sense" view of the world, a kind of naive realism in the sense that it tends to recognize realities more or less corresponding to all linguistic terms? In other words, what relation is there between the dhammas, the ultimate elements of existence, and the objects of common-sense realism? What degree of reality, if any, could be bestowed on the latter? It is in their answers to these questions that the Abhidhammikas formulated the theory of pannatti -- concepts or designations -- together with a distinction drawn between two kinds of truth, conventional (sammuti) and absolute (paramattha). This theory assumes significance in another context. In most of the Indian philosophies which were associated with the atma-tradition and subscribed to a substantialist view of existence, such categories as time and space came to be defined in absolute terms. The problem for the Abhidhammikas was how to explain such categories without committing themselves to the same metaphysical assumptions. The theory of pannatti was the answer to this. What may be described as the first formal definition of pannatti occurs in the Dhammasangani.107 Here the three terms, pannatti, nirutti, and adhivacana are used synonymously and each term is defined by lumping together a number of appropriate equivalents. In Mrs. Rhys Davids' translation: "That which is an enumeration, that which is a designation, an expression (pannatti), a current term, a name, a denomination, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinctive mark of discourse on this or that dhamma." 108 Immediately after this definition, a "predication of equipollent terms," 109 it is observed that all the dhammas constitute the pathway of pannattis (sabbe dhamma pannatti-patha).110 As shown by this definition, designation is the pannatti; what is designated thereby is the pannatti-patha. Whether the term pannatti, as used here, denotes the individual names given to each and every dhamma only, or whether it also denotes names assigned to various combinations of the dhammas, is not explicitly stated. According to the Abhidhamma, it may be noted, every combination of the objectively real dhammas represents a nominal reality, not an objective reality. The fact that the term pannatti includes names of both categories, the objective and the nominal, is suggested not only by what is stated elsewhere in the Abhidhamma Pitaka,111 but also by the later exegesis.112 We may conclude then that according to the Dhammasangani definition, pannatti denotes all names, terms, and symbols that are expressive of the real existents as well as of their combinations in different forms. Another important fact that should not be overlooked here is that according to the later exegesis pannatti includes not only names (nama) but also ideas corresponding to them (attha).113 Since the assignment of a designation creates an idea corresponding to it, we may interpret the above definition to include both. It is true, of course, that the dhammas do not exist in dependence on the operation of the mind, on their being designated by a term and conceptualized by mind. Nevertheless the assignment of names to the dhammas involves a process of conceptualization. Hence pannatti includes not only the names of things, whether they are real or nominal, but also all the concepts corresponding to them. This theory of pannatti, presented as ancillary to the doctrine of dhammas, is not a complete innovation on the part of the Abhidhamma. Such a theory is clearly implied in the early Buddhist analysis of empirical existence into the aggregates, sense bases, and elements, and the only really new feature in the pannatti theory is its systematic formulation. Accordingly the term "person" becomes a common designation (sammuti) given to a congeries of dependently originated psycho-physical factors: "Just as there arises the name `chariot' when there is a set of appropriate constituents, even so there comes to be this convention `living being' when the five aggregates are present." 114 There is, however, this important difference to be noted: the early Buddhist idea of sammuti is not based on a formulated doctrine of real existents. Although what is analysed is called sammuti, that into which it is analysed is not called paramattha. Such a development is found only in the Abhidhamma, as we have already seen. We should note that in the Abhidhamma, a clear distinction is drawn between sammuti and pannãtti. Pannatti, as we have seen, refers to terms (nama) expressive of things both real (paramattha) and convention-based (sammuti) and the ideas corresponding to them (attha). In contrast, sammuti is used in a restricted sense to mean only what is convention-based. It is this meaning that finds expression in the compound sammuti-sacca (conventional truth). That for the Abhidhamma sammuti is not the same as pannatti is also seen by the fact that in the Dhammasangani definition of pannatti quoted above, the term sammuti does not occur among its synonyms. Although the theory of pannatti is formally introduced in the works of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, it is in the Abhidhamma commentaries that we find more specific definitions of the term along with many explanations on the nature and scope of pannattis and on how they become objects of cognition. For example, because pannattis are without corresponding objective reality, the commentaries call them asabhava-dhammas -- things without a real nature -- to distinguish them from the real elements of existence.115 Since sabhava, the intrinsic nature of a dhamma, is itself the dhamma, from the point of view of this definition what is qualified as asabhava amounts to an abhava, a non-existent in the final sense. It is in recognition of this fact that the three salient characteristics of empirical reality -- origination (uppada), subsistence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga) -- are not applied to them. For these three characteristics can be predicated only of those things which answer to the Abhidhammic definition of empirical reality.116 Again, unlike the real existents, pannattis are not brought about by conditions (paccayatthitika). For this same reason, they are also defined as "not positively produced" (aparinipphanna). Positive production (parinipphannata) is true only of those things which have their own individual nature (avenika-sabhava).117 Only a dhamma that has an own- nature, with a beginning and an end in time, produced by conditions, and marked by the three salient characteristics of conditioned existence, is positively produced.118 Further, pannattis differ from dhammas in that only the latter are delimited by rise and fall; only of the dhammas and not of the pannattis can it be said, "They come into being having not been (ahutva sambhonti); and, after having been, they cease (hutva pativenti)." 119 Pannattis have no own-nature to be manifested in the three instants of arising, presence, and dissolution. Since they have no existence marked by these three phases, such temporal distinctions as past, present, and future do not apply to them. Consequently they have no reference to time (kalavimutta).120 For this self-same reason, they have no place in the traditional analysis of empirical existence into the five khandhas, for what is included in the khandhas should have the characteristics of empirical reality and be subject to temporal divisions.121 55381 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 3:10am Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 644 ) htootintnaing Dear Dhamma Friends, 'Vi~n~naana paccayaa naama-ruupam'. There are 19 pa.tisandhi cittas or 19 rebirth consciousness. Two of them have been discussed. There left 17 pa.tisandhi cittas. They are a) 8 mahaavipaaka cittas b) 5 ruupavipaaka cittas c) 4 aruupavipaaka cittas 8 mahaavipaaka cittas can serve as linking consciousness or rebirth consciousness in cases of human beings or deva beings. These 8 vinnaanas can be patisandhi-vinnaanas of kaama-sugati-bhuumi or sensuous-happy-destinations. Vinnaana paccayaa naamaruupam. As soon as one of 8 mahaavipaaka cittas arises as patisandhi-vinnaana there also have to arise naama- ruupam. There are 7 examples of this 'vinnaana paccayaa naama- ruupam'. These 7 are one for human being and other 6 vinnaanas for deva in each realm of 6 deva realms. As soon as human patisandhi arise there also arise associated naama namely vedanaa-sannaa-sankhaara-vinnaana and also arise are ruupa which are all kaamaja ruupa at patisandhi moment. The problem is the word patisandhi. It is actual moment of total start of a life and it is not 'baby-birth' or anything like that. Unlike human beings who are gabbhaseyyaka (womb-born) beings deva beings are all opapaatika (arise in mature form) beings. This means as soon as one of 8 mahaavipaaka cittas arises as patisandhi vinnaana of deva being there also arise naama of 4 vipaaka naamakkhandhaa and ruupa of full-blown matured deva beings. The same applis to b) group of patisandhi where all 5 ruupavipaaka cittas are patisandhi vinnaanas of brahma beings. As soon as these 5 ruupavipaaka vinnaana arise there also arise naama-ruupam. That is 4 vipaaka-naamakkhandhas along with ruupa of brahmaa beings. The third group is not according to normal description of D.O. That is vinnaana paccayaa naama-ruupam. Instead it is 'vinnaana paccayaa naamam'. Because there is no ruupa at all in aruupa brahmaa bhuumis. Aruupa brahmaa beings do not have any form of ruupa. Once in a group, I asked a question and there was no answer. The question was directed to the writer of a message. He wrote that aruupa brahmaa can have ruupa if they wish. This is not so. May you be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts on Dhamma Thread. Any adding, any correction, any support will be very helpful for all. 55382 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 3:31am Subject: [dsg] Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 372- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (k) htootintnaing --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: .... > > If I write on 'systematic attention' will you both be saying I > am promoting 'self'? .... S: Quite likely:-))) ... --------------------------------------------------------------------- - Htoo: Dear Sarah, Why 'Quite likely:-)))' ? I just re-write what Nina write. So if this is 'Quite likely' then all DSGs will also be 'Quite likely'. Because Sujin, Nina, Sarah all seem a single clone. With much respect, Htoo Naing 55383 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 3:34am Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 645 ) htootintnaing Dear Dhamma Friends, 'Vi~n~naana paccayaa naama-ruupam'. There are 19 vipaaka vinnaanas, which can serve as patisandhi vinnaanas. Because of arising of these 19 patisandhi vinnaanas there have to arise patisandhi-naama and patisandhi-ruupa. All these have been explained. Again these these 19 vinnaanas can also give rise to other effects apart from patisandhi naama and patisandhi ruupa. They can give rise to their results also in the course of life. Examples cittas are tadaarammana cittas or retention consciousness and bhavanga cittas or life continuing consciousness and cuti citta or life-ending consciousness. The exception is that there are 9 vipaaka cittas that can never do the job of tadaarammana or retention consciousness. They are ruupavipaaka cittas and aruupavipaaka cittas. Because they are consciousness of ruupa-brahmaa and aruupa-brahmaa, who never have tadaarammana or retention consciousness. When they arise in the course of life they also support or condition naama and ruupa. So it is true that vinnaana paccayaa naama-ruupam. Apart from 19 patisandhi vinnaanas there are other vipaaka vinnaanas that cannot be patisandhi vinnaanas but they can still be vinnaanas in the course of life. They also condition naama-ruupam to arise. There are 32 vipaaka vinnaanas. 19 have been explained. There left (32-19=13) 13 vinnaanas. These 13 vinnaanas are 10 panca-vinnaana cittas and other three vinnaanas. These 3 vinnaanas are 2 sampaticchana cittas or 2 receiving consciousness and 1 santirana citta, which is somanassa santirana citta of kusala orogin. 10 vinnaana cittas are 2 seeing-consciousness, 2 hearing- consciousness, 2 smelling-consciousness, 2 tasting-consciousness, and 2 touching- consciousness. Other 3 vinnaana cittas do the job of manovinnaanas. Among them somanassa santiirana is true manovinnaana cittas in terms of dhaatu. But 2 receiving consciousness are mano-dhaatu rather than mano- vinnaana-dhaatu. Mano-dhaatu is mind-element and mano-vinnaana- dhaatu is mind-consciousness-element. They also condition naama-ruupam to arise. So vinnaana paccayaa naama-ruupam. May you be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts on Dhamma Thread. Any adding, any correction, any support will be very helpful for all. 55384 From: "Joop" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 4:57am Subject: Re: Concepts and other irrealities (4) jwromeijn --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Joop" wrote: > > To all, interested in the two levels of truth > I hope the (absent) mods will not be to negative about my long quote, I really think this essay of Karunadasa can give DSG a new impulse. Metta Joop Karunadasa: "The Dhamma Theory; Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma", " III. PANNATTI AND THE TWO TRUTHS (continued 1) " … Another noteworthy characteristic of pannattis is that they cannot be described either as conditioned (sankhata) or as unconditioned (asankhata), for they do not possess their own-nature (sabhava) to be so described.122 Since the two categories of the conditioned and the unconditioned comprise all realities, the description of pannattis as exempt from these two categories is another way of underscoring their unreality. What the foregoing observations amount to is that while a dhamma is a truly existent thing (sabhavasiddha), a pannatti is a thing merely conceptualized (parikappasiddha).123 The former is an existent verifiable by its own distinctive intrinsic characteristic,124 but the latter, being a product of the mind's synthetic function, exists only by virtue of thought. It is a mental construct superimposed on things and hence possesses no objective counterpart. It is the imposition of oneness on what actually is a complex (samuhekaggahana) that gives rise to pannattis.125 With the dissolution of the appearance of unity (ghana-vinibbhoga),126 the oneness disappears and the complex nature is disclosed: Thus as when the component parts such as axles, wheels, frame, poles, etc., are arranged in a certain way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage "chariot," yet in the ultimate sense, when each part is examined, there is no chariot, and just as when the component parts of a house such as wattles, etc., are placed so that they enclose a space in a certain way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage "house," yet in the ultimate sense there is no house, and just as when trunk, branches, foliage, etc., are placed in a certain way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage "tree," yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is examined, there is no tree, so too, when there are the five aggregates (as objects) of clinging, there comes to be the mere term of common usage "a being," "a person," yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is examined, there is no being as a basis for the assumption "I am" or "I." 127 In a similar way should be understood the imposition of oneness on what is complex. Two kinds of pannatti are distinguished. One is called nama-pannatti and the other attha-pannatti. The first refers to names, words, signs, or symbols through which things, real or unreal, are designated: "It is the mere mode of recognizing (sannakaramatta) by way of this or that word whose significance is determined by worldly convention." 128 It is created by worldly consent (lokasanketa- nimmita) and established by worldly usage (lokavoharena siddha).129 The other, called attha-pannatti, refers to ideas, notions, or concepts corresponding to the names, words, signs, or symbols. It is produced by the interpretative function of the mind (kappana) and is based on the various forms or appearances presented by the real elements when they are in particular situations or positions (avattha- visesa).130 Both nama-pannatti and attha-pannatti thus have a psychological origin and as such both are devoid of objective reality. Nama-pannatti is often defined as that which makes known (pannapanato pannatti) and attha-pannatti as that which is made known (pannapiyatta pannatti).131 The former is an instance of agency definition (kattu-sadhana) and the latter of object definition (kamma- sadhana). What both attempt to show is that nama-pannatti which makes attha-pannatti known, and attha-pannatti which is made known by nama- pannatti, are mutually inter-dependent and therefore logically inseparable. This explains the significance of another definition which states that nama-pannatti is the term's relationship with the ideas (saddassa atthehi sambandho) and that attha-pannatti is the idea's relationship with the terms (atthassa saddehi sambandho).132 These two pairs of definition show that the two processes of conceptualization and verbalization through the symbolic medium of language are but two separate aspects of the same phenomenon. It is for the convenience of definition that what really amounts to a single phenomenon is treated from two different angles, which represent two ways of looking at the same thing. The difference is established by defining the same word, pannatti, in two different ways. When it is defined as subject it is nama- pannatti -- the concept as name. When it is defined as object it is attha-pannatti -- the concept as meaning. If the former is that which expresses (vacaka), the latter is that which is expressible (vacaniya).133 In this same sense, if the former is abhidhana, the latter is abhidheya.134 Since attha-pannatti stands for the process of conceptualization it represents more the subjective and dynamic aspect, and since nama-pannatti stands for the process of verbalization it represents more the objective and static aspect. For the assignment of a term to what is constructed in thought -- in other words, its expression through the symbolic medium of language -- invests it with some kind of relative permanence and objectivity. It is, so to say, crystallized into an entity. Now the definition of attha-pannatti as that which is made known by nama-pannatti gives rise to the question as to what its position is in relation to the real existents (dhammas). For if the real existents, too, can be made known (= attha-pannatti), on what basis are the two categories, the real and conceptual, to be distinguished? What should not be overlooked here is that according to its very definition attha-pannatti exists by virtue of its being conceived (parikappiyamana) and expressed (pannapiyamana). Hence it is incorrect to explain attha-pannatti as that which is conceptualizable and expressible, for its very existence stems from the act of being conceptualized and expressed. This rules out the possibility of its existing without being conceptualized and expressed. In the case of the dhammas or real existents the situation is quite different. While they can be made known by nama-pannatti, their existence is not dependent on their being known or conceptualized. Where such a real existent is made known by a nama-pannatti, the latter is called vijjamana-pannatti,135 because it represents something that exists in the real and ultimate sense (paramatthato). And the notion or concept (= attha-pannatti) corresponding to it is called tajja-pannatti, the verisimilar or appropriate concept.136 This does not mean that the real existent has transformed itself into a concept. It only means that a concept corresponding to it has been established. If the doctrine of dhammas led to its ancillary theory of pannatti as discussed above, both in turn led to another development, i.e. the distinction drawn between two kinds of truth as sammuti-sacca (conventional truth) and paramattha-sacca (absolute truth). Although this distinction is an Abhidhammic innovation it is not completely dissociated from the early Buddhist teachings. For the antecedent trends that led to its formulation can be traced to the early Buddhist scriptures themselves. One such instance is the distinction drawn in the Anguttara Nikaya between nitattha and neyyattha.137 The former refers to those statements which have their meaning "drawn out" (nita-attha), i.e. to be taken as they stand, as explicit and definitive statements. The latter refers to those statements which require their meaning "to be drawn out" (neyya-attha). The distinction alluded to here may be understood in a broad way to mean the difference between the direct and the indirect meaning. The distinction is so important that to overlook it is to misrepresent the teachings of the Buddha: "Whoever declares a discourse with a meaning already drawn out as a discourse with a meaning to be drawn out and (conversely) whoever declares a discourse with a meaning to be drawn out as a discourse with a meaning already drawn out, such a one makes a false statement with regard to the Blessed One." 138 It seems very likely that this distinction between nitattha and neyyattha has provided a basis for the emergence of the subsequent doctrine of double truth. In point of fact, the commentary to the Anguttara Nikaya seeks to establish a correspondence between the original sutta-passage and the Theravada version of the two kinds of truth.139 One interesting feature in the Theravada version of the theory is the use of the term sammuti for relative truth. For in all other schools of Buddhist thought the term used is satv¤ti. The difference is not simply that between Pali and Sanskrit, for the two terms differ both in etymology and meaning. The term sammuti is derived from the root man, to think, and when prefixed with sam it means consent, convention, general agreement. On the other hand, the term satvati is derived from the root va, to cover, and when prefixed with sam it means covering, concealment. This difference is not confined to the vocabulary of the theory of double truth alone. That elsewhere, too, Sanskrit satvati corresponds to Pali sammuti is confirmed by other textual instances.140 Since sammuti refers to convention or general agreement, sammuti-sacca means truth based on convention or general agreement. On the other hand, the idea behind satvati-satya is that which covers up the true nature of things and makes them appear otherwise.141 55385 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 0:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 2/2/06 12:40:59 AM Eastern Standard Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Things, events, associations, and people are all visible data at least. ----------------------------------------- Howard: No, they aren't, Larry. They are mentally imposed/imputed upon a basis of a collection of visible data and other sense-door data. ---------------------------------------- > It seems very very strange, Howard, to say life is only a word. > --------------------------------------- Howard: There is no life per se to be found, to be literal. However, there is a huge multitude of actual phenomena, past and present, that serve as the basis for our thinking about "my life" or "a life" or just plain "life", and using these labels. And, yes, it IS very strange! It is not how we normally think, and it goes against the grain. ------------------------------------------ When I> > am thirsty I want a certain collection of body sensations in my mouth > and down my throat. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Sure. And the thirst, quite real, is at the center of the particular desert scenario I've been writing about. ------------------------------------------ Body sensations are realities. If words didn't refer> > to realities they would be meaningless. Give me a word that doesn't > refer to a reality. ------------------------------------------ Howard: Here are two: 'Larry' and 'Howard'. ------------------------------------------ > > Larry > ==================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55386 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 0:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts upasaka_howard Hi, TG - In a message dated 2/2/06 2:00:07 AM Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: > > Hi Howard > > The Buddha defined 3 types of craving. Craving arises due to feeling (12 > fold chain). > > The 3 cravings directly correspond to the 3 types of feelings... > > When one has a painful feeling, one craves the "end" of that feeling -- > vibhava-tanha. > When one has a pleasant feeling, one craves the "continuance" of that > feeling -- bhava-tanha. > When one has a neither painful or pleasant feeling one craves "sense > pleasure" -- kama-tanha. > > Now, whether you agree with my "feeling-->craving" analysis, craving does > arise due to feeling according to the Buddha. ------------------------------------------ Howard: There is no question that feeling is a requisite condition for craving. But that is not the same as saying that it is *merely* the feeling (or a thought-of increase of that feeling) that is craved. Sometimes the feeling is craved, sometime its cessation. Sometimes the (apparent) cause of the feeling is craved, sometimes its cessation. The matter is not simple. The feeling is the central causative factor, but it is not always the object of desire or aversion, at least not solely. ------------------------------------------ > > Couple more points below... > > > In a message dated 2/1/2006 10:34:58 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, > upasaka@... writes: > > I do understand your point, TG, and I see validity in it. On the other > hand, I don't believe our desert friend is merely thinking about that oasis > > and picturing getting there and drinking the water. He *wants* to get > there, > he > *wants* to see the cool water, he *wants* to put his hands into it, to cup > them, and to gulp down that water, soothing his parched throat and ending > his > thirst. It's not just that last that he craves. It is a whole scenario. > And even if it were just the quenching of the thirst that he wanted, > that quenching is not in existence, but only the idea of it is, and thus it > > is > *still* not an existing paramattha dhamma that is the object of craving or > attachment, but the thought of such. In fact, all craving and attachment is > > a > craving for something nonexistent and an attachment to an idea! > TG: I think what is being craved by fantasies is the sensual experience of > > the mind that the fantasy triggers. --------------------------------------- Howard: I agree that this lies at the core. -------------------------------------- That experience is essential an > > "escapism" from affliction. Again, I would say that the fantasies are > mental > formations....and although the mind isn't necessarily intentionally craving > mental > formations, that is in fact what gets craved. ----------------------------------------- Howard: We're getting closer on this, TG. ----------------------------------------- > > > > Language confuses things at times. If I say I want something, that > says something about my current thought and emotive processes. It often > doesn't > say that there *is* such a thing and that I want it. If I want to go on a > trip > to Italy, what is the object that I want? There is no such thing as a "trip > > to > Italy" as a paramattha dhamma, and certainly none that currently exists > here > and now. When I want to go on a trip to Italy, I am engaging in a process > of > thought and emotion. That's the whole story. > > TG: No doubt we are filled with delusion....a mental formation that indeed > > is part and parcel of craving. But I don't think the mind craves for > things > that aren't real...it just thinks it does. ;-) -------------------------------------- Howard: That thinking is quite sufficient for the craving. The role of thinking in craving is *major*! That is 90% of the matter of emotional papanca. ------------------------------------- > > > > With metta, > Howard > > > TG > ===================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 55387 From: TGrand458@... Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 3:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts TGrand458@... In a message dated 2/2/2006 6:28:14 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Howard: That thinking is quite sufficient for the craving. The role of thinking in craving is *major*! That is 90% of the matter of emotional papanca. Hi Howard I would say that fundamentally, thinking is not a cause of craving, it is the result of craving. I think attachment associated with thinking would probably be better classified as holding/grasping -- upadana. Craving leads to thinking. Thinking leads to quests. Quests lead to new contacts. New contacts lead to new feelings. New feelings lead to new cravings. And the cycle continues. I believe the role of thinking is that of attempting to satisfy craving. However, because of continuous new contacts, many instigated as a result of thinking --> quests: craving continues instigating a journey. As new contacts lead to new feelings, perception, mental formations; the foundation for thinking becomes more diverse. The result is thinking spreads out...like ever expanding branches on a tree. And because thinking does not satisfy craving, the process is unending unless another (successful) approach to end craving is found. TG 55388 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 10:52am Subject: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 373- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (l) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== [Ch22 -Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 contd] In the following sutta we read that systematic attention (wise attention) conditions the arising of the “limbs of wisdom” which, if they have arisen, by cultivation go to fulfilment. The “limbs of wisdom”, which are also called the “factors of enlightenment” (bojjhangas), are: mindfulness, investigation of Dhamma (dhamma-vicaya), energy, rapture, tranquillity, concentration and equanimity. Further on, in the same section (§8), we read again about the hindrances which weaken insight and about the “limbs of wisdom” which conduce to realizing the fruits of liberation by knowledge. We read: * Now, monks, at the time when the ariyan disciple makes the Dhamma his object, gives attention to it, with all his mind considers it, with ready ear listens to the Dhamma,—at such a time these five hindrances do not exist in him; at such a time the seven limbs of wisdom by cultivation go to fulfilment." * This sutta reminds us of the great value of listening to the Dhamma and carefully and thoroughly considering it, in order to be able to apply it. The hindrances are eradicated at different stages of enlightenment. The magga-citta of the sotåpanna eradicates doubt. Since the sotåpanna has no more wrong view and sees realities as they are, there cannot be any doubt about them. The magga-citta of the anågåmí eradicates sensuous desire, ill-will and regret. The magga-citta of the arahat eradicates sloth and torpor, restlessness and ignorance. The arahat is free of all the hindrances. Defilements can only be eradicated stage by stage because they are so deeply rooted. ***** (Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 to be continued) Metta, Sarah ====== 55389 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 11:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 372- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (k) sarahprocter... Hi Htoo, --- htootintnaing wrote: > > If I write on 'systematic attention' will you both be saying I > > am promoting 'self'? > .... > S: Quite likely:-))) > ... > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > - > Htoo: > > Dear Sarah, > > Why 'Quite likely:-)))' ? > > I just re-write what Nina write. So if this is 'Quite likely' then > all DSGs will also be 'Quite likely'. Because Sujin, Nina, Sarah all > seem a single clone. .... S: Oops! Apologies for being so flippant. It was just a silly joke in my rush. Now I'm up at 3am (!) ready for our trip and I can give it a little more 'wise attention' I hope before leaving my computer. In the text from Cetasikas given, it was a translation ('Monks, in him who practises unsystematic attention....') given. In context, it clearly refers to ayoniso manasikaara as a condition for the arising of the hindrances without any 'self' involved. If you, I or anyone else writes about 'systematic attention' in the sense of following a special practise or 'DOING' something to avoid akusala, then there is likely to be some 'promotion of self', don't you think? Back to the text, of course it depends how one understands the words 'in him who practises unsystematic attention.....'. B.Bodhi in his translation gives 'when one attends carelessly, unarisen sensual desire arises and expands; unarisen ill will and arisen ill will increases and expands'. (and so so for the other hindrances) I’ve just checked the Pali: Ayoniso bhikkave, manasikaroto anuppanno ceva kaamacchando uppajjati, uppanno ca kaamacchando bhiyyobhaavaavaya vepullaava sa.myvattati. Could we say, ‘when there is unwise attention (ayoniso manasikaara), sense desire, ill-will (and so on) are bound to arise and increase.....’ No one, no practicing, but no need to get hung up on the use of conventional language in translations either:-). Htoo, I’ll look f/w to anymore of your input and apologies again if I my silly comment gave any offence. Metta, Sarah ======== 55390 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 11:45am Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta sarahprocter... Hi Charles Cherry*, > op 31-01-2006 11:40 schreef Charles op cherry_avium@...: > > > That's the definition of dhamma in abhidhamma. The word dhamma itself > > has many definitions. Why dont we try to look it from another side. . .... S: see Useful Posts, scroll down to 'Dhamma - meanings' ... > Ch: The whole satipatthana itself has as the object the pancakkhanda. > > N: The reason is that satipatthana does not have nibbaana as object, it > is > mundane, not lokuttara. ... S: To elaborate, satipatthana refers to the understanding and awareness of pancakkhandha as you say, one at a time. At moments of enlightenment, the dhamma or element of nibbana is the object of the lokuttara cittas with wisdom. Sabbe dhamma anatta. Not just sankhara dhamma. We had some detailed discussions on this before as well, but it was quite a while back.... Metta, Sarah * 'Cherry' seems popular, so I think it's here to stay:-). ========= 55391 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 0:15pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta sarahprocter... Hi Charles Cherry, Hi Cherry, Look at U Silananda’s comments in the first link and Nyantiloka’s in the second under ‘sabbe dhamma anatta’ http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/18228 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/48150 Btw, a useful resource for the searching the archives of this group is to go to www.dhammastudygroup.org and to key in the search phrase in ‘google’ there at the top. I just did this for ‘sabbe dhamma anatta’. You get several entries, click on ‘cache’ for the first two or three and scroll down quickly to the most colourful entries. Try others if you have time too! Metta, Sarah ======== 55393 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 2:09pm Subject: [dsg] Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 372- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (k) htootintnaing Dear Sarah, At this time you might be on your trip. But you can check anyway as the world is advanced. :-)) When I read your message I was laughing because of you. I am not king of the square ring but I am a real student of dhamma while many think I am an advanced abhidhammist. Thank you very much for setting up of this group and a good maintenance. I also thank A Sujin and Nina for their incomparable work in dhamma. I am a real student of dhamma. You may remember dhammayatana and how silly I was, ha ha ha ha. I have just been investigating what I have studied. There is no self from the start. If *doing* invlove self it is wrong. If *practice* involves self it is wrong. I have collected a number of errors that were made. First I thought it would be good to post. But later I changed my mind and I cleared them from my mind. Examples; rupa and naama combination. Sense 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 are OK. But when sense 6 arrive still someone wrote the object is ruupa and consciousness to that object of sense 6 is naama. With deepest respect, Htoo Naing -------------------------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > Hi Htoo, > > --- htootintnaing wrote: > > > If I write on 'systematic attention' will you both be saying I > > > am promoting 'self'? > > .... > > S: Quite likely:-))) > > ... > > ----------------------------------------------------------------- ---- > > - > > Htoo: > > > > Dear Sarah, > > > > Why 'Quite likely:-)))' ? > > > > I just re-write what Nina write. So if this is 'Quite likely' then > > all DSGs will also be 'Quite likely'. Because Sujin, Nina, Sarah all > > seem a single clone. > .... > S: Oops! Apologies for being so flippant. It was just a silly joke in my > rush. Now I'm up at 3am (!) ready for our trip and I can give it a little > more 'wise attention' I hope before leaving my computer. > > In the text from Cetasikas given, it was a translation ('Monks, in him who > practises unsystematic attention....') given. In context, it clearly > refers to ayoniso manasikaara as a condition for the arising of the > hindrances without any 'self' involved. > > If you, I or anyone else writes about 'systematic attention' in the sense > of following a special practise or 'DOING' something to avoid akusala, > then there is likely to be some 'promotion of self', don't you think? > > Back to the text, of course it depends how one understands the words 'in > him who practises unsystematic attention.....'. > > B.Bodhi in his translation gives 'when one attends carelessly, unarisen > sensual desire arises and expands; unarisen ill will and arisen ill will > increases and expands'. (and so so for the other hindrances) > > I've just checked the Pali: > > Ayoniso bhikkave, manasikaroto anuppanno ceva kaamacchando uppajjati, > uppanno ca kaamacchando bhiyyobhaavaavaya vepullaava sa.myvattati. > > Could we say, `when there is unwise attention (ayoniso manasikaara), sense > desire, ill-will (and so on) are bound to arise and increase.....' > > No one, no practicing, but no need to get hung up on the use of > conventional language in translations either:-). > > Htoo, I'll look f/w to anymore of your input and apologies again if I my > silly comment gave any offence. > > Metta, > > Sarah > ======== > 55394 From: "htootintnaing" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 2:27pm Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 646 ) htootintnaing Dear Dhamma Friends, 'Vi~n~naana paccayaa naama-ruupam'. Many vinnaanas have been discussed in connection with Dependent Origination. Avijjaa (ignorance) paccayaa(conditions) sankhaara (formation). Sankhaara(formation) paccayaa(conditions) vinnaana (consciousness). Vinnaana(consciousness) paccayaa(conditions) naama- ruupam (mentality-materiality). Avijja (ignorance) has been discussed. Sankhaara have also been discussed. Because of sankhaara or formation there have to arise vinnaanas or consciousness. There are 89 vinnaanas or 89 consciousness. Are all these 89 consciousness or vinnaana conditioned by sankhaara, which again is conditioned by avijjaa? Fruition-consciousness or phala cittas are not conditioned by avijjaa, sankhaara. Path-consciousness or magga cittas are not conditioned by avijjaa, sankhaara. And there are many other consciousness that are not of the output of avijjaa, sankhaara. There are 12 akusala cittas or 12 unwholesome consciousness. They are not vinnaanas of Dependent Origination. But they have cetanaa cetasika when they arise and this cetanaa is main culprit of all actions or formations or sankhaara. So they are 'sankhaara of D.O' rather than 'vinnaanas of D.O'. But one needs to be careful that implication is not the same as cetana is cetasika and 12 akusala cittas are cittas, which are also known as vinnaanas. If just one citta is considered in these 12 akusala cittas it is not linear but it is conditional. Example a lobha citta arises. It is because of avijja. In that citta moha already exists. Because of avijjaa there have to arise sankhaara (cetanaa). Cetana also arises at the very same time. Because of sankhaara (cetanaa) there has to arise vinnaana (akusala citta or lobha citta). Here just a moment already include 1.avijjaa, 2.sankhaara, 3.vinnaana. When this lobha citta arises there also arise cittaja ruupa and cetasikas along with lobha citta. So naama-ruupa also arise at the very same moment. So the example is 'arising of a single moment of lobha citta'. At that time there are_ 1.avijjaa, 2.sankhaara, 3. vinnaana, 4. naama-ruupa. But 'naama-ruupa paccayaa salaayatanaa' does not apply in this case. Because lobha citta does not condition '6-sense-base' to arise. I do not believe moment to moment paticcasamuppaada. Any thought? May you be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts on Dhamma Thread. Any adding, any correction, any support will be very helpful for all. 55395 From: LBIDD@... Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 4:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] clinging to concepts lbidd2 Larry: "Give me a word that doesn't refer to a reality." ------------------------------------------ Howard: "Here are two: 'Larry' and 'Howard'. Hi Howard, I thought you would give me something difficult like"if" or "yesterday". Each of the two names refer to the 5 khandhas. Self view is a wrong view of the 5 khandhas, not a wrong view of an idea. If there is no khandha there is no self view. Can you think of Larry or Howard without thinking of realities? Larry ps: I'm leaning more toward the idea that pa~n~natti (ideas, etc.) belong in the 5 khandhas, but that's a secondary issue. 55396 From: LBIDD@... Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 4:44pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 370- Different Groups of Defilements Part 2 (i) lbidd2 Htoo: "Dear Larry, You said 'Hindrance can *only arise* without meditation.' Did you mean 'Hindrance cannot arise with meditation'?" Hi Htoo, Yes, that's my understanding. How do you see it? Larry 55397 From: LBIDD@... Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 4:49pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concepts and other irrealities (3) lbidd2 Joop: "To all, interested in the two levels of truth In the first message of this serie about the two levels of realities I only mentioned the essay of Karunadasa. (#55304 and #55311) But after reading it again I'm convinced that the Dhamma Study in the DSG can use texts of other Pali and Abhidhamma scholars than usually are quoted. For that reason in this and the next message parts of the essay "The Dhamma Theory; Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma" by Y. Karunadasa (Wheel Publication No. 412/413) www.abhidhamma.org/dhamma_theory_philosophical_corn.htm: Hi Joop, Why don't you focus on one or two points and then offer your own view. That would be easier to respond to. Larry 55398 From: "Charles" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 5:22pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott < sarahprocterabbott@...> wrote: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/18228 > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/48150 Dear Sarah, I must say that I'm feeling disappointed. From the first time I post the meaning of anatta, there's no reasoning back, only replies saying that the dhamma means both sankhara and asankara. I have put the reasons for my argument, I have read the U Silananda review (it's just the same telling that the dhamma = sankara + asakhara). If you just please read my quote from Ven. Mahasi explanation, and please if you could give the reasoning back why would nibbana be classified as anatta. But please do not tell me again that dhamma here means sakhara + asakhara, I have known that. I am asking about why is the dhamma there defined as sankhara + asakhara? Just because in abhidhamma it is defined that way. Then I would assume that you're being side-minded here. 55399 From: "Charles" Date: Thu Feb 2, 2006 5:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Meaning of dhamma in sabbe dhamma anatta cherry_avium --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott < sarahprocterabbott@...> wrote: > Sabbe dhamma anatta. Not just sankhara dhamma. Hi Sarah, From the single line of sabbe dhamma anatta, how can you assume that the definition of dhamma there is sankara + asankhara. How can you ignore the full sutta like the anattalakkhana sutta in spite of a single poem which itself is a poem which may means different from the words being written?