#61400 From: "Andrew" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 4:00 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > I think your statements here fairly well capture the whole ethos that > pits what the Buddha said from time to time, against "the teachings". > > I don't attribute any evil motives to the tradition makers, but I see > clearly that they have been unaware of their distorting influence. > > The very notion that specific spoken words of the Buddha need to be > read in conjunction with all his other spoken words is entirely > symptomatic of tradition-making. What is happening in this process is > that words, spoken as being entirely sufficient for the occasion in > which they were uttered, become portrayed as originating from their > future being assembled together. This is a misrepresentation of the > past. > > Each Sutta is a self-sufficient statement, aimed at a specifc audiece, > in a specific context. I do not know of any Suttas that refer the > audience to other spoken utterances so that the present one may be > understood. I see no requirement or direction or implicit > understanding in any Sutta that the Buddha was guaranteed of the same > audience from one Sutta to the next. > > The ability to cross-reference texts is a luxury afforded all of us > today, but no-one in the days when they were spoken. Taking a Sutta > outside of its own context is to distort it, IMRAO (in my reasonably > arrogant opinion :-)). Hi Herman (and Jon and Joop) I disagree - your opinion is not *reasonably* arrogant, it's just *plain* arrogant! ((-: Herman, not very long ago, I posted for you a sutta of an encounter between the Buddha, Ananda and Vacchagotta. Remember that? And the Buddha explained to Ananda that he responded to Vacchagotta in a certain way in order to maintain the consistency of what he had taught on many other occasions. If you care to open your eyes, you will find the Sutta pitika replete with similar references - there is another one that comes to mind in which the Buddha stresses to the monks that they must remember and recite accurately so that the sassana can last. Now you're arguing that there ain't no overall consistency to be understood in the suttas - each sutta is self-sufficient and without the modern (!!) luxury of cross-referencing. You also say the Buddha wasn't "guaranteed" of the same audience twice - what about the Sangha and the kings etc he met on numerous occasions during his life?? Truly, I am speechless! This is the most outrageous post I have ever read on DSG. I'd better stop now ... Best wishes Andrew PS you never did respond to my Vacchagotta quote, but not to worry. Let's drop it. #61402 From: "Andrew" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 4:14 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa corvus121 Hi Howard See my post to Herman. I disagree with your points below although I note you make the big concession "occasionally one sutta (or a few) may be helpful in throwing light on another sutta". I'll leave it at that. Best wishes Aghast Andrew --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > ======================== > I am in basic agreement with you on this, Herman. I would add a couple > comments: > > There may be several motivations, not always consciously realized, for > saying that a sutta is understandable only "in the context of the body of > suttas as a whole." > > 1) Occasionally one sutta (or a few) may be helpful in throwing light on > another sutta whose meaning is not clear on first examination, because of > unstated information that was obvious to the original hearers or because of > insufficiently reported context. Don't forget, for one thing, that at the time of > the Buddha, many bhikkhus and laypersons would have already heard other lectures > by him at a time he was teaching them again that served as common but > unstated background information. A realization of the foregoing serves as commendable > motivation, I'd say, though to literally require a context of the suttas AS A > WHOLE is, of course, to make an impossible requirement. It would be far > better, I think, to simply say that individual suttas are often usefully read with > reference to other related suttas. > > 2) Another possible motivation, not an admirable one at all, is that > this tack of relying on the "suttas as a whole" enables one to dismiss an > evident meaning that is not to one's liking and to impose instead a meaning that is > quite "a stretch". In that regard, this principle affords one the opportunity > to pick and choose those suttas that seem to support one's preferred > interpretation. This motivation also applyAn important caveat to keep in mind is that > our clinging to views is a blindingly opaque blinder! > > 3) At issue is not only the matter of reading an individual sutta "in > the context of the body of suttas as a whole," but also the matter of > back-interpretation of a sutta in the context of later, non-suttic (Abhidhammic and > commentarial) teachings. What I wrote above in both items 1) and 2) applies here > as well, I'd say: Item 1) particularly with regard to the commentaries, which > help explain the background and context of a sutta, and item 2) with regard > to the Abhidhamma, a later systemization. > > With metta, > Howard > #61403 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 3:14 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa upasaka_howard Hi, Andrew - In a message dated 7/14/06 7:29:38 PM Eastern Daylight Time, athel60@... writes: > Hi Howard > > See my post to Herman. I disagree with your points below although I > note you make the big concession "occasionally one sutta (or a few) > may be helpful in throwing light on another sutta". I'll leave it at > that. > > Best wishes > Aghast Andrew > ==================== LOL! My, my - aghast are you! I presume it is item # 2 that has you upset. I guess you think that all DSG folks are immune to such a deficiency as I discuss there. Well, I congratulate you if you are immune to it. I admit that I am not immune to it. I've caught myself straining credulity at times to support cherished beliefs. But, hey, that's me. With metta, Howard #61404 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 7:34 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Born with pa~n~na. scottduncan2 Dear Kel, Thanks for your comments. Kel: "Ledi Sayadaw wrote that when you do anapana and you can see a stream of air coming and going from the nostril then you're tihetuka. Now, none of the text says this but it apparently came from his experience." That's an odd thing, for sure. I've not seen that, but then I keep my eyes closed. I'll bet it did come from his experience though, given that he must have been a master. Kel: "Easiest way to think about it is that it puts a limit on your attainments this life. All the 8 kusala cittas can arise so certainly panna can. None of the jhanas or lokuttara cittas will arise if you're dvihetuka. Sarah and I had a debate about the vipassana-nanas before. According to my teachers, up to sankarupekkha is possible even for dvihetuka. Hence, the practice is still the same. Try to reach the the highest understanding possible this life and use it as a spring board for next life (hopefully in happy realms). Being born into a Buddha sasana gives you pretty good odds of being tihetuka so I wouldn't worry." I'm not too worried, I guess, but reading the quote I thought, man what if... A bit off topic, but how did you find your teachers and when you did, how did you ascertain that they were good teachers? With loving kindness, Scott. #61405 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 7:59 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. scottduncan2 ..."If the cause and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness would cease completely and totally without remainder, could eye-consciousness be discerned? "No, friend. "In this way, friend, this has been declared, disclosed, and revealed by the Blessed One thus: For such a reason this consciousness is nonself," (SN 35: 234)... Herman? Are you out there? Querelously, S. #61406 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 7:49 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Born with pa~n~na. scottduncan2 Dear Nina, Thanks for your continued instruction. N: "It is beneficial to consider how many different conditions have to concur just for the arising of one moment of Kusala citta accompanied by pa~n~naa." I like it when you quietly note how a thing is beneficial to consider. I'll consider that very thing. N: "Many sobhana cetasikas that assist the kusala citta, kusala in the past, living in the right place, associating with wise people." See above. N: "I quoted before the Atthasaalini who explains samaya as concurrence of conditions.This helps not to see a self who can cultivate pa~n~naa." I see where "samaya" is a word that is rather loaded with nuances, as I look at the PTS PED. Phrases and words such as "in course of time," "proper time," "due season," "at the right time," " coincidence," "circumstance." You're right, nowhere in these ideas resides the notion that there is someone doing something. Its all about waiting, really. N: "But the situation is not hopeless, by listening and considering the Dhamma understanding can develop. I think that there is no need to think of pa~n~naa, it can arise for a moment when the right conditions are present." I'll try not to think of it then (except when learning about it...) With loving kindness, Scott. #61407 From: "kelvin_lwin" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 10:27 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Born with pa~n~na. kelvin_lwin Hi Scott, > S: That's an odd thing, for sure. I've not seen that, but then I keep my > eyes closed. Kel: hehe, in case you aren't kidding .. seeing the stream is with your eyes closed, fyi. It's kinda like seeing nimitta. > S: I'm not too worried, I guess, but reading the quote I thought, man Kel: No doubt, it would suck to be born as dvihetuka. My ego says I'm not so I'm quite happy in my own delusion. > S: but how did you find your teachers and > when you did, how did you ascertain that they were good teachers? Kel: I was born and raised in Burma until my family moved to America. So my teachers are all from there or descended from there. Not to say there isn't differences in the way dhamma is presented. I find that if you avoid becoming dogmatic about a particular teacher/tradition then it's easy to appreciate all the teachers. I guess I have an ingrained trust in the goodness of sangha. My personal theory is they have gained whatever understanding following the method they teach. Any shortcomings from others following it, prolly lies in the insufficient understanding of the follower. This is mostly for meditation which I believe require practice but actual application/test must be in everyday life. As for Abhidhamma, Burma has technical pitaka degrees and we're fortunate to learn under one who is in America. He will tell us what different teachers believe and teaches if there is any controversial topics. - Kel #61408 From: "gazita2002" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 10:42 pm Subject: Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" gazita2002 Hello James, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "buddhatrue" wrote: > > Hi Azita, > > Nice to hear from you. I would imagine that you are somewhere on > this audio tape but I'm not sure if I have heard you yet. (The > presentation is quite professional with Jon's introductions and > Indian music interludes. Kudos to Jon!) azita: I've made comment on the musical interludes also. I really like them > Hello James and others, > > I see no conflict here. > > James: No offense, but that doesn't really surprise me. azita: no offense taken, and I'm not surprised by u not being surprised :-) > > You may have also heard A.Sujin say the > development of the Path must go along with detachment. > > James: Yeah, I heard her say something along those lines. I > wouldn't necessarily disagree with that but I think the emphasis is > a little off. I would say that the development of the Path must go > along with renunciation. Detachment is the end result of the Path. > But I understand why K. Sujin chooses to emphasize detachment over > renunciation: detachment is passive while renunciation is active. Azita: passive and active aren't words I would use for either detachment or renunciation. I think as knowledge and understanding of the unsatisfactoriness of all phenomena grows then renunciation and detachment grow too. > It is my understanding that the monk in question does generate > desire, endeavours, activates persistence, upholds and exerts his > intent for these four right efforts and does so knowing that it is > not 'self' that is doin this. > > James: Why would you assume something like that? Why would you > assume that the monk know it is `not self' doing this? After all, > the Buddha first taught the Noble Eightfold Path before he taught > the teaching of anatta. azita: N8P is anatta IMHO. Each aspect of N8P is a cetasika, not a being anywhere to be found. > I would suggest that this monk > undertakes the 4 right efforts with detachment for any result, > > James: I'm sorry but this is not human nature. No one is going to > do anything unless they have a vested interest in the result. > > with > the knowledge that desire, endeavour, persistence, intent are > realities, dare I say cetasikas, that arise and fall and do not > belong to anyone. > > James: Again, you are putting the cart before the horse. azita: only doing so if I thought I could develop the 4 right efforts prior to having any theoretical knowledge of what is developing these efforts. > In fact, I suggest that this 'monk' is unable to do anything else > but undertake these four right efforts bec I imagine wisdom and > knowledge is highly developed and this 'monk' may even be a > sotapanna. > > James: Again, this is a wild assumption. The Buddha first taught > the Noble Eightfold Path to fellow ascetics who were not sotapanna. azita; yes it was an assumption, I have no idea where this monk is in his development however I still suggest a highly developed wisdom. Patience, courage and good cheer, Azita. #61409 From: "Andrew" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 10:52 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Andrew - > > In a message dated 7/14/06 7:29:38 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > athel60@... writes: > > > Hi Howard > > > > See my post to Herman. I disagree with your points below although I > > note you make the big concession "occasionally one sutta (or a few) > > may be helpful in throwing light on another sutta". I'll leave it at > > that. > > > > Best wishes > > Aghast Andrew > > > ==================== > LOL! My, my - aghast are you! > I presume it is item # 2 that has you upset. I guess you think that > all DSG folks are immune to such a deficiency as I discuss there. Well, I > congratulate you if you are immune to it. I admit that I am not immune to it. I've > caught myself straining credulity at times to support cherished beliefs. But, > hey, that's me. Dear Howard No, I'm not upset but yes, I am aghast and agog at the implications of the viewpoint expressed by Herman and adopted by yourself and Joop. If memory serves me right, Jon's original point was that what is generally written in the suttas is not sufficient to understand without "interpretation". And that interpretation is best based upon a knowledge of the entire body of suttas. Clearly, he didn't think he was making a contentious point because that is exactly what historians do. Yes, historians - those people we love to quote when we want to throw doubt on the Abhidhamma as Buddhaword. Prof. Harvey: "There is an overall harmony to the [Pali] Canon, suggesting authorship of its system of thought by one mind." This idea that suttas are to be read completely by themselves and ignoring the context of the body of suttas sounds nutty to me. Sorry, but it does. And the next time you and Herman start discussing Dhamma by comparing and contrasting what is said in this sutta and that sutta, perhaps someone should remind you to keep the suttas apart (none of this modern cross-referencing allowed)! ((-: Anyway, I'm glad I gave you a good laugh out loud. Very healthy. Best wishes Andrew #61410 From: "Andrew" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 10:56 pm Subject: A thought on saddha corvus121 Hello everyone Sometimes our only interest in a subject is to refute it. I came across an interesting quote from Bh. Dhammanando on esangha the other day which I would like to share: "It really does help when the Dhamma is approached in a spirit of reverence and humility, and with a wish to understand, not to find faults everywhere." Best wishes Andrew #61411 From: "gazita2002" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 11:08 pm Subject: a friend's question gazita2002 Hello dhamma friends A friend asks: "say you're having kamma on you and you know and you cant do anything but develop wisdom and detach - OK - but that doesn't give you a smile and fun. So you could end up being WISE -but- well basically unhappy." She goes on to write "that is a kind of (ill-informed?) view of Buddhas philosophy that I have, and would appreciate a comment from your self" I have written to her with my ideas/thoughts, and if anyone else can help out here, I would much appreciate too. Sarah, if u read this u may be interested to know that the question is from Gillian in Maleny. Patience, courage and good cheer, Azita #61412 From: "Andrew" Date: Fri Jul 14, 2006 11:31 pm Subject: An apology to Herman corvus121 Hi Herman I want to apologise for saying that your post was outrageous and that I thought the idea was nutty. Clearly this was over the top and out of order and I apologise unreservedly. As Jon has said, your posts are always challenging and for the less patient like me, this can sometimes lead to a hasty response. Sorry if I have upset you or anyone else on the list. Best wishes Andrew #61413 From: "Phil" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 1:50 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa philofillet Hi Howard, Andrew Herman and whoever else. I was curious as to what made Andrew "aghast" since there are always so much examples of wrong view on parade here. > > Howard: 1) Occasionally one sutta (or a few) may be helpful in throwing > light on > > another sutta I disagree with the "occasionally". I, for one, would never read a sutta without reflecting on it in the light of the anatta sutta. It was the Buddha's second sutta, delivered to the 5 first followers. I don't know who anyone could say that it doesn't set the stage for, and flavour, the entire suttanta. But of course being told that there is no self that can give rise to this or that mental factor (and the other aggregates) whenever and wherever it is desired isn't very palatable for modern, result-oriented Buddhists. People like to think that they can have sati, or metta, or whatever, by intending to have it. The anatta sutta makes it crystal clear that that is wrong. In that regard, this principle affords one the > opportunity > > to pick and choose those suttas that seem to support one's > preferred > > interpretation. Au contraire. If we reflect on the suttanta in the light of certain "cardinal discourses" (as one of the N. Thera's called them in his little Wheel book) it discourages us from turning to relatively obscure suttas (say one of the thousands in AN) in order to justify one's practices - I think of the ever popular "rely on craving to get rid of craving" sutta from AN that Swee Boon, Howard and Herman (I think) have all quoted here. I would not turn to that one after having reflected on the cardinal suttas, personally. It doesn't make sense in the light of the entire body of the Buddha's teaching. But people latch on to it with such pleasure. The flavour of the Buddha's teaching is anatta - if one reads suttas without appreciating this one can come to all kinds of comfortable conclusions about what one can do to become enlightened. Reflecting on the anatta sutta, and other cardinal discourses (such as the other two of the first three) spare us from going wrong in this way. That's just my piece. I will drop back out of this thread now. Phil #61414 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 2:10 am Subject: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 89 and Tiika. nilovg Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 89, resultant-condition, vipaaka-paccaya. Intro: As to vipåka-condition, citta and its accompanying cetasikas which are vipåka condition one another by being vipåka. The realities involved in vipåka-condition are phenomena which are conascent, arising at the same time. They assist one another "by effortless quiet''. They are merely vipåka, they have no other activity. The nature of vipåkacitta is altogether different from the nature of kusala citta and akusala citta which are active in the wholesome way or in the unwholesome way. Vipåkacitta and its accompanying cetasikas also condition one another by way of conascence- condition and by way of mutuality-condition. ------------ Text Vis. 89: (14) A resultant state that, by effortless quiet, assists effortless quiet [in other states] is 'kamma-result condition'. ----------- N: The Tiika states that he teaches the nature of vipaaka that is dissimilar to kusala citta and akusala citta which are with exertion (sa-ussaahe). It explains that it is effortless, quiet (nirussaaha santa) accomplished by the performance of kamma when other conditions are fulfilled. The Tiika explains that this is not the type of calm which is due to the allayment of defilements. Vipaakacitta is quiet because it is inactive, passive. Seeing, for example, only sees and when objects and bases associate, it does not have to make an effort to see. The sense-cognitions such as seeing are ahetuka vipaakacittas (without roots) accompanied by seven cetasikas which is the minimum number of cetasikas that accompany citta. They are, for example not accompanied by effort, viriya, or decision, adhimokkha, nor by sobhana cetasikas or akusala cetasikas. The Tiika states that due to its quietness vipaakacittas such as the bhavangacitta are difficult to know (duviññeyya). The bhavangacitta is a vipaakacitta that arises in between the processes of cittas and keeps the continuity in the life of an individual. It does not experience an object that impinges on one of the six doorways, it experiences the same object as the rebirth- consciousness. The Tiika explains that the apprehending of ruupas experienced through the sense-doors is known at the occurrence of javana, and also the vipaakacittas which arise after the sense-cognitions, such as receiving-consciousness (sampa.ticchana-citta) and investigating- consciousness (santiira.na-citta) are difficult to know. ---------- Text Vis.:In the course of an existence it is a condition for states originated by it, and at rebirth-linking for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed, and in both cases for the associated states, according as it is said: 'One resultant indeterminate aggregate is a condition, as kamma-result condition, for three aggregates and for the kinds of materiality originated by consciousness.... At the moment of rebirth-linking one resultant indeterminate aggregate [is a condition ... ] for three aggregates ... Three aggregates [are a condition ... ] for one aggregate ... Two aggregates are a condition, as kamma-result condition, for two aggregates and for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed. Aggregates are a condition, as kamma-result condition, for the physical basis' (P.tn.1,173). ------ N: In the planes where there are five khandhas (nåma and rúpa), vipåkacittas, except the five sense-cognitions, can produce rúpa which arises simultaneously and which, according to the "Paììhåna''(Faultless Triplet, Investigation Chapter, § 428), is also conditioned by the citta and cetasikas by way of vipåka-condition. In the planes where there are five khandhas kamma produces at the first moment of life the paìisandhi-citta which is vipåkacitta as well as rúpa. According to the "Paììhåna'' (same section) citta and cetasikas condition at that moment kamma-produced rúpa by way of vipåka-condition. As to the words, ‘ Aggregates are a condition, as kamma-result condition, for the physical basis', the physical basis is the heartbase that kamma produces at the moment of rebirth-consciousness. ------------ Conclusion: Vipaakacitta is quiet, effortless, passive. It is only result, it does not affect our life in the future such as the javana- cittas. Of the four classes of citta or jaatis, kusala vipaakacitta and akusala vipaakacitta are included in one jaati, the jaati of vipaaka. The other jaatis are kusala, akusala and kiriya. When we have an unpleasant experience such as an accident we keep on thinking of a concept of a situation or of an event we consider as "our vipåka'' and we may wonder why this had to happen to us. We tend to forget that vipåkacitta is only one moment which falls away immediately. Instead of thinking of concepts with aversion we should develop understanding of paramattha dhammas, realities which each have their own characteristic and which appear one at a time. It is important to have right understanding of cause and effect in our life. We like to experience pleasant objects and we may think that we can choose ourselves which objects we wish to experience. However, it depends on kamma whether we experience a pleasant object or an unpleasant object at a particular moment. Kamma produces its appropriate result and when it is time for akusala vipåka it is unavoidable. When there is awareness of the characteristics of seeing, hearing, thinking and other realities which appear there will be less ignorance. We will gradually learn to distinguish between the moments of vipåka and the moments of kusala citta and akusala citta. ----------- Nina. #61415 From: "Phil" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 2:32 am Subject: More on ignorance and wrong understanding philofillet Hi all Here's another passage from Survey of Paramattha Dhammas by Acharn Sujin on the relationship between ignorance and wrong understanding: "Because of ignorance one has wrong understanding and takes the dhammas that arise and fall away for self, a being or a person." Ph: There are Buddhists who believe in beings, that people exist in reality. I think they were called puggilivis or something like that. Pugilists? They were a fringe group in the Buddha's day, according to Bhikkhu Bodhi's intro to the SN anthology. Of course they still exist today. Three *may* be some here at DSG! Wouldn't that be exciting!?!? "This is the cause of desire and ever growing infatuation with one's rank, title or status, with one's birth, one's family, the colour of one's skin and so on." The eight worldly concerns, how powerful they are, how deeply we cling to the khandas. How we "wish disregard the impermanence of the khandas" (dhammas?) as Nina put it in one of her books. so much moha and lobha, so pervasive, all consuming. But there are rare openings in the "dome of lobha" - they can be experienced, and they condition the arising of more. There is more hope. The Buddha wouldn't have taught us that it is possible to eradicate akusala and cultivate kusala if it weren't for those openings of understanding. "In reality, what one sees are only different colours appearing through the eyes, not self, not a being, not a person. The sound one hears is not self, not a being, not a person. What appears through the senses are only different kinds of dhammas that arise because of their appropriate conditions." "THe wrong view that takes dhammas for self, a being or a person, has been compared to the perception of a mirage. People who are travelling in the desert may perceive a mirage of water ahead of them, but when they come close the mirage disappears because in reality there is no water. The mirage they perceived was a deception, an optical illusion. Even so is the wrong understanding that takes dhammas for self, a being or a person, a deception caused by ignorance, by wrong perception or remembrance, and by wrong belief." Ph: People are a deception, that is true, but they are important in our lives and remembrance that they are a deception needn't interfere with our loving them, caring for them, enjoying their company. The development of wisdom allows us to take better care of people than if we were clinging them in complete ignorance. (Now we are clinging to them in *almost* complete ignorance - there has been some progress, and that progress comes with more metta and and karuna and other kusala cetasikas accompanying all kusala cittas - and they find expression through our relationships with people.) Phil Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 5:56 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: >>I do not see in the Satipatthana Sutta any idea of the establishing of >>mindfulness as a preliminary step to insight; there is only the knowing >>that *is* the development of insight. >> > >--------------------------------------- >Howard: > I do. ... > I'd be interested to know what particular part(s) of the Satipatthana Sutta you have in mind when you say you see in it the idea of satipatthana as being a preliminary step to insight. I think there are passages in the sutta which support a different view. From the very beginning of the sutta: "What are the four [Arousings of Mindfulness]? "Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly comprehending (it) and mindful (of it), having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief; he lives contemplating the feelings in the feelings, ardent, clearly comprehending (them) and mindful (of them), having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief; he lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness, ardent, clearly comprehending (it) and mindful (of it), having overcome in this world covetousness and grief; he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, ardent, clearly comprehending (them) and mindful (of them), having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/misc/wayof.html The key words here, applicable to each of the 4 arousings/establishments, are: - lives contemplating (the object) - ardent, clearly comprehending (it) and mindful (of it), having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief; and in particular the words "clearly comprehending and mindful", which seem to indicate that what is belong spoken of is insight itself and not some preliminary stage or step. Where in the text do you find the idea of a subsequent step to follow? >And if >attention and mindfulness do not develop first, what is it then that leads to the >wisdom. > As regards the question of what leads to the wisdom, there are a number of factors, the most important of which must I think be previously developed wisdom but this alone is not sufficient. The factors mentioned in the texts are hearing the dhamma, reflecting on it and applying or relating what has been thus understood to the present moment. Jon #61417 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 5:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... jonoabb Hi Howard Many thanks for the quote from Bhikkhu Bodhi. Does he refer to any part of the text of the sutta to support his views on this? In what way is the text to be read as describing a 'methodical' cultivation, I wonder? Jon upasaka@... wrote: >Hi again, Jon - > > From the site >http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/soma/wayof.html#msg, the following is the first paragraph of a message by Bhikkhu Bodhi. >I have set off with double slashes the part I wish to emphasize:: >________________ >The Satipatthana Sutta, the Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness, is >generally regarded as the canonical Buddhist text with the fullest instructions >on the system of meditation unique to the Buddha's own dispensation. //The >practice of Satipatthana meditation centers on the methodical cultivation of one >simple mental faculty readily available to all of us at any moment. This is >the faculty of mindfulness, the capacity for attending to the content of our >experience as it becomes manifest in the immediate present.// What the Buddha >shows in the sutta is the tremendous, but generally hidden, power inherent in >this simple mental function, a power that can unfold all the mind's potentials >culminating in final deliverance from suffering. >----------------------------- > >With metta, >Howard > > #61418 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 1:56 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Scott - In a message dated 7/14/06 11:01:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > ..."If the cause and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness would > cease completely and totally without remainder, could > eye-consciousness be discerned? > > "No, friend. > > "In this way, friend, this has been declared, disclosed, and revealed > by the Blessed One thus: For such a reason this consciousness is > nonself," (SN 35: 234)... > > Herman? Are you out there? > > Querelously, > > S. > > > > ======================== That's an excellent quote, Scott! It shows how intimately connected is anatta and conditionality. Nothing whose existence is extrinsic, nothing that is other-dependent for its very "life", no conditioned dhamma, has own-being. Every conditioned dhamma is empty of self, empty of me and mine. As regards constructs (such as chariots), they depend on their parts and aspects, and on the conceptualizing that grasps them as "things" and as units. With metta, Howard #61419 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 5:58 am Subject: Cetasikas' study corner 486- Non-Aversion/Adosa (r) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== Ch 29, Non-Aversion(Adosa)contd ***** We could also, in order to have less anger and more loving kindness, reflect on the virtues the Bodhisatta accumulated. We read in the Visuddhimagga (IX, 26) about the way of reviewing these: * "… is it not the fact that when your Master was a Bodhisatta before discovering full enlightenment, while he was still engaged in fulfilling the Perfections during the four incalculable ages and a hundred thousand aeons, he did not allow hate to corrupt his mind even when his enemies tried to murder him on various occasions? For example, in the Sílavant Birth Story (Jåtakas I, 261) when his friends rose to prevent his kingdom of three hundred leagues being seized by an enemy king who had been incited by a wicked minister in whose mind his own queen had sown hate for him, he did not allow them to lift a weapon. "Again when he was buried, along with a thousand companions, up to the neck in a hole dug in the earth in a charnel ground, he had no thought of hate. And when, after saving his life by a heroic effort helped by jackals scrapping away soil when they had come to devour the corpses, he went with the aid of a spirit to his own bedroom and saw his enemy lying on his own bed, he was not angry but treated him as a friend, undertaking mutual pledge, and he then exclaimed: “The brave aspire, the wise will not lose heart; I see myself as I had wished to be.” "(Jåtakas I, 267) * However, only reflecting on loving-kindness is not enough, it should be practised. For example, when others talk to us we can listen to them with loving kindness. When there is more right understanding of realities there are more conditions for loving kindness in our relationship with others. When we cling to a concept of “people” we tend to be attached to an idea of having friends. We feel lonely when we are without friends. In the ultimate sense there are no friends who exist, there are only citta, cetasika and rúpa, and these arise and then fall away immediately. Actually, friendship or loving kindness can arise with the citta which thinks of a being. Loving kindness can be extended to whosoever is in our company and then there is a moment of true friendship. At such a moment there is no thought of self who wants friendship from others, no feeling of loneliness or worry about the attitude of others towards us. If we consider more the reality of loving kindness instead of clinging to an idea of friendship there are more conditions for unselfish love. ***** Non-Aversion(Adosa)to be contd Metta, Sarah ====== #61420 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:02 am Subject: Re: [dsg] a friend's question nilovg Hi Azita, Can you tell Gilian: when there is more understanding of the citta at this moment, there is kusala citta and this cannot possibly be accompanied by unhappy feeling. Anyway, our life is one moment, and this changes all the time. The abhidhamma will help her to understand her daily life. She likes to have fun, this is a conditioned moment, but it cannot stay. Even if she understands this there can be a beginning of detachment. But she does not have to think of detachment. She can have fun and smile, just naturally. But she may find out that more understanding of her life is to the benefit of herself and her surroundings. why don't you encourage her to join dsg? Would you share with us what you wrote to her? Warmest wishes to Gillian, and also to you, Nina. Op 15-jul-2006, om 8:08 heeft gazita2002 het volgende geschreven: > A friend asks: "say you're having kamma on you and you know and you > cant do anything but develop wisdom and detach - OK - but that doesn't > give you a smile and fun. So you could end up being WISE -but- well > basically unhappy." #61421 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: >Howard: > Here's the issue, Jon: Consider two namarupic streams, for example, >"you" and "Sarah". > OK, clear so far. As I prefer to put it, we are talking about moments at which the object of our consciousness is another person. >How is it that you are aware of her and she of you? Exactly >how? What are the mechanisms of communication and the means of knowing about >each other and interacting with each other? How does her cetana and her actions >impact you, and vice-versa? Each stream for SURE impacts the other, effects >the other, and conditions the other! > I'm not clear on the relevance of these questions, and why they should arise when the object of consciousness is another person (or being) and not otherwise. Do they arise when the object is a living being other than a person (say, an animal or insect)? What is so special about the moments when another person/being is the object of one's consciousness? Let me explain why I question the relevance of these questions. Let's suppose you are having a face-to-face conversation with another person. In terms of dhammas, the world at that moment is just the 5 sense-doors and the mind door, as described in the SN suttas that are so often been cited here. In absolute terms, the seeing of the visible object and hearing of the audible object that we take for 'other person' is no different in its character to the moments of seeing and hearing in between of visible and audible object that we take for something other that another person. I think the Buddha went to great lengths to convey the fact that for any given individual there are only the experiences through the 6 doors and that visible object is only that rupa, regardless of whether we regard it as belonging to a person or not. > Each of these two streams consists of actually occurring dhammas. >Neither stream is a fiction (in that sense). What are the exact mechanisms of >interaction between them? How exactly does one influence the other? (You know darn >well that they DO!) Just as conditionality within a mind-stream is important, >so is conditionality between streams. Have details been given anywhere? No, >not so far as I know. > So that I can understand better what you are getting at, could I ask whether what you are referring here only holds for the worldling and not the enlightened being, or does it hold for enlightened beings also? >>You feel that the Abhidhamma as it stands does not cover this >>'inter-stream interaction'. To my understanding it does, because in >>ultimate ('dhammic') terms moments of so-called inter-stream interaction >>are no different from other moments. >> > >--------------------------------------- >Howard: > Well, you are FAR more easily satisfied than I! ;-) >-------------------------------------- > > ;-)), ;-)). Can be a blessing or a curse, can't it! Jon #61422 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 2:03 am Subject: Re: [dsg] An apology to Herman upasaka_howard Hi, Andrew - In a message dated 7/15/06 2:34:15 AM Eastern Daylight Time, athel60@... writes: > Hi Herman > > I want to apologise for saying that your post was outrageous and that I > thought the idea was nutty. Clearly this was over the top and out of > order and I apologise unreservedly. > > As Jon has said, your posts are always challenging and for the less > patient like me, this can sometimes lead to a hasty response. > > Sorry if I have upset you or anyone else on the list. > > Best wishes > Andrew > ===================== It's always a pleasure to witness lovingkindness, compassion, and expressed regret! :-) Sadhu! With metta, Howard #61423 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:13 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Born with pa~n~na. sarahprocter... Dear Scott, I've appreciated all your reflections. See U.P. under 'Hetu' for a little more on this topic. It'll take a bit of wading. Esp. see the ones Htoo wrote under Hetu2. Also, CMA p214. I also recall seeing the refs in texts to the impossibility of attaining jhana and lokuttara cittas with 2 roots. I understand from my discussions with KS that this also includes the development of any insight too. She suggested we may wonder why someone hears the Dhamma but it doesn't register or have any impact, for example. However, such listening or other good deeds in this life, such as supporting the Sangha, may be a condition for bhavana to develop in the next life (with 3 roots). As Kel, pointed out, different teachers have different understandings on this rather delicate point. As Nina suggested, we can't know for sure and it's useless to speculate (as we all do:-)), but again we can see that many conditions, including theses hetus, determine the ability to develop understanding in this life. I think it can also help us to have understanding and compassion rather than irritation, for example, when friends and families have no interest in what we consider to be 'right'. Metta, Sarah ======= #61424 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:14 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) jonoabb Hi Mike m. nease wrote: >J: There is a world of difference between the citta that is samatha bhavana >and the citta that is vipassana bhavana. The panna that accompaines >samatha bhavana does not directly experience the true nature of a >presently arising dhamma. So at a moment of samatha bhavana there is no >'overlap' with vipassana bhavana. > >M: Guess I've missed something here. I have a feeling you've stated this >before in different terms but could you please elaborate? Is it impossible >for samatha bhaavanaa to arise with a citta experiencing a paramatha dhamma >(e.g. color)? > > It is more the fact that the panna is not of the appropriate kind. The panna of samatha bhavana knows the difference between kusala and akusala, but does not attend to the characteristic of the object. Does that answer your question, Mike? Jon #61425 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:13 am Subject: Re: [dsg] A Second Thought on My Second Reading jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: >Hi again, Jon - > > One more time! (I'd say "Once more with feeling," but that would be >anothger thread! ;-) > And in your case, a lengthy one ;-)) > If there is anger (for exmple), and if concentration only serves to >strengthen it, that concentration is certainly akusala and is not an >enlightenment factor. > Quite so. And this is why it is not the development of concentration that is key in samatha, but it is the development of kusala (having the quality of tranquillity, hence the term 'samatha'). >When, OTOH, one is concentrated on the present anger with sati and >objectivity, that is a basis for insight to arise and for the rapid, if not >immediate, ceasing of that anger. > If we are talking about insight, it is not a matter of concentrating on a chosen object. If I am not mistaken, there is no reference in the texts to concentrating on akusala as part of the development of insight, nor as a means of causing the ceasing of the akusala. But that is perhaps another thread ;-)) >So, it is certainly incorrect to think that >concentration in-and-of-itself is kusala. > It is good that we agree on this, because I think it is an important matter to keep in mind. Concentration will only be kusala when it arises with kusala citta. Citta is kusala not by virtue of its being concentrated on something, but by virtue of other factors. That is why the practice of samatha is not a matter of choosing an object and concentrating on it. Where is the kusala in concentrating on (say) an earth kasina, the breath, etc? >With metta, >Howard > >P.S. Apologies for "Thinking out loud"! ;-) > > Not at all. Feel free any time! Jon #61426 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:01 am Subject: Re: [dsg] sabhaava jonoabb Hi Herman Herman Hofman wrote: >>Hi Nina (and Howard) >> >> --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom >> >> My own thoughts exactly! When we feel hungry we may not know whether >> it is nama or rupa that appears at a given moment. When there is pain >> (rupa) and aversion to the pain (nama), we are not always clear which >> is which. >> >> > >It seems to me that you are saying that there is an ultimate reality >different to and masked by what is experienced. It seems that citta >can be wrong about what it is experiencing. > No, that's not what I'm saying at all. I'm saying that I read the teachings to be saying that although the reality of the present moment is always citta experiencing an object of nama, rupa or concept, we perceive there to be a world of people and things. It is not the citta that experiences that is wrong about that experience, it is subsequent cittas that (while correctly experiencing their own object) fail to see things as they truly are. > If that's >all there is, citta and whatever its object is, then that is all there >is, and it is only a subsequent citta that can take a former citta as >object, and be doubtful about it, Which would be the reality of that >moment. > Yes, that is more or less how I understand it to be described in the texts. >And in that context, the belief in some ultimate reality >hiding behind what actually appears is also just an object of the >current citta. > Yes, if you're talking about 'belief' and not direct knowledge. But what I am putting forward is my reading of the texts and not a personally held 'belief'. What the texts say, on my reading, is that if a citta is accompanied by panna of the appropriate level then it can know the immediately preceding dhamma as it truly is. That is the scenario, but no amount of belief will bring about the arising of such direct knowledge; other factors are needed (and these, too, are mentioned at length in the texts). Jon #61427 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:20 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 1 (was, Knowledge of the Difference ...) jonoabb Hi Mateesha matheesha wrote: >M: My point in quoting both those suttas were that the Buddha always >mentions Samadhi as preceeding insight in the suttas. > Agreed. >If samadhi (as >defined in the abhidhamma) is present in every moment anyway, why >should it be mentioned in this manner? > > Because it plays an important role, as do the other factors such as (in the first sutta you quoted) conviction, joy, rapture, pleasure, serenity, etc or (in the other sutta) wholesome morality, freedom from remorse, joy, rapture, tranquillity, happiness etc. Samadhi is one of several relevant factors. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you regard the reference to samadhi here as being in effect a reference to samatha bhavana. It is this idea that I am trying to address. As I say, samadhi is one of several factors that are said to play a role in the development of insight. But I do not read the sutta as saying 'develop each of these several factors (individually) and you will end up with insight'. It is saying, to my reading, that as the conditions for the development of insight are being fulfilled, these factors (including insight itself) are being developed and become more prominent. >It is said that for enlightenment samadhi and panna are both required >and that they counterinfluence each other. What do you think of the >sutta quote below - especially in the idea that samadhi is something >to be developed actively ?: > >"As for the individual who has attained insight into phenomena >through heightened discernment, but not internal tranquillity of >awareness, he should approach an individual who has attained internal >tranquillity of awareness... and ask him, 'How should the mind be >steadied? How should it be made to settle down? How should it be >unified? How should it be concentrated?' The other will answer in >line with what he has seen & experienced: 'The mind should be >steadied in this way. The mind should be made to settle down in this >way. The mind should be unified in this way. The mind should be >concentrated in this way.' Then eventually he [the first] will become >one who has attained both internal tranquillity of awareness & >insight into phenomena through heightened discernment. > >http://www.metta.lk/mirror/www.accesstoinsight/canon/sutta/anguttara/a >n04-094.html > > I take the reference to 'internal tranquillity of awareness' to be a reference to samatha. The person who has attained, say, stream entry is encouraged to develop samatha (or develop it further). Again, we should not equate samadhi and samatha (although in some contexts samadhi means samatha). >I'm short of time! Will answer the rest later, > Thanks for making the time! Jon #61428 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:33 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bored and Lonely sarahprocter... Hi Howard (& James), I thought this was a kind note and I agree with your practical comments and that contact is important and part of our daily life. It's like family - we often disagree, but the answer isn't to cut contact. We should remember that the real meaning of seclusion is that of a mental state, rather than a physical state. (More in U.P. under 'Lonely'). I was glad to see James' post and discussions recently inc. comments on the audio too. I've also appreciated your (and Nina's) encouraging posts to newcomers and also to oldcomers:-), as well as your friendly assistance when anyone goes a tad 'over-the-top'. Just as when we're physically with other people, there can be kindness, consideration and generosity on the internet too, as you appreciate:-). Meanwhile, we're greatly looking forward to meeting James soon in Hong Kong. Metta, Sarah p.s I like the way you've pursued various threads, such as the 'desirable' rupa one - I'm hoping to chip in on it too:-). --- upasaka@... wrote: > Hi, James - > > I've read your entire post, but I'm not reproducing it here. I'm > very > sorry to hear you are bored, and even more that you are lonely! Please > do keep > up with the meditation. But also, try to get regular exercise, and do > get out > and join some activities - whatever you like. Join a Buddhist group if > possible, or a social group, or something which will put you with other > people > engaged in an activity that appeals to you. Seclusion is well and good, > but note > that in most cases, even monks have friends! Humans, like porpoises and > elephants are social animals! ;-) > > With metta, > Howard > > P.S. Please do keep in touch! :-) #61429 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 2:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 7/15/06 8:57:32 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > Hi Howard > > upasaka@... wrote: > > >>I do not see in the Satipatthana Sutta any idea of the establishing of > >>mindfulness as a preliminary step to insight; there is only the knowing > >>that *is* the development of insight. > >> > > > >--------------------------------------- > >Howard: > > I do. ... > > > > I'd be interested to know what particular part(s) of the Satipatthana > Sutta you have in mind when you say you see in it the idea of > satipatthana as being a preliminary step to insight. > > I think there are passages in the sutta which support a different view. > From the very beginning of the sutta: > "What are the four [Arousings of Mindfulness]? > "Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating the body in the body, > ardent, clearly comprehending (it) and mindful (of it), having overcome, > in this world, covetousness and grief; he lives contemplating the > feelings in the feelings, ardent, clearly comprehending (them) and > mindful (of them), having overcome, in this world, covetousness and > grief; he lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness, ardent, > clearly comprehending (it) and mindful (of it), having overcome in this > world covetousness and grief; he lives contemplating mental objects in > mental objects, ardent, clearly comprehending (them) and mindful (of > them), having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief." > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/misc/wayof.html > > The key words here, applicable to each of the 4 > arousings/establishments, are: > - lives contemplating (the object) > - ardent, clearly comprehending (it) and mindful (of it), having > overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief; > and in particular the words "clearly comprehending and mindful", which > seem to indicate that what is belong spoken of is insight itself and not > some preliminary stage or step. > > Where in the text do you find the idea of a subsequent step to follow? > > >And if > >attention and mindfulness do not develop first, what is it then that leads > to the > >wisdom. > > > > As regards the question of what leads to the wisdom, there are a number > of factors, the most important of which must I think be previously > developed wisdom but this alone is not sufficient. The factors > mentioned in the texts are hearing the dhamma, reflecting on it and > applying or relating what has been thus understood to the present moment. > > Jon > > ======================== You made some good points in the foregoing, especially as regards the early passages that mention clearly comprehending. I just don't read quite as much into that as you, but your point is a very good one. One reason why I don't read so much into it is that an early mention (in the section on mindfulness of the body) doesn't necessarily pertain to an early stage of the practice. The order is body, feelings, consciousness, and dhammas, and the fact that body is mentioned first doesn't imply early practice. But your point is still a good one. BTW, I noticed something interesting: On ATI, there are three different translations provided. Two of the three use the terminology you used of "clearly comprehending". The third, by Thanissaro Bhikkhu writes "ardent, alert, & mindful," using 'alert' instead of 'clearly comprehending'. The use of 'clearly comprehending' shows that a degree of pa~n~na is already in force. (Of course, I do readily admit that some pa~n~na *must* be present at the outset anyway.) I would be interested in knowing what the Pali is in the original that two of the three translate as "clearly comprehending" instead of "alert". As for evidence of development of wisdom, I see that even within the subsection on mindfulness of the body pertaining to breathing. It starts with merely distinguishing longer and shorter breaths, it moves on to noticing what happpens in the body along with the breathing [As a consequence of attending to the breath, certain bodily sensations become observable that were not in evendence previously - I know this first-hand], and finally it becomes possible to discern arisings and dissolutions with the body. This is a graduated development. With metta, Howard #61430 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:23 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa nilovg Hi Andrew, Howard, Herman, I think cross references, study of the abhidhamma, the commentaries, all of them are useful. The one does not exclude the other. On the Pali list I had to do a cross reference about Rahula who should not be overcome by objects experienced through the six doors. Jim gave me an enormous lists of similar texts and I am so glad I looked at the different translations. It helped me to have more understanding of the text. Nina. Op 15-jul-2006, om 1:14 heeft Andrew het volgende geschreven: > See my post to Herman. I disagree with your points below although I > note you make the big concession "occasionally one sutta (or a few) > may be helpful in throwing light on another sutta". I'll leave it at > that. #61431 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) jonoabb Hi Howard upasaka@... wrote: >Hi, Jon (and Matheesha) - > >In a message dated 7/9/06 11:29:32 AM Eastern Daylight Time, >jonoabb@... writes: > > > >>Thus the samadhi that supports panna can be developed only with the >>development of panna. There is no such thing as concentration per se to >>be developed that then 'leads to' panna. To put that another way, a citta >>that is kusala must be kusala by virtue of other mental factors that arise >>together with it (such as panna, sati, passadhi, adosa, alobha, etc); the >>concentration factor is incidental to that (but still imporant). >> >==================== > Jon, the (inadequate) teachers of the Buddha were masters of jhana, >some even of all 8 jhanas. So, according to you they had to have developed >pa~n~na along with all the jhana factors. So, why were they not awakened? >Obviously, the pa~n~na involved had to have been weak. > Samatha and vipassana are different kinds of kusala and the panna which accompanies each is similarly of a different kind. The panna of insight is not just a more developed form of the panna of samatha, but it is panna of a different order altogether. > I do, of course, readily admit that *some* pa~n~na must be present for >the attainment of jhana, as one must be able to distinguish conditions. >Entering and remaining in a jhana is a fine balancing act. Without an adequate >degree of discernment, attaining jhanas wouldn't be possible. But, in general, to >accomplish most anything of complexity requires at least an iota of >discernment. > Note that pa~n~na isn't included as a jhana factor. (Nor are sati or >viriya, for that matter.) The jhana factors are: > > 1. Initial application (vitakka) > 2. Sustained application (vicara) > 3. Joy (píti) > 4. Happiness (sukha) > 5. One-pointedness (ekaggata) > > Obviously, sati is *crucial* for attaining jhana, being critical for >developing, heightening, and sustaining concentration. Likewise, viriya is >crucial. But even sati and viriya, critical as they are, aren't considered jhana >factors. And pa~n~na is not a jhana factor. So, yes, certainly, a degree of >discernment is needed to enter jhanas, but pa~n~na isn't central to jhanas. It >is, of course, an enlightenment factor, but that is another matter. > As Nina explained, the jhana factors are factors that are successively abandoned in order to progress to the next level of jhana. It is the function of panna to see the disadvantage of each factor in turn and recognise the need for its abandonment. Jon #61432 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 2:42 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 7/15/06 8:58:34 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Many thanks for the quote from Bhikkhu Bodhi. Does he refer to any part > of the text of the sutta to support his views on this? > --------------------------------------------- Howard: No, he does not. He references a book by Bhiukkhu Soma and some ancient commentaries, but I saw no quotes. I guess he drew his conclusions from the sutta "as a whole" LOLOL!!!) -------------------------------------------- In what way is > > the text to be read as describing a 'methodical' cultivation, I wonder? ------------------------------------------- Howard: He doesn't provide proof. ------------------------------------------ > > Jon > ===================== With metta, Howard #61433 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Reading and Hearing the Dhamma jonoabb Hi Herman Herman Hofman wrote: >As we know, the Suttas treat of name and form as codependent. You >don't get one without the other. Never. In daily life, you also do not >ever get form and content divorced from each other either. There is >not abstract blueness and abstract vaseness coming together as a blue >vase. The reality is the unity of blue vase in its entire context, and >the abstracted concepts are blue and vase. Colour, sound, feeling etc >divorced from its arising, from the ground which gives rise to their >appearing is abstract, it is concepting. > I don't take issue with the general assertion that each arising dhamma is dependent on other co-arising dhammas (and indeed on previously arisen dhammas and in some cases subsequently arisen dhammas), and this aspect of things is extensively set out in the texts under 'conditionality'. But the texts make it clear that, when it comes to the development of insight, dhammas can be individually known, since each differs from the others in an important respect (each has a particular characteristic). So it is not a case of individual dhammas being divorced from their context, but rather of a single dhamma being the object of panna at a given mind-moment. This has nothing to do with 'concepting' (or has it?). >> As regards 'concepting all day', we are all in the same boat, that is to >> say, there is a lot of it going on all the time but, if we are to pay any >> regard to what is said in the texts, there are also numerous moments that >> do not involve conceptualisation, for example, the moments of actual >> experience of objects at the 5 sense doors. What is your take on this? >> > >I could appreciate this more if this is what I actually experienced. >First of all, I do not experience sense doors at all. How is it that >there is so much talk and agreement on sense doors, and I can find >nothing that correlates with that. It has to be my view that sense >doors are learnt, not experienced. They are a concept. They are an >artificial framework. > I think it is common to everyone that what is seen through the eyes cannot be experienced through the ears and vice versa. I am using sense-doors in that respect. True, there is a more precise abhidhamma definition of the term, but then as you say this is not the object of our experience. (That of course does not mean it doesn't exist.) >Yes, I agree that there MUST be moments of experience before they >become reflected (on). The only experience I know anything about, >though, is the one that is attended to, reflected upon. And I don't >for a moment believe that I can attend to experience, or reflect on >it, without altering it. My selective attention to and reflection on >what MUST have been, is actually a creative act, that has no necessary >connection to an underlying reality. There is freedom in imagination. > I think what you have said here is a fair description of what is perceived if one tries to focus on the experiencing of objects through the 5 senses. But the texts tell us that a different picture emerges when insight is developed. The development of insight is not about trying to experience/verify immediately the description of reality contained in the texts. Any such attempts are bound to be clouded by ignorance and wrong view. >Kusala, like everything else, is a concept. An experience becomes >kusala by virtue of pigeonholing it as such. Of all the experiences >that are kusala, what do they have in common? What is the experiential >correlate of kusala? Likewise with panna. What distinguishes panna out >of the menatl soup? How is panna known? And by what standard is panna >judged to actually be perverted panna? > > Good questions. There are 'experiential correlates' of all dhammas and their attributes, otherwise there wouldn't be much point in having them explained to us, would there ;-)). This is where it is necessary to rely on the commentaries and Abhidhamma, because the suttas assume a relatively high level of understanding on the part of the audience (for many of whom the mere hearing of a sutta was sufficient to bring enlightenment). The characteristic of kusala is said to be tranquillity or calm (the mental factor passadhi), and that of panna dispelling ignorance, giving light. Another synonym for kusala used in the suttas is 'not harmful to oneself or to others'. But actually experiencing these for ourselves is of course another matter. Jon #61434 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 7:30 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. scottduncan2 Dear Howard, This is good - H: "...As regards constructs (such as chariots), they depend on their parts and aspects, and on the conceptualizing that grasps them as 'things' and as units." - especially the last clause: "dependent on the conceptualising that grasps them..." With loving kindness, Scott. #61435 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 7:59 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) scottduncan2 Dear Jon, May I please ask a question? You note: J: "Samatha and vipassana are different kinds of kusala and the panna which accompanies each is similarly of a different kind. The panna of insight is not just a more developed form of the panna of samatha, but it is panna of a different order altogether." Could you please elaborate on the above? What comes to mind, based on my limited understanding, is that pa~n~na is pa~n~na - a cetasika which arises and falls away and with its sole function. Thinking of it this way, I'm not sure how it can be of "a different order." Is this being of a different order dependent on the conditions out of which pa~n~na arises at a given moment? Is this dependent on the object (which is what you say above, I think)? In other words, is the quality of pa~n~na influenced by context in which it arises? Thanks in advance for your consideration and clarification. With loving kindness, Scott. #61436 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 4:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) upasaka_howard Hi, Scott - In a message dated 7/15/06 11:28:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > Dear Jon, > > May I please ask a question? You note: > > J: "Samatha and vipassana are different kinds of kusala and the panna > which accompanies each is similarly of a different kind. The panna of > insight is not just a more developed form of the panna of samatha, but > it is panna of a different order altogether." > > Could you please elaborate on the above? What comes to mind, based on > my limited understanding, is that pa~n~na is pa~n~na - a cetasika > which arises and falls away and with its sole function. Thinking of > it this way, I'm not sure how it can be of "a different order." > > Is this being of a different order dependent on the conditions out of > which pa~n~na arises at a given moment? Is this dependent on the > object (which is what you say above, I think)? In other words, is the > quality of pa~n~na influenced by context in which it arises? > > Thanks in advance for your consideration and clarification. > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > ========================= Jon may be 100% correct - I don't know. What I DO know, and what pleases me very much, is to see you examining matters yourself and being willing to question statements that don't strike you as absolutely and uncontestably true. That sort of attitude, one based on the aim of safeguarding truth, protects yourself and protects the Dhamma. Sadhu! Jon has exhibited the same attititude in his asking for sutta quotes justifying stated positions! With metta, Howard #61437 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 9:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) scottduncan2 Dear Howard, Thank you for the below: H: "Jon may be 100% correct - I don't know. What I DO know, and what pleases me very much, is to see you examining matters yourself and being willing to question statements that don't strike you as absolutely and uncontestably true. That sort of attitude, one based on the aim of safeguarding truth, protects yourself and protects the Dhamma. Sadhu!" Its hard, isn't it, to approach the truth, (at least for me)? Is there "truth?" I think there is. Does this make me a "fundamentalist?" I think it does, by definition, if I consider that the truth has been taught and lies in what is left to us in the ti-pitaka. I find that there is much doubt that is allayed for me by what must be sadhaa. This doesn't seem manufactured, to me. I'm not making myself experience confidence in the ti-pitaka, for example. I still want to learn what is correct. Sadhaa, it is said, must be balanced by pa~n~na. Neither arise because one wants them to. I personally know the experience of sadhaa much more than I do that of pa~n~na, (if I know the experience of the latter at all). Since one can't help it arising and, that it does arise in relation to certain aspects of the Dhamma, maybe this can condition the arising of pa~n~na later. Does that make sense? With loving kindness, Scott. #61438 From: "Larry" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 10:25 am Subject: Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Scott - > > In a message dated 7/14/06 11:01:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > scduncan@... writes: > > > ..."If the cause and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness would > > cease completely and totally without remainder, could > > eye-consciousness be discerned? > > > > "No, friend. > > > > "In this way, friend, this has been declared, disclosed, and revealed > > by the Blessed One thus: For such a reason this consciousness is > > nonself," (SN 35: 234)... > > > > Herman? Are you out there? > > > > Querulously, > > > > S. > > > > > > > > > ======================== > That's an excellent quote, Scott! It shows how intimately connected is > anatta and conditionality. Nothing whose existence is extrinsic, nothing that > is other-dependent for its very "life", no conditioned dhamma, has own-being. > Every conditioned dhamma is empty of self, empty of me and mine. > As regards constructs (such as chariots), they depend on their parts > and aspects, and on the conceptualizing that grasps them as "things" and as > units. > > With metta, > Howard L: I don't see anything about own-being here. I believe the sutta says consciousness is anatta because it is dependent, but it doesn't say why dependence is an indicator of anatta. The sutta goes on to discuss the search for heartwood in a plantain tree, similar to the "Lump of Foam" sutta. But this doesn't seem to have anything to do with dependence. If we say the dependence of eye, forms and eye-consciousness on one another defines eye- consciousness then I think we are clearly in the realm of concepts. If you say eye- consciousness is a concept then I agree it is empty of "own-being". "Empty of own-being" always refers to concepts. "So too, a bhikkhu does not recognize either a self or anything belonging to a self in these six bases for contact." L: This seems to refer to a simple identity error. For example, consciousness is not self because it is consciousness. In general, I would say the arguments presented in this sutta don't actually fit together or lend support to one another. But they all agree that consciousness is anatta. Larry #61439 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:23 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) upasaka_howard Hi, Scott - In a message dated 7/15/06 12:25:55 PM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > Dear Howard, > > Thank you for the below: > > H: "Jon may be 100% correct - I don't know. What I DO know, and what > pleases me very much, is to see you examining matters yourself and > being willing to question statements that don't strike you as > absolutely and uncontestably true. That sort of attitude, one based on > the aim of safeguarding truth, protects yourself and protects the > Dhamma. Sadhu!" > > Its hard, isn't it, to approach the truth, (at least for me)? Is > there "truth?" I think there is. > > Does this make me a "fundamentalist?" > ------------------------------------ Howard: What? To believe that "truth" is not an empty concept? No, that's not how I understand 'fundamentalism'. I understand it to be an unquestioning adherence to dogma. ------------------------------------ I think it does, by definition,> > if I consider that the truth has been taught and lies in what is left > to us in the ti-pitaka. > --------------------------------- Howard: To accept even the Tipitaka unquestioningly, without examining directly ("ehipassiko"), would indeed be a fundamentalism. But I don't see that in you. --------------------------------- I find that there is much doubt that is> > allayed for me by what must be sadhaa. This doesn't seem > manufactured, to me. I'm not making myself experience confidence in > the ti-pitaka, for example. I still want to learn what is correct. -------------------------------- Howard: Confidence born of contemplation of the Dhamma and looking within for direct confirmation is wisdom-based saddha; it is Dhammic saddha. Confidence based on mere authority is not. -------------------------------- > > Sadhaa, it is said, must be balanced by pa~n~na. Neither arise > because one wants them to. I personally know the experience of sadhaa > much more than I do that of pa~n~na, (if I know the experience of the > latter at all). Since one can't help it arising and, that it does > arise in relation to certain aspects of the Dhamma, maybe this can > condition the arising of pa~n~na later. --------------------------------- Howard: What the roots are of one's saddha is critical, I believe. -------------------------------- > > Does that make sense? > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > ================= With metta, Howard #61440 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 11:11 am Subject: Letters from Nina, 6. nilovg Dear friends, < We do not come to know seeing, visible object, contact and feeling "as such", merely by thinking about them. Pañña should realize the characteristic of seeing when it presents itself; it should realize seeing as nama which arises because of conditions, not self. The nama which sees is different from the rupa which is visible object. When we learn to see realities as elements which arise because of conditions and which we cannot control, we will be less carried away by pleasant or unpleasant objects. After I had typed the sutta-text I went to a party. When I have typed a text I find that it afterwards reminds me of reality, more so than when I only read the text. And thus, when I was at the party, the text reminded me of the six doors. I saw objects that were pleasing and owing to that pleasant impression happy feeling arose. I saw objects that were displeasing and owing to that unpleasant impression unhappy feeling arose. There was diversity of elements and so there was diversity of contact and diversity of feeling. My legs were tired and there was hardness which could be experienced. There were speeches and I felt tense, and then there were aversion and hardness which could be experienced. Later on when we received roses, there was a pleasant impression through the eyes. Is it not true that all day long there is diversity of elements, diversity of contact and diversity of feelings?> ****** Nina #61441 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 7:21 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry (and Scott) - In a message dated 7/15/06 1:33:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > L: I don't see anything about own-being here. I believe the sutta says > consciousness is > anatta because it is dependent, but it doesn't say why dependence is an > indicator of > anatta. ------------------------------------ Howard: No, it doesn't say why. What is there to say? What arises dependently lacks self. What could be clearer? ----------------------------------- > > The sutta goes on to discuss the search for heartwood in a plantain tree, > similar to the > "Lump of Foam" sutta. But this doesn't seem to have anything to do with > dependence. If we > say the dependence of eye, forms and eye-consciousness on one another > defines eye- > consciousness then I think we are clearly in the realm of concepts. If you > say eye- > consciousness is a concept then I agree it is empty of "own-being". "Empty > of own-being" > always refers to concepts. ----------------------------------- Howard: I'm not following you at all here. ---------------------------------- > > "So too, a bhikkhu does not recognize either a self or anything belonging to > a self in these > six bases for contact." > > L: This seems to refer to a simple identity error. For example, > consciousness is not self > because it is consciousness. ---------------------------------- Howard: LOL! All problems solved! -------------------------------- > > In general, I would say the arguments presented in this sutta don't actually > fit together or > lend support to one another. But they all agree that consciousness is > anatta. > > Larry > > ==================== With metta, Howard #61442 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 11:07 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life 24. nilovg Dear friends, Chapter 4 The Characteristic of Lobha Cittas are of different types. They can be classified as kusala cittas (wholesome cittas), akusala cittas (unwholesome cittas), vipåkacittas (cittas which are result) and kiriyacittas (cittas which are neither cause nor result). All these kinds of cittas arise in a day, yet we know so little about them. Most of the time we do not know whether the citta is kusala, akusala, vipåka or kiriya. If we learn to classify our mind we will have more understanding of ourselves and of others. We will have more compassion and loving kindness towards others, even when they behave in a disagreeable way. We do not like the akusala cittas of others; we find it unpleasant when they are stingy or speak harsh words. However, do we realize at which moments we ourselves have akusala cittas? When we dislike other people's harsh words, we ourselves have akusala cittas with aversion at that moment. Instead of paying attention to the akusala cittas of others we should be aware of our own akusala cittas. If one has not studied the Abhidhamma which explains realities in detail, one may not know what is akusala. People may take what is unwholesome for wholesome and thus accumulate unwholesomeness without knowing it. If we know more about different types of citta we can see for ourselves which types arise more often, kusala cittas or akusala cittas, and thus we will understand ourselves better. We should know the difference between kusala and akusala. The Atthasåliní (Book I, Part I, chapter I, 38) speaks about the meaning of the word ``kusala''. The word ``kusala'' has many meanings; it can mean ``of good health'', ``faultless'', ``skilful'', ``productive of happy results''. When we perform dåna (generosity), síla (good moral conduct) and bhåvanå (mental development), the citta is kusala. All different kinds of wholesomeness such as the appreciation of other people's good deeds, helping others, politeness, paying respect, observing the precepts, studying and teaching Dhamma, samatha (tranquil meditation) and vipassanå (development of ``insight'', right understanding of realities), are included in dåna, síla or bhåvanå. Kusala is ``productive of happy results''; each good deed will bring a pleasant result. ****** Nina. #61443 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 11:37 am Subject: Re: [dsg] More on ignorance and wrong understanding nilovg Hi Phil, I like very much what you write here. It can help people who think that the Abhidhamma makes us asocial. At the same time I like to be reminded of people being like a mirage. This is also in Howard's logo: like a phantom and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra. There is no contradiction. Nina. Op 15-jul-2006, om 11:32 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > People are a deception, that is true, but they are important in > our lives and remembrance that they are a deception needn't interfere > with our loving them, caring for them, enjoying their company. The > development of wisdom allows us to take better care of people than if > we were clinging them in complete ignorance. (Now we are clinging to > them in *almost* complete ignorance - there has been some progress, > and > that progress comes with more metta and and karuna and other kusala > cetasikas accompanying all kusala cittas - and they find expression > through our relationships with people.) #61444 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 1:04 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) scottduncan2 Dear Howard, Thank you. Now, though, you've got me thinking... Howard: "What? To believe that "truth" is not an empty concept? No, that's not how I understand 'fundamentalism'. I understand it to be an unquestioning adherence to dogma." Pardon this sophomoric act, but I sought a little of the consensual view on "fundamentalism" (googled the word and used web definitions): 1) "Movement or attitude stressing strict and literal adherance to a set of basic principles." 2) "A belief in the infallibility, and literal interpretation, of a particular religion's doctrine or holy books." 3) "Committment to, and belief in, the literal meaning of a scriptural text...[calls for] a return to the foundational beliefs, fundamentals of the religion, or a literal interpretation of the scriptures." "Literal" is "actual," that is "being or reflecting the essential or genuine character of something." It is "limited to the explicit meaning of a word or text. "Figurative" is "implicitly or explicitly representative of something in terms of some other unlike thing that seems to be similar or analogous." I think it is, perhaps, meant as "metaphorical." Some of the above seems applicable to the way I function. In particular, I think I am concerned with literality. It might be the developmental stage I'm at, mind you. I want to know what a given word means. If I read a sutta in English, I want to see the key words in paali, and learn what those mean, and then try to get a sense of the context, the spin, the point of view of the translator - stuff like that. I think there is a way things are meant to be understood. I don't trust my own "understanding." I don't trust statements, whether mine or another's that begin with "I think," or "My opinion is." Howard: "To accept even the Tipitaka unquestioningly, without examining directly ('ehipassiko'), would indeed be a fundamentalism. But I don't see that in you." Well, I do question in a way. I question what something means. I want to learn the essence of something. I want to know what something is as close to what was intended. I don't want to go off on flights of fancy, relying on my own brilliant creativity to come up with some sort of conceptual bastard of my own creation and call it Dhamma. This is why I choose to study Abhidhmamma since I find it complimentary, clarificatory, defining, and very structuring of what I learn. Suttas alone, in my opinion, are way too open to misinterpretation. Do you see what I mean? Is this "fundamentalism?" Howard: "Confidence born of contemplation of the Dhamma and looking within for direct confirmation is wisdom-based saddha; it is Dhammic saddha. Confidence based on mere authority is not." I do see your point here, Howard. I agree, and yet, who or what is the "authority?" My say-so? No. Yours? It has seemed so to me at times, but not always. As the scale increases, I prefer to combine sutta, abhidhamma, and commentaries as these are closest to source. Again, perhaps this does make me a fundamentalist, at least from some definitional aspects of the term Howard: "What the roots are of one's saddha is critical, I believe." Yes, hetu - Sarah's got me into the "stacks" on that one. Later, my good man. Sorry I went on, this has been on my mind... With loving kindness, Scott. #61445 From: "Larry" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 2:21 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, An answer and a question: --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Larry (and Scott) - > > In a message dated 7/15/06 1:33:33 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... > writes: > > > L: I don't see anything about own-being here. I believe the sutta says > > consciousness is > > anatta because it is dependent, but it doesn't say why dependence is an > > indicator of > > anatta. > > ------------------------------------ > Howard: > No, it doesn't say why. What is there to say? What arises dependently > lacks self. What could be clearer? > ----------------------------------- L: Well, a reason why the dependently arisen is anatta. > > > > > The sutta goes on to discuss the search for heartwood in a plantain tree, > > similar to the > > "Lump of Foam" sutta. But this doesn't seem to have anything to do with > > dependence. If we > > say the dependence of eye, forms and eye-consciousness on one another > > defines eye- > > consciousness then I think we are clearly in the realm of concepts. If you > > say eye- > > consciousness is a concept then I agree it is empty of "own-being". "Empty > > of own-being" > > always refers to concepts. > > ----------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm not following you at all here. > ---------------------------------- L: What isn't clear? > > > > > "So too, a bhikkhu does not recognize either a self or anything belonging to > > a self in these > > six bases for contact." > > > > L: This seems to refer to a simple identity error. For example, > > consciousness is not self > > because it is consciousness. > > ---------------------------------- > Howard: > LOL! All problems solved! > -------------------------------- > > > > > In general, I would say the arguments presented in this sutta don't actually > > fit together or > > lend support to one another. But they all agree that consciousness is > > anatta. > > #61446 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 10:56 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/15/06 5:26:17 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > >------------------------------------ > >Howard: > > No, it doesn't say why. What is there to say? What arises dependently > >lacks self. What could be clearer? > >----------------------------------- > > L: Well, a reason why the dependently arisen is anatta. > > ====================== I suspect that our difference here is in our understandings of 'anatta'. I presume you mean by it merely "impersonal" - neither an agent or soul or something belonging to an agent or soul. I include all that under the term 'anatta', but more centrally I take 'anatta' to mean lacking in a core of own-being, lacking in identity, lacking of ITSELF! I take it as virtually synonymous with "dependent". To be anatta is to literally not be self, to lack identity/own-being/self-existence. Think for a second about all the things that are said to be not-self. Think about hardness as being not-self, for example, and sights, sounds, tastes, and odors. Does it surprise you in the slightest these phenomena are not yourself? That they are not "Larry"? Is there any depth to their not being self in that sense? I truly think not. But there IS depth in their lacking themselves! In lacking self-existence! No-soul is an important special case of anatta. It amounts to the conventional person lacking any core of own-being or of entity-ness. But it is not the whole of anatta. With metta, Howard #61447 From: "matheesha" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 3:05 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... matheesha333 Hi Jon, Howard > > > > >>I do not see in the Satipatthana Sutta any idea of the establishing of > > >>mindfulness as a preliminary step to insight; there is only the knowing > > >>that *is* the development of insight. > > >> > > > > > >--------------------------------------- > > >Howard: > > > I do. ... > > > > > > > I'd be interested to know what particular part(s) of the Satipatthana > > Sutta you have in mind when you say you see in it the idea of > > satipatthana as being a preliminary step to insight. M: I would say that all the phrase: "This is the one way, monks, for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, for the destruction of suffering and grief, for reaching the right path, for the attainment of Nibbana, namely, the four foundations of mindfulness" ..is sufficient in itself to say that satipattana gives rise to panna ,as without panna there is none of the above. But I can see how you could take it to mean that clear comprehension is panna in itself. So then we need to look at where it does talk of panna more clearly: "And how are the four frames of reference developed & pursued so as to bring the seven factors for Awakening to their culmination? "[1] On whatever occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself — ardent, alert, & mindful — putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world, on that occasion his mindfulness is steady & without lapse. When his mindfulness is steady & without lapse, then mindfulness as a factor for Awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. "[2] Remaining mindful in this way, he examines, analyzes, & comes to a comprehension of that quality with discernment. When he remains mindful in this way, examining, analyzing, & coming to a comprehension of that quality with discernment, then analysis of qualities as a factor for Awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. http://www.metta.lk/mirror/www.accesstoinsight/tipitaka/sn/sn54/sn54. 013.than.html M: I think the Ananda sutta above is delightful. It speaks of how mindfulness 'steady without lapse' leads to development of panna. So clear comprehension seems more about intelligent awareness, a curious awareness, rather than actually applying book knowledge to what is going on. I would go as far as to say that that defeats the purpose because then it would not be direct experiencing or direct knowledge. We would simply be applying conceptual theories that we have learnt to supplant and supplement direct awareness and learning. Buddhism is not a matter of faith. No amount of book learning can approximate direct experiencing because it will always be more or less skewed from the reality of things. "[3] On whatever occasion a monk trains himself to breathe in... &... out sensitive to the mind; trains himself to breathe in... &... out satisfying the mind; trains himself to breathe in... &... out steadying the mind; trains himself to breathe in... &... out releasing the mind: On that occasion the monk remains focused on the mind in & of itself — ardent, alert, & mindful — putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. I don't say that there is mindfulness of in-&-out breathing in one of confused mindfulness and no alertness, which is why the monk on that occasion remains focused on the mind in & of itself — ardent, alert, & mindful — putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. M: Here is another wonderful passage from the same sutta linking greed and distress, confused mindfulness and lack of being focused. When there is no focus, caught up in the matters of the world (ie- giving rise to hindrences and associated conceptual thinking) there is no mindfulness. with metta Matheesha #61448 From: "matheesha" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 3:28 pm Subject: Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. matheesha333 Hi Howard, Larry, Scott, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Larry" wrote: > > Hi Howard, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@ wrote: > > > > Hi, Scott - > > > > In a message dated 7/14/06 11:01:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > > scduncan@ writes: > > > > > ..."If the cause and condition for the arising of eye- consciousness would > > > cease completely and totally without remainder, could > > > eye-consciousness be discerned? > > > > > > "No, friend. > > > > > > "In this way, friend, this has been declared, disclosed, and revealed > > > by the Blessed One thus: For such a reason this consciousness is > > > nonself," (SN 35: 234)... > > > > > > Herman? Are you out there? > > > > > > Querulously, > > > > > > S. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ======================== > > That's an excellent quote, Scott! It shows how intimately connected is > > anatta and conditionality. Nothing whose existence is extrinsic, nothing that > > is other-dependent for its very "life", no conditioned dhamma, has own-being. > > Every conditioned dhamma is empty of self, empty of me and mine. > > As regards constructs (such as chariots), they depend on their parts > > and aspects, and on the conceptualizing that grasps them as "things" and as > > units. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > L: I don't see anything about own-being here. I believe the sutta says consciousness is > anatta because it is dependent, but it doesn't say why dependence is an indicator of > anatta. M: Dependence is an indicator of anatta, because if something were truly indpendant, it would be able to stand on its own and would not be affected if something else (the causes in this case) were withdrawn. I was struck with how much Passing away is solidly poitning towards anatta while reading the above quote. > > The sutta goes on to discuss the search for heartwood in a plantain tree, similar to the > "Lump of Foam" sutta. But this doesn't seem to have anything to do with dependence. If we > say the dependence of eye, forms and eye-consciousness on one another defines eye- > consciousness then I think we are clearly in the realm of concepts. M: anything can be a concept if we think about it. But those that you mention above can be experienced and are real (as much as they can be). with metta Matheesha #61449 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 3:42 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Matheesha, Jon, and Howard, What think you all of this: "The term 'clear comprehension' [sampaja~n~na] should be understood to mean that to the clarity of bare mindfulness is added the full comprehension of purpose and of actuality, internal and external, or, in other words: Clear comprehension is right knowledge (naa.na) or wisdom (pa~n~na), based on right attentiveness (sati)," (The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, Nyanaponika Thera, p. 46). How representative is this of the way things are? Is this saying what Matheesha notes below? M: "...satipattana gives rise to panna ,as without panna there is none of the above. But I can see how you could take it to mean that clear comprehension is panna in itself." It seems as if Matheesha is in agreement, in a way, with Nyanaponika, who seems to suggest that clear comprehension is a complex consisting of pa~n~na and sati. M: "... It speaks of how mindfulness 'steady without lapse' leads to development of panna. So clear comprehension seems more about intelligent awareness, a curious awareness, rather than actually applying book knowledge to what is going on..." What do you think? With loving kindness, Scott. #61450 From: "Andrew" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 4:07 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Scott Duncan" wrote: > Well, I do question in a way. I question what something means. I > want to learn the essence of something. I want to know what something > is as close to what was intended. I don't want to go off on flights > of fancy, relying on my own brilliant creativity to come up with some > sort of conceptual bastard of my own creation and call it Dhamma. > > This is why I choose to study Abhidhmamma since I find it > complimentary, clarificatory, defining, and very structuring of what I > learn. Suttas alone, in my opinion, are way too open to > misinterpretation. > > Do you see what I mean? Is this "fundamentalism?" Dear Scott and Howard My ten cents worth: one cannot incisively question something one doesn't understand. In some ways, one undergoes a 2 stage process: 1. studying and learning a new system, what it says, how (according to its own tenets) it "hangs together" and explains itself. When doing this, one doesn't say "what I believe is ..." but rather "what this system says is ..." 2. once a level of understanding is reached, one can then question the answers the system throws back. "The system provides this answer to Question A but I see a problem in this aspect because ..." Sometimes, somebody with a greater understanding of the system can elucidate that the perceived problem isn't really a problem. Sometimes not. These 2 stages are not necessarily strictly sequential. I gave a quote from Bh, Dhammanando the other day in which he said you should have a "wish to understand". What I believe he means is this - you should be willing to openly undertake stage 1. There is no suggestion at all that stage 2 should not be undertaken. Indeed, it MUST be. Sometimes on this list I find people who are undertaking stage 1 being characterised as unthinking fundamentalists/dogmatists. And I think that's very unfair. So, Scott, I don't see you as "fundamentalist" at all. You have a wish to understand that prepares you well to ask the difficult questions, to truly listen to and hear the answers and, if necessary, discard them. Keep it up! Best wishes Andrew #61451 From: "Andrew" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 4:17 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] An apology to Herman corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Andrew - > > In a message dated 7/15/06 2:34:15 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > athel60@... writes: > > > Hi Herman > > > > I want to apologise for saying that your post was outrageous and that I > > thought the idea was nutty. Clearly this was over the top and out of > > order and I apologise unreservedly. > > > > As Jon has said, your posts are always challenging and for the less > > patient like me, this can sometimes lead to a hasty response. > > > > Sorry if I have upset you or anyone else on the list. > > > > Best wishes > > Andrew > > > ===================== > It's always a pleasure to witness lovingkindness, compassion, and > expressed regret! :-) Sadhu! Thanks Howard Thanks also Phil and Nina for your comments. I find it instructive to reflect on what causes and conditions these little explosive akusala moments and what characterises them. It's also interesting to reflect on that feeling of regret - it can be an unwholesome inferiority-conceit (omana) thing or a wholesome hiri-ottappa thing or mixture, who can say for sure. The past has ceased to exist ... Best wishes Andrew #61452 From: "gazita2002" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:17 pm Subject: Re: a friend's question gazita2002 Hello Nina and others, this is what I wrote to Gillian. "Kamma is certainly a powerful phenomena. Its basically why u and I and every other being are here doing what ever it is we do. As wisdom and understanding of Buddhas teachings grow and develop, there is less and less unpleasant feeling and also less pleasant feeling - especially the pleasant feeling that goes along with attachments. However, the level of wisdom and understanding that conditions less attachment is actually quite highly developed. Meanwhile, 'back at the ranch' where probably u and I are at, moments of understanding that see realities as impermanent, non-self and therefore unsatisfactory, are most likely non-existent. Gillian, I speak for myself here, as I cant possibly know 'your' wisdom. At beginning stage of development, one can hear about and accept that all things are anicca, dukkha, anatta but it takes a very long time to really see the impermanence and non-selfness in any given moment, and when that is seen by wisdom then the unsatisfactoriness is also seen. Possibly there is less fun as u say, however I dont see my dhamma friends as unhappy beings - they are very friendly, helpful, kind and mostly cheerful - mind u, I dont see them every day :-) Maybe when we see 'danger' in the fun things eg. wine, parties, movies, or whatever ones fun activities include, we pull back and because these fun things are the very such things that society considers normal and in fact spends huge amounts of money on, we find that we are going against the flow rather than with it. A.Sujin gives reminders, that the noble 8 fold Path to enlightenment goes along with detachment and that to me, means not only detachment to the unpleasant but rhe pleasant as well. Gillian, I dont think this is an easy path. Very difficult and very subtle - however the thought of Samsara, the wheel of life and death, going endlessly round and round, is very frightening and very pointless IMHO ! This present moment is all there is! To develop knowledge and understanding of the arising and passing away of seeing, visible object, hearing, sound, taste, flavour, smelling, odour, body sense, tactile objects, mind and mind objects, seems like a noble thing to do because ultimately one does no longer deliberately hurt another living being -not by action, speech or thought. Thats true love, Metta, may all beings be happy," Patience, courage and good cheer, azita. --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Hi Azita, > Can you tell Gilian: ............ > why don't you encourage her to join dsg? > Would you share with us what you wrote to her? > Warmest wishes to Gillian, and also to you, > Nina. > Op 15-jul-2006, om 8:08 heeft gazita2002 het volgende geschreven: > > > A friend asks: "say you're having kamma on you and you know and you > > cant do anything but develop wisdom and detach - OK - but that doesn't > > give you a smile and fun. So you could end up being WISE -but- well > > basically unhappy." > #61453 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:02 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, H: "I suspect that our difference here is in our understandings of 'anatta'. I presume you mean by it merely "impersonal" - neither an agent or soul or something belonging to an agent or soul. I include all that under the term 'anatta', but more centrally I take 'anatta' to mean lacking in a core of own-being, lacking in identity, lacking of ITSELF! I take it as virtually synonymous with "dependent". To be anatta is to literally not be self, to lack identity/own-being/self-existence. Think for a second about all the things that are said to be not-self.. Think about hardness as being not-self, for example, and sights, sounds, tastes, and odors. Does it surprise you in the slightest these phenomena are not yourself? That they are not "Larry"? Is there any depth to their not being self in that sense? I truly think not. But there IS depth in their lacking themselves! In lacking self-existence! No-soul is an important special case of anatta. It amounts to the conventional person lacking any core of own-being or of entity-ness. But it is not the whole of anatta." L: My main objection is that I don't see this sutta saying consciousness lacks identity or is in some way not consciousness because it is dependent on eye and form. Is there some other sutta that makes that argument? In the commentarial literature "empty of own being" basically means "is not impermanent". It could be inferred that in sutta "empty of own being" means "is not an object of analytical consciousness". If consciousness is not found in analysis then surely it would not be included in the "all". To say that consciousness is not self is not the same as saying consciousness is not itself. To say that consciousness is not self simply means that whatever self is conceived to be it is not found in or as consciousness. A rupa is not a chariot because a chariot is not found with an analytical consciousness, but a rupa is. If nothing were found with an analytical consciousness then one might well question the efficacy of analytical consciousness. "Because eye-consciousness is dependent on eye and form, it is not self" must assume that self is independent. That certainly seems to be a common assumption. But I don't see how to link this with the "no heartwood" argument which basically has to do with un-findability. I find this un-findability argument to be somewhat problematic because the plantain tree and the other objects of analysis in the "Lump of Foam" sutta are compounds. Is the Buddha saying that consciousness is a compound? If so, of what? Do you agree that all compounds are concepts? Larry #61454 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 6:46 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Matheesha: "Dependence is an indicator of anatta, because if something were truly independent, it would be able to stand on its own and would not be affected if something else (the causes in this case) were withdrawn. I was struck with how much Passing away is solidly pointing towards anatta while reading the above quote." Hi Matheesha, I agree that the independence of self is implied as a wrong belief. But I don't see impermanence as being referenced in this particular sutta, although it _is_ always with us as an indicator of anatta. M: "anything can be a concept if we think about it. But those that you mention above [eye, forms, eye-consciousness] can be experienced and are real (as much as they can be)." L: What I meant was that the _combination_ of the three can only be experienced as a concept because consciousness can only have one object at a time. Any concept is empty of own-being because the concept is not found in anything ultimately experiencable. In abhidhamma technical lingo a concept is not only a word but any object of consciousness that could not be an object of ultimate analysis (pa~n~naa). For example, a chariot or a self. We can "see" a chariot without actually thinking the word "chariot", but we can't see a chariot ultimately. The same applies to any compound, including the inter-dependent compound of eye, form, and eye-consciousness. Larry #61455 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 3:55 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) upasaka_howard Hi, Andrew (and Scott) - In a message dated 7/15/06 7:20:09 PM Eastern Daylight Time, athel60@... writes: > Dear Scott and Howard > > My ten cents worth: one cannot incisively question something one > doesn't understand. In some ways, one undergoes a 2 stage process: > 1. studying and learning a new system, what it says, how (according to > its own tenets) it "hangs together" and explains itself. When doing > this, one doesn't say "what I believe is ..." but rather "what this > system says is ..." > 2. once a level of understanding is reached, one can then question the > answers the system throws back. "The system provides this answer to > Question A but I see a problem in this aspect because ..." Sometimes, > somebody with a greater understanding of the system can elucidate that > the perceived problem isn't really a problem. Sometimes not. > > These 2 stages are not necessarily strictly sequential. I gave a quote > from Bh, Dhammanando the other day in which he said you should have > a "wish to understand". What I believe he means is this - you should > be willing to openly undertake stage 1. There is no suggestion at all > that stage 2 should not be undertaken. Indeed, it MUST be. > > Sometimes on this list I find people who are undertaking stage 1 being > characterised as unthinking fundamentalists/dogmatists. And I think > that's very unfair. > > So, Scott, I don't see you as "fundamentalist" at all. You have a wish > to understand that prepares you well to ask the difficult questions, to > truly listen to and hear the answers and, if necessary, discard them. > > Keep it up! > > Best wishes > Andrew > ========================== Andrew, I think what you said in the foregoing is reasonable and is a fair (i.e., just and appropriate) assessment. With metta, Howard #61456 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 4:08 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/15/06 9:35:37 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > "Because eye-consciousness is dependent on eye and form, it is not self" > must assume that self is independent. That certainly seems to be a > common assumption. But I don't see how to link this with the "no > heartwood" argument which basically has to do with un-findability. ------------------------------------- Howard: Self really means identity/own being. The lack of core is exactly the lack of entity-ness or own being, as I see it. For something to be findable or graspable it must be something in-and-of-itself, a true entity, and not just a dependent appearance. What is "self" is independent. ------------------------------------ > > I find this un-findability argument to be somewhat problematic because > the plantain tree and the other objects of analysis in the "Lump of > Foam" sutta are compounds. Is the Buddha saying that consciousness is a > compound? If so, of what? ---------------------------------- Howard: What is translated as 'compounded' is often sankhata, and needn't mean more than conditioned (or sometimes fabricated). I don't think it always means compounded. -------------------------------- > > Do you agree that all compounds are concepts? > ----------------------------- Howard: Yes, I do. ================= With metta, Howard #61457 From: "robmoult" Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 9:00 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Translation from Pali robmoult Hi Nina, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Hi Rob M, > not every thing is clear.The construction is difficult. > Op 14-jul-2006, om 17:24 heeft robmoult het volgende geschreven: > > "Cittam cetasikam ruupam, nibbaanan ti niruttaro catudhaa desayii > dhamme, catusaccappakaasano." > > This is one of the opening verses of Buddhadatta's Abhidhammavatara. > ---- > N: citta, cetasika, rupa, nibbaana, the fourfold unsurpassing that is > taught in dhamma , the explaining (pakaasano) of four truths. > > in desayii: ay is a lengthening of e. The i could indicate passive. > Not sure. > Perhaps Steve could help. Ven. Dhammanando must have his rains retreat. > Nina. ===== FYI - I passed this Pail text to a bhikkhu friend of mine who replied: This a 4-line verse with 8 syllables per line. Need to do a bit of syntactical acrobatics to render it in proper English. "Citta, cetasika, rupa, nibbana," thus the Unsurpassed (niruttaro) One who explained the 4 Truths (catusaccappakaasano) preached (desayii) dhammas in 4 ways (catudhaa). Grammatical notes: niruttaro & catusaccappakaasano are in nominative singular desayii is in 3rd person past tense; the ending "i" is lengthened to "ii" due to metrical considerations. dhamme is in accusative plural catudhaa is in ablative singular with an instrumental sense The sentence, although versified, is in simple past tense. There is no passive construction involved. Metta, Rob M :-) #61458 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sat Jul 15, 2006 11:11 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, H: "Self really means identity/own being. The lack of core is exactly the lack of entity-ness or own being, as I see it. For something to be findable or graspable it must be something in-and-of-itself, a true entity, and not just a dependent appearance. What is "self" is independent." L: I don't think the Buddha ever meant to say consciousness is unfindable, but he did often point out that self and other such concepts are unfindable. And it seems to me that identity and own-being are opposites. Identity is a concept and own-being is an experience. The Buddha always defines emptiness (e.g. lack of heartwood) as one dhamma being empty of something else. We could say nibbana is empty of consciousness or we could say consciousness is empty of self, permanence, independence etc. I suppose if we say consciousness is empty of independence that would satisfy the "no heartwood" analogy. Also, I forgot about the Knowledge of Cause and Condition which, along with the Knowledge of the Delimitation of Nama and Rupa brings about the Purification by Overcoming Doubt. Doubt here means doubt about a creator god and questions such as 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future? and Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Whence will this being have come? Whither will it be bound? Notice that this particular knowledge doesn't seem to have anything to do with emptiness. I agree that experience is not substantial but I wouldn't say there is no experience or no correct discerning of experience. I do agree that self (and experience) is often assumed to be substantial. Monumental even. Larry #61459 From: "matheesha" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 12:56 am Subject: Re: a friend's question matheesha333 Hello Azita, > > A friend asks: "say you're having kamma on you and you know and you > cant do anything but develop wisdom and detach - OK - but that doesn't > give you a smile and fun. So you could end up being WISE -but- well > basically unhappy." Buddhist practice is multidimensional and complex. It is not a 'one size fits all' phenomena. Some will just have faith in the buddha, dhamma and sangha, another will add keeping precepts to that, another will read the dhamma, another will meditate. One will live life as a lay person, another will renounce lay life and will become a monk. What you wish to do is up to you, based on your requirements and abilities at this given moment in time. As your practice matures you will be able to undertake deeper practice. The Buddha clearly spoke of sensual pleasures that a lay person could enjoy. If you current level of practice allows you to do that, there is nothing wrong in that for a lay person. There are some suttas in which the Buddha encourages lay people to do good kamma hoping for good rebirth for example. However if you try to force a level of practice that is beyond you at the moment there can be much conflict and suffering. We take on so much based on faith. Our cravings tell us to go out and enjoy the sunshine, but our wisdom tells us it is of no use! Without having understood the problem of 'sunshine' thoroughly this conflict will naturally arise. The result is to be, like you said, wise and sad! If we try to apply book knowledge often it is not strong enough, clear enough, not REAL enough to be able to counteract our defilements which arise as reactions to what is happening around us. This is another reason why direct experiencing is required. It undermines our experiencing here and now, because that is what has been thoroughly investigated, understood and rejected as unsatisfactory. Learning it in a book is theory knowledge and wont have the same power, and the battle with the defilements like craving is truly an epic one and we need all the help we can get. If we become sad with insight, it seems certain that there has been some unbalanced development going on. The Buddha said, the higher we go up the path, the more happiness there will be. So there has to be something wrong. The suttas speak so much about tranquility, peace, equanimity, happiness. What is missing?? Try development of metta, samadhi, sila, saddha. These are wonderful qualities which will give rise to so much happiness and kusala. They will complement your development of insight and you will see how well they come together. with metta Matheesha #61460 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 1:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... How about upadana? And bhava ? jonoabb Hi Joop Good to see you back after your spell away. You have reminded me about this earlier post of yours. I did not find time to reply before you took your break. I come back to it now. Joop wrote: >Jon > >Thanks; one thing is clear now: you agree with me that clinging is >not the same as desiring because, as you say, sensuous desire is only >one of the four objects of clinging. > > I am not quite with you here. We are discussing the link *ta.nhaa* --> *upaadaana*. According to my reading of the texts, each of these Pali terms refers to certain specific dhammas. CMA gives the following information regarding *tanha* in this context (VIII, #3): <<<<<<<<<<<<<<< There are six kinds of craving: craving for forms, for sounds, for smells, for tastes, for tangibles, and for mental objects. Each of these again becomes threefold according to whether it is: - simply craving for sensual pleasure; or - craving for existence, i.e. craving conjoined with an eternalist view ('sassataditthi'); or - craving for annihilation, i.e. craving conjoined with an annihilationist view ('ucchedaditthi'). In all its varieties, craving is ultimately reducible to the cetasika greed ('lobha'). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And it gives the following information regarding *upaadaana* (VIII, #3 and VII, #7 consolidated): <<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Here clinging ('upaadaana') is of four kinds: (1) clinging to sense pleasures, kaamupaadaana (2) clinging to wrong views, di.t.thupaadaana (3) clinging to rites and ceremonies, siilabbatupaadaana (4) clinging to a doctrine of self, attavaadupaadaana Clinging to sense pleasures [the first of these 4 kinds] is intensified craving, a mode of the cetasika greed; the other three kinds of clinging are modes of the cetasika wrong view. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And it gives the following information regarding the nature of the conditioning rrelationship bbetween the two (VIII, #3): <<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Each of these types of clinging [upaadaana] is conditioned by craving [tanha]. In the first case [i.e. (1) clinging to sense pleasures (kaamupaadaana)], - weak or initial greed for an object is called craving [tanha], while - the intensified greed is called clinging [upaadaana]. In the other three cases [i.e., (2) clinging to wrong views (di.t.thupaadaana), (3) clinging to rites and ceremonies (siilabbatupaadaana), (4) clinging to a doctrine of self (attavaadupaadaana)], - the greed that conditions wrong view is called craving [tanha], while - the views that are accepted under the influence of that greed are called clinging [upaadaana]. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >That's what I stated again and again and was (to my surprise) >problematic and the reason I made message #60551. > >Unless … >You say (with Nyatiloka) that "sensuous desire" is one of the four >kinds of clinging (I prefer to say: the four "object of clinging", is >that a problem?) > > Sorry, I'm not with you here. Nyanatiloka's term for kaamupaadaana is 'clinging to sensuality'. >Perhaps the other three are also "desire" but not "sensuous desire" >What have (2) erroneous views, (3) rules and ritual and, (4) >personality-belief in common ? > They are all aspects of wrong view (Pali: miccha ditthi). Wrong view is rooted in lobha. >Psychological seen the function of this triad is: anxiety-reduction >So there is the SENSUOUS DESIRE >and the ANXIETY-REDUCTION DESIRE > >You also say that these three have something in common: "the other 3 >relates to views about the way things are"; that's more cognitive >language, I feel more at ease with psychological language but perhaps >it's the same core. > > I mentioned 'views about the way things are' as a rough paraphrase of the dhamma term wrong view (miccha ditthi). >An extra argument for that is that you are calling the other three >desire too: >"For example, through craving for heavenly rebirth, etc. people often >may be induced to cling to certain rules and rituals, with the hope >of reaching thereby the object of their desires." > That is an example given by Nyanatiloka to illustrate the nature of the relationship. >I used the term "psychological" and that's why I find the passage of >Payutto so helpful. It's modern language of people who are used to >think in psychological terms, a way of thinking and a language that >only exist a hundred year or so. > > Are there any questions for me in the preceding 4 or 5 passages from your post? >Maybe this gives new problems or misunderstandings. >I'm curious what you think of Payutto, especially chapter 5 and the >appendix of his study >( www.buddhismtoday.com/english/philosophy/thera/002-dependent.htm ) > I haven't read the article. From past experience I doubt that discussion about a third party's views would prove fruitful (there is usually difficulty in agreeing what is actually being said by the other person). However, if you'd like to adopt any passage from the article as reflecting your own view, I'd be very happy to discuss the passage on that basis. >And, because you know more about 'wrong view" than I do: how do you >see the connection between wrong view and ingorance (avijja), the >first step of DO? > > You asked this question before and I gave an answer that described each mental state, but you said that was not an answer to your question. Would you mind explaining a little more exactly what the question is? Thanks. In the meantime, I repost my earlier answer, slightly revised; Both wrong view (miccha ditthi) and ignorance (moha/avijja) are akusala mental factors. Moha is also one of the 3 roots of akusala cittas. Moha darkens the true nature of dhammas, and it accompanies each akusala citta. Miccha ditthi has a distorted view about dhammas, a wrong interpretation. It arises only with lobha-muula-citta. One clings to one's view. (See Nina' post at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/50461) Looking forward to continuing this exchange. Jon #61461 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 2:31 am Subject: Feeding Awareness ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: What is Feeding the Awareness (Sati) Link to Awakening! The Blessed Buddha once said: Bhikkhus, just as this body, is sustained by feeding, exists in dependence on feeding and cannot survive without food, exactly & even so are the Seven Links to Awakening also sustained by feeding, they can also only exist in dependence on feeding and they cannot survive without feeding... And what, bhikkhus, is the feeding of the emergence of any yet unarisen Awareness Link to Awakening and feeding of the completion by development of any already arisen Awareness Link to Awakening ??? There are states that are the basis and source for the Awareness Link to Awakening!! Frequently giving careful and rational attention to them, is feeding the arising of any unarisen Link to Awareness Link to Awakening and feeding the gradual fulfilment by development of any already arisen Awareness Link to Awakening... And what, Bhikkhus, is the starving that obstructs the emergence of any yet unarisen Awareness Link to Awakening & which also hinders any already arisen Awareness Link from reaching any fulfilment by development? There are, bhikkhus, things that are basis and source for the Awareness Link to Awakening: not giving frequent, careful & rational attention to them; not considering them much; is the starving that prevents any unarisen Awareness Link to Awakening from arising and also blocks any already arisen Awareness Link to Awakening from reaching complete fulfilment by development... Comments from the classical commentaries: Establishing continual mental presence standing near the object is the characteristic of the Awareness Link to Awakening (sati-sambojjhanga). Neither neglecting any nor forgetting anything is the function of Awareness. Remaining anchored on the object, undistracted & undisrupted, is the manifestation of the Awareness Link to Awakening. The food that are basis and source the arising of the Awareness Link to Awakening is: 1: Training of Clear Comprehension (sampajanna): http://What-Buddha-Said.net/drops/Clear_Comprehension.htm 2: Training of the Four Foundations of Awareness (satipatthana): http://What-Buddha-Said.net/library/Manual/Meditation.Manual.htm 3: Avoidance of careless, mindless & always distracted people. 4: Friendship with those endowed with acute & alert awareness. 5: Determination regarding establishing unremitting awareness. What is Right & Noble Awareness? Answer and Details at: http://What-Buddha-Said.net/drops/What_is_Right_Awareness.htm Further studies in this superb state: http://What-Buddha-Said.net/drops/Sati_Studies.htm Awareness is the state that increases when opening the eyes extra-wide! Try Now! Awareness is a crucial Universal Basis for all other advantageous states whatsoever... Awareness is all helpful and useful everywhere and anytime. Sati Saturates so Sweet! Sources (edited extracts): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V: 65-6+102-8] 46: Links. 2+51: Group & Nutriments.... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. #61462 From: "Phil" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 5:07 am Subject: Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life I. philofillet Hi Nina and all I like (of course - we like suttas, there is so much lobha) the passage that precedes the below bit about the chariot in the sutta. Mara comes to tempt the bhikkhuni, and asks ""By whom has this being been created? Where is the maker of the being? Where has the being arisen? WHere does the being cease?" He is asking speculative questions to lead the bhikkhuni of the path. But she answers beautifully: "Why now do you assume 'a being?', Mara, is that your speculative view? This is a heap of sheer formations: here no being is found." (SN 5:10) It's so very, very clear - in the Buddha's teaching, a presumption of beings, or persons (or chariots) is wrong view, wrong understanding. Of course accumulated ignorance and lobha and perverted sanna makes us forget this, but we can understand it intellectually, at least. Phil > For this has been said: . > 'As with the assembly of parts > The word "chariot" is countenanced, > So, When the khandhas are present, > 'A being' is said in common usage' > (Kindred Sayings I, 135. The five khandhas (aggregates) are nothing else but > nama and rupa. See Ch.2.) > #61463 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 1:45 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/16/06 2:11:40 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > H: "Self really means identity/own being. The lack of core is exactly > the lack of entity-ness or own being, as I see it. For something to be > findable or graspable it must be something in-and-of-itself, a true > entity, and not just a dependent appearance. What is "self" is > independent." > > L: I don't think the Buddha ever meant to say consciousness is > unfindable, but he did often point out that self and other such concepts > are unfindable. And it seems to me that identity and own-being are > opposites. Identity is a concept and own-being is an experience. The > Buddha always defines emptiness (e.g. lack of heartwood) as one dhamma > being empty of something else. We could say nibbana is empty of > consciousness or we could say consciousness is empty of self, > permanence, independence etc. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: The Buddha defined 'empty' to mean "empty of self or anything pertaining to a self". By 'self' I understand a "self-existent thing" or "self-existent core of something", a separate, independent, non-contingent existent, an entity having own being and identity ("I am") - or the alleged nature that is responsible for making a phenomenon such an entity. The principle of anatta is an outright denial of self. ---------------------------------------------- > > I suppose if we say consciousness is empty of independence that would > satisfy the "no heartwood" analogy. > > Also, I forgot about the Knowledge of Cause and Condition which, along > with the Knowledge of the Delimitation of Nama and Rupa brings about the > Purification by Overcoming Doubt. Doubt here means doubt about a creator > god and questions such as 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? > What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what > was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the > future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? > Having been what, what shall I be in the future? and Am I? Am I not? > What am I? How am I? Whence will this being have come? Whither will it > be bound? ---------------------------------------- Howard: All "I talk" expresses a belief in and sense of the self of (or a self in) the empirical person. It expresses the idea of the empirical person as, to quote "myself" (LOL!): a separate, independent, non-contingent existent, an entity having own being and identity ("I am"). ---------------------------------------- > > Notice that this particular knowledge doesn't seem to have anything to > do with emptiness. > > I agree that experience is not substantial but I wouldn't say there is > no experience or no correct discerning of experience. I do agree that > self (and experience) is often assumed to be substantial. Monumental > even. > > Larry > ======================== With metta, Howard #61464 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 6:21 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Hello* jonoabb Hi Herman Herman Hofman wrote: >Given my post of a minute or ten ago, I would disallow your entire >take on the Satipatthana Sutta. For instance, how does the fake >category "kusala" of umpteen years later figure in it? > Your reference to kusala as a 'fake category of umpteen years later' is a new one for me. Would you mind saying a little more about it? Thanks. >It is a gross distortion of the Satipatthana Sutta to render it as a >discussion of generalities compiled by a dead tradition, when it is, >in fact, about the only events that ever happen, specific ones. Here >and now. And when the here and now is rightly seen, it too disappears. > > What I said regarding the Satipatthana Sutta was: > Secondly, in the Satipatthana Sutta it mentions, in the section on > mindfulness of the body, mindfulness while going about all personal > activities and, in the section on mindfulness of the mind, knowing mind > with akusala as mind with akusala. I set out below the particular passages I had in mind. A. From the section on mindfulness of the body: "And further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, in going forwards (and) in going backwards, is a person practising clear comprehension; in looking straight on (and) in looking away from the front, ... in bending and in stretching, ... in wearing the shoulder-cloak, the (other two) robes (and) the bowl, ... in regard to what is eaten, drunk, chewed and savored, ... in defecating and in urinating, ... in walking, in standing (in a place), in sitting (in some position), in sleeping, in waking, in speaking and in keeping silence, is a person practicing clear comprehension. What is the problem you have with my characterisation of this as 'mindfulness while going about all personal activities'? B. From the section on mindfulness of the mind: "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust, as with lust; ... the consciousness with hate, as with hate; ... the consciousness with ignorance, as with ignorance; ... the shrunken state of consciousness, as the shrunken state; ... the distracted state of consciousness, as the distracted state; ... What is the problem you have with my characterisation of this as 'knowing mind with aksuala as mind with akusala' (even is akusala is a 'later category')? Finally, in terms of the topic under discussion, namely whether a non-active mind is a prerequisite for the development of insight (which I understand to be your position), do you have any substantive comment to make on these passages? >IMRAO >(in my reasonably >arrogant opinion :-)) > Love the arrogance, but would like to see a bit more reason !! ;-)) Jon #61465 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 6:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa jonoabb Hi Herman Herman Hofman wrote: >I think your statements here fairly well capture the whole ethos that >pits what the Buddha said from time to time, against "the teachings". > >I don't attribute any evil motives to the tradition makers, but I see >clearly that they have been unaware of their distorting influence. > > That is an interesting view, but I won't ask for specifics just now (I don't think any purpose would be served by such a side-track ;-)) >The very notion that specific spoken words of the Buddha need to be >read in conjunction with all his other spoken words is entirely >symptomatic of tradition-making. What is happening in this process is >that words, spoken as being entirely sufficient for the occasion in >which they were uttered, become portrayed as originating from their >future being assembled together. This is a misrepresentation of the >past. > Unless the Buddha had invited us to do just that ;-)). And to my reading, that is indeed the case. In one sutta after another the Buddha mentions the value of repeated listening to the teachings, asking questions about what was not clear, discussing what had been heard, and reflecting on what had been understood. To then say that each sutta should be read in isolation without reference to any other sutta seems contradictory to that approach. >Each Sutta is a self-sufficient statement, aimed at a specifc audiece, >in a specific context. I do not know of any Suttas that refer the >audience to other spoken utterances so that the present one may be >understood. > There are passages in suttas that read: 'For have I not said on many occasions that ...'. So I think there are suttas that refer the audience to other spoken utterances so that the present one may be understood. >I see no requirement or direction or implicit >understanding in any Sutta that the Buddha was guaranteed of the same >audience from one Sutta to the next. > No requirement, of course, but we know that many of his followers were present at multiple discourses. And as mentioned above, followers were encouraged to hear more. >The ability to cross-reference texts is a luxury afforded all of us >today, but no-one in the days when they were spoken. Taking a Sutta >outside of its own context is to distort it, IMRAO (in my reasonably >arrogant opinion :-)). > But spiritedly (and excellently) put as usual, Herman. On a point of fact, however, I believe your assertion about lack of cross-referencing during the time of the Buddha is not correct. There are references in the texts to the suttas being memorised and repeated among the monks and lay-followers (their powers of memory were far superior to ours), and we can safely assume that different suttas were compared. Your (well-intentioned but distorting) traditionalist friend, Jon #61466 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 6:23 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Hello* jonoabb Hi Mateesha matheesha wrote: >Hi Jon, > >I think your discussion with Herman links into our disucussion on >samadhi and panna. > Agreed! >M: These are factors for becoming a sotapanna, and panna is one >(main) component of that state. Your definition of 'practice in >accordance with the dhamma' probably does not include calming the >mind, but most buddhists would see it that way. > > Well I certainly regard samatha ('tranquillity', which I think is what you mean by 'calming the mind') as something highly recommended by the Buddha. But samatha ('tranquillity') is not the same as samadhi ('concentration'). Samadhi is a factor that plays an important role in both vipassana bhavana and samatha bhavana. As I see it, the development of insight can begin at any time, and it brings with it the development of the samadhi (concentration) that supports that insight, so that by the time enlightenment is attained the accompanying samadhi is said to be of the intensity of jhana (a similar kind of thing happens with the development of samatha). The problem for me with the idea of mundane samatha (tranquillity) as a necessary prerequisite for the development of insight (which I think is what you are implying here) is that it seems to mean that there cannot be even weak moments of insight until jhana has been attained. I see no basis for this at all in the texts. Have I misunderstood your position on this? >>Secondly, in the Satipatthana Sutta it mentions, in the section on >>mindfulness of the body, mindfulness while going about all personal >>activities and, in the section on mindfulness of the mind, knowing >>mind with akusala as mind with akusala. >> >> > >M: Yes, exactly. If the mind was full of conceptual thinking, >frantically active with thought, there would be no mindfulness, no >sati, no insight into phenomena could arise. Sati requires a calm >mind, is supported by samadhi, (gives rise to samadhi as well). > > Here is the passage in question: "And further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, in going forwards (and) in going backwards, is a person practising clear comprehension; in looking straight on (and) in looking away from the front, ... in bending and in stretching, ... in wearing the shoulder-cloak, the (other two) robes (and) the bowl, ... in regard to what is eaten, drunk, chewed and savored, ... in defecating and in urinating, ... in walking, in standing (in a place), in sitting (in some position), in sleeping, in waking, in speaking and in keeping silence, is a person practicing clear comprehension. I think what you are saying is that 'practising clear comprehension' must involve banishing all conceptual thinking. Have I understood your remarks correctly? I do not see that actually stated anywhere in the sutta. Do you find support for that interpretation in other suttas (or the commentary)? You say that sati requires a 'calm mind'. I'm not sure if this is a reference to samatha (tranquillity) or samadhi (concentration). The term 'samadhi' does not mean a 'calm mind'. >>Thirdly, the dhammas to be known as forming part of 'the all' (SN >>again) are dhammas such as the seeing consciousness now arising, >>the visible object now arising, mind-states now arising. >> > >M: Well then we could all read a book on abhidhamma and have direct >insight by just being simply being awake and experiencing. But that >doesnt happen. You might say more (sutamaya) panna is required, I say >the mind is too active and need to cultivate sati and samadhi. > I was referring to the words of the sutta, without drawing on the Abhidhamma. Here is the passage from SN 35:27 (p. 1141 of CDB): “Bhikkhus, without directly knowing and fully understanding the all, without developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying suffering. “And what, bhikkhus, is the all...? “The eye and forms and eye-consciousness and things to be cognized by eye-consciousness. The ear and sounds and ear-consciousness and things to be cognized by ear-consciousness….” You imply that an active mind is inimical to the arising of panna, and that 'direct knowing and full understanding' can only occur when the mind is calmed by the development of mundane samatha. But again we must ask whether this is actually said in the suttas. My point was that there is no reference to any such prerequisite in this particular sutta. Of course no-one is saying that direct knowing and fully understanding is a matter of 'just simply being awake and experiencing'. But that doesn't mean it has anything to do with a non-active mind, either. >M: Satipattana sutta talks of being mindful of craving, aversion etc. >Yet the gradual path of the Buddhas teaching clearly talks of much >preparation of the mind before starting satipattana practice. > Well this is the crux of the matter. I'd be interested to know which particular references in the suttas talk of 'much preparation of the mind before starting satipatthana practice'. I hope you don't mind if I snip the rest of your post for now (as usual you have packed a lot into your reply). Jon #61467 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 3:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa upasaka_howard Hi, Jon (and Herman) - In a message dated 7/16/06 9:25:28 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > Hi Herman > > Herman Hofman wrote: > > >I think your statements here fairly well capture the whole ethos that > >pits what the Buddha said from time to time, against "the teachings". > > > >I don't attribute any evil motives to the tradition makers, but I see > >clearly that they have been unaware of their distorting influence. > > > > > > That is an interesting view, but I won't ask for specifics just now (I > don't think any purpose would be served by such a side-track ;-)) > > ======================== Jon, I think that what you wrote here was reasonable and quite moderate. I have to laugh at myself: I remind myself of a man in an old Jewish tale repeated in Fiddler on the Roof, an observer of an argument between two men expressing apparently totally opposite opinions. When the first "contender" had finished stating his opinion, the man smiled and said "You're right." Then the second discussant gave his counter-argument, and the observer said "You know, boychik? You're also right!" Another bystander chimed in then, and asked "Hey! You said he's right, but then you said the other one is also right! They can't both be right!" And the observer, turning to the bystander, and with eyebrows raised, agreed "You're right too!!" ;-)) Actually, the Chinese Hua Yen Buddhists (and Japanese Kegon Buddhists) who take primary sustenance from the Avatamsaka Sutra call that way of seeing "The round view". It amounts to seeing all sides of an issue (and all aspects of phenomena). Often that is "enlightening", but sometimes it is paralyzing! ;-)) With metta, Howard #61468 From: Ken O Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 8:27 am Subject: Re: [dsg] a friend's question ashkenn2k Hi Nina and Azita To me this is very common. When I first learn Buddhism, I was thinking this doctrine is very negative, every time talk about suffering. It take a while to dawn on me that Buddha is like a doctor. prescribe medicine to eradicate the cause of suffering. It is through this eradication, real happiness arise. A few quotes Because untainted happiness is the higher :-) AN II Vii Selected <> AN X 65 extract <> one who have wisdom slept well AN III, 34 < Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 9:20 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, "Own being" is a technical term meaning an authentic experience such as the experience of hardness. If that is not what you mean by that term you shouldn't use it. Larry --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Larry - > > In a message dated 7/16/06 2:11:40 AM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... > writes: > > > Hi Howard, > > > > H: "Self really means identity/own being. The lack of core is exactly > > the lack of entity-ness or own being, as I see it. For something to be > > findable or graspable it must be something in-and-of-itself, a true > > entity, and not just a dependent appearance. What is "self" is > > independent." > > > > L: I don't think the Buddha ever meant to say consciousness is > > unfindable, but he did often point out that self and other such concepts > > are unfindable. And it seems to me that identity and own-being are > > opposites. Identity is a concept and own-being is an experience. The > > Buddha always defines emptiness (e.g. lack of heartwood) as one dhamma > > being empty of something else. We could say nibbana is empty of > > consciousness or we could say consciousness is empty of self, > > permanence, independence etc. > > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > The Buddha defined 'empty' to mean "empty of self or anything > pertaining to a self". By 'self' I understand a "self-existent thing" or > "self-existent core of something", a separate, independent, non-contingent existent, an > entity having own being and identity ("I am") - or the alleged nature that is > responsible for making a phenomenon such an entity. > The principle of anatta is an outright denial of self. > ---------------------------------------------- > > > > > I suppose if we say consciousness is empty of independence that would > > satisfy the "no heartwood" analogy. > > > > Also, I forgot about the Knowledge of Cause and Condition which, along > > with the Knowledge of the Delimitation of Nama and Rupa brings about the > > Purification by Overcoming Doubt. Doubt here means doubt about a creator > > god and questions such as 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? > > What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what > > was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the > > future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? > > Having been what, what shall I be in the future? and Am I? Am I not? > > What am I? How am I? Whence will this being have come? Whither will it > > be bound? > > ---------------------------------------- > Howard: > All "I talk" expresses a belief in and sense of the self of (or a self > in) the empirical person. It expresses the idea of the empirical person as, > to quote "myself" (LOL!): a separate, independent, non-contingent existent, an > entity having own being and identity ("I am"). > ---------------------------------------- > > > > Notice that this particular knowledge doesn't seem to have anything to > > do with emptiness. > > > > I agree that experience is not substantial but I wouldn't say there is > > no experience or no correct discerning of experience. I do agree that > > self (and experience) is often assumed to be substantial. Monumental > > even. > > > > Larry > > > ======================== > With metta, > Howard > #61470 From: "Larry" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 9:37 am Subject: Re: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 89 and Tiika. lbidd2 Hi Nina, N: "As to vipåka-condition, citta and its accompanying cetasikas which are vipåka condition one another by being vipåka. The realities involved in vipåka-condition are phenomena which are conascent, arising at the same time. They assist one another "by effortless quiet''." L: This refers to the conditioning of resultant feeling and the other resultant cetasikas by resultant consciousnesses and vice versa, correct? I wouldn't refer to resultant consciousness _itself_ as effortless quiet. It seems to me that all the resultant consciousnesses perform their functions in a very energetic and active way. What do you think, is listening an effortless activity? Larry #61471 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 9:48 am Subject: Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" buddhatrue Hi Azita, Thank you so much for your e-mail! I really found it heart-felt and profound. Actually, some of the subjects you introduced, in the way you introduced them, require me to be a bit more circumspect in my response. So, I am going to give your post a bit of time to burn on the back burner of my mind- and then I will respond. I hope you understand my delay in responding. However, I want to thank you for responding to me though this is a difficult subject here in DSG. I wrote to two others and they blew me off rather than respond like you have done, and that is their issue. I am happy that you reached out to me and I will give your post the consideration it deserves. Please wait till I fight the demons in my own mind....:-)))). Metta, James --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "gazita2002" wrote: > > Hello James, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "buddhatrue" > wrote: > > > > Hi Azita, > > > > Nice to hear from you. I would imagine that you are somewhere on > > this audio tape but I'm not sure if I have heard you yet. (The > > presentation is quite professional with Jon's introductions and > > Indian music interludes. Kudos to Jon!) > > azita: I've made comment on the musical interludes also. I really > like them #61472 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 10:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bored and Lonely buddhatrue Hi Sarah and Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > Hi Howard (& James), > > I thought this was a kind note and I agree with your practical comments > and that contact is important and part of our daily life. It's like family > - we often disagree, but the answer isn't to cut contact. James: Yes, I agree with you also. I wrote to Howard off-list about his post, in the same veign as you Sarah-- because I didn't want to cause any problems to the list. Howard is just such a sweetheart! > > We should remember that the real meaning of seclusion is that of a mental > state, rather than a physical state. (More in U.P. under 'Lonely'). I was > glad to see James' post and discussions recently inc. comments on the > audio too. James: Yes, loneliness is the great unspoken secret of us all!!!!! And I dared to speak about it (big deal). We should all examine our loneliness and determine when it is conditioned from outside or from inside, as you suggest Sarah. God, couldn't someone make this easier??? ;-)) > > I've also appreciated your (and Nina's) encouraging posts to newcomers and > also to oldcomers:-), as well as your friendly assistance when anyone goes > a tad 'over-the-top'. Just as when we're physically with other people, > there can be kindness, consideration and generosity on the internet too, > as you appreciate:-). James: Yes, Howard is a great mediator and inspiration. However, he isn't a lackeye for your group. Howard is a beautiful individual in his own right- belonging to no one and to nothing. > > Meanwhile, we're greatly looking forward to meeting James soon in Hong > Kong. James: Yes, I am greatly looking forward to meeting you and Jon also. Really, I don't want to debate dhamma when we meet; I just want to meet you both. I want to tell you both, face-to-face, how thankful I am for all the kindness you have both shown me. I know that I can be a handful at times (at most times ;-). But you both have been the only ones to show me kindness and consideration through it all. You are both obviously doing something right!! I have wanted for a long time to meet you and now I am getting my chance. I thank kamma for that. > > Metta, > > Sarah Metta, james #61473 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 10:37 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bored and Lonely buddhatrue Hi S and H, There is a typo here: --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "buddhatrue" wrote: However, he > isn't a lackeye for your group. Howard is a beautiful individual in > his own right- belonging to no one and to nothing. "lackeye" here is supposed to be "lackey": http://dictionary.reference.com/search?r=2&q=lackey Metta, James #61474 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 11:08 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life 25 nilovg Dear friends, The Atthasåliní (Book I, Part I, chapter I, 39) states about akusala: ``A-kusala means ``not kusala''. Just as the opposite to friendship is enmity, or the opposite to greed, etc. is disinterestedness, etc., so ``akusala'' is opposed to ``kusala''... Unwholesome deeds will bring unhappy results. Nobody wishes to experience an unhappy result, but many people are ignorant about the cause which brings an unhappy result, about akusala. They do not realize when the citta is unwholesome, and they do not always know it when they perform unwholesome deeds. When we study the Abhidhamma we learn that there are three groups of akusala cittas. They are: Lobha-muula-cittas, or cittas rooted in attachment (lobha) Dosa-muula-cittas, or cittas rooted in aversion (dosa) Moha-muula-cittas, or cittas rooted in ignorance (moha) Moha (ignorance) arises with every akusala citta. Akusala cittas rooted in lobha (attachment) actually have two roots: moha and lobha. They are named ``lobha-muula-cittas'', because there is not only moha, which arises with every akusala citta, but lobha as well. Lobha- muula-cittas are thus named after the root which is lobha. Akusala cittas rooted in dosa (aversion) have two roots as well: moha and dosa. They are named ``dosa-muula-cittas'' after the root which is dosa. Akusala cittas rooted in moha (ignorance), have only one root which is moha. Each of these three classes of akusala cittas includes again different types of akusala citta and thus we see that there is a great variety of cittas. Now I shall deal first with lobha-muula-citta. Lobha is the paramattha dhamma (absolute reality) which is cetasika (mental factor arising with the citta); it is a reality and thus it can be experienced. Lobha is ``clinging'' or ``attachment''. The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 162) states: ...lobha has the characteristic of grasping an object, like birdlime (lit. ``monkey lime''). Its function is sticking, like meat put in a hot pan. It is manifested as not giving up, like the dye of lampblack. Its proximate cause is seeing enjoyment in things that lead to bondage. Swelling with the current of craving, it should be regarded as taking (beings) with it to states of loss, as a swift- flowing river does to the great ocean. ****** Nina. #61475 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 11:14 am Subject: Letters from Nina. 7. nilovg Second Letter from Tokyo, 20 April '71. Dear Friend, I will repeat your question: 'There is awareness, but not often of characteristics of nama and rupa. How can I get to know directly characteristics of realities?' Is there seeing now? It has a characteristic which can be directly experienced. It is a type of nama, not self. It is a reality which experiences visible object through the eye-door. Is there hearing now? It has a characteristic. Is there pain now? It has a characteristic. Is there dosa now? It has a characteristic. Is there softness now? It has a characteristic. Is there heat now? It has a characteristic. A characteristic of nama or rupa is not something besides that which can be experienced now, at this moment. All realities which appear have different characteristics and they can be experienced one at a time. Seeing is nama, visible object is rupa; they have different characteristics. You wrote that you cannot experience the difference between seeing and thinking about what was seen. You may think that at the moment of seeing there is also thinking about the object you see. When we pay attention to the shape and form of something such as a chair, or a person, there is thinking. But are there not also moments of just experiencing what appears through the eyes? There is not all the time thinking or defining what something is. Of course, in the beginning we cannot yet know realities as they are, but can their characteristics not be experienced now and then? There are different degrees of knowing characteristics of nama and rupa and when paññaa has been developed more, they will be known more clearly. ******* Nina. #61476 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 7:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/16/06 12:37:10 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > "Own being" is a technical term meaning an authentic experience such as the > experience > of hardness. If that is not what you mean by that term you shouldn't use it. > > Larry > =================== On what stone is that definition engraved? I have always understood 'own being' to mean independent existence, intrinsic existence, inherent existence, or self-existence. Your stated meaning for the term strikes me as wildly off the mark. It is *not* what I mean, it is *not* the meaning I have seen held by others, and, in any case, I will use a term as I will use it - not as I am told to use it. I must say, that last sentence of yours surprises me and disappoints me. With metta, Howard #61477 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 7:34 am Subject: To Larry: An Olive Branch upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - I don't know how it has happened that disagreements on minor matters of theory has led to inor disagreeableness of posting between us. I think we'd be far better off scuttling theory discussions and salvaging metta than the opposite. Don't you? In any case, I apologize for my part in any acrimonious posting. I value our friendship of long standing. With metta, Howard #61478 From: "Larry" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 11:43 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, I am taking "own being" as a translation of "sabhava" and the meaning of that word by those who invented it is basically "authentic experience". The meaning you are using is from madhyamika. We can discuss that if you want but that seems to me to be venturing rather far afield. I would venture to say that in both meanings "no own being" refers only to concepts. Of course you can use any word you want. It's just difficult to understand what you mean. I know you don't mean there is no experience. Why not drop it altogether since that specific idea isn't found in sutta? Larry --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Larry - > > In a message dated 7/16/06 12:37:10 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... > writes: > > > Hi Howard, > > > > "Own being" is a technical term meaning an authentic experience such as the > > experience > > of hardness. If that is not what you mean by that term you shouldn't use it. > > > > Larry > > > =================== > On what stone is that definition engraved? I have always understood > 'own being' to mean independent existence, intrinsic existence, inherent > existence, or self-existence. Your stated meaning for the term strikes me as wildly > off the mark. It is *not* what I mean, it is *not* the meaning I have seen held > by others, and, in any case, I will use a term as I will use it - not as I am > told to use it. I must say, that last sentence of yours surprises me and > disappoints me. > #61479 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 8:14 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/16/06 2:53:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > I am taking "own being" as a translation of "sabhava" and the meaning of > that word by > those who invented it is basically "authentic experience". > The meaning you are using is > > from madhyamika. We can discuss that if you want but that seems to me to be > venturing > rather far afield. I would venture to say that in both meanings "no own > being" refers only > to concepts. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Actually, I wasn't thinking about the Pali at all, but just speaking in English. By 'own being' I meant what would naturally be meant by a native speaker of the language who was philosophically inclined. As to 'sabhava' in Theravada, I understand that it has the same meaning there as 'lakkhana'. But, as I say, I wasn't speaking Pali. I understand that you thought I was forcing the meaning of "own being" on 'sabhava', but I wasn't doing that. I said "own being" because that was what I was talking about, not the 'sabhava' of Theravada. So, the bottom line is that there was a miscommunication between us. --------------------------------------- > > Of course you can use any word you want. It's just difficult to understand > what you mean. I > know you don't mean there is no experience. Why not drop it altogether > since that > specific idea isn't found in sutta? --------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, the notion of "own being" is found in the suttas. It is "atta", it is "self". And own being is exactly what no dhamma has. That is what I understand 'Sabbe dhamma anatta' to mean. ------------------------------------- > > Larry > ================= With metta, Howard #61480 From: "Larry" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 2:09 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, H: "Yes, the notion of "own being" is found in the suttas. It is "atta", it is "self". And own being is exactly what no dhamma has. That is what I understand 'Sabbe dhamma anatta' to mean." L:: Okay, but I still don't understand. What does it mean to you to say the experience of hardness has no own being? The most common notion of anatta that I know of refers to impermanence. I take it you mean something other than that. Larry #61481 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 10:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/16/06 5:19:32 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > L:: Okay, but I still don't understand. What does it mean to you to say the > experience of > hardness has no own being? The most common notion of anatta that I know of > refers to > impermanence. I take it you mean something other than that. > =================== If anatta were nothing more than impermanence, then there would be no need for the idea of anatta. Moreover, nibbana would be atta!! The experience of hardness hasn't own being, and also the hardness experienced hasn't own being, because he hardness and the knowing of it are each dependently originated. Each is conditioned, each is contingent, each fails to be self-existent. Nibbana is something else entirely. Not only is it not self-existent, but in fact is not existent in any sense, nor is it nothing at all - it is, in fact, beyond all conditions and beyond all description. To say anything at all about nibbana is already to speak falsely. The best we can do is "point". With metta, Howard #61482 From: "matheesha" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 3:52 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Hello* matheesha333 Hi Jon, > Well I certainly regard samatha ('tranquillity', which I think is what > you mean by 'calming the mind') as something highly recommended by the > Buddha. But samatha ('tranquillity') is not the same as samadhi > ('concentration'). Samadhi is a factor that plays an important role in > both vipassana bhavana and samatha bhavana. > M: I agree. > As I see it, the development of insight can begin at any time,... M; Certainly. Panna, as one of the 3 trainings, is vast in meaning. and it > brings with it the development of the samadhi (concentration) that > supports that insight, so that by the time enlightenment is attained the > accompanying samadhi is said to be of the intensity of jhana (a similar > kind of thing happens with the development of samatha). M: :), yes that would happen in that snapshot view. But what is NOT described is the process which lead up to that. The snapshot views of abhidhamma can be powerful descriptions, but does not seem to be the full story, for who can suddenly give rise to a jhanic level of samadhi complete with fetter destroying panna? I think from experience you will know that it is incredibly difficult. I know from experience that there are other ways of giving rise to panna from direct experiencing, but you might not accept that as evidence in this court. :) > The problem for me with the idea of mundane samatha (tranquillity) as a > necessary prerequisite for the development of insight (which I think is > what you are implying here) is that it seems to mean that there cannot > be even weak moments of insight until jhana has been attained. I see no > basis for this at all in the texts. Have I misunderstood your position > on this? > M: I remember you quoting that sutta where the buddha says jhana is only required for the anagami stage and partial development of samadhi is adequate for the sotapanna stage. The foundations of insight are laid at this stage. So the idea that jhana is essential for panna, I dont believe. That it is incredibly helpful for it- I do. I understand that this is in conflict with abhidhammic understanding? The suttas dont talk of two types of samadhi, that belonging to samatha and other to vipassana, it just talks of one. The difference in these two is not the character of samadhi (even though intensities differ) but how sati/mindfulness is wielded, to experience only one object (samatha) or many (vipassana). > >>Secondly, in the Satipatthana Sutta it mentions, in the section on > >>mindfulness of the body, mindfulness while going about all personal > >>activities and, in the section on mindfulness of the mind, knowing > >>mind with akusala as mind with akusala. > >> > >> > > > >M: Yes, exactly. If the mind was full of conceptual thinking, > >frantically active with thought, there would be no mindfulness, no > >sati, no insight into phenomena could arise. Sati requires a calm > >mind, is supported by samadhi, (gives rise to samadhi as well). > > > > > > Here is the passage in question: > > "And further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, in going forwards (and) in going backwards, > is a person practising clear comprehension; > in looking straight on (and) in looking away from the front, ... > in bending and in stretching, ... > in wearing the shoulder-cloak, the (other two) robes (and) the bowl, ... > in regard to what is eaten, drunk, chewed and savored, ... > in defecating and in urinating, ... > in walking, in standing (in a place), in sitting (in some position), in > sleeping, in waking, in speaking and in keeping silence, > is a person practicing clear comprehension. > > > I think what you are saying is that 'practising clear comprehension' > must involve banishing all conceptual thinking. Have I understood your > remarks correctly? I do not see that actually stated anywhere in the > sutta. Do you find support for that interpretation in other suttas (or > the commentary)? > M: Jon, how many times have you been aware of everything you were doing, as this monk in the sutta was? What is the difference - it is papanca. Strings and strings of thought that we normally have. I feel quite handicapped, not to be able to refer to direct experience, and many meditators here will know exactly what I mean, when I say thoughts arent conducive to mindfulness. I guess I use this to understand the suttas, like you use the abhidhamma. Lets try quoting again :) "And how are the four frames of reference developed & pursued so as to bring the seven factors for Awakening to their culmination? "[1] On whatever occasion the monk remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world, on that occasion his mindfulness is steady & without lapse. When his mindfulness is steady & without lapse, then mindfulness as a factor for Awakening becomes aroused. He develops it, and for him it goes to the culmination of its development. "[2] Remaining mindful in this way, he examines, analyzes, & comes to a comprehension of that quality with discernment. M: 'Mindfulness is steady without lapse' - what is that? There are no disturbing thoughts. What does it mean to have mutta-sati? There is confusion. OK, I agree it doesnt say it directly. But that is the clearest inference. He is mindful putting aside 'greed and distress with reference to the world' - these are papanca, thoughts about the world. He analyses what he has experienced directly through mindfulness. Now, you asked whether it is required to put away ALL conceptual thinking. No, because that is possible only in a jhana :) and because of the intense one-pointedness, not the best place to give rise to panna. However rising from the jhana, that samadhi can be harnessed, because the mind is relatively quiet immdediately afterwards. > You say that sati requires a 'calm mind'. I'm not sure if this is a > reference to samatha (tranquillity) or samadhi (concentration). The term > 'samadhi' does not mean a 'calm mind'. > "Friend Visàkha, one pointedness of mind is concentration". M: When there is one-pointedness of mind (citta ekaggata) there is samadhi. Again dipping into the practical. To be one pointed as opposed to distracted, is to have a calm mind, which gives rise to little papanca. > >>Thirdly, the dhammas to be known as forming part of 'the all' (SN > >>again) are dhammas such as the seeing consciousness now arising, > >>the visible object now arising, mind-states now arising. > >> > > > >M: Well then we could all read a book on abhidhamma and have direct > >insight by just being simply being awake and experiencing. But that > >doesnt happen. You might say more (sutamaya) panna is required, I say > >the mind is too active and need to cultivate sati and samadhi. > > > > I was referring to the words of the sutta, without drawing on the > Abhidhamma. Here is the passage from SN 35:27 (p. 1141 of CDB): > "Bhikkhus, without directly knowing and fully understanding the all, > without developing dispassion towards it and abandoning it, one is > incapable of destroying suffering. > "And what, bhikkhus, is the all...? > "The eye and forms and eye-consciousness and things to be cognized by > eye-consciousness. The ear and sounds and ear-consciousness and things > to be cognized by ear-consciousness…." > > You imply that an active mind is inimical to the arising of panna, and > that 'direct knowing and full understanding' can only occur when the > mind is calmed by the development of mundane samatha. But again we must > ask whether this is actually said in the suttas. My point was that there > is no reference to any such prerequisite in this particular sutta. > M: The suttas clearly talk of samadhi leading to panna. I have quoted a few suttas including Mahacattasarika. I think the point is that the suttas only talk of samadhi and there is no division into mundane or supramundane. If we think of it, for a moment, purely as one-pointedness, without any complication, all the problems drop away. The Bodhisattva remembered his jhana experience in the cradle and that is the path he used to lead to panna. > Of course no-one is saying that direct knowing and fully understanding > is a matter of 'just simply being awake and experiencing'. But that > doesn't mean it has anything to do with a non-active mind, either. > M: Agreed. It depends on the degree of non action - if completely absorbed into an object of meditation, it is very difficult to give rise to panna. If a person is excited about something (caught up in the world with papanca) it is also very difficult. It can only happen when the mind is constanlty mindful and clearly comprehending. This requires a one-pointedness of some degree, more than the 'day to day' levels. > >M: Satipattana sutta talks of being mindful of craving, aversion etc. > >Yet the gradual path of the Buddhas teaching clearly talks of much > >preparation of the mind before starting satipattana practice. > > > > Well this is the crux of the matter. I'd be interested to know which > particular references in the suttas talk of 'much preparation of the > mind before starting satipatthana practice'. M: http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima- Nikaya/Majjhima3/107-ganakamoggallana-e2.html There is morality, sense restraint, moderation in eating and vigilence according to the Gradual training of the buddhas, in the above sutta. It also mentions 'clearing the mind of obstructing things'. Then the satipattana sutta also talks of being away from greed and distress with reference to the world. It talks of continued mindfulness which is not normally possible, but is possible under certain conditions. The sutta also speaks of seclusion before practice. You might insist that this is only for anapanasati but even that meditation fulfils satipattaana practice. with much metta Matheesha #61483 From: "Larry" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 4:05 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, Okay, dependently arisen dhammas have no own being because they are dependent. That could still refer to impermanence, so I'm still not sure what that means. If you said a chariot has no own being I would take that to mean that chariotness could not be found in the collection of parts we call a chariot. I take it you don't mean that. If you mean there is no eye consciousness without an eye, that is all very well, but there is still eye consciousness (with an eye) from time to time, isn't there? Can't eye consciousness be found at that time with straight forward satipatthana? What about a chariot? Can a chariot be found when all its parts are present? Or does "no own being" simply refer to dependence? That would cover both consciousness and chariot, but it wouldn't distinguish between the two. Is it important to distinguish between consciousness and a chariot as experience and non-experience, or not? Larry --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Larry - > > In a message dated 7/16/06 5:19:32 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... > writes: > > > L:: Okay, but I still don't understand. What does it mean to you to say the > > experience of > > hardness has no own being? The most common notion of anatta that I know of > > refers to > > impermanence. I take it you mean something other than that. > > > =================== > If anatta were nothing more than impermanence, then there would be no > need for the idea of anatta. Moreover, nibbana would be atta!! > The experience of hardness hasn't own being, and also the hardness > experienced hasn't own being, because he hardness and the knowing of it are each > dependently originated. Each is conditioned, each is contingent, each fails > to be self-existent. > Nibbana is something else entirely. Not only is it not self-existent, > but in fact is not existent in any sense, nor is it nothing at all - it is, in > fact, beyond all conditions and beyond all description. To say anything at > all about nibbana is already to speak falsely. The best we can do is "point". > #61484 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 4:40 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling egberdina Hi Ken, On 14/07/06, ken_aitch wrote: > > > It's a deal, although I think we have different understandings of > "dependency" and "ultiamcy." To me, dependency (the doctrine of > dependent origination) tells us how dhammas roll on without being > controlled by anyone. Every dhamma conditions, and is conditioned by, > other dhammas. > > Ultimacy (your word for the doctrine of ultimate reality) reminds us > whenever there seems to be a controlling entity there are really > (ultimately) only dhammas - rolling on by conditions. > > You have asked me to explain how the two live together and I have > answered by saying they are the same. I hope you don't think I am > dodging the question. > Compliments to the chef, an ingenious solution. > Now it's your turn. Please explain how anatta means no soul - as > distinct from no self. We all know the famous line from the relevant sutta. "And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am?" It's a sort of begging the question definition of anatta. Of course only what is constant, pleasant, and not subject to change is worthy of the definiton of being a soul. And there is nothing like that to be found, as the monks are often asked to confirm. What instead is to be found? Beings, who lack ultimate control over their being, in that they can not have permament happiness, they can not stave of change and decay. And what is the nature of their being? "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Radha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a being. Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling... perception... fabrications...Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for consciousness, Radha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a being." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn23/sn23.002.than.html In a word, craving. Craving and being are synonymous. Further in the same samyutta, it speaks of who is entitled to say there is no being. "Ràdha, what is the realization? Ràdha, the destruction of craving, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion is the realization. Ràdha, who is the person who has realized? The reply is the worthy one. It is the venerable one of this name and clan" Do you notice the specific identification of who it is that isn't? That is the being that has extinguised craving. He is the one that practiced for the ending of craving for consciousness —( for the ending of craving, Radha, is Unbinding.) By implication, in the presence of craving, no being is entitled to deny their being. And how is their being known? When there is association along the lines I was this, I was that, I am this, I am that, I will be this, I will be that. Does their being end, or is it lessened by association along these lines - I was not this, I was not that, I am not this, I am not that, I will not be this, I will not be that? No, of course not. These are just particularly unworthy denials of that very being. Being / craving does not cease by denial, it ceases by non-assocation. Who is not associating? Someone in jhana. Who is in jhana? Someone who mindfully ceases the narrating/discursing of their being, and their denials of it. Kind Regards Herman #61485 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 5:07 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bored and Lonely egberdina Hi James, > > James: Yes, loneliness is the great unspoken secret of us all!!!!! > And I dared to speak about it (big deal). We should all examine our > loneliness and determine when it is conditioned from outside or from > inside, as you suggest Sarah. God, couldn't someone make this > easier??? ;-)) > I appreciated your post on lonelineness and boredom. And I agree with this one too. What waits for anyone who discards their props of sensuous existence, is lonelineness and boredom. It is not a stretch to recognise in the busy-ness of folks a very concerted effort to stave of lonelineless and boredom. Frankly, without jhanas, we'd be stuffed. And that's also why the Buddha taught them. Be well and Kind Regards Herman #61486 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 5:14 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] To Larry: An Olive Branch lbidd2 Hi Howard, I hadn't noticed this note until now. I realize my "voice" is often abrasive and I'll try to monitor that but I also think our discussions on theory are interesting, so I'd like to continue, if you are willing. Larry -------------------------- Howard: "Hi, Larry - I don't know how it has happened that disagreements on minor matters of theory has led to inor disagreeableness of posting between us. I think we'd be far better off scuttling theory discussions and salvaging metta than the opposite. Don't you? In any case, I apologize for my part in any acrimonious posting. I value our friendship of long standing. With metta, Howard" #61487 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 6:19 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. egberdina Hi Larry and Howard, On 16/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > Do you agree that all compounds are concepts? > According to Karunadasa, " according to Abhidhamma, from a plurality of conditions a plurality of effects takes place. Applied to the dhamma-theory, this means that a multiplicity of dhammas brings about a multiplicity of other dhammas." http://www.orientalia.org/article594.html From this I infer that a single dhamma is an idealised unit, not one that is knowable experientially as a single dhamma. Ergo, there is nothing experienced which is not compound. Ergo, all experience is concept (according to the Abhidhamma). What do you reckon? Kind Regards Herman #61488 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 3:08 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/16/06 7:34:31 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Okay, dependently arisen dhammas have no own being because they are > dependent. That > could still refer to impermanence, so I'm still not sure what that means. --------------------------------------- Howard: No, dependency isn't only a matter of temporal dependency. There is also simultaneous dependency and support. Just as an example, knowing and known (i.e., subject and object) are mutually and simultaneously dependent. There are all sorts of complex dependencies and interdependencies, typically a mix of simultaneous and different-time dependencies. But even just looking at the temporal dependencies, it is the conditionality - the dependence, that literally makes a dhamma anatta. The impermanence is an indicator of the conditionality: what is conditioned is impermanent - sabbe sankhara anicca. ---------------------------------- If you said a > > chariot has no own being I would take that to mean that chariotness could > not be found in > the collection of parts we call a chariot. I take it you don't mean that. > -------------------------------- Howard: The chariot is dependent on its parts, and on the conceptual imputation. Again, it is conditionality. But here we get into pa~n~natti, which, in fact, don't exist at all in reality. -------------------------------- If you mean there is > > no eye consciousness without an eye, that is all very well, but there is > still eye > consciousness (with an eye) from time to time, isn't there? Can't eye > consciousness be > found at that time with straight forward satipatthana? What about a chariot? > Can a chariot > be found when all its parts are present? > ---------------------------------- Howard: As I say, a chariot actually doesn't exist at all except in a manner of speaking and in a manner of thinking. But more important than that: The fact that eye consciousness, when present, lacks own being, lacks self, and is su~n~na and anatta does NOT mean that it is nothing at all. It is a paramattha dhamma, and unlike pa~n~natti, it DOES arise. The anatta of the Buddha is not a nihilism. ----------------------------------- Or does "no own being" simply refer to > dependence? > --------------------------------- Howard: Exactly. ---------------------------------- That would cover both consciousness and chariot, but it wouldn't distinguish> > > between the two. Is it important to distinguish between consciousness and a > chariot as > experience and non-experience, or not? -------------------------------- Howard: The distinction lies in the role of conceptuality. Paramattha dhammas do not depend on conceptuality for an alleged existence. They do not self-exist, but they *do* exist, whereas pa~n~natti truly do not. The Tibetans, I believe, don't distinguish between paramattha dhammas and pa~n~natti, believing that everything is concept-only, but that is not what the Buddha taught as far as I'm concerned. ------------------------------- > > Larry > ================== With metta, Howard #61489 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 3:17 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] To Larry: An Olive Branch upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/16/06 8:14:16 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > I hadn't noticed this note until now. I realize my "voice" is often > abrasive and I'll try to monitor that but I also think our discussions > on theory are interesting, so I'd like to continue, if you are willing. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Sure, Larry! Though I'm running a bit out of steam on our current thread - probably close to the repeating-myself stage ;-), I'll be happy to continue. As for abrasiveness, I certainly think I at least matched you in that! ---------------------------------------- > > Larry > =================== With metta, Howard #61490 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 7:26 pm Subject: Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" buddhatrue Hi Azita, I'm going to address this issue from another angle. There is a Taoist principle called "wu-wei", which means doing without doing. I believe that Buddhist meditation practice should follow the principle of wu wei. You see, there can be doing with doing (acting through ego), not doing with not doing (inaction), and doing without doing (egoless action/anatta). Of course, egoless action only comes about through practice. It is only through practice that one is able to follow the natural way of things (dhamma) and achieve wu wei. However, it is important that one not think that complete inaction is wu wei; inaction is inaction and absolutely nothing gets accomplished. How this applies to meditation is that when one begins the practice there isn't wu wei, there is just action. The person sits on the pillow, counts the breaths, and keeps track of the progress being made. The ego is involved in this and the person may have all sorts of fantasies of becoming enlightened, becoming famous, and saving the whole universe. But this isn't a big deal and it isn't the fault of the practice. With time and more practice, and proper guidance, the person no longer meditates with the goal of becoming "enlightened and famous"; the person meditates with no goal in mind at all. This is when meditation becomes wu wei and real progress can be made. Metta, James http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wu_wei #61491 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 7:33 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Bored and Lonely buddhatrue Hi Herman, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi James, > > I appreciated your post on lonelineness and boredom. And I agree with > this one too. What waits for anyone who discards their props of > sensuous existence, is lonelineness and boredom. It is not a stretch > to recognise in the busy-ness of folks a very concerted effort to > stave of lonelineless and boredom. Frankly, without jhanas, we'd be > stuffed. And that's also why the Buddha taught them. BINGO! You got it. I'm so glad. > > Be well and > > Kind Regards > > > Herman > Metta, James #61492 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 7:42 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Herman, H: "According to Karunadasa, " according to Abhidhamma, from a plurality of conditions a plurality of effects takes place. Applied to the dhamma-theory, this means that a multiplicity of dhammas brings about a multiplicity of other dhammas." http://www.orientalia.org/article594.html From this I infer that a single dhamma is an idealised unit, not one that is knowable experientially as a single dhamma. Ergo, there is nothing experienced which is not compound. Ergo, all experience is concept (according to the Abhidhamma). What do you reckon? Kind Regards Herman" L: I have forgotten what "dhamma theory" means but I believe abhidhamma holds that many dhammas condition one dhamma, one dhamma can be many different conditions for one dhamma, and one dhamma can play a part in the arising of many different dhammas. But that doesn't change the rule that there can be only one object of consciousness and one consciousness at a time in any given continuum. For example, all four great elements arise at the same time but only one at a time can be experienced. When it seems as though there is a multiplicity of dhammas we have a compact whole. A compact whole can be sorted out into individual dhammas that can be understood in terms of cause and condition and experienced as impermanent. However, even a so called individual dhamma is probably a multiplicity of mind moments, but these can at least be distinguished as form, feeling, perception, volitional formation, and consciousness. It isn't necessary to tune into a single mind moment to see that the whole we are concerned with isn't real, imo. I think madhyamaka my reason as you do, that experience is basically conceptual. If that works for you, go for it. But be warned, if you think Theravada has a bunch of abstruse, convoluted, counter intuitive commentaries, wait until you see the Madhyamaka ones. Larry #61493 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 3:48 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" upasaka_howard Hi, James (and Azita) - In a message dated 7/16/06 10:27:08 PM Eastern Daylight Time, buddhatrue@... writes: > I believe that Buddhist meditation practice should follow the > principle of wu wei. You see, there can be doing with doing (acting > through ego), not doing with not doing (inaction), and doing without > doing (egoless action/anatta). Of course, egoless action only comes > about through practice. It is only through practice that one is > able to follow the natural way of things (dhamma) and achieve wu > wei. However, it is important that one not think that complete > inaction is wu wei; inaction is inaction and absolutely nothing gets > accomplished. > > How this applies to meditation is that when one begins the practice > there isn't wu wei, there is just action. The person sits on the > pillow, counts the breaths, and keeps track of the progress being > made. The ego is involved in this and the person may have all sorts > of fantasies of becoming enlightened, becoming famous, and saving > the whole universe. But this isn't a big deal and it isn't the > fault of the practice. With time and more practice, and proper > guidance, the person no longer meditates with the goal of > becoming "enlightened and famous"; the person meditates with no goal > in mind at all. This is when meditation becomes wu wei and real > progress can be made. > ======================= Top notch, James! IMO, sadhu x 3!!! With metta, Howard #61494 From: "Phil" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 8:02 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life I. philofillet Hi Nina (or anyone who has listened to the India 2005 talks) > We can experience their characteristics when they > appear, no matter how we name them. In the recent talks, is Acharn Sujin saying that knowing the nimitta of dhammas is enough for now, that we are unlikely to experience the characteristics directly? It sounds like that to me, though I haven't heard those talks recently. I know nimitta has many meanings, but this feels like a kind of shift in the teaching to me. I also know I've asked you about this before, but it feels like an important point so thanks in advance for a re-explanation. Phil #61495 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 8:03 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Hi Howard, Thanks for all your patience with this inquiry. I think I understand what you mean now, and for the most part I agree. Could I ask for one point of clarification? You say that paramattha dhammas don't self-exist but they are not non-existent like a concept. By "not self-existent" (dependent) do you simply mean that paramattha dhammas are not uncaused or do you mean that no paramattha dhamma has a unique, unshared characteristic? Or do you mean something altogether different? Larry #61496 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 3:35 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Larry) - In a message dated 7/16/06 9:21:10 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > According to Karunadasa, " according to Abhidhamma, from a plurality > of conditions a plurality of effects takes place. Applied to the > dhamma-theory, this means that a multiplicity of dhammas brings about > a multiplicity of other dhammas." > http://www.orientalia.org/article594.html > > From this I infer that a single dhamma is an idealised unit, not one > that is knowable experientially as a single dhamma. ------------------------------------ Howard: I don't see that. For me, that is a non sequitur. Also, it happens that I don't agree with the conclusion as fact. --------------------------------- > > Ergo, there is nothing experienced which is not compound. Ergo, all > experience is concept (according to the Abhidhamma). --------------------------------- Howard: Nope, according to the Tibetans! ;-) --------------------------------- > > What do you reckon? > ------------------------------ Howard: Please see above. ;-) =============== With metta, Howard #61497 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 7:43 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life I. ken_aitch Hi all, I enjoyed reading this post from Phil: ------------- P: > I like (of course - we like suttas, there is so much lobha) the passage that precedes the below bit about the chariot in the sutta. Mara comes to tempt the bhikkhuni, and asks ""By whom has this being been created? Where is the maker of the being? Where has the being arisen? Where does the being cease?" He is asking speculative questions to lead the bhikkhuni off the path. But she answers beautifully: "Why now do you assume 'a being?', Mara, is that your speculative view? This is a heap of sheer formations: here no being is found." (SN 5:10) ------------- Even when the Dhamma says straight out: "No being is found!" we still tend to think there is a being. This is the cause of most of DSG's disagreements: to varying degrees, people can't quite accept the teaching of no-self. We read a sutta like this one, and we think, "Yes, wonderful: there are no beings here," but we still have ideas of an evil spirit or of a bhikkhuni, or of our own selve who are reading the sutta. I suggest that none of us should finish considering any sutta until we have analysed it down to namas and rupas - no beings of any kind. Ultimately, Mara is the presently arisen conditioned dhamma. Every dhamma we ever experience is a temptation for thoughts of either attachment, "This is mine, " conceit, "This I am," or wrong view, "This is my self." Ultimately, the one that knows Mara as it truly is, is panna - just another conditioned dhamma. And ultimately, it is citta (at the mind-door) that is considering the sutta. Ken H #61498 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 5:08 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - In a message dated 7/16/06 11:04:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > By "not self-existent" (dependent) do you > simply mean that paramattha dhammas are not uncaused or do you mean that > no paramattha dhamma has a unique, unshared characteristic? ===================== I mean the former. Conditioned realities are utterly dependent on other (equally empty) conditions for their brief existence. Every dhamma *is* a unique event-quality, but is nothing at all in-and-of-itself. So, there is uniqueness and existence, but no self-existence, no separate, independent existence, no own-being: none in the slightest. With metta, Howard #61499 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 9:43 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. egberdina Hi Howard and Larry, On 17/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > Hi, Herman (and Larry) - > > In a message dated 7/16/06 9:21:10 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > > hhofmeister@... writes: > > > According to Karunadasa, " according to Abhidhamma, from a plurality > > of conditions a plurality of effects takes place. Applied to the > > dhamma-theory, this means that a multiplicity of dhammas brings about > > a multiplicity of other dhammas." > > http://www.orientalia.org/article594.html > > > > From this I infer that a single dhamma is an idealised unit, not one > > that is knowable experientially as a single dhamma. > > > ------------------------------------ > Howard: > I don't see that. For me, that is a non sequitur. Also, it happens > that I don't agree with the conclusion as fact. > --------------------------------- Perhaps, if it is a sequitur for me, and a non-sequitur for you, we are using different logic. This shouldn't be too difficult to pinpoint if you would be interested in finding out that much. I have previously read your view on the following matter, and have never understood it. Perhaps it will sink in this time, but probably not :-) It is said in Abhidhamma that in every mind-moment there are always at least a number of factors present. That seems pretty much like each mind-moment is compound. You have in the past, proceeded from there to say that the "individual" components are knowable as such, although they are never individually present. Which I do not understand. If the factors never appear individually, how are they known individually? > > > > > > Ergo, there is nothing experienced which is not compound. Ergo, all > > experience is concept (according to the Abhidhamma). > > > --------------------------------- > Howard: > Nope, according to the Tibetans! ;-) > --------------------------------- Larry asked if all compounds are concepts. Unless I'm wrong, you agreed with this. If all mind-moments are compounds, why are they not concepts if all compounds are concepts? > > > > > What do you reckon? > > > ------------------------------ > Howard: > Please see above. ;-) > Sorry if I am missing something. KInd Regards Herman #61500 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 10:52 pm Subject: Cetasikas' study corner 487- Non-Aversion/Adosa (s) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== Ch 29, Non-Aversion(Adosa)contd ***** Loving kindness is one of the meditation subjects of samatha. Those who have accumulated conditions for the development of calm to the degree of jhåna can attain jhåna with this meditation subject(1). Loving kindness (mettå) is among the four meditation subjects which are called the “divine abidings” (brahma-vihåras). The other three “divine abidings” are: compassion (karuùå), sympathetic joy (muditå) and equanimity (upekkhå). They are called divine abidings because they are excellent and of a “faultless nature”: those who cultivate them live like the “Brahmå divinities” (Atthasåliní, I, Book I, Part V, Chapter XII, 195). The divine abidings are also called “Illimitables” (appamaññås) because they arise in an immeasurable field, their field or object is beings without limits. Loving kindness, for example, can, when jhåna is attained with this subject, be extended to all beings, none excepted. Loving kindness is sublime and it can be illimitable, but even the most excellent qualities are impermanent and dukkha. Without the development of right understanding good deeds, excellent virtues or even jhåna cannot lead to the end of defilements. The final goal of the Buddha’s teachings is the eradication of defilements and this means the end of dukkha. *** 1) With this subject different stages of rúpa-jhåna can be attained, but not the highest stage, since the jhånacittas of the highest stage (the fourth in the fourfold system and the fifth in the fivefold system) are accompanied by indifferent feeling. Loving kindness can be accompanied by pleasant feeling or by indifferent feeling and thus it is not the object of the jhånacittas of the highest stage of jhåna. ***** Non-Aversion(Adosa)to be contd Metta, Sarah ====== Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 11:26 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] a friend's question sarahprocter... Dear Gillie (& Azita), I like your question and all the responses, including Azita's, so far. Like Nina, I'd like to encourage you to discuss this topic further with us all here. --- gazita2002 wrote: > A friend asks: "say you're having kamma on you and you know and you > cant do anything but develop wisdom and detach - OK - but that doesn't > give you a smile and fun. So you could end up being WISE -but- well > basically unhappy." > She goes on to write "that is a kind of (ill-informed?) view of > Buddhas philosophy that I have.... ..... S: Surely, the most important thing is developing right understanding regardless of the situations we find ourselves in or regardless of the results of kamma we experience? If our goal is just to feel good and have fun, we go on and on having expectations, clinging to ourselves and experiencing disapointments again and again. I don't think we end up having any less fun, but perhaps (as Azita has indicated), the kind of fun changes. Rather than a dinner or show out on a Saturday evening, a dhamma discussion or reflection may be more appealing. But really, it all depends on our different inclinations and tendencies. Jonothan and I still have lots of fun, as do Nina and Lodewijk abd Khun Sujin too, for that matter. I think the comment about the different inclinations also goes for whether we tend to be basically cheery or unhappy too. As Azita knows, we just had a holiday in the Swiss mountains with my mother. One of my brothers, James, also joined us. Now, James has no interest in the Dhamma, but even as a small child, he always had a very cheery disposition. He always had lots of friends and I don't remember him ever getting cross. I hadn't seen him for many years, but it was the same this time. Jonothan, James and I had one very long day of climbing in the rain. It was tough for us all. I kept mumbling about turning back and commenting on the lack of views, being thirsty and so on. James on the other hand was always convinced the top of the mountain was round the corner, the weather was perfect (he'd say) for hiking and somehow he urged me on. The next day he twisted his ankle and he was grounded, but no problem he said, he could catch up on sports on TV, make friends and have a rest. The point is that by conditions (especially one called natural decisive condition), our moods and tendencies are what they are and we can't do anything about them, because these tendencies have already arisen. Even if we think or plan ahead to have a different kind of holiday, to be a different kind of person or whatever, it's still just a matter of our accumulations to think and think in such ways at such times. Trying to change our characters is not the way to have less attachment to Self. On the other hand, if we know more about the different realities in our life, even intellectually, it'll lessen the idea of self and gradually by developing awareness, it'll lessen the strong attachment to our being a certain way. I'd also just like to add that sometimes people do think that in order to develop awareness that they should be more serious and not have fun. This may well be the ill-informed view you may be referring to. Again it shows the strong attachment to Self and to an unnatural way of life, rather than accepting one's tendencies as they are at such times. I think life is easier and easier when one begins to see all one's ideas about different kinds of forced practice for what they are -- merely attachments and fantasies, rather than an acceptance of conditioned dhammas which are anatta. Does that sound too strong to you, Gillie? Gillie, I don't know if this is any help, but please do respond to our comments, even if it's in brief or via Azita:-). Metta, Sarah p.s Do you have access to an MP3 player? If so, I'm confident you would enjoy listening to some of the edited audio discussions we've made available. Best regards to Jill J too. ======== #61502 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun Jul 16, 2006 11:53 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) sarahprocter... Hi Scott, Howard,(Tep, Nina, Matheesha....), --- Scott Duncan wrote: > Howard: "What the roots are of one's saddha is critical, I believe." > > Yes, hetu - Sarah's got me into the "stacks" on that one. .... S: :-) You can always tell when someone has worked as a teacher - they hand out homework in their sleep or from the Swiss Alps, lol! .... [Scott, many thanks indeed for adding your nice, cheery pic to the member album. Now you've gone digital, if you'd care to sometime add a pic of your children (and even one of Andy) to the 'Significant Others' album, that would be v.nice too. If any other active posters, like Matheesha, can also be encouraged by your example to add a pic, all well and good:-)). Scott, whilst 'into the "stacks' ', other topics in U.P. of relevance to your threads are: ***** - Ekayano (the only way) - Bahiya Sutta -Sunnatta, Cula Sunnatta Sutta -Bhavana (cultivation) - Posture ****** I forget what else. If you come across anything of special interest, special confusion, or special disagreement, pls share. Oh, and Howard, if you ever lose that spiral post to Jon again, check under 'Spiral' in U.P. I think it's a good one and also relevant to some of the discussions with Tep and suttas he's raised before. Tep, do you have any comments on it? (see #61324). On that topic, I liked Scott's comments on the Upanisa sutta and upanissaya too. On another thread we were having about sense objects that have already fallen away, I think Nina has already responded, Howard. More under 'navattabba arammana' in U.P. Btw, K.Sujin used an analogy of water pouring through paper, but later adopted my analogy of the 'perfect photocopy' which seemed a little closer to my daily life:-). Metta, Sarah ======= #61503 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 12:50 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 89 and Tiika. nilovg Hi Larry, Op 16-jul-2006, om 18:37 heeft Larry het volgende geschreven: > The realities involved in > vipåka-condition > are phenomena which are conascent, arising at the same time. They > assist one another "by effortless quiet''." > > L: This refers to the conditioning of resultant feeling and the > other resultant cetasikas by > resultant consciousnesses and vice versa, correct? I wouldn't refer > to resultant consciousness > _itself_ as effortless quiet. It seems to me that all the resultant > consciousnesses perform their > functions in a very energetic and active way. What do you think, is > listening an effortless > activity? ------------------- N: Yes, U Narada (Guide to Conditional Relations, p. 54) explains that they cause one another to be passive, calm and peaceful as itself. As the tiika states, this is not the calm due to the absence of defilements. Compared to the active javana cittas (kusala or akusala ), they are passive. They do not motivate actions, they do not produce result, they are themselves result. As to performing functions which all cittas do, you have a point. Seeing performs the function of seeing, dassana kicca. Hearing performs the function of hearing, savana kicca. Still, they are vipaaka and compared to javanacittas they are passive, quiet. This is a figurative way of speaking for teaching purposes. Hearing hears only sound, but hearing can also be used in the sense of hearing the Dhamma or listening to the Dhamma. The Pali savana is used in both cases, thus, we have to consider the context. When we listen and consider the Dhamma, there are kusala javanacittas and these are bhaavanaa. However, there are not only kusala cittas, there are likely to be akusala cittas as well. For example, when we cannot keep the attention focussed on the Dhamma, or we are bored, or we disapprove of what the Buddha taught. But the javanacittas that we call listening, namely, thinking, are certainly quite different from vipaakacittas. Considering the text of the Visuddhimagga can help us to realize that hearing, the experience of sound is quite different from thinking on account of what is heard, thinking of words and their meaning.We can learn to be mindful of different characteristics, and that means that we do not pay attention to the names of realities. Characteristics matter, not the names. The javanacittas are accompanied by akusala cetasikas or by sobhana cetasikas, many of them. There is no citta arising that is not accompanied by cetasikas. I followed your threads with Howard and Herman who quoted Karunadasa. Citta is a reality, and its being accompanied by cetasikas does not make it suddenly a concept. Citta and cetasikas are paramattha dhammas. Another question is: when awareness and right understanding arise in a following process, they can be aware of one dhamma at a time, as you also stress. Either citta, or cetasika or rupa, one at a time can be object of awareness. But no matter they are objects of awareness or not, they arise all the time throughout life, they are ultimate realities. Nobody can change their characteristics. Nina. 3) #61504 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 1:02 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Translation from Pali nilovg Dear Rob M, I am glad you asked the bhikkhu. I am inclined to translate catudhaa as : fourfold. Thus, the ultimate realities are expounded as four. The fouir words that are quoted with ..ti are exactly these four. I also think that the 4 truths refer here to the four ultimate realities. Nina. Op 16-jul-2006, om 6:00 heeft robmoult het volgende geschreven: > "Citta, cetasika, rupa, nibbana," thus the Unsurpassed (niruttaro) > One who explained the 4 Truths (catusaccappakaasano) preached > (desayii) dhammas in 4 ways (catudhaa). > > Grammatical notes: > niruttaro & catusaccappakaasano are in nominative singular > desayii is in 3rd person past tense; the ending "i" is lengthened > to "ii" due to metrical considerations. > dhamme is in accusative plural > catudhaa is in ablative singular with an instrumental sense #61505 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 1:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: a friend's question nilovg Dear Azita, thank you for sharing what you wrote to Gillian, I appreciate it very much. Nina. Op 16-jul-2006, om 3:17 heeft gazita2002 het volgende geschreven: > This present moment is all there is! To develop knowledge and > understanding of the arising and passing away of seeing, visible > object, hearing, sound, taste, flavour, smelling, odour, body sense, > tactile objects, mind and mind objects, seems like a noble thing to > do because ultimately one does no longer deliberately hurt another > living being -not by action, speech or thought. #61506 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 1:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] a friend's question nilovg Hi Ken O, thank you for the sutta quotes. It takes a long time to be able to apply these texts in our life. Only through the development of insight. Nina. Op 16-jul-2006, om 17:27 heeft Ken O het volgende geschreven: > The happiness of the senses and the happiness of renunciation. But > the happiness of renunciation is the higher of the two. #61507 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 1:22 am Subject: [dsg] Re: object and feeling ken_aitch Hi Herman, ------ KH: > > Please explain how anatta means no soul - as distinct from no self. > > H: > We all know the famous line from the relevant sutta. "And is it fitting to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am?" ------- Ah yes, Victor used to recite that line as an answer to every question. ---------- H: > It's a sort of begging the question definition of anatta. Of course only what is constant, pleasant, and not subject to change is worthy of the definiton of being a soul. And there is nothing like that to be found, as the monks are often asked to confirm. What instead is to be found? Beings, who lack ultimate control over their being, in that they can not have permament happiness, they can not stave of change and decay. ---------- I'm sorry; I can't follow your reasoning. I suspect you are quoting from the teachings of Bhikkhu Thanissaro, but, as you know, I reject those teachings completely. I don't begrudge BT and his followers the right to have their beliefs. However, I would warn anyone against infiltrating the sangha, altering the written Dhamma and slandering the Buddha (as being a purveyor of escapist gobbledegook). According to the texts, those behaviours are among the worst of all evil kammas. Having said that, I should emphasise that I bear no resentment against Bhikkhu Thanissaro or any of his followers. It is mere dhammas that slander the Buddha and divide the sangha, and it is mere dhammas that suffer as a result. Any concept I may have of those dhammas as 'living beings' is a valuable opportunity for metta. Therefore, I thank BT for that opportunity. :-) --------------------- H: > And what is the nature of their being? "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Radha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a being. Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling... perception... fabrications...Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for consciousness, Radha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a being." Being / craving does not cease by denial, it ceases by non-assocation. Who is not associating? Someone in jhana. Who is in jhana? Someone who mindfully ceases the narrating/discursing of their being, and their denials of it. --------------------- Yes, I remember Victor telling us about the self. What I still don't understand - not that it is any of my business - is why you believe in a self but not in an eternal self. If there were one, wouldn't it be better that there were both - so that the self could live forever? Ken H #61508 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 1:32 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life I. nilovg Hi Phil, Characteristics present themselves, and we can begin to be aware of them. We cannot pinpoint that it is the characteristic of this moment of seeing or this visible object, because that have fallen away and only the nimitta remains. This does not matter, seeing presents itself again and again, visible object presents itself again and again. There is no need to think: is it this one, is it that one. There are characteristics time and again and understanding can gradually be developed. When insight has developed to the stage that it realizes the arising and falling away of one dhamma at a time, it has become more precise. Listening to the Thai sessions I am reminded not to think of the names of realities. I quote some parts: < What appears as such means, it has that characteristic, it is not something else. Seeing does not see something else but what appears now....> It seems that rupa is easier, someone said. Kh Sujin: < But then, personality belief, sakkaayadi.t.thi is with the naama khandhas.> Nina. Op 17-jul-2006, om 5:02 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > In the recent talks, is Acharn Sujin saying that knowing the nimitta > of dhammas is enough for now, that we are unlikely to experience the > characteristics directly? #61509 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 4:15 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Hello* egberdina Hi Jon, Last things first. On 16/07/06, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > Finally, in terms of the topic under discussion, namely whether a > non-active mind is a prerequisite for the development of insight (which > I understand to be your position), do you have any substantive comment > to make on these passages? > > >IMRAO > >(in my reasonably > >arrogant opinion :-)) > > > > Love the arrogance, but would like to see a bit more reason !! ;-)) > Yes, I'm sure :-). However, I must confess to not aspiring to your standards of what is reasonable. Ven Buddhagosa, I believe, in describing what the standard is by which the intrinsic desirabiilty of phenomena should be judged, lays the sayso at the feet of respected members of the community, you know, the lawyers, accountants, cheesemerchants and the like. It is no stretch that a similar test could apply for what is to be considered reasonable, and if that were the case, the sheer weight of lack of numbers in your camp should see you quickly revise your stance. Without disrespect to you as a person, and your small band of egregious Sujinites, I only count one lawyer and one accountant amongst your yaysayers. Where are the cheesemerchants? It should come as no surprise to you that amongst the millions that consider themselves Buddhist, only a few handfuls subscribe to the quirky interpretations you avidly put forth. Like others, I tend to steer away from "secret" teachings. Before I find things of substance to say to you :-), wasn't it you who vowed and declared some time ago that the satipatthana sutta did not apply to you? You know, the accumulation thingy? I am not inclined to hold you to any position for longer than the count of three, but have you changed your mind about this suttas applicability to you? If not, why put yourself in a position of judging how it ought to apply to others? (Who of course don't exist :-)) Kind Regards Herman #61510 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 12:48 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Larry) - In a message dated 7/17/06 12:48:59 AM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > Hi Howard and Larry, > > On 17/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > > > > >Hi, Herman (and Larry) - > > > > In a message dated 7/16/06 9:21:10 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > > > > hhofmeister@... writes: > > > > >According to Karunadasa, " according to Abhidhamma, from a plurality > > >of conditions a plurality of effects takes place. Applied to the > > >dhamma-theory, this means that a multiplicity of dhammas brings about > > >a multiplicity of other dhammas." > > >http://www.orientalia.org/article594.html > > > > > >From this I infer that a single dhamma is an idealised unit, not one > > >that is knowable experientially as a single dhamma. > > > > > > ------------------------------------ > > Howard: > > I don't see that. For me, that is a non sequitur. Also, it happens > > that I don't agree with the conclusion as fact. > > --------------------------------- > > Perhaps, if it is a sequitur for me, and a non-sequitur for you, we > are using different logic. This shouldn't be too difficult to pinpoint > if you would be interested in finding out that much. > > I have previously read your view on the following matter, and have > never understood it. Perhaps it will sink in this time, but probably > not :-) > > It is said in Abhidhamma that in every mind-moment there are always at > least a number of factors present. That seems pretty much like each > mind-moment is compound. > ------------------------------------ Howard: If by a mind-moment you are talking about a mindstate, that is something that I believe is never directly seen but only conceptualized. I would put matters as follows: At anytime, there are a number of mental events occuring that are the knowing of some object in various ways, and other activities (such as mood) that are not particularly associated with that object. Those are the facts, as I see the matter. At that time, only the object is what is known *qua* object, though I think that the various mental activites are also known "participatively". After the fact, there is a conceptualizing of "mindstate", but the mindstate or citta (in the sense of mind-activity-bundle) is none of the mental activities in affect nor is it anything that exists in any sense except as imputed on the actual activities by conceptualization. --------------------------------------------------- You have in the past, proceeded from there to > > say that the "individual" components are knowable as such, although > they are never individually present. Which I do not understand. If the > factors never appear individually, how are they known individually? ------------------------------------- Howard: What you call the "individual components", I call the actual event-qualities that occur. What you think is something they are components of, I think is concept only, though not conceptualized from whole cloth. ----------------------------------- > > > > > > > > > > > >Ergo, there is nothing experienced which is not compound. Ergo, all > > >experience is concept (according to the Abhidhamma). > > > > > > --------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Nope, according to the Tibetans! ;-) > > --------------------------------- > > Larry asked if all compounds are concepts. Unless I'm wrong, you > agreed with this. If all mind-moments are compounds, why are they not > concepts if all compounds are concepts? ---------------------------------------- Howard: They *are* concept-only. Mindstates are concepts. At any time, what you call "components" are present, but grasping them all together as a unit, as a group-entity, is the result of an additional stage of conceptualizing. I've said that before (to Nina), and I still maintain that. I never deserted that. --------------------------------------- > ====================== With metta, Howard #61511 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 5:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) scottduncan2 Dear Sarah, Thanks, its sort of dusty in here. And I found an old coffee cup. S: "- Ekayano (the only way) - Bahiya Sutta -Sunnatta, Cula Sunnatta Sutta -Bhavana (cultivation) - Posture I forget what else. If you come across anything of special interest, special confusion, or special disagreement, pls share." With loving kindness, Scott. #61512 From: "robmoult" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 5:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Translation from Pali robmoult Hi Nina, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Dear Rob M, > I am glad you asked the bhikkhu. > I am inclined to translate catudhaa as : fourfold. Thus, the ultimate > realities are expounded as four. The fouir words that are quoted > with ..ti are exactly these four. I also think that the 4 truths > refer here to the four ultimate realities. > Nina. > Op 16-jul-2006, om 6:00 heeft robmoult het volgende geschreven: > > > "Citta, cetasika, rupa, nibbana," thus the Unsurpassed (niruttaro) > > One who explained the 4 Truths (catusaccappakaasano) preached > > (desayii) dhammas in 4 ways (catudhaa). > > > > Grammatical notes: > > niruttaro & catusaccappakaasano are in nominative singular > > desayii is in 3rd person past tense; the ending "i" is lengthened > > to "ii" due to metrical considerations. > > dhamme is in accusative plural > > catudhaa is in ablative singular with an instrumental sense ===== I agree and disagree :-) Acariya Anuruddha borrowed a lot from Buddhadatta's Abhidhammavatara, including the structure of citta / cetasika / rupa / Nibbana. I have the PTS version of the Abhidhammavatara, but there is no English translation and the Pali is quite difficult (expecially because it is all written in verse). I am trying to determine if Buddhadatta used the term "paramattha" to describe citta / cetasika / rupa / Nibbana. It looks as though he did not. Buddhaghosa uses the term paramattha a few times but, from what I have found, never in the sense of "ultimate realities". So it looks as though it was Acariya Anaruddha who first linked "paramattha" with citta / cetasika / rupa / Nibbana. Metta, Rob M :-) #61513 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 5:22 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Larry, and Howard, Regarding: H: "It is said in Abhidhamma that in every mind-moment there are always at least a number of factors present. That seems pretty much like each mind-moment is compound." Is this about how it is said that there are "seven universal" cetasikas which accompany every citta which arises? These are phassa (contact), vedanaa (feeling), sa~n~na (remembrance/perception), cetanaa (volition), ekagataa (one-pointedness/concentration), jiivitindriya (life faculty/vitality), and manasikaara (attention) cetasikas. With loving kindness, Scott. #61514 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 6:36 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Hello* jonoabb Hi Herman Herman Hofman wrote: >Hi Jon, > >Last things first. > >On 16/07/06, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > >> Finally, in terms of the topic under discussion, namely whether a >> non-active mind is a prerequisite for the development of insight (which >> I understand to be your position), do you have any substantive comment >> to make on these passages? >> >> >IMRAO >> >(in my reasonably >> >arrogant opinion :-)) >> > >> >> Love the arrogance, but would like to see a bit more reason !! ;-)) >> >> > >Yes, I'm sure :-). However, I must confess to not aspiring to your >standards of what is reasonable. Ven Buddhagosa, I believe, in >describing what the standard is by which the intrinsic desirabiilty of >phenomena should be judged, lays the sayso at the feet of respected >members of the community, you know, the lawyers, accountants, >cheesemerchants and the like. > > Sorry if there has been any misunderstanding. By 'reason' I meant 'substance', not 'reasonableness'. (This was a reference, half in jest, to keeping to the topic under discussion (the need for a non-active mind) rather than introducing issues such as the fakeness of the term 'kusala', which seemed rather tangential to the discussion (not that there are any rules about such things).) I can assure you I saw nothing unreasonable in your post, nor did I mean to suggest there was. >It is no stretch that a similar test could apply for what is to be >considered reasonable, and if that were the case, the sheer weight of >lack of numbers in your camp should see you quickly revise your >stance. Without disrespect to you as a person, and your small band of >egregious Sujinites, I only count one lawyer and one accountant >amongst your yaysayers. Where are the cheesemerchants? > > It hadn't occurred to me but, yes, we have no cheese merchants ;-)) >It should come as no surprise to you that amongst the millions that >consider themselves Buddhist, only a few handfuls subscribe to the >quirky interpretations you avidly put forth. Like others, I tend to >steer away from "secret" teachings. > > 'Quirky' perhaps, but 'secret', never. Because the only interpretation I'm interested in is the one contained in the Tipitaka and its commentaries, accessible to all who take the trouble to study these teachings. To my way of thinking, it is the people whose interpretation of the teachings is based on their own 'practice'/experience, and not the recorded teachings, who are the ones with the 'secret' teachings. >Before I find things of substance to say to you :-), wasn't it you who >vowed and declared some time ago that the satipatthana sutta did not >apply to you? You know, the accumulation thingy? > Sorry, but I have no idea what this refers to. Could you say a bit more about the context. I'd like to follow up, as I have obviously left a wrong impression, which I'd like to correct. >I am not inclined to >hold you to any position for longer than the count of three, but have >you changed your mind about this suttas applicability to you? If not, >why put yourself in a position of judging how it ought to apply to >others? (Who of course don't exist :-)) > > You're always welcome to remind me of anything I've said before, and expecially if I've contradicted myself because I'd like to know. Sorry if you read my post as being in any sense judgemental of you. Nothing was further from my mind. I was rather enjoying our exchange ;-)) Jon #61515 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 6:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Translation from Pali nilovg Dear Rob M, I remember that Ven. Dhammanando once gave us a text from the suttas: paramatthato, in truth. I look at Katavatthu, Ch I: is there a person in the absolute sense? The Co. elaborates and mentions aggregates, aayatanas, dhaatus, indriyas. There is more under U.P. Op 17-jul-2006, om 14:19 heeft robmoult het volgende geschreven: > I am trying to determine if Buddhadatta used the term "paramattha" to > describe citta / cetasika / rupa / Nibbana. It looks as though he did > not. Buddhaghosa uses the term paramattha a few times but, from what > I have found, never in the sense of "ultimate realities". So it looks > as though it was Acariya Anaruddha who first linked "paramattha" with > citta / cetasika / rupa / Nibbana. #61516 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 4:50 am Subject: RE: [dsg] Abidharma origins dacostacharles Hi Nina, What I was getting at is the Abhidhamma has a different approach from the Vinaya and the Sutra, not a different aim. Therefore its appeal is to a different group of beings. I agree that the Abhidhamma gives the basics about mental and physical phenomenon with the aim to directly experience them. However, I do not agree that it has no other aim. The goal of relying on the Abhidhamma is to go beyond the "direct experience of mental and physical phenomenon" to a point where there is no-suffering. The Abhidhamma is liken to the mystical philosopher's stone - The single cure for all diseases (i.e., forms of suffering) including ageing and death. The sutras, on the other hand, are prescriptions for specific situations (i.e., diseases). Were we may also disagree is in a view about the sutras. You feel they seem to assume a great deal of understanding. I feel they don't, you just have to find the right one for the situation; this is why those at the Buddha's time who listened could understand, they heard the right one for the situation they were in. While today, we are looking at all of them - mainly with the thought of collecting knowledge as apposed to curing the suffering that arises due to a given situation. Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Nina van Gorkom Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2006 11:29 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] Abidharma origins Dear Charles D, I am not inclined to compare sutta and abhidhamma so much, or evaluate the one as more complicated as the other. To me they are the Buddha's teachings to be verified oneself through the development of vipassanaa. The suttas seem to assume a great deal of understanding and those at the Buddha's time who listened could understand. I listened to an audio taken in Srinagar (no 3a, perhaps you could download it). We may repeat the words, everything is dhamma, but it takes time to directly understand that whatever appears through one of the six doors is a conditioned dhamma, not a person, not a thing. <...> #61517 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 7:25 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling sarahprocter... Hi Howard (Nina, Phil, KenH, KenO, Herman & all), --- upasaka@... wrote: > When someone says that some sense-door object is desirable, it is > a > fair question to ask "Desirable for what? Why should it be desired?" > (For that > is what 'desirable' means - "worthy of and appropriate for being > desired". If > that is not what is meant, 'desirable' should not be used.) <...> > Precision in language is *important*! And it is THAT which I am > discussing. ...... S: I like the way you persist with a topic until satisfied. I tend to agree with your points here (and also with Nina, Ken H, Phil, KenO and others who've written on this thread. So, everyone's right:-)). As Nina wrote, "each moment there is experience of an object, and depending on kamma that object is desirable (i.t.tharamma.na) or undesirable (ani.t.thaarama.na). We do not know at all whether there is seeing now of an agreeable or a disagreeable object. If we try to find out all about kamma and the way it conditions our life now it would lead to madness." As for the implication you raised of an object being pleasant/desirable vs unpleasant/undesirable, I think we can say that usually desirable objects are a supporting condition for desire to arise and undesirable objects for aversion to arise. Of course, we all wish to have pleasant experiences through the senses and wish the same for our families and friends. Only nibbana and the lokuttara cittas are appa.nihita or 'desireless' dhammas - they cannot be objects of desire. A pleasant or desirable rupa means that by nature it is pleasant and usually is a condition for desire, depending on 'normal' accumulations. The development of samatha and vipassana runs against the current of such normal accumulations, of course. For example, we read about how various parts of the body such as hair are usually taken as beautiful, desirable and lead to lobha, but when samatha is developed and the repulsiveness is seen in such objects, the desirable is no longer desirable. In Sammohavinodani (PTS translation, 2286), it talks about desirable objects 'as proximate cause of enjoyment' for those who still have the tendency to greed to ' yam loke piyarrupa.m' ('what is dear in the world'). Of course, this is exactly what we read about throughout the suttas too. It goes on: "Just as there is water below and above and on all sides of one who is immersed in water, so indeed in a desirable (i.t.tha) object the arising of greed is completely habitual for beings, and likewise in an undesirable(ani.t.tha) object the arising of annoyance (pa.tigha)." Perhaps this is what you were looking for, Howard? (Of course, whether desirable objects are found to be desirable as usual or undesirable for some reason, any unwholesome tendencies are a perversion [vipallasa] of sanna and citta). ***** To All, I'd also like to summarise some key points from old discussions and say that when we generalise and say that seeing diamonds, a dhamma book or a Buddha image is kusala vipaka and that seeing pig's dung or wearing beads is akusala vipaka, these are only conventional examples, like when we say having a holiday, eating good food, or winning a lottery is kusala vipaka. This is why, to be precise, we have to talk about realities. Rupas rise and fall away so fast that no one but a Buddha can know whether each one is desirable or undesirable. All we can say is that kusala vipaka experiences a pleasant/desirable object and akusala vipaka experiences an unpleasant/undesirable object. Can we tell now as we look at the computer screen whether it is kusala and akusala vipaka? I don't think so. In fact, there's no necklace, no diamond, no pig, no lottery, no holiday and no screen or dhamma page. There's only thinking about these objects and there's no point in trying to pinpoint what is a desirable or pleasant object and what isn't. Again we can only generalise and say that as a rule kusala vipaka is followed by attachment and akusala vipaka by aversion. As Nina has stressed, there are different accumulations from past lifetimes and aeons by pakatupanissaya paccaya so that as we once discussed before with K.Sujin, the same air will feel hot to one and cold to another or the same food will taste sweet to one person and salty for another. What is ‘sappaya (suitable)’ as object for awareness will also be different. Again we refer conventionally to suitable places and so on, but in fact such terms are just a kind of shorthand for realities appearing through 6 doorways. (I thought Herman raised a pertinent point on this topic while we were away). Finally, I liked Phil's reminder from SN about being thrashed all the time by pleasant and unpleasant objects, the 'village raiding dacoits' (or robbers). As he said, 'all sense objects are likely to give rise to akusala response, because "the all" is burning with greed, hatred and delusion (SN25:28)." We spend a lot of time trying to arrange or set up pleasant experiences for ourselves and dear ones, completely forgetting that the cause for having pleasant experiences now is past kusala kamma. And then as Phil points out, in the end, whether pleasant or unpleasant objects are being experienced, without the guarding of the senses and development of understanding, there's just more being 'thrashed' in samsara. I think the implication of this is deep and important. The point of looking and considering the texts carefully and being precise as you emphasise, is that so often we are misled by ignorance and wrong views. When we begin to understand that there’s no self, that the vipaka citta which sees or hears an object(desirable or undesirable) lasts for an instant and then is followed by a string of other cittas in the sense and mind-door processes, we begin to see that the problem is not the experiencing of various objects, but the dwelling on these experiences, the importance attached to feelings and sense objects and all the other accumulated defilements. I think, we can also slowly begin to understand the meaning of guarding the senses and to appreciate the importance of being aware of seeing, visible object and so on. I had intended to just chip in with one or two brief comments, but instead it's been an opportunity to reflect on this whole topic again for which I thank everyone. Metta, Sarah [Anyone interested, also see U.P. - 'Rupas -Intrinsic qualities, desirable/undesirable' for more on this popular topic.] ===== #61518 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 7:54 am Subject: paramattha dhammas. nilovg Dear Rob M, Indeed I found The post by Ven. Dhammanando: < attani ca, attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamaane (MN. i. 138; also cited in the Kathaavatthu's debate on the puggalavaada, Kvu. 68) And seven translations:...> --------- I repost an old post by Suan: < Suan: First, I would like to quote the following statements made by Buddhaghosa in Section 57, Anangana Suttavannanaa, Mulapannaasa, Majjimanikaaya Atthakathaa. "Buddhassa bhagavato duvidhaa desanaa sammutidesanaa, paramatthadesanaa caati. Tattha puggalo satto itthii puriso khattiyo braahmaºo devo maaroti evaruupaa sammutidesanaa. Aniccam dukkham anattaa, khandhaa dhaatuu aayatanaani satipa tthaanaati evaruupaa paramatthadesanaa. Tattha bhagavaa ye sammutivasena desanam sutvaa attham pativijjhitvaa moham pahaaya visesam adhigantum samatthaa tesam sammutidesanam deseti. Ye pana para matthavasena desanam sutvaa attham pativijjhitvaa moham pahaaya visesamadhigantum samatthaa, tesam paramattha- desanam deseti." "The Buddha Bhagavaa's way of teaching is twofold in terms of the conventional way of teaching (sammutidesanaa) and the ultimate way of teaching (paramatthadesanaa). There, such way of teaching as person, sentient being, woman, man, Royals, Brahmin, gods, and maaro is the conventional way of teaching. Such way of teaching as impermanence, misery, selflessness, aggregates, elements, venues, and Establishment of Recollection (Satipatthaana) is the ultimate way of teaching. There, the Buddha Bhagavaa delivers the conventional way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teaching in conventional terms, penetrating the meaning, and removing ignorance. On the other hand, the Buddha delivers the ultimate way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teachings in ultimate terms, penetrating the meaning, and removing ignorance." Buddhaghosa also made the following statement in Atthasaalinii, page 223, in Roman edition. "Abhidhammo naama paramatthadesanaa" "Abhidhamma is the ultimate way of teaching." Thus, whenever we find in a Suttam the teachings of impermanence, misery, selflessness, aggregates, elements, venues, and Establishment of Recollection (Satipatthaana), we can know for sure that this Suttam is engaging in the ultimate way of teaching. And, as the ultimate way of teaching is indicative of Abhidhamma, we can establish the fact that this Suttam contains a segment or segments of Abhidhamma. For example, Mahaa Satipatthaana Suttam would easily qualify as Abhidhamma because this Suttam dedicates itself to teaching the establishment of recollection exclusively. We can also find in the Suttams the teachings of persons and sentient beings so that they can also qualify as the conventional way of teaching. For example, Metta Suttam uses sentient beings as its objects while containing items of Abhidhamma such as gentleness (mettaa or adosa in Abhidhamma parlance). Therefore, we now know that Suttanta Pitaka contains both the conventional way of teaching and the ultimate way of teaching. That is another way of saying that Suttams contains segments of Abhidhamma. Now, let's take a closer look at the second paragraph we quoted earlier from Anangana Suttavannanaa. "There, the Buddha delivers the conventional way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teaching in conventional terms, penetrating the meaning, and removing ignorance. On the other hand, the Buddha delivers the ultimate way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teachings in ultimate terms, penetating the meaning, and removing ignorance." The above paragraph is extremely significant in determining the goal of Suttanta Pitaka and Abhidhamma Pitaka. The first sentence shows the conventional way of teaching and its purpose. And the purpose is the gain of unique insight. Unique insight is the right view that is sammaaditthi, which is an ultimate reality, or an item of Abhidhamma. In short, Suttams not only contain segments of Abhidhamma, but also have the right view that is an item of Abhidhamma as their goal. The second sentence solves the issue of whether Abhidhamma can deliver awakening at all. Yes, Abhidhamma can deliver the goods because "the Buddha delivers the ultimate way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teachings in ultimate terms, penetating the meaning, and removing ignorance." Suan; First, I would like to quote the following statements made by Buddhaghosa in Section 57, Anangana Suttavannanaa, Mulapannaasa, Majjimanikaaya Atthakathaa. "Buddhassa bhagavato duvidhaa desanaa sammutidesanaa, paramatthadesanaa caati. Tattha puggalo satto itthii puriso khattiyo braahmaºo devo maaroti evaruupaa sammutidesanaa. Aniccam dukkham anattaa, khandhaa dhaatuu aayatanaani satipa tthaanaati evaruupaa paramatthadesanaa. Tattha bhagavaa ye sammutivasena desanam sutvaa attham pativijjhitvaa moham pahaaya visesam adhigantum samatthaa tesam sammutidesanam deseti. Ye pana para matthavasena desanam sutvaa attham pativijjhitvaa moham pahaaya visesamadhigantum samatthaa, tesam paramattha- desanam deseti." "The Buddha Bhagavaa's way of teaching is twofold in terms of the conventional way of teaching (sammutidesanaa) and the ultimate way of teaching (paramatthadesanaa). There, such way of teaching as person, sentient being, woman, man, Royals, Brahmin, gods, and maaro is the conventional way of teaching. Such way of teaching as impermanence, misery, selflessness, aggregates, elements, venues, and Establishment of Recollection (Satipatthaana) is the ultimate way of teaching. There, the Buddha Bhagavaa delivers the conventional way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teaching in conventional terms, penetrating the meaning, and removing ignorance. On the other hand, the Buddha delivers the ultimate way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teachings in ultimate terms, penetrating the meaning, and removing ignorance." Buddhaghosa also made the following statement in Atthasaalinii, page 223, in Roman edition. "Abhidhammo naama paramatthadesanaa" "Abhidhamma is the ultimate way of teaching." Thus, whenever we find in a Suttam the teachings of impermanence, misery, selflessness, aggregates, elements, venues, and Establishment of Recollection (Satipatthaana), we can know for sure that this Suttam is engaging in the ultimate way of teaching. And, as the ultimate way of teaching is indicative of Abhidhamma, we can establish the fact that this Suttam contains a segment or segments of Abhidhamma. For example, Mahaa Satipatthaana Suttam would easily qualify as Abhidhamma because this Suttam dedicates itself to teaching the establishment of recollection exclusively. We can also find in the Suttams the teachings of persons and sentient beings so that they can also qualify as the conventional way of teaching. For example, Metta Suttam uses sentient beings as its objects while containing items of Abhidhamma such as gentleness (mettaa or adosa in Abhidhamma parlance). Therefore, we now know that Suttanta Pitaka contains both the conventional way of teaching and the ultimate way of teaching. That is another way of saying that Suttams contains segments of Abhidhamma. Now, let's take a closer look at the second paragraph we quoted earlier from Anangana Suttavannanaa. "There, the Buddha delivers the conventional way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teaching in conventional terms, penetrating the meaning, and removing ignorance. On the other hand, the Buddha delivers the ultimate way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teachings in ultimate terms, penetating the meaning, and removing ignorance." The above paragraph is extremely significant in determining the goal of Suttanta Pitaka and Abhidhamma Pitaka. The first sentence shows the conventional way of teaching and its purpose. And the purpose is the gain of unique insight. Unique insight is the right view that is sammaaditthi, which is an ultimate reality, or an item of Abhidhamma. In short, Suttams not only contain segments of Abhidhamma, but also have the right view that is an item of Abhidhamma as their goal. The second sentence solves the issue of whether Abhidhamma can deliver awakening at all. Yes, Abhidhamma can deliver the goods because "the Buddha delivers the ultimate way of teaching to those who are capable of gaining unique insight by hearing the teachings in ultimate terms, penetating the meaning, and removing ignorance."> ****** end quote. Can this be of help to you? I do not mind so much whether you call rupa, citta, cetasika and nibbaana paramattha dhammas or not. But they have unalterable characteristics no matter how one names them. At this moment understanding of the characteristics of citta, cetasika and rupa can be developed when they appear. Nina. #61519 From: "matheesha" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 10:45 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) matheesha333 Sarah: If any other active posters, like Matheesha, can > also be encouraged by your example to add a pic, all well and good:-)). Never, I say Never will you see me. ;-) Did you know that female infants stare longer at faces than male ones? Apparently females are better at reading body language and experessions than males. Now you know why! :) #61520 From: "m. nease" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 11:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] a friend's question m_nease Hi Azita, ----- Original Message ----- From: gazita2002 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Sent: Friday, July 14, 2006 11:08 PM Subject: [dsg] a friend's question Hello dhamma friends A friend asks: "say you're having kamma on you and you know and you cant do anything but develop wisdom and detach - OK - but that doesn't give you a smile and fun. So you could end up being WISE -but- well basically unhappy." Can unhappiness (domanassa) arise at the same time as detachment (alobha)? Not sure but I doubt it. If not, then what conditions detachment conditions happiness, even in the short run, seems to me. I think all the Dhamma properly understood conditions detachment. mike #61521 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 7:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling upasaka_howard Hi, Sarah (and all) - In a message dated 7/17/06 10:52:33 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sarahprocterabbott@... writes: > Hi Howard (Nina, Phil, KenH, KenO, Herman &all), > > --- upasaka@... wrote: > > > When someone says that some sense-door object is desirable, it is > >a > >fair question to ask "Desirable for what? Why should it be desired?" > >(For that > >is what 'desirable' means - "worthy of and appropriate for being > >desired". If > >that is not what is meant, 'desirable' should not be used.) > <...> > > Precision in language is *important*! And it is THAT which I am > >discussing. > ...... > S: I like the way you persist with a topic until satisfied. > --------------------------------- Howard: :-) ------------------------------- I tend to> > agree with your points here (and also with Nina, Ken H, Phil, KenO and > others who've written on this thread. So, everyone's right:-)). ------------------------------- Howard: LOL! This reminds me of my recent post to Jon, with the Fiddler on the Roof story! Well, in any case, I'm glad my name is on your list! ;-) ------------------------------ > > As Nina wrote, "each moment there is experience of an object, and > depending on kamma that object is desirable (i.t.tharamma.na) or > undesirable (ani.t.thaarama.na). We do not know at all whether there is > seeing now of an agreeable or a disagreeable object. If we try to find out > all about kamma and the way it conditions our life now it would lead to > madness." > > As for the implication you raised of an object being pleasant/desirable vs > unpleasant/undesirable, I think we can say that usually desirable objects > are a supporting condition for desire to arise and undesirable objects for > aversion to arise. Of course, we all wish to have pleasant experiences > through the senses and wish the same for our families and friends. Only > nibbana and the lokuttara cittas are appa.nihita or 'desireless' dhammas - > they cannot be objects of desire. --------------------------------- Howard: Agreed. ------------------------------- > > A pleasant or desirable rupa means that by nature it is pleasant and > usually is a condition for desire, depending on 'normal' accumulations. > The development of samatha and vipassana runs against the current of such > normal accumulations, of course. ----------------------------------- Howard: I agree on both counts. ----------------------------------- > > For example, we read about how various parts of the body such as hair are > usually taken as beautiful, desirable and lead to lobha, but when samatha > is developed and the repulsiveness is seen in such objects, the desirable > is no longer desirable. > > In Sammohavinodani (PTS translation, 2286), it talks about desirable > objects 'as proximate cause of enjoyment' for those who still have the > tendency to greed to ' yam loke piyarrupa.m' ('what is dear in the > world'). Of course, this is exactly what we read about throughout the > suttas too. It goes on: > > "Just as there is water below and above and on all sides of one who is > immersed in water, so indeed in a desirable (i.t.tha) object the arising > of greed is completely habitual for beings, and likewise in an > undesirable(ani.t.tha) object the arising of annoyance (pa.tigha)." ------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, that's not bad. 'Desirable' meaning standardly leading to greed (desire). However, it would be rare that such a dhamma would be expewrirnced as unpleasant, for few folks crave that. ------------------------------------ > > Perhaps this is what you were looking for, Howard? ------------------------------------ Howard: It's the sort of thing I would want, though rather general. ------------------------------------- > > (Of course, whether desirable objects are found to be desirable as usual > or undesirable for some reason, any unwholesome tendencies are a > perversion [vipallasa] of sanna and citta). > Metta, > > Sarah > > [Anyone interested, also see U.P. - 'Rupas -Intrinsic qualities, > desirable/undesirable' for more on this popular topic.] > ==================== With metta, Howard #61522 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 11:26 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, 26 nilovg Dear friends, Lobha is sometimes translated as ``greed'' or ``craving''; it can be translated by different words, since there are many degrees of lobha. Lobha can be coarse, medium or subtle. Most people can recognize lobha when it is very obvious, but not when it is of a lesser degree. For example, we can recognize lobha when we are inclined to eat too much of a delicious meal, or when we are attached to alcoholic drinks and cigarettes. We are attached to people and we suffer when we lose those who are dear to us through death. Then we can see that attachment brings sorrow. Sometimes attachment is very obvious, but there are many degrees of lobha and often we may not know that we have lobha. Cittas arise and fall away very rapidly and we may not realize it when lobha arises on account of what we experience in daily life through the six doors, especially if the degree of lobha is not as intense as greed or lust. Every time there is a pleasant sight, sound, odour, taste or tangible object, lobha is likely to arise. It arises many times a day. Lobha arises when there are conditions for its arising; it is beyond control. In many suttas the Buddha speaks about lobha, points out the dangers of it and the way to overcome it. The pleasant objects which can be experienced through the five senses are in several suttas called the ``five strands of sense-pleasures''. We read in the Mahå- dukkhakkhandha-sutta (``Greater Discourse on the Stems of Anguish'', Middle Length Sayings I, no. 13) that the Buddha, when he was staying near Såvatthii, in the Jeta Grove, said to the monks: And what, monks, is the satisfaction in pleasures of the senses? These five, monks, are the strands of sense-pleasures. What five? Visible objects cognisable by the eye, agreeable, pleasant, liked, enticing, connected with sensual pleasures, alluring. Sounds, cognisable by the ear... Smells, cognisable by the nose... Tastes cognisable by the tongue... Touches, cognisable by the body, agreeable, pleasant, liked, enticing, connected with sensual pleasures, alluring. These, monks, are the five strands of sense- pleasures. Whatever pleasure, whatever happiness arises in consequence of these five strands of sense-pleasures, this is the satisfaction in sense-pleasures. *********** Nina. #61523 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 11:23 am Subject: Letters from Nina, 8. nilovg Dear friends, The Buddha explained realities in many different ways so that people would be able to know them as nama-elements and rupa-elements, as not self. We read in the 'Nandakovada-sutta' (Middle Length Sayings, III, no. 146) that Nandaka, a bhikkhu, had to preach to the nuns. Then the Buddha asked him to repeat to them exactly the same sermon. Why? Their 'faculties' (indriyas) were developed and hearing the same sermon again would be the right condition for them to attain the degree of enlightenment for which they were ripe. How could that happen? Could it be just because they were listening and thinking about what they heard, or rather because there would be mindfulness while listening? While listening there could be mindfulness of nama and rupa, of seeing, hearing, thinking or feeling, of any reality appearing through one of the six doors. When I quote what Nandaka said, one may think, 'Is that all?' However, when one listens with mindfulness one can come to know realities as they are. We read: 'What do you think about this, sisters? Is the eye permanent or impermanent?' 'Impermanent, revered sir.' 'But is what is impermanent anguish or happiness?' 'Anguish, revered sir.' 'Is it right to regard that which is impermanent, anguish and liable to alteration as, "This is mine, this am I, this is myself"?' 'No, revered sir.’ ‘What do you think about this, sisters? Is the ear... the nose... the tongue... the bodysense... the mind, permanent or impermanent? ... Is it right to regard that which is impermanent, anguish and liable to alteration as, "This is mine, this am I, this is myself"?' 'No, revered sir.What is the reason for this? Already, revered sir, by means of perfect intuitive wisdom it has been well seen by us as it really is that, "These six internal sense- fields are impermanent." ' The six 'internal sense-fields' are the five senses and the mind. The same is said about the six 'external sense-fields' : colours, sounds, smells, flavours, tangibles and dhammas. The same is said about the 'six classes of consciousness' which experience these objects. Then Nandaka said: 'It is good, sisters, it is good. For it is thus, sisters, that by means of perfect intuitive wisdom this is seen by an ariyan disciple as it really is. ****** Nina. #61524 From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 11:55 am Subject: New file uploaded to dhammastudygroup dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Hello, This email message is a notification to let you know that a file has been uploaded to the Files area of the dhammastudygroup group. File : /satipatthana chart/satipatthana chart 1.pdf Uploaded by : nobdup Description : You can access this file at the URL: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/satipatthana%20chart/satipa\ tthana%20chart%201.pdf To learn more about file sharing for your group, please visit: http://help.yahoo.com/help/us/groups/files Regards, nobdup #61525 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 2:48 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. egberdina Hi Scott, On 17/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > Dear Herman, Larry, and Howard, > > Regarding: > > H: "It is said in Abhidhamma that in every mind-moment there are > > always at least a number of factors present. That seems pretty much > like each > mind-moment is compound." > > > Is this about how it is said that there are "seven universal" > cetasikas which accompany every citta which arises? These are phassa > (contact), vedanaa (feeling), sa~n~na (remembrance/perception), > cetanaa (volition), ekagataa (one-pointedness/concentration), > jiivitindriya (life faculty/vitality), and manasikaara (attention) > cetasikas. > Yes, I'm sure that's right. But the emphasis is not on the number of items on the list, or the items on the lists, but the idea that the ingredients of an amalgam can be known individually. Kind Regards Herman #61526 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 3:12 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. egberdina Hi Howard, > > > > It is said in Abhidhamma that in every mind-moment there are always at > > least a number of factors present. That seems pretty much like each > > mind-moment is compound. > > > > ------------------------------------ > Howard: > If by a mind-moment you are talking about a mindstate, that is > something that I believe is never directly seen but only conceptualized. I would put > matters as follows: At anytime, there are a number of mental events occuring > that are the knowing of some object in various ways, and other activities (such > as mood) that are not particularly associated with that object. Those are the > facts, as I see the matter. OK. > At that time, only the object is what is known *qua* object, though I > think that the various mental activites are also known "participatively". > After the fact, there is a conceptualizing of "mindstate", but the mindstate or > citta (in the sense of mind-activity-bundle) is none of the mental activities in > affect nor is it anything that exists in any sense except as imputed on the > actual activities by conceptualization. > --------------------------------------------------- So far so good. (I'm tempted to say "I agree" :-)) > > You have in the past, proceeded from there to > > > > say that the "individual" components are knowable as such, although > > they are never individually present. Which I do not understand. If the > > factors never appear individually, how are they known individually? > > ------------------------------------- > Howard: > What you call the "individual components", I call the actual > event-qualities that occur. What you think is something they are components of, I think > is concept only, though not conceptualized from whole cloth. > ----------------------------------- > Your position is now crystal clear to me. I'm glad I asked, and that you explained. I had previously assumed your position to be similar to Nagasenas in King Milinda's questions, which it now clearly is not. 'Suppose, O king, the cook in the royal household were to make a syrup or a sauce, and were to put into it curds, and salt, and ginger, and cummin seed, and pepper, and other ingredients. And suppose the king were to say to him: "Pick out for me the flavour of the curds, and of the salt, and of the ginger, and of the cummin seed, and of the pepper, and of all the things you have put into it." Now would it be possible, great king, separating off one from another those flavours that had thus run together, to pick out each one, so that one could say: "Here is the sourness, and here the saltness, and here the pungency, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness "?' 'No, that would not be possible. But each flavour would nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.' For me this is an inadmissable example, because the flavours are first known in their own context, individually, before they are put in the soup. But in the case of the Abhidhamma theory, there is never the case where one factor is available to be tasted in isolation. It leaves a question for me as to how an event-quality can be said to be ultimate (which you don't seem to be saying) if there just is no possibility of distilling single factors out to be known as single factors. It seems that all events are always flavoured by their context. > ---------------------------------------- > Howard: > They *are* concept-only. Mindstates are concepts. At any time, what > you call "components" are present, but grasping them all together as a unit, as > a group-entity, is the result of an additional stage of conceptualizing. I've > said that before (to Nina), and I still maintain that. I never deserted that. > --------------------------------------- Understood. KInd Regards Herman #61527 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 3:37 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. lbidd2 Howard: "Conditioned realities are utterly dependent on other (equally empty) conditions for their brief existence. Every dhamma *is* a unique event-quality, but is nothing at all in-and-of-itself. So, there is uniqueness and existence, but no self-existence, no separate, independent existence, no own-being: none in the slightest." Hi Howard, Very good! I can't say I understand this, but I think you have hit on the right balance, the middle way. Thanks very much. Larry #61528 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 3:44 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 89 and Tiika. lbidd2 Hi Nina, Thanks for the explanation of listening. When I turn my head to listen, what is that? How is activity classified? Larry #61529 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 4:01 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling egberdina Hi Ken, > H: > It's a sort of begging the question definition of anatta. Of > > course only what is constant, pleasant, and not subject to change is > worthy of the definiton of being a soul. And there is nothing like > that to be found, as the monks are often asked to confirm. > > What instead is to be found? Beings, who lack ultimate control over > their being, in that they can not have permament happiness, they can > not stave of change and decay. > > ---------- > > I'm sorry; I can't follow your reasoning. I suspect you are quoting > from the teachings of Bhikkhu Thanissaro, but, as you know, I reject > those teachings completely. > I don't have any BT teachings to quote, but there's a bunch of his translations around on the Net. I'm only going from the Sutta, Ken. Honest :-) > I don't begrudge BT and his followers the right to have their beliefs. > However, I would warn anyone against infiltrating the sangha, altering > the written Dhamma and slandering the Buddha (as being a purveyor of > escapist gobbledegook). According to the texts, those behaviours are > among the worst of all evil kammas. > > Having said that, I should emphasise that I bear no resentment against > Bhikkhu Thanissaro or any of his followers. It is mere dhammas that > slander the Buddha and divide the sangha, and it is mere dhammas that > suffer as a result. Any concept I may have of those dhammas as 'living > beings' is a valuable opportunity for metta. Therefore, I thank BT for > that opportunity. :-) > I wonder why you use any words other than dhamma at all? My translation of the above paragraphs into KenSpeak is "dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma etc etc" How am I doing? But precisely because you didn't write that, though you suggest that is what you would write, I don't actually believe that your experience is limited to dhamma level only. It sounds more like you use the word dhamma as an automatic suffix to anything you actually experience, at the level you experience it. > --------------------- > H: > And what is the nature of their being? > > > "Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Radha: when one is > caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be 'a being. Any > desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling... perception... > fabrications...Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for > consciousness, Radha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one > is said to be 'a being." > > > > Being / craving does not cease by denial, it ceases by > non-assocation. Who is not associating? Someone in jhana. Who is in > jhana? Someone who mindfully ceases the narrating/discursing of their > being, and their denials of it. > > --------------------- > > Yes, I remember Victor telling us about the self. What I still don't > understand - not that it is any of my business - is why you believe > in a self but not in an eternal self. If there were one, wouldn't it > be better that there were both - so that the self could live forever? Good question. It's not a matter of believing in a self. Self is given as a structure of consciousness. Consciousness is not only of its object, but also of consciousness of consciouness of object. How else can nama be differentiated from rupa? Self is a relationship between what is and isn't. I think the self you deny is the self as agent, and somehow you think I entertain self as agent. But I treat of self as identity. The idea of "what would be better?" is an expression of the craving that is the dynamo for the ceaseless process of me becoming me, you becoming you. And we never quite get there, but to deny the reality of the process of self trying to become self is futile to say the least. Kind Regards Herman #61530 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 4:01 pm Subject: Vism.XVII,90 lbidd2 "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga), Ch. XVII 90. (15) The four kinds of nutriment, which assist material and immaterial states by consolidating them, are 'nutriment conditions', according as it is said: 'Physical nutriment is a condition, as nutriment condition, for this body. Immaterial nutriments are conditions, as nutriment condition, for associated states and for the kinds of materiality originated by them' (P.tn.1,5). But in the Question Section it is said: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant indeterminate nutriments are conditions, as nutriment condition, for aggregates associated therewith and for the kinds of materiality due to kamma performed' (P.tn.1,174). ************************ 90. ruupaaruupaana.m upatthambhaka.t.thena upakaarakaa cattaaro aahaaraa aahaarapaccayo. yathaaha ``kaba.liikaaro aahaaro imassa kaayassa aahaarapaccayena paccayo. aruupino aahaaraa sampayuttakaana.m dhammaana.m ta.msamu.t.thaanaana~nca ruupaana.m aahaarapaccayena paccayo''ti (pa.t.thaa0 1.1.15). pa~nhaavaare pana ``pa.tisandhikkha.ne vipaakaabyaakataa aahaaraa sampayuttakaana.m khandhaana.m ka.tattaa ca ruupaana.m aahaarapaccayena paccayo''tipi (pa.t.thaa0 1.1.429) vutta.m. 1) #61531 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 4:20 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling egberdina Hi Howard and Sarah, > > As Nina wrote, "each moment there is experience of an object, and > > depending on kamma that object is desirable (i.t.tharamma.na) or > > undesirable (ani.t.thaarama.na). We do not know at all whether there is > > seeing now of an agreeable or a disagreeable object. If we try to find out > > all about kamma and the way it conditions our life now it would lead to > > madness." > > > > As for the implication you raised of an object being pleasant/desirable vs > > unpleasant/undesirable, I think we can say that usually desirable objects > > are a supporting condition for desire to arise and undesirable objects for > > aversion to arise. Of course, we all wish to have pleasant experiences > > through the senses and wish the same for our families and friends. Only > > nibbana and the lokuttara cittas are appa.nihita or 'desireless' dhammas - > > they cannot be objects of desire. > > > --------------------------------- > Howard: > Agreed. > ------------------------------- > > > > > > A pleasant or desirable rupa means that by nature it is pleasant and > > usually is a condition for desire, depending on 'normal' accumulations. > > The development of samatha and vipassana runs against the current of such > > normal accumulations, of course. > > > ----------------------------------- > Howard: > I agree on both counts. > ----------------------------------- I see no necessary link between rupas and pleasantness/unpleasantness. It seems quite circular, to me, to say that an object is desirable because it is pleasant. Kind Regards Herman #61532 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 12:45 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Larry - Thank you! :-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 7/17/06 6:39:23 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@... writes: > Howard: "Conditioned realities are utterly dependent on other (equally > empty) conditions for their brief existence. Every dhamma *is* a unique > event-quality, but is nothing at all in-and-of-itself. So, there is > uniqueness and existence, but no self-existence, no separate, > independent existence, no own-being: none in the slightest." > > Hi Howard, > > Very good! I can't say I understand this, but I think you have hit on > the right balance, the middle way. Thanks very much. > > Larry > #61533 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 5:12 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, 26 philofillet Hi Nina It seems to me that lobha from objects through the five senses is inevitable for now - even the noble ones have it, until arahant(?) But what about lobha related to pleasant mental objects? I am too lazy to get my SN anthology at the moment, but there are many suttas, if I recall correctly, in which greed for pleasant mental objects is taught about. I, personally, tend to place more concern on the lobha that I sense so strongly related to Dhamma. The way reading a sutta, for exdample, or listening to a dhamma talk, can help us shift away from unpleasant mental feeling. There is often understanding involved, of course, but there is so much evasion of unpleasant mental feeling through lobha for pleasasnt mental feeling. As you write in one book (or translate Acharn Sujin, I forget which) "Lobha takes us away from the present reality." OK, cut the babble Phil. My question - am I right in thinking that suttas teach about lobha for mental objects as well, and not just the five sense objects that are pointed at in the sutta you quote here? If I think of a sutta passage during a busy day and am comforted by it, it is not arising through one of the five doors, is it? Or is it still conditioned by having read it or heard it earlier through those doors? But that was just sound or visual object. Lobha from suttas must always come as a mental object, right? (Of course I know suttas can be appreciated with understanding at times as well.) Phil p.s it looks like this will be one of my mucho posting days. Please pick and choose little bits you'd like to respond too, when you have time. I am going to post once more, about that sankhara/sankhata thing. > In many suttas the Buddha speaks about lobha, points out the > dangers of it and the way to overcome it. The pleasant objects which > can be experienced through the five senses are in several suttas > called the ``five strands of sense-pleasures''. #61534 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 4:54 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life I. philofillet Hi Nina > Characteristics present themselves, and we can begin to be aware of > them. Ph: There has to be relaxing about this - if we press too hard or are too stringent in our understanding of what's involved, we miss the boat. I like in one of the talks from 2001, I think, you are talking about another Thai teacher, who you have heard say that we can begin to know the characteristics - and not just by thinking - even *before* the first stage of insight. I tend to doubt that this is possible - I see/semse/think about so much *thinking* involved in everything. But there can be conditions for me to relax and begin to have more awareness than I *think* I am capable of. :) It can happen. But not *should* happen. I see you have "can" in the sentence above. As you know, I prefer this to "should" :) >We cannot pinpoint that it is the characteristic of this moment > of seeing or this visible object, because that have fallen away and > only the nimitta remains. Ph: Better to understand through the nimitta the characteristic of a dhamma that has fallen away than think mistakenly that it is direct experience of the characteristic that is still present - that is the way I am seeing this now. This does not matter, seeing presents > itself again and again, visible object presents itself again and > again. There is no need to think: is it this one, is it that one. Ph: If we do, we are just fooling ourselves. Lobha, moha, mana and other akusala factors are fooling us. Because we are thinking about something related to Dhamma, we can think that it is by definition kusala. Wrong, wrong, wrong. By thinking this we end up just accumulating more lobha and moha. But no need to be uptight about this. > There are characteristics time and again and understanding can > gradually be developed. Ph: It develops as we develop a habit for it. I like in a talk Azita uses a metaphor of turning on the tap when we want water. We develop a habit for it. Don't think about the need to do it, just do it. "Just understand" as Acharn Sujin says so often. > When insight has developed to the stage that it realizes the arising > and falling away of one dhamma at a time, it has become more precise. Not for us. Not yet. But no need to think about this. Thinking about what one is not capable of is another form of clinging to self, more mana. But the mana comes, of course, naturally enough. And the lobha. No need to fret about it, at least we understand how much there is of it. Others don't see this yet, I guess, and there's no way to get it across to them, I guess, because of the nature of all that lobha and moha and ditthi. But you keep trying so patiently. I'm not so patient! Please hold your response to this, Nina, because I will be posting again about something I thought about when reading about why the Buddha taught both sankhara and sankhata dhamma in Survey of Paramttha Dhamma this morning. Thanks! Phil #61535 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 5:26 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Thanks, I was just trying to get into the ballpark. H: "Yes, I'm sure that's right. But the emphasis is not on the number of items on the list, or the items on the lists, but the idea that the ingredients of an amalgam can be known individually." Since I know what you are referring to, the question is a good one: Can one know each part of the amalgam? If one is to know them, wouldn't the respective elements, if even in list-form, assist in the knowing? Wouldn't there be some need for sort of descriptive or nominal identification of these aspects of naama? With loving kindness, Scott. #61536 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 1:00 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Sarah, and also Jon at the end) - In a message dated 7/17/06 7:36:07 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > Hi Howard and Sarah, > > > > >As Nina wrote, "each moment there is experience of an object, and > > >depending on kamma that object is desirable (i.t.tharamma.na) or > > >undesirable (ani.t.thaarama.na). We do not know at all whether there is > > >seeing now of an agreeable or a disagreeable object. If we try to find > out > > >all about kamma and the way it conditions our life now it would lead to > > >madness." > > > > > >As for the implication you raised of an object being pleasant/desirable > vs > > >unpleasant/undesirable, I think we can say that usually desirable objects > > >are a supporting condition for desire to arise and undesirable objects > for > > >aversion to arise. Of course, we all wish to have pleasant experiences > > >through the senses and wish the same for our families and friends. Only > > >nibbana and the lokuttara cittas are appa.nihita or 'desireless' dhammas > - > > >they cannot be objects of desire. > > > > > > --------------------------------- > > Howard: > > Agreed. > > ------------------------------- > > > > > > > > > >A pleasant or desirable rupa means that by nature it is pleasant and > > >usually is a condition for desire, depending on 'normal' accumulations. > > >The development of samatha and vipassana runs against the current of such > > >normal accumulations, of course. > > > > > > ----------------------------------- > > Howard: > > I agree on both counts. > > ----------------------------------- > > I see no necessary link between rupas and pleasantness/unpleasantness. > It seems quite circular, to me, to say that an object is desirable > because it is pleasant. > > > Kind Regards > > > > Herman > > ============================= I don't contenance unobserved rupas. If they existed, no one would know it. Consider the aroma of some spicey dish that is pleasant to me, and consider at another time the objectively "same" aroma, but unpleasant to me. I say they are two different olfactory rupas in my mindstraem, the first pleasant and the second unpleasant. Likewise, if you and I both smelled "the same" aroma at a given time, they are, in fact, not at all the same rupa, thought they correspond, and your might be pleasant and mine unpleasant. (Oh, and Jon, it just occurred to me that this is a good example for the virtue of discussing multiple namarupic streams.) With metta, Howard #61537 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 5:51 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: object and feeling ken_aitch Hi Sarah and Howard, Welcome back, Sarah. I'd like to chip in again on this thread, not to interrupt but just because I find it helpful. ------------ S (quoting Sammohavinodani): > > "Just as there is water below and above and on all sides of one who is immersed in water, so indeed in a desirable (i.t.tha) object the arising of greed is completely habitual for beings, and likewise in an undesirable (ani.t.tha) object the arising of annoyance (pa.tigha)." > > > Howard: Yes, that's not bad. 'Desirable' meaning standardly leading to greed (desire). However, it would be rare that such a dhamma would be experienced as unpleasant, for few folks crave that. ------------ Folks are illusory beings, and, therefore, it is of no consequence whether we say, "Folks crave pleasant rupas," or we say, "Folks do not crave pleasant rupas." However, it is of consequence to know that dhammas (citta and cetasika) crave pleasant rupas. They do that, not because they understand the pleasant nature of those rupas, but simply because they are conditioned to experience them that way. All of these discussions are opportunities for us to see the world as it truly is - just a few, dumb, disinterested, namas and rupas rising and falling away by conditions. Thanks again for the opportunity. :-) Ken H 25) #61538 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 5:34 pm Subject: sankhara vs sankhata dhamma philofillet Hi again Nina and all I appreciated this from Survery of Paramattha Dhammas on why the Buddha taught sankhata as well as sankhara dhamma. "The Buddha's teaching is complete as to the letter and meaning. But, he gave further explanation of Dhamma subjects, whose meaning people might understnad. He added words that described the meaning, making it even clearer. People might misunderstand dhammas, which arise because of conditions (sankhara dhamma) and might mistakenly believe that dhammas that arise could continue to exist. Hence, the BUddha taught that sankhara dhammas are also sankhata dhammas, dhammas that have already been conditioned. Sankhata dhammas are dhammas that have arisen and then fall away." This reminded me of one of the phrases from your books (I think?) that have stuck in my mind - "we wish to disregard the impermanence of conditioned dhammas" (or nama and rupa, I forget which) This sankhata dhamma helps to drive home the impermanence of the dhammas, to remind us that they are already gone. This can help us to avoid the mistake of thinking we can sit and examine dhammas whenever we want to. When we do this, we are actually thinking about dhammas, though we might take it for experience of them. Thus we might come up with all sorts of theories about what vedana is for example, and since this is based on our "experience" we think it is a validation of the Buddha's teaching to "rely on oneself." In fact is just refined thinking. The dhammas are already gone. We wish to disregard the impermanence of dhammas, the fleetingness of them, the anattaness of them. Much more attractive to "experience" them as lasting for more than one moment, to be lasting over a continuous period of time, as our "experience" tells us. Experience of dhammas, or thinking rooted in moha and lobha? Anyways, I appreciated reading about why dhammas are taught to be sankhata as well as sankhara. And now my burst of posting is done! :) Phil #61539 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 7:48 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] a friend's question egberdina Hi Mike, On 18/07/06, m. nease wrote: > > > Can unhappiness (domanassa) arise at the same time as detachment > (alobha)? Not sure but I doubt it. If not, then what conditions detachment > conditions happiness, even in the short run, seems to me. I think all the > Dhamma properly understood conditions detachment. > How is detachment (alobha) manifest? Kind Regards Herman #61540 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 8:00 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling egberdina Hi Ken, On 18/07/06, ken_aitch wrote: > > > Folks are illusory beings, and, therefore, it is of no consequence > whether we say, "Folks crave pleasant rupas," or we say, "Folks do not > crave pleasant rupas." > What is the ontological status of illusory being? How can something be known as not being? Is the illusory status of something that isn't real, real? Kind Regards Herman #61541 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 8:03 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. egberdina Hi Scott, On 18/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > Dear Herman, > > Thanks, I was just trying to get into the ballpark. > > H: "Yes, I'm sure that's right. But the emphasis is not on the number > > of items on the list, or the items on the lists, but the idea that the > ingredients of an amalgam can be known individually." > > > Since I know what you are referring to, the question is a good one: > Can one know each part of the amalgam? > > If one is to know them, wouldn't the respective elements, if even in > list-form, assist in the knowing? Wouldn't there be some need for > sort of descriptive or nominal identification of these aspects of naama? > How are the elements known if they are never apart from their amalgam status? Kind Regards Herman #61542 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 7:47 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling lbidd2 Herman: "I see no necessary link between rupas and pleasantness/unpleasantness. It seems quite circular, to me, to say that an object is desirable because it is pleasant." Hi Herman and all, I've been thinking about this and it seems to me that a possible scenario is: consciousness of desirable object arises, then pleasant feeling, then desire Instead of looking at the ultimate reality of rupa, why not look at what you actually consider to be a desirable object and see how an encounter with that plays out. You might also ask why is the desirable object desirable to _you_. Larry #61543 From: Ken O Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 8:20 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... ashkenn2k Hi all Just two cents of my view. If one will view ignorance as delusion or confusion, then panna could be view as clear comprehension, clear awareness. Panna and ignorance, there are many terms in the Pali that describe them. I think you are dicussing terminology rather than the essence of the teaching. We have to ask ourselves, satipatthana is literally known as the foundation of mindfullness, it is mindfulness foundation to wisdom or wisdom foundation to mindfullness. Could we have a case where mindfulness arise while panna does not arise or the other way around? So when we read the sutta where is said right view as the forerunner before all the other seven in the 8NT, could we said mindfulness first then right view. There are so many meanings to right view as said in MN 9, Right View. Cheers Ken O #61544 From: Ken O Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 8:34 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. ashkenn2k Hi Howard I am assuming that you are saying that anatta is not just empty of a self, it is empty of a core. Do your like to explain the lack of a core? How do you define feelings, preceptions using the lack of a core. Are we able to experience something that is actually lack a core. If it lacks a core, how do we know the difference between feelings and preceptions etc. kind regards Ken O #61545 From: Ken O Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 9:20 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" ashkenn2k Hi James and Howard When visible object impinges on a seeing sense citta, is there any action to be taken by anyone or a self said I need to arise this and that to arise seeing involved? Simply said wu wei because dhamma is conditional. In other words, wu wei means wu wo er wei, no self in doing. kind regards Ken O #61546 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 6:04 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/17/06 9:12:11 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ken_aitch@... writes: > Hi Sarah and Howard, > > Welcome back, Sarah. I'd like to chip in again on this thread, not to > interrupt but just because I find it helpful. > > ------------ > S (quoting Sammohavinodani): >>"Just as there is water below and > above and on all sides of one who is immersed in water, so indeed in a > desirable (i.t.tha) object the arising of greed is completely habitual > for beings, and likewise in an undesirable (ani.t.tha) object the > arising of annoyance (pa.tigha)." > >> > > >Howard: > Yes, that's not bad. 'Desirable' meaning standardly leading to > greed (desire). However, it would be rare that such a dhamma would be > experienced as unpleasant, for few folks crave that. > ------------ > > Folks are illusory beings, and, therefore, it is of no consequence > whether we say, "Folks crave pleasant rupas," or we say, "Folks do not > crave pleasant rupas." ------------------------------------- Howard: Hey, Ken, the fact, agreed to by most of us including me, that "people" don't really exist adds nothing whatsoever to this conversation. Are you throwing it in for fun? It's nothing surprising to Buddhists. You said above "Welcome back, Sarah. I'd like to chip in again on this thread, not to interrupt but just because I find it helpful." But there is no Sarah, and no you, and no chipping in, and no thread, and no interrupting - and so it doesn't matter whether you welcome Sarah or don't welcome Sarah! That few folks crave what is experienced as unpleasant is *true*. It is just as true as Sarah having returned an your welcoming her. So, what is your point? Why was the reasonor your saying <>? The Buddha said that folks crave what is pleasant, it is well known that that is true, and it is an important fact. So, why do you say it is of no consequence when in fact it certainly is? The Buddha, all the time, used the sort of language you object to. If you were around circa 500 BCE, would you have taken the Buddha to task for speaking as he did? ------------------------------------------- > > However, it is of consequence to know that dhammas (citta and > cetasika) crave pleasant rupas. -------------------------------------------- Howard: Dhammas don't do anything at all, including crave. (Tanha is not a thing that craves. It IS the craving.) There are no "citta things" that are conscious. (Cittas are instances of being conscious; they are activities, not things that engage in ac activity). If dhammas were actors, cravers, feelers, knowers, recognizers etc, they would be little beings themselves! Dhammas are not agents. You replace one self by many selves, Ken, and think that this is Dhamma. ---------------------------------------------- > > > They do that, not because they understand the pleasant nature of those > rupas, but simply because they are conditioned to experience them that > way. > > All of these discussions are opportunities for us to see the world as > it truly is - just a few, dumb, disinterested, namas and rupas rising > and falling away by conditions. Thanks again for the opportunity. :-) > > Ken H > ====================== With metta, Howard #61547 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 17, 2006 6:24 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/17/06 11:34:29 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@... writes: > Hi Howard > > I am assuming that you are saying that anatta is not just empty of a > self, it is empty of a core. Do your like to explain the lack of a > core? How do you define feelings, preceptions using the lack of a > core. Are we able to experience something that is actually lack a > core. If it lacks a core, how do we know the difference between > feelings and preceptions etc. > > > kind regards > Ken O > ====================== Please forgive me, Ken, but I've reached the saturation point on this thread. I'm afraid I've said all that I can on it. My apologies. With metta, Howard #61548 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 1:49 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, 26 nilovg Hi Phil, Op 18-jul-2006, om 2:12 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: It seems to me that lobha from objects through the five senses is inevitable for now - even the noble ones have it, until arahant(?) ----------- N: The anaagamii has eradicated lobha for sense objects. ---------- Ph: But what about lobha related to pleasant mental objects? ------- N: Each ruupa that is sense object appears through the relevant sense- door and then through mind-door in the following mind-door process. If there is lobha in a sense-door process there is also lobha in the following mind-dor process, that is the fixed order (niyama) of cittas. After that we think of concepts and this often with lobha. ----------- Ph: ... am I right in thinking that suttas teach about lobha for mental objects as well, and not just the five sense objects that are pointed at in the sutta you quote here? ------- N: Yes, often. S IV< 91, XXXV, III,2, § 116, Worldly sense-pleasures, this is how to go to the world’s end. One is conscious of the world through the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, bodysense, mind. --------- Ph: I, personally, tend to place more concern on the lobha that I sense so strongly related to Dhamma. .... There is often understanding involved, of course, but there is so much evasion of unpleasant mental feeling through lobha for pleasasnt mental feeling. As you write in one book (or translate Acharn Sujin, I forget which) "Lobha takes us away from the present reality." ------- N: And what if the present reality is lobha for Dhamma? You often speak about your concern for this. I know what you mean, but is it beneficial to keep being concerned about this? There is lobha already if we step to the left or to the right. We have to accept that lobha always comes in, but if we are over anxious we cannot lead our life naturally. --------- Nina. #61549 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 1:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 89 and Tiika. nilovg Hi Larry, Op 18-jul-2006, om 0:44 heeft LBIDD@... het volgende geschreven: > Thanks for the explanation of listening. When I turn my head to > listen, > what is that? How is activity classified? ---------- N: You want to turn your head, javana cittas cause it to turn. But nobody else can know what types arise, kusala cittas or akusala cittas. Listening to what is the question, and with what types of citta. Nina. 5) #61550 From: "Phil" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 2:34 am Subject: Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, 26 philofillet Hi Nina > N: Each ruupa that is sense object appears through the relevant sense- > door and then through mind-door in the following mind-door process. > If there is lobha in a sense-door process there is also lobha in the > following mind-dor process, that is the fixed order (niyama) of cittas. I see. "niyama" refers not only to mind door following sense-door, but also to the jati following along as well. But...can there not be a sense door process rooted in lobha that is understood with panna by the following mind-door process? Or is that kusala understanding only in a subsequent mind door process? > > N: And what if the present reality is lobha for Dhamma? > > You often speak about your concern for this. > > I know what you mean, but is it beneficial to keep being concerned > about this? There is lobha already if we step to the left or to the > right. We have to accept that lobha always comes in, but if we are > over anxious we cannot lead our life naturally. Yes, you're right. But I don't fret about it. I'm more likely to mention it here than think about it during the day - this is the place to think about and discuss that sort of thing. Still, am aware of how I grab the SN anthology for a quick sutta fix when I'm bored or restless, or the Survey of PDs that I am enjoying so much now. There are all the passages that have already been highlighted with pencil, so I can quickly let my eyes pore over favourite places that will give me a wisdom boost.Or, more rarely, if there is fear and I go to a sutta for a bit of comforting mental food. Better that than alcohol, of course, but still do sense how the hetus are pretty soggy and sucky and eager for fast comfort when I pick up a book of suttas or one of my Dhamma notebooks or something. Just a stage, I'm sure. I'll always remember Rob K talking about how he was so concerned about lobha when he got into Dhamma that he hesitated to eat ice cream. Same sort of thing. Just a stage. It certainly won't keep me away from studying suttas. Thanks for your feedback, Nina. Phil 5) #61551 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 1:55 am Subject: Feeding the Investigation ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: What is Feeding the Investigation of States Link to Awakening! The Blessed Buddha once said: Bhikkhus, just as this body, is sustained by feeding, exists in dependence on feeding and cannot survive without food, exactly & even so are the Seven Links to Awakening also sustained by feeding, they can also only exist in dependence on feeding and they cannot survive without feeding... And what, bhikkhus, is the feeding of the emergence of any yet unarisen Investigation of states Link to Awakening and feeding of the very completion by advance of any already arisen Investigation of states Link to Awakening? There are states that are: Advantageous or Disadvantageous. Blameable or Blameless. Ordinary or Excellent. On the Bright or the Dark side. Frequently giving careful and rational attention to them, is feeding the arising of any unarisen Link to Investigation of states Link to Awakening and feeding the gradual fulfilment of any already arisen Investigation of states Link to Awakening... And what, Bhikkhus, is the starving that obstructs the emergence of any yet unarisen Investigation of states Link to Awakening & which also hinders any already arisen Investigation of states Link from reaching any fulfilment by deliberate development? There are, bhikkhus, things that are Advantageous or Disadvantageous, Blameable or Blameless, Ordinary or Excellent and on the Bright or the Dark side: not giving frequent, careful & rational attention to them; not considering them much & often; is the starving that prevents any unarisen Investigation of states Link to Awakening from arising and also blocks any already arisen Investigation of states Link to Awakening from reaching complete fulfilment by mental development... Comments from the classical commentaries: Examining is the characteristic of the Investigation of states Link to Awakening (Dhamma-Vicaya-sambojjhanga). Scrutiny, inspection, inquiry, exploration, analysis, research & repeated review is the purpose of the Investigation of states quality. Interested and eager curiosity is the manifestation of this Investigating function. Before, while and after doing any mental, verbal or bodily action simply ask yourself: Are this behaviour really: Advantageous or disadvantageous, blameable or blameless, ... on the Bright or Dark side and act accordingly! Keep on refining this discrimination!!! Conditions helpful for the emergence of the Investigation Link to Awakening are: 1: Asking Questions. 2: Clean, healthy & hygienic mental & physical praxis. 3: Avoidance of people with small & unclear understanding. 4: Friendship with people with exact & profound understanding. 5: Repeated reviewing reflection on all deeper questions. 6: Commitment to finding out precisely why & how... There is investigation of external states and there is investigation of internal states. Both is a crucial for all progress towards understanding. Awakening is pure Knowing! Sources (edited extracts): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V: 65-6+102-8] 46: Links. 2+51: Group & Nutriments.... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PS: Please include the word Samahita in any comment, since then will my automatic mail filters pick it up and I will see it & respond!! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. Friendship is the Greatest ... Let there be Calm & Free Bliss !!! <....> 1) #61552 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 4:01 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Bhikkhu Bodhi and Buddhaghosa jonoabb Hi Joop Joop wrote: >Jon: "Regarding your closing comment ('It's a reason again to prefer >the Suttas more than commentaries on it'), the fact is that there is >so much left unsaid in the suttas that they cannot be 'read' without >a considerable amount of 'interpretation', and I think you'll find >that there is no general consensus on their meaning when taken alone >(or as a body of work) without reference to other supporting >material. > >Joop: I disagree with that "unsaid" Who knows what is unsaid? >It's dangerous to talk about "unsaid": that opens the door for >esoteric (secret) texts that are - according some buddhists - spoken >to the Buddha to a elite-audience. I'm anti-esoteric: the Buddha has >His hand open when teaching, He had no secrets. > > I think 'left unsaid' was not a wise choice of words on my part ;-)) What I meant was that in a great many suttas the Buddha was addressing people who were ready for enlightenment and the language was at a level that makes it difficult for us to follow. References to khandhas, ayatanas, dhatus, dependent origination, the four noble truths and the like need endless explanation before they become meaningful to us, whereas they were readily understood on a first hearing by many at the time of the Buddha. So I stick with my point that the suttas cannot be read without the assistance of explanation from elsewhere. >The problem I have with the rest of your remark is that's very >difficult to know if commentators don't do more than 'commentate' (I >think this is not english but its is clear I hope); it's possible >they change a little bit the content. For example because they don't >like 'cognitive dissonance'. Looked at all the Suttas together, the >impression of a rather anarchistic canon can arise; and some people >don't like spiritual anarchy. > I'm not quite with you here, but if you'd like to bring up an instance of a commentary that you say does more than commentate on the original I'd be happy to discuss it. >Jon: "By the way, would you agree that individual suttas need to be >read in the context of the body of suttas as a whole?" > >Joop: A clear question, I can give a clear answer: No >The Buddha did not make a complete system of his teachings, that did >His followers, in a process, mostly given the name 'scholasticism' >Of course I can understand a Sutta (for example in which the Buddha >talks about DO) better when relating it to other Suttas (about the >same topic). > > You seem to give clear 'No' and then a clear 'Yes' ;-)). >The problem with your question is: who makes the "context" you are >talking about? > What is the problem you have with 'body of suttas as a whole'? >By the way, Jon; you are good in asking question but do not always >react to the answers or answer the questions of others. See for >example my message # 60587 about Dependent Origination >To be honest, that DO-discussion was more important to me than this >commentators-discussion. > Well you're not bad at asking questions yourself, Joop ;-)). But point taken, and I have given a reply to your earlier post. Thanks for the reminder. Jon 14) #61553 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 4:05 am Subject: Cetasikas' study corner 488- Non-Aversion/Adosa (t) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== Ch 29, Non-Aversion(Adosa)contd ***** Through the development of right understanding the clinging to the self can gradually decrease, and as a consequence there will be more conditions for loving kindness and patience. One will be more inclined to help others without selfish motives. There are many degrees of non-aversion, adosa, and in the arahat nonaversion has reached perfection. Those who have attained enlightenment, the ariyans, do not have wrong view of people who exist; they have realized that there are only nåma and rúpa, but they can still think of the concept “being”. The arahat can think of “being” but he thinks of beings without any defilements. Those who have eradicated defilements are truly kind to all beings. ***** Non-Aversion(Adosa)to be contd Metta, Sarah ====== 1) #61554 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 4:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... jonoabb Hi, Howard upasaka@... wrote: > You made some good points in the foregoing, especially as regards the >early passages that mention clearly comprehending. I just don't read quite as >much into that as you, but your point is a very good one. One reason why I >don't read so much into it is that an early mention (in the section on >mindfulness of the body) doesn't necessarily pertain to an early stage of the practice. >The order is body, feelings, consciousness, and dhammas, and the fact that >body is mentioned first doesn't imply early practice. But your point is still a >good one. > Just on a minor point here: the passage I quoted was not from the section on mindfulness of the body but on the so-called synopsis, which is the core proposition stated at the outset and then expounded on in the 4 sections beginning with mindfulness of the body that follow. > BTW, I noticed something interesting: On ATI, there are three >different translations provided. Two of the three use the terminology you used of >"clearly comprehending". The third, by Thanissaro Bhikkhu writes "ardent, alert, & >mindful," using 'alert' instead of 'clearly comprehending'. The use of >'clearly comprehending' shows that a degree of pa~n~na is already in force. (Of >course, I do readily admit that some pa~n~na *must* be present at the outset >anyway.) I would be interested in knowing what the Pali is in the original that >two of the three translate as "clearly comprehending" instead of "alert". > Yes, that is interesting. The Pali for 'ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful' is 'atapi, sampajano, satima'. The commentary as quoted in Soma Thera's 'The Way of Mindfulness' says about sampajano: "Clearly comprehending." Endowed with knowledge called circumspection [sampajañña]. This is further explained in the sub-commentary as follows: Clearly comprehending = Discerning rightly, entirely and equally [samma samantato samañca pajananto]. Rightly = Correctly [aviparitam]. Entirely = By knowing in all ways [sabbakarapajananena]. Equally = By reason of proceeding through the conveying of higher and higher spiritual attainments [uparupari visesavaha-bhavena pavattiya]. As a matter of interest, the commentary on 'satima' gives: "Mindful." Endowed with mindfulness that lays hold of the body as a subject of meditation, because this yogavacara (the man conversant with contemplative activity) contemplates with wisdom after laying hold of the object with mindfulness. There is nothing called contemplation without mindfulness. Therefore the Master said: "Mindfulness is necessary in all circumstances, O bhikkhus, I declare."[SN] Necessary in all circumstances = Everywhere in the state of becoming, in every sluggish and unbalanced state of mind, it is desirable. Or, that by the help of which the other proper Factors of Enlightenment [bojjhanga] are capable of being developed, is "necessary in all circumstances." Here, contemplation takes place by means of wisdom that is assisted by mindfulness. > As for evidence of development of wisdom, I see that even within the >subsection on mindfulness of the body pertaining to breathing. It starts with >merely distinguishing longer and shorter breaths, it moves on to noticing what >happpens in the body along with the breathing [As a consequence of attending >to the breath, certain bodily sensations become observable that were not in >evendence previously - I know this first-hand], and finally it becomes possible >to discern arisings and dissolutions with the body. This is a graduated >development. > Yes, there is a graduated development there, but whether it is mindfulness followed by insight is another matter. In any event, enlightenment with jhana as basis, where breath is the object of jhana, is a rather special case. I think it's difficult to find any graduated development elsewhere in the sutta. Certainly there is none explicit. Jon 85) #61555 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 4:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) jonoabb Hi Scott Scott Duncan wrote: >J: "Samatha and vipassana are different kinds of kusala and the panna >which accompanies each is similarly of a different kind. The panna of >insight is not just a more developed form of the panna of samatha, but >it is panna of a different order altogether." > >Could you please elaborate on the above? What comes to mind, based on >my limited understanding, is that pa~n~na is pa~n~na - a cetasika >which arises and falls away and with its sole function. Thinking of >it this way, I'm not sure how it can be of "a different order." > Yes, panna has the same function no matter whether it accompanies samatha consciousness or vipassana consciousness, that is to say, the same general function, that of dispelling ignorance, but there are differences also, because the way of vipassana is different from the way of samatha. As you will already know, before his enlightenment as the Buddha the Bodhisatta received instruction from teachers who had attained the highest levels of jhana (for which great panna is required), and he himself attained those levels, yet realised that this was not the way leading to escape from samsara. When he finally attained enlightenment, it was by way of the development of insight. So insight is not just a progression from samatha/jhana; it is a different way/path altogether (as a rider to that, however, I should add that when insight is developed, so is samatha). >Is this being of a different order dependent on the conditions out of >which pa~n~na arises at a given moment? Is this dependent on the >object (which is what you say above, I think)? In other words, is the >quality of pa~n~na influenced by context in which it arises? > The person who develops jhana but has no interest in the development of insight sees the danger in the clinging to (and other akusala conditioned by) the objects experienced through the sense-doors, but does not see the 'danger'/suffering/lack of satisfactoriness in conditioned dhammas. Unless there is some inkling at an intellectual level at least of the unsatisfactoriness in life in samsara (this is also called a 'sense of urgency' (samvega)), there will be no conditions for insight to arise or develop. I think it fair to say that the panna in each of these 2 cases -- seeing the danger in clinging to sense-objects (and as the escape from that, abiding in jhana and on death rebirth in the Brahma worlds), and seeing the unsatisfactoriness of life in samsara (and as the escape from that, insight into the true nature of dhammas and on death no rebirth in any plane whatsoever) -- is panna of a different order to the other. Jon 85) #61556 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 4:26 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhijja domanassa (was, Re: Hello*) jonoabb Hi Mateesha (Continuing with your post) matheesha wrote: >M: Satipattana sutta talks of being mindful of craving, aversion etc. >Yet the gradual path of the Buddhas teaching clearly talks of much >preparation of the mind before starting satipattana practice. Just >being secluded in itself, not to mention the life of a monk, has >great effects on the mind, as I'm sure many here have experienced, in >terms of calming it. The sutta itself talks of being away >from 'abhijja domanassa' before starting this practice. This is >clearly a practical instruction to someone who hasnt attained >arahathood and can have no claim to a mind without akusala (or even >atta ditti), and is the path to getting rid of those very same >defilements. > You mention here the need to be away from abhijja domanassa before starting the practice of satipatthana, according to the Satipatthana Sutta. Here is the passage that refers to the overcoming of abhijja domanassa ('covetousness and grief' in this translation from The Way of Mindfulness): "What are the four [Arousings of Mindfulness]? "Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly comprehending (it) and mindful (of it), having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief; "he lives contemplating the feelings in the feelings, ... "he lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness, ... "he lives contemplating mental objects in mental objects, ardent, clearly comprehending (them) and mindful (of them), having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief." Now whatever meaning we are to give to the words 'having overcome, in this world, covetousness and grief', it must be a meaning that is consistent with the rest of the sutta, which essentially describes just *how* it is that a person lives contemplating the body, feelings, consciousness and mental objects in the manner described. For example, in the section on The Contemplation of Consciousness we find: "And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating consciousness in consciousness? "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust, as with lust (and without lust, as without lust); the consciousness with hate, as with hate (and without as without); the consciousness with ignorance, as with ignorance, etc; the shrunken state of consciousness, as the shrunken state; the distracted state of consciousness, as the distracted state; ... "Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating consciousness in consciousness." And in the section on The Contemplation on Mental Objects: "And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in mental objects? "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating the mental objects in the mental objects of the five hindrances. "How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the mental objects of the five hindrances? "Here, O bhikkhus, when sensuality is present, a bhikkhu knows with understanding: 'I have sensuality,' ... When anger is present, he knows with understanding: 'I have anger,' ... When sloth and torpor are present, he knows with understanding: 'I have sloth and torpor,' ... When agitation and worry are present, he knows with understanding: 'I have agitation and worry,' ... When doubt is present, he knows with understanding: 'I have doubt,' ... "Thus, indeed, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu lives contemplating mental object in the mental objects of the five hindrances." So it is clear that the sutta is contemplating a mind which all the usual defilements are still arising. There is no suggestion here of having to be free of abhijja domanassa before there can be any development of mindfulness/insight. As I see it, the overcoming of abhijja and domanassa occurs when mindfulness/insight arises, or indeed at any moment of kusala. If the citta is kusala, abhijja domanassa have been (momentarily) overcome. The overcoming is not something to be 'done' as a prerequisite to the development of mindfulness/insight. >Abhidhamma probably has problems understanding >intensities and frequencies as it has a very limited and snapshot >view of dhammas, which direct experiencing doesnt produce (-ie the >temporal element/causality can clearly be seen in the latter). A >state intense mental activity (thoughts) unconducive to insight and a >calm mind still giving rise to a few defilements are poles apart in >usefeulness to the Path. > The idea you mention here, that intense mental activity is not conducive to insight while a calm mind with few defilements is, is a commonly held one, and I think you would say that your personal experience confirms this. But the question must be whether it is an idea that is found in the suttas. It is not safe to rely on our (or anyone else's) personal experience, because subjective assessments of this kind are bound to be coloured by wrong view and ignorance and a desire to be persuaded that we are making progress. I see there are other sutta references and quotes coming up next in your post. If you don't mind I'll finish here and continue in a separate post. Jon 23) #61557 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 1:02 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" upasaka_howard Hi, Ken (and James) - In a message dated 7/18/06 12:27:07 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@... writes: > Hi James and Howard > > When visible object impinges on a seeing sense citta, is there any > action to be taken by anyone or a self said I need to arise this and > that to arise seeing involved? > ---------------------------------- Howard: When there is visual contact, all actions that led to that have already occurred. So, ... no. ;-) As for a self, or a person, doing anything, have you gotten the impresson from my writing, recently and for years prior, that I believe in the literal existence of such things? If not, then I don't understand why you would ask what you just asked. ------------------------------------ Simply said wu wei because dhamma is> > conditional. In other words, wu wei means wu wo er wei, no self in > doing. ----------------------------------- Howard: Yes, it means "so self" in doing in the sense of acting free of *sense* of self. It is probably much the same as kiriya kamma, an undefiled acting. ---------------------------------- > > > kind regards > Ken O > ================== With metta, Howard 22) #61558 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 5:23 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" egberdina Hey KenO, On 18/07/06, Ken O wrote: > > > When visible object impinges on a seeing sense citta, When was the last time this happened to you? Kind Regards Herman 22) #61559 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 1:34 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhijja domanassa (was, Re: Hello*) upasaka_howard Hi, Jon (and Matheesha) - Jon, as I started into your post, and I read "So it is clear that the sutta is contemplating a mind which all the usual defilements are still arising. There is no suggestion here of having to be free of abhijja domanassa before there can be any development of mindfulness/insight.", I went back to see who was writing this post! LOL! Because I would have expected you of all people to say that pa~n~na and seclusion from abhijja domanassa would be in effect at the very outset of the practice of satipatthana! But as for calm needing to be in place in order for that practice to proceed, I believe you are both correct in this matter. Even with much calm in place, defilements can and do arise. With a degree of calm, they can be observed, seen clearly, and let go of, but not so when mind is wildly out of control and upset. As I see it, there needs to be neither total absorption with the mind unable to see see anything but a single focus, nor a mind that is like the choppy surface of a pond roiled by powerful storm winds. With metta, Howard In a message dated 7/18/06 7:26:49 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > Hi Mateesha > > (Continuing with your post) > > matheesha wrote: > > >M: Satipattana sutta talks of being mindful of craving, aversion etc. > >Yet the gradual path of the Buddhas teaching clearly talks of much > >preparation of the mind before starting satipattana practice. Just > >being secluded in itself, not to mention the life of a monk, has > >great effects on the mind, as I'm sure many here have experienced, in > >terms of calming it. The sutta itself talks of being away > >from 'abhijja domanassa' before starting this practice. This is > >clearly a practical instruction to someone who hasnt attained > >arahathood and can have no claim to a mind without akusala (or even > >atta ditti), and is the path to getting rid of those very same > >defilements. > > > > You mention here the need to be away from abhijja domanassa before > starting the practice of satipatthana, according to the Satipatthana Sutta. > 23) #61560 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 1:36 am Subject: Typo Re: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" upasaka_howard Hi again, Ken (and James) - In a message dated 7/18/06 8:11:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@... writes: > Howard: > Yes, it means "so self" in doing in the sense of acting free of > *sense* of self. It is probably much the same as kiriya kamma, an undefiled > acting. > ====================== Of course, "so self" was intended to be "no self". Sorry. With metta, Howard 1) #61561 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 5:47 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Again, I am your worst source for this kind of information... "How are the elements known if they are never apart from their amalgam status?" They don't arise separately. Citta cognises. When accompanied by the various other mental factors (cetasikas), each with its own function,(such as pa~n~na which knows the characteristics of things in certain ways)the thinking function of citta is enhanced or added to by the additional functions of the other elements. The elements can be known because it is of the nature of some of the elements to know. Since these variegated cittas arise and fall away in process or series, any object can be known or be an object of citta in the process. The next citta can know the characteristics of the preceding one. There's my attempt. Someone who knows better than I ought to correct this. How do you see it? With loving kindness, Scott. 65) #61562 From: "Phil" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 6:03 am Subject: Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" philofillet Hi Ken O and Herman Ken, I don't know the context of where your discussion is at, but isn't there a mistake in what you wrote below? Visible object and eye sense (both rupa) condition the arising of the seeing citta, don't they? I don't think visible object impinges on "seeing sense citta" does it? (citta is nama, so did you mean the rupa "seeing sense?") e.g SN 35 60 "In dependence on the eye and forms, eye- consciousness arises." I always find it interesting that the nama of seeing arises dependent on two forms of rupa, and cannot arise unless they have arisen. Really gets at the anattaness of seeing, how it goes against our conventional understanding of a self who chooses what to see and so on. Phil > > > > When visible object impinges on a seeing sense citta, 22) #61563 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 6:04 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, 26 nilovg Hi Phil, These processes go so fast, the subsequent mind-door process of cittas follow already, and the javanacittas are also rooted in lobha. Afterwards there can be other processes with paññaa. Nina. Op 18-jul-2006, om 11:34 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > But...can there not be > a sense door process rooted in lobha that is understood with panna > by the following mind-door process? Or is that kusala understanding > only in a subsequent mind door process? 5) #61564 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 6:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Matheesha and photo nilovg Hi Matheesha, you made me laugh so much. Let them stare at you, the heck with it! You are only one of the many, there is like an army of members' photos out there. I used to be disinclined, but Sarah asked it so kindly, that I agreed. I also noticed that there is some conceit when we think: he or she looks at me. There is still he and me. A kind of upholding one's precious personality. Nina. Op 17-jul-2006, om 19:45 heeft matheesha het volgende geschreven: > Never, I say Never will you see me. > > ;-) > > Did you know that female infants stare longer at faces than male > ones? Apparently females are better at reading body language and > experessions than males. Now you know why! 85) #61565 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Right view the forerunner (was, Re: Hello) jonoabb Hi Mateesha Coming to the end of your post ;-)) matheesha wrote: >"Of those, right view is the forerunner. And how is right view the >forerunner? In one of right view, right resolve comes into being. In >one of right resolve, right speech comes into being. In one of right >speech, right action...In one of right action, right livelihood...In >one of right livelihood, right effort...In one of right effort, right >mindfulness...In one of right mindfulness, right concentration...In >one of right concentration, right knowledge...In one of right >knowledge, right release comes into being. Thus the learner is >endowed with eight factors, and the Arahant with ten. >-mahacattasarika sutta > >It is clear that samadhi (a calm unified mind) is a forerunner to >panna. > I have already agreed that samadhi is often given as a factor preceding insight (although just what that means is another matter; it doesn't, for example, mean that samatha is a prerequisite for the development of insight). But in fact in this particular passage from the Mahacattasarika Sutta panna is given as the forerunner, because right view is the mental factor of panna. By the way, I'm not sure if I agree with your paraphrasing of samadhi as 'a calm and unified mind'. That is more a description of samatha, I believe, or perhaps of any kusala mind-state. Samadhi, as I understand it, is just the mental factor of concentration. Although it is one of the universal factors, it assumes a particularly important role when it comes to the development of samatha and vipassana. >It is clearly said that a person who doesnt have samadhi should >approach another and ask how that samadhi should be developed, the >mind unified and concentrated. (samadhi sutta) > > I believe the sutta passage you quoted before and refer to above is talking about samatha, not samadhi. The passage says (I am using the Bhikkhu Bodhi translation in NDB): "Therein, monks, the person who gains the higher wisdom of insight into things but not internal tranquility of mind should approach one who gains internal tranquility and inquire of him: "How, friend, should the mind be steadied? How should the mind be composed? How should the mind be unified? How should the mind be concentrated?" "The other then answers him as he has seen and understood the matter thus: "The mind should be steadied in such a way, composed in such a way, unified in such a way, concentrated in such a way." "At a later time this one gains both internal tranquility of mind and the higher wisdom of insight into things." (For comparison, your earlier version is at http://www.metta.lk/mirror/www.accesstoinsight/canon/sutta/anguttara/an04-094.ht\ ml) In a footnote, BB gives a summary of the commentary as follows: "AA explains internal tranquility of mind (ajjhattam cetosamatha) as the concentration of full mental absorption (i.e. jhana), and the higher wisdom of insight into things (abhipannadhammavipassana) as insight knowledge discerning formations (sankharapariggahaka-vipassananana). The latter is called `higher wisdom' and it is insight into the `things' comprised of the five aggregates." So here is a case of a person who has already attained a high level of insight being encouraged to develop samatha. As I see it, he is encouraged to develop samatha for its own sake, not as a prerequisite to the development of insight (which is already well developed in him). >Maybe the problem was not knowing the samadhi (unifcation) is >(almost) essential for a calm mind. > I agree that samadhi is essential for samatha (I think that's what you're saying here). By the way, in an earlier post you mentioned 'citta ekaggata'. I have found a reference to this in Nyanatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary, under the entry for citass'ekaggataa (a synonym) which reads: 'one-pointedness of mind', is a synonym of concentration, or 'samadhi'. Thanks for exchanging ideas. Jon 23) #61566 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:22 am Subject: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" buddhatrue Hi Ken O, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Ken O wrote: > > Hi James and Howard > > When visible object impinges on a seeing sense citta, is there any > action to be taken by anyone or a self said I need to arise this and > that to arise seeing involved? James: Yes, there is a little self which is found in the pituitary gland. Without the assistance of this little self, seeing could not occur. Don't you know anything?? ;-)) Simply said wu wei because dhamma is > conditional. In other words, wu wei means wu wo er wei, no self in > doing. > > > kind regards > Ken O Metta, James 22) #61567 From: "matheesha" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 8:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Matheesha and photo matheesha333 Hi Nina, >nina: you made me laugh so much. Let them stare at you, the heck with it! > You are only one of the many, there is like an army of members' > photos out there. > I used to be disinclined, but Sarah asked it so kindly, that I agreed. > I also noticed that there is some conceit when we think: he or she > looks at me. There is still he and me. A kind of upholding one's > precious personality. M: I agree. It's a funny thing. The ideas that others project on to you because of what you look like, and what you suspect others might think, neither of which might have anything to do with the reality of the situation! I have some 'insight' (in a psychological sense) into my subtle resistence to posting a photo, so it is not too great a problem. :) But I suspect I will in due course. You are right of course about manna/conceit. The day I become an arahanth I promise, everyone can have my photo freely. Hope Sarah is not feeling too embarrassed. :) Maybe there is a need to keep an eye on her flock. ;-) take care all, Matheesha 85) #61568 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 10:41 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe 27 nilovg Dear friends, The satisfaction in sense-pleasures is not true happiness. Those who do not know the Buddha's teachings may think that attachment is wholesome, especially when it arises with pleasant feeling. They may not know the difference between attachment and loving kindness (mettå), phenomena which may both arise with pleasant feeling. However, a citta accompanied by pleasant feeling is not necessarily kusala citta. When we learn more about akusala cittas and kusala cittas and when we are mindful of their characteristics, we will notice that the pleasant feeling which may arise with lobha-múla- citta (citta rooted in attachment) is different from the pleasant feeling which may arise with kusala citta. Feeling (vedanå) is a cetasika which arises with every citta. When the citta is akusala, the feeling is also akusala, and when the citta is kusala, the feeling is also kusala. We may be able to know the difference between the characteristic of the pleasant feeling arising when we are attached to an agreeable sight or sound, and the characteristic of the pleasant feeling arising when we are generous. The Buddha pointed out that lobha brings sorrow. When we lose people who are dear to us or when we lose the things we enjoy, we have sorrow. If we are attached to a comfortable life we may have aversion when we have to endure hardship or when things do not turn out the way we want them to be. We read in the Greater Discourse on the Stems of Anguish, which was quoted above, that the Buddha spoke to the monks about the dangers in the pleasures of the senses: And what, monks, is the peril in sense-pleasures? In this case, monks, a young man of family earns his living by some craft... He is afflicted by the cold, he is afflicted by the heat, suffering from the touch of gadflies, mosquitos, wind, sun, creeping things, dying of hunger and thirst. This, monks, is a peril in pleasures of the senses that is present, a stem of ill... If, monks, this young man of family rouses himself, exerts himself, strives thus, but if these possessions do not come to his hand, he grieves, mourns, laments, beating his breast and wailing, he falls into disillusionment, and thinks: ``Indeed my exertion is in vain, indeed my striving is fruitless.'' This too, monks, is a peril in the pleasures of the senses that is present... And again, monks, when sense-pleasures are the cause... kings dispute with kings, nobles dispute with nobles, brahmans dispute with brahmans, householders dispute with householders, a mother disputes with her son, a son disputes with his mother, a father disputes with his son, a son disputes with his father, a brother disputes with a brother, a brother disputes with a sister, a sister disputes with a brother, a friend disputes with a friend. Those who enter into quarrel, contention, dispute and attack one another with their hands and with stones and with sticks and with weapons, these suffer dying then and pain like unto dying. This too, monks, is a peril in the pleasures of the senses that is present... ******* Nina. 1) #61569 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 10:49 am Subject: Letters from Nina, 9. nilovg Dear friends, < It is, sisters, like the oil for lighting an oil-lamp which is impermanent and liable to alteration, and like the wick which is impermanent and liable to alteration, and like the flame which is impermanent and liable to alteration, and like the light which is impermanent and liable to alteration. If anyone, sisters, were to speak thus: " The oil for lighting this oil-lamp is impermanent and liable to alteration, and the wick... and the flame is impermanent and liable to alteration, but that which is the light-- that is permanent, lasting, eternal, not liable to alteration," speaking thus, sisters, would he be speaking rightly?' 'No, revered sir. What is the reason for this? It is, revered sir, that if the oil for lighting this oil-lamp be impermanent and liable to alteration, and if the wick... and if the flame be impermanent and liable to alteration, all the more is the light impermanent and liable to alteration.' 'Even so, sisters, if anyone should speak thus: "These six internal sense-fields are impermanent and liable to alteration, but whatever pleasure or pain or indifferent feeling I experience as a result of these six internal sense-fields-- that is permanent, lasting, eternal, not liable to alteration," speaking thus, sisters, would he be speaking rightly?' 'No, revered sir. What is the reason for this? As a result of this or that condition, revered sir, these or those feelings arise. From the stopping of this or that condition these or those feelings are stopped.' ******* Nina. 1) #61570 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 11:25 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life I. nilovg Hi Phil, If direct awareness of dhammas could not arise before the first stage of insight, how could there be a stage of insight? It is a gradual process, a growing of sati and paññaa, towards that stage of insight. But no use to specualte who can and who cannot. Nina. Op 18-jul-2006, om 1:54 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > you are > talking about another Thai teacher, who you have heard say that we > can begin to know the characteristics - and not just by thinking - > even *before* the first stage of insight. I tend to doubt that this > is possible - I see/semse/think about so much *thinking* involved in > everything. 13) #61571 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 11:33 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abidharma origins nilovg Hi Charles D, To be born at the Buddha's time and hear his teaching directly from him is due to the right conditions. For many of them paññaa had matured because they had developed it for many aeons in the past. That is why they could understand his words. I think the whole of the Tipitaka, not only the Abhidhamma points to reaching the end of the cycle of birth and death. Nina. Op 17-jul-2006, om 13:50 heeft Charles DaCosta het volgende geschreven: > You feel they seem > to assume a great deal of understanding. I feel they don't, you > just have to > find the right one for the situation; this is why those at the > Buddha's time > who listened could understand, they heard the right one for the > situation > they were in. 5) #61572 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 8:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life I. upasaka_howard Hi, Nina (and Phil) - In a message dated 7/18/06 2:56:57 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Phil, > If direct awareness of dhammas could not arise before the first stage > of insight, how could there be a stage of insight? It is a gradual > process, a growing of sati and paññaa, towards that stage of insight. > But no use to specualte who can and who cannot. > Nina. > ====================== Yay!! I love every word you said here, Nina! Exactly so!!! With metta, Howard 13) #61573 From: "Bhante Seelagawesi" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 1:18 pm Subject: Love and compassion bhanteseelag... Dear Dhamma Friends, One day the Buddha saw two children were catching fish. The Buddha went to them. They had a nice feeling in their heart towards the Buddha. The Buddha questioned them what they were doing. The Buddha got the answer. He inquired them whether they like to be killed by others. Those two children answered. They said no. The Buddha asked them whether they like to bear harms from others. They said no. Then the Buddha said; if you consider the feeling of others as you feel, you may not wish to kill or harm others. The teaching of the Buddha was clear for those two children and they found there was no wish in their hearts to catch fish further. They could find the freedom of that harmful hobby for ever. The love and compassion would be fruitful with the teaching of the Buddha. So I focus my mind follow the teaching of the Buddha in my individual practice. There is the space to have a living relationship with the Buddha. It is not difficult for me to bear others complains, blames, criticizing and other displease responding. I may get angry but I have the energy to tolerate and follow the teaching with my practice. I invite you too. May you gain good health! May you experience peace and happiness! With much love and compassion, Seelagawesi thero #61574 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 3:46 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. egberdina Hi Scott, On 18/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > Dear Herman, > > Again, I am your worst source for this kind of information... > > > "How are the elements known if they are never apart from their amalgam > status?" > > > They don't arise separately. Citta cognises. When accompanied by the > various other mental factors (cetasikas), each with its own > function,(such as pa~n~na which knows the characteristics of things in > certain ways)the thinking function of citta is enhanced or added to by > the additional functions of the other elements. > > The elements can be known because it is of the nature of some of the > elements to know. Since these variegated cittas arise and fall away > in process or series, any object can be known or be an object of citta > in the process. The next citta can know the characteristics of the > preceding one. > > There's my attempt. Someone who knows better than I ought to correct > this. > > How do you see it? > In silence :-) Kind Regards Herman #61575 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 3:38 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling egberdina Hi Larry, On 18/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > Herman: "I see no necessary link between rupas and > > pleasantness/unpleasantness. It seems quite circular, to me, to say that > an object is desirable because it is pleasant." > > > Hi Herman and all, > > I've been thinking about this and it seems to me that a possible > scenario is: > > consciousness of desirable object arises, then pleasant feeling, then > desire > > Instead of looking at the ultimate reality of rupa, why not look at what > you actually consider to be a desirable object and see how an encounter > with that plays out. You might also ask why is the desirable object > desirable to _you_. > Thanks, Larry, for a very worthwhile suggestion. Kind Regards Herman #61576 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 6:52 pm Subject: Re: object and feeling ken_aitch Hi Howard, My apologies! I misread what you were saying. I thought you were saying folks could not crave dhammas because they only knew concepts. I might add that suggestions of that kind have been put (quite persuasively) several times on DSG. People have argued that no direct reaction to a paramattha dhamma could be of any great consequence. They say that it is only concepts (or the experience of them) that could stir up emotions. The Honey-ball Sutta has been cited in support, and I don't think any overall agreement has ever been reached. But that was not what you were saying, and my contribution was completely out of place. The moral of the story is: never chip in on anyone's conversation unless you have at least listened to what they are saying. :-) Returning to the scene of the crime: --------- KH: > > Folks are illusory beings, and, therefore, it is of no consequence whether we say, "Folks crave pleasant rupas," or we say, "Folks do not crave pleasant rupas." > > > Howard: Hey, Ken, the fact, agreed to by most of us including me, that "people" don't really exist adds nothing whatsoever to this conversation. Are you throwing it in for fun? It's nothing surprising to Buddhists. You said above "Welcome back, Sarah. I'd like to chip in again on this thread, not to interrupt but just because I find it helpful." But there is no Sarah, and no you, and no chipping in, and no thread, and no interrupting - and so it doesn't matter whether you welcome Sarah or don't welcome Sarah! That few folks crave what is experienced as unpleasant is *true*. ------------ Yes, I am sure it is. --------------------- H: > It is just as true as Sarah having returned an your welcoming her. So, what is your point? Why was the reason for your saying < KH: > > However, it is of consequence to know that dhammas (citta and cetasika) crave pleasant rupas. > Howard: Dhammas don't do anything at all, including crave. (Tanha is not a thing that craves. It IS the craving.) ---------- I prefer to say that dhammas do things, and that tanha is the thing that craves. But, normally, I would say the meaning was the same either way. You, however, say there is an important difference. You also say (on another thread) that dhammas lack something called "own being" and "self existence." So we do disagree. Our differences probably go back to the way we understand consciousness. You believe it is an event, and you believe that namas and rupas are "event contents" as distinct from dhammas in their right. I think your opinion is a dangerous divergence from the texts. The danger is that you (or panna) will never directly know paramattha dhammas while there is this wrong intellectual understanding of them. Figuratively speaking, you are sending panna on a wild goose chase. You are telling it to search for an experiential flux when it should be searching for a distinct nama or rupa. Moving on: ------------- H: > There are no "citta things" that are conscious. (Cittas are instances of being conscious; they are activities, not things that engage in ac activity). If dhammas were actors, cravers, feelers, knowers, recognizers etc, they would be little beings themselves! Dhammas are not agents. You replace one self by many selves, Ken, and think that this is Dhamma. ------------- Yes, I do think of dhammas as little doers, which might not be strictly correct. But is there is any great danger in that? Isn't it OK provided I understand them as having a "lifespan" of just one citta (nothing carrying over)? It's not as if I were saying they had a choice. I think we all agree that dhammas are the slaves of conditions - they have no choice (or even any interest) in what they are "doing." But, again, it might go back to the idea of an "experiential event" as opposed to distinct dhammas. (?) Ken H 29) #61577 From: "Phil" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 4:49 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma in Daily Life I. philofillet Hi Nina > If direct awareness of dhammas could not arise before the first stage > of insight, how could there be a stage of insight? Yes, but still important to remember that thinking about dhammas with attachment is not awareness of dhammas. So the "direct awareness" above *is* much more fleeting and rare than most people would like to believe. (Yes, no use thinking about who is capable and who is not but reading posts at this forum will naturally enough lead me to speculate about who believes what...and there are photos of members too, so I can even look at the person as I speculate about his or her wrong view...) I will have to *think* about this some more.... Phil 16) #61578 From: Ken O Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:01 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" ashkenn2k Hi Herman H: When was the last time this happened to you? many countless times previous timexxxx :-0. There is no I is involved in the process, it is just that I myselt still cannot realise it only. Ken O #61579 From: Ken O Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:05 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" ashkenn2k Hi Phil you are right, my fingers are too fast and I take for granted that my audience would know it :-) Cheers Ken O #61580 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 3:53 pm Subject: Dhammas According to Karunadasa/KenH upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - With regard to our recent postings, I provide some material from Karunadasa's Dhamma Theory article that I think is relevant: 1) Analysis shows that the world of experience is resolvable into a plurality of factors; synthesis shows that these factors are not discrete entities existing in themselves but inter-connected and inter-dependent nodes in a complex web of relationships. It is only for the purpose of definition and description that things are artificially dissected. In actuality the world given to experience is a vast network of tightly interwoven relations. This fact needs emphasis because the Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas has sometimes been represented as a radical pluralism. Such an interpretation is certainly not admissible. It is mostly Stcherbatsky's writings,11 mainly based on the Sarvastivada sources, that has given currency to this incorrect interpretation. "Up to the present time," observes Nyanaponika Thera, "it has been a regular occurrence in the history of physics, metaphysics, and psychology that when a whole has been successfully dissolved by analysis, the resultant parts come again to be regarded as little Wholes." 12 This is the kind of process that culminates in radical pluralism. As we shall soon see, about a hundred years after the formulation of the dhamma-theory, such a trend surfaced within certain schools of Buddhist thought and culminated in the view that the dhammas exist in all three periods of time. But the Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka did not succumb to this error of conceiving the dhammas as ultimate unities or discrete entities. In the Pali tradition it is only for the sake of definition and description that each dhamma is postulated as if it were a separate entity; but in reality it is by no means a solitary phenomenon having an existence of its own. This is precisely why the mental and material dhammas are often presented in inter-connected groups. In presenting them thus the danger inherent in narrowly analytical methods has been avoided -- the danger, namely, of elevating the factors resulting from analysis to the status of genuinely separate entities. Thus if analysis shows that composite things cannot be considered as ultimate unities, synthesis shows that the factors into which the apparently composite things are analysed (ghana-vinibbhoga) are not discrete entities.13If this Abhidhammic view of existence, as seen from its doctrine of dhammas, cannot be 2) This situation has to be considered in the context of the logical apparatus used by the Abhidhammikas in defining the dhammas. This involves three main kinds of definition. The first is called agency definition ( kattu-sadhana) because it attributes agency to the thing to be defined. Such, for example, is the definition of citta (consciousness) as "that which thinks" (cinteti ti cittat).25 The second is called instrumental definition (karana-sadhana) because it attributes instrumentality to the thing to be defined. Such, for example, is the definition of citta as "that through which one thinks" (cinteti ti etena cittat).26 The third is called definition by nature (bhava-sadhana) whereby the abstract nature of the thing to be defined is brought into focus. Such, for example, is the definition," The mere act of thinking itself is citta ( cintanamattam eva cittat)." 27The first two kinds of definition, it is maintained, are provisional and as such are not valid from an ultimate point of view.28 This is because the attribution of agency and instrumentality invests a dhamma with a duality when it is actually a unitary and unique phenomenon. Such attribution also leads to the wrong assumption that a given dhamma is a substance with inherent qualities or an agent which performs some kind of action. Such definitions are said to be based on tentative attribution (samaropana)29 and thus are not ultimately valid.30 It is as a matter of convention (vohara), and for the sole purpose of facilitating the grasp of the idea to be conveyed,31 that a duality is assumed by the mind in defining the dhamma, which is actually devoid of such duality.32 Thus both agency and instrumental definitions are resorted to for the convenience of description, and as such they are not to be understood in their direct literal sense. On the other hand, what is called definition by nature (bhavasadhana) is the one that is admissible in an ultimate sense.33 This is because this type of definition brings into focus the real nature of a given dhamma without attributing agency or instrumentality to it, an attribution which creates the false notion that there is a duality within a unitary dhamma. With metta, Howard #61581 From: Ken O Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:09 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" ashkenn2k Hi James Since you said there is a little self in the pituitary gland, so can you ask this little self to say when seeing red, I wish to see blue (assuming we are not colour blind :->) Or when one see something unpleasant like a dung, could the little self now change it to flower. Also dont use imagination because that is cheating ok :-) We can move the iris left and right, could we do it for changing of colours. Cheers Ken O #61582 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 9:19 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: K. Sujin on "No 'Tryng'" buddhatrue Hi Ken O, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Ken O wrote: > > Hi James > > Since you said there is a little self in the pituitary gland, so can > you ask this little self to say when seeing red, I wish to see blue > (assuming we are not colour blind :->) Or when one see something > unpleasant like a dung, could the little self now change it to > flower. Also dont use imagination because that is cheating ok :-) We > can move the iris left and right, could we do it for changing of > colours. LOL! Me and my little self aren't on speaking terms nowadays. We had a fight over what to watch on TV. :-) (BTW, do you understand satire?) > > > Cheers > Ken O Metta, James #61583 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 9:12 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: object and feeling ken_aitch Hi Herman, ---------- <. . .> KH: > > I suspect you are quoting from the teachings of Bhikkhu Thanissaro, but, as you know, I reject those teachings completely. > > H: > I don't have any BT teachings to quote, but there's a bunch of his translations around on the Net. I'm only going from the Sutta, Ken. Honest :-) ---------- OK, I'm letting you off this time. :-) The teachings I am referring to are any New Age style ideas about 'every religion ultimately teaching the same thing' 'all roads eventually leading to the same goal' 'no matter what we call it - Almighty God, Nirvana, Oneness with the Universe - we'll all be there together in the end.' Do you subscribe to that sort of teaching? Do you see a traveller on the Path? Does it matter to you that your version of the Dhamma differs from the original Theravada? --------------- <. . .> H: > I wonder why you use any words other than dhamma at all? My translation of the above paragraphs into KenSpeak is "dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma etc etc" How am I doing? --------------- Looks good to me, although I'm not keen on the "etc etc" part. :-) ------------------- H: > But precisely because you didn't write that, though you suggest that is what you would write, I don't actually believe that your experience is limited to dhamma level only. It sounds more like you use the word dhamma as an automatic suffix to anything you actually experience, at the level you experience it. -------------------- Hmmm. Now you're confusing me. Is that the same as "dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma dhamma?" It looks disturbingly like "concept concept concept concept!" The entire purpose of Dhamma discussions is to learn more about the dhammas that are arising now. What other purpose could they have? What else is there? ------------ <. . .> KH: > What I still don't understand - not that it is any of my business - is why you believe in a self but not in an eternal self. If there were one, wouldn't it be better that there were both - so that the self could live forever? > > H: > Good question. It's not a matter of believing in a self. Self is given as a structure of consciousness. Consciousness is not only of its object, but also of consciousness of consciouness of object. How else can nama be differentiated from rupa? Self is a relationship between what is and isn't. ------------- Thanks for your answer, but is it Dhamma, or is it some kind of philosophy? It leaves me feeling lost in a sea of concepts. Oh to be back on dry dhamma! --------------------- H: > I think the self you deny is the self as agent, and somehow you think I entertain self as agent. But I treat of self as identity. The idea of "what would be better?" is an expression of the craving that is the dynamo for the ceaseless process of me becoming me, you becoming you. And we never quite get there, but to deny the reality of the process of self trying to become self is futile to say the least. --------------------- I think I see a speck of dhamma in the distance. But what is this talk about treating self as identity? Seriously, to which dhamma does that refer? How does it help me to understand the dhammas that arising now? Ken H #61584 From: "Phil" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:21 pm Subject: Direct awareness before vipasanna-nana? (Benares 2001) (was Abhidhamma inDL 1) philofillet Hi Nina Thanks for your feedback. > Hi Phil, > If direct awareness of dhammas could not arise before the first stage > of insight, how could there be a stage of insight? It is a gradual > process, a growing of sati and pa÷Çaa, towards that stage of >insight. I thought I sent a post but it hasn't shown up. Whatever. The gist was yes, direct awareness can arise (though not for me yet so I can only take the Buddha's word for it) but we also can remember/understand that thinking about dhammas with attachment is not the direct awareness in question. The latter is much rarer and more fleeting than people would like to think. Here is a transcript of the talk in question, with some of my lobha-rooted comments interspersed. Sorry in advance for any typos. Nina ¡°I found it difficult, when there is no vipasanna-nana and you don¡¯t know the difference between nama and rupa, can there be awareness, and not just thinking of lobha, and dosa, and Acharn Supi (sp?) explained you can little by little learn the characteristics, even before vipasanna-nana, without thinking, it is possible¡± Acharn Sujin: ¡°Because without the moment of being aware, and learn the characteristics of nama and rupa little by little, how can be the moment of realization of the characteristic of nama as nama and rupa as rupa, as dhatu too, dhamma. Because now we know that realities are there ¨C each one has its own characteristic ¨C but there is no awareness of any one. We just know that each reality has its own, its specific characteristic, but when there is no awareness it is only thinking, keep on thinking, even when dosa arises, there is thinking about the characteristic of dosa. That¡¯s why many people do not like to have dosa because the characteristic of dosa is unpleasant, so they just want to get away from it instead of studying it and understanding it as just a reality. And the point is that the theory is not too difficult, but there is not enough condition, to condition right awareness, and develop understanding( when there is right awareness of an object.)* But since there can be thinking about the nama or rupa which appears, why not the awareness arise instead?* (PH: I don¡¯t know the answer to this question. I don¡¯t see the logical connection, but of course it is not a matter of logic.) But we are not used to the characteristic of awareness. We used to take samadhi ¨C concentration ¨C for awareness. (Ph: Sometimes I¡¯m not sure if Acharn Sujin means ¡°we used to¡± or ¡°we are used to ¨Cing¡± Either one would be fine, of course, in this case, to describe the wrong view about samadhi.) We used to think about the word, satipatthana, but what about the understanding of the satipatthana itself.? We just talk and say ¡°without satipatthana there cannot be the development of right understanding.¡± But when and what is the characteristic of satipatthana, that¡¯s the most important point. Because if anybody would like to develop satipatthana not knowing anything about it, how can that be the development of satipatthana. Everything must be very carefully studied and really understand (sic) because the characteristic of reality has its own characteristic. There can be the development of understanding reality as it is. (Ph: I always remember she said ¡°we cannot do something without understanding in order to have understanding.¡± Start where we are and plough ahead and hope that understanding arises out of the muck of our lobha-rooted approach? No, we cannot have understanding by doing something without understanding. The development of understanding doesn¡¯t work that way. This goes against the ways of the world, of course. Start as a beginner and keep making mistakes until you get it right, that is the modern way. ) Right now it¡¯s like the taste, how much one understands the seeing the hearing the smelling. (Ph: I like in one talk, Acharn Sujin asks, ¡°is there the flavour of understanding now?¡± and everyone says oh no, not us, not yet. But she says yes, there is the flavour, the hint of understanding. That is the point of this topic, I guess. The flavour of understanding, the flavour of awareness, is a step on the way to the real thing ¨C as long as we don¡¯t stop with the flavour and mistake it for the real thing.) Even while one is listening, all realities arise and fall away by conditions, completely gone, so it depends on the moment of awareness. If awareness does not arise, just considering more, and understanding, even thinking about it, in order to really get closer to the characteristic of nama and rupa. Are we now closer? (She asks to Kom, he answers ¡°only a little bit.¡±) That¡¯s true, that¡¯s true, that¡¯s why one knows the path leading to the realization of nibanna or the cessation of lobha, that it must be the right way, the right path, otherwise its motivated by lobha again, all the time.¡± Ph: Yes, after all, there is right understanding that conditions awareness of all the lobha in one¡¯s Dhamma practice and spurs one to encourage others to be aware of the lobha in theirs. I will keep talking about it, Nina, I¡¯m pretty sure of that. There is also an implication in the last bit above that that¡¯s why right understanding knows that it is a gradual path and will take a long time. Right understanding is wary of the Seven Year Seven Month Seven Week Seven Day Plan as promoted by the retreat/workshop operators. Phil p.s weekend's over. See you again next week. > Hi Phil, > If direct awareness of dhammas could not arise before the first stage > of insight, how could there be a stage of insight? It is a gradual > process, a growing of sati and pa÷Çaa, towards that stage of insight. > But no use to specualte who can and who cannot. > Nina. > Op 18-jul-2006, om 1:54 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > > > you are > > talking about another Thai teacher, who you have heard say that we > > can begin to know the characteristics - and not just by thinking - > > even *before* the first stage of insight. I tend to doubt that this > > is possible - I see/semse/think about so much *thinking* involved in > > everything. > #61585 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 9:11 pm Subject: Re: Dhammas According to Karunadasa/KenH buddhatrue Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Ken - > > With regard to our recent postings, I provide some material from > Karunadasa's Dhamma Theory article Thanks for supplying this material from Karunadasa. As I have written before, I believe that Karunadasa has the correct interpretation of the Abhidhamma, as opposed to K. Sujin's and Nina's interpretation which is pluralistic. Pluralism is incompatible with DO. Honestly, I don't see how anyone could not see this. I argued the same thing in DSG before I even read Karunadasa's article (I forgot who first linked it to me; Did you?). But, honestly, do you think that presenting this article to Ken H. is going to change his mind? If he has the lack of insight to accept a pluralistic approach to the dhamma, he isn't going to understand or appreciate anything Karunadasa has to say. Nina has read Karunadasa and she still doesn't get it. I linked Phil to Karunadasa and he still doesn't get it. I don't think that they are ever going to get it. Metta, James #61586 From: "Phil" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:36 pm Subject: Link to Ben Poomy Pokitty talk? [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. philofillet Hi Scott, Herman and and all About 6 months ago I posted a transcript from India 2001 which I call the "Ben Poomy Pokitty" talk (sounds cute!) becauses that (or something like it) is the Thai term, I take it, for the way satipattha can arise in a natural, unforced way in daily life. Acharn Sujin talks about some of the process factors that are dealt with below in a very lucid, helpful way. If the moderators or anyone would know where that post is (perhaps in UPs?) it would help out here, I'm sure. (Well, it would help out where there are conditions for it to help out...) I should keep these transcripts in a word file. Dumb. phil > > The elements can be known because it is of the nature of some of the > > elements to know. Since these variegated cittas arise and fall away > > in process or series, any object can be known or be an object of citta > > in the process. The next citta can know the characteristics of the > > preceding one. > > > > There's my attempt. Someone who knows better than I ought to correct > > this. > > > > How do you see it? > > > > In silence :-) > > > Kind Regards > > > Herman > #61587 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 3:41 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: object and feeling upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/18/06 10:06:09 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ken_aitch@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > My apologies! I misread what you were saying. I thought you were > saying folks could not crave dhammas because they only knew concepts. > > I might add that suggestions of that kind have been put (quite > persuasively) several times on DSG. People have argued that no direct > reaction to a paramattha dhamma could be of any great consequence. > They say that it is only concepts (or the experience of them) that > could stir up emotions. The Honey-ball Sutta has been cited in > support, and I don't think any overall agreement has ever been reached. > > But that was not what you were saying, and my contribution was > completely out of place. The moral of the story is: never chip in on > anyone's conversation unless you have at least listened to what they > are saying. :-) ------------------------------------------ Howard: Thanks, Ken! No problem at all. :-) ----------------------------------------- > > Returning to the scene of the crime: > --------- > KH: >>Folks are illusory beings, and, therefore, it is of no > consequence whether we say, "Folks crave pleasant rupas," or we say, > "Folks do not crave pleasant rupas." > >> > > >Howard: > Hey, Ken, the fact, agreed to by most of us including me, that > "people" don't really exist adds nothing whatsoever to this > conversation. Are you throwing it in for fun? It's nothing surprising > to Buddhists. > You said above "Welcome back, Sarah. I'd like to chip in again on this > thread, not to interrupt but just because I find it helpful." But > there is no Sarah, and no you, and no chipping in, and no thread, and > no interrupting - > and so it doesn't matter whether you welcome Sarah or don't welcome Sarah! > That few folks crave what is experienced as unpleasant is *true*. > ------------ > > Yes, I am sure it is. > > --------------------- > H: > It is just as true as Sarah having returned an your welcoming > her. So, what is your point? Why was the reason for your saying < is of no consequence whether we say, "Folks crave pleasant rupas," or > we say, "Folks do not crave pleasant rupas."? The Buddha said that > folks crave what is pleasant, it is well known that that is true, and > it is an important fact. So, why do you say it is of no consequence > when in fact it certainly is? The Buddha, all the time, used the sort > of language you object to. If you were around circa 500 BCE, would you > have taken the Buddha to task for speaking as he did? > ----------------------- > > Quite right! None of us objects to the use of conventional language. > However, if you had been talking about what I thought you were talking > about, it might have been a good time to warn against mixing > conventional language with non-conventional language. ----------------------------------------- Howard: Miscommunication is a real problem when no in-person contact is available. I misinterpret frequently! --------------------------------------- > > --------- > <. . .> > KH: >>However, it is of consequence to know that dhammas (citta and > cetasika) crave pleasant rupas. > > >Howard: > Dhammas don't do anything at all, including crave. (Tanha is not a > thing that craves. It IS the craving.) > ---------- > > I prefer to say that dhammas do things, and that tanha is the thing > that craves. But, normally, I would say the meaning was the same > either way. > > You, however, say there is an important difference. You also say (on > another thread) that dhammas lack something called "own being" and > "self existence." So we do disagree. ------------------------------------ Howard: Probably we misunderstand each other. ----------------------------------- > > Our differences probably go back to the way we understand > consciousness. You believe it is an event, and you believe that namas > and rupas are "event contents" as distinct from dhammas in their right. ----------------------------------- Howard: What is consciousness if not an event? An activity? A happening? I can't imagine. ----------------------------------- > > I think your opinion is a dangerous divergence from the texts. > ----------------------------------- Howard: What texts? What are "the texts"? Sati spoke of consciousness being reborn, and the Buddha corrected him. You probably think that is only because "a" consciousness arises and ceases immediately (or with very short duration), the followed by a new consciousness, and each of these is a separate "thing that knows". I do not think that is the reason. The fact of awareness (vi~n~nana) not lasting and of each occurrence of being aware quite new certainly is part of it. But another part of it is that there are no "things that know at all". They would be knowers!! ----------------------------------- The > > danger is that you (or panna) will never directly know paramattha > dhammas while there is this wrong intellectual understanding of them. ------------------------------------- Howard: LOL! Well, you just be content with your direct knowing, Ken. As far as I'm concerned, your view is an atta-view. -------------------------------------- > Figuratively speaking, you are sending panna on a wild goose chase. > You are telling it to search for an experiential flux when it should > be searching for a distinct nama or rupa. ------------------------------------- Howard: I am doing nothing of the sort. I distinguish things quite as well as you, Ken. I just don't reify them and impute separate, self-existence. -------------------------------------- > > Moving on: > ------------- > H: >There are no "citta things" that are conscious. (Cittas are > instances of being conscious; they are activities, not things that > engage in ac activity). If dhammas were actors, cravers, feelers, > knowers, recognizers etc, they would be little beings themselves! > Dhammas are not agents. You replace one self by many selves, Ken, and > think that this is Dhamma. > ------------- > > Yes, I do think of dhammas as little doers, which might not be > strictly correct. ------------------------------------------ Howard: But, Ken, that is exactly my point!! And it is the opposite position, that dhammas are event-qualities, not things that act, hat you seem to object to. Hardness is a quality that arises and ceases, an event-quality, with the emphasis on quality. Knowing that hardness is an activity that occurs, that arises and ceases, an event-quality. -------------------------------------------- > But is there is any great danger in that? Isn't it OK provided I > understand them as having a "lifespan" of just one citta > (nothing carrying over)? ------------------------------------------- Howard: I think there is a great danger in conceiving of a plurality of little selves, of little agents that act. It is an atta-view. ------------------------------------------- > > It's not as if I were saying they had a choice. I think we all agree > that dhammas are the slaves of conditions - they have no choice (or > even any interest) in what they are "doing." > > But, again, it might go back to the idea of an "experiential event" as > opposed to distinct dhammas. (?) ----------------------------------------- Howard: There is no problem with distinctness, IMO. ---------------------------------------- > > Ken H > > ==================== With metta, Howard 29) #61588 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:52 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. scottduncan2 Dear Herman, H: "In silence :-)" Shhhhh! With loving kindness, Scott. 71) #61589 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 11:53 pm Subject: Re: Link to Ben Poomy Pokitty talk? [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. sarahprocter... Hi Phil & all, --- Phil wrote: > > Hi Scott, Herman and and all > > About 6 months ago I posted a transcript from India 2001 which I > call the "Ben Poomy Pokitty" talk (sounds cute!) becauses that (or > something like it) is the Thai term, I take it, for the way > satipattha can arise in a natural, unforced way in daily life. > Acharn Sujin talks about some of the process factors that are dealt > with below in a very lucid, helpful way. If the moderators or anyone > would know where that post is (perhaps in UPs?) it would help out > here, I'm sure. (Well, it would help out where there are conditions > for it to help out...) ..... S: I know the one you mean, but can't find it quickly - I just searched in my google mail which is usually easy, but have a feeling you may have spelt the Thai differently last time (or else google just can't cope with it:-). Anyway, there's a nice section (I think) in U.P. under 'Satipatthana Now, Naturally' and I found these fairly recent posts of yours there on the topic: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/55077 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/59483 If I have a bit of time later, I'll also transcribe part of a tape I heard this morning which made me think of a couple of points you've raised recently (a) on prevalent wrong view and b) on getting closer to understanding characteristics of dhammas. Thx for all your good quotes and comments. Metta, Sarah ====== 71) #61590 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 7:50 pm Subject: Re: Mindfulness and insight 2 (samadhi) scottduncan2 Dear Jon, Thanks for taking the time to respond. These are thoughtful replies. J: "Yes, panna has the same function no matter whether it accompanies samatha consciousness or vipassana consciousness, that is to say, the same general function, that of dispelling ignorance, but there are differences also, because the way of vipassana is different from the way of samatha." So, according to the type of consciousness, pa~n~na differs. If it arises with samatha consciousness, it knows the characteristics of samatha; if it arises with vipassana consciousness, it knows - what - anicca, anatta, and dukkha vis-a vis the particular dhamma which serves as object? Is "vipassana" a synonym for pa~n~na? What is "vipassana consciousness?" "As you will already know, before his enlightenment as the Buddha the Bodhisatta received instruction from teachers who had attained the highest levels of jhana (for which great panna is required), and he himself attained those levels, yet realised that this was not the way leading to escape from samsara. When he finally attained enlightenment, it was by way of the development of insight." Is "insight" synonymous with "vipassana?" J: "So insight is not just a progression from samatha/jhana; it is a different way/path altogether (as a rider to that, however, I should add that when insight is developed, so is samatha)." Yes, that much seems apparent. J: "The person who develops jhana but has no interest in the development of insight sees the danger in the clinging to (and other akusala conditioned by) the objects experienced through the sense-doors, but does not see the 'danger'/suffering/lack of satisfactoriness in conditioned dhammas. Unless there is some inkling at an intellectual level at least of the unsatisfactoriness in life in samsara (this is also called a 'sense of urgency' (samvega)), there will be no conditions for insight to arise or develop." So for the one who develops jhaana, pa~n~na only knows a limited sphere of dhammas, those related to the objects of the five sense doors. The totality of conditioned dhammas is not known by pa~n~na in this case. Is this a function of jhaana-citta being the object? J: "I think it fair to say that the panna in each of these 2 cases -- seeing the danger in clinging to sense-objects (and as the escape from that, abiding in jhana and on death rebirth in the Brahma worlds), and seeing the unsatisfactoriness of life in samsara (and as the escape from that, insight into the true nature of dhammas and on death no rebirth in any plane whatsoever) -- is panna of a different order to the other." Or can one say that the scope of what pa~n~na has known differs in the two cases? I see the distinction between the two, and this seems to me to mean that, while pa~n~na is only pa~n~na, with right view and right understanding as characteristics, it is the number or scope of dhammas known by pa~n~na that conditions either rebirth in the Brahma worlds or escape or whatever else comes conditioned by the ratio of ignorance to pa~n~na (or dhammas known thereby.) Is this close? Any corrections please. With loving kindness, Scott. 86) #61591 From: sarah abbott Date: Wed Jul 19, 2006 12:14 am Subject: Re: Link to Ben Poomy Pokitty talk? [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. sarahprocter... Hi Phil,(Matheesha & Nina at the end*) --- Phil wrote: > Hi Scott, Herman and and all > > About 6 months ago I posted a transcript from India 2001 which I > call the "Ben Poomy Pokitty" talk (sounds cute!) becauses that (or > something like it) is the Thai term, I take it, for the way > satipattha can arise in a natural, unforced way in daily life. .... S: This is meant to follow another note I just sent which hasn't shown up yet. I think the first link I gave to a message of yours may be the one (without the Thai). #55077. Feel free to re-post it if it's the one you have in mind. Btw, I just checked the spelling with Jon and he gave me this for the Thai: "ben phuu mii pokati charoen satipatthaan" "ben [is] phuu [a person] mii [have] pokati [naturally, i.e pakatu in Pali as in natural decisive support] charoen [develop] satipatthaan [satipatthana]" Metta, Sarah * I'm in a hurry, so will just add a brief note here to say I found your exchange on the photo album most amusing - with Nina's 'what the heck?' and Matheesha's comment he'd probably add a pic in due course and then when he's an arahant - not holding my breath!! Anyway, thx for the honest response. Actually, it was Rob Ep that got the photo album running and I also remember we had to be encouraged and helped to put in a pic too:-). With the discussions on loneliness and and this one on the attitudes of others, I can't resist re-quoting these lines from 'Cetasikas': "Loving kindness can be extended to whosoever is in our company and then there is a moment of true friendship. At such a moment there is no thought of self who wants friendship from others, no feeling of loneliness or worry about the attitude of others towards us." ===== 71) #61592 From: "Phil" Date: Wed Jul 19, 2006 1:41 am Subject: Link to Ben Poomy Pokitty talk? [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. philofillet Hi Sarah > S: This is meant to follow another note I just sent which hasn't shown up > yet. I think the first link I gave to a message of yours may be the one > (without the Thai). #55077. Feel free to re-post it if it's the one you > have in mind. Thanks so much, yes, that is the one. People will see it, I think, without my reposting it. Everybody check Sarah's link in that previous post. Great talk passage, yup. Phil p.s thanks also for the Thai, Jon. I guess I will stick with Ben Poomy Pokitty for now. I have a feeling I will name a character in one of my children's stories after that. 71) #61593 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 18, 2006 11:54 pm Subject: Cetasikas' study corner 489- Non-Aversion/Adosa (u) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== Ch 29, Non-Aversion(Adosa)contd ***** Questions i Why must there be right understanding of the characteristic of loving kindness in order to develop it as a subject of calm? ii Why is the “near enemy” of loving kindness attachment? iii Can there be kindness with indifferent feeling? iv Can there be non-aversion, adosa, towards an object which is not a being? ***** Non-Aversion(Adosa)finished! Metta, Sarah ====== 1) #61594 From: sarah abbott Date: Wed Jul 19, 2006 3:56 am Subject: The growth of panna & understanding of sakkaya ditthi sarahprocter... Dear Phil, Nina & all, I've appreciated your discussions. I was listening to part of an old tape (from Myanmar) and someone was asking about knowing sakkaya ditthi in daily life. We may think that sakkaya ditthi (and other wrong views) are prevalent all around us, but is there any understanding of sakkaya ditthi when it arises and appears? "Whenever it appears one can see that one has to go on developing understanding until it's the moment of letting go of everything. If there is no understanding of sakkaya ditthi, can it be eradicated?" Of course, having the idea of sakkaya ditthi doesn't mean there has to be any thinking in words that there's a 'me' or a 'person' involved. It can be much more subtle than that. As panna grows, it can "see the very subtle sakkaya ditthi, taking whatever is appearing as me, still me." "Panna has to grow stage by stage." As an example of sakkaya ditthi, earlier, she gave the example of the heat of the body. Nothing appears but heat and we may know this, but still there's an idea of 'me, my body which is hot'. There's still clinging when it hasn't been eradicated and there may be doubt too - anything which hasn't been eradicated. On the direct understanding of characteristics, she added that: "If there's no understanding very precisely of the different characteristics of nama and rupa, we keep on thinking about what characteristic nama is". We may "just follow the words 'nama experiences an object', but the characteristic of that which experiences an object is now. One doesn't realise how much panna has to grow to understand the nature of nama and rupa as they are, as nobody, as no one - one reality at a time." On the topic of sense door and mind door processes and the direct awareness which I think you were discussing, she was saying: "When we study pariyatti, we know about the sense door process, bhavanga cittas and the mind door process which follows so quickly. ... It's like now. (It seems like) someone, something, all the time, because (such ideas) follow by accumulations and we don't know how many processes have gone. But when there is awareness, when panna grows, (it becomes apparent that just as) akusala arises so fast, sati and panna have to arise as fast to know characteristics one by one, because now at the moment of being aware (say) hardness, there are many, many moments of seeing and hearing and thinking (many processes with bhavanga cittas in between) and then a moment of awareness. (These moments of awareness) are so far apart, but when panna grows, it gets closer and closer to understanding more characteristics of reality, so it can see whatever arises. Sati is there just then and then - the next one, the next one, the next one. When it's not 'me', it can be like that, but when it's still 'me', the idea follows and there can be attachment to results or anything (else)." ***** S:This is a slightly 'loose' transliteration. I thought it was interesting how she was stressing a) that unless sakkaya ditthi arises and appears, it can never be eradicated and b)how the development of panna and giving up of the idea of 'me' and all kinds of attachment go hand-in-hand. As she said, 'when panna grows, it gets closer and closer to understanding more characteristics of reality', so that (we can add), instead of occasional moments of awareness of the 'nimitta' of realities, it can eventually directly understand the rising and falling away of such realities as they appear. I also find the emphasis on the development of understanding 'until it's the moment of letting go of everything' to be very helpful. As she also repeated again, "What's the most valuable thing in one's life if it's not the understanding of reality?". "For Sariputta, a few words were enough to let go of all the clinging. (For us), when will that moment come if there is not the understanding of reality now?" Metta, Sarah p.s. Nina, I'm glad to read your old letters from Tokyo again . I hope Lodewijk will add his comments from time to time. ======= 1) #61595 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 19, 2006 4:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhammas According to Karunadasa/KenH egberdina Hi James and Howard, On 19/07/06, buddhatrue wrote: > > > Thanks for supplying this material from Karunadasa. As I have > written before, I believe that Karunadasa has the correct > interpretation of the Abhidhamma, as opposed to K. Sujin's and > Nina's interpretation which is pluralistic. Pluralism is > incompatible with DO. Honestly, I don't see how anyone could not > see this. I argued the same thing in DSG before I even read > Karunadasa's article (I forgot who first linked it to me; Did you?). > > But, honestly, do you think that presenting this article to Ken H. > is going to change his mind? If he has the lack of insight to > accept a pluralistic approach to the dhamma, he isn't going to > understand or appreciate anything Karunadasa has to say. Nina has > read Karunadasa and she still doesn't get it. I linked Phil to > Karunadasa and he still doesn't get it. I don't think that they are > ever going to get it. > This is what Karunadasa has to say about dhamma-theory and how it fits in with Abhidhamma. From an article titled "Time and Space: The Abhidhamma Perspective". "It would thus be quite fitting to call this theory the cornerstone of the Abhidhamma. But the dhamma-theory was intended from the start to be more than a mere hypothetical scheme. It arose from the need to make sense out of experiences in meditation and was designed as a guide for meditative contemplation and insight. For the Abhidhamma, to see the world correctly is to see - not persons and substances - but bare phenomena (suddha-dhamma) arising and perishing in accordance with their conditions. The task the Abhidhamma specialists set themselves was to specify exactly what these "bare phenomena" are and to show how they relate to other "bare phenomena" to make up our "common sense" picture of the world." Bow, bow, bow and unlimited saddhus in his general direction!!! Dhamma theory and the specific Abhidhamma that is based on dhamma-theory originates as a manual for meditators. What is laid bare in dhamma theory is not knowable as experience outside of a meditative context. Shopping for groceries, driving a car, interacting with others as others, is valid human activity, in its context. What is invalid, and dishonest, is to apprehend Mrs Hendricks down at the shopping mall, and disassociate her as a dhamma. Dhammas don't shop. But humans do disassociate. But disassociation is not dhamma, it is disassociation. The framework for the realisation of dhammas is non-association. (read meditation) And thank you James, Howard and Mr Karunadasa. Kind Regards Herman 3) #61596 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Wed Jul 19, 2006 2:13 am Subject: RE: [dsg] a friend's question dacostacharles Hi Azita, Tell your friend that Buddhist's Wisdom gives one the knowledge of how to go beyond the suffering due to negative karma - so yes, you will smile and be happy while you exhaust the karma. It is "Worldly wisdom" that will leave you WISE -but- no smile and no fun (bitterness). So you could end up being WISE -but- well basically unhappy. Charles DaCosta _____ Subject: [dsg] a friend's question Hello dhamma friends A friend asks: "say you're having kamma on you and you know and you cant do anything but develop wisdom and detach - OK - but that doesn't give you a smile and fun. So you could end up being WISE -but- well basically unhappy." She goes on to write "that is a kind of (ill-informed?) view of Buddhas philosophy that I have, and would appreciate a comment from your self" <....> 11) #61597 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 19, 2006 6:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Direct awareness before vipasanna-nana? (Benares 2001) (was Abhidhamma inDL 1) nilovg Hi Phil, I appreciate your quote from the talk very much. It is worth considering again and again. A reminder how much we think of realities. But it has to be like that in the beginning, and beginning can last for ages! We know it takes a long time, khanti, patience, is the highest ascetism as Kh Sujin likes to repeat. Nina. Op 19-jul-2006, om 4:21 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > Acharn Sujin: ¡°Because without the moment of being aware, and > learn the characteristics of nama and rupa little by little, how can > be the moment of realization of the characteristic of nama as nama > and rupa as rupa, as dhatu too, dhamma. Because now we know that > realities are there ¨C each one has its own characteristic ¨C but > there is no awareness of any one. We just know that each reality has > its own, its specific characteristic, but when there is no awareness > it is only thinking, keep on thinking, even when dosa arises, there > is thinking about the characteristic of dosa. That¡¯s why many > people do not like to have dosa because the characteristic of dosa > is unpleasant, so they just want to get away from it instead of > studying it and understanding it as just a reality. And the point is > that the theory is not too difficult, but there is not enough > condition, to condition right awareness, and develop understanding #61598 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 19, 2006 7:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The growth of panna & understanding of sakkaya ditthi nilovg Hi Sarah, I am so glad you quoted about heat I take so much for self today! There is a heatwave here, I feel it, but how good to be reminded of: it is dhamma, not me. How forgetful I am not being aware of the rupa that is heat or of the bodily feeling or mental unhappy feeling. See, we need Dhamma friends to remind us of realities. I also appreciated the other parts of the talk you transcribed. Thank you. Nina. Op 19-jul-2006, om 12:56 heeft sarah abbott het volgende geschreven: > As an example of sakkaya ditthi, earlier, she gave the example of > the heat > of the body. Nothing appears but heat and we may know this, but still > there's an idea of 'me, my body which is hot'. There's still > clinging when > it hasn't been eradicated and there may be doubt too - anything which > hasn't been eradicated. 2) #61599 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Wed Jul 19, 2006 5:05 am Subject: Link to Ben Poomy Pokitty talk? [dsg] Re: The chariot is not ultimately real. scottduncan2 Dear Phil, Thanks, Sarah found it, as you know by now... P: "About 6 months ago I posted a transcript from India 2001 which I call the "Ben Poomy Pokitty" talk..." With loving kindness, Scott.