#61000 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 9:18 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Howard (and Ken), I hope you both don't mind if I respond to the statement below, I'm just trying to think something through: H: "BTW, I'm not fond of using 'satipatthana', which means 'establishing of mindfulness' or 'foundation of mindfulness' or 'setting forth of mindfulness', as a substitute for 'pa~n~na'. I've wondered about this, not so much, as Howard notes, regarding the use of satipa.t.thaana "as a substitute for 'pa~n~na,'" which Ken can address if he wishes, but in the sense of how it is often noted that satipa.t.thaana "arises." I think this is relevant to the thread since knowledge of the difference between naama and ruupa is said to come via satipa.t.thaana. Nyanaponika notes that satipa.t.thaana means "literally awareness of mindfulness." The PTS PED suggests "setting up mindfulness" as a definition. I can see how this latter is derived since the same source defines "pa.t.thaana" as "setting forth" or "putting forward." The difference between the use of "setting up" and "awareness of" in relation to mindfulness is significant, in my opinion. It seems that a person would be the one "setting up mindfulness;" when one says "awareness of mindfulness" a certain impersonality is preserved in the definition which favours "anatta-thinking." I've gotten the impression, learning about things, that satipa.t.thaana is "a practise," implying something one does. This sort of thinking about it is just a developmental phase, I realise. The PTS PED further defines satipa.t.thaana as "intense concentration, earnest thought, [and] application of mindfulness." From the same source, breaking down the compound, "sati" is "memory, recognition, consciousness, intentness of mind, wakefulness of mind, altertness, lucidity of mind, self possession, conscience, [and] self-consciousness." Nyanaponika defines sati simply as "mindfulness," but then goes on to elaborate that it is a "mental factor...inseparably associated with all kammically wholesome (kusula) and kammically produced lofty (sobhana) consciousness." As a mental factor then, the notion that one can, by will, produce sati, or by extension, satipa.t.thaana, seems unlikely. To me, this would support the claim found in the famous "party line" that satipa.t.thaana has either to arise or not. I'd appreciate some assistance in this but I don't see where "satipa.t.thaana" is listed amongst the 52 mental factors; "sati" is, however. How is one to understand the relationship between "sati" as an "official" mental factor, and "satipa.t.thaana" as an "unofficial" mental factor? What sort of arising is satipa.t.thaana? Is it a momentary precursor to sati-proper, a sort of moment which ensues just prior to sati arising? In this case, is it, as Nyanaponika may be suggesting, an awareness of being mindful? Phenomenologically and for example, when I am walking somewhere, say at work, and the idea of satipa.t.thaana comes to mind, I suddenly am aware that, prior to that thought, I had not been "aware." I notice the difference between my experience just prior to the thought and the experience now. I sort of experience an openness to experience and a sense of sounds, sights, thoughts, emotions, etc. The world feels somewhat more spacious or some such. I experience thinking like, "Oh I've not been mindful," or, "Oh yeah, mindfulness," or something like that. And then I go on to pay attention to what I see and hear and think, etc, but with the sense that there is an observing in place. Would it be fair to say that the moment of satipa.t.thaana arises just prior to my catching up with it in the form of a thought about the concept satipa.t.thaana? Would it be fair, then and as well, to say that what ensues are moments of sati proper arising until something else arises to derail these moments? Please, and hopefully this was not too long, can I get some correction on this? With loving kindness, Scott. #61001 From: Ken O Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 10:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) ashkenn2k Hi Howard > ======================= > Okay, I understand you. But what I had said was that > remembering an object or aspects of the mindstate that took that dhamma as an object is not knowing that object now. Remembering it, no matter how clearly, is not knowing it because it does not exist. What is known must exist. In the case of recalling a bodily sensation, for example, what is known now is a mind-door phenomenon, > a memory, and no longer the original sensation, because that > original sensation does not exist - it is gone! ------------------- k: Maybe the wording of citta becomes an object of another citta is not properly explain. When a citta becomes an object, it does not meant the citta still exist. It is the experiencing of the mindstate (cittas and cetasikas) that has become the object of the next citta. Just like a strong liking of an object, the pleasant feelings can be an object for a numerous citta process. Even though the previous pleasant feeling has fallen away, the experiencing of the pleasant object has become a strong paccaya for the subsequent mental process. It becomes an object for the subsequent mental process. Cheers Ken O #61002 From: Ken O Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 10:37 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles ashkenn2k Hi Joop Do take a break. When I first started the path, it was a grueling process and reading many dhamma books does not make it better. In fact it become worse because a lot of views were written by many different people and it is easy to get lost. Please do come back at times and say hello. Here in DSG, we treasure friendship and there will be dhamma friends around to discuss dhammas. It does not matter that we agree or we do not, what matters is that dhamma is shared and learn with each other. Cheers Ken O #61003 From: "jonoabb" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 10:43 am Subject: Re: [dsg] sabhaava jonoabb Hi Nina (and Howard) --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Hi Howard, > I like your remarks, especially what you said as to different > characteristics that are distinguishable. > They are distinguishable. Then you say: no one confuses... Yes, I do! > Not in theory, but I am not sure when nama appears and when rupa, at > this moment. I mix up nama and rupa. My own thoughts exactly! When we feel hungry we may not know whether it is nama or rupa that appears at a given moment. When there is pain (rupa) and aversion to the pain (nama), we are not always clear which is which. Then we also mix up namas (take one kind of nama for another). We may not distinguish clearly dosa from unpleasant feeling. Also, we mix up rupas (take one kind of rupas for another). For example, we take the unpleasant body-sense experience that sometimes accompanies hearing (a loud sound) or seeing (glare in the eyes) as part of the audible or visible object. Lots of confusion, even for something as basic as nama and rupa ;-)) Jon #61004 From: "jonoabb" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 10:40 am Subject: [dsg] Ignorance ( was Re: Cetasikas study corner 433 ) jonoabb Hi Daniel --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Daniel wrote: > > Hi all, > ... > My opinion is that it is a nice argument that the brain is only ruupa, therefore > it can no more "experience" than a finger can experience. But on the other hand, > we might say that the brain causes experience, which is something else. > > I think there > is an additional complication here because we tend to think of the problem in > two ways : either there is a non-material I which "has" the quality of > experiencing, either there is a sort of material I which is the brain which > also "has" the experience. Buddhism doesn't agree with either, as far as I > understand because of the annata idea.Some day I hope I will manage to > understand not only what buddhism does not say, but also what it does say... :) I agree with what you say here, but would just add that the 2 ways of thinking you give are only part of the story; we think of things in many different ways, of which the 2 are a good representation. The other problem can be to think that because we have read, understood and accepted the teachings we no longer have these kind of thoughts. In my case at least they are deeply rooted and manage to manifest in a variety of subtle and not so subtle ways. Jon #61005 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 11:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) nilovg Hi Howard (and Scott), Lodewijk said that you raise a real problem, he can understand what you mean. It deserves an explanation. But then he said that one should not reason too much about it. Dosa has fallen away, but since cittas arise and fall away extremely rapidly for all practical purposes, the characteristic of dosa can be understood. Let me give a similar example, that of the experience of visible object that has just fallen away. The eye-door process falls away and then visible object is experienced through the mind-door just after it has fallen away. We do not count processes, or try to find out which visible object appears in which process. Certainly it impinges again and again. But there is its characteristic appearing just now. No need to reason about it. Seeing sees visible object now, that is what counts. In the suttas we read: the monk knows that he has dosa or that he does not have dosa. It is not noticing, everybody can say that he knows or notices this. No, it is understanding (pajanati), knowing with insight. For example, Kindred Sayings IV, 138, Is there a method: Note: seeing with the eyeof wisdom, with insight. We can begin to be aware of lobha and dosa, but after the first stage of insight paññaa can understand these realities more precisely. If we think that we can never be aware of akusala that has just fallen away, enlightenment cannot be attained. We shall keep on taking dhammas for self, instead of understanding them, also akusala, as just dhamma. As to three meanings of satipa.t.thaana, this is also for Scott: In the “Papañcasúdaní”, Commentary to the Satipaììhånasutta, and in the Commentary to the Book of Analysis, the Dispeller of Delusion (I, Ch 7, A. Suttanta Division) it is said: “...There are three kinds of foundation of mindfulness, satipaììhåna: 1. the domain of mindfulness (sati gocaro) 2. the Master’s threefold surpassing of resentment and gratification (delight) as regards the entry of his disciples [on the way of practice] . 3. mindfulness (sati). As to the domain of mindfulness, sati gocara, this refers to the object of sati, that is: the body, feelings, cittas, dhammas. As to mindfulness, sati, this refers to sati cetasika that is aware of the characteristics of realities. > When we refer to sati of satipa.t.thaana it is direct awareness and understanding of a reality. As to the Abhidhamma, Lodewijk said that he has no doubt that this is the Buddha's teaching. See my recent post to Rob M. Nina. Op 1-jul-2006, om 23:32 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > When > > dosa has fallen away as Ken H explained, citta with sati sampajañña > > arising shortly afterwards in another process can be aware of it. > > > ====================== > I don't believe it, Nina. There is no knowing of what does not exist. > There is remembering it, but that is not the same. #61006 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 6:56 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Scott (and Ken) - In a message dated 7/2/06 12:19:28 PM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > Dear Howard (and Ken), > > I hope you both don't mind if I respond to the statement below, I'm > just trying to think something through: > > H: "BTW, I'm not fond of using 'satipatthana', which means > 'establishing of mindfulness' or 'foundation of mindfulness' or > 'setting forth of mindfulness', as a substitute for 'pa~n~na'. > > I've wondered about this, not so much, as Howard notes, regarding the > use of satipa.t.thaana "as a substitute for 'pa~n~na,'" which Ken can > address if he wishes, but in the sense of how it is often noted that > satipa.t.thaana "arises." I think this is relevant to the thread > since knowledge of the difference between naama and ruupa is said to > come via satipa.t.thaana. > > Nyanaponika notes that satipa.t.thaana means "literally awareness of > mindfulness." The PTS PED suggests "setting up mindfulness" as a > definition. I can see how this latter is derived since the same > source defines "pa.t.thaana" as "setting forth" or "putting forward." > The difference between the use of "setting up" and "awareness of" in > relation to mindfulness is significant, in my opinion. > > It seems that a person would be the one "setting up mindfulness;" when > one says "awareness of mindfulness" a certain impersonality is > preserved in the definition which favours "anatta-thinking." I've > gotten the impression, learning about things, that satipa.t.thaana is > "a practise," implying something one does. This sort of thinking > about it is just a developmental phase, I realise. -------------------------------------- Howard: Setting up of mindfulness (if that is what 'satipatthana' means) would be a fabricational activity, a sankhara. Nothing personal about it. ------------------------------------- > > The PTS PED further defines satipa.t.thaana as "intense concentration, > earnest thought, [and] application of mindfulness." From the same > source, breaking down the compound, "sati" is "memory, recognition, > consciousness, intentness of mind, wakefulness of mind, altertness, > lucidity of mind, self possession, conscience, [and] self-consciousness." > > Nyanaponika defines sati simply as "mindfulness," but then goes on to > elaborate that it is a "mental factor...inseparably associated with > all kammically wholesome (kusula) and kammically produced lofty > (sobhana) consciousness." As a mental factor then, the notion that > one can, by will, produce sati, or by extension, satipa.t.thaana, > seems unlikely. To me, this would support the claim found in the > famous "party line" that satipa.t.thaana has either to arise or not. -------------------------------- Howard: It cannot be just willed into existence or wished into existence. But the likelihood of its arising can be increased by willful activities. That is, it can be cultivated. But "the party line" (you sure love the phrase, Scott ;-) doesn't like to speak much of cultivation, though the Buddha sure did. --------------------------------- > I'd appreciate some assistance in this but I don't see where > "satipa.t.thaana" is listed amongst the 52 mental factors; "sati" is, > however. > > How is one to understand the relationship between "sati" as an > "official" mental factor, and "satipa.t.thaana" as an "unofficial" > mental factor? What sort of arising is satipa.t.thaana? Is it a > momentary precursor to sati-proper, a sort of moment which ensues just > prior to sati arising? In this case, is it, as Nyanaponika may be > suggesting, an awareness of being mindful? ------------------------------------ Howard: I believe that I always see the usage of 'satipatthana' by DSG "party liners" - If you want to keep going with that phrase, I can also! (LOL!) - as a synonym for 'pa~n~na', which is why I raised that issue before. ----------------------------------- > > Phenomenologically and for example, when I am walking somewhere, say > at work, and the idea of satipa.t.thaana comes to mind, I suddenly am > aware that, prior to that thought, I had not been "aware." I notice > the difference between my experience just prior to the thought and the > experience now. I sort of experience an openness to experience and a > sense of sounds, sights, thoughts, emotions, etc. The world feels > somewhat more spacious or some such. I experience thinking like, "Oh > I've not been mindful," or, "Oh yeah, mindfulness," or something like > that. And then I go on to pay attention to what I see and hear and > think, etc, but with the sense that there is an observing in place. ---------------------------------- Howard: My take on sati is that it is a remembering to attend to what is actually happening at the moment - that is, to ride herd on the mind, avoiding getting lost in thought. It amounts to a kind of vigilance. ----------------------------------- > > Would it be fair to say that the moment of satipa.t.thaana arises just > prior to my catching up with it in the form of a thought about the > concept satipa.t.thaana? Would it be fair, then and as well, to say > that what ensues are moments of sati proper arising until something > else arises to derail these moments? > > Please, and hopefully this was not too long, can I get some correction > on this? > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > ================== With metta, Howard #61007 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 11:23 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, no 11 nilovg Dear friends, As regards the fifty-two kinds of cetasika which may arise with citta, they are classified as three khandhas: the cetasika which is feeling (vedanå) is classified as one khandha, the vedanåkkhandha; the cetasika which is remembrance or ``perception'' (saññå) is classified as one khandha, the saññåkkhandha; as regards the other fifty cetasikas, they are classified altogether as one khandha, the sa.nkhårakkhandha. For example, in sa.nkhårakkhandha are included the following cetasikas: volition or intention (cetanå), attachment (lobha), aversion (dosa), ignorance (moha), loving kindness (mettå), generosity (alobha) and wisdom (paññå). All defilements and all good qualities are included in saòkhårakkhandha, they are impermanent not ``self''. Sa .nkhårakkhandha is sometimes translated as ``activities'' or ``mental formations''. As regards citta, all cittas are one khandha: viññå.nakkhandha. The Påli terms viññå.na, mano and citta are three terms for the same reality: that which has the characteristic of knowing or experiencing something. When citta is classified as khandha the word viññå.na is used. Thus, one khandha is rúpakkhandha and the other four khandhas are nåmakkhandhas. Three nåmakkhandhas are cetasika and one nåmakkhandha is citta. Anything which is khandha does not last; as soon as it has arisen it falls away again. Although khandhas arise and fall away, they are real; we can experience them when they present themselves. Nibbåna, the unconditioned dhamma which does not arise and fall away, is not a khandha. The Visuddhimagga (XX, 96) explains about the arising and falling away of nåma and rúpa: There is no heap or store of unarisen nåma-rúpa (existing) prior to its arising. When it arises it does not come from any heap or store; and when it ceases, it does not go in any direction. There is nowhere any depository in the way of heap or store or hoard of what has ceased. But just as there is no store, prior to its arising, of the sound that arises when a lute is played, nor does it come from any store when it arises, nor does it go in any direction when it ceases, nor does it persist as a store when it has ceased (``Kindred Sayings'' IV, 197), but on the contrary, not having been, it is brought into being owing to the lute, the lute's neck, and the man's appropriate effort, and having been, it vanishes--so too all material and immaterial states (rúpa and nåma), not having been, are brought into being, having been, they vanish. ****** Nina. #61008 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 12:08 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Howard, Thanks and sorry for intruding between you and Ken H. Howard: "Setting up of mindfulness (if that is what 'satipatthana' means) would be a fabricational activity, a sankhara. Nothing personal about it." Thanks, Howard, that makes sense. Have I gotten the meaning wrong? Howard: "It cannot be just willed into existence or wished into existence. But the likelihood of its arising can be increased by willful activities. That is, it can be cultivated. But "the party line"...doesn't like to speak much of cultivation, though the Buddha sure did." Yes, I see this. Cultivation is very important. I wonder what it is, from the anatta-viewpoint, that arises and is "cultivation?" I'll have to look at this. It can only be something I think I am doing and so before that it too must be a complex, conditioned arising. I agree though. Howard: "I believe that I always see the usage of 'satipatthana' by DSG "party liners"...as a synonym for 'pa~n~na', which is why I raised that issue before." Yeah, well since pa~n~na means "is endowed with knowledge or insight; possessed of highest cognition; understanding; knowledge; and is "related to vipassanaa," I'd say that satipa.t.thaana could be condition for pa~n~na; but not equivalent necessarily. Howard: "My take on sati is that it is a remembering to attend to what is actually happening at the moment - that is, to ride herd on the mind, avoiding getting lost in thought. It amounts to a kind of vigilance." A remembering to attend: that fits with experience, at least for me. With loving kindness, Scott. #61009 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 12:19 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) scottduncan2 Dear Nina, I appreciate the following clarification since I was wondering about this. Thank you. N: "As to three meanings of satipa.t.thaana: "...There are three kinds of foundation of mindfulness, satipa.t.thaana: 1. the domain of mindfulness (sati gocaro) 2. the Master's threefold surpassing of resentment and gratification (delight) as regards the entry of his disciples [on the way of practice]. 3. mindfulness (sati)." I don't really comprehend the second foundation. "As to the domain of mindfulness, sati gocara, this refers to the object of sati, that is: the body, feelings, cittas, dhammas. As to mindfulness, sati, this refers to sati cetasika that is aware of the characteristics of realities...When we refer to sati of satipa.t.thaana it is direct awareness and understanding of a reality." This is very clear. Thank you very much. With loving kindness, Scott. #61010 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 8:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Scott - In a message dated 7/2/06 3:25:31 PM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > Dear Howard, > > Thanks and sorry for intruding between you and Ken H. ----------------------------------------- Howard: It's not intruding, Scott. From my perspective, all posts on DSG are open to reply by all members. I think that strictly private converations should be offlist. (My opinion, and not claiming it as official DSG policy!) ----------------------------------------- > > Howard: "Setting up of mindfulness (if that is what 'satipatthana' > means) would be a fabricational activity, a sankhara. Nothing personal > about it." > > Thanks, Howard, that makes sense. Have I gotten the meaning wrong? ----------------------------------------- Howard: What meaning - "setting up of mindfulness" as meaning for 'satipatthana'? No, that's one of the standard ones. ---------------------------------------- > Howard: "It cannot be just willed into existence or wished into > existence. But the likelihood of its arising can be increased by > willful activities. That is, it can be cultivated. But "the party > line"...doesn't like to speak much of cultivation, though the Buddha > sure did." > > Yes, I see this. Cultivation is very important. I wonder what it is, > from the anatta-viewpoint, that arises and is "cultivation?" > --------------------------------------- Howard: From my perspective, cultivation isn't a dhamma. The term references a multitude of related events and activities which, together, cultivate kusala conditions and lead towards awakening. -------------------------------------- I'll> > have to look at this. It can only be something I think I am doing and > so before that it too must be a complex, conditioned arising. > --------------------------------------- Howard: That's right! (As far as I'm concerned.) ------------------------------------- I agree > though. Howard: "I believe that I always see the usage of 'satipatthana' by> > DSG "party liners"...as a synonym for 'pa~n~na', which is why I raised > that issue before." > > Yeah, well since pa~n~na means "is endowed with knowledge or insight; > possessed of highest cognition; understanding; knowledge; and is > "related to vipassanaa," I'd say that satipa.t.thaana could be > condition for pa~n~na; but not equivalent necessarily. ------------------------------------------ Howard: I agree. I think that establishing mindfulness is an essential condition (or set of conditions) for the arising of insight. ----------------------------------------- > > Howard: "My take on sati is that it is a remembering to attend to > what is actually happening at the moment - that is, to ride herd on > the mind, avoiding getting lost in thought. It amounts to a kind of > vigilance." > > A remembering to attend: that fits with experience, at least for me. > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > > ======================= With metta, Howard #61011 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 2:58 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the abhidhamma of existentialism egberdina Hi Larry, On 02/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > Regarding the determining consciousness (votthapana citta), I see it as > instigating the reaction that is javana citta, but I'm not sure if I > would call this a choice. In dependent arising the accumulation of > javana cittas precipitates action, as I understand it so far, and even > this doesn't seem to be a choice. What we call 'choice' doesn't seem to > figure into this micro-environment, but we obviously make choices all > the time. Perhaps we just have to say that abhidhamma, like science in > general, is a deterministic system. > Just a quick note today, more to follow later. I just want to say that you will find no agreement on whether the micro-environment is deterministic, in scientific circles. The view that certain quantum events, such as the decay of a sub-atomic particle, are truly random (without cause) is held by very respected people in the field. Suffice it to say that beliefs about the nature and extent of causation are just that, both in Buddhist and scientific circles. That a belief ends up being held about what can never be more than inference, speaks loudly about the intentional nature of consciousness. People believe what they will. Kind Regards Herman #61012 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 3:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the abhidhamma of existentialism lbidd2 Herman: "That a belief ends up being held about what can never be more than inference, speaks loudly about the intentional nature of consciousness." Hi Herman, I agree if by 'intention' you mean desire and clinging. By 'determinism' I meant that arising is caused, conditioned by other dhammas. No dhamma is a causal free-agent. I think I've found a place for 'choice' in abhidhamma: volition (cetanaa). Ordinarily when we self consciously make a choice there is a lot of back and forth indecision. I think this is volition preceded by doubt mediated by decision (vicikiccha>adhimokkha>cetanaa). Larry #61013 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 8:28 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Hello* egberdina Hi Greg and Jon, Greg, please do not read the rest of this post. You asked a simple question, and some have answered the simple question that you asked. The rest of this post will not be related to your post in any way. On 01/07/06, jonoabb wrote: > > Without going into detail at the moment, we like to stress here that > insight is something that can be developed regardless of how active > one's mind is. Are you familiar with the Satipatthana Sutta? > Hi Jon, What is the basis for your stressed assertion that insight is something that can be developed regardless of how active the mind is? How does that relate to anything the Buddha taught, and especially the Satipatthana Sutta? Kind Regards Herman #61014 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 9:01 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Hello. Calming the mind. egberdina Hi KenH, Sorry again, Greg. This one is not meant for you :-) > > But then I saw his answer differently. Any explanation of Dhamma > should have this effect on us. Reality is just a number of fleeting, > unsatisfactory, devoid-of-self mental and physical phenomena arising > and falling away by conditions. This is the understanding that the > Buddha wanted to instil in us. > > This understanding arises to the extent that we have heard and wisely > considered the true Dhamma. With respect, I suggest it has nothing to > do with the other form of vipassana practice - sitting quietly or > concentrating on something in an effort to make insight happen. > The Buddha, who you seem to know well enough to even know his intentions, did not write the book on vipassana that you seem to be alluding to. The Buddha wrote the book about the 8fold path, with jhanas right up there as a summum bonum. Perhaps it is Buddhagosa whom you are so imtimately familiar with? But no, that couldn't be. If you knew him that well, surely you'd get his name right???? As you know, incorrect referencing of essays attracts a lot of red ink. If you're going to attribute ideas to people, you should first be very clear about who said what.I've got an idea. Why don't I become the lecturer, and you the pupil? :-) Kind Regards Herman #61015 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 10:50 pm Subject: Discussion with Herman / was Re: Hello. Calming the mind. ken_aitch Hi Herman, ------- H: > The Buddha, who you seem to know well enough to even know his intentions, did not write the book on vipassana that you seem to be alluding to. The Buddha wrote the book about the 8fold path, with jhanas right up there as a summum bonum. Perhaps it is Buddhagosa whom you are so imtimately familiar with? But no, that couldn't be. If you knew him that well, surely you'd get his name right???? -------- I am always happy to talk Dhamma with you, but I restrict my comments to the Dhamma as it is preserved in all three baskets of the Pali Canon and their ancient commentaries. If anything I say contradicts those texts please come down on me like a ton of bricks. However, if it is only some other [professed] record of the Dhamma that is being contradicted, I am really not interested, sorry. ------------- H: > As you know, incorrect referencing of essays attracts a lot of red ink. If you're going to attribute ideas to people, you should first be very clear about who said what.I've got an idea. Why don't I become the lecturer, and you the pupil? :-) ------------- I was appointed Assistant Junior Lecturer in Elements of Dhamma - an introductory subject in a very long course. Most of my students think they could do better standing on their heads, but until I am sacked I am not going anywhere! Ken H #61016 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 1:40 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... ken_aitch Hi Howard, --------- H: > Yes, yes, Ken, You're beating a dead horse. The moment we're thinking, it is all about concepts. Likewise the minute we are talking. But when there is direct experiencing of sights, sounds, etc, dhammas are involved. ---------- I'm not sure of what you mean by 'beating a dead horse' in this instance. I think it normally means promoting a lost cause. But perhaps you mean I am telling you something you already know. (?) Either way, I'll just give it another whack. :-) I agree that worldlings, like everyone else, have extensive experience of dhammas. The trouble is our experiences are either tainted with moha (ignorance of dhammas), or, at best, lacking in panna (right understanding of dhammas). That is the way our dhammas are conditioned to arise: there is no denying it. ----------------- KH: > > If he is a Dhamma student, he will know that cittas> > with painful vedana are experiencing undesirable bodily sense objects, > but there is no satipatthana and so his knowledge is, at best, > theoretical. > Howard: And if he is an even better Dhamma student s/he will know that there are no cittas doing anything. There is just the doing - and those doings are the so-called cittas. ----------------- There are cittas, cetasikas and rupas. These are the absolute, conditioned realities: they arise, perform their functions and fall away. ----------------- H: > And as you say, if there is insight, then there will be true knowing. BTW, I'm not fond of using 'satipatthana', which means "establishing of mindfulness" or "foundation of mindfulness" or "setting forth of mindfulness", as a substitute for 'pa~n~na'. -------------- I don't see the problem. There is no satipatthana without panna, and there is no panna without either satipatthana or samatha. In DSG discussions, "panna" normally means the satipatthana kind (unless otherwise stated). Ken H #61017 From: "bhanteseelagawesi" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 2:13 pm Subject: Confidence is clear in the Four Noble Truth bhanteseelag... Dear Dhamma friends, I would like to bring this Dhamma as I practice. The person who is pleasnat in the world, tries to find the satisfaction with his senses. What ever he does for the satisfaction, he experiences the failure within and in the world. Now he wants to know the reason of his failure. There he feels the suffering and the cause of it. This is because of his wise attention. Wise attention takes his mind further more. Then he feels the cessation of the suffering and he is interest to seek the way. In this case he believe the Buddha and trust His Teaching. Then he feels that he desire to contact the followers of the Buddha, The Sangha. This consideration is factful and realistic. So now his mind is stable to follow the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha with confidence and determination. I would like to invite you and ask you to focus your mind with the art of "Reasoning and Consideraton". I trust that you may find practical resources for the meditative mind in this sharing. Thank you very much for your kind considration. May you find peace and happiness! With much love and compassion, Seelagawesi Thero #61018 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 3:08 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... ken_aitch Hi Scott, ----------------- S: > I've wondered about this, not so much, as Howard notes, regarding the use of satipa.t.thaana "as a substitute for 'pa~n~na,'" which Ken can address if he wishes, but in the sense of how it is often noted that satipa.t.thaana "arises." I think this is relevant to the thread since knowledge of the difference between naama and ruupa is said to come via satipa.t.thaana. ----------------- You've had a lot of response to this post, and there's not much I can add. I'll just say that I regard the entire Dhamma as satipatthana. This is not a popular view, and some people have criticised me saying that satipatthana is just one of many things taught by the Buddha. Years ago, however, someone quoted K Sujin as having said, "The Buddha taught satipatthana, and every word of his teaching should be understood in terms of satipatthana." I may have taken that too literally, I don't know, but it still rings true. The teaching is to understand the dhammas that are arising now. Whatever subject is expounded - demons in hell worlds, saints in brahma viharas, aeons in the past or in the future - the purpose is always to teach the nature of the presently arisen conditioned reality. I said there was not much I could add, but now I think about it I could go on forever. Better not, though. :-) Ken H #61019 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 3:36 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... nilovg Hi Ken H, hear, hear! Satipa.t.thaana is the Buddha's teaching par excellence. He taught that all dhammas are anattaa, and this can be realized by the development of insight. The development of vipassanaa, or of the eightfold Path, these amount to the development of seeing dhammas as they really are. If we read the suttas carefully, we can see that the suttas speak about forgetfulness and mindfulness of the realities that appear. They are exhortations to be mindful. Yes, I also could go on forever. Nina. Op 3-jul-2006, om 12:08 heeft ken_aitch het volgende geschreven: > Years ago, however, someone quoted K Sujin as having said, "The Buddha > taught satipatthana, and every word of his teaching should be > understood in terms of satipatthana." I may have taken that too > literally, I don't know, but it still rings true. The teaching is to > understand the dhammas that are arising now. Whatever subject is > expounded - demons in hell worlds, saints in brahma viharas, aeons in > the past or in the future - the purpose is always to teach the nature > of the presently arisen conditioned reality. #61020 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 4:56 am Subject: Fwd: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 86 and Tiika. nilovg Some computer troubles. Sorry if this appears again. Begin doorgestuurd bericht: > Van: Nina van Gorkom > Datum: 3 juli 2006 10:14:35 GMT+02:00 > Aan: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Onderwerp: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 86 and Tiika. > > Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 86. > > Postnascence-condition, pacchaajaata-paccaya. > > Intro: > As to postnascence-condition, pacchaajaata-paccaya, citta and its > accompanying cetasikas support the rúpas of the body which have > arisen previously and have not fallen away yet. Thus, in this way > citta conditions these rúpas by way of postnascence-condition. > Citta does not cause the arising of the ruupas it conditions by way > of postnascence, these rúpas have arisen already prior to the > arising of the citta; citta supports and consolidates these rúpas > which are still present, since ruupa lasts as long as seventeen > moments of citta. > In the case of base and object which are prenascence-condition, > ruupa conditions naama, whereas in the case of postnascence- > condition naama conditions ruupa. > ---------------- > > Text Vis.: 86. (11) An immaterial state that [while present] > assists prenascent > material states [also present] by consolidating them is a > 'postnascence > condition', like the volition of appetite for food, which assists the > bodies of vultures' young. > --------- > N: As to the simile, the Tiika adds that it is not said: the > volition of getting the food, but the volition of expectation of > food (aahaaraasaa). > > Ven. U Narada gives an explanation of this simile (Guide to > Conditional Relations, p. 45). He explains that this condition is > like the volition of appetite (aahaaraasaacetanaa) for food, which > is the condition that supports the bodies of young vultures so that > they do not die even though they have no food to eat. The mother > does not bring them food, but they have to wait until they have > wings and can search food themselves. The volition associated with > the craving for taste is related to the bodies of young vultures by > supporting them so that they do not die of hunger. Evenso, the > naamadhammas support and consolidate the prenascent ruupas produced > by the four causes, so that similar ruupas will continue to be > produced. This condition operates while the previously arisen > ruupas are still present when the citta that conditions them in > this way arises and is present. > > > Text Vis. Hence it is said: 'Postnascence states of consciousness > and its concomitants are a condition, as postnascence condition, > for the prenascent [co-present] body' (P.tn.1,5). > --------- > N: The Tiika elaborates on the expression ‘ prenascent > body' (kaayassa), that this is the so called material body of the > four great Elements and the derived ruupas that are produced by the > four factors. > Citta is postnascence-condition for the previously arisen rúpas of > the body which have been produced by the four factors of kamma, > citta, temperature and nutrition and which have not fallen away > yet. Citta supports and consolidates these rúpas. > The paìisandhi-citta cannot be postnascence-condition, since there > is no previously arisen rúpa at the first moment of life. At the > first moment of life kamma produces rúpas simultaneously with the > paìisandhi-citta, but after that, throughout our life, each citta > is postnascence-condition for the previously arisen rúpas of the body. > > The Tiika refers to the text of the Patthaana that states that the > cittas of the four jaatis of kusala, akusala, vipaaka and kiriya > are postnascence-condition for the previously arisen ruupas of the > body. Thus, this condition is classified as fourfold. > > > Conclusion. > > We take it for granted that so long as we are alive our bodily > functions are operating, but we could not move, stretch out our > hands or perform actions without citta that supports and > consolidates the prearisen ruupas by way of postnascence-condition. > We are inclined to take the body for self, but it is actually the > four principal ruupas (the four great elements) and derived ruupas > that originate from kamma, citta, temperature or nutrition. After > they have arisen and are still present for an extremely short > moment, they are consolidated throughout our life by each citta > that arises, except by the rebirth-consciousness. > Seeing is dependent on eyesense, a ruupa that is produced by kamma. > But, this ruupa, while it is still present, is consolidated by the > citta arising afterwards by way of postnascence, otherwise eyesense > could not perform its function. > The cittas which are the sense-cognitions such as seeing or hearing > do not produce ruupas themselves, but they consolidate the ruupas > that have arisen just before. Thus, every citta arising at this > moment, be it kusala citta, akusala citta, vipaakacitta or > kiriyacitta, is supporting the ruupas of the body that have arisen > just before and are still present, otherwise life could not continue. > > The teaching of prenascence-condition, purejåta-paccaya, conascence- > condition, sahajåta-paccaya, and postnascence-condition, pacchåjåta- > paccaya, reminds us of the intricacy of the relationships between > different phenomena. > > ***** > > Nina. > #61021 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 6:10 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Ken H, Thanks for the brief but thoughtful reply: K: "...I'll just say that I regard the entire Dhamma as satipatthana. This is not a popular view, and some people have criticised me saying that satipatthana is just one of many things taught by the Buddha." The statement is tenable I think, although as you say, can be seen as controversial. If, as the definition given by Nyanatiloka states, "sati [is]...a mental factor inseparably associated with all kammically wholesome (kusula) and kammically produced lofty (sobhana) consciousness," then, given that satipa.t.thaana is the application of sati, the thesis can be stated and supported. I suppose it is also true that the Buddha taught other things, and that different aspects of the teaching impinge differently on the variously constellated students of the Dhamma. K: "Years ago, however, someone quoted K Sujin as having said, 'The Buddha taught satipatthana, and every word of his teaching should be understood in terms of satipatthana.' I may have taken that too literally, I don't know, but it still rings true. The teaching is to understand the dhammas that are arising now. Whatever subject is expounded - demons in hell worlds, saints in brahma viharas, aeons in the past or in the future - the purpose is always to teach the nature of the presently arisen conditioned reality." Knowing the "nature of the presently arisen conditioned reality" is not easy to do yet its easy to see, at least intellectually, how this is rather essential. I see I have a favourite viewpoint these days: that being anatta. To support the statement you make, if I happen to think that it is anattaa that "is the entire Dhamma," then without the arisen application of mindfulness to condition the arisen awareness of a dhamma now there would be no way to know this dhamma from the perspective of anattaa. In the chapter on The Meaning of Anatta,(A Survey of Paramattha Dhammas,) K. Sujin writes: "Before someone can understand that this body is anattaa and that even so this consciousness is anattaa, the characteristics of naama and ruupa appearing at this moment must be 'described, shown, made plain, set forth, made clear, analysed and expounded,' as we read in the sutta. Characteristics of naama and ruupa appear at this moment, while we see, hear, smell, taste, experience tangible object or think," (p.383). Further, in his introductory message in The Way of Mindfulness: The Satipa.t.thaana Sutta and Its Commentary, Bhikkhu Bodhi writes: "The practise of Satipa.t.thaana meditation centers on the methodical cultivation of one simple mental faculty readily available to all of us at any moment. This is the faculty of mindfulness, the capacity for attending to the content of our experience as it becomes manifest in the immediate present. What the Buddha shows in the sutta is the tremendous, but generally hidden, power inherent in this simple mental function, a power that can unfold all the mind's potentials culminating in final deliverance from suffering." So Ken, at least you're not alone in making the statement you have made. And I suppose the following statement, from the Satipa.t.thaana Sutta itself, carries some weight as well: "This is the only way, O bhikkhus, for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, for the destruction of suffering and grief, for the reaching the right path, for the attainment of Nibbanaa, namely the Four Arousings of Mindfulness." I honestly don't really know what to do with the emphatic nature of this statement of the Buddha. I mean to say that a particular method is "the only way" is to make a very, very strong and all-inclusive statement. The dictum to practise and determine for oneself is always there to fall back on, I suppose. At any rate, you could have gone on and didn't, whereas I seem to have... With loving kindness, Scott. #61022 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 4:01 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/3/06 4:41:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ken_aitch@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > --------- > H: >Yes, yes, Ken, You're beating a dead horse. The moment we're > thinking, it is all about concepts. Likewise the minute we are > talking. But when there is direct experiencing of sights, sounds, etc, > dhammas are involved. > ---------- > > I'm not sure of what you mean by 'beating a dead horse' in this > instance. I think it normally means promoting a lost cause. But > perhaps you mean I am telling you something you already know. (?) > Either way, I'll just give it another whack. :-) -------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, the latter. (And ouch!) ------------------------------------ > > I agree that worldlings, like everyone else, have extensive experience > of dhammas. The trouble is our experiences are either tainted with > moha (ignorance of dhammas), or, at best, lacking in panna (right > understanding of dhammas). That is the way our dhammas are conditioned > to arise: there is no denying it. ---------------------------------------- Howard: Who denies it? And that will not change though one reads until one is blue in the face. (Unless, of course, one actually pays attentin to the Buddha and does more than merely read & think.) ---------------------------------------- > > ----------------- > KH: >>If he is a Dhamma student, he will know that cittas> > >with painful vedana are experiencing undesirable bodily sense objects, > >but there is no satipatthana and so his knowledge is, at best, > >theoretical. > > > Howard: > And if he is an even better Dhamma student s/he will know that > there are no cittas doing anything. There is just the doing - and > those doings are the so-called cittas. > ----------------- > > There are cittas, cetasikas and rupas. These are the absolute, > conditioned realities: they arise, perform their functions and fall away. --------------------------------------- Howard: Workng those catechism beads again, I see! Well, at least such repetition is a *form* of meditating, hypnotic though it is. --------------------------------------- > > ----------------- > H: >And as you say, if there is insight, then there will be true > knowing. > > BTW, I'm not fond of using 'satipatthana', which means "establishing > of mindfulness" or "foundation of mindfulness" or "setting forth of > mindfulness", as a substitute for 'pa~n~na'. > -------------- > > I don't see the problem. > ----------------------------------- Howard: Omigod! I am open mouthed with astonishment! ;-)) ---------------------------------- There is no satipatthana without panna, and> > there is no panna without either satipatthana or samatha. In DSG > discussions, "panna" normally means the satipatthana kind (unless > otherwise stated). ---------------------------------- Howard: I get nothing to sink my teeth into here. Establishing mindfulness is requisite for the arising of insights. They are, however, not the same. That's what I said, and you certainly haven't given me any evidence to the contrary. --------------------------------- > > Ken H > ===================== With metta, Howard #61024 From: "jonoabb" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 8:33 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Reading and Hearing the Dhamma jonoabb Hi Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Jon, ... > I'm slowly wading through this ever-growing "to-be-replied-to" inbox > of mine. The myth of Sysiphus comes to mind. He was condemned for all > eternity to rolling a boulder up hill only to watch it come rolling > down again :-) Anyways.... I know just how you feel ;-)) > > > > >In fact, I doubt that a well-trained reader could even see the > > >marks without the meanings. > > > > > > > > > Nor could a person hear speech without the meaning. > > > > Yes, I agree with you. And I did say that the theory requires more > work. But there is something quite different between hearing meaning > from speech and reading meaning in writing. Hearing is a much more > immediate sense than vision. We do have eyelids but no earlids. We can > at will choose to not see, to not read, but we cannot escape spoken > instructions. And that is the gist of the difference. Speech is the > means par excellence whereby one person can convey their will to a > susceptible other. That just does not happen with reading. I think you are saying that meaning can be conveyed better by face- to-face dialogue than by written exchange. I have no argument with that (and I doubt that anyone would). But where do you go from there? > I think there is a certain theory of mind in what you say, and I have > doubts about its usefuleness. You seem to be inferring momentary but > meaningless sense data. That may well be the case, but it is an > inference. Just to clarify, I am simply restating things the way I understand them to be explained in the texts. No inferences from my own experiences. I suggest that humans do not consciously operate at a level > below name/form, so the basic unit of consciousness in my scheme is > always a concept. I'm afraid you've lost me here. But I understand that you are proposing a scheme based on your own experience and observation. Interesting though that may be, I'm not sure it helps the discussion in this particular thread (the value of hearing dhamma vs. reading dhamma). > As I suggested above, mere visible object is speculation (harmless, > but speculative nonetheless). As I see it, all objects of > consciousness are concepts. Well, so is your 'scheme' speculation ;-)). But the idea of mere visible object is clearly to be found in the texts, so I think it merits consideration. > You see the difference between then and now as being the greater > developed panna in the Buddha's followers. I see the main difference > as being the greater willingness (intent) to do the Master's bidding. > The Buddha was a heterodox forest-dwelling contemplative. The impact > of his spoken words lead in that direction. This is a side issue, but I do not agree with the description of the Buddha as a forest-dwelling contemplative. That may have been a description of the Bodhisatta before his enlightenment, but as the Buddha he spent most of his teaching years living in monasteries among large numbers of other monks, and holding audience with all manner of people both monks and laity. He clearly on occasions praised the forest-dwelling contemplative life when properly lived, but he equally clearly did not recommend it for all, or as necessary for the development of insight. Jon #61025 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 4:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/3/06 6:42:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Ken H, > hear, hear! > Satipa.t.thaana is the Buddha's teaching par excellence. He taught > that all dhammas are anattaa, and this can be realized by the > development of insight. The development of vipassanaa, or of the > eightfold Path, these amount to the development of seeing dhammas as > they really are. > ========================= I don't get it! Is it a DSG or Khun Sujin idiosyncratic usage of 'satipatthana' to take it to mean "development of insight" and "development of vipassanaa", when the meaning of the term is "development - or establishing, or foundation - of mindfulness"? You go on to say "If we read the suttas carefully, we can see that the suttas speak about forgetfulness and mindfulness of the realities that appear. They are exhortations to be mindful. Yes, I also could go on forever." Yes, indeed. I agree completely! Mindfulness and the exhortation to vigorously cultivate it is stressed again and again in the suttas, and it certainly should be. My point was that identifying 'satipatthana' with 'pa~n~na' is an odd practice that is inexplicable. The term 'satipatthana' involves sati, not pa~n~na. The fact that pa~n~na crucially depends on sati is just that - a fact. The fact that sati always occurs when pa~n~na does is reflected by the combination-term 'satipa~n~na'. But the fact that 'satipa~n~na' sounds a lot like 'satipatthana' shouldn't cause anyone to confuse satipatthana with wisdom (in case that sound similarity had some slight influence). There is sati, there is satipatthana, there is pa~n~na, and there is satipa~n~na. They are all related. But they are distinguishable. The Buddha took already extant terminology, such as 'kamma', and changed its meaning to express the (imo) true Dhamma. But he was the Buddha! Why not leave meaning changes to him? With metta, Howard #61026 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 9:01 am Subject: The fourth "bodily Tie." scottduncan2 Dear All, I was reading in chapter 7 of the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, entitled "Abhidhamma Categories." Therein the four Defilements (aasavaa) are listed, and under the rubric of (bodily)Ties (ganthas)are listed four, the last being: "Dogmatic belief that 'this alone is truth.'" ["ida.msaccaa-bhiniveso kaayagantho."] The "ganthas are those that bind mind with body or the present body with bodies of future existences. Here the term kaaya is used in the sense of mass or body - both mental and physical," (p. 366, the buddhanet version of Narada's translation). Can anyone please shed some light as to the exact meaning and sense of this particular aspect of the Dhamma? With loving kindness, Scott. #61027 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 9:53 am Subject: Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." scottduncan2 S: "Can anyone please shed some light as to the exact meaning and sense of this particular aspect of the Dhamma?" I meant other than me but I just was looking and found abhinevesa to mean: "...wishing for, tendency towards, inclination...liking, loving, being given or inclined to...adherence to one's dogmas." Nonetheless, how is this a "bodily Tie?" S. #61028 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 12:00 pm Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, no 12. nilovg Dear friends, The khandhas are realities which can be experienced. We experience rúpakkhandha when, for example, we feel hardness. This phenomenon does not stay; it arises and falls away. Rúpakkhandha is impermanent. Not only rúpas of the body, but the other physical phenomena are included in rúpakkhandha as well. For example, sound is rúpakkhandha; it arises and falls away, it is impermanent. Vedanåkkhandha (feeling) is real; we can experience feelings. Vedanåkkhandha comprises all kinds of feelings. Feeling can be classified in different ways. Sometimes feelings are classified as threefold: pleasant feeling unpleasant feeling indifferent feeling Sometimes they are classified as fivefold. In addition to pleasant feeling, unpleasant feeling and indifferent feeling there are: pleasant bodily feeling painful bodily feeling Bodily feeling is feeling which has bodysense, the rúpa which has the capacity to receive bodily impressions, as condition; the feeling itself is nåma, but it has rúpa (bodysense) as condition. When an object contacts the bodysense, the feeling is either painful or pleasant; there is no indifferent bodily feeling. When the bodily feeling is painful it is akusala vipåka (the result of an unwholesome deed), and when the bodily feeling is pleasant it is kusala vipåka (the result of a wholesome deed). Since there are many different moments of feeling arising and falling away it is difficult to distinguish them from each other. For instance, we are inclined to confuse pleasant bodily feeling which is vipåka and the pleasant feeling which may arise shortly afterwards together with attachment to that pleasant bodily feeling. Or we may confuse painful bodily feeling and unpleasant feeling which may arise afterwards together with aversion. When there is bodily pain, the painful feeling is vipåka, it accompanies the vipåkacitta which experiences the unpleasant object impinging on the bodysense. Unpleasant (mental) feeling may arise afterwards; it is not vipåka, but it accompanies the akusala citta with aversion, and thus it is akusala. The akusala citta with aversion arises because of our accumulated aversion (dosa). ****** Nina. #61029 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 11:52 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... nilovg Dear Scott, Howard, Ken H, Scott writes: Further, in his introductory message in The Way of Mindfulness: The Satipa.t.thaana Sutta and Its Commentary, Bhikkhu Bodhi writes: And I suppose the following statement, from the Satipa.t.thaana Sutta itself, carries some weight as well: "This is the only way, O bhikkhus, for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, for the destruction of suffering and grief, for the reaching the right path, for the attainment of Nibbanaa, namely the Four Arousings of Mindfulness." I honestly don't really know what to do with the emphatic nature of this statement of the Buddha. I mean to say that a particular method is "the only way" is to make a very, very strong and all-inclusive statement. ------- I quote part of The Way, Co to the Satipa.t.thaana Sutta about ekaayana Maggo, the only way. This has several meanings. Recently Sarah wrote about it, and there is also material in Useful posts. <"The only way" = The one way [Ekayanoti ekamaggo]. There are many words for "way." The word used for "way" here is "ayana" ("going" or road). Therefore, "This is the only way, O bhikkhus [ekayano ayam bhikkhave maggo]" means here: "A single way ("going" or road), O bhikkhus, is this way; it is not of the nature of a double way [ekamaggo ayam bhikkhave maggo na dvedhapathabhuto]." Or it is "the only way" because it has to be trodden by oneself only [ekeneva ayitabbo]. That is without a companion. The state of being companionless is twofold: without a comrade, after abandoning contact with the crowd, and in the sense of being withdrawn (or secluded) from craving, through tranquillity of mind. Or it is called "ekayana" because it is the way of the one [ekassa ayana]. "Of the one" = of the best; of all beings the Blessed One is best. Therefore, it is called the Blessed One's Way. Although others too go along that way, it is the Buddha's because he creates it. Accordingly it is said: "He, the Blessed One, is the creator of the uncreated path, O Brahman." It proceeds (or exists) only in this Doctrine-and-discipline and not in any other. Accordingly the Master declared: "Subhadda, only in this Doctrine-and-discipline is the Eightfold Way to be found." And further, "ekayana" means: It goes to the one [ekam ayati] — that is, it (the way) goes solely to Nibbana. Although in the earlier stages this method of meditation proceeds on different lines, in the latter, it goes to just the one Nibbana. And that is why Brahma Sahampati said: Whose mind perceiving life's last dying out Vibrates with love, he knows the only way That led in ancient times, is leading now, And in the future will lead past the flood.6 As Nibbana is without a second, that is, without craving as accompanying quality, it is called the one. Hence it is said: "Truth is one; it is without a second." Why is the Arousing of Mindfulness intended by the word "way"? Are there not many other factors of the way, namely, understanding, thinking, speech, action, livelihood, effort, and concentration, besides mindfulness? To be sure there are. But all these are implied when the Arousing of Mindfulness is mentioned, because these factors exist in union with mindfulness. Knowledge, energy and the like are mentioned in the analytically expository portion [niddese]. In the synopsis [uddese], however, the consideration should be regarded as that of mindfulness alone, by way of the mental disposition of those capable of being trained. Some [keci], however, construing according to the stanza beginning with the words, "They do not go twice to the further shore [na param digunam yanti]"7 say, "One goes to Nibbana once, therefore it is ekayana." This explanation is not proper. Because in this instruction the earlier part of the Path is intended to be presented, the preliminary part of the Way of Mindfulness proceeding in the four objects of contemplation is meant here, and not the supramundane Way of Mindfulness. And that preliminary part of the Path proceeds (for the aspirant) many times; or it may be said that there is many a going on it, by way of repetition of practice. In what sense is it a "way"? In the sense of the path going towards Nibbana, and in the sense of the path which is the one that should be (or is fit to be) traversed by those who wish to reach Nibbana.> end quote. Howard, please note: Howard, you mentioned satipaññaa, but the expression is rather: sati sampajañña, sampajañña being another word for paññaa. When speaking of sati of satipatthaana, it does not mean sati without understanding. And it appears from your post that you think likewise. Sati is mindful of a paramattha dhamma so that at that very moment paññaa can develop and gradually penetrate the true nature of the dhamma sati is mindful of. It is a gradual growth from moment to moment. There are bound to be many moments of forgetfulness in between. But no need for impatience, satipatthaana is being accumulated.So, I cannot see a problem here, Howard as regards using the word satipatthana, including also right understanding of realities. Paññaa is the aim: right understanding of realities, this is the aim of satipatthana. ------------------ Ken:I suppose it is also true that the Buddha taught other things, and that different aspects of the teaching impinge differently on the variously constellated students of the Dhamma. ------------ N: Even when the Buddha taught daana, siila, samatha, satipatthaana was always implied. His teaching is unique, different from all other teachings. All kinds of kusala can be developed together with satipatthana. This is beneficial, otherwise one does not understand kusala as a dhamma. ----------- K: "Years ago, however, someone quoted K Sujin as having said, 'The Buddha taught satipatthana, and every word of his teaching should be understood in terms of satipatthana.....the purpose is always to teach the natureof the presently arisen conditioned reality." -------- Scott: Knowing the "nature of the presently arisen conditioned reality" is not easy to do yet its easy to see, at least intellectually, how this is rather essential. I see I have a favourite viewpoint these days: that being anatta. To support the statement you make, if I happen to think that it is anattaa that "is the entire Dhamma," then without the arisen application of mindfulness to condition the arisen awareness of a dhamma now there would be no way to know this dhamma from the perspective of anattaa. ------- In the chapter on The Meaning of Anatta,(A Survey of Paramattha Dhammas,) K. Sujin writes: "Before someone can understand that this body is anattaa and that even so this consciousness is anattaa, the characteristics of naama and ruupa appearing at this moment must be 'described, shown, made plain, set forth, made clear, analysed and expounded,' as we read in the sutta. Characteristics of naama and ruupa appear at this moment, while we see, hear, smell, taste, experience tangible object or think," (p.383). ------- N: Thank you, Scott, your post is really inspiring. Nina. #61030 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 8:23 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/3/06 3:01:14 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Bodily feeling is feeling which has bodysense, the rúpa which has the > capacity to receive bodily impressions, as condition; the feeling > itself is nåma, but it has rúpa (bodysense) as condition. When an > object contacts the bodysense, the feeling is either painful or > pleasant; there is no indifferent bodily feeling. When the bodily > feeling is painful it is akusala vipåka (the result of an unwholesome > deed), and when the bodily feeling is pleasant it is kusala vipåka > ===================== A question about feeling occurs to me, Nina. Exactly what is it, according to Abhidhamma, that is the specific kamma vipaka? As I understand the Abhidhammic teaching, though I stand to be corrected on this, each dhamma has its unique affective "taste"; i.e., given the dhamma, the "taste" (i.e., how the dhamma feels) is determined. Also, as I understand it, the operation of vedana is in effect all the time - that is, in every mindstate. So, what is it, then, that is kammically determined? Since the vedanic "taste" of a dhamma is determined by the dhamma, and the operation of vedana occurs whenever a dhamma is known, it would appear that what the kamma vipaka must be is either the dhamma that is object or the selection of that dhamma as object (i.e., as support for consciousness). Am I right or wrong in this according to Abhidhamma, Nina? With metta, Howard #61031 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 1:47 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Nina, Well, that's kind of you to say, the below... N: "Thank you, Scott, your post is really inspiring." ...but your reply is so full of information that to be fortunate enough to get such a reply is like having a magical ethereal book in which one finds clear and wise responses to seemingly any Dhamma question, no matter how abstruse. Enough rhetoric (although I mean it); thank *you* very much, Nina! I very much appreciate having the benefit of participating with you within this forum! Now back to re-reading that beautiful reply... With loving kindness, Scott. #61032 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 2:41 pm Subject: Normal buddhatrue Hi All, I was watching an episode of Nightline which featured child molesters. There was one child molester who was describing what his recovery had been like. He described how he had to change his way of thinking so that it didn't always go to sex and other destructive thoughts. You could tell that he was working real hard on getting rid of the destructive mind patterns of desire, but he wasn't being extremely successful. It was a daily struggle. He had gotten out of prison and because of public outrage; he was forced to live in a trailer, by himself, on the grounds of a prison. Helicopters passed over his trailer constantly and vigilantes camped out on the perimeters and watched his trailer with binoculars. People carried signs in protest calling him a monster. The television episode ended with him going back to jail because he had evidently said something alarming to his counselors during therapy that made them worried. What I kept thinking about was how hard this man was trying to be "normal". He wanted to present himself to the world as normal and well put-together. Maybe he was and maybe he wasn't, I don't know; but I was struck by how hard he was working toward that goal. This reminded me of how hard we all, even though we are torn asunder internally by desires everyday, try as hard as we can to appear "normal". Granted, most people are not as mentally disturbed as child molesters, but then again it is just a matter of degree. We are all insane and all deluded and the sooner we admit that to ourselves the better. And finally, in an insane world, the only thing really sane to do is practice mindfulness meditation. Everything else is really just a vain attempt at trying to appear "normal". Metta, James Ps. Just thought I would share my thoughts; not wanting to debate. #61033 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 2:55 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Reading and Hearing the Dhamma egberdina Hi Jon, On 04/07/06, jonoabb wrote: > > > I suggest that humans do not consciously operate at a level > > below name/form, so the basic unit of consciousness in my scheme is > > always a concept. > > > I'm afraid you've lost me here. But I understand that you are > proposing a scheme based on your own experience and observation. > Interesting though that may be, I'm not sure it helps the discussion > in this particular thread (the value of hearing dhamma vs. reading > dhamma). > I am obviously out of place here. Everyone else operates at a paramattha level, and I am the only silly duffer that is concepting all day. Enjoy your non-conceptual paramattha dhammas. Kind Regards Herman #61034 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 3:31 pm Subject: Re: Normal scottduncan2 Dear James, Hi! Interesting post. I hope you don't mind if I respond through the particular lens I've been using lately... J: "...He described how he had to change his way of thinking so that it didn't always go to sex and other destructive thoughts. You could tell that he was working real hard on getting rid of the destructive mind patterns of desire, but he wasn't being extremely successful. It was a daily struggle." I've worked with pedophiles in a clinical setting. Call me pessimistic: deep change is not often possible most cases. I'm sure I'd get a fair amount of disagreement from my peers. The notion that one can change one's thinking at the superficial conscious level and expect this to have an effect at the deeper and vastly more complex levels of the psyche is simply nonsensical (if not delusional in the conventional sense). But that wasn't my point (sorry for the brief diatribe); considering anatta, the man's attempt is as vain as would be mine if, in relation to the Dhamma, I were to announce to myself that after writing this post, I'll sit and work up some pa~n~na for awhile, know some dhammas, and then get the kids some supper. It is very hard to say what sort of accumulations and conditions are involved when pedophilia supervenes. J: "What I kept thinking about was how hard this man was trying to be "normal". He wanted to present himself to the world as normal and well put-together. Maybe he was and maybe he wasn't, I don't know; but I was struck by how hard he was working toward that goal. This reminded me of how hard we all, even though we are torn asunder internally by desires everyday, try as hard as we can to appear "normal". Granted, most people are not as mentally disturbed as child molesters, but then again it is just a matter of degree. We are all insane and all deluded and the sooner we admit that to ourselves the better." I like that last line. And I don't mean any disrespect for that poor guy in the story either. I get down on myself when cravings and desires keep arising. At least its good to think that the self that the world these days sees as so important and valuable and deserving of shoring up is actually not real. Thanks for the food for thought, James. [No debate? Are you off your food or something? ;-)) -look, I learned to make these little faces and I can't stop amusing myself.] With loving kindness, Scott. #61035 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 11:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Normal upasaka_howard Hi, James - I find wonderful compassion in this post of yours, James! Sadhu! :-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 7/3/06 5:56:55 PM Eastern Daylight Time, buddhatrue@... writes: > > Hi All, > > I was watching an episode of Nightline which featured child > molesters. There was one child molester who was describing what his > recovery had been like. He described how he had to change his way > of thinking so that it didn't always go to sex and other destructive > thoughts. You could tell that he was working real hard on getting > rid of the destructive mind patterns of desire, but he wasn't being > extremely successful. It was a daily struggle. He had gotten out > of prison and because of public outrage; he was forced to live in a > trailer, by himself, on the grounds of a prison. Helicopters passed > over his trailer constantly and vigilantes camped out on the > perimeters and watched his trailer with binoculars. People carried > signs in protest calling him a monster. The television episode > ended with him going back to jail because he had evidently said > something alarming to his counselors during therapy that made them > worried. > > What I kept thinking about was how hard this man was trying to > be "normal". He wanted to present himself to the world as normal > and well put-together. Maybe he was and maybe he wasn't, I don't > know; but I was struck by how hard he was working toward that goal. > This reminded me of how hard we all, even though we are torn asunder > internally by desires everyday, try as hard as we can to > appear "normal". Granted, most people are not as mentally disturbed > as child molesters, but then again it is just a matter of degree. > We are all insane and all deluded and the sooner we admit that to > ourselves the better. > > And finally, in an insane world, the only thing really sane to do is > practice mindfulness meditation. Everything else is really just a > vain attempt at trying to appear "normal". > > Metta, > James > > Ps. Just thought I would share my thoughts; not wanting to > debate. #61036 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 4:07 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Normal egberdina Hi James, > > I was watching an episode of Nightline which featured child > molesters. There was one child molester who was describing what his > recovery had been like. He described how he had to change his way > of thinking so that it didn't always go to sex and other destructive > thoughts. You could tell that he was working real hard on getting > rid of the destructive mind patterns of desire, but he wasn't being > extremely successful. It was a daily struggle. He had gotten out > of prison and because of public outrage; he was forced to live in a > trailer, by himself, on the grounds of a prison. Helicopters passed > over his trailer constantly and vigilantes camped out on the > perimeters and watched his trailer with binoculars. People carried > signs in protest calling him a monster. People can be so dishonest, hey? They do not own up to the monsters within themselves. (but believe me, we all know they are there) > We are all insane and all deluded and the sooner we admit that to > ourselves the better. > Hear, hear!! > And finally, in an insane world, the only thing really sane to do is > practice mindfulness meditation. Everything else is really just a > vain attempt at trying to appear "normal". > Amen to that. Keep well. Herman #61037 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 4:13 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal egberdina Hi Scott, > > I've worked with pedophiles in a clinical setting. Call me > pessimistic: deep change is not often possible most cases. I'm sure > I'd get a fair amount of disagreement from my peers. The notion that > one can change one's thinking at the superficial conscious level and > expect this to have an effect at the deeper and vastly more complex > levels of the psyche is simply nonsensical (if not delusional in the > conventional sense). > I am of the view that no-one with a deterministic view of the world should be allowed to work in the health care sector. Because in the guts of the matter, everyone tries to make their own prophecies real. Kind Regards Herman #61038 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 5:29 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Normal scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Interesting: H: "I am of the view that no-one with a deterministic view of the world should be allowed to work in the health care sector. Because in the guts of the matter, everyone tries to make their own prophecies real." If this view were to become policy there'd not be a single worker in the health care sector. There is no such person, believe me. Seriously, now. (I couldn't think of any other way to respond to your post, Herman.) With loving kindness, Scott. #61039 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 5:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal egberdina Hi Scott, On 04/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > Dear Herman, > > Interesting: > > H: "I am of the view that no-one with a deterministic view of the world > > should be allowed to work in the health care sector. Because in the > guts of the matter, everyone tries to make their own prophecies real." > > > If this view were to become policy there'd not be a single worker in > the health care sector. > > There is no such person, believe me. Seriously, now. > > Are you claiming that everyone has a deterministic outlook? Kind Regards Herman #61040 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 6:24 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) ken_aitch Hi Nina and Howard, We have been talking about citta at the mind-door experiencing an object that has just fallen away. Nina, you say there is no need to reason about it, and no doubt you are right, but it is one of those things like a loose tooth that we just can't leave alone. When you say there is no need to reason about it, I don't believe you are avoiding the question. I take you to be saying, 'That is the way absolute reality works, and, if it doesn't have an exact comparison in conventional reality, then so be it.' In conventional reality we say that we can look up and see the stars. But many (or most) of those stars blew up billions of years ago and ceased to exist. Even the ones that did not blow up are not seen as they are at this minute: we are seeing light that emitted from them in the long distant past. In the same way, objects that are six inches in front of our eyes are not being seen as they are now; they are being seen as they were one extremely small fraction of a second in the past. So absolute reality is not so different from conventional reality after all. Admittedly, we have the scientific explanation of light travel to explain the conventional reality, but who is to say there is not a similar explanation for the ultimate? I am happy to accept the explanation does exist but that, for enlightenment purposes at least, we do not need to reason about it. Ken H #61041 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 6:48 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Normal scottduncan2 Dear Herman, H: "Are you claiming that everyone has a deterministic outlook?" No, my apologies Herman. I blame the heat (30 degrees celius). I withdraw from the thread to the cool of the basement... With loving kindness, Scott. #61042 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 6:52 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Normal scottduncan2 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Scott Duncan" wrote: > > Dear Herman, > > H: "Are you claiming that everyone has a deterministic outlook?" > > No, my apologies Herman. I blame the heat (30 degrees celius). I > withdraw from the thread to the cool of the basement... > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > Uh, that would be "celsius" degrees actually... #61043 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 7:34 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal egberdina Hi Scott, On 04/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > Dear Herman, > > Interesting: > > H: "I am of the view that no-one with a deterministic view of the world > > should be allowed to work in the health care sector. Because in the > guts of the matter, everyone tries to make their own prophecies real." > > > If this view were to become policy there'd not be a single worker in > the health care sector. > > There is no such person, believe me. Seriously, now. > > (I couldn't think of any other way to respond to your post, Herman.) > > With loving kindness, In the past you have created the appearance of walking on eggshells, when it really wasn't necessary. But now you make a unilateral statement and ask me to take that only on your sayso, and, yes, you may safely assume that is leaving a bad taste in my mouth. You are in good company here with your desire to make unilateral statements. And until you explain, I will take the view that your "seriously, now" is nothing but a smug utterance, and that following it up with loving kindness is just icing on the cake. I can think of many other way to respond. And I have the freedom to not respond, but I am choosing to post this, as it is written. Herman #61044 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 7:53 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal lbidd2 Hi Herman, I'll discuss determinism with you. How do you define determinism? Larry #61045 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 7:51 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Normal scottduncan2 Dear Herman, H: "...But now you make a unilateral statement and ask me to take that only on your sayso, and, yes, you may safely assume that is leaving a bad taste in my mouth...And until you explain, I will take the view that your 'seriously, now' is nothing but a smug utterance, and that following it up with loving kindness is just icing on the cake. I can think of many other way to respond. And I have the freedom to not respond, but I am choosing to post this, as it is written." Yeah, you're correct, Herman, probably on all counts. Not very skillful of me. Again, my apologies. Sincerely and apologetically, Scott. #61046 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 11:57 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal egberdina Hi Larry, Thank you. (I'm still working on the Sartre stuff) On 04/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > Hi Herman, > > I'll discuss determinism with you. How do you define determinism? > Determinism, for me, is the view that everything has a cause. What do you reckon? Kind Regards Herman #61047 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 12:24 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Normal nilovg Hi James, thanks for sharing your thoughts. This reminded me of a remark Mike once made to me: all of us are insane, meaning, so long as there is ignorance and wrong view. I was thinking of you moving to Taiwan, when will this be? Good luck, Nina. Op 3-jul-2006, om 23:41 heeft buddhatrue het volgende geschreven: > > And finally, in an insane world, the only thing really sane to do is > practice mindfulness meditation. Everything else is really just a > vain attempt at trying to appear "normal". > #61048 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 2:50 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." nilovg Dear Scott, The Co. to the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (Topics of Abh. p. 259): I think this to be a warning of the danger of being in the cycle. BTW as to the Pali of the Cula suññatta sutta, "Atthi cevida.m asu~n~nata.m yadida.m imameva kaaya.m paticca salaayatanika.m jiivitapaccayeti", atthi means there is. cevida.m: is a sandhi, and I try: ce+eva+ida.m. I wish I could help more, but I have to work so hard on Tiika pali. Nina. Op 3-jul-2006, om 18:53 heeft Scott Duncan het volgende geschreven: > "...wishing for, tendency towards, inclination...liking, loving, being > given or inclined to...adherence to one's dogmas." > > Nonetheless, how is this a "bodily Tie?" #61049 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 3:32 am Subject: Abh in Daily Life, no 12. nilovg Hi Howard, In a message dated 7/3/06 3:01:14 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Bodily feeling is feeling which has bodysense, the rúpa which has the > capacity to receive bodily impressions, as condition; the feeling > itself is nåma, but it has rúpa (bodysense) as condition. When an > object contacts the bodysense, the feeling is either painful or > pleasant; there is no indifferent bodily feeling. When the bodily > feeling is painful it is akusala vipåka (the result of an unwholesome > deed), and when the bodily feeling is pleasant it is kusala vipåka > ===================== H: A question about feeling occurs to me, Nina. Exactly what is it, according to Abhidhamma, that is the specific kamma vipaka? As I understand the Abhidhammic teaching, though I stand to be corrected on this, each dhamma has its unique affective "taste"; i.e., given the dhamma, the "taste" (i.e., how the dhamma feels) is determined. Also, as I understand it, the operation of vedana is in effect all the time - that is, in every mindstate. ------- N: Yes, feeling accompanies each citta. Cittas can be of four jaatis: kusala akusala ,vipaaka or kiriya (inoperative). The accompanying feeling and all the other accompanying cetasikas are of the same jaati as the citta. thus, feeling can be kusala, akusala vipaaka or kiriya. Feeling feels, experiences the flavor of the object. Citta does not feel, it cognizes the object that presents itself. ------- H: So, what is it, then, that is kammically determined? --------- N: vipaaka. Vipaakacitta and cetasikas, including feeling. As I wrote: capacity to receive bodily impressions, as condition; the feeling > itself is nåma, but it has rúpa (bodysense) as condition. When an > object contacts the bodysense, the feeling is either painful or pleasant; there is no indifferent bodily feeling. > Bodily feeling accompanies the vipaakacitta (produced by kamma) that is body-consciousness. --------- H: Since the vedanic "taste" of a dhamma is determined by the dhamma, and the operation of vedana occurs whenever a dhamma is known, it would appear that what the kamma vipaka must be is either the dhamma that is object or the selection of that dhamma as object (i.e., as support for consciousness). Am I right or wrong in this according to Abhidhamma, Nina? _____ N: Painful feeling which is vipaaka can be an object of citta arising afterwards in a following mind-door process. In that process there are javanacittas that are either kusala cittas or akusala cittas. We usually have cittas with aversion that react to painful feeling. Did I answer your questions? Nina. #61050 From: Ken O Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 4:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Normal ashkenn2k Hi Nina and James Deluded yes, insane no :-) Cheers Ken O #61051 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:22 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Howard, Ken H., Herman, Nina, There is this, too, which I read this morning: "Even remembrance that arises and falls away is only a type of naama. If sati is aware of naama and ruupa and pa~n~na understands them clearly, one can let go of the wrong view of a self or a person who exists in this life. One has realised the characteristic of momentary death (kha.nika mara.na) of realities, their passing away at each moment," (A Survey of Paramattha Dhammas, p. 393). Might this serve as a description of satipa.t.thaana, in a way? With loving kindness, Scott. #61052 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:28 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." scottduncan2 N: "The Co. to the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (Topics of Abh. p. 259): They are the ties of the body in that they tie the physical body with the mental body or the future body with the present body; they bind so that escape is difficult. I think this to be a warning of the danger of being in the cycle." Thank you, that makes sense. N: "BTW as to the Pali of the Cula su��atta sutta, "Atthi cevida.m asu~n~nata.m yadida.m imameva kaaya.m paticcasalaayatanika.m jiivitapaccayeti", atthi means there is. cevida.m: is a sandhi, and I try: ce+eva+ida.m. I wish I could help more, but I have to work so hard on Tiika pali." No problem, Nina, I appreciate the input. I'm aware that you are very busy. I'll work with the above. I still need to do more breaking up the compounds, as with "cevida.m." With loving kindness, Scott. #61053 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Mon Jul 3, 2006 11:39 pm Subject: The Clothes ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: Venerable Sariputta explains the Seven Links to Awakening! Venerable Sariputta once said: Friends! Friend; the Bhikkhus replied. Venerable Sariputta then explained this: Friends, there are these Seven Links to Awakening. What seven? 1: The Awareness Link to Awakening. 2: The Investigation Link to Awakening. 3: The Energy Link to Awakening. 4: The Joy Link to Awakening. 5: The Tranquillity to Awakening. 6: The Concentration Link to Awakening. 7: The Equanimity Link to Awakening. These are the Seven Links to Awakening. In whichever of these Seven Links to Awakening, I wish to dwell in the morning, in that I abide in the morning; in whichever I wish to dwell at noon, in that I abide at noon; in whichever I wish to dwell in the evening, in that I abide in the evening... Suppose a king or a minister had a cupboard full of clothes of many various colours, then whichever pair of clothes he wished to put on in the morning, that he would put on in the morning; whichever clothes he wished to put on at noon, that he would put on at noon; & whichever clothes he wished to put on in the evening, that he would put on in the evening: so too, in whichever of these Seven Links to Awakening, I wish to abide in for whatever period, in that indeed I easily abide dwelling fully absorbed... If it occurs to me that now there is The Awareness Link to Awakening present in me, then it occurs to me that it is measureless, & it occurs to me that it is well established; and while it is remaining I know that it remains; and if it falls away in me, then I know that it falls away caused by this or that specific condition & definable circumstance! So too with the other six links to awakening. I note & know their presence & ceasing. Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V: 70-1] section 46: The Links.4: The Clothes... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. #61054 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:48 am Subject: Buddhism’s Answer to Fundamentalism egberdina Hi Christine, or anyone else that may know what transpired at the 4th Global Conference on Buddhism. What was the upshot of the above agenda item? Kind Regards Herman #61055 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 6:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Reading and Hearing the Dhamma jonoabb Hi Herman --- Herman Hofman wrote: > Hi Jon, > > On 04/07/06, jonoabb wrote: > > > > > > I suggest that humans do not consciously operate at a level > > > below name/form, so the basic unit of consciousness in my scheme is > > > always a concept. > > > > > > I'm afraid you've lost me here. But I understand that you are > > proposing a scheme based on your own experience and observation. > > Interesting though that may be, I'm not sure it helps the discussion > > in this particular thread (the value of hearing dhamma vs. reading > > dhamma). > > > > I am obviously out of place here. Everyone else operates at a > paramattha level, and I am the only silly duffer that is concepting > all day. Enjoy your non-conceptual paramattha dhammas. I'm sorry if I have somehow given offence. I would really like to understand what you mean by "humans do not consciously operate at a level below name/form", if you would care to explain or give an example. I took you to be saying it was your own idea about things (as opposed to your understanding of the teachings), but if I am mistaken then my apologies (and of course there is no reason why folks should not float their own theories on things). As regards 'concepting all day', we are all in the same boat, that is to say, there is a lot of it going on all the time but, if we are to pay any regard to what is said in the texts, there are also numerous moments that do not involve conceptualisation, for example, the moments of actual experience of objects at the 5 sense doors. What is your take on this? As regards concepting/conceptualisation, there is to be distinguished (again, according to the texts) that which is kusala, and that which is akusala and, within the former, that which is accompanied by panna and that which is not. I do not quite see how this relates to our thread on reading vs. hearing, but I'm sure it will become clearer ;-)). Jon #61056 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 6:15 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." egberdina Hi Scott, > N: "The Co. to the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (Topics of Abh. p. 259): > > > They are the ties of the body in that they tie the physical body > with the mental body or the future body with the present body; they > bind so that escape is difficult. > > I think this to be a warning of the danger of being in the cycle." > > > Thank you, that makes sense. > So, how does a mind/body dualism reading of Buddhism make sense to you? Herman #61057 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 6:27 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Normal buddhatrue Hi Nina, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Hi James, > I was thinking of you moving to Taiwan, when will this be? > Good luck, > Nina. Thanks. I will be moving to Taiwan at the end of this month. I will send you some updates off-list. Metta, James #61058 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 4:05 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/4/06 6:33:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > In a message dated 7/3/06 3:01:14 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > vangorko@... writes: > > >Bodily feeling is feeling which has bodysense, the rúpa which has the > >capacity to receive bodily impressions, as condition; the feeling > >itself is nåma, but it has rúpa (bodysense) as condition. When an > >object contacts the bodysense, the feeling is either painful or > >pleasant; there is no indifferent bodily feeling. When the bodily > >feeling is painful it is akusala vipåka (the result of an unwholesome > >deed), and when the bodily feeling is pleasant it is kusala vipåka > > > ===================== > H: A question about feeling occurs to me, Nina. Exactly what is it, > according to Abhidhamma, that is the specific kamma vipaka? As I > understand the > Abhidhammic teaching, though I stand to be corrected on this, each > dhamma has its > unique affective "taste"; i.e., given the dhamma, the "taste" (i.e., > how the > dhamma feels) is determined. Also, as I understand it, the operation > of vedana > is in effect all the time - that is, in every mindstate. > > ------- > > N: Yes, feeling accompanies each citta. Cittas can be of four jaatis: > kusala akusala ,vipaaka or kiriya (inoperative). The accompanying > feeling and all the other accompanying cetasikas are of the same > jaati as the citta. thus, feeling can be kusala, akusala vipaaka or > kiriya. ---------------------------------- Howard: Okay, but my question still remains. -------------------------------- > > Feeling feels, experiences the flavor of the object. Citta does not > feel, it cognizes the object that presents itself. ------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I know that. ------------------------------ > > ------- > > H: So, what is it, > then, that is kammically determined? > > --------- > > N: vipaaka. Vipaakacitta and cetasikas, including feeling. > > As I wrote: which has the >capacity to receive bodily impressions, as condition; > the feeling >itself is nåma, but it has rúpa (bodysense) as > condition. When an >object contacts the bodysense, the feeling is > either painful or pleasant; there is no indifferent bodily feeling. > ------------------------------------- Howard: I'm sorry, Nina. I don't see how this pertains to what I asked. ----------------------------------- > > Bodily feeling accompanies the vipaakacitta (produced by kamma) that > is body-consciousness. --------------------------------- Howard: Okay. ------------------------------- > > --------- > > H: Since the vedanic "taste" of a dhamma is > determined by the dhamma, and the operation of vedana occurs whenever > a dhamma is > known, it would appear that what the kamma vipaka must be is either > the dhamma > that is object or the selection of that dhamma as object (i.e., as > support > for consciousness). Am I right or wrong in this according to > Abhidhamma, Nina? > > _____ > > N: Painful feeling which is vipaaka can be an object of citta arising > afterwards in a following mind-door process. In that process there > are javanacittas that are either kusala cittas or akusala cittas. We > usually have cittas with aversion that react to painful feeling. -------------------------------------- Howard: I'm sorry, but I don't see what that has to do with my question. -------------------------------------- > > Did I answer your questions? ---------------------------------------- Howard: I'm really sorry, Nina, but your answer still leaves in place what I haven't understood. Let me try to be clearer: Above there is the following part of your reply: - - - - - - - - - - H: So, what is it, then, that is kammically determined? --------- N: vipaaka. Vipaakacitta and cetasikas, including feeling. - - - - - - - - - - - From that, I understand you to be saying that all aspects of the current state are the vipaka. Now, let us say that the current state is the fruition of kamma, K. What might have been different had K not occurred? Would the dhamma that is the current object not have arisen, or would it have arisen but not as support for the current citta, or something else? My point is that if that same dhamma were to arise as object of the current citta even if K had not occurred, what could be different? Possibly some of the other cetasikas, but not the feeling (for the feeling operation would be "tasting" the same object, and thus experirncing the same "taste"). *In the original post of yours to which I was replying, it seemed to me you were saying that it is the FEELING that is kamma vipaka. My point then was that the feeling-taste "comes with" the object; so it could not be the feeling that is vipaka, but the dhamma itself that has that particular "taste". * What you had said was "When the bodily feeling is painful it is akusala vipåka (the result of an unwholesome deed), and when the bodily feeling is pleasant it is kusala vipåka ------------------------------------------- > > Nina. > ======================= With metta, Howard #61059 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 8:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: >Hi, Nina - > >In a message dated 7/3/06 6:42:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, >vangorko@... writes: > > > >>Hi Ken H, >>hear, hear! >>Satipa.t.thaana is the Buddha's teaching par excellence. He taught >>that all dhammas are anattaa, and this can be realized by the >>development of insight. The development of vipassanaa, or of the >>eightfold Path, these amount to the development of seeing dhammas as >>they really are. >> >> >========================= > I don't get it! Is it a DSG or Khun Sujin idiosyncratic usage of >'satipatthana' to take it to mean "development of insight" and "development of >vipassanaa", when the meaning of the term is "development - or establishing, or >foundation - of mindfulness"? > You go on to say "If we read the suttas carefully, we can see that the >suttas speak about forgetfulness and mindfulness of the realities that >appear. They are exhortations to be mindful. Yes, I also could go on forever." > Yes, indeed. I agree completely! Mindfulness and the exhortation to >vigorously cultivate it is stressed again and again in the suttas, and it >certainly should be. My point was that identifying 'satipatthana' with 'pa~n~na' is >an odd practice that is inexplicable. The term 'satipatthana' involves sati, >not pa~n~na. > As you correctly point out (and is not questioned by anyone here, I would say), sati and panna are 2 different mantal factors, and while panna necessarily involves sati, sati may arise without panna. However, when we look at the text of the Satipatthana Sutta we see that what is being spoken of is the development of insight, nothing less. When it says (and I paraphrase) 'When going, he knows he is going',or 'He knows mind with anger as mind with anger', the knowing in question is knowing with panna of the level of insight, as I understand it. Putting aside the (agreed) difference between the mental factor of sati and the mental factor of panna, do you see a difference between the development spoken of in the Satipatthana Sutta and the development of insight/vipassana bhavana? > The fact that pa~n~na crucially depends on sati is just that - a fact. >The fact that sati always occurs when pa~n~na does is reflected by the >combination-term 'satipa~n~na'. But the fact that 'satipa~n~na' sounds a lot like >'satipatthana' shouldn't cause anyone to confuse satipatthana with wisdom (in >case that sound similarity had some slight influence). There is sati, there is >satipatthana, there is pa~n~na, and there is satipa~n~na. They are all related. >But they are distinguishable. > The Buddha took already extant terminology, such as 'kamma', and >changed its meaning to express the (imo) true Dhamma. But he was the Buddha! Why >not leave meaning changes to him? > > No argument from me here. But the Buddha also taught the same thing in different ways (such as the different ways of classifying dhammas, use of the terms mano, vinnana and citta for mind). Jon #61060 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 8:36 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa jonoabb Hi Joop Joop wrote: >Hallo all > >In a interview with the journal 'Inquiring Mind' Bhikkhu Bodhi tells >about his translation work of the Suttas ( >www.inquiringmind.com/Articles/Translator.html ) >But also he answers a question that interest me too: the role of >Buddhaghosa in Theravada. >A quote that give me the impression that BB is less buddhaghosian >(some don't like the term 'orthodox) than I thought. It's a reason >again to prefer the Suttas more than commentaries on it. > Interesting article. I had noticed in his translation of the Samyutta Nikaya that Bhikkhu Bodhi has no hesitation in questioning the commentarial interpretation of sutta passages. Regarding your closing comment ('It's a reason again to prefer the Suttas more than commentaries on it'), the fact is that there is so much left unsaid in the suttas that they cannot be 'read' without a considerable amount of 'interpretation', and I think you'll find that there is no general consensus on their meaning when taken alone (or as a body of work) without reference to other supporting material. By the way, would you agree that individual suttas need to be read in the context of the body of suttas as a whole? Jon #61061 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 8:36 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: >Hi, Jon - > >In a message dated 6/30/06 11:22:02 AM Eastern Daylight Time, >jonabbott@... writes: > > > >>Hi Howard >> >>Thanks very much for this reply and further explanation. However, I >>still have no idea what folks have in mind when they talk about >>dhamma-level analysis of inter-stream relations. My difficulty is >>that as I see it the analysis of dhammas as found in the texts as >>being all encompassing. What sort of matters would a dhamma-level >>analysis of inter-stream relations cover? >> >>Jon >> >==================== > Okay. :-) > Actually, the issue isn't important. It is true that all we need to >know is, in fact, all we can directky know, namely whatever arises in one's own >mindstream. > > An uncharacteristically meek Howard response ;-)) Hope you're not just saying this to avoid further discussion on the topic ;-)). Jon #61062 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:33 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 7/4/06 11:37:21 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > Hi Howard > > upasaka@... wrote: > > >Hi, Nina - > > > >In a message dated 7/3/06 6:42:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > >vangorko@... writes: > > > > > > > >>Hi Ken H, > >>hear, hear! > >>Satipa.t.thaana is the Buddha's teaching par excellence. He taught > >>that all dhammas are anattaa, and this can be realized by the > >>development of insight. The development of vipassanaa, or of the > >>eightfold Path, these amount to the development of seeing dhammas as > >>they really are. > >> > >> > >========================= > > I don't get it! Is it a DSG or Khun Sujin idiosyncratic usage of > >'satipatthana' to take it to mean "development of insight" and "development > of > >vipassanaa", when the meaning of the term is "development - or > establishing, or > >foundation - of mindfulness"? > > You go on to say "If we read the suttas carefully, we can see that the > >suttas speak about forgetfulness and mindfulness of the realities that > >appear. They are exhortations to be mindful. Yes, I also could go on > forever." > > Yes, indeed. I agree completely! Mindfulness and the exhortation to > >vigorously cultivate it is stressed again and again in the suttas, and it > >certainly should be. My point was that identifying 'satipatthana' with > 'pa~n~na' is > >an odd practice that is inexplicable. The term 'satipatthana' involves > sati, > >not pa~n~na. > > > > As you correctly point out (and is not questioned by anyone here, I > would say), sati and panna are 2 different mantal factors, and while > panna necessarily involves sati, sati may arise without panna. -------------------------------------- Howard: Good! We are "on the same page". -------------------------------------- > > However, when we look at the text of the Satipatthana Sutta we see that > what is being spoken of is the development of insight, nothing less. -------------------------------------- Howard: Of course it is. And what this sutta specifically teaches are the four areas to which mindfulness should be applied in order to cultivate that insight. Satipatthana is the setting up or framing or establishing of that mindfulness. The word 'satipatthana' is just not a synonym for 'pa~n~na' or for 'pa~n~na bhavana'. An analogy, Jon: Kamma leads to kamma vipaka. But 'kamma' should NOT be taken as synonym for 'kamma vipaka'. There is just no reason to create a new meaning for 'satipatthana'! Why was that done, Jon? Do you know? When language is clear, why in the world should it then be muddled? ------------------------------ > When it says (and I paraphrase) 'When going, he knows he is going',or > 'He knows mind with anger as mind with anger', the knowing in question > is knowing with panna of the level of insight, as I understand it. > > Putting aside the (agreed) difference between the mental factor of sati > and the mental factor of panna, do you see a difference between the > development spoken of in the Satipatthana Sutta and the development of > insight/vipassana bhavana? -------------------------------- Howard: Please see what I wrote above. As satipatthana (as an activity rather than on the sense of a domain of application of that activity) proceeds properly in concert with other kusala conditions, more and more frequently and with greater and greater clarity, pa~n~na arises. That is, of course (!), the point of establishing mindfulness. -------------------------------- > > > The fact that pa~n~na crucially depends on sati is just that - a fact. > >The fact that sati always occurs when pa~n~na does is reflected by the > >combination-term 'satipa~n~na'. But the fact that 'satipa~n~na' sounds a > lot like > >'satipatthana' shouldn't cause anyone to confuse satipatthana with wisdom > (in > >case that sound similarity had some slight influence). There is sati, there > is > >satipatthana, there is pa~n~na, and there is satipa~n~na. They are all > related. > >But they are distinguishable. > > The Buddha took already extant terminology, such as 'kamma', and > >changed its meaning to express the (imo) true Dhamma. But he was the > Buddha! Why > >not leave meaning changes to him? > > > > > > No argument from me here. But the Buddha also taught the same thing in > different ways (such as the different ways of classifying dhammas, use > of the terms mano, vinnana and citta for mind). -------------------------------------- Howard: In my opinion, a neologism created for no good reason is worse than useless. It simply destroys precision and clarity of thought. ------------------------------------- > > Jon > > ================= With metta, Howard #61063 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 7/4/06 11:51:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > > Okay. :-) > > Actually, the issue isn't important. It is true that all we need to > >know is, in fact, all we can directky know, namely whatever arises in one's > own > >mindstream. > > > > > > An uncharacteristically meek Howard response ;-)) Hope you're not just > saying this to avoid further discussion on the topic ;-)). > > Jon > ====================== My "meek" response (LOL!) has a 2-fold basis: 1) It is true that all that we directly know arises as our "own" experience, and only direct experience can be freeing. In that sense, the issue isn't important. 2) From a theoretical point of view, especially as regards the causal basis for "shared" (better really to say "corresponding") experience and as regards the matter of ethics, this matter of multiple mindstreams and their interaction is extremely important! However, the topic is extraordinarily deep and complex, and *not having any (paramattha-level) teachings by the Buddha on this to rely on, I would find it too much of a burden, too wearisome, to get into. ========================= With metta, Howard * BTW, some Mahayana sutras (like the monstrously huge Avatamsaka Sutra) do address the issue of stream interactions, but such suttas will be of no help as they are a) clearly not, IMO, the word of the Buddha, b) very allegorical and phantasmagorical (especially the Avatamsaka Sutra), and c) still insufficiently precise. #61064 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 10:38 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life , 13. nilovg Dear friends, Though bodily feeling and mental feeling are both nåma, they are entirely different kinds of feelings, arising because of different conditions. When there are no more conditions for dosa there can still be painful bodily feeling, but there is no longer unpleasant (mental) feeling. The arahat, the perfected one who has eradicated all defilements, may still have akusala vipåka so long as his life has not terminated yet, but he has no aversion. We read in the Kindred Sayings (I, Sagåthå-vagga, the Måra-suttas, chapter II, §3, The Splinter): Thus have I heard: The Exalted One was once staying at Råjagaha, in the Maddakucchi, at the Deer-preserve. Now at that time his foot was injured by a splinter. Sorely indeed did the Exalted One feel it, grievous the pains he suffered in the body, keen and sharp, acute, distressing and unwelcome. He truly bore them, mindful and deliberate, nor was he cast down... Feelings are sixfold when they are classified by way of the contacts occurring through the six doors: there is feeling which arises because of what is experienced through the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the bodysense and the mind. All these feelings are different; they arise because of different conditions. Feeling arises and falls away together with the citta it accompanies and thus at each moment feeling is different. We read in the Kindred Sayings (IV, Saîåyatana-vagga, Part II, Kindred Sayings about Feeling, §8, Sickness II) that the Buddha said to the monks: ... Monks, a monk should meet his end collected and composed. This is our instruction to you. ... Now, monks, as that monk dwells collected, composed, earnest, ardent, strenuous, there arises in him feeling that is pleasant, and he thus understands: ``There is arisen in me this pleasant feeling. Now that is owing to something, not without cause. It is owing to this contact. Now this contact is impermanent, compounded, arisen owing to something. Owing to this impermanent contact which has so arisen, this pleasant feeling has arisen: How can that be permanent?'' Thus he dwells contemplating the impermanence in contact and pleasant feeling, contemplating their transience, their waning, their ceasing, the giving of them up. Thus as he dwells contemplating their impermanence... the lurking tendency to lust for contact and pleasant feeling is abandoned in him. So also as regards contact and painful feeling... contact and neutral feeling... ******* Nina. #61065 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 11:21 am Subject: Buddhism and Solipsism, the Moon. nilovg Hi Ken H, ------- Ken: We have been talking about citta at the mind-door experiencing an object that has just fallen away... In conventional reality we say that we can look up and see the stars. But many (or most) of those stars blew up billions of years ago and ceased to exist. Even the ones that did not blow up are not seen as they are at this minute: we are seeing light that emitted from them in the long distant past. In the same way, objects that are six inches in front of our eyes are not being seen as they are now; they are being seen as they were one extremely small fraction of a second in the past. -------- N:Khun Sujin would say: it does not matter. Seeing just sees visible object now. In Thai you say, mai pen rai (it does not matter). It has a lot of meaning: do not speculate, reason so much, do not worry. There is this moment to attend to. I try to explain somewhat more, otherwise you may still wonder. A citta or cetasika can be the object (be it by way of thinking about or by mindfulness and understanding) of another citta, but this citta could not arise in the same process. In one process all the cittas have only one object, be it a sense object or an idea or concept. Thus one citta among the cittas in the same process could not select a preceding citta (in that same process) and take that as object. All of them are engaged with that one object. Since processes succeed one another so fast an object that has fallen away can still be experienced by cittas in a following process. For all practical purposes it is still present. Kh Sujin would tell me: it is not yesterday’s. A text in the Expositor speaks about an object experienced through the cittas of the mind-door (p. 400): <’Arisen by means of the six modes of (sense-) cognition’ means that only matter as now present should be understood by means of all the six modes of cognition. That is fixed by the cognition of the five senses, but these cognitions do not cognize the past and the future; only sense-mind cognition does that; it falls into the stream of the fivefold cognition and goes along with it.’ > ------- K: So absolute reality is not so different from conventional reality after all. ----------- N: It is different: it has an unalterable characteristic, no matter how you name it. Take the moon. In the Dhammasangani, under colour, some examples are: colour of the disc of moon, sun, stars...These are examples taken from conventional language to show that colours are different because of conditions. We do not see only a grey colour. There are many, but Kh Sujin would ask: can you count all the colours in this room? No, but they are, all of them, seen. We do not always define: this is the moon, there are also many moments of just seeing colour. Or she would aks us: what colour shirt was so and so wearing? It means: seeing sees all that is visible, but there is not always defining: here is this colour or that colour. Colour has an unalterable characteristic: it is seen through the eyes, and it cannot be changed into sound. ----------- K: Admittedly, we have the scientific explanation of light travel to explain the conventional reality, but who is to say there is not a similar explanation for the ultimate? I am happy to accept the explanation does exist but that, for enlightenment purposes at least, we do not need to reason about it. ------ N: The ultimate is more simple, direct: it can be experienced. We do not need so many words. Elaborating about ‘it does not matter’: Kh Sujin often says it does not matter and I think it helpful. Someone does not like to be distracted or is worried about sati arising so seldom. It does not matter. ‘And if it matters, it shows that there is clinging’. Nina. #61066 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 11:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... nilovg Dear Scott, absolutely. A very good quote. Momentary death, this is very essential. It is realized through the development of satipatthaana, mindfulness and understanding of naama and ruupa. Nina. Op 4-jul-2006, om 14:22 heeft Scott Duncan het volgende geschreven: > "Even remembrance that arises and falls away is only a type of naama. > If sati is aware of naama and ruupa and pa~n~na understands them > clearly, one can let go of the wrong view of a self or a person who > exists in this life. One has realised the characteristic of > momentary death (kha.nika mara.na) of realities, their passing away at > each moment," (A Survey of Paramattha Dhammas, p. 393). > > Might this serve as a description of satipa.t.thaana, in a way? #61067 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 11:34 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." nilovg Hi Herman, I get into trouble with philosophical terms like dualism. Nina. Op 4-jul-2006, om 15:15 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > So, how does a mind/body dualism reading of Buddhism make sense to > you? #61068 From: "Christine Forsyth" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 2:23 pm Subject: Re: Buddhism’s Answer to Fundamentalism christine_fo... --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Christine, > > or anyone else that may know what transpired at the 4th Global > Conference on Buddhism. > > What was the upshot of the above agenda item? > > > Kind Regards > > > Herman > Hello Herman, I will have a look at the DVD of the session when I get time, to refresh my memory and get back to you. The session was chaired by Ajahn Brahmavamso, and the speakers had fifteen minutes each. This was followed by questions from the audience of 900 attendees. The speakers were: Rev. Heng Sure ordained in 1976 at the City of Ten Thousand Buddhas, after receiving his M.A. from UC Berkeley's Oriental Languages Department at in 1976, and a Ph.D. from the Graduate Theological Union (GTU) in 2003. After thirty years in robes he become the senior monastic disciple of the late Chan Master Hsuan Hua. He speaks Mandarin Chinese, French and bit of Japanese in making translations of Buddhist texts. Rev. Heng Sure a Trustee of the United Religions Initiative since 1997 and serves as a Board member of the Interfaith Center at the Presidio. He also directs the Berkeley Buddhist Monastery and have taught at the GTU seminary since 1997. He grew up in Toledo, Ohio and is involved in translating Buddhist music, both liturgical and popular, into the West. The Honorable Dr Geoff Gallop – was born in Geraldton on 27 September 1951. He was awarded the Rhodes Scholarship in 1972 and graduated in philosophy, politics and economics at the University of Oxford in 1974. After gaining a Master of Philosophy degree at Murdoch University he returned to Oxford where he was a Research Fellow at Nuffield College from 1979 to 1981. He was awarded his doctorate by Oxford University in 1983. In 1986 he contested and won the seat of Victoria Park for the Australian Labor Party in the Legislative Assembly. In February 2001, Dr Geoff Gallop was elected the 31st Premier of Western Australia and Minister for Public Sector Management, Federal Affairs, Science, Citizenship and Multicultural Interests. Premier Gallop was returned to office in February 2005. Ven. Thich Quang Ba, Spiritual Director of the Sakyamuni Buddhist Centre in Canberra. metta Christine ---The trouble is that you think you have time--- #61069 From: "matheesha" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 3:46 pm Subject: bhikkhuni samyutta matheesha333 Just read this wonderful little sutta from the bhikkhuni samyutta. I was struck by the depth of insight into suffering. I suspect if someone tried to simply convince themselves of this, they would verve on the edge of depression, rather than insight. Direct knowledge is essential. with metta, "Why now do you assume 'a being'? Mara, have you grasped a view? This is a heap of sheer constructions: Here no being is found. Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word 'chariot' is used, So, when the aggregates are present, There's the convention 'a being.' It's only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn05/sn05.010.bodh.html #61070 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:21 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal lbidd2 Hi Herman, H: "(I'm still working on the Sartre stuff)" L: Don't sweat it. I went ahead and joined the existlist group and I'm slaking my thirst for dark drama. H: "Determinism, for me, is the view that everything has a cause. What do you reckon?" L: Okay, what's the problem with that? Larry #61071 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:39 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Hi Howard, H: "In the original post of yours to which I was replying, it seemed to me you were saying that it is the FEELING that is kamma vipaka. My point then was that the feeling-taste "comes with" the object; so it could not be the feeling that is vipaka, but the dhamma itself that has that particular "taste". * What you had said was "When the bodily feeling is painful it is akusala vipåka (the result of an unwholesome deed), and when the bodily feeling is pleasant it is kusala vipåka" L: I haven't been following this thread and I don't 100% understand your question, but I can say feeling "comes with" the consciousness. Take a soft rupa, for example. Some consciousnesses of softness are pleasant and some are unpleasant. Body consciousness is kamma resultant so whatever feeling arises with that consciousness is a result of kamma. However, feeling also arises with consciousnesses that are not resultant. So that feeling is not resultant. Feeling arises with every consciousness. I think there are some very tricky goings-on with regard to resultant feeling in the dependent arising. I have a theory about it but it might be better to wait until we see the commentary. Larry #61072 From: Ken O Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 6:02 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. ashkenn2k Hi Howard > > ===================== > > H: A question about feeling occurs to me, Nina. Exactly what is > it, according to Abhidhamma, that is the specific kamma vipaka? As I understand the Abhidhammic teaching, though I stand to be corrected on this, each dhamma has its unique affective "taste"; i.e., given the dhamma, the "taste"(i.e., how the dhamma feels) is determined. Also, as I understand it, the operation of vedana is in effect all the time - that is, in every mindstate. ------- k: Some objects are disagreeable and others are agreeable according to vipaka kamma. According to Dispeller of Delusion pg - 11, their distinction is by way of the average human being. Just like smelling dung is always unpleasant vedana (vipaka kamma) object. Cheers Ken O #61073 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 2:27 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/4/06 8:42:13 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > L: I haven't been following this thread and I don't 100% understand your > question, but I can say feeling "comes with" the consciousness. Take a > soft rupa, for example. Some consciousnesses of softness are pleasant > and some are unpleasant. Body consciousness is kamma resultant so > whatever feeling arises with that consciousness is a result of kamma. > ==================== It has been my understanding that the Abhidhammic take is that pleasant softness is a different rupa from unpleasant softness - that the vedanic taste of an object of consciousness is not something associayed with the knowing but a feature of that object. Did I misunderstand? With metta, Howard #61074 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 2:42 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/4/06 9:03:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@... writes: > Hi Howard > > >>===================== > >>H: A question about feeling occurs to me, Nina. Exactly what is > >it, according to Abhidhamma, that is the specific kamma vipaka? As > I understand the Abhidhammic teaching, though I stand to be corrected > on this, each dhamma has its unique affective "taste"; i.e., given > the dhamma, the "taste"(i.e., how the dhamma feels) is determined. > Also, as I understand it, the operation of vedana is in effect all > the time - that is, in every mindstate. > ------- > > k: Some objects are disagreeable and others are agreeable according > to vipaka kamma. According to Dispeller of Delusion pg - 11, their > distinction is by way of the average human being. Just like smelling > dung is always unpleasant vedana (vipaka kamma) object. -------------------------------------- Howard: Some people might enjoy the smell, finding it pleasant (either consistently or at various times). My understanding of the Abhidhamma perspective on this is that there is no "dung smell" as a single thing, but, instead, there are multiple instances of "dung smell", each a different rupa, and each with its own vedanic "taste", so that a pleasant dung smell in a given mindstream is simply a different object than an unpleasant dung smell in that same mindstream or in another. The pleasantness or unpleasantness is entirely associated with the specific object (at a specific time in a specific mindstream.) That differs from the commonsense view that object X, independent of specific instance, always has the same "taste", and it also differs from the even more commonsense view that object X has no inherent "taste" but has "taste" imposed on it by the particular mindstate. -------------------------------------- > > > Cheers > Ken O > > ==================== With metta, Howard #61075 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 7:07 pm Subject: "no posture" scottduncan2 Dear All Ever read something that really hit home? "In the sixfold sense-sphere (phasaayatana) there is no posture," (A Survey..., p. 388). Heavy. With loving kindness, Scott. #61076 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 7:21 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Hi Howard, H: "It has been my understanding that the Abhidhammic take is that pleasant softness is a different rupa from unpleasant softness - that the vedanic taste of an object of consciousness is not something associated with the knowing but a feature of that object. Did I misunderstand?" L: Pleasant softness is a characteristic of a different concept than unpleasant softness. One might say the softness of a worm is the same as the softness of spaghetti but the kamma result is different if that softness is experienced in the mouth. You might trip over a rotting corpse or you might fall out of a window and land on a rotting corpse. In one case the softness is a hindrance and in the other the softness is a help. I think this element of conceptuality in kamma theory may speak to the underlying conceptuality of kamma formations. But who knows, it's a difficult subject. Larry #61077 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 7:24 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." scottduncan2 Dear Herman, N: "I think this to be a warning of the danger of being in the cycle." S: "Thank you, that makes sense." H: "So, how does a mind/body dualism reading of Buddhism make sense to you?" Sorry, I meant to reply to Nina that her answer regarding the "bodily tie" thing made sense, not to suggest that "mind/body dualism" made sense to me. With loving kindness, Scott. #61078 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 3:52 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/4/06 10:23:53 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > H: "It has been my understanding that the Abhidhammic take is that > pleasant softness is a different rupa from unpleasant softness - that > the vedanic taste of an object of consciousness is not something > associated with the knowing but a feature of that object. Did I > misunderstand?" > > L: Pleasant softness is a characteristic of a different concept than > unpleasant softness. > ---------------------------------------- Howard: I didn't have concepts in mind here. I'm talking about two kinds of rupa, a pleasant softness and an unpeasant softness. ---------------------------------------- One might say the softness of a worm is the same as> > the softness of spaghetti but the kamma result is different if that > softness is experienced in the mouth. -------------------------------------- Howard: No, I don't think so. The softness in either case is probably felt the same. The pleasantness or unpleasantness is not the feel of the rupas, but of the thoughts, which are not the same objects as the rupas. Imagine having a dead worm in the mouth or spaghetti in the mouth with no thoughts at all at the time. Whichever it is, noodles or worms, the softness would probably be the same in feeling. If one is then told that it is spaghetti, there might be felt pleasantness, but if one is told it is worms, there would be felt unpleasantness (and revulsion), regardless of what the facts are. The pleasant or unpleasant object in this case is not the softness rupa, but is a concept. -------------------------------------- You might trip over a rotting > > corpse or you might fall out of a window and land on a rotting corpse. > In one case the softness is a hindrance and in the other the softness is > a help. > ------------------------------------- Howard: The particular rupa will have whatever feel/"taste" it has. Which rupa with which feel arises may well be conditioned in part by prior thought, but the rupa that actually arises has whatever vedanic feel it has. The vedanic taste is not a cetasika - it is a characteristic of the object, and the namic cetasika of vedana experiences feels the object - it is the experiencing of that taste. --------------------------------------- I think this element of conceptuality in kamma theory may speak> > to the underlying conceptuality of kamma formations. But who knows, it's > a difficult subject. > > Larry > > ==================== With metta, Howard #61079 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 4:39 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles dacostacharles Hi Kenneth, I believe the most common presentation of OD is "the 12-links in a chain of causation." This is linear approach; just do not add anything to it or take anything away from it. Now, from my-standpoint, this linear approach could be used in many ways too; it really depends on what you need. I tend to see this approach as more of a model than a practice. It is a model of why there is suffering and death. Because there is ignorance, there must be . Because there is birth there will be . I am starting to reexamine this thread and it is looking good. Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Kenneth Sent: Saturday, July 01, 2006 17:07 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles Hi Joop and Charles DeCoasta Joop : You said it is D.O. casual chain, could you tell me, then after death, what will arise. Charlse: A linear direction. I would apprieciate if you explain these from the suttas If it is birth, first or ignorance or ... If it is birth what condition it, is it ignorance or is it craving or kamma. If it is the in reverse order, have you seen Buddha said craving is the condition for feeling, feeling for cotact. In another way do you see Buddha said in the reverse order Depending on feeling, craving arise or Depending on craving, feeling arise? Kind regards Ken O #61080 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 4:44 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles dacostacharles Hi Joop, I wonder what could be the logic behind "'Craving' does occur too in DO but not immediately before (or after) 'ignorance; most times 'ignorance' is numbered #1 and 'craving' #8." Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Joop Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 08:53 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles Hallo Ken I hardly have a view, I just tried to understand DO without any frame of reference. Because the Buddha said to Ananda that DO is not easy but profound. So I don't compare it immediately with other teachings and don't use it as just another way of saying te same. Just try to understand without any prejudice (view). 'Craving' does occur too in DO but not immediately before (or after) 'ignorance; most times 'ignorance' is numbered #1 and 'craving' #8. I'm taking a break for some weeks Joop <.....> #61081 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:26 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles dacostacharles Hi all, The Wheel of life was an early teaching tool of the monks, I think after the Buddha's' death. Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Joop Sent: Sunday, June 25, 2006 21:52 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles --- In dhammastudygroup@ yahoogroups.com, Ken O wrote: > > Hi Joop > .... Hallo Ken, all Ken, in my opinion you are mixing things a little bit. k: Sorrow, lamentation and grief all have unpleasant feelings. J: you mean, they condition unpleasant feelings? That's not that they are feelings themselves? k: Ignorance is comprised within unplesant and pleasant feelings J: I don't know what is meaned with 'comprised' here. 'Ignorance' is not a feeling, I think In his translation of SN Bhikkhu Bodhi explains: ". that ignorance, as the most basic cause of samsaric existence, is lack of knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. Although in popular accounts ignorance is often identified with the idea of self, the definitions here show that the view of self is an aspect of clinging, which is itself conditioned by craving, while the latter is in turn conditioned by ignorance." (page 728 note 8) J (yesterday): Another point that interest me: the Buddha did not describe (D.O.) as a cycle. k: see below suttas. . J: This suttas are about the samsara-cycle, not about D.O. Perhaps you are more convinced when you read this: The Wheel of Birth and Death by Bhikkhu Khantipalo The Wheel Publication No. 147/148/149 ". The History of the Wheel Dependent Arising is explained many times and in many different connections in the Discourses of Lord Buddha, but He has not compared it to a wheel. This simile is found in the Visuddhimagga ("The Path of Purification") and in the other commentarial literature. ." Metta Joop #61082 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 5:21 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles dacostacharles Hi Ken O, This is a late reply to your post stating: ". it is a mini cycle, birth to death and death to birth then birth to death. I am assuming that you are saying there is a mini cycle in the chain, then how does ignorance and craving play in the D.O.?" You can view "becoming --- birth --- sickness & old age --- death" as the physical chain of causation (i.e., the body's chain). And, "ignorance . clinging" can be viewed as the psychological chain (i.e., the mind's chain). The psychological chain explains the subtle psychological process by which our experience is viewed. Remember that DO is a step-by-step presentation of how suffering arises dependent on ignorance and desire, and how suffering ceases with the cessation of ignorance and desire. Charles DaCosta <....> #61083 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jul 4, 2006 8:55 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Hi Howard, The main idea of kamma is that it is a flawless natural justice. See what you can come up with given that criterion. Larry 9) #61084 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 12:03 am Subject: Abh in Daily life 12, vipaaka nilovg Hi Howard, I appreciate it so much each time you have a question on the Abh. but I could not answer your q. to satisfaction because I did not get what you wanted to know and why you asked that question. Sometimes I cannot follow what you are saying. I kept the post and what about this: you split different parts and make it into a short question for each item, one by one? I would like to know what you wanted me to answer to. I see that several others are butting in, good! Nina. #61085 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 12:08 am Subject: Re: [dsg] "no posture" nilovg Dear Scott, not heavy. what we take for posture are only different ruupas arising and falling away. In the ultimate sense there is no posture. This will explain what people wonder about: the change of posture hides painful feeling.There are passages in the Vis. but these we should read carefully. Nina. Op 5-jul-2006, om 4:07 heeft Scott Duncan het volgende geschreven: >> it Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe > Dear All > > Ever read something that really hit home? > > "In the sixfold sense-sphere (phasaayatana) there is no posture," (A > Survey..., p. 388). > > Heavy. > #61086 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 1:24 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... ken_aitch Hi Howard, There has been a lot of discussion on this thread, and I am not sure if you still hold the following opinion: ------------ KH: > > There is no satipatthana without panna, and> > there is no panna without either satipatthana or samatha. In DSG > discussions, "panna" normally means the satipatthana kind (unless > otherwise stated). Howard: I get nothing to sink my teeth into here. Establishing mindfulness is requisite for the arising of insights. They are, however, not the same. That's what I said, and you certainly haven't given me any evidence to the contrary. ------------- I am sure they are the same. The sati in satipatthana refers only to right mindfulness - the mundane path factor - not to lesser kinds of sati. Therefore, whenever there is satipatthana there is insight. They are different names for the same moment of consciousness. Sati is wholesome awareness, of course, but there is also awareness in the conventional sense. It is not a cetasika, just a name given to cittas (either wholesome or unwholesome) that have concepts of alertness. Not since my pre-DSG days have I associated satipatthana with this conventional kind of alertness. I remember Zen stories in which apprentice swordsmen tried unsuccessfully to catch their masters off guard. But I no longer associate that kind of training with the Dhamma. I wonder if an arahant would be more alert, in the conventional sense, than would just any other person. I can't see why, but I suppose he might. (?) Ken H #61087 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 6:17 am Subject: Re: "no posture" scottduncan2 Dear Nina, Thank you for the below: N: "...what we take for posture are only different ruupas arising and falling away. In the ultimate sense there is no posture. This will explain what people wonder about: the change of posture hides painful feeling.There are passages in the Vis. but these we should read carefully." I've not yet checked in the Vis. for this reference. I did check the Paali, and found the word: "iriyaapatha" If I've correctly parsed the compound there is: "iriya," "apatha," and, by association, "patha." Iriya is said to mean (PTS PED): "to set in motion, to stir, to move, to wander about, behave, show a certain way of deportment." Patha is "path, road, way." Apatha is "no way or road, wrong way." Iriyaapatha itself I find defined as "deportment," "ways of movement," "4 postures, walking, standing, sitting, lying down." Would it be fair, then, in the light of there being "no posture," to read this into the meaning of the compound iriyaapatha? That is, to consider the negation of "apatha" to imply that these postures are in fact "no way or road" or "wrong way?" Or is this going beyond the mark in translating the word? Sincerely, Scott. #61088 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 2:49 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/5/06 12:12:31 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > The main idea of kamma is that it is a flawless natural justice. See > what you can come up with given that criterion. > > Larry > ====================== Yes, I've heard of kamma and kammic result popularly charcterized that way. And I do see that there is a significant element of truth to that characterization, though I suspect that it is a gross oversimplification. In any case, I don't quite see what you are after. All that I have been commenting on is the matter of pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feel of dhammas in relation to kamma as regards the Abhidhammic position that each dhamma has its unique feel, independent of other aspects of a mindstate. If it is true that Abhidhamma sees matters that way, and if the Abhidhamma is correct in that, then it cannot be the feel which is kamma vipaka, but the selection of an object WITH such feel that is the vipaka. It's just the technical point that I'm discussing of what item, exactly, is the vipaka. Incidentally, I can think of a "Buddhist" argument that would suggest that the feel of an object is not determined only by the object, but also by other aspects of the mindstate, and that is that no condition arises from a single "cause". But I think that argument can be easily countered in this case, as the arising as object of that particular dhamma (with its particular feel) has multiple conditions. With metta, Howard #61089 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 3:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/5/06 4:25:07 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ken_aitch@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > There has been a lot of discussion on this thread, and I am not sure > if you still hold the following opinion: > > ------------ > KH: >>There is no satipatthana without panna, and> > >there is no panna without either satipatthana or samatha. In DSG > >discussions, "panna" normally means the satipatthana kind (unless > >otherwise stated). > > Howard: > I get nothing to sink my teeth into here. Establishing > mindfulness is requisite for the arising of insights. They are, > however, not the same. That's what I said, and you certainly haven't > given me any evidence to the contrary. > ------------- > > I am sure they are the same. The sati in satipatthana refers only to > right mindfulness - the mundane path factor - not to lesser kinds of > sati. Therefore, whenever there is satipatthana there is insight. They > are different names for the same moment of consciousness. ------------------------------------- Howard: We disagree. Using 'satipatthana' to mean "pa~n~na' is unique to Khun Sujin and friends so far as I know. Satipatthana is the establishing of mindfulness. That's it. Right mindfulness is not the same path factor as right understanding. They are two different factors. And the setting up of mindfulness, or establishing of it, or a framework for it, is more along the lines of right effort, for that matter, than even right mindfulness, for it is the *establishing* of mindfulness. In any case, it is not pa~n~na. This discussion pertains to language use, not to content of Dhamma. My opinion is that unnecessary neologisms are harmful. ---------------------------------- > > Sati is wholesome awareness, of course, but there is also awareness in > the conventional sense. It is not a cetasika, just a name given to > cittas (either wholesome or unwholesome) that have concepts of > alertness. ---------------------------------- Howard: Huh? -------------------------------- > > Not since my pre-DSG days have I associated satipatthana with this > conventional kind of alertness. I remember Zen stories in which > apprentice swordsmen tried unsuccessfully to catch their masters off > guard. But I no longer associate that kind of training with the Dhamma. -------------------------------------- Howard: I don't know what this has to do with the issue at hand. ------------------------------------- > > I wonder if an arahant would be more alert, in the conventional sense, > than would just any other person. I can't see why, but I suppose he > might. (?) > > Ken H > ======================= With metta, Howard #61090 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 2:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily life 12, vipaaka upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/5/06 3:04:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > I appreciate it so much each time you have a question on the Abh. but > I could not answer your q. to satisfaction because I did not get what > you wanted to know and why you asked that question. Sometimes I > cannot follow what you are saying. I kept the post and what about > this: you split different parts and make it into a short question for > each item, one by one? > I would like to know what you wanted me to answer to. > I see that several others are butting in, good! > Nina. > ======================== I very much thank you for considering my questions, Nina. I hope that the conversations between Larry and me have clarified what I was after a little. But, for starters, how about beginning with the following question: Is it so that according to Abhidhamma each dhamma (arisen in a mindstream as object) has its own unique vedanic feel, independent of other issues and conditions? The "commonsense" view is that how an object of consciousness feels to us is not entirely determined by the object itself, but by the current state of mind - that is, pleasantness etc is "in the eye of the beholder". But that "commonsense view" is not the Abhidhammic view. Am I right or wrong in that? With metta, Howard #61091 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 8:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: >>However, when we look at the text of the Satipatthana Sutta we see that >>what is being spoken of is the development of insight, nothing less. >> >> > >-------------------------------------- >Howard: > Of course it is. And what this sutta specifically teaches are the four >areas to which mindfulness should be applied in order to cultivate that >insight. Satipatthana is the setting up or framing or establishing of that >mindfulness. The word 'satipatthana' is just not a synonym for 'pa~n~na' or for >'pa~n~na bhavana'. > If I read you correctly, you are positing an 'establishing of mindfulness' as a form of kusala that leads (subsequently) to moments of insight. That is not my reading of the Satipatthana Sutta. I take the references in the sutta to 'mindfully doing this or that' to be a reference to moments of insight. Otherwise there could not be the guarantee of enlightenment as found at the end of the sutta. Conceptually, there is a difficulty with mindfulness as an intermediate step on the path to insight. As you will know, kusala is classified in different ways in the texts, one of those being the 3-fold classification of sila, samadhi and panna. Under this classification, moments of kusala that are without panna are either sila or samadhi, neither of which necessarily leads to insight. >An analogy, Jon: Kamma leads to kamma vipaka. But 'kamma' should >NOT be taken as synonym for 'kamma vipaka'. > No sure about your analogy ;-)). The expression 'kamma vipaka' is not found in the texts or mainstream Theravada writings as far as I know. But I would of course agree that kamma should not be used when vipaka is intended (as it commonly is outside Theravada discussions). A better analogy might be the use in the texts of the term 'samadhi' to mean samatha/jhana. 'Samadhi' means 'concentration' whereas samatha means 'tranquility' or 'calm' and jhana means 'burning up' or something like that. >There is just no reason to create >a new meaning for 'satipatthana'! Why was that done, Jon? Do you know? When >language is clear, why in the world should it then be muddled? > > The real question here is not one of a change in meaning but what is meant by the text of the Satipatthana Sutta. Your understanding of that is different to mine ;-)). On my reading of the sutta, what is being spoken of is the development of insight pure and simple. > Please see what I wrote above. > As satipatthana (as an activity rather than on the sense of a domain >of application of that activity) proceeds properly in concert with other kusala >conditions, more and more frequently and with greater and greater clarity, >pa~n~na arises. That is, of course (!), the point of establishing mindfulness. > > This is a point of difference between us, and a significant one that we should discuss further. I do not see any 'activity' of the establishment of mindfulness that is a form of kusala in and of itself, leading in due course to insight. > In my opinion, a neologism created for no good reason is worse than >useless. It simply destroys precision and clarity of thought. > > No argument from me on this point. Jon #61092 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 8:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: > My "meek" response (LOL!) has a 2-fold basis: > > 1) It is true that all that we directly know arises as our "own" >experience, and only direct experience can be freeing. In that sense, the issue >isn't important. > > 2) From a theoretical point of view, especially as regards the causal >basis for "shared" (better really to say "corresponding") experience and as >regards the matter of ethics, this matter of multiple mindstreams and their >interaction is extremely important! However, the topic is extraordinarily deep and >complex, and *not having any (paramattha-level) teachings by the Buddha on >this to rely on, I would find it too much of a burden, too wearisome, to get >into. > > Thanks for taking the time to explain this. I don't want to push you into discussing an area that obviously don't want to get into, but if you could say a little about why it is regarded by some as an important matter (in the Theravadin context, if possible), I would be grateful. Jon #61093 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 8:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Hello* jonoabb Hi Herman Herman Hofman wrote: >Hi Jon, > >What is the basis for your stressed assertion that insight is >something that can be developed regardless of how active the mind is? >How does that relate to anything the Buddha taught, and especially the >Satipatthana Sutta? > A good question, and one that I'm happy to discuss any time. It goes I think to the very heart of the teachings. A comprehensive reply is not possible in a single post. However, in brief, my understanding on the matter is as follows. (We should probably agree what we mean by activity of the mind in this context. I take it to mean discursive thinking, especially of the akusala kind.) First, the factors for the development of insight as given in the sutta from SN 55's are 4-fold: association with the right persons, hearing the true dhamma, useful reflection on what has been heard, and practice in accordance with the dhamma. No reference here to a quiet/non-active mind. Secondly, in the Satipatthana Sutta it mentions, in the section on mindfulness of the body, mindfulness while going about all personal activities and, in the section on mindfulness of the mind, knowing mind with akusala as mind with akusala. Thirdly, the dhammas to be known as forming part of 'the all' (SN again) are dhammas such as the seeing consciousness now arising, the visible object now arising, mind-states now arising. OK, there's a lot more to it than that, of course, but I think you get my drift. As I see it, an active mind is no bar to the development of insight. Herman, I know you have a different take on this, and I look forward to discussing it further. Jon #61094 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 4:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 7/5/06 11:36:06 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > I don't want to push you into discussing an area that obviously don't > want to get into, but if you could say a little about why it is regarded > by some as an important matter (in the Theravadin context, if possible), > I would be grateful. > ====================== It's simple, Jon: People (or namrupic streams, or whatever you like) don't exist in isolation. They interact. And morality and ethics are intimately involved with that interaction. With metta, Howard #61095 From: Ken O Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 8:57 am Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles ashkenn2k Hi Charles When you say there is physical chain and there is a mental chain, and since you say it is linear, then could you explain how does this combined together in the D.O.? Is it the mental that conditioned the physical chain or the physical conditioned the mental chain? When you said it is linear, then how do you explain why did Buddha kept saying even in reverse order, it always meant dependent on becoming there is birth and Not dependent of birth there is becoming. Cheers Ken O #61096 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 4:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 7/5/06 11:31:47 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > Hi Howard > > upasaka@... wrote: > > >>However, when we look at the text of the Satipatthana Sutta we see that > >>what is being spoken of is the development of insight, nothing less. > >> > >> > > > >-------------------------------------- > >Howard: > > Of course it is. And what this sutta specifically teaches are the four > >areas to which mindfulness should be applied in order to cultivate that > >insight. Satipatthana is the setting up or framing or establishing of that > >mindfulness. The word 'satipatthana' is just not a synonym for 'pa~n~na' or > for > >'pa~n~na bhavana'. > > > > If I read you correctly, you are positing an 'establishing of > mindfulness' as a form of kusala that leads (subsequently) to moments of > insight. That is not my reading of the Satipatthana Sutta. I take the > references in the sutta to 'mindfully doing this or that' to be a > reference to moments of insight. > ------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, I am not at all surprised that you do, Jon. As you know, I completely disagree. ;-) ------------------------------------------ > Otherwise there could not be the > > guarantee of enlightenment as found at the end of the sutta. > > Conceptually, there is a difficulty with mindfulness as an intermediate > step on the path to insight. As you will know, kusala is classified in > different ways in the texts, one of those being the 3-fold > classification of sila, samadhi and panna. Under this classification, > moments of kusala that are without panna are either sila or samadhi, > neither of which necessarily leads to insight. > > >An analogy, Jon: Kamma leads to kamma vipaka. But 'kamma' should > >NOT be taken as synonym for 'kamma vipaka'. > > > > No sure about your analogy ;-)). > ----------------------------------------- Howard: Mindfulness is a requisite condition for wisdom, but the two are not he same. ----------------------------------------- The expression 'kamma vipaka' is not > > found in the texts or mainstream Theravada writings as far as I know. > But I would of course agree that kamma should not be used when vipaka is > intended (as it commonly is outside Theravada discussions). > > A better analogy might be the use in the texts of the term 'samadhi' to > mean samatha/jhana. 'Samadhi' means 'concentration' whereas samatha > means 'tranquility' or 'calm' and jhana means 'burning up' or something > like that. > > >There is just no reason to create > >a new meaning for 'satipatthana'! Why was that done, Jon? Do you know? When > > >language is clear, why in the world should it then be muddled? > > > > > > The real question here is not one of a change in meaning but what is > meant by the text of the Satipatthana Sutta. Your understanding of that > is different to mine ;-)). On my reading of the sutta, what is being > spoken of is the development of insight pure and simple. > > > Please see what I wrote above. > > As satipatthana (as an activity rather than on the sense of a domain > >of application of that activity) proceeds properly in concert with other > kusala > >conditions, more and more frequently and with greater and greater clarity, > >pa~n~na arises. That is, of course (!), the point of establishing > mindfulness. > > > > > > This is a point of difference between us, and a significant one that we > should discuss further. I do not see any 'activity' of the > establishment of mindfulness that is a form of kusala in and of itself, > leading in due course to insight. > > > In my opinion, a neologism created for no good reason is worse than > >useless. It simply destroys precision and clarity of thought. > > > > > > No argument from me on this point. > > Jon > > =================== With metta, Howard #61097 From: Ken O Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 9:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. ashkenn2k Hi Howard > -------------------------------------- > Howard: > Some people might enjoy the smell, finding it pleasant > (either consistently or at various times). k: this is call perversion of perception. Some people enjoy pain. But pain is still pain. H: My understanding of the Abhidhamma perspective on this is that there is no "dung smell" as a single thing, but, instead, there are multiple instances of "dung smell", each a different rupa, and each with its own vedanic "taste", so that a pleasant dung smell in a given mindstream is simply a different object than an unpleasant dung smell in that same mindstream or in another. The pleasantness or unpleasantness is entirely associated with the specific object (at a specific time in a specific mindstream.) That differs from the commonsense view that object X, independent of specific instance, > always has the same "taste", and it also differs from the even more > commonsense view that object X has no inherent "taste" but has > "taste" imposed on it by the particular mindstate. > -------------------------------------- k: A simple Abhidhammic sense process of 17 cittas, the nose citta (vipaka) that arise to meet the object, unpleasant arise due to the unplesantness of the object. Even though after 17 cittas, the whole process could either starts again or into the mental process. When this process starts again, it is still a smell object but a new one likewise for the sense citta. the commonsense smell is a snow ball effect of these sense + mental process. When we see the visible object of the dung, we associated it with the smell. Hence in future, we will perceive the dung a concept with an unpleasant feeling. But it is the perception that is why perversion arise. Some animals like the sight of dung as it associated with food (This association of the smell which meant food could condition pleasant feelings). But a dung which is smelly will still be unpleasant judging by human standards. (Perversion of preception starts at the javana process, at this instance is the pleasant feelings of the smell that meant food) Cheers Ken O #61098 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 5:49 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/5/06 12:31:35 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@... writes: > Hi Howard > > >-------------------------------------- > >Howard: > > Some people might enjoy the smell, finding it pleasant > >(either consistently or at various times). > > k: this is call perversion of perception. Some people enjoy pain. > But pain is still pain. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Some odors that are pleasant to one person are unpleasant to another. (Including cooking of meat for example.) Abhidhamma would say that the pleasant odor is a different rupa from the unpleasant one. The common sense view is that they are smelling the same odor, and one person finds it pleasant, the other unpleasant. I am inclined to the Abhidhammic view. But in any case, the attitude that one feeling is "right" and the other "perversion" doesn't sit at all well with me. It smacks of arrogance. There *are* perversions - taking impermanent for permanent, harmful for wholesome, and so on, but matters of taste don't fit in there. ---------------------------------------- > > H: My understanding of the Abhidhamma perspective on this is that > there is no "dung smell" as a single thing, but, instead, there are > multiple instances of "dung smell", each a different rupa, and each > with its own vedanic "taste", so that a pleasant dung smell in a > given mindstream is simply a different object than an unpleasant dung > smell in that same mindstream or in another. The pleasantness or > unpleasantness is entirely associated with the specific object (at a > specific time in a specific mindstream.) That differs from the > commonsense view that object X, independent of specific instance, > >always has the same "taste", and it also differs from the even more > > commonsense view that object X has no inherent "taste" but has > >"taste" imposed on it by the particular mindstate. > >-------------------------------------- > > k: A simple Abhidhammic sense process of 17 cittas, the nose citta > (vipaka) that arise to meet the object, unpleasant arise due to the > unplesantness of the object. Even though after 17 cittas, the whole > process could either starts again or into the mental process. When > this process starts again, it is still a smell object but a new one > likewise for the sense citta. the commonsense smell is a snow ball > effect of these sense + mental process. > > When we see the visible object of the dung, we associated it with the > smell. Hence in future, we will perceive the dung a concept with an > unpleasant feeling. But it is the perception that is why perversion > arise. > ------------------------------------- Howard: As you wish. I still don't see any addressing of my point - namely Abhidhamma's association of feeling uniquely with a dhamma. ------------------------------------ Some animals like the sight of dung as it associated with> > food (This association of the smell which meant food could condition > pleasant feelings). But a dung which is smelly will still be > unpleasant judging by human standards. --------------------------------- Howard: Not all humans under all conditions. What one experiences is multiply conditioned. A mother who smells the diaper of her previously constipated baby may find the odor pleasant. Someone else may find it unpleasant. Common sense says they smell the same thing, but one likes it and the other dislikes it. Abhidhamma, I believe, says they do NOT smell the same odor. And THAT is the question I've been pursuing, and only that. All the rest of the conversation is quite irrelevant. -------------------------------- (Perversion of preception> > starts at the javana process, at this instance is the pleasant > feelings of the smell that meant food) > > > > > Cheers > Ken O > > ==================== With metta, Howard #61099 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 10:10 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, 14 nilovg Dear friends, There are still many more ways of classifying feelings. If we know about different ways of classifying feelings it will help us to realize that feeling is only a mental phenomenon which arises because of conditions. We are inclined to cling to feeling which has fallen away, instead of being aware of the reality of the present moment as it appears through eyes, ears, nose, tongue, bodysense or mind. In the passage of the Visuddhimagga which was quoted above (XX, 96) nåma and rúpa are compared to the sound of a lute which does not come from any ``store'' when it arises, nor goes in any direction when it ceases, nor persists as a ``store'' when it has ceased. However, we cling so much to feelings that we do not realize that the feeling which has fallen away does not exist any more, that it has ceased completely. Vedanåkkhandha (feeling) is impermanent. Saññåkkhandha (perception) is real; it can be experienced whenever we remember something. There is saññå with every moment of citta. Each citta which arises experiences an object and saññå which arises with the citta remembers and ``marks'' that object so that it can be recognized. Even when there is a moment that one does not recognize something citta still experiences an object at that moment and saññå which arises with the citta ``marks'' that object. Saññå arises and falls away with the citta; saññå is impermanent. So long as we do not see saññå as it really is: only a mental phenomenon which falls away as soon as it has arisen, we will take saññå for self. Sa.nkhårakkhandha (all the cetasikas other than vedanå and saññå) is real; it can be experienced. When there are beautiful mental factors (sobhana cetasikas) such as generosity and compassion, or when there are unwholesome mental factors such as anger and stinginess, we can experience sa.nkhårakkhandha. All these phenomena arise and fall away; sa.nkhårakkhandha is impermanent. Viññå.nakkhandha (citta) is real; we can experience it when there is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, experiencing tangible object through the bodysense or thinking. Viññån.akkhandha arises and falls away; it is impermanent. All sa.nkhåra dhammas (conditioned phenomena), that is, the five khandhas, are impermanent. ***** Nina. #61100 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 10:20 am Subject: Re: [dsg] bhikkhuni samyutta nilovg Dear Matheesha, I appreciate it that you sent this sutta. I hope you and others will do this again. This sutta is an exhortation to develop satipatthaana so that eventually the truth can be realized that there is in the ultimate sense no being. There are likely to be many moments of forgetfulness, but we can begin again and again, being mindful of whatever characteristic appears through one of the senses or the mind-door. Nina. Op 5-jul-2006, om 0:46 heeft matheesha het volgende geschreven: > Just read this wonderful little sutta from the bhikkhuni samyutta. I > was struck by the depth of insight into suffering. I suspect if > someone tried to simply convince themselves of this, they would verve > on the edge of depression, rather than insight. Direct knowledge is > essential. > > > "Why now do you assume 'a being'? > Mara, have you grasped a view? > This is a heap of sheer constructions: > Here no being is found. > > Just as, with an assemblage of parts, > The word 'chariot' is used, > So, when the aggregates are present, > There's the convention 'a being.' > > It's only suffering that comes to be, > Suffering that stands and falls away. > Nothing but suffering comes to be, > Nothing but suffering ceases." > #61101 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 10:40 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "no posture" nilovg Dear Scott, the word is iriyaa: with long aa. No negation in this word. But posture like walking etc. is a conventional expression to denote some action. In the satipatthaana sutta the Buddha exhorted us to be mindful of naama and ruupa, no matter in what posture. Nina. Op 5-jul-2006, om 15:17 heeft Scott Duncan het volgende geschreven: > > I've not yet checked in the Vis. for this reference. I did check the > Paali, and found the word: > > "iriyaapatha" > > If I've correctly parsed the compound there is: > > "iriya," "apatha," and, by association, "patha." > #61102 From: "matheesha" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 10:54 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... matheesha333 Hi Jon, Howard, Just wanted to add something here.. > >J: Conceptually, there is a difficulty with mindfulness as an intermediate > > step on the path to insight. As you will know, kusala is classified in > > different ways in the texts, one of those being the 3-fold > > classification of sila, samadhi and panna. Under this classification, > > moments of kusala that are without panna are either sila or samadhi, > > neither of which necessarily leads to insight. Under the structure and causative progression of the three trainings, five faculties, the noble eightfold path, the immediate causative factors (not sure how you would list that according to the abhidhamma classifciations, but certainly plainly clear from the suttas) for panna is samadhi. The causative factor for samadhi in the five faculties and noble eightfold path, is mindfulness. Sati-->Samadhi-->Panna Maybe abhidhamma and sutta diverge at this point. regards Matheesha #61103 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 11:37 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects nilovg Hi Howard, Perhaps you remember the discussions about this subject before, when an object is desirable and when undesirable and whether the desirability is inherent in the object itself or not? We discussed this with Rob M, Sarah, Rob K (who gave the example of a dog liking dung). This was with our Visuddhimagga studies, but I could not find the place now. Also Larry made notes. The conclusion was that it is hard to find out. One criterium was how most people evaluate the object, like government officials, Rob M proposed. This is also in the Dispeller of Delusion. The conclusion in the tiika was: kusala kamma produces kusala vipaakacitta and this can experience only a desirable object and the opposite for akusala vipaakacitta. But, it is very hard to know about the desirability of an object. Since different cittas arise and fall away so rapidly and we are mostly thinking of vipaaka when the vipaakacittas have passed, it is very hard to find out what type of vipaakacitta arose at a particular moment. Our personal evaluation of objects is quite another matter. The javanacittas in a process, after the vipaakacitta has fallen away, react in a wholesome or unwholesome way to the object, they like it or dislike it. This depends on accumulated tendencies. So we have to differentiate between different types of citta: vipaakacitta and kusala or akusala citta. You asked: do they smell the same odour? You mean: the same type, because odour does not stay. It is always different. Thus, according to the Abh. objects experienced by seeing, hearing, etc, which are vipaakacittas are intrinsically desirable or undesirable. Kh Sujin explained: we like a beautiful but heavy string of beads, and it is desirable through eyes, but undesirable through bodysense since it is heavy. It is hard to tell what kind of vipaakacitta arises at which moment. Kusala vipaakacitta and akusala vipaakacitta are one jaati or class, the jaati of vipaaka. Vipaaka is the result of kamma. The object itself that is experienced by vipaakacitta is not vipaaka. We have to be precise in terminology. I think that it is of no use to find out whether the object experienced some moments ago was desirable or not. I cannot find out and to what use is it. It is more important that we react wisely to the object. Odour is just odour, a ruupa impinging on the nose, and it does not belong to us. It is conditioned. It is ruupa, different from naama. Perhaps this answered in part the issues we corresponded about? I did not bring in feeling yet. Nina. Op 5-jul-2006, om 18:49 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Not all humans under all conditions. What one experiences is multiply > conditioned. A mother who smells the diaper of her previously > constipated baby > may find the odor pleasant. Someone else may find it unpleasant. > Common sense > says they smell the same thing, but one likes it and the other > dislikes it. > Abhidhamma, I believe, says they do NOT smell the same odor. And > THAT is the > question I've been pursuing, and only that. All the rest of the > conversation is > quite irrelevant. #61104 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 8:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - Thank you for your whole post, of which i quote only the beginning below. In a message dated 7/5/06 2:48:43 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > > Hi Howard, > Perhaps you remember the discussions about this subject before, when > an object is desirable and when undesirable and whether the > desirability is inherent in the object itself or not? > ------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I do recall that. I seem to recall also that the upshot was that Abhidhamma says that yes, the desirability or undesirability is inherent. Of course, people can be perverse and like what is unpleasant or harmful, and dislike what is pleasant or beneficial. (That is a sense of 'perversion' that I accept.) Speaking about "perversion": When I was a child, there was an Italian family living next door - wonderful people. The grandmother was frequently cooking dishes with lots of garlic, oil, and sharp parmigiana cheese. I hated the odors! I found them so unpleasant - to the point of being nauseated even! But now, as an adult, I love such odors!! They are my very favorite. Well, whether the experienced odors were "the same" and perceived differently, or were different in vedanic taste, I don't see either case as a case of "perversion". ;-) ----------------------------------------------- We discussed > > this with Rob M, Sarah, Rob K (who gave the example of a dog liking > dung). > This was with our Visuddhimagga studies, but I could not find the > place now. Also Larry made notes. > The conclusion was that it is hard to find out. One criterium was how > most people evaluate the object, like government officials, Rob M > proposed. This is also in the Dispeller of Delusion. > The conclusion in the tiika was: kusala kamma produces kusala > vipaakacitta and this can experience only a desirable object and the > opposite for akusala vipaakacitta. > But, it is very hard to know about the desirability of an object. > Since different cittas arise and fall away so rapidly and we are > mostly thinking of vipaaka when the vipaakacittas have passed, it is > very hard to find out what type of vipaakacitta arose at a particular > moment. > Our personal evaluation of objects is quite another matter. The > javanacittas in a process, after the vipaakacitta has fallen away, > react in a wholesome or unwholesome way to the object, they like it > or dislike it. This depends on accumulated tendencies. ------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I agree. Whatever object, nama or rupa, that arises, it is either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral (as I understand Abhidhamma to claim, and as I am inclined to believe), but how one reacts to it, with liking, disliking, or neutrality, is determined by other conditions - accumulations, as you say. I also believe that whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral object arises on an occasion is largely due to kamma. ====================== With metta, Howard #61105 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 4:05 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Buddhism’s Answer to Fundamentalism egberdina Hi Christine, On 05/07/06, Christine Forsyth wrote: > > > Hello Herman, > > I will have a look at the DVD of the session when I get time, to > refresh my memory and get back to you. The session was chaired by > Ajahn Brahmavamso, and the speakers had fifteen minutes each. This > was followed by questions from the audience of 900 attendees. The > speakers were: > Thanks. Please don't go to any trouble. Kind Regards Herman #61106 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 4:16 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal egberdina Hi Larry, On 05/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > H: "Determinism, for me, is the view that everything has a cause. What > do you reckon?" > > L: Okay, what's the problem with that? > No more of a problem than any other view. It's just a view. Same as God created the universe. Or, there is no self. It can never be tested, and can never be found to be true or false. The problem is not that view, or any other view, but the fact that it is held. Holding a view is simply an unacceptance of the way things are. Kind Regards Herman #61107 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 4:43 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal lbidd2 Herman: "Holding a view is simply an unacceptance of the way things are." Hi Herman, My bias would be to say holding a view is ignorance of the way things are. It seems to me, in order to function one needs either knowledge or opinion (belief/view). So if we don't really know much there aren't a lot of options. Larry #61108 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 5:08 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal egberdina Hi Larry, On 06/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > Herman: "Holding a view is simply an unacceptance of the way things > are." > > Hi Herman, > > My bias would be to say holding a view is ignorance of the way things > are. It seems to me, in order to function one needs either knowledge or > opinion (belief/view). So if we don't really know much there aren't a > lot of options. > Yes, I agree with you. I would see a view as a basic, underlying attitude that colours all fleeting opinions. In that respect, Sartre has much to say about the view that even views are conditioned / necessarily so. He calls any denial of freedom to see things in any way at all "bad faith". So holding a deterministic view, which would include in it that holding that view is a necessary consequence of the past, is an act of bad faith. Acts of bad faith have as aim the avoidance of anguish (dukkha perhaps?) that follows from the realisation that things on no account must be seen in any particular way, but that there is the necessity to see them in some way; and that whichever way things are seen is the heavy responsibility that we either knowingly carry or try to ignore. Kind Regards Herman #61109 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 5:17 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." egberdina Hi Nina, On 05/07/06, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > > Hi Herman, > I get into trouble with philosophical terms like dualism. > Nina. > Op 4-jul-2006, om 15:15 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > > > > So, how does a mind/body dualism reading of Buddhism make sense to > > you? > I understand. Mind / Body dualism is simply the view that the mind is one thing, and that the body is another thing. Which wouldn't really fit in with dependent origination. Kind Regards Herman #61110 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 5:50 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Howard: "All that I have been commenting on is the matter of pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feel of dhammas in relation to kamma as regards the Abhidhammic position that each dhamma has its unique feel, independent of other aspects of a mindstate." Hi Howard, I think there is a little squibble in the syntax here. Only feeling is pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. Even though it is said that feeling "tastes" the object, I read this as being merely a figure of speech. It isn't correct to say a soft rupa is pleasant. Conventional objects are said to be inherently desirable or undesirable meaning they condition the arising of pleasant or unpleasant feeling. But ultimate realities are not inherently desirable or undesirable. We could say kusala is desirable, or we might say pleasant feeling is desirable, but I don't think abhidhamma says anything like that. Abhidhamma does say feeling conditions the arising of desire, but unpleasant feeing conditions the arising of the desire to end it. Soft rupa is definitely not inherently desirable or undesirable. As for kamma, I think we have to make sense out of it as a conventional phenomenon having to do with delusion and then try to fit it into ultimate reality without destroying it. If we analyze kamma the same way we analyze a chariot, we end up with no kamma. Maybe that's enlightenment. Who knows? Larry #61111 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 2:31 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Nina) - In a message dated 7/5/06 8:18:28 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > I understand. Mind / Body dualism is simply the view that the mind is > one thing, and that the body is another thing. Which wouldn't really > fit in with dependent origination. > ========================= So, do you think they are one and the same? And if yes, in what way? 'Cause they sure don't SEEM the same, bro! My understanding of mind/body duality, or, better (for me), mind/matter duality, is that mentality and materiality are not only distinguishable, but independently existent, and separate. I see materialists as considering matter to be all there is - an "external", substantial, self-existent category, with mentality a function of matter. I see idealists as considering mind to be all there is - an "internal", substantial, self-existent category, with materiality a function of mind. I see dualists as considering all that there is to be both mind and matter, the first an "internal", substantial, self-existent category, the second an "external", substantial, self-existent category, and with the two "realities" as entirely separate and self-existent, yet interacting (like billiard balls in collision). I see the Dhamma, however, as nondualist, with experience an overarching, insubstantial process, and mentality and materiality its two faces - distinguishable, but interdependent. With metta, Howard #61112 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 2:39 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/5/06 9:18:50 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > > Howard: "All that I have been commenting on is the matter of pleasant, > unpleasant, and neutral feel of dhammas in relation to kamma as regards > the Abhidhammic position that each dhamma has its unique feel, > independent of other aspects of a mindstate." > > Hi Howard, > > I think there is a little squibble in the syntax here. Only feeling is > pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. Even though it is said that feeling > "tastes" the object, I read this as being merely a figure of speech. It > isn't correct to say a soft rupa is pleasant. Conventional objects are > said to be inherently desirable or undesirable meaning they condition > the arising of pleasant or unpleasant feeling. But ultimate realities > are not inherently desirable or undesirable. We could say kusala is > desirable, or we might say pleasant feeling is desirable, but I don't > think abhidhamma says anything like that. Abhidhamma does say feeling > conditions the arising of desire, but unpleasant feeing conditions the > arising of the desire to end it. Soft rupa is definitely not inherently > desirable or undesirable. > > As for kamma, I think we have to make sense out of it as a conventional > phenomenon having to do with delusion and then try to fit it into > ultimate reality without destroying it. If we analyze kamma the same way > we analyze a chariot, we end up with no kamma. Maybe that's > enlightenment. Who knows? > > Larry > > ========================== I don't know the Abhidhamma position on this, but I, for one, take all dhammas to be entirely specific. There is no hardness "in general" except as concept, but there are actual "hardnesses" (i.e., hardness sensations) that arise in one mindstream or another at some time or other, and each such experiential focus or support for consciousness (or object, to use the common term) is unique and is either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, and vedana is the operation that detects which of these it is and to what degree. With metta, Howard #61113 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 6:58 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal lbidd2 Hi Herman, There are several things one could say about holding a deterministic view. First, to be clear, what we are talking about is dependent arising. Granted, holding a view without really seeing what's what is merely holding an ultimately meaningless concept. However, if that view is taught by those in the know, merely contemplating that view may inch one toward actually seeing "what's what" directly. Regarding a view as true is dishonest either because you don't know it is true or you know it isn't true. Ironically, embracing that ugly feeling of dishonesty may get you at least to the truth of suffering. But building a view of all pervasive inevitable dishonesty and regarding that as true is also dishonest if you don't know it is true. You can go around feeling disgusted with yourself for being dishonest all the time and try to get others to feel disgusted with themselves so you have some company, but I don't think you will get very far until you break the bond of desire. Somehow that disgusted feeling is arising not because of dishonesty, but because of desire. Larry #61114 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 7:12 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Howard: "I don't know the Abhidhamma position on this, but I, for one, take all dhammas to be entirely specific. There is no hardness "in general" except as concept, but there are actual "hardnesses" (i.e., hardness sensations) that arise in one mindstream or another at some time or other, and each such experiential focus or support for consciousness (or object, to use the common term) is unique and is either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, and vedana is the operation that detects which of these it is and to what degree." Hi Howard, I wouldn't say the support for consciousness (object of consciousness) is pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral unless that object is feeling. To say soft is pleasant is mixing up nama and rupa. Soft is soft and pleasant is pleasant. Satipatthana. Larry #61115 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 7:24 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: "no posture" scottduncan2 Dear Nina, You are a patient paali teacher: N: "...the word is iriyaa: with long aa. No negation in this word. But posture like walking etc. is a conventional expression to denote some action." Thanks. I have more to learn on breaking apart compound words. N: "In the satipatthaana sutta the Buddha exhorted us to be mindful of naama and ruupa, no matter in what posture." Right. With loving kindness, Scott. #61116 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 3:35 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/5/06 10:17:45 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > I wouldn't say the support for consciousness (object of consciousness) > is pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral unless that object is feeling. To > say soft is pleasant is mixing up nama and rupa. Soft is soft and > pleasant is pleasant. Satipatthana. > > Larry > ======================== I don't say "soft" is pleasant (or unpleasant). I say some "softs" (i.e., softness-sensations) are pleasant and some are not. Quite specific. Aside from my saying it, my main point is that I have been led to believe - right here is River City - that Abhidhamma says that. With metta, Howard #61117 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 8:53 pm Subject: Vism.XVII,87 lbidd2 "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga), Ch. XVII 87. (12) A state that assists the efficiency and power of the proximate (next) in the sense of repetition is a 'repetition condition', like repeated application to books and so on. It is threefold as profitable, unprofitable, and functional impulsion; for it is said: 'Preceding profitable states are a condition, as repetition condition, for succeeding profitable states ... Preceding unprofitable ... Preceding functional indeterminate states are a condition, as repetition condition, for succeeding functional indeterminate states' (P.tn.1,5). ********************** 87. aasevana.t.thena anantaraana.m pagu.nabalavabhaavaaya upakaarako dhammo aasevanapaccayo ganthaadiisu purimapurimaabhiyogo viya. so kusalaakusalakiriyajavanavasena tividho hoti. yathaaha ``purimaa purimaa kusalaa dhammaa pacchimaana.m pacchimaana.m kusalaana.m dhammaana.m aasevanapaccayena paccayo. purimaa purimaa akusalaa...pe0... kiriyaabyaakataa dhammaa pacchimaana.m pacchimaana.m kiriyaabyaakataana.m dhammaana.m aasevanapaccayena paccayo''ti (pa.t.thaa0 1.1.12). #61118 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 1:12 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Dependent Origination ... How about upadana? dacostacharles Hi Herman, Sorry I missed this. You are welcome and the feeling is mutual. Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Herman Hofman Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 00:13 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] Dependent Origination ... How about upadana? Hi Charles, On 23/06/06, Charles DaCosta tele.dk> wrote: > > > Hi Herman & Ken0, > > Herman, I think you asked a very important question (especially for an > Abidharmists). ".what direct experience is ." > > Again, this is a concept and like all concepts it must be defined. So search > your own heart for an answer and I will hope that it, the search, brings all > closer to the truth. > I have always appreciated your posts, and I would like to thank you for them. Kind Regards Herman #61119 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 9:18 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Howard: "I don't say "soft" is pleasant (or unpleasant). I say some "softs" (i.e., softness-sensations) are pleasant and some are not. Quite specific. Aside from my saying it, my main point is that I have been led to believe - right here is River City - that Abhidhamma says that." Hi Howard, Herman has gotten me real nervous about the word "is". I would say a specific soft rupa is "experienced as" pleasant. In the absolute ultimate sense there may be quite a few feelings per rupa in the sense that every consciousness in a 5 door process arises with a specific feeling for the same object and all the consciousnesses in following mind-door processes with the same rupa as object also arise with specific feeling cetasikas and it is quite likely that they are different kinds of feeling, flipping back and forth between pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral. Larry #61120 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 1:42 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles dacostacharles Hi KenO, Glad to. In a nut shell, most beings (esp. human) are "mind&body." D.O. presents why . i.e., see the other links that define the DO model. Now, keep in mind that the linear method is not the only interpretation, and that its purpose is to provide a simplistic model. In a nutshell: you are born out of a woman's womb, your mind is clouded (you know nothing so you live in ignorance). Thanks to consciousness you be come self-aware (i.e., of mind - desire, and body - sensation). . I am not sure what you mean by ". why did Buddha kept saying even in reverse order, it always meant dependent on becoming there is birth and Not dependent of birth there is becoming." However, if you mean what I think - the reverse order also served several purposes: (1) Because there is "A" there is "B", because there is "B" there must have been (i.e., was) "A"; (2) To create emphasis, to emphasize the subject; (2) The links are also reversible -- if you are born you can "become" sick, old, ., because you are born you are in the cycle of samsara therefore becoming is a possible next link. In the same way the two mini chains condition each other. Hope this make since, If not please let me know! It's late, unusually hot, and I am very tired. Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Ken O Sent: Wednesday, July 05, 2006 17:57 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles Hi Charles When you say there is physical chain and there is a mental chain, and since you say it is linear, then could you explain how does this combined together in the D.O.? Is it the mental that conditioned the physical chain or the physical conditioned the mental chain? When you said it is linear, then how do you explain why did Buddha kept saying even in reverse order, it always meant dependent on becoming there is birth and Not dependent of birth there is becoming. Cheers Ken O #61121 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 9:22 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Vism.XVII,87 lbidd2 Hi Nina, I would be interested to know if there is any mention of "accumulation" (ayuhana) with regard to repitition condition. Larry #61122 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 2:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects nilovg Hi Howard, Ken O, and all, Howard wrote: Yes, I do recall that. I seem to recall also that the upshot was that Abhidhamma says that yes, the desirability or undesirability is inherent. Of course, people can be perverse and like what is unpleasant or harmful, and dislike what is pleasant or beneficial. (That is a sense of 'perversion' that I accept.) ... Well, whether the experienced odors were "the same" and perceived differently, or were different in vedanic taste, I don't see either case as a case of "perversion". ;-) ----------------------------------------------- N: Well, Ken O was right with perversion, I found the text, see below. I like your example about food, and it shows that our subjective evaluations change. When there is aversion or attachment there is already perversion. ------------- Howard: Whatever object, nama or rupa, that arises, it is either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral (as I understand Abhidhamma to claim, and as I am inclined to believe), ------- N: not quite. Only ruupa is said to be desirable (i.t.thaaramma.na) or undesirable (ani.t.thaarama.na). Or the co say: also possible is moderately desirable or undesirable, but not neutral. ----------- H: but how one reacts to it, with liking, disliking, or neutrality, is determined by other conditions - accumulations, as you say. I also believe that whether pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral object arises on an occasion is largely due to kamma. ---- N: There are four originating factors for ruupas of the body: kamma, citta, temperature and nutrition. Say there is heat now impinging on the bodysense and this is originated by temperature. The bodyconsciousness is vipaaka produced by kamma, but the heat is not produced by kamma. --------- Here is the text I found, relating to Visuddhimagga Ch XIV, 193: The Dispeller of Delusion (Sammohavinodanii) deals with desirable and undesirable objects (p. 9-11), and states that kusala kamma does not condition undesirable objects. It mentions opinions of people who say that there are no intrinsic agreeable and disagreeable objects, but that it depends on people’s like or dislike of objects whether these are agreeable or disagreeable. The Co states that it is through perversion of perception that the same object is agreeable for one and disagreeable for another. We read that the elder Tipi.taka Cula-Abhaya said: 'The agreeable and disagreeable are distinguishable according to vipaaka (kamma result) only, not according to javana (impulsion that follows the vipaka). But it is impulsion through perversion of perception (saññavipallasa) only that lusts for the agreeable and hates the same agreeable; that lusts for the disagreeable and hates the same agreeable. Only by way of vipaaka however is it rightly distinguishable. For resultant consciousness (vipaaka citta) cannot be mistaken. If the object is agreeable it is profitable result that has arisen; if disagreeable, it is unprofitable result that has arisen.” The Dispeller of Delusion adds that agreeableness and disagreeableness should be distinguished by way of doors. What is pleasant through the eyedoor may be unpleasant through the body-door. We have to distinguish between vipaakacittas that experience pleasant or unpleasant objects depending on the kamma that produce them, and the javana-cittas, the akusala cittas or kusala cittas arising afterwards that react to the objects in an unwholesome way or wholesome way. Like or dislike of the objects may arise with the javanacittas and these are conditioned by a person’s accumulated inclinations. That is why it is said: End quote. It is beyond control what type of vipaakacitta arises at a particular moment. Vipaakacitta is by nature quiet and effortless (nirussaha) I just read in the tiika to the Vis. XVII, 87, Larry just posted. I read in the Co to the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (Topics of Abh, p. 302): Seeing is vipaaka and is accompanied by indifferent feeling, no matter visible object is desirable or undesirable. The sense- cognitions other than body-consciousness are accompanied by indifferent feeling. Body-consciousness is an exception because the impact is more violent. But the painful feeling or pleasant feeling accompanying it is only one moment, passing so rapidly. Nina. #61123 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 2:21 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Vism.XVII,87 nilovg Hi Larry, It is true that kusala and akusala kamma are performed by kusala javanacittas and akusala javanacittas. Also inclinations for kusala and akusala are being accumulated during those moments. Accumulation is not specifically mentioned here by the Tiika. Only that kusala and akusala gains in strength during those moments. U Narada specifies that after the fourth javana the strength decreases. The accumulated inclinations has been dealt with as a condition for future kusala and akusala in natural decisive support-condition. And kamma-condiiton will be dealt with later on. Nina. Op 6-jul-2006, om 6:22 heeft LBIDD@... het volgende geschreven: > I would be interested to know if there is any mention of > "accumulation" > (ayuhana) with regard to repetition condition. > #61124 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 4:46 am Subject: Re: [dsg] On rebirth egberdina Hi KenO, On 25/06/06, Ken O wrote: > > > Hi Herman > > > > Attributing kamma to conditions is kamma, not very good kamma. > > Denial of freedom to act or not to act is kamma, not very good > kamma. > > > k: The freedom to act is a very difficult issue, an issue that is > always been discussing in DSG as long as I know :-). When we say a > freedom to act, is there an I or me or self involved. This is > something we have to keep in mind. Yes, it is difficult, especially verbally. Is there an I involved in having to keep something in mind? :-) The role of D.O is to dispell the > notion of any I making. To attribute that I must do this or I must > act like that to gain enlightement, isn't I is still involved. Is > there an I involved, when we hear or when we see, in other words do > we need an I to see or hear. Is there an I involved when we see. > Only when pleasant sound arise, I like this sound, or this song is > pleasant, I is involved. I must be generous, I must be compassion, > isn't I already involved. I don't think that there is an inherent problem in "I" being an object of consciousness. "I" in that way is simply the thing that unifies a whole bunch of experience. "This and that happened to me" is not about me as creator / initiator of that experience. It would be a problem to think in terms of "my consciousness" but it is not a problem to think in terms of "consciousness of me". Why, even the Buddha, that epitome of anattaness, could recall "his" births. They happened to him, and to no-one else. So there is a big difference between I as identity and I as agent, and these differences are not apparent when we use the same word for both meanings. With regards to freedom to act, I think that each moment of mindfulness of acting / doing, carries with it the possibility of ceasing that action / doing. > It is extrememly difficult to believe that > the path leading to enlightments starts from listening. > So difficult, in fact, that I don't believe it :-) > In fact IMHO true selfless compassion must start from the > understanding of the three characteristics. Because when one see > danger in danger, then can one be compassionate for those who does > not see the danger in danger. I believe that true selfless compassion is an impossibility in the presence of a deterministic outlook. It is only when there is the freedom to be uncompassionate that true compassion becomes possible. When one clearly see the I making, one > can never be selfish because there is no I to make it selfish. Those > who are compassion but I is still not eradicate will still have to > suffer the round of rebirths even though one can enjoy good fruits. I > believe in the gist of our development of the path, we always have to > ask ourselves, is there an I involved. > I know that verbally it is hard to talk about this, because the English language pre-supposes an acting subject and an object in every sentence. And so the statement "we always have to ask ourselves ......" could so easily be read as an I-making statement. And I know you don't mean it that way. But, really, avoidance of atta statements becomes very contrived, because in that very act the thing we fear most has already happened, to us (hah hah :-) Kind Regards Herman #61125 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 6:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." dualism. nilovg Hi Herman, Howard, thank you, Herman. Howard has also answered this. Anyway, the terms mind and body are conventional. In the ultimate sense there are naama and ruupa and as, Howard says, distinguishable and interdependent. To elaborate on distinguishable: it is difficult, as Jon so well explained. Talking of a heatwave, people have aversion towards too much heat. My body, I dislike it. A lot of self here. In fact there are many types of nama and rupa involved, but we confuse them. If there could be awareness, they could be distinguished one at a time. Heat is a ruupa, body-consciousness that experiences it is vipaakacitta, so is the accompanied by painful feeling, but it passes so quickly and vipaaka is effortless, quiet, passive, we can hardly notice it. Then arise javanacittas that evaluate the heat: often with aversion and accompanied by unhappy mental feeling. There are many dhammas here, but we are bound to confuse them. It does not seem relevant, even uninteresting, to be aware of a nama or rupa, but it is the beginning of a long journey towards the realization of the truth of anatta. Even when beginning to be mindful, one may attach less important to my important body, and to thoughts like, how terrible is this heat. I have to laugh when I read about heatwave, we also have it. Nina. Op 6-jul-2006, om 2:17 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > I understand. Mind / Body dualism is simply the view that the mind is > one thing, and that the body is another thing. Which wouldn't really > fit in with dependent origination. #61126 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 6:20 am Subject: Re: [dsg] On rebirth nilovg Hi Ken O and Herman, Ken, I appreciate this very much. And this: , Kh Sujin helps us every time when we are in Bgk to have more understanding of this idea of I being involved, no matter what we do, even kusala! She asked us: do we perform kusala for the sake of ourselves? We have to learn to be honest. I am glad you bring this up. We often discussed before: is there a thought of ' I want to be a good person when giving, when observing siila'? And yes, there is deep in our mind. We like to be good. Paññaa can detect this and it is very essential, otherwise we get stuck. Nina. Op 6-jul-2006, om 13:46 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > When one clearly see the I making, one > > can never be selfish because there is no I to make it selfish. Those > > who are compassion but I is still not eradicate will still have to > > suffer the round of rebirths even though one can enjoy good > fruits. I > > believe in the gist of our development of the path, we always > have to > > ask ourselves, is there an I involved. #61127 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 3:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/6/06 12:20:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Herman has gotten me real nervous about the word "is". I would say a > specific soft rupa is "experienced as" pleasant. > > In the absolute ultimate sense there may be quite a few feelings per > rupa in the sense that every consciousness in a 5 door process arises > with a specific feeling for the same object and all the consciousnesses > in following mind-door processes with the same rupa as object also arise > with specific feeling cetasikas and it is quite likely that they are > different kinds of feeling, flipping back and forth between pleasant, > unpleasant, and neutral. > > Larry > > ====================== Please for give me - I'm straining to follow exactly what you are asserting, but I'm missing it. (My initial reading of what you wrote here had you contradicting at the end what you wrote at the beginning; so, I'm obviously not understanding you.) As *the same* rupa (and here I am mean literally SAME) persists as support for consciousness, but cetasikas come and go, does the rupa, according to Abhidhamma and/or the commentaries, continually remain the same in feeling (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, and even to the same degree), or does that feel change along with changing cetasikas? If the feel changes with cetasikas, then I would say that the feel is extrinsic to the rupa, depending on cetasikas and other conditions; but if it remains the same, I would say it is intrinsic to the rupa. With metta, Howard #61128 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 3:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/6/06 5:20:19 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > The Dispeller of Delusion adds that agreeableness and > disagreeableness should be distinguished by way of doors. What is > pleasant through the eyedoor may be unpleasant through the body-door. > > ====================== That is meaningless to me. Except for mind-door, no rupa is contacted through more than one sense door. There IS no rupa that is both an eye-door rupa and a body-door rupa! No sight is also a sound, and no sound is also a sight. No sight is heard, and no sound is seen. So what can that second sentence possibly mean? With metta, Howard #61129 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 3:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/6/06 5:20:19 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Howard: > Whatever object, nama or rupa, that arises, it is either > pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral (as I understand Abhidhamma to > claim, and as > I am inclined to believe), > > ------- > > N: not quite. Only ruupa is said to be desirable (i.t.thaaramma.na) > or undesirable (ani.t.thaarama.na). Or the co say: also possible is > moderately desirable or undesirable, but not neutral. > ======================== Nina, I'm not following your meaning here. Are you saying that rupas are only pleasant or unpleasant, but never neutral? I thought that was the case only for body-door rupas. Cannot eye-door and ear-door rupas (if not nose-door) be neutral in feel? With metta, Howard #61130 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 3:24 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/6/06 5:20:19 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > The Co states that it is through perversion of perception that the > same object is > agreeable for one and disagreeable for another. > We read that the elder Tipi.taka Cula-Abhaya said: 'The agreeable and > disagreeable are distinguishable according to vipaaka (kamma result) > only, not according to javana (impulsion that follows the vipaka). > But it is impulsion through perversion of perception (saññavipallasa) > only that lusts for the agreeable and hates the same agreeable; that > lusts for the disagreeable and hates the same agreeable. Only by way > of vipaaka however is it rightly distinguishable. For resultant > consciousness (vipaaka citta) cannot be mistaken. If the object is > agreeable it is profitable result that has arisen; if disagreeable, > it is unprofitable result that has arisen.â€? > ========================= Okay as regards agreeable or disagreeable (i.e., to ones liking or disliking), but what about pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral in feel? The feel is not the same as being liked or disliked. With metta, Howard #61131 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: >>If I read you correctly, you are positing an 'establishing of >>mindfulness' as a form of kusala that leads (subsequently) to moments of >>insight. That is not my reading of the Satipatthana Sutta. I take the >>references in the sutta to 'mindfully doing this or that' to be a >>reference to moments of insight. >> >> >------------------------------------------- >Howard: > Well, I am not at all surprised that you do, Jon. As you know, I >completely disagree. ;-) > Yes, I was aware of your disagreement on this point ;-)) I'd be interested to know whether you see anything specific in the Satipatthana Sutta as supporting the view that satipatthana (as spoken of in that sutta) is something other than, and precedent to, the development of insight. >>No sure about your analogy ;-)). >> >> >> >----------------------------------------- >Howard: > Mindfulness is a requisite condition for wisdom, but the two are not >he same. >----------------------------------------- > > Yes, the factors that co-arise with insight are requisite conditions for that insight. Jon #61132 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:17 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... jonoabb Hi Mateesha matheesha wrote: >Hi Jon, Howard, > >Just wanted to add something here.. > > > >>>J: Conceptually, there is a difficulty with >>>mindfulness as an intermediate step on the path >>>to insight. As you will know, kusala is classified >>>in different ways in the texts, one of those being >>>the 3-fold classification of sila, samadhi and panna. >>>Under this classification, moments of kusala that >>>are without panna are either sila or samadhi, neither >>>of which necessarily leads to insight. >>> > >Under the structure and causative progression of the three >trainings, five faculties, the noble eightfold path, the immediate >causative factors (not sure how you would list that according to the >abhidhamma classifciations, but certainly plainly clear from the >suttas) for panna is samadhi. The causative factor for samadhi in >the five faculties and noble eightfold path, is mindfulness. > >Sati-->Samadhi-->Panna > >Maybe abhidhamma and sutta diverge at this point. > Thanks for joining in the thread, and for your comments. Yes, you are right about samadhi being the proximate cause for panna (can't recall about sati --> samadhi, but you're no doubt right on that too). The sutta reference is cited in the Abhidhamma (and in the Visuddhimagga also), so no divergence there. The samadhi in question is, as I understand it, the samadhi that arises together with panna of the level of insight (that is to say, it is not the samadhi of samatha). If you have specific sutta references for these 2 points I'd be interested to see them. On the general question being discussed with Howard, do you see satipatthana as spoken of in the Satipatthana Sutta as a form of kusala separate from insight into the true nature of dhammas? If so, how would you see that kusala as being classified (under any of the classifications of kusala mentioned in the texts -- such as dana, sila and bhavana, or the punna-kiriya-vatthu)? Jon #61133 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Wed Jul 5, 2006 10:28 pm Subject: Sequential Seven ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: How do the 7 Links to Awakening develop Sequentially? Whenever withdrawn in body and withdrawn in mind one reflects on the Buddha-Dhamma, then the Awareness Link to Awakening arise and develop. Thus aware one examines that! Whenever examining a mental state, then the Investigation Link to Awakening arise and develop. While thus being curious & enthusiastically investigating, keen energy is aroused! Whenever energy is aroused in one who is enthusiastic, then the Energy Link to Awakening arise and develop. In one energetic & enthusiastic and who therefore succeeds, joy is born! Whenever succeeding in enthusiastic joy, then the Joy Link to Awakening arise & develop. One thus joyous becomes mentally satisfied and therefore calmed in both body and mind! Whenever calmed in body & mind, then the Tranquillity Link to Awakening arise & develop. One thus satisfied, calmed, serene, settled & tranquil in both body & mind becomes happy! Whenever calmed & comfortable in body & tranquil & happy in mind, then the Concentration Link to Awakening arise & develop. Concentrated one reviews all rationally and reasonably! Whenever one well balanced reviews all mental states rationally and reasonably, then the Equanimity Link to Awakening arise & develop. In equanimity one knows & sees things right. It is in this very way that the seven Links to Awakening develop sequentially, one after the other; successively one leading to the next... Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V: 67-69] section 46: The Links.3: Morality.... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. #61134 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:24 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: > It's simple, Jon: People (or namrupic streams, or whatever you like) >don't exist in isolation. They interact. And morality and ethics are intimately >involved with that interaction. > Very clear, thanks Howard, and I absolutely agree. But I don't understand why it is said the teachings are lacking as regards this aspect of things. At the absolute ('dhammic') level, morality and ethics are represented by the 3 cetasikas of right speech, right action and right livelihood (I refer to the mundane factors which, somewhat confusingly, carry the same name as their NEP counterparts). As you know, these 3 factors are abstentions ('virati'). They are the factors that enable individuals to observe morality and ethics, by not breaching those standards of behaviour. The mental factors of hiri and ottappa also play a role. Jon #61135 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:22 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal jonoabb Hi Larry (and Herman) LBIDD@... wrote: >Herman: "Holding a view is simply an unacceptance of the way things >are." > >Hi Herman, > >My bias would be to say holding a view is ignorance of the way things >are. It seems to me, in order to function one needs either knowledge or >opinion (belief/view). So if we don't really know much there aren't a >lot of options. > There is also a hypothesis, which is neither knowledge nor belief/view. In the teachings, the term 'right view' is used as a synonym for knowledge of the way things truly are. Jon #61136 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 4:46 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 7/6/06 11:18:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > I'd be interested to know whether you see anything specific in the > Satipatthana Sutta as supporting the view that satipatthana (as spoken > of in that sutta) is something other than, and precedent to, the > development of insight. > ======================== Because mindfulness is a requisite condition for insight, the establishing of mindfulness also is. But that doesn't make the establishing of mindfulness synonymous with insight. Existence is also requisite for insight. There are many conditions requisite for insight. Mindfulness, of course, is a crucial one - and close. Why all of a sudden is there such an inclination to be imprecise, Jon? With metta, Howard #61137 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 4:59 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 7/6/06 11:38:35 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > > Hi Howard > > upasaka@... wrote: > > > It's simple, Jon: People (or namrupic streams, or whatever you like) > >don't exist in isolation. They interact. And morality and ethics are > intimately > >involved with that interaction. > > > > Very clear, thanks Howard, and I absolutely agree. > ------------------------------ Howard: :-) --------------------------- But I don't > > understand why it is said the teachings are lacking as regards this > aspect of things. At the absolute ('dhammic') level, morality and > ethics are represented by the 3 cetasikas of right speech, right action > and right livelihood (I refer to the mundane factors which, somewhat > confusingly, carry the same name as their NEP counterparts). ----------------------------- Howard: I would just somehow hope for more, namely to see a detailing of the "mechanics" of inter-stream interaction at the same level of detail as there is with regard to intra-stream mental processes in the Abhidhamma and the commentaries, breaking down processes into javana, registration, etc. How is it that there *is* interaction between namarupic streams? How doers that work exactly? The details are missing. (My background as mathematician-scientist leads me to want more detail, I suppose.) ------------------------------- > > As you know, these 3 factors are abstentions ('virati'). They are the > factors that enable individuals to observe morality and ethics, by not > breaching those standards of behaviour. The mental factors of hiri and > ottappa also play a role. > > Jon > > ==================== With metta, Howard #61138 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 11:00 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects nilovg Hi Howard, Op 6-jul-2006, om 16:24 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Okay as regards agreeable or disagreeable (i.e., to ones liking or > disliking), but what about pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral in > feel? The feel is > not the same as being liked or disliked. ------------------------------- N: for precision I would prefer to add object, instead of 'in feel'. And as said (see other post), not neutral object. You must have a reason to add 'in feel', and I will deal with this later on. ----------------- Howard: The Dispeller of Delusion adds that agreeableness and > disagreeableness should be distinguished by way of doors. What is > pleasant through the eyedoor may be unpleasant through the body-door. > > ====================== That is meaningless to me. Except for mind-door, no rupa is contacted through more than one sense door. There IS no rupa that is both an eye-door rupa and a body-door rupa! No sight is also a sound, and no sound is also a sight. No sight is heard, and no sound is seen. So what can that second sentence possibly mean? ----- N: Here is figurative way of speaking to explain matters. When you have a thing in your hands it may be unpleasant to touch but a thing of beauty to see. It teaches us to think in the way of : only one object through one doorway at a time. Usually we are taken in by this or that and have a judgement about it, without realizing that in reality only one dhamma is experienced through one doorway. Remember my example of the string of beads that is so heavy in wearing but beautifull to look at. Nina. #61139 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 10:48 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects nilovg Hi Howard, Op 6-jul-2006, om 16:19 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Nina, I'm not following your meaning here. Are you saying that rupas > are only pleasant or unpleasant, but never neutral? I thought that > was the case > only for body-door rupas. Cannot eye-door and ear-door rupas (if not > nose-door) be neutral in feel? ------------------- N: Ruupas that are sense object: visible object, sound, odour, flavour, tangible object, are either desirable or undesirable. They are not neutral, the vipaakacitta that experiences them is the result of kusala kamma or akusala kamma. But we mostly do not know about the desirable or undesirable nature; as said: it is gone before it can be noted. Tangible object is either desirable or undesirable. The feeling (only one extremely short moment!) that accompanies vipaakacitta that experiences it is either painful or pleasant. The javanacittas arise and react, with wise attention or with unwise attention. They react because of accumulated inclinations, they are conditioned. There is no time to do anything about them. They arise already. Because of conditions we are able to listen and study the teachings and in this way understanding can be accumulated during the moments of javana. There can be wise attention sometimes. If there is a short moment of bodily pain, we tend to react with aversion and unhappy feeling. This is like two darts that cause suffering. Not only the dart of bodily pain but also the dart of mental unhappy feeling. But although the body is sick, the mind need not be sick. Nina. #61140 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 11:24 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily life 12, vipaaka nilovg Hi Howard, looking at your post of yesterday, I tried to explain about the objects being intrinsically desirable or undesirable. This has nothing to do with feeling. Feeling arises with each citta. As to the evaluation of the object, this comes in with the javanacittas: as said these react wisely or unwisely. They are accompanied by feelings, and these may be happy, unhappy or indifferent. Kusala citta may be accompanied by happy feeling or by indifferent feeling, akusala citta may be accompanied by happy feeling, unhappy feeling or indifferent feeling. Thus, what type of feeling arises is dependent on the type of citta it accompanies. One object, desirable or undesirable, is experienced by cittas arising in a process, and first after the kiriyacitta that is the sense-door adverting citta, there are vipaakacittas, then another kiriyacitta the determining citta, then the javanacittas. It is according to a certain law what types of feeling accompany which cittas. Nobody can change that. It is good to know, otherwise we cling all the time to an idea of my feeling. Feeling cannot be caused to arise at will. Nina. Op 5-jul-2006, om 15:57 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Is it so that according to Abhidhamma each dhamma (arisen in a > mindstream as object) has its own unique vedanic feel, independent > of other issues > and conditions? The "commonsense" view is that how an object of > consciousness > feels to us is not entirely determined by the object itself, but by > the current > state of mind - that is, pleasantness etc is "in the eye of the > beholder". But > that "commonsense view" is not the Abhidhammic view. Am I right or > wrong in > that? > #61141 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 11:40 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. nilovg Hi Howard, your first post about the subject, working backwards. Op 4-jul-2006, om 17:05 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Now, let us say that the current state is the > fruition of kamma, K. What might have been different had K not > occurred? Would the > dhamma that is the current object not have arisen, or would it have > arisen but > not as support for the current citta, or something else? ----------- N: There would be another vipaaka produced by another kamma. There is never any lack of vipaakacittas experiencing desirable or undesirable objects, even now. It is really amazing that this occurs all the time. You wonder whether the dhamma that is object would not arise, but this is something beyond my knowing. I do not know, but what I know that there is time and again experience of objects. ----------- > My point is that if > that same dhamma were to arise as object of the current citta even > if K had not > occurred, what could be different? Possibly some of the other > cetasikas, but > not the feeling (for the feeling operation would be "tasting" the > same object, > and thus experirncing the same "taste"). ------------------- N: Feeling accompanies each citta, there never is any lack of feeling. And also the other cetasikas, each citta is accompanied by at least seven cetasikas, and these share the same object with the citta. --------- H: > *In the original post of yours to > which I was replying, it seemed to me you were saying that it is > the FEELING that > is kamma vipaka. My point then was that the feeling-taste "comes > with" the > object; so it could not be the feeling that is vipaka, but the > dhamma itself > that has that particular "taste". > * ----------- N: Let us use the word vipaaka instead of kamma vipaaka. Feeling that accompanies vipaakacitta is also vipaaka. All the cetasikas that accompany vipaakacitta are vipaaka. You say: < the feeling-taste "comes with" the object; so it could not be the feeling that is vipaka, but the dhamma itself that has that particular "taste".> When you say the dhamma itself you mean the object, I take it. The object is not vipaaka, the citta and feeling that experience it are vipaaka. I would avoid: the expression 'feeling taste'. Nina. #61142 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:27 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/6/06 2:01:35 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > >Okay as regards agreeable or disagreeable (i.e., to ones liking or > >disliking), but what about pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral in > >feel? The feel is > >not the same as being liked or disliked. > ------------------------------- > N: for precision I would prefer to add object, instead of 'in feel'. > And as said (see other post), not neutral object. > You must have a reason to add 'in feel', and I will deal with this > later on. > ==================== Saying "in feel" was redundant. With metta, Howard #61143 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:32 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects upasaka_howard Hi again, Nina - In a message dated 7/6/06 2:01:35 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Howard: > The Dispeller of Delusion adds that agreeableness and > >disagreeableness should be distinguished by way of doors. What is > >pleasant through the eyedoor may be unpleasant through the body-door. > > > > > ====================== > That is meaningless to me. Except for mind-door, no rupa is contacted > through more than one sense door. There IS no rupa that is both an > eye-door > rupa and a body-door rupa! No sight is also a sound, and no sound is > also a > sight. No sight is heard, and no sound is seen. So what can that > second sentence > possibly mean? > ----- > N: Here is figurative way of speaking to explain matters. When you > have a thing in your hands it may be unpleasant to touch but a thing > of beauty to see. It teaches us to think in the way of : only one > object through one doorway at a time. ----------------------------------- Howard: Ah, okay - it was speaking of pa~n~natti, and not paramattha dhammas. That's fine. And yes, I agree with that: A gingko tree may have beautiful appearance and very unpleasant odor for example. ---------------------------------- Usually we are taken in by this or that and have a judgement about > > it, without realizing that in reality only one dhamma is experienced > through one doorway. > Remember my example of the string of beads that is so heavy in > wearing but beautifull to look at. -------------------------------- Howard: Yep - same idea as the gingko tree example. ------------------------------- > Nina. > > =============== With metta, Howard #61144 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:50 am Subject: Re: [dsg] desirable and undesirable objects upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/6/06 2:02:51 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Op 6-jul-2006, om 16:19 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > > >Nina, I'm not following your meaning here. Are you saying that rupas > >are only pleasant or unpleasant, but never neutral? I thought that > >was the case > >only for body-door rupas. Cannot eye-door and ear-door rupas (if not > >nose-door) be neutral in feel? > ------------------- > N: Ruupas that are sense object: visible object, sound, odour, > flavour, tangible object, are either desirable or undesirable. They > are not neutral, the vipaakacitta that experiences them is the result > of kusala kamma or akusala kamma. But we mostly do not know about the > desirable or undesirable nature; as said: it is gone before it can be > noted. > Tangible object is either desirable or undesirable. The feeling (only > one extremely short moment!) that accompanies vipaakacitta that > experiences it is either painful or pleasant. > The javanacittas arise and react, with wise attention or with unwise > attention. They react because of accumulated inclinations, they are > conditioned. There is no time to do anything about them. They arise > already. > Because of conditions we are able to listen and study the teachings > and in this way understanding can be accumulated during the moments > of javana. There can be wise attention sometimes. > If there is a short moment of bodily pain, we tend to react with > aversion and unhappy feeling. This is like two darts that cause > suffering. Not only the dart of bodily pain but also the dart of > mental unhappy feeling. > But although the body is sick, the mind need not be sick. > Nina. > > ======================= I find it hard to believe that eye-door dhammas cannot be neutral. In fact, I would have suspected that they are *always* neutral, with pleasant or unpleasant feeling arising only after subsequent mental processing of such a rupa. It doesn't seem to me that any visual object per se is either desirable or undesirable. A palette of color is a palette of color. With metta, Howard #61145 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 9:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily life 12, vipaaka upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/6/06 2:44:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > looking at your post of yesterday, > I tried to explain about the objects being intrinsically desirable or > undesirable. This has nothing to do with feeling. Feeling arises with > each citta. ------------------------------------- Howard: I know that the operation of feeling arises as a cetasika in every mindstate. But when it operates it "tastes" the object as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, and that pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality detected by the vedana is what I would call the "feel" of the object. Now, a desirable object should not have unpleasant feel, nor an undesirable object pleasant feel unless vedana is malfunctioning, is that not so? What could 'desirable' mean except for "properly felt as pleasant"? ------------------------------------ > As to the evaluation of the object, this comes in with the > javanacittas: as said these react wisely or unwisely. They are > accompanied by feelings, and these may be happy, unhappy or > indifferent. Kusala citta may be accompanied by happy feeling or by > indifferent feeling, akusala citta may be accompanied by happy > feeling, unhappy feeling or indifferent feeling. Thus, what type of > feeling arises is dependent on the type of citta it accompanies. > One object, desirable or undesirable, is experienced by cittas > arising in a process, and first after the kiriyacitta that is the > sense-door adverting citta, there are vipaakacittas, then another > kiriyacitta the determining citta, then the javanacittas. It is > according to a certain law what types of feeling accompany which > cittas. Nobody can change that. It is good to know, otherwise we > cling all the time to an idea of my feeling. Feeling cannot be caused > to arise at will. ------------------------------------- Howard: I'm sorry, Nina, but the foregoing has a degree of complexity that only confuses me. Let's get concrete: Suppose the object is the sharp sensation of a dentist's probe jammed into a nerve - what one informally calls "a terrible pain". That rupa is strongly unpleasant. I would also say it is quite undesirable. Is its unpleasantness due to the mindstate in which it is the object, or is it inherent in the rupa itself? I don't have any stake in its being one way or the other, but what are the facts according to Abhidhamma? ------------------------------------ > Nina. > > ================== With metta, Howard #61146 From: "matheesha" Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 1:31 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... matheesha333 Hi Jon. Howard, J:> Yes, you are right about samadhi being the proximate cause for panna > (can't recall about sati --> samadhi, but you're no doubt right on that > too). The sutta reference is cited in the Abhidhamma (and in the > Visuddhimagga also), so no divergence there. > > > If you have specific sutta references for these 2 points I'd be > interested to see them. From the Upanisa sutta: conviction has stress & suffering as its prerequisite, joy has conviction as its prerequisite, rapture has joy as its prerequisite, serenity has rapture as its prerequisite, pleasure has serenity as its prerequisite, concentration has pleasure as its prerequisite, knowledge & vision of things as they actually are present has concentration as its prerequisite, disenchantment has knowledge & vision of things as they actually are present as its prerequisite, dispassion has disenchantment as its prerequisite, release has dispassion as its prerequisite, knowledge of ending has release as its prerequisite. "Just as when the gods pour rain in heavy drops & crash thunder on the upper mountains: The water, flowing down along the slopes, fills the mountain clefts & rifts & gullies. When the mountain clefts & rifts & gullies are full, they fill the little ponds. When the little ponds are full, they fill the big lakes. When the big lakes are full, they fill the little rivers. When the little rivers are full, they fill the big rivers. When the big rivers are full, they fill the great ocean. In the same way: ------------ [Ananda:] "What, O Venerable One, is the reward and blessing of wholesome morality?" [The Buddha:] "Freedom from remorse, Ananda." "And of freedom from remorse?" "Joy, Ananda" "And of joy?" "Rapture, Ananda" "And of rapture?" "Tranquillity, Ananda." "And of tranquillity?" "Happiness, Ananda." "And of happiness?" "Concentration, Ananda." "And of concentration?" "Vision and knowledge according to reality." "And of the vision and knowledge according to reality?" "Turning away and detachment, Ananda." "And of turning away and detachment?" "The vision and knowledge with regard to Deliverance, Ananda." -- AN X.1 (Nyanatiloka, trans.; from Path to Deliverance, pp. 65-66) M: Also in the mahacattasarika sutta talks of each step of the noble eightfold path leading to the next. So satipattana becomes a prerequisite for samma samadhi, which then leads to gnana (insight), leading to samma vimutti. The connection of sila-->samadhi-->panna should be clear. >J: The samadhi in question is, as I understand it, the samadhi that arises > together with panna of the level of insight (that is to say, it is not > the samadhi of samatha). M: Samadhi is a singular quality of mind - citta ekaggata. But it can lead to different things. Pleasant abiding, panna, wakefulness, special abilities, a pliable mind, suppression of craving, to name some (all from the suttas), depending on how it is directed. So I wouldnt differentiate too readily between the samadhi of samatha and the samadhi 'of panna', because there is a lot of overlap in the sense of it being citta ekaggata anyway. It's just a very powerful and useful tool in Buddhist practice because of it's multiple effects. > > On the general question being discussed with Howard, do you see > satipatthana as spoken of in the Satipatthana Sutta as a form of kusala > separate from insight into the true nature of dhammas? If so, how would > you see that kusala as being classified (under any of the > classifications of kusala mentioned in the texts -- such as dana, sila > and bhavana, or the punna-kiriya-vatthu)? M: I'm trying to follow what the discussion has been so far .. am I right to say that you feel satipattana has to be moments of insight because kusala without insight cannot lead to ..insight. It can be well explained without the use of kusala, as seen in the suttas above. On the otherhand the obvious classification is under bhaavana. Tilakkana are qualities of the dhammas which are arising all the time. Samadhi leads to a quiet calm mind, away from the five hindrences which cloud mental/physical processes from observation (often described as 'mud, dye, algae, rushing water' etc in the sense of obscuring). When the hindrences are reduced, sati into these subtle quick processes is possible. Then the mind does not give rise to strings of thought/concepts which distract from observing what is arising now. When the mind is calmed, clear and alert, sati arises. When sati keeps arising in this manner it is able to follow these dhammas from their arising to their passing away. When it keeps doing this it starts discerning patterns in the dhammas. The most apparent pattern is the one of impermanence. nothing lasts, everything passes away. This inturn leads to the understanding that this continuosly arising and passing away is dukkha, nothing to hold on to, everything lasts only a moment, is fleeting. Everything we thought was solid turned out to be exactly the opposite. Then when one keeps seeing this he applies it to every dhamma which ever arose and understands to his dismay that there is no self to be seen either. it is all just dhammas arising and passing away and that one dhamma gives rise to the next autmatically, mechanically, without the need for a being to intervene. he gets insight into causality as well. :) hope that wasnt too thick (in a dhamma sense)! I suspect there might be much in that you would disagree to but I was just speaking my mind. :) with metta Matheesha #61147 From: Illusion Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 1:52 pm Subject: The Daily Enlightnment vvhite_illusion Are you happy with yourself and your life RIGHT NOW? This is important because "RIGHT NOWS" are all we have. RIGHT NOW, reflect... Yes. Reflect RIGHT NOW... If not RIGHT NOW, then when? source: http://buddhanet.net/flash/the-daily-enlightenment/index.html -- []\/[][]D (Maya Putra) #61148 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 3:03 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal egberdina Hi Larry, On 06/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > Hi Herman, > > There are several things one could say about holding a deterministic > view. First, to be clear, what we are talking about is dependent > arising. > > Granted, holding a view without really seeing what's what is merely > holding an ultimately meaningless concept. However, if that view is > taught by those in the know, merely contemplating that view may inch one > toward actually seeing "what's what" directly. > > Regarding a view as true is dishonest either because you don't know it > is true or you know it isn't true. Ironically, embracing that ugly > feeling of dishonesty may get you at least to the truth of suffering. > But building a view of all pervasive inevitable dishonesty and regarding > that as true is also dishonest if you don't know it is true. You can go > around feeling disgusted with yourself for being dishonest all the time > and try to get others to feel disgusted with themselves so you have some > company, but I don't think you will get very far until you break the > bond of desire. Somehow that disgusted feeling is arising not because of > dishonesty, but because of desire. > I agree with what you say. For something a little bit different, I thought I'd surprise you, and say something radical :-) Without desire, there is no consciousness. Or alternatively, consciousness is a manifestation of desire. From the "normal" perspective we ask the question, "why do we go to sleep?". But far more relevant is the question "Why do we wake up? " I wonder if there is a middle road between becoming and nibbana, a coming to terms with desire? Kind Regards Herman #61149 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 3:29 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." egberdina Hi Howard, On 06/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > Hi, Herman (and Nina) - > > In a message dated 7/5/06 8:18:28 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > > hhofmeister@... writes: > > > I understand. Mind / Body dualism is simply the view that the mind is > > one thing, and that the body is another thing. Which wouldn't really > > fit in with dependent origination. > > > > ========================= > So, do you think they are one and the same? And if yes, in what way? > 'Cause they sure don't SEEM the same, bro! In the absence of any reflection there isn't any differentiation, I reckon. And certainly, upon reflection, they certainly aren't the same. > My understanding of mind/body duality, or, better (for me), > mind/matter duality, is that mentality and materiality are not only distinguishable, but > independently existent, and separate. > I see materialists as considering matter to be all there is - an > "external", substantial, self-existent category, with mentality a function of > matter. I see idealists as considering mind to be all there is - an "internal", > substantial, self-existent category, with materiality a function of mind. I see > dualists as considering all that there is to be both mind and matter, the > first an "internal", substantial, self-existent category, the second an > "external", substantial, self-existent category, and with the two "realities" as > entirely separate and self-existent, yet interacting (like billiard balls in > collision). I see the Dhamma, however, as nondualist, with experience an overarching, > insubstantial process, and mentality and materiality its two faces - > distinguishable, but interdependent. > This is very nicely put. Thank you. The one niggling issue that remains is the one of solipsism, and it is probably overkill to raise that again. However, from a Dhamma point of view, others present merely as materiality, as their bodies. Yet we know that we behave quite differently in the presence of and towards rocks then we do to people and living things. And we also behave quite differently to the body we identify as our own then we do to other material things we call our own eg pushbike or fishing rod. I think that the main smokescreen arises through analysis. There seems to be no recognition in Dhamma analysis-into-components that that very analysis assails the function of whatever is being analysed. In breaking down the chariot into components the transport function is lost. In finding that a chariot is not to be found in it its component parts, one has lost sight of the fact that a thing is first and foremost what it means, what it does. And human beings cease to be human beings when they are analysed, because their meaning and function as human beings are not to be found in a breakdown of their materiality. A rose, in the hands of an analyst, is a pile of petals. A rose, well left alone, is a home for the insects. Kind Regards Herman #61150 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 11:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 7/6/06 6:31:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > On 06/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > > >Hi, Herman (and Nina) - > > > > In a message dated 7/5/06 8:18:28 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > > > > hhofmeister@... writes: > > > > >I understand. Mind / Body dualism is simply the view that the mind is > > >one thing, and that the body is another thing. Which wouldn't really > > >fit in with dependent origination. > > > > > > > ========================= > > So, do you think they are one and the same? And if yes, in what way? > > 'Cause they sure don't SEEM the same, bro! > > In the absence of any reflection there isn't any differentiation, I > reckon. And certainly, upon reflection, they certainly aren't the > same. > > > > > My understanding of mind/body duality, or, better (for me), > > mind/matter duality, is that mentality and materiality are not only > distinguishable, but > > independently existent, and separate. > > I see materialists as considering matter to be all there is - an > > "external", substantial, self-existent category, with mentality a function > of > > matter. I see idealists as considering mind to be all there is - an > "internal", > > substantial, self-existent category, with materiality a function of mind. > I see > > dualists as considering all that there is to be both mind and matter, the > > first an "internal", substantial, self-existent category, the second an > > "external", substantial, self-existent category, and with the two > "realities" as > > entirely separate and self-existent, yet interacting (like billiard balls > in > > collision). I see the Dhamma, however, as nondualist, with experience an > overarching, > > insubstantial process, and mentality and materiality its two faces - > > distinguishable, but interdependent. > > > > This is very nicely put. Thank you. ----------------------------------- Howard: Thanks. :-) ---------------------------------- > > The one niggling issue that remains is the one of solipsism, and it is > probably overkill to raise that again. However, from a Dhamma point of > view, others present merely as materiality, as their bodies. Yet we > know that we behave quite differently in the presence of and towards > rocks then we do to people and living things. And we also behave quite > differently to the body we identify as our own then we do to other > material things we call our own eg pushbike or fishing rod. ----------------------------------------- Howard: This points out, I would say, the importance of inferential knowledge. We worldlings, at least, would be utterly stupid, like "sessile sea anemones" to quote William James, without it. ------------------------------------------ > > I think that the main smokescreen arises through analysis. There seems > to be no recognition in Dhamma analysis-into-components that that very > analysis assails the function of whatever is being analysed. In > breaking down the chariot into components the transport function is > lost. In finding that a chariot is not to be found in it its component > parts, one has lost sight of the fact that a thing is first and > foremost what it means, what it does. And human beings cease to be > human beings when they are analysed, because their meaning and > function as human beings are not to be found in a breakdown of their > materiality. A rose, in the hands of an analyst, is a pile of petals. > A rose, well left alone, is a home for the insects. ---------------------------------------- Howard: This is why, I'd say, the Abhidhamma includes not only a Dhammasangani but also a Patthana. But, as I have pointed out, the study of interstream interaction is basically missing in Abhidhamma. In the suttas, it is dealt with conventionally, and that is really quite adequate, I think, for purposes of liberation. -------------------------------------- > > > Kind Regards > > > Herman > > ====================== With metta, Howard #61151 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 4:11 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." egberdina Hi Howard, On 07/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > ---------------------------------------- > Howard: > This is why, I'd say, the Abhidhamma includes not only a Dhammasangani > but also a Patthana. But, as I have pointed out, the study of interstream > interaction is basically missing in Abhidhamma. In the suttas, it is dealt with > conventionally, and that is really quite adequate, I think, for purposes of > liberation. > -------------------------------------- > Yes, quite so. The saving grace of the Abhidhamma is the puggalapannatti :-) Kind Regards Herman #61152 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 4:21 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. egberdina Hi Larry, On 06/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > Herman has gotten me real nervous about the word "is". I would say a > specific soft rupa is "experienced as" pleasant. > Larry, you are briliant. You have just proved that I am real. Because only what is real can have consequence. Your nervous state speaks loudly about my reality. Thanks Laz Herman #61153 From: LBIDD@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 4:45 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Howard: "If the feel changes with cetasikas, then I would say that the feel is extrinsic to the rupa, depending on cetasikas and other conditions" Hi Howard, That's it as far as I know. Feel as you call it IS a cetasika. Take a specific sweet rupa. Only neutral feeling arises with taste consciousness, so taste consciousness experiences this specific sweet rupa as a neutral feel. However, adverting, investigating, determining, and registration consciousnesses also experience this same rupa with their individual feeling cetasikas. I don't know if there is a rule about which feeling arises with these consciousnesses. Maybe Nina can help here. Javana may arise with desire in which case pleasant feeling experiences this same rupa as pleasant. The consciousnesses in a following mind-door process may arise with unpleasant feeling, meaning that the same rupa is experienced as unpleasant. I think attributing a feel to an object is a cognitive error which can be recognized with insight. Larry #61154 From: LBIDD@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 5:19 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Normal lbidd2 Hi Herman, H: "For something a little bit different, I thought I'd surprise you, and say something radical :-) Without desire, there is no consciousness. Or alternatively, consciousness is a manifestation of desire. From the "normal" perspective we ask the question, "why do we go to sleep?". But far more relevant is the question "Why do we wake up? " I wonder if there is a middle road between becoming and nibbana, a coming to terms with desire?" L: I often wonder why get out of bed ;-)) Consciousness is certainly a result of desire. Why desire? We can choose not to. Larry #61155 From: Ken O Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 5:45 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles ashkenn2k Hi Charles > > In a nutshell: you are born out of a woman's womb, your mind is > clouded (you know nothing so you live in ignorance). Thanks to > consciousness you be come self-aware (i.e., of mind - desire, and body - sensation). . k: From what your written, there are parellel casual chains, one mental and one body. Then when the mental chain ends in becoming, how does it conditon back to ignorance in our mental lifetime. But you have not answered is physical conditioned mental or the other way round. > However, if you mean what I think - the reverse order also served > several purposes: (1) Because there is "A" there is "B", because there is "B" there must have been (i.e., was) "A"; (2) To create emphasis, to emphasize the subject; (2) The links are also reversible -- if you are born you can "become" sick, old, ., because you are born you are in the cycle of samsara therefore becoming is a possible next link. k: The sutta is very clear on this on reversible. Using your model, and those we see in the sutta, it is not feeling that condition citta rather it is citta that condition feeling. It is because of citta, feeling arise and in the reversal way it is feeling arise dependence of Citta. How would you explain the reversal on this link? b. On one hand you mention that samasaric is a cycle, then on the other birth and death and birth is a linear model, do you mind explaining? I hope you dont mind forthright questions, if they are rude, I am sorry because I dont know to rephrase them to sound better Cheers KEn O #61156 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 2:10 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/6/06 8:03:27 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > That's it as far as I know. Feel as you call it IS a cetasika. > -------------------------------- Howard: My understanding of the Abhidhamma position was that vedana is an operation which feels the object. ------------------------------- Take a> > specific sweet rupa. Only neutral feeling arises with taste > consciousness, so taste consciousness experiences this specific sweet > rupa as a neutral feel. However, adverting, investigating, determining, > and registration consciousnesses also experience this same rupa with > their individual feeling cetasikas. I don't know if there is a rule > about which feeling arises with these consciousnesses. Maybe Nina can > help here. Javana may arise with desire in which case pleasant feeling > experiences this same rupa as pleasant. The consciousnesses in a > following mind-door process may arise with unpleasant feeling, meaning > that the same rupa is experienced as unpleasant. > > I think attributing a feel to an object is a cognitive error which can > be recognized with insight. ---------------------------------------- Howard: That might well be so, but that is what I thought was the Abhidhammic teaching. For some reason, no one seems to be able to tell me straight out what IS te Abhidhammic teaching about vedana! ----------------------------------------- > > Larry > ==================== With metta, Howard #61157 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 7:07 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." scottduncan2 Dear Herman, All, Please consider my ideas on the following: H: "The one niggling issue that remains is the one of solipsism..." Three "web definitions" of solipsism (and likely inadequate as such): 1) "...the view confining reality to oneself and one's experiences." 2) "The notion that it is impossible ever to know another person so why bother..." 3) " The theory that self is the only object of real knowledge or that nothing but self exists." Are these a fair representation of the concept? In my opinion, I fail to grasp how the teachings of the Buddha are seen as containing an inherent solipsism. And further, given that one of the central teachings is that of anatta or the absolute lack of a self in existence anywhere - the polar opposite of solipsism - I fail to see the relevance of the critique of the teachings on this ground. I can't see where the teachings can be any clearer on anything than on anatta. There is ultimately no self according to the Buddhadhamma. How then can it in any way be accused of solipsism? H: "I think that the main smokescreen arises through analysis. There seems to be no recognition in Dhamma analysis-into-components that that very analysis assails the function of whatever is being analysed." Why is this? Because the Dhamma analysis-into-components teaches anatta. The teaching assails the belief in a "whole," not the existence of function. The notion that these "functions" are functions of a self is part of the illusion, in my opinion. To be specific, the functions exist, each with its own characteristic but they are not a unified whole; that one sees it as such is self view, and not even very subtle that. Again, it is the "being" that is assailed. H: "In breaking down the chariot into components the transport function is lost. In finding that a chariot is not to be found in it its component parts, one has lost sight of the fact that a thing is first and foremost what it means, what it does." To consider that functionality is lost following a breaking down of an illusory whole into its component parts is, to me, missing the essential point. The chariot is not ultimately real. Its "transport function" of a non-existent chariot ultimately was conceptual. The Dhamma doesn't care about the chariot. The teachings are not to preserve the chariot but to demonstrate its danger. And, this being said, one can still ride in a chariot to this day, were one to be found, notwithstanding the Buddha's refutation of its ultimate reality. H: "And human beings cease to be human beings when they are analysed, because their meaning and function as human beings are not to be found in a breakdown of their materiality. A rose, in the hands of an analyst, is a pile of petals. A rose, well left alone, is a home for the insects." Human beings don't exist, if one takes the Buddha at his word. Does this relieve one of the need to hope that something wholesome arises in one's interactions with these conventional/conceptual "others?" Not if one wants out of samsara eventually. Is not the above merely sentimentalism. Did the Buddha teach anatta or not? For what its worth... With loving kindness, Scott. #61158 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:44 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." egberdina Hi Scott, On 07/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > Dear Herman, All, > > Please consider my ideas on the following: > > H: "The one niggling issue that remains is the one of solipsism..." > > Three "web definitions" of solipsism (and likely inadequate as such): > > 1) "...the view confining reality to oneself and one's experiences." > > 2) "The notion that it is impossible ever to know another person so > why bother..." > > 3) " The theory that self is the only object of real knowledge or > that nothing but self exists." > > Are these a fair representation of the concept? > Yes, they're fine. > In my opinion, I fail to grasp how the teachings of the Buddha are > seen as containing an inherent solipsism. I must say I am replying against my better judgment, because already I'm having to dig through old posts to correct your misrepresentations of what I said. On second thoughts, I'll just suggest that you reread what I said. I have not referred to the teachings of the Buddha as being solipsist. And further, given that one > of the central teachings is that of anatta or the absolute lack of a > self in existence anywhere - the polar opposite of solipsism - I fail > to see the relevance of the critique of the teachings on this ground. > I can't see where the teachings can be any clearer on anything than > on anatta. How you understand anatta is your responsibility. The Bahiya Sutta captures it neatly for me. > > There is ultimately no self according to the Buddhadhamma. How then > can it in any way be accused of solipsism? There is no solipsism in the DhammaVinaya. But there is implicit solipsism in the Dhammasangani. > > H: "I think that the main smokescreen arises through analysis. There > > seems to be no recognition in Dhamma analysis-into-components that > that very analysis assails the function of whatever is being analysed." > > > Why is this? Because the Dhamma analysis-into-components teaches > anatta. The teaching assails the belief in a "whole," not the > existence of function. The notion that these "functions" are functions > of a self is part of the illusion, in my opinion. To be specific, the > functions exist, each with its own characteristic but they are not a > unified whole; that one sees it as such is self view, and not even > very subtle that. Again, it is the "being" that is assailed. > Really? The Bahiya Sutta, again. If you are saying that Bahiya, the Buddha and the bovine are figments of an unembodied imagination, then I suggest you are way ahead of yourself. > H: "In breaking down the chariot into components the transport > > function is lost. In finding that a chariot is not to be found in it > its component parts, one has lost sight of the fact that a thing is > first and foremost what it means, what it does." > > > To consider that functionality is lost following a breaking down of an > illusory whole into its component parts is, to me, missing the > essential point. This is just leading statement upon leading statement. > The chariot is not ultimately real. Meaningless drivvle. Its "transport > function" of a non-existent chariot ultimately was conceptual. The > Dhamma doesn't care about the chariot. The teachings are not to > preserve the chariot but to demonstrate its danger. And, this being > said, one can still ride in a chariot to this day, were one to be > found, notwithstanding the Buddha's refutation of its ultimate reality. There is more danger in your reading of anatta than in any chariot I've ever seen. > > H: "And human beings cease to be human beings when they are analysed, > > because their meaning and function as human beings are not to be found > in a breakdown of their materiality. A rose, in the hands of an > analyst, is a pile of petals. A rose, well left alone, is a home for > the insects." > > > Human beings don't exist, if one takes the Buddha at his word. Does > this relieve one of the need to hope that something wholesome arises > in one's interactions with these conventional/conceptual "others?" > Not if one wants out of samsara eventually. Is not the above merely > sentimentalism. Did the Buddha teach anatta or not? > The Buddha taught anatta, which is nothing like your misrepresentation of it. > For what its worth... > Not a lot. > With loving kindness, > You too > Scott. > > > Herman #61159 From: LBIDD@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 8:37 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Howard: "My understanding of the Abhidhamma position was that vedana is an operation which feels the object." Hi Howard, For some reason this language is very elusive. Are you saying that objects have a feeling characteristic that vedana feels? Something like taste consciousness tasting a flavor rupa? Larry #61160 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 5:13 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Scott) - In a message dated 7/6/06 11:47:36 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > Hi Scott, > > On 07/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > > > >Dear Herman, All, > > > > Please consider my ideas on the following: > > > > H: "The one niggling issue that remains is the one of solipsism..." > > > > Three "web definitions" of solipsism (and likely inadequate as such): > > > > 1) "...the view confining reality to oneself and one's experiences." > > > > 2) "The notion that it is impossible ever to know another person so > > why bother..." > > > > 3) " The theory that self is the only object of real knowledge or > > that nothing but self exists." > > > > Are these a fair representation of the concept? > > > > Yes, they're fine. > > > > In my opinion, I fail to grasp how the teachings of the Buddha are > > seen as containing an inherent solipsism. > > I must say I am replying against my better judgment, because already > I'm having to dig through old posts to correct your misrepresentations > of what I said. On second thoughts, I'll just suggest that you reread > what I said. > > I have not referred to the teachings of the Buddha as being solipsist. --------------------------------------- Howard: Correct. :-) ------------------------------------ > > > And further, given that one > > of the central teachings is that of anatta or the absolute lack of a > > self in existence anywhere - the polar opposite of solipsism - I fail > > to see the relevance of the critique of the teachings on this ground. > > I can't see where the teachings can be any clearer on anything than > > on anatta. > > How you understand anatta is your responsibility. The Bahiya Sutta > captures it neatly for me. ------------------------------------ Howard: It gets a important piece of it for me. (I love that sutta, BTW!) ------------------------------------ > > > > > > There is ultimately no self according to the Buddhadhamma. How then > > can it in any way be accused of solipsism? > > There is no solipsism in the DhammaVinaya. But there is implicit > solipsism in the Dhammasangani. ------------------------------------- Howard: Yes - by omission. ------------------------------------- > > > > > > H: "I think that the main smokescreen arises through analysis. There > > > > seems to be no recognition in Dhamma analysis-into-components that > > that very analysis assails the function of whatever is being analysed." > > > > > > Why is this? Because the Dhamma analysis-into-components teaches > > anatta. The teaching assails the belief in a "whole," not the > > existence of function. The notion that these "functions" are functions > > of a self is part of the illusion, in my opinion. To be specific, the > > functions exist, each with its own characteristic but they are not a > > unified whole; that one sees it as such is self view, and not even > > very subtle that. Again, it is the "being" that is assailed. > > > > Really? The Bahiya Sutta, again. If you are saying that Bahiya, the > Buddha and the bovine are figments of an unembodied imagination, then > I suggest you are way ahead of yourself. > > > > H: "In breaking down the chariot into components the transport > > > > function is lost. In finding that a chariot is not to be found in it > > its component parts, one has lost sight of the fact that a thing is > > first and foremost what it means, what it does." > > > > > > To consider that functionality is lost following a breaking down of an > > illusory whole into its component parts is, to me, missing the > > essential point. > > This is just leading statement upon leading statement. > > > > The chariot is not ultimately real. > > Meaningless drivvle. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Mmm, I'd say you are over reaching here, Herman. There was, of course, a point in that metaphor from the Milindapanha. (And if I may venture an idea, your disapproval might be expressed a bit more softly, don't you think? :-) ------------------------------------------ > > > Its "transport > > function" of a non-existent chariot ultimately was conceptual. The > > Dhamma doesn't care about the chariot. The teachings are not to > > preserve the chariot but to demonstrate its danger. And, this being > > said, one can still ride in a chariot to this day, were one to be > > found, notwithstanding the Buddha's refutation of its ultimate reality. > > There is more danger in your reading of anatta than in any chariot > I've ever seen. > > > > > > H: "And human beings cease to be human beings when they are analysed, > > > > because their meaning and function as human beings are not to be found > > in a breakdown of their materiality. A rose, in the hands of an > > analyst, is a pile of petals. A rose, well left alone, is a home for > > the insects." > > > > > > Human beings don't exist, if one takes the Buddha at his word. Does > > this relieve one of the need to hope that something wholesome arises > > in one's interactions with these conventional/conceptual "others?" > > Not if one wants out of samsara eventually. Is not the above merely > > sentimentalism. Did the Buddha teach anatta or not? > > > > The Buddha taught anatta, which is nothing like your misrepresentation of > it. > > > For what its worth... > > > > Not a lot. ------------------------------- Howard: Uh, oh! ;-) -------------------------------- > > > > With loving kindness, > > > > You too > > > Scott. > > > > > > > > Herman > > ====================== With metta, Howard #61161 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 5:19 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/6/06 11:49:08 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Howard: "My understanding of the Abhidhamma position was that vedana is > an operation which feels the object." > > Hi Howard, > > For some reason this language is very elusive. Are you saying that > objects have a feeling characteristic that vedana feels? Something like > taste consciousness tasting a flavor rupa? > > Larry > ======================== That is exactly the impression that has been converyed to me on DSG to be the Abhidhamnmic position. Now, I don't know 1) whether or not that *is* the position of Abhidhamma, or 2) Abhidhammc position notwithstanding, whether it is a fact or not. I don't expect to have item # 2 clarified for me, but I do think item # 1 could be. With metta, Howard #61162 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 5:33 pm Subject: My Posting Frequency upasaka_howard Hi, all - It's now past midnight. Were it not for that, this would be my 11th post of the day to DSG! Although all this posting hasn't stood in the way of my meditating and study, I believe my posting is excessive. Also, I will shortly be starting to go through the massive and difficult Mahayana work, the Avatamsaka Sutra, and I would like to add on another meditation sitting daily - at least a few days a week. So, I hope to cut down considerably on the amount of posting I do. I will, of course, reply to all posts addressed to me but perhaps a bit more briefly than presently, and I plan to cut down overall on the number and size of my posts - at least for a while. With metta, Howard #61163 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 5:36 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] My Posting Frequency upasaka_howard Hi agai, all - In a message dated 7/7/06 12:34:29 AM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@... writes: > It's now past midnight. Were it not for that, this would be my 11th > post of the day to DSG! > ======================= LOL! I should have said 13th, not 11th. (And, in fact, this post would be the 14th!) With metta and excess(!), Howard #61164 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 10:57 pm Subject: Fwd: Abhidhamma in Daily Life 15 nilovg Something happened and my post arrived at Han's address instead of dsg. Here it is. Begin doorgestuurd bericht: > Van: Nina van Gorkom > Datum: 6 juli 2006 19:32:03 GMT+02:00 > Aan: han tun > Onderwerp: Abhidhamma in Daily Life 15 > > Dear friends, > > Sometimes the khandhas are called the ``khandhas of clinging'' (in > Påli: upådånakkhandha). Those who are not arahats still cling to > the khandhas. We take the body for self; thus we cling to > rúpakkhandha. We take mentality for self; thus we cling to > vedanåkkhandha, to saññåkkhandha, to sa.nkhårakkhandha and to > viññå.nakkhandha. If we cling to the khandhas and do not see them > as they are, we will have sorrow. So long as the khandhas are still > objects of clinging for us, we are like people afflicted by sickness. > We read in the Kindred Sayings (III, Khandha-vagga, the First > Fifty, paragraph1, Nakulapitar) that the housefather Nakulapitar, > who was an old, sick man, came to see the Buddha at Crocodile Haunt > in the Deerpark. The Buddha said to him that he should train > himself thus: > > ``Though my body is sick, my mind shall not be sick.'' > > Later on Såriputta gave him a further explanation of the Buddha's > words: > > Herein, housefather, the untaught many-folk... who are unskilled in > the worthy doctrine, untrained in the worthy doctrine--these regard > body as the self, they regard the self as having body, body as > being in the self, the self as being in the body. ``I am the > body'', they say, ``body is mine'', and are possessed by this idea; > and so, possessed by this idea, when body alters and changes, owing > to the unstable and changeful nature of the body, then sorrow and > grief, woe, lamentation and despair arise in them. They regard > feeling (vedanå) as the self... They regard perception (saññå) as > the self... They regard the activities (sa.nkhårakkhandha) as the > self... They regard consciousness (viññå.na) as the self... That, > housefather, is how body is sick and mind is sick too. > And how is body sick, but mind is not sick? > Herein, housefather, the well-taught ariyan disciple... regards not > body as the self, regards not the self as having body, nor body as > being in the self, nor self as being in the body. He says not ``I > am body'', he says not ``body is mine'', nor is possessed by this > idea. As he is not so possessed, when body alters and changes owing > to the unstable and changeful nature of body, then sorrow and > grief, woe, lamentation and despair do not arise in him. He regards > not feeling (vedanå) as the self... He regards not perception > (saññå) as the self... He regards not the activities > (sa.nkhårakkhandha) as the self... He regards not consciousness > (viññå.na) as the self... Thus, housefather, body is sick, but mind > is not sick. > > ******* > Nina. > > #61165 From: LBIDD@... Date: Thu Jul 6, 2006 11:47 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 L: "Are you saying that objects have a feeling characteristic that vedana feels? Something like taste consciousness tasting a flavor rupa?" ======================== H: "That is exactly the impression that has been converyed to me on DSG to be the Abhidhammic position." Hi Howard, Maybe Nina should rule on this but I think it's a misunderstanding. Take this case: CMA guide, p.172: "Through the force of unwholesome kamma one encounters an undesirable object, and thus the resultant cittas in the cognitive process by which that object is cognized will be generated by the maturation of that unwholesome kamma. In this case the sense consciousness, reception, investigation, and registration cittas are necessarily uwholesome resultants. The accompanying feeling is always equanimity, except in the case of body-consciousness, which is accompanied by pain." L: I read this as meaning that if the body consciousness is accompanied by pain the reception, investigation, and registration consciousnesses will be accompanied by neutral feeling. Therefore the object could not have a feeling characteristic because two different kinds of resultant feeling cetasikas arise, pain and equanimity. Interestingly, for eye, ear, nose, taste, and smell consciousnesses only neutral feeling will arise in all four resultant consciousnesses whether the object is undesirable or desirable neutral. In the case of an extremely desirable object investigation and registration will be accompanied by pleasant feeling but the sense consciousness and reception consciousness will be accompanied by neutral feeling. Body consciousness will be accompanied by pleasant feeling in the case of a desirable-neutral and a very desirable object, the other three resultant consciousnesses will be accompanied by neutral feeling for a desirable neutral object, and investigation and registration will be accompanied by pleasant feeling for a very desirable object while reception consciousness is accompanied by neutral feeling. It would be good to sort this out for when we get to feeling in dependent arising. Larry #61166 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 3:30 am Subject: feelings. nilovg Hi Larry and Howard, Howard: "If the feel changes with cetasikas, then I would say that the feel is extrinsic to the rupa, depending on cetasikas and other conditions" ------ N: Feeling is different according as it arises with different cittas. We have to consider the citta it accompanies. --------- Larry: That's it as far as I know. Feel as you call it IS a cetasika. Take a specific sweet rupa. Only neutral feeling arises with taste consciousness, so taste consciousness experiences this specific sweet rupa as a neutral feel. However, adverting, investigating, determining, and registration consciousnesses also experience this same rupa with their individual feeling cetasikas. I don't know if there is a rule about which feeling arises with these consciousnesses. Maybe Nina can help here. ------- N: There is a rule (dhamma niyama). Sense-door adverting- consciousness is a kiriyacitta and it is accompanied by indifferent feeling. The vipaakacittas tasting-consciousness, receiving- consciousness are always accompanied by indifferent feeling. Investigating-consciousness which is vipaaka is accompanied by indifferent feeling, but when the object is very pleasant, it is accompanied by happy feeling. Determining-consciousness is kiriyacitta and this is always accompanied by indifferent feeling. The javanacittas that are kusala cittas or akusala cittas are accompanied by their appropriate feelings (already discussed). The registering cittas are also vipaakacittas arising after the javanacittas. The type of feeling that accompanies these may also be dependent on the feeling accompanying the previous javanacittas. This is a more complicated and detailed matter. ------------ Larry: Javana may arise with desire in which case pleasant feeling experiences this same rupa as pleasant. The consciousnesses in a following mind-door process may arise with unpleasant feeling, meaning that the same rupa is experienced as unpleasant. -------- N: No, this is accompanied by the same type of feeling. The javanacittas in that process are also of the same type. After that other mind-door processes of cittas that think of ruupa and then javanacittas maybe kusala or akusala and these are accompanied by their appropriate feelings. --------- Nina. #61167 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 2:56 am Subject: desirable and undesirable. nilovg Hi Howard, I feel like you that we cannot post endlessly. I try once more, but like you, I do not want to repeat myself. And, you do not have to answer my post. Both of us have other obligations and I do 'feel' with you. Now I use feeling in a conventional way! The reason why I cannot give you a satisfactory answer is that feeling in the Abhidhamma is different from feeling or emotion as we use the word in conventional language. In the Abh it is explained in a matter of fact, unemotive way. It is only a dhamma. Just an impersonal element. Is the object desirable? It does not matter. Is it undesirable? It does not matter. We are in the cycle and we have to learn to accept any kind of vipaaka. Is feeling pleasant or unpleasant? It does not matter. All of them are elements arising because of their proper conditions. No self who can change them. Perhaps you heard what you did not expect to hear about feeling. But I try again. Op 6-jul-2006, om 22:07 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: I know that the operation of feeling arises as a cetasika in every mindstate. But when it operates it "tastes" the object as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral, and that pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality detected by the vedana is what I would call the "feel" of the object. Now, a desirable object should not have unpleasant feel, nor an undesirable object pleasant feel unless vedana is malfunctioning, is that not so? What could 'desirable' mean except for "properly felt as pleasant"? ------------------------------------ N: As said before, an object could not be neutral, since vipaakacitta that experiences it is produced by kamma. There is no neutral kamma. But, objects may be moderately desirable (or pleasant) and moderately undesirable. You wrote (other post): See above. We know so little about visible object, cittas that experience it are so rapidly arising and falling away. But what is the use of finding out all this? The reactions during javanacittas are what counts. What you say above counts for vipaakacitta, not for the following javanacittas. After seeing a pleasant object that appears when meeting the Buddha, there can be javanacittas with aversion and unpleasant feeling. -------- H: > As to the evaluation of the object, this comes in with the > javanacittas: as said these react wisely or unwisely. They are > accompanied by feelings, and these may be happy, unhappy or > indifferent. ... I'm sorry, Nina, but the foregoing has a degree of complexity that only confuses me. Let's get concrete: Suppose the object is the sharp sensation of a dentist's probe jammed into a nerve - what one informally calls "a terrible pain". That rupa is strongly unpleasant. I would also say it is quite undesirable. Is its unpleasantness due to the mindstate in which it is the object, or is it inherent in the rupa itself? I don't have any stake in its being one way or the other, but what are the facts according to Abhidhamma? ------------------------------------ N: It is an undesirable object ;-)) . Inherent in the object. But, the javanacittas do not necessarily have to be cittas rooted in aversion and thus accompanied by unpleasant feeling. It depends on the manner of attention to the object. Remember: < We read in the Kindred Sayings (I, Sagåthå-vagga, the Måra-suttas, chapter II, §3, The Splinter): Thus have I heard: The Exalted One was once staying at Råjagaha, in the Maddakucchi, at the Deer-preserve. Now at that time his foot was injured by a splinter. Sorely indeed did the Exalted One feel it, grievous the pains he suffered in the body, keen and sharp, acute, distressing and unwelcome. He truly bore them, mindful and deliberate, nor was he cast down...> --------- Yes, it is possible to be mindful of the hardness or heat of what is an undesirable ruupa. Then the feeling is either indifferent or pleasant. Understanding can arise with indifferent or pleasant feeling. If we want to understand more about feelings we should pay attention to the citta it accompanies. My answer may be unsatisfactory, but I cannot explain more. Nina. #61168 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 3:43 am Subject: Fwd: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 87 and Tiika. nilovg This may appear twice. Begin doorgestuurd bericht: > Van: Nina van Gorkom > Datum: 7 juli 2006 10:25:33 GMT+02:00 > Aan: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Onderwerp: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 87 and Tiika. > > Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 87 > > Repetition-Condition (aasevana-paccaya) > > Intro: > > Repetition-condition, aasevana-paccaya, pertains only to naama, > namely to the > javana-cittas arising in a process of cittas. Javana-cittas are > kusala, akusala or, in > the case of arahats, kiriya. With regard to cittas of the sense- > sphere, kaamaavacara > cittas, there are usually seven javana-cittas in a process of cittas. > The first javana-citta conditions the second javana-citta by > repetition-condition, aasevana-paccaya, thus, the first javana- > citta is the conditioning dhamma (paccaya dhamma) and the second > one is the conditioned dhamma (paccayupanna dhamma). After that the > second javana-citta which is in its turn the conditioning dhamma, > conditions the third one, and so on, until the seventh javana-citta > which does not condition the succeeding citta in this way since it > is the last javana-citta. > > In the sense-door process the javana-cittas follow upon the > determining-consciousness (votthapana-citta) and in the mind-door > process upon the mind-door adverting-consciousness (mano- > dvaaraavajjana-citta). The javana-cittas experience the same object > as the preceding cittas in the process, and, except in the case of > the arahat, they experience it in a wholesome way or in an > unwholesome way. > > The cittas which are repetition-condition have to be of the same > jåti.Thus, if the first javana-citta is akusala, the following ones > are also akusala, and if the first javana-citta is kusala, the > following ones are also kusala. > As we have seen, each citta conditions the succeeding citta by way > of proximity-condition, anantara-paccaya, and by way of contiguity- > condition, samanantara-paccaya. Moreover, a preceding citta can > condition a succeeding citta by way of decisive support of > proximity, anantårupanissaya-paccaya. Javana-citta, besides being a > condition for the next one by way of repetition-condition, is also > a condition for the next one by way of proximity, contiguity and > decisive support of proximity. Realities can be related to each > other by way of several > conditions. Repetition-condition only pertains to javana-cittas. > ---------- > Text Vis: 87. (12) A state that assists the efficiency and power of > the proximate > (next) in the sense of repetition is a 'repetition condition', like > repeated application to books and so on. > -------- > N: The Tiika mentions that a preceding javana-citta conditions a > following one similar to itself. > The Tiika elaborates on the expression ‘repeated application to > books’. It is like studying, listening and bearing in mind > (uggaha.na, savana, dhaara.na) that is done repeatedly so that > one’s understanding gains in strength. > Evenso the preceding javana-citta conditions the following one by > repetition condition so that is gains in strength. > A question is asked why, just as in the case of proximity- > condition, a former javana-citta cannot condition a following one > of a different jaati? > The answer is that the javana-citta could not cause a citta of a > different jaati to become distinguished by its efficiency and power. > Thus, when the javanacitta is kusala, it can condition the > succeeding kusala citta to gain in efficiency and power. > Another question is why repetition-condition does not operate in > the case of vipaaka. > Vipaakacitta is the result of kamma, and with its weak and > effortless nature it does not bring about another vipaaka, the > Tiika states. > > The Tiika mentions that repetition-condition applies to javana- > cittas that are of the same jaati, but the plane of citta (bhuumi) > or the object that is experienced may not always the same. > This happens in the process when someone develops samatha and > attains jhåna, and also in the process when someone develops > vipassanå and attains enlightenment. As regards the attainment of > jhåna, jhånacittas do not have sense objects, they are not > kåmåvacara cittas, cittas of the sense sphere. But in the process > when jhåna is attained there are first kåmåvacara cittas which are, > in the case of non-arahats, mahå-kusala cittas which experience the > meditation subject through the mind-door. Each one of the mahå- > kusala cittas is repetition-condition for the next one and the last > mahå-kusala citta in that process conditions the jhånacitta, which > is of a different plane of citta, rúpåvacara citta, by way of > repetition-condition. Each one of these jhånacittas conditions the > next one by way of repetition-condition, except the last one in > that process. > > In the process during which enlightenment is attained, there are > first mahå-kusala cittas accompanied by paññå which clearly sees > the reality appearing at that moment as impermanent, dukkha or > anattå. Each of these mahå-kusala cittas is repetition-condition > for the next one. The last mahå-kusala-citta, the "change-of- > lineage'' (gotrabhuu), arising before the magga-citta, the > lokuttara kusala citta, experiences an object different from the > preceding ones, namely nibbåna. The "change-of-lineage'', which is > kamåvacara citta, conditions the magga-citta by way of repetition- > condition but the magga-citta itself is not repetition-condition > for the succeeding phalacitta. The phalacitta is of a different > jåti, the jåti which is vipåka. The phalacitta which is the result > of the magga-citta and immediately succeeds it, performs the > function of javana, but it is not repetition-condition. > ---------- > Text Vis.: It is threefold as profitable, unprofitable, and > functional impulsion; for it is said: 'Preceding profitable states > are a condition, as repetition condition, for succeeding profitable > states ... Preceding unprofitable ... Preceding functional > indeterminate states are a condition, as repetition condition, for > succeeding functional indeterminate states' (P.tn.1,5). > -------- > N: The Tiika refers to the Pa.t.thaana which states that by way of > repetition-condition kusala dhamma conditions kusala dhamma, > akusala dhamma conditions akusala dhamma and indeterminate dhamma > conditions indeterminate dhamma (referring to the kiriyacittas of > the arahat which perform the function of javana). > --------- > Conclusion: > > Ruupas which are sense objects, namely, visible object, sound, > odour,flavour, tangible object, are either desirable or > undesirable. The sense-cognitions that experience them are > vipaakacitta produced by kusala kamma or akusala kamma. The > javanacittas that arise after the vipaakacittas still experience > the same object as the vipaakacittas, and they have wise attention > or unwise attention with regard to the object. Whether the javana- > cittas are kusala cittas or akusala cittas depends on natural > decisive support-condition which includes one's accumulated > inclinations, and also on root-condition and on several other > conditions. They arise and fall away extremely rapidly, there is > nobody who can manipulate them. > > The performing of akusala kamma or kusala kamma occurs during the > moments of javana and these can produce results later on. Moreover, > during the moments of javana unwholesome or wholesome tendencies > are being accumulated. Thus, the moments of javana condition our > life in the future. When we are not intent on > daana, siila or bhaavana, the javana-cittas are akusala. When we > are thinking of people, events, or different things, javana-cittas > motivate thinking and usually these are akusala cittas since we > accumulated such a great deal of akusala. > Because of conditions we are able to listen and study the teachings > and thus, understanding can be accumulated during the moments of > javana. In this way there can be wise attention towards desirable > or undesirable objects at times. > > ******** > > Nina > > #61169 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 4:38 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Thanks for the clarifications. Regarding definitions: H: "Yes, they're fine." Okay, one is never sure with generic definitions from unknown sources. H: "I have not referred to the teachings of the Buddha as being solipsist." My mistake. H: "How you understand anatta is your responsibility. The Bahiya Sutta captures it neatly for me. There is no solipsism in the DhammaVinaya. But there is implicit solipsism in the Dhammasangani." I'll go over the Bahiya sutta when I have a wee bit more time. I realise I've missed that the reference to solipsism was directed at the famous Third Basket. Sorry. H: "Really? The Bahiya Sutta, again. If you are saying that Bahiya, the Buddha and the bovine are figments of an unembodied imagination, then I suggest you are way ahead of yourself." I'll go over the sutta, as mentioned. That might help me see in what way I'm ahead of myself. H: "There is more danger in your reading of anatta than in any chariot I've ever seen. The Buddha taught anatta, which is nothing like your misrepresentation of it." Would you be able to be more specific as to how I've misrepresented anatta? I'm not going to debate you on it, I'm just wanting to make sure I understand things. The way you phrase it I get the impression that I've somehow gotten myself way out in left field or something. I'm not really at the same level of things as are you. I've only been "here" a relatively short time. With loving kindness, Scott. #61170 From: "matheesha" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 7:21 am Subject: Re: desirable and undesirable. matheesha333 Hi Howard, Nina H:Let's get concrete: Suppose the object is the sharp > sensation > of a dentist's probe jammed into a nerve - what one informally calls "a > terrible pain". That rupa is strongly unpleasant. I would also say it > is quite > undesirable. Is its unpleasantness due to the mindstate in which it > is the object, > or is it inherent in the rupa itself? I don't have any stake in its > being one > way or the other, but what are the facts according to Abhidhamma? > ------------------------------------ > N: It is an undesirable object ;-)) . Inherent in the object. But, > the javanacittas do not necessarily have to be cittas rooted in > aversion and thus accompanied by unpleasant feeling. It depends on > the manner of attention to the object. > M: I was reminded of one sutta where the Buddha says that a monk who has control over his mind can experience pleasantness as unpleasantness and vice versa, as he wishes. So I guess stating an object as pleasant/unpleasant is acutally more for the masses who don't have such control. with metta Matheesha #61171 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 3:40 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry (and Nina) - In a message dated 7/7/06 2:52:01 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Maybe Nina should rule on this but I think it's a misunderstanding. Take > this case: > > CMA guide, p.172: "Through the force of unwholesome kamma one encounters > an undesirable object, and thus the resultant cittas in the cognitive > process by which that object is cognized will be generated by the > maturation of that unwholesome kamma. In this case the sense > consciousness, reception, investigation, and registration cittas are > necessarily uwholesome resultants. The accompanying feeling is always > equanimity, except in the case of body-consciousness, which is > accompanied by pain." > > L: I read this as meaning that if the body consciousness is accompanied > by pain the reception, investigation, and registration consciousnesses > will be accompanied by neutral feeling. Therefore the object could not > have a feeling characteristic because two different kinds of resultant > feeling cetasikas arise, pain and equanimity. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Okay, I read it differently. The "undesirability" is inherent. Moreover, if it is a body-door object the feel is unpleasant (determined), and presumably also if it is a mind-door object, and if it is an eye-door, ear-door, nose-door, or tongue-door object it is neutral. That pretty much makes the feel inherent as I see it. The object determines how it is felt. Also, BTW, that last line from the CMA quote "The accompanying feeling is always equanimity, except in the case of body-consciousness, which is accompanied by pain." is exactly what I was saying to Nina - most rupas are neutral, with only body-door rupas never being neutral! Recall that I said I was amazed that visual object should be other thn neutral, Nina? ------------------------------------------- > > Interestingly, for eye, ear, nose, taste, and smell consciousnesses only > neutral feeling will arise in all four resultant consciousnesses whether > the object is undesirable or desirable neutral. > ------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes! ------------------------------------------ In the case of an> > extremely desirable object investigation and registration will be > accompanied by pleasant feeling but the sense consciousness and > reception consciousness will be accompanied by neutral feeling. Body > consciousness will be accompanied by pleasant feeling in the case of a > desirable-neutral and a very desirable object, the other three resultant > consciousnesses will be accompanied by neutral feeling for a desirable > neutral object, and investigation and registration will be accompanied > by pleasant feeling for a very desirable object while reception > consciousness is accompanied by neutral feeling. > > It would be good to sort this out for when we get to feeling in > dependent arising. > > Larry > > ====================== With metta, Howard #61172 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 4:12 am Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles dacostacharles Hi, You can only be insulting or rude when you intent to; i.e.: questions, no matter how tough or how bad, can't be insulting or rude to me. I am not so shallow, and sure, not so high that I can't make mistakes or misunderstand something. So fire away, and please don't be shy. According to many Buddhist (of all 3 so-called "yanas") we have (in us /or/ are) Buddha Nature. We are born with this potential but it is clouded by ignorance, desire, delusion, etc., (it depends on who you talk too). We are born with these clouds also (as normal and as natural as suffering). According to one Tibetan tradition, the first beings did not have the clouds. I don't remember the details of this Buddhist legend, but I think the second generation of beings tasted "mana" (i.e., ???) from the earth and delighted in it. Since then, each consecutive generation has been born with the clouds. This is to explain why the 12-links begins with "Ignorance." The reverse order is also used to say, if one of the links are present in your (past, present, or future) situation then the previous links must be, or have been, present also. And, the mental chain does not end in "becoming," however, it could be said that there is change or a new beginning (ref: the concept of Re-birth/-incarnation). Both the mental and the physical condition each other, they are like the two sides of a soft coin; push on one side, the other side protrudes. Now keep in mind that: 1. Mind is not separate from body, they are one, this is why the link is "mind/form, mind&form, or .body replacing form. 2. D.O. presents the following: every thing is a consequence of something before, the origin of everything is dependent on a particular set of circumstances having happened. 3. When I am presenting the linear model, I am not dismissing the cyclic models, I am only creating focus on a single life-time for a being, event, emotion, etc.. Now to explain how ignorance comes back (i.e., is "reborn"), we would have to go beyond the one life-time model. Other than that, this is where the legend comes in. It was made a fundamental part of existing (like suffering, it is the foundation of which suffering exists), suffering could not exist without it. In terms of ignorance in our many mental lifetimes - I am not sure what you are really getting at but I think, on this point, you would be more interested in a many life-times model of D.O. because they implicitly state something is past from one life-time to the next life-time. Here, for example, we can talk about how the birth of emotions & moods are conditioned by a single desire or attachment. In each birth the desire or attachment is manifested in a somewhat different emotion/mood. Emotions/moods are born, decay, and die; just as desires and attachments (note: parallel cycles). What do you mean by citta? Feelings are conditioned by past-lives. I cut the following in because I have a hard time remembering the links: 1. Ignorance (avijja) 2. Volitional Activities (sankhara) 3. Consciousness (vinnana) 4. Mind & Matter (nama-rupa) 5. Six Sense Doors (salayatana) 6. Contact (phassa) 7. Sensation (vedana) 8. Craving (tanha) 9. Clinging (upadana) 10. Becoming (bhava) 11. Birth (jati) 12. Decay And Death (jara-marana) Dependent on ignorance, volitional activities arise. Dependent on volitional activities, consciousness arises. Dependent on consciousness, mind and matter arises. Dependent on mind and matter, the 6 sense doors arise. Dependent on 6 sense doors, contact with a sense objects arise. Dependent on contact with a sense objects, sensations arise. Dependent on sensations, cravings arise. Dependent on cravings, clinging arises. Because there is/was clinging, cravings must have arisen. ... (seeing the 12 links in reverse order) Charles DaCosta ________________________________________ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Ken O Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 02:46 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles Hi Charles > > In a nutshell: you are born out of a woman's womb, your mind is > clouded (you know nothing so you live in ignorance). Thanks to > consciousness you be come self-aware (i.e., of mind - desire, and body - sensation). . k: From what your written, there are parallel casual chains, one mental and one body. Then when the mental chain ends in becoming, how does it condition back to ignorance in our mental lifetime. But you have not answered is physical conditioned mental or the other way round. > However, if you mean what I think - the reverse order also served > several purposes: (1) Because there is "A" there is "B", because there is "B" there must have been (i.e., was) "A"; (2) To create emphasis, to emphasize the subject; (2) The links are also reversible -- if you are born you can "become" sick, old, ., because you are born you are in the cycle of samara therefore becoming is a possible next link. k: The sutta is very clear on this on reversible. Using your model, and those we see in the sutta, it is not feeling that condition citta rather it is citta that condition feeling. It is because of citta, feeling arise and in the reversal way it is feeling arise dependence of Citta. How would you explain the reversal on this link? b. On one hand you mention that samasaric is a cycle, then on the other birth and death and birth is a linear model, do you mind explaining? I hope you dont mind forthright questions, if they are rude, I am sorry because I dont know to rephrase them to sound better Cheers KEn O #61173 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 11:03 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, 16 nilovg Dear friends, So long as we are still clinging to the khandhas we are like sick people, but we can be cured of our sickness if we see the khandhas as they are. The khandhas are impermanent and thus they are dukkha (unsatisfactory). We read in the Kindred Sayings (III, Khandha-vagga, Last Fifty, §104, Suffering) that the Buddha taught to the monks the four noble Truths: the Truth of dukkha, the Truth of the arising of dukkha, the Truth of the ceasing of dukkha, the Truth of the way leading to the ceasing of dukkha. He said: Monks, I will teach you dukkha, the arising of dukkha, the ceasing of dukkha, the way leading to the ceasing of dukkha. Do you listen to it. And what, monks, is dukkha? It is to be called the five khandhas of grasping. What five? The rúpakkhandha of grasping, the vedanåkkhandha of grasping, the saññåkkhandha of grasping, the sa.nkhårakkhandha of grasping, the viññå.nakkhandha of grasping. This, monks, is called dukkha. And what, monks, is the arising of dukkha? It is that craving... that leads downward to rebirth... the craving for feeling, for rebirth, for no rebirth... This, monks, is called the arising of dukkha. And what, monks, is the ceasing of dukkha? It is the utter passionless ceasing, the giving up, the abandonment of, the release from, the freedom from attachment to that craving... This, monks, is called the ceasing of dukkha. And what, monks, is the way going to the ceasing of dukkha? It is the ariyan eightfold Path... This, monks, is the way going to the ceasing of dukkha. So long as there is still clinging to the khandhas there will be the arising of the khandhas in rebirth, and this means sorrow. If we develop the eightfold Path, the development of right understanding of realities, we will learn to see what the khandhas really are. Then we are on the way leading to the ceasing of dukkha, which means: no more birth, old age, sickness and death. Those who have attained the last stage of enlightenment, the stage of the arahat, will be, after their life-span is over, free from the khandhas. ******** Nina. #61174 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 11:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. nilovg Hi Howard, there is a misunderstanding here. We have to differentiate ruupas that are objects (never neutral) and feelings accompanying the vipaakacittas that experience those objects. Visible object itself is never neutral, the vipaakacitta that experience it is accompanied by indifferent feeling. Nina. Op 7-jul-2006, om 16:40 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Also, BTW, that > last line from the CMA quote "The accompanying feeling is always > equanimity, > except in the case of body-consciousness, which is accompanied by > pain." is > exactly what I was saying to Nina - most rupas are neutral, with > only body-door > rupas never being neutral! Recall that I said I was amazed that > visual object > should be other thn neutral, Nina? #61175 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 11:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." nilovg Hi Howard, no Howard, this is not true. See my post to Herman. Abhidhamma and satipatthaana go together, are closely connected. I can rephrase: abhidhamma and satipatthana condition harmonious living in society. Take metta: if we do not know citta and cetasikas we take for metta what is selfish affection. We mislead ourselves forever and this is to the harm of ourselves as well as others. We learn about conceit, how often it arises. The Vibhanga gives many examples. Conceit: does this not also concern others? It can lead to evil deeds. Nina. Op 7-jul-2006, om 0:55 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > But, as I have pointed out, the study of interstream > interaction is basically missing in Abhidhamma. #61176 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 11:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." nilovg Hi Herman, good stuff to discuss with Lodewijk. I tend not to think in 'either or', but rather: we can think and should think of others, but without wrong view, with mettaa and compassion. But Howard's point about interaction is good. Reading for example the Vinaya: the monk is to develop satipatthana no matter what he is doing, and he sees danger in the slightest faults. This is with satipatthaana and I mean development of understanding of the dhamma appearing now. He has many rules and these help him in his interaction with the other monks he is living with. Through understanding of nama and rupa there will be more kusala with shame and fear of blame, there will be right action, right speech and right livelihood, as Jon suggested. More harmonious living in society. Nina. Op 7-jul-2006, om 0:29 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > And human beings cease to be > human beings when they are analysed, because their meaning and > function as human beings are not to be found in a breakdown of their > materiality. A rose, in the hands of an analyst, is a pile of petals. > A rose, well left alone, is a home for the insects. #61177 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 8:27 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/7/06 2:12:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > there is a misunderstanding here. We have to differentiate ruupas > that are objects (never neutral) and feelings accompanying the > vipaakacittas that experience those objects. > Visible object itself is never neutral, the vipaakacitta that > experience it is accompanied by indifferent feeling. > Nina. > ====================== Nina, what does it mean for a rupa that is object and that is felt as pleasant or unpleasant to be "neutral"? Neutral in what respect? I'm not certain I understand what that means. It *sounds* like you mean that the object can be felt as pleasant, as unpleasant, or neutrally, independent of the object. In that case, objects don't have vedanic taste associated with them, but how an object feels is entirely a matter of how the vedana operation has been conditioned to feel that object. If that is what you are saying, the statement is quite clear, but it is an entirely different perspective than I have previously gained from DSG and from the CMA. It would seem that the vedanic evaluation is, indeed, "in the eye of the beholder", and not "objective". With metta, Howard #61178 From: LBIDD@... Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 3:53 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Fwd: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 87 and Tiika. lbidd2 Hi Nina, Just a minor question. I wonder why the repitition of registration consciousness isn't due to repitition condition. Larry #61179 From: LBIDD@... Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 4:09 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. lbidd2 Hi Howard, When an inherently undesirable rupa is experienced with bodily consciousness the accompanying feeling is pain. When that same rupa is experienced with registration consciousness the accompanying feeling is equanimity. Neither feeling is more valid or correct than the other. Larry #61180 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 4:44 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The chariot is not ultimately real. egberdina Hi Scott, I apologise for the tone of my post yesterday. On 07/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > >The chariot is not ultimately real. Could I ask you to expand on this? I think this is a pretty fundamental area, and I think that in discussing this, we could harmlessly kill many birds with one stone. So I am not avoiding answering your question on anatta, I think in due course that will come to the fore. Kind Regards Herman #61181 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 4:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." egberdina Hi Nina, I am heartened by your comments. On 08/07/06, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Hi Herman, > good stuff to discuss with Lodewijk. I tend not to think in 'either > or', but rather: we can think and should think of others, but without > wrong view, with mettaa and compassion. But Howard's point about > interaction is good. > Reading for example the Vinaya: the monk is to develop satipatthana > no matter what he is doing, and he sees danger in the slightest > faults. This is with satipatthaana and I mean development of > understanding of the dhamma appearing now. He has many rules and > these help him in his interaction with the other monks he is living > with. Through understanding of nama and rupa there will be more > kusala with shame and fear of blame, there will be right action, > right speech and right livelihood, as Jon suggested. More harmonious > living in society. Over time it will be good to discuss how Abhidhamma and daily life interact. In my daily life, at the moment, I am focussing on trimming my in-box :-) Thanks and Kind Regards Herman #61182 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 5:43 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The chariot is not ultimately real. scottduncan2 Dear Herman, H: "I apologise for the tone of my post yesterday." Not a problem, man. S: "The chariot is not ultimately real." H: "Could I ask you to expand on this? I think this is a pretty fundamental area, and I think that in discussing this, we could harmlessly kill many birds with one stone. So I am not avoiding answering your question on anatta, I think in due course that will come to the fore." Well, I'll try. Please remember that I'm at a sort of "learning and consolidating" phase or whatever and, as such, am going to sound just like an annoying parrot: Things are not as they seem; the thing as a whole, the thing construed to be such-and-such, is not that thing ultimately. The conventional world full of apparently stable and lasting things can be experienced as being radically different. There is a fleeting, intense, higher-order level of "existence" open to experience. Experience of this level alters the sense of experience of the mundane, which is far more common (in both senses of the word, I guess). Were one to suddenly experience another level of the chariot in which one was accustomed to ride, one would still ride in the chariot, it would look the same and all that, but one would know something about it that forever changed the way one "saw" it. Therefore: "The chariot is not ultimately real." What do you think? With loving kindness, (and, by way of explanation for this sign-off, if "metta" actually arises once in awhile I'd like to actually be ready with the words - in English since Paali isn't my native tongue.) Scott. #61183 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 1:35 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/7/06 7:20:44 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > When an inherently undesirable rupa is experienced with bodily > consciousness the accompanying feeling is pain. When that same rupa is > experienced with registration consciousness the accompanying feeling is > equanimity. Neither feeling is more valid or correct than the other. > > Larry > ==================== That's fine. It still makes the feel determined by the object. Of course, we don't have a clue as to whether any of those claims are facts. ;-) With metta, Howard #61184 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 6:56 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." scottduncan2 H: "The Bahiya Sutta captures it neatly for me." "Then, Baahiya, you should train yourself thus: In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. I reference to the cognised, only the cognised. That is how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the cognised in reference to the cognised, then, Baahiya, there is no you in terms of that, there is no you there. When there is no you there, you are neither here nor yonder nor between the two. Thus, just this, is the end of stress." "Tasmaatiha te Baahiya, eva.m sikkhitabba.m: "di.t.te di.t.tamatta.m bhavassati, sute sutamatta.m bhavassati, mute mutamatta.m bhavassati, vi~n~naate vi~n~namatta.m bhavissati" -ti. Eva.m hi te Baahiya, sikkhitabba.m. Yato kho te Baahiya, di.t.te di.t.tamatta.m bhavissati sute sutamatta.m bhavissati mute mutamatta.m bhavissati vi~n~naate vi~n~namatta.m bhavissati, tato tva.m Baahiya na tena, yato tva.m Baahiya na tena, tato tva.m Baahiya na tattha, yato tva.m Baahiya na tattha, tato tva.m Baahiya nevidha, na hura.m, na ubhayam antare, e sevanto dukkhassaa" -ti. Scott. #61185 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 7:25 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. ken_aitch Hi Howard (and Nina), ---------- N: > > there is a misunderstanding here. We have to differentiate ruupas> that are objects (never neutral) and feelings accompanying the vipaakacittas that experience those objects. > Visible object itself is never neutral, the vipaakacitta that experience it is accompanied by indifferent feeling. > > H: > Nina, what does it mean for a rupa that is object and that is felt as pleasant or unpleasant to be "neutral"? Neutral in what respect? --------------- In no respect is an object of the senses ever neutral. It is always desirable, moderately desirable or undesirable. There is no neutral kamma, so why should the results of kamma experience neutral objects? As Larry asked, where would be the justice in that? --------------------- H: > I'm not certain I understand what that means. It *sounds* like you mean that the object can be felt as pleasant, as unpleasant, or neutrally, independent of the object. --------------------- Yes, that's right. Whenever we react either wholesomely or greedily to an undesirable object, the vedana can be pleasant or neutral but never unpleasant. Whenever we react with dosa, the vedana is unpleasant. This is regardless of the desirability/undesirability of the object. It is the painful vedana that tastes the object as painful, the pleasant that tastes it as pleasant, and the neutral that tastes it as neutral. The object itself does not contain feelings. ----------------------------- H: > In that case, objects don't have vedanic taste associated with them, but how an object feels is entirely a matter of how the vedana operation has been conditioned to feel that object. ----------------------------- That's right, dhammas have no such property as 'vedanic taste.' ----------------------------------- H: > If that is what you are saying, the statement is quite clear, but it is an entirely different perspective than I have previously gained from DSG and from the CMA. ----------------------------------- DSG discusses this question at regular intervals, and the advice from the Abhidhamma students has always been the same. I know how it feels having to be told the same thing over and over by these good people, so you are not alone in that respect. ----------- H: > It would seem that the vedanic evaluation is, indeed, "in the eye of the beholder", and not "objective". ----------- Yes, painful vedana tastes an object as painful. With the exception of body-consciousness, the taste has no necessary correlation with the nature of the object. In the case of body-consciousness, vedana tastes the object in a way that has some correlation with its desirability/undesirability. Other sense consciousnesses, as we know, are accompanied by neutral vedana regardless of the object. The difference here lies in the nature of body-object rupas themselves. They are more strongly physical than are the other sense-object rupas. There is a CMA explanation in which contact with a body object at the body door is likened to a piece of iron on an anvil being struck with a hammer. Contact at the other doors is more like a cotton-ball being struck with another cotton-ball. Come to think of it, this is one of those areas where I need to be told the same thing time and time again. Even though I have studied it quite closely on previous occasions, and taken an active role in the discussions, I have forgotten this part. Such is life! :-) (I think the anvil is there in all cases, but I am not sure. And I could guess as to which dhammas correlate with the anvil, the iron and the hammer, but I won't risk it. As with most of these matters, I should just look it up in Useful Posts!) Ken H #61186 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 3:47 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/7/06 2:37:14 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes to Howard: > Take metta: if we do not know citta and cetasikas > we take for metta what is selfish affection. ==================== Christians, Jews, Moslems, Hindus, agnostics, atheists, and many, many decent and serious Buddhists of all stripes don't know anything about cittas and cetasikas, or about Abhidhamma. Do they all confuse open, genuine, unconditional love and good will for sentient beings with selfish affection? And do no Abhidhammikas make such an error despite what they have read? And for those people who do recognize the distinction, are they all loving? With metta, Howard P.S. Of course, my questions are rhetorical. The intended answers are NO, NO, and NO. Metta comes about by living, by suffering, by carefully looking within, and by the intention and effort to be a kind, compassionate, and loving person - a clear goal of all religions. #61187 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 3:52 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abh in Daily Life, no 12. upasaka_howard Hi, Ken (and Nina) - Thank you for the following, Ken. What you say is clear and unambiguous. With metta, Howard In a message dated 7/7/06 10:26:25 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ken_aitch@... writes: > Hi Howard (and Nina), > > ---------- > N: >>there is a misunderstanding here. We have to differentiate > ruupas> that are objects (never neutral) and feelings accompanying the > vipaakacittas that experience those objects. > >Visible object itself is never neutral, the vipaakacitta that > experience it is accompanied by indifferent feeling. > >> > > H: >Nina, what does it mean for a rupa that is object and that is > felt as pleasant or unpleasant to be "neutral"? Neutral in what respect? > --------------- > > In no respect is an object of the senses ever neutral. It is always > desirable, moderately desirable or undesirable. > > There is no neutral kamma, so why should the results of kamma > experience neutral objects? As Larry asked, where would be the justice > in that? > > --------------------- > H: >I'm not certain I understand what that means. It *sounds* like > you mean that the object can be felt as pleasant, as unpleasant, or > neutrally, independent of the object. > --------------------- > > Yes, that's right. Whenever we react either wholesomely or greedily to > an undesirable object, the vedana can be pleasant or neutral but never > unpleasant. > > Whenever we react with dosa, the vedana is unpleasant. This is > regardless of the desirability/undesirability of the object. It is > the painful vedana that tastes the object as painful, the pleasant > that tastes it as pleasant, and the neutral that tastes it as neutral. > The object itself does not contain feelings. > > ----------------------------- > H: >In that case, objects don't have vedanic taste associated with > them, but how an object feels is entirely a matter of how the vedana > operation has been conditioned to feel that object. > ----------------------------- > > That's right, dhammas have no such property as 'vedanic taste.' > #61188 From: "m. nease" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 2:16 pm Subject: Fw: [dsg] feelings. m_nease Hi Nina (and Larry and Howard), ----- Original Message ----- From: Nina van Gorkom To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Sent: Friday, July 07, 2006 3:30 AM Subject: [dsg] feelings. N.: After that other mind-door processes of cittas that think of ruupa and then javanacittas maybe kusala or akusala and these are accompanied by their appropriate feelings. M.: Nina, I've heard and read about this before and could look it up but I know you don't mind and understand the value of repetition. My question is, is there a significant difference (especially as regards accumulation) between sense-door and mind door javanacittas? Thanks in Advance, mike #61190 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Fri Jul 7, 2006 10:10 pm Subject: Re: desirable and undesirable. ken_aitch Hi Matheesha, You wrote: ------------ <. . .> > I was reminded of one sutta where the Buddha says that a monk who has control over his mind can experience pleasantness as unpleasantness and vice versa, as he wishes. So I guess stating an object as pleasant/unpleasant is actually more for the masses who don't have such control. > ------------- I think that sutta refers to seeing the pleasant in the unpleasant and the unpleasant in the pleasant, does it not? It would be interesting to read the commentary. That way, we could understand the sutta in a way that was consistent with the Dhamma as a whole. One thing for sure is that dhammas are beyond anyone's control. Not even a Buddha can make the inherently unpleasant pleasant. Kusala consciousness can experience an unpleasant object and have pleasant feeling at the same time. Right understanding can see pleasant objects as inherently fleeting, unsatisfactory and not-self. I suspect that is the kind of thing the sutta is referring to. Ken H #61191 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 12:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The chariot is not ultimately real. egberdina Hi Scott, Thanks for your reply. On 08/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > > S: "The chariot is not ultimately real." > > > Well, I'll try. Please remember that I'm at a sort of "learning and > consolidating" phase or whatever and, as such, am going to sound just > like an annoying parrot: > Sure. No probs. > Things are not as they seem; the thing as a whole, the thing construed > to be such-and-such, is not that thing ultimately. The conventional > world full of apparently stable and lasting things can be experienced > as being radically different. There is a fleeting, intense, > higher-order level of "existence" open to experience. > > Experience of this level alters the sense of experience of the > mundane, which is far more common (in both senses of the word, I > guess). Were one to suddenly experience another level of the chariot > in which one was accustomed to ride, one would still ride in the > chariot, it would look the same and all that, but one would know > something about it that forever changed the way one "saw" it. > > Therefore: "The chariot is not ultimately real." > > What do you think? > I probably don't understand, but am happy to keep exploring. From my perspective, when there is the experience of riding to town in my fine horse-drawn carriage, that is the experience, that is the world. When there is ecstatic experience (standing out side of self) that is the experience, that is the world. How is any experience of a higher order than another experience? Wouldn't that determination just be what is happening while that determination is being made? Experience is just what it is. Every illusion and imagination possible has as much facticity, as much being, as much reality about it as, as any other experience. How say you? Kind Regards Herman #61192 From: Illusion Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 12:43 am Subject: Excerpt: How What You Know Might Obstruct You vvhite_illusion Excerpt: How What You Know Might Obstruct You Because it is ignorant to cling, to cling to knowledge is to cling to ignorance instead. - stonepeace Our point of view, perception, and learning are all objects of our knowledge, and these are things that prevent us from going ahead. "I already know everything there is to know about that. I don't need to learn any more." We have arrived only at the fourth rung of the ladder, yet we think it is the top rung. Whatever the value of what our intellect and our insight has attained, we have to abandon it. If we don't, we put an end to further progress. Even though it has some value, our knowledge has become an obstacle. If we are caught in our knowledge, if we say that our knowledge is absolute truth, we suffer from the knowledge-obstacle. Those who have knowledge but know that they have to abandon it in order to go further do not suffer from the knowledge-obstacle. Objects of knowledge are like water that has become ice and prevents the river from flowing. We need knowledge, but we have to use it intelligently. If we think that our present knowledge is paramount, our way is blocked. Our knowledge has become an obstacle. This way of looking at knowledge is quite special to Buddhism. The Buddha taught that we cannot [or should not] be attached to anything; we have to abandon even our insight, our understanding, and our knowledge [to be truly free]. - Understanding Our Mind (Thich Nhat Hanh) This and more available @ Awareness Place: www.AwarenessPlace.com -- []\/[][]D (Maya Putra) #61193 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 1:43 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Fwd: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 87 and Tiika. nilovg Hi Larry, Because it is vipaaka and thus weak, passive. It cannot be a condition for the following citta to gain in strength, like the javanacitta that is repetition-condiiton. The vipaakacittas that are registration or retention, tadaaramma.na, are only two more vipaakacittas produced by kamma after the javanacittas. They arise only when a process runs its full course. They arise only in sensuous planes of existence and in connection with cittas of the sense-sphere. We read in the Co. to the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (Topics of Ab. p. 127): Op 8-jul-2006, om 0:53 heeft LBIDD@... het volgende geschreven: > Just a minor question. I wonder why the repetition of registration > consciousness isn't due to repetition condition. #61194 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 2:31 am Subject: object and feeling. nilovg Dear Ken H, Howard, Matheesha and all, Ken, you explained the subject of object and feeling ver clearly, thank you. Ken H wrote: That's right, dhammas have no such property as 'vedanic taste.' ---------------------------------------------- Howard: > It would seem that the vedanic evaluation is, indeed, "in the eye of the beholder", and not "objective". ----------- Nina: Feeling does not arise alone, as you know, it is always accompanying citta and other cetasikas. The latter condition the feeling by conascent-condiiton, and this is very important. It means that feeling can be kusala, akusala, vipaaka or kiriya, depending on the citta it accompanies. True, the object is also a condition, it is object-condition. But this is not the only condition. There is also natural strong dependence-condition that conditions citta and feeling to be kusala or akusala. Understanding that has been accumulated can condition wise attention to the object. If this would not be the case there would only be lobha with happy or indifferent feeling towards a desirable object. One would just be infatuated all the time and insight could not grow nor enlightenment be attained. If happy feeling arises with the citta rooted in lobha, that feeling can be the object in a process of cittas arising afterwards, never in the same process. Thus, feeling that has just fallen away can become object of clinging in another process. Thus clinging is accumulated more and more. It is true that we cling very much to feeling. Or feeling can become an object of understanding: understanding of it as only a conditioned element, not belonging to anyone. Matheesha said, referring to a sutta (yes: the removal of unwholesome thoughts) that a monk who has control over his mind can experience pleasantness as unpleasantness and vice versa, as he wishes. It is paññaa that can have such control. He does not have to force himself, it comes naturally because of his accumulations. When he sees a beautiful girl, he just sees her as a sack of bones. --------- Ken H: There is a CMA explanation in which contact with a body object at the body door is likened to a piece of iron on an anvil being struck with a hammer. Contact at the other doors is more like a cotton-ball being struck with another cotton-ball. ------- N: See Topics of Abh. p. 22: here is a differentiation in contact between derived ruupas (upadaaya ruupas) and between the three great elements, tangible object on the bodybase. In the first case the impact is weak, like contact of cottonwool with cottonwool. In the second case, the impact is strong; We have been talking about cittas and their functions, an particular feelings that accompany these cittas. As said, there is a certain kind of law or fixed order (citta niyama) that cannot be changed. I quote from the same Topics of Abh, p. 129: There is no person who can arrange anything. ****** Nina. #61195 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 2:47 am Subject: Re: [dsg] feelings. nilovg Hi Mike, All javanacittas, except the last one in a series, are repetition- condition for the following one, so that it gains in strength. This happens in a sense-door process and also in mind-door processes. A sense-object that is experienced by cittas arising in a sense-door process is experienced by cittas of the following mind-door process and the javanacittas in that process are the same types, of the same jaati as those that arose in the preceding sense-door process. After that there may be other mind-door processes that define the sense object and think about it with kusala cittas or with akusala cittas. Thus, on account of one object kusala cittas or akusala cittas go on and on for a long time. Someone asked Kh Sujin whether there can be paññaa even in a sense- door process. We know that the eight types of kusala citta, accompanied with paññaa or without it can arise in sense-door processes. When a stage of insight arises, say, the first stage, the difference between nama and rupa is realized in a mind-door process. But the different processes follow upon each other so rapidly and paññaa could not be prevented from also arising in sense-door processes. You ask: is there a significant difference (especially as regards accumulation) between sense-door and mind door javanacittas? There is accumulation in both, but it is hard to measure their difference. There are countless mind-door processes that think on account of a sense-object. There is no end to thinking. Nina. Op 7-jul-2006, om 23:16 heeft m. nease het volgende geschreven: > N.: After that other mind-door processes of cittas that think of ruupa > and then javanacittas maybe kusala or akusala and these are > accompanied by their appropriate feelings. > > M.: Nina, I've heard and read about this before and could look it > up but I know you don't mind and understand the value of > repetition. My question is, is there a significant difference > (especially as regards accumulation) between sense-door and mind > door javanacittas? #61196 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 2:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily Life , 13. egberdina Hi Nina, > Feelings are sixfold when they are classified by way of the contacts > occurring through the six doors: there is feeling which arises > because of what is experienced through the eyes, the ears, the nose, > the tongue, the bodysense and the mind. All these feelings are > different; they arise because of different conditions. Feeling arises > and falls away together with the citta it accompanies and thus at > each moment feeling is different. How are the six doors known? Kind Regards Herman #61197 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 3:03 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The fourth "bodily Tie." nilovg Hi Howard and Herman, Howard, you make a good point. I agree with you. By accumulation a person can have genuine mettaa. There are very impressive examples of this. I remember good, practical councils about giving, not with a sour face, in a post related to Judaeism. Really admirable. Actually, the Abhidhamma helps us not to take kusala or akusala for mine. This is also the aim of the perfections, paramis. That is why Lodewijk said, the Abhidhamma should not be separated from the Brahma vihaaras and the perfections. Insight leading to enlightenment cannot be developed without also cultivating all kinds of kusala through body, seech and mind. Kh Sujin said that people regret lack of mindfulness, but that the reseaon is that the perfections are still deficient. The perfections and satipatthaana, and thus also the Abhidhamma, all hang together Herman was applauding the puggala paññatti as dealing with human beings (sorry about your inbox). Actually, it deals with accumulations of different individuals. We cannot say that it only deals with concepts. It is closely connected with the other books of the Abhidhamma. Nina. Op 8-jul-2006, om 4:47 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Take metta: if we do not know citta and cetasikas > > we take for metta what is selfish affection. > ==================== > Christians, Jews, Moslems, Hindus, agnostics, atheists, and many, many > decent and serious Buddhists of all stripes don't know anything > about cittas > and cetasikas, or about Abhidhamma. Do they all confuse open, genuine, > unconditional love and good will for sentient beings with selfish > affection? #61198 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 3:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily Life , 13. nilovg Hi Herman, now. Op 8-jul-2006, om 11:54 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > How are the six doors known? #61199 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 8, 2006 3:34 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily Life , 13. egberdina Hi Nina, On 08/07/06, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > > > Hi Herman, > now. > Op 8-jul-2006, om 11:54 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > How are the 6 doors known now ? Sorry if I am too persistent :-) I am just wondering what there is beside citta and its object that gives rise to the idea of doors? Kind Regards Herman