#93400 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 2:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas upasaka_howard (Writing from home now) Hi, Ken (and TG) - In a message dated 12/10/2008 6:24:34 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, kenhowardau@... writes: Hi TG, ------------ <. . .> TG: This whole topic regarding the speed of "dhammas" is an issue brought forth by the Abhidhamma sector I do believe. Now we're being chastised by that same sector for dealing with the issue they brought up? LOL I'm getting use to it. ------------------ No, not at all: you can bring up the 'speed of dhammas' as many times as you like. My point in saying "end of story" was that the impermanence of dhammas was due to their having the inherent characteristic, anicca - end of story! ------------------ TG: > Speed of impermanence was the issue, not impermanence in general. ------------------ Absolute impermanence would imply there was nothing that changed more quickly, wouldn't it? I think that's all we need to know about speed. ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: All speed, so far as I understand it is relative, and without comparison, there is no speed. But memory is sufficient to provide the comparison, I believe. As for arising, change, and cessation, that also depends comparison, it seems to me, though, again, possibly involving memory for its observation. In the suttas, the Buddha did make one speed comparison, saying that mind, by which I believe he there meant thought and also mind state (the palatte of sankharas/cetasikas), changes more quickly than form (rupa). ------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------- TG: > Well, since I've gone this far. All 'conditions' are impermanent. ------------------- O'oh, there's that nebulous Sea of Conditions again. Apparently, in this sea of conditions there is nothing that conditions and there is nothing that gets conditioned - but there are conditions nonetheless. (?) ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: The mode of existence of conditioned dhammas is entirely contingent, making it quite subtle and not at all along the entity-lines we are so used to thinking in terms of. -------------------------------------------------- How would you know? What would manifest? ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Fleeting qualities and activities without own being. --------------------------------------------- --------------------------- TG: > But I'm curious...how does a "conditioned dhamma" HAVE the impermanence characteristic? Did they purchase it at "Dhammas R Us"? I can see the slogan -- Buy one "own characteristic" and we'll throw in an "anicca characteristic" for half price. ;-) Those "Dhammas" have so many characteristics inside of them I'm surprised they don't explode. --------------------------- Every conditioned dhamma has the anicca characteristic. If one dhamma conditions another to arise, it too will have the anicca characteristic. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: I quite agree with that, Ken. I suspect that TG also does. The arising, changing, and ceasing of conditions serves to conditions the arising, altering, and ceasing of their effects. There is no seen beginning to the process of conditionality and impermanence. ---------------------------------------------- Does that answer your question? Or do you want to go back to 'the first cause?' ------------------------------ TG: > This is not just you Ken, I know this is the Abhidhamma style of speaking. But it sure seems like there is an "entity-view" hiding amongst them there "Dhammas" in the way in which they are spoken about. ------------------------------ Entity-view? When you say "entity" do you mean an absolute reality (paramattha dhamma) or are you referring to something that is thought to exist outside the world of paramattha dhammas? If you mean the former then there would be nothing wrong with entity view (paramattha- dhamma view). If, however, you were talking about a "sea of conditions" then I would have to conclude there was definitely entity (non-paramattha) view involved. No doubt about it, I'm sorry! :-) ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Conditions are just dhammas viewed in their role of their effect on other dhammas, existent or "caused" to arise. --------------------------------------------- Ken H ============================ With metta, Howard #93401 From: "Alex" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 8:49 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Suttas in which the Buddha held back the deep teaching? truth_aerator Hi Sarah, >sarah abbott wrote: > > Hi Alex, > > Butting in on your thread with Jon... > > --- On Tue, 2/12/08, Alex wrote: > > A: a)jhana mastery does not seem to be a prerequisite for insight > development for sotapanna level (although it can certainly help). > .... >S: I almost had one of TG's fits!! What about all those hundreds of >sutta quotes you force-fed us with supposedly showing how essential >they were for enlightenment? Weren't you even saying that >enlightenment occurred during jhana or something like that? Jhana is definately helpful for any and all insight, and in mn43 (or 44) is one of 5 conditions for Arhatship. The thing needing to be clarified is if the Buddha has meant that samadhi-indriya is a) Required for Stream b) Always has to include Jhana. It *may* be possible for Jhana to happen after listening, although it may not be relevant to us now. The suttas are clear that one can remain in sitting meditation for up to 7 days without moving. The amount of time may vary though, so we should not be to happy to believe that momentary jhana is enough. For some it may, but I believe that we should err on the side of caution especially if we believe that people today are slowerer to understand and realize the path/fruit. > > However all drastically changes for Anagami and especially Arhatship. > ... > S: What is your support for this? How does the path "drastically >change"? The amount of Jhana that may be required to help remove the latent tendencies for lust/hatred. Sotopanna removes 3 latent tendencies (self view, r&r, doubt), Anagami has to remove 2 more (lust/hatred). > Isn't it the continuation and development of the same 8-fold path? Yes, especially the Samadhi relevant parts for Anagami and Panna relevant parts for Arhat Metta, #93402 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 8:51 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas scottduncan2 Dear TG (and Howard), Do you agree with this? Howard: "Conditions are just dhammas viewed in their role of their effect on other dhammas, existent or 'caused' to arise." Sincerely, Scott. #93403 From: "Alex" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 8:55 am Subject: Re: Suttas in which the Buddha held back the deep teaching? truth_aerator Hi Jon, >"jonoabb" wrote: > You're a man of surprises, Alex. This is something I've been saying > all along! > > But I'm not sure whether we mean the same thing ;-)) > > To my understanding, for the person who has developed insight to a > high degree but has not developed mundane jhana, when magga citta > arises (i.e., when enlightenment is attained) the accompanying > samadhi is of the intensity of jhana, and this is the meaning of > "momentary samadhi/jhana". > > Is this your understanding also? > > Jon While it is possible for there to be a momentary jhana that allows a high level induvidial to become an Ariyan without major prior practice, I am very unsure that for US today the above is applicable. Meditation and its deliberate cultivation is required for all those who aren't Ariyans here and have lots of kilesas to remove. With best wishes, #93404 From: TGrand458@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 3:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas TGrand458@... Hi Howard In a message dated 12/11/2008 8:58:37 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Every conditioned dhamma has the anicca characteristic. If one dhamma conditions another to arise, it too will have the anicca characteristic. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: I quite agree with that, Ken. I suspect that TG also does. The arising, changing, and ceasing of conditions serves to conditions the arising, altering, and ceasing of their effects. There is no seen beginning to the process of conditionality and impermanence. ---------------------------------------------- ............................................... New TG: Of course all conditions are impermanent. What I disagree with is that there are "dhammas" that HAVE something called "the anicca characteristic." I DON'T believe "dhammas" are in possession of a "anicca characteristic." In fact, I don't accept the term "dhammas" at all, as it has come to have a multi-layered meaning with much of that being on the side of delusion IMO. All conditions are impermanent, period. I see no reason to layer a "impermanent characteristic" on top of that. Its wording of course, but the wording of things having 'their own' this or that is wording that misleads. TG OUT #93405 From: TGrand458@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 4:02 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts TGrand458@... Hi Sarah In a message dated 12/11/2008 6:30:06 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, sarahprocterabbott@... writes: The dhatus (elements) only include paramattha dhammas, dhammas which arise and fall in an absolute sense and can be directly known by insight. ......................................................... TG: Sutta source for this assertion please? If no Sutta source is forthcoming, then I consider it an assertion that is groundless in terms of being the Buddha's teaching. TG OUT #93406 From: TGrand458@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 4:04 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts TGrand458@... Hi Jon In a message dated 12/11/2008 6:48:33 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: So what is your understanding of "leading to detachment", in this context? Detachment from what? Jon ................................................................ TG: Detachment from all conditions. Turning away from all conditions. Seeing conditions as an 'affliction' "leads" to detachment. Isn't this obvious? TG #93407 From: "Alex" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 9:06 am Subject: [dsg] Re: On Concepts truth_aerator Hi Sarah, TG and all, > ... > S: Any my advice to you and everyone is to really consider what is > said in the Suttas and other parts of the Tipitaka and ancient > commentaries carefully. As an orthodox Buddhist one cannot take the above seriously. Only the Buddha is The unfallible Authority on Buddhism. In DN16 he has said to compare any teaching said to be "his" with the SUTTAS. He didn't even want to give the Order to pillar of wisdom Ven. Sariputta, nothing to say about this or that monk living 1000 years later. To me it answers a lot about why the attainments have fallen after the Buddha's parinibbana. It wasn't because of some magickal properties of time, it was because adhammic additions were made (purposefully or accidentally). With best wishes, #93408 From: "Alex" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 9:10 am Subject: [dsg] Re: On Concepts truth_aerator Hi Sarah, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > Hi Alex, TG & all, > > --- On Tue, 2/12/08, Alex wrote: > > TG:>> Here is Nyanatiloka' s Dictionary description of mind-object- base > >(ayatana) -- "it may be physical or mental, past, present, or > >future, real or imaginary" > > > > > > > >> That settles the issue. LOL > > A:> It does settle the issue, Sarah. > > >The mind contents may refer to "real or imaginary" , but that > doesn't change the fact that mental content exists and is fully > conditioned. > .... > S: Sorry, but it doesn't settle the issue. Nyantiloka's dictionary has always been a wonderful asset, but it does contain errors and this is a glaring one. > And how Sarah, do you know what is true and what is false here? Are you better than Ven. Nyantiloka? If someone could find a sutta quote saying that concepts are eternal, not subject to change, beyond 5 khandas, etc etc than I would gladly change my view that ALL things, concepts included, are Anicca dukkha Anatta. With best wishes, #93409 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 10:55 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas scottduncan2 Dear TG (and Howard), Regarding: Howard: "Conditions are just dhammas viewed in their role of their effect on other dhammas, existent or 'caused' to arise." Scott: Ill take it that your answer whether or not you agree with the above, would be the below: New TG: Of course all conditions are impermanent. What I disagree with is that there are 'dhammas' that HAVE something called 'the anicca characteristic.' I DON'T believe 'dhammas' are in possession of a 'anicca characteristic.' In fact, I don't accept the term 'dhammas' at all, as it has come to have a multi-layered meaning with much of that being on the side of delusion IMO. All conditions are impermanent, period. I see no reason to layer a 'impermanent characteristic' on top of that." Scott: Here, from an unlikely commentator, might be a position you could appreciate: "Time...is motionless, and without beginning or end. That is has motion and is the cause of change is an illusion. Indeed it is itself really an illusion, for except to the narrow sight of beings in limited dimensions there are no such things as past, present and future. Men think of time only because of what they call change, yet that too is an illusion. All that was, and is, and is to be, exists simultaneously," (spoken to the seeker Randolph Carter, moving toward the Ultimate Gate, by a Being of limitless mind; from Through the Gates of the Silver Key, H.P Lovecraft with E. Hoffman Price, in Necronomicon, The Best Weird Tales of H.P. Lovecraft, p. 409). Sincerely, Scott #93410 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 6:22 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts upasaka_howard Hi, Scott (and Herman) - In a message dated 12/11/2008 8:00:29 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "Nibbana is classified by some commentators, not by the Buddha. As you know, Nibbana is absent from the Sabba Sutta, in which the Buddha expounds the All." Scott: Below is the Sabbasutta.m You've capitalised 'All' for effect and nuanced meaning, I suppose. The balk is directed at the notion that Nibbaana is classified as naama, as far as I can tell. SN 23 (1) Sabbasutta.m "...And what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all. "If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus, 'Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all' - that would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. And for what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain." [...Ki~nca, bhikkhave, sabba.m? Cakkhu~nceva ruupaa ca, sota~nca saddaa ca, ghaana~nca gandhaa ca, jivhaa ca rasaa ca, kaayo ca pho.t.thabbaa ca, mano ca dhammaa ca â€" ida.m vuccati, bhikkhave, sabba.m. Yo, bhikkhave, eva.m vadeyya â€" 'ahameta.m sabba.m paccakkhaaya a~n~na.m sabba.m pa~n~naapessaamÄ«'ti, tassa vaacaavatthukamevassa; pu.t.tho ca na sampaayeyya, uttari~nca vighaata.m aapajjeyya. Ta.m kissa hetu? Yathaa ta.m, bhikkhave, avisayasmi''nti...] H: "Nibbana is included by the commentators, who do not seem to understand the significance of "Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range." Scott: Nibbaana is 'included by the commentators' in what? As naama? What is your alternative? What are your arguments against Nibbaana being included as naama? ================================ An odd thing that I note is that in the Abhidhammatha Sangaha, nibbana is included in the Compendium of Matter!! This makes sense to me only if "matter" is to be understood not in the usual, limited, physical sense, but in the completely general sense of "whatever is not a form of knowing (of an object)," and, nibbana, being beyond all conditions, is, in particular, neither citta nor cetasika. In any case, the inclusion of nibbana in the Compendium of Matter certainly makes it not a species of nama. In my view, nibbana is beyond all category, including even those of being and nonbeing. It can be pointed to by the use of some adjectives, mostly negative, but it is a reality [THE reality, in my view] that is truly beyond all description, being utterly beyond all conditions, circumstances, or states of being. With metta, Howard #93411 From: "connie" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 11:50 am Subject: Vis. Revisited. nichiconn dear scott, herman, i've kinda high-jacked nina's subject line & hope you don't feel i'm taking you hostage since "[nibaana] makes conditioned consciousness bend towards it - it is an object of lokuttara citta and accompanying cetasikas" was said in another thread, but wanted to remind you of the James Tour's "reCollections", particularly "of The Dhamma"... a few ch.7 tracks for your listening pleasure: 82. [Inviting of inspection;] it is worthy of an invitation to inspect (ehipassa-vidhi) given thus 'come and see this Dhamma' (ehi passa ima.m dhamma.m)', thus it is 'inviting of inspection (ehipassika)'. But why is it worthy of this invitation? Because it is found and because of its purity. For if a man has said that there is money or gold in an empty fist, he cannot say 'Come and see it'. Why not? Because it is not found. And on the other hand, while dung or urine may well be found, a man cannot, for the purpose of cheering the mind by exhibiting beauty, say 'Come and see this'; on the contrary they have to be covered up with grass and leaves. Why? Because of their impurity. But this ninefold supramundane Dhamma is actually found as such in its individual essence, and it is as pure as the full moon's disk in a cloudless sky, as a gem of pure water on bleached cloth. [217] Consequently, it is worthy of the invitation to inspect since it is found and pure, thus it is 'inviting of inspection'. 83. The word 'opanayika (onward-leading)' is [equivalent to the gerund] upanetabba (ought to - can - be induced). Here is an exposition. An inducing (upanayana is an inducement (upanaya)). [As the four paths and four fruitions] this [Dhamma] is worth inducing (upanayanam arahati) [, in other words, arousing,] in one's own mind [subjectively] by means of development, without any question of whether or not one's clothing or one's head is on fire (see A.iv,320), thus it is 'onward-leading (opanayika)'. This applies to the [above mentioned eight] formed supramundane states (dhammas). But the unformed [dhamma] is worth inducing by one's own mind [to become the mind's object], thus it is 'onward-leading', too; the meaning is that it is worth treating as one's shelter by realizing it. Or alternatively, what 84. induces (upaneti) [the noble person] onwards to nibbana is the noble path, which is thus inducive (upaneyya). Again, what can (ought to) be induced (upanetabba) to realizability is the Dhamma consisting in fruition and nibbana, which is thus inducive (upaneyya), too. The word upaneyya is the same as the word opanayika. {36} {36}. This passage is only loosely renderable because the exegesis here is based almost entirely on the substitution of one Pali grammatical form for another (pada - siddhi). The reading opaneyyiko (for apanayiko) does not appear in any Sinhalese text (generally the most reliable); consequently the sentence 'opanayiko' va opaneyyiko' (see Harvard text) is absent in them, being superflous. Pm's explanations are incorporated. This paragraph depends on the double sense of upaneti (upa+neti to lead on or induce) and its derivatives as (1) an attractive inducement and (2) a reliable guide and so the word induce is stretched a bit and inducive coined on the analogy of conducive. Upanaya (inducement) is not in PTS Dict, nor it upanayana (inducing) in this sense (see also Ch.XIV,68). Upanayana means in logic 'application', subsumption'; and also upanetabba means 'to be added', see end of 72. For alliiyana (treating as one's shelter) see refs. in Glossary. >> how do you lock this seat in the upright position, anyway? connie #93412 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 12:11 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Conditions, was:The speed of cittas nilovg Hi TG, Op 11-dec-2008, om 17:57 heeft TGrand458@... het volgende geschreven: > In fact, I don't accept the term "dhammas" at all, as it has come > to have a > multi-layered meaning with much of that being on the side of > delusion IMO. > All conditions are impermanent, period. I see no reason to layer a > "impermanent characteristic" on top of that. ------- N: One reality conditions another reality by way of...root, object, predominance, conascence...etc. It is clearer to say that a condition is a way , a mode, by which one reality influences another, or produces it, or maintains it. Better than saying: all conditions are impermanent. Then it looks like you are replacing the terms realities or dhammas by conditions, as if conditions are things that do this or that. Nina. #93413 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 12:20 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts nilovg Hi Howard, Op 11-dec-2008, om 20:22 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > An odd thing that I note is that in the Abhidhammatha Sangaha, nibbana > is included in the Compendium of Matter!! ------ After explaining conditioned dhammas, citta, cetasika and rupa, he says: Nibbaana however is termed supramundane and is to be realized by the wisdom of the four Paths.> See the word: however, in Pali: pana: nibbaana.m pana.. Pana can indicate a contrast. Do you remember the discussions with Dieter? Nina. #93414 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 8:24 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Re: Series Survey Quote. upasaka_howard Hi, Jon (and James) - In a message dated 12/11/2008 8:50:14 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: Hi James > Are you kidding me? You don't know what sutta I am talking about > that refers to "The All"? It is, of course, the sutta titled "The > All" (Sabba Sutta): Thanks for the sutta reference. This is one of the suttas I mentioned in an earlier post that is found in the Salayatana ("six sense-bases")-samyutta of the SN. In this sutta, "the All" refers to the six sense-bases. ------------------------------------------ Howard: Not the 6, Jon, but the 12 (internal and external), and, implicitly, the 18 (including the 6 categories of vi~n~nana) ------------------------------------------- As the commentary explains (according to a footnote in the BB translation), the all of the six sense-bases ("aayatana-sabba") has a narrower range than the all-inclusive all ("sabba-sabba"), i.e., everything knowable, being that which comes into range of the Buddha's knowledge of omniscience. --------------------------------------------- Howard: What would that include other than what is mentioned in the Sabba Sutta? Are you now saying that nibbana is NOT known through the mind door? ------------------------------------------ As with the other suttas in the salayatana-samyutta, I would see this sutta as talking about matters directly relevant to the development of insight. --------------------------------------------- Howard: What is there in that sutta that makes you see it this way? As I see it, this sutta is a straightforwardly ontological one that rules out anything not directly referred in the sutta. It is basically a "This is it, baby! There just ain't nuthin' else!" sutta. The matter of insight just doesn't happen to enter into this particular sutta. ---------------------------------------------- Jon > "Monks, I will teach you the All. Listen & pay close attention. I > will speak." > > "As you say, lord," the monks responded. > > The Blessed One said, "What is the All? Simply the eye & forms, ear > & sounds, nose & aromas, tongue & flavors, body & tactile > sensations, intellect & ideas. This, monks, is called the All. 1 > Anyone who would say, 'Repudiating this All, I will describe > another,' if questioned on what exactly might be the grounds for his > statement, would be unable to explain, and furthermore, would be put > to grief. Why? Because it lies beyond range." > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn35/sn35.023.than.html ============================ With metta, Howard #93415 From: "colette" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 11:50 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas (are they monitored by a "prefect" or law officer) ksheri3 "And if ya don't see what ya like Leave your body alone and just get high" Almond Bros. Band Hi Alberto, AND SO DISAGREE WE SHALL. Watch this: > A: Conditions is the name of the game, and the object that nama > dhammas have, Lets qualify that. We're speaking of noumena, thoughts and/or thought processes, but you set conditions upon this thing called Nama which has nothing more than as well as nothing less than RUPA as the substantiating qualification of a NAMA. Well now, since you seem to be obsessed with materialism and material things let us work as a mage and manifest your thoughts. We could ask Ron Epstein for his excellenct wisdom on this through his expertise in THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS but I don't have time. Watch me pull a rabit out of my hat, oops, that was Bullwinkels catch phrase, I meant to say watch me pull a thing out of your head. lol Since Nama is subordinate to the existance and power of material objects, aka THINGS, well, I guess I'm going to take the position that NOTHING EXISTS and it's nothing more than SUNYATA or SUNYA, therefore, IF, conditions are the name of the game then you don't stand a chance of even getting close to the finish line since those things are very empty and are very valueless. I bet that makes your bank account feel good since now your baubles and trinkets are nill, zip, nada, NOTHING!. If conditions are the name of the game how can a game be played when nothing is on the table? How can a game be played with nothing? How is it possible for a NAMA to exist after I have clearly allowed your objects, your objectivity, your RUPA, your conditions, to be manifested as SUNYA OR SUNYATA? toodles, colette --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "sprlrt" wrote: > > Hi Colette, > > ... > C: Is "citta" a thought? Is it nothing more than a thought? > Now we can play. > > A: Citta is a dhamma and is real, a thought is pannati and is a > convention, not something real, no matter how deeply rooted, and I > know we don't agree on this ... <...> #93416 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 9:03 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas upasaka_howard Hi, TG (and Ken) - In a message dated 12/11/2008 11:58:02 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: Hi Howard In a message dated 12/11/2008 8:58:37 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Every conditioned dhamma has the anicca characteristic. If one dhamma conditions another to arise, it too will have the anicca characteristic. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: I quite agree with that, Ken. I suspect that TG also does. The arising, changing, and ceasing of conditions serves to conditions the arising, altering, and ceasing of their effects. There is no seen beginning to the process of conditionality and impermanence. ---------------------------------------------- ............................................... New TG: Of course all conditions are impermanent. What I disagree with is that there are "dhammas" that HAVE something called "the anicca characteristic." I DON'T believe "dhammas" are in possession of a "anicca characteristic." In fact, I don't accept the term "dhammas" at all, as it has come to have a multi-layered meaning with much of that being on the side of delusion IMO. All conditions are impermanent, period. I see no reason to layer a "impermanent characteristic" on top of that. Its wording of course, but the wording of things having 'their own' this or that is wording that misleads. TG OUT ============================= I also take exception to the "impermanent characteristic" terminology in that it suggests reification of mere characteristics. There is no need to add to our inventory of presumed "entities". But, that aside, I took Ken to be saying that the arising, alteration, and cessation of requisite conditions lead to like behavior in their effects. TG, I believe you might think of this in terms like the swelling or receding of some things induces corresponding behavior in others. (The Buddha used streams and rivers analogies.) As for sankhata dhammas, they are just mental & physical qualities and mental activities, all fleeting and contingent and ungraspable as separate existences, but certainly distinguishable and not nothing at all. With metta, Howard #93417 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 9:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 12/11/2008 3:21:19 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi Howard, Op 11-dec-2008, om 20:22 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > An odd thing that I note is that in the Abhidhammatha Sangaha, nibbana > is included in the Compendium of Matter!! ------ After explaining conditioned dhammas, citta, cetasika and rupa, he says: Nibbaana however is termed supramundane and is to be realized by the wisdom of the four Paths.> --------------------------------------------- Howard: But what has that to do with its being included in the Compendium of Matter? -------------------------------------------- See the word: however, in Pali: pana: nibbaana.m pana.. Pana can indicate a contrast. ----------------------------------------- Howard: ??? ---------------------------------------- Do you remember the discussions with Dieter? ------------------------------------------ Howard: No, I do not. --------------------------------------- Nina. ============================= Nina, I would hope that you would say a bit more on this. I'm not taking anything from what you have written here. (I guess I'm just not understanding you.) With metta, Howard #93418 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 3:30 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts egberdina Hi Scott, 2008/12/12 Scott : > Dear Herman, > I am happy to read that you think our discussions are worthwhile. > SN 23 (1) Sabbasutta.m > > "...And what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and > sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and > tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all. > > "If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus, 'Having rejected this all, I > shall make known another all' - that would be a mere empty boast on > his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, > further, he would meet with vexation. And for what reason? Because, > bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain." > > [...Ki~nca, bhikkhave, sabba.m? Cakkhu~nceva ruupaa ca, sota~nca > saddaa ca, ghaana~nca gandhaa ca, jivhaa ca rasaa ca, kaayo ca > pho.t.thabbaa ca, mano ca dhammaa ca " ida.m vuccati, bhikkhave, > sabba.m. Yo, bhikkhave, eva.m vadeyya " 'ahameta.m sabba.m > paccakkhaaya a~n~na.m sabba.m pa~n~naapessaamī'ti, tassa > vaacaavatthukamevassa; pu.t.tho ca na sampaayeyya, uttari~nca > vighaata.m aapajjeyya. Ta.m kissa hetu? Yathaa ta.m, bhikkhave, > avisayasmi''nti...] > > H: "Nibbana is included by the commentators, who do not > seem to understand the significance of "Anyone who would say, > 'Repudiating this All, I will describe another,' if questioned on what > exactly might be the grounds for his statement, would be unable to > explain, and furthermore, would be put to grief. Why? Because it lies > beyond range." > > Scott: Nibbaana is 'included by the commentators' in what? As naama? > What is your alternative? What are your arguments against Nibbaana > being included as naama? > Here is BT's footnote to this sutta. 1. The Commentary's treatment of this discourse is very peculiar. To begin with, it delineates three other "All's" in addition to the one defined here, one of them supposedly larger in scope than the one defined here: the Allness of the Buddha's omniscience (literally, All-knowingness). This, despite the fact that the discourse says that the description of such an all lies beyond the range of explanation. Secondly, the Commentary includes nibbana (unbinding) within the scope of the All described here as a dhamma, or object of the intellect even though there are many other discourses in the Canon specifically stating that nibbana lies beyond the range of the six senses and their objects. Sn 5.6, for instance, indicates that a person who has attained nibbana has gone beyond all phenomena (sabbe dhamma), and therefore cannot be described. MN 49 discusses a "consciousness without feature" (vianam anidassanam) that does not partake of the "Allness of the All." Furthermore, the following discourse (SN 35.24) says that the "All" is to be abandoned. At no point does the Canon say that nibbana is to be abandoned. Nibbana follows on cessation (nirodha), which is to be realized. Once nibbana is realized, there are no further tasks to be done. Thus it seems more this discourse's discussion of "All" is meant to limit the use of the word "all" throughout the Buddha's teachings to the six sense spheres and their objects. As the following discourse shows, this would also include the consciousness, contact, and feelings connected with the sense spheres and their objects. Nibbana would lie outside of the word, "all." This would fit in with another point made several times in the Canon: that dispassion is the highest of all dhammas (Iti 90), while the arahant has gone beyond even dispassion (Sn 4.6; Sn 4.10). This raises the question, if the word "all" does not include nibbana, does that mean that one may infer from the statement, "all phenomena are not-self" that nibbana is self? The answer is no. As AN 4.174 states, to even ask if there is anything remaining or not remaining (or both, or neither) after the cessation of the six sense spheres is to differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated (or to complicate the uncomplicated see the Introduction to MN 18). The range of differentiation goes only as far as the "All." Perceptions of self or not-self, which would count as differentiation, would not apply beyond the "All." When the cessation of the "All" is experienced, all differentiation is allayed." > Do you mean to say that the Sabbasutta.m supports the view that > Nibbaana is not 'classified' by the Buddha? Exactly. And that the commentators have overshot the runway by a few hundred miles. I'll comment on the rest of your post later. I'm happy to keep discussing if you are, but if it were to come down to a commentarial notion that has no correlate in the suttas being pivotal to your case, I'd just as soon drop out. Cheers Herman #93419 From: TGrand458@... Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 1:11 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas TGrand458@... Hi Scott The below is not a position I appreciate or endorse. But I appreciate you taking the time to send it. TG OUT In a message dated 12/11/2008 11:55:59 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Scott: Here, from an unlikely commentator, might be a position you could appreciate: "Time...is motionless, and without beginning or end. That is has motion and is the cause of change is an illusion. Indeed it is itself really an illusion, for except to the narrow sight of beings in limited dimensions there are no such things as past, present and future. Men think of time only because of what they call change, yet that too is an illusion. All that was, and is, and is to be, exists simultaneously,simultaneously," (spoken to the seeker Randolph Carte the Ultimate Gate, by a Being of limitless mind; from Through the Gates of the Silver Key, H.P Lovecraft with E. Hoffman Price, in Necronomicon, The Best Weird Tales of H.P. Lovecraft, p. 409). #93420 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 6:56 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas egberdina Hi Alberto, 2008/12/12 sprlrt : > Dear Herman, > > > A: There is only one dhamma that the eye is able to see, visible rupa > only, all the things we "see" are not dhammas, this is my > understanding of the Buddha teaching, and this can be proved only by > satipatthana, when there are the conditions for panna to arise, > instead of avijja, to experience that visible rupa, before sanna turns > into something we are more or less familiar with (a table, for > instance). If we (mis)take that table for the dhamma that the Buddha > called visible object, I think we are on the wrong path. It is my understanding that the Buddha did not teach a complex theory of perception, as the scholastics have done. His teaching is simply this: "When, ....., for you in the seen is merely what is seen... in the cognized is merely what is cognized, then, ......, you will not be 'with that.' When, ........, you are not 'with that,' then, ......, you will not be 'in that.' When, ......, you are not 'in that,' then, ......., you will be neither here nor beyond nor in between the two. Just this is the end of suffering." > >> >> Sanna is real, it arises for a moment and can provide an object to the >> mind to think about, when there are conditions for this to happen. > > H: I imagine that in order to stay within the theory, this "mind" also > is just a momentary arising? > > A: Yes, mind and its concomitants are not separable, though they have > separate characteristics, functions etc. > >> Take a table, no table there actually, > > H: In order to deny the reality of a table, I first have to conceive > of it. > > A: But if you don't conceive a table there is no need to deny it or, > at the moment there is sati and panna experiencing visible object, a > dhamma, there is no table. It was you who said "take a table", not me :-) Furthermore, as in the Bahiya Sutta, the Buddha does not deny what is seen, heard, felt, thought etc. What is denied is what is not there ie a self in experience. > >>but after seeing consciuousness >> and other cittas of a sense process experience a visible rupa (table, >> chairs, mirages, dogs etc.), sanna marks that rupa and when mind door >> processes arise & fall, that rupa, visible object, get recognized by >> sanna, which has experienced that rupa many many times before in this >> lifetime > > H: What?? Sanna is a momentary arising in one part of the theory, but > persistent in the next part? I hope you are able to clarify. > > A: I'll try, the last citta of a sense door process is followed by > several bhavanga citta, the last of these is also the mind door, > bhavangupaccheda, through wich the object marked or rembembered by the > sanna of that citta is passed on, all according to conditions, to the > next cittas of this new process. Conditioned dhammas don't last, by > they are themselves the conditions for their arising again, six in > particular, called hetus, are root-conditions, which are three > akusala, moha (avijja), lobha and dosa, and three kusala, amoha > (panna), alobha and adosa. Panna is the kusala root that can > eventually, when complete, experience nibbana for the last time and > destroy all three akusala roots and change the nature of the other > three roots from kusala, i.e. still producing results, to kiriya, > functional only. Sorry, the above doesn't address what I was unclear about. Let me rephrase it. You wrote: Sanna is real, it arises for a moment and can provide an object to the mind to think about, when there are conditions for this to happen. And then you wrote: that rupa, visible object, get recognized by sanna, which has experienced that rupa many many times before in this lifetime In the first sanna is momentary In the second, sanna persists to know many rupas, again and again, over long periods of time. They can't both be right. Surely you understand that to recognise means to know again. How can a momentary arising know anything again, without there being a preservation of past "knowings" in some way? We started this discussion around your claim that each citta vanishes without trace. I am simply pointing out that the function of sanna is not possible in that scenario. Cheers Me, myself, I #93421 From: Asiri Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 6:53 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self (there is only one way) asiri57 Only way is following Sathipatthana sutta. Atula #93422 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Thu Dec 11, 2008 9:01 pm Subject: Today Arahat Theri Sanghamitta arrived @ LK bhikkhu0 Friends: How to be Real Buddhist through Observance? Unduwap Poya is this Fullmoon of December celebrating 2 events: 1: The arrival of Arahat Nun Theri Sanghamitta , sister of Arahat Mahinda , daughter of emperor Asoka from India in the 3rd century B.C. establishing the Order of Nuns. 2: The arrival at Anuradhapura of a sapling of the sacred Bodhi-tree at Buddhagaya, brought to Sri Lanka by Arahat Theri Sanghamitta . Arahat Theri Sanghamitta arrives w. tree. This day is designated Sanghamitta Day. Nowadays Dasasil Matas; ten-precept nuns, take an active part in making these celebrations. <...> over 2000 years old Bodhi Tree in Ceylon. On such Full-Moon Uposatha Poya Observance days: Any Lay Buddhist simply joins the Three Refuges & undertakes the Five Precepts like this: Newly bathed, shaved, white-clothed, with clean bare feet, one kneels at a shrine with a Buddha-statue, and bows first three times, so that feet, hands, elbows, knees & head touch the floor. Then, with joined palms at the heart, one recites these memorized lines in a loud, calm & steady voice: As long as this life lasts: I hereby take refuge in the Buddha. I hereby take refuge in the Dhamma. I hereby take refuge in the Sangha. I hereby seek shelter in the Buddha for the 2nd time. I hereby seek shelter in the Dhamma for the 2nd time. I hereby seek shelter in the Sangha for the 2nd time. I hereby request protection from the Buddha for the 3rd time. I hereby request protection from the Dhamma for the 3rd time. I hereby request protection from the Sangha for the 3rd time. I will hereby respect these Three Jewels the rest of my life! I accept to respect & undertake these 5 training rules: I hereby accept the training rule of avoiding all Killing. I hereby accept the training rule of avoiding all Stealing. I hereby accept the training rule of avoiding all Sexual Abuse. I hereby accept the training rule of avoiding all Dishonesty. I hereby accept the training rule of avoiding all Alcohol & Drugs. As long as this life lasts, I am thus protected by these 5 precepts... Then, one keeps and protects these sacred vows better than one's own eyes & children!, since they protect you & all other beings much better than any army! They are the highest offer one can give in/to this world! So is the start towards Nibbāna: the Deathless Element! This is the Noble Way to Peace, to Freedom, to Ease, to Happiness, initiated by Morality , developed further by Dhamma-Study and fulfilled by training of Meditation ... Today indeed is Pooya or Uposatha / observance day, where any lay Buddhist normally keeps even the Eight Precepts from sunrise until the next dawn... <....> May your journey hereby be light, swift and sweet. Never give up !! Bhikkhu Samahita: what.buddha.said@... For Details on The Origin of Uposatha Observance Days: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/uposatha.html Have a nice day! Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) .... #93423 From: "gazita2002" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 12:35 am Subject: Rajgir gazita2002 Hello All, after leaving Bodhgaya, we stayed one nite in Rajgir and climbed the hill where the first council was held, 3 months after Buddhas Parinibbana. Wonderful view over Rajgir and surrounds. My two travelling companions recited the Ratana Sutta while we sat deep in one of the caves. It must have been a very beautiful place in the time of the Buddha. On the previous day we had taken a few of our sewing centre girls ans some of the children to Rajgir and Nalanda for the day. They went back to Bodhgaya while we stayed on. we also climbed Vultures Peak which was quite late in the afternoon as the sun was setting so quite spectacular. Then a frightful road trip thro Patna to the airport to fly to Delhi. We had a bet on what time we would reach the airport, the prize being a lunch in Mumbai, and Chittapala won by 3 minutes. Now this may sound trivial but if anyone could have seen the state of traffic and road conditions in Patna, one would think that a miracle had occurred. Now in Aurangabad in Maharashtra state, and conditions are much better here. We are all feeling a tad ragged but do plan on going to the Ellora and Ajanta caves which are Buddhist in origin and quite old. Ven Guttasila developed a nasty chest infection so we had to take him to a hospital and I was very impressed with his treatment. A lot o the staff are Buddhist and surrounded Ven bed and chanted 'namo tassa bagawato, arahato ....... should be able to put a foto on dsg later of this particular event. Will post more after we visit the caves, depending on conditions....... Patience, courage and good cheer, azita #93424 From: "sprlrt" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 12:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas (are they monitored by a "prefect" or law officer) sprlrt Hi Colette, C: Lets qualify that. We're speaking of noumena, thoughts and/or thought processes A: It's ok with me if you call dhammas noumena, but then for me noumena are not thoughts, i.e. what one thinks about (a table, a person, a dog, a song's lyrics), which I take to be concepts, not dhammas, realities. C: Since Nama is subordinate to the existance and power of material objects, aka THINGS, well, I guess A: Not necessarily, according to tipitaka there are planes of existance without rupa khandha (arupa bhumi, the immaterial planes), which are just "made of" the other four nama khandha only. I assume you know some Dhamma theory on the doors and its objects, but I'll recap, just in case: There are six doors through which nama can experience six corresponding classes of objects. The five sense doors can only experience 7 rupas, four of these five can experience only one object each. The eyes, the ears, the nose, and the tongue can only experience one object each, visible object, ruparammana, etc. The rupas that can be experienced through the body door are three, solidity, temperature and motion. Seven objects only for five doors. The classes of object that mind door can experience, dhammarammana, includes all the 7 rupas that are experienced by the 5 five sense door, and the other rupas as well, all the namas (89 cittas and 52 cetasikas) which means that nama can experience itself, and nibbana, and these are the objects that are real and actually exist, and mind can also experience another class of objects, concepts, pannati, which can be anything, there is no limit or boundary to what concepts can be, the stuff samsara is made of, and all are conventions, inferred, unreal, made up by a self, by a concept. Alberto #93425 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 2:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts egberdina Hi Howard, 2008/12/12 : > Hi, Scott (and Herman) - > > ================================ > An odd thing that I note is that in the Abhidhammatha Sangaha, nibbana > is included in the Compendium of Matter!! That is well worth noting!! > This makes sense to me only if "matter" is to be understood not in the > usual, limited, physical sense, but in the completely general sense of > "whatever is not a form of knowing (of an object)," and, nibbana, being beyond all > conditions, is, in particular, neither citta nor cetasika. Yes. In any case, the > inclusion of nibbana in the Compendium of Matter certainly makes it not a > species of nama. Yes. >In my view, nibbana is beyond all category, Yes. >including even those > of being and nonbeing. Yes. Being doesn't depend on being known. But non-being does. The khandas are known, but they are not (in a manner of speaking). It can be pointed to by the use of some adjectives, > mostly negative, but it is a reality [THE reality, in my view] that is truly > beyond all description, being utterly beyond all conditions, circumstances, or > states of being. Yes. Amen. Cheers Herman #93426 From: "Scott" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 4:45 am Subject: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Thanks for continuing to discuss: SN 35 23 (1) Sabbasutta.m "...And what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odours, the tongue and tastes, the body and tactile objects, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called the all. "If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus, 'Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all' - that would be a mere empty boast on his part. If he were questioned he would not be able to reply and, further, he would meet with vexation. And for what reason? Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain." [...Ki~nca, bhikkhave, sabba.m? Cakkhu~nceva ruupaa ca, sota~nca saddaa ca, ghaana~nca gandhaa ca, jivhaa ca rasaa ca, kaayo ca pho.t.thabbaa ca, mano ca dhammaa ca'' ida.m vuccati, bhikkhave, sabba.m. Yo, bhikkhave, eva.m vadeyya'' 'ahameta.m sabba.m paccakkhaaya a~n~na.m sabba.m pa~n~naapessaamī'ti, tassa vaacaavatthukamevassa; pu.t.tho ca na sampaayeyya, uttari~nca vighaata.m aapajjeyya. Ta.m kissa hetu? Yathaa ta.m, bhikkhave, avisayasmi''nti...] Scott: Here's the Commentary on which Bh. Bodhi gave his opinions: Note 6, p.1399, Spk: "The all (sabba) is fourfold: (i) the all- inclusive all (sabbasabba), i.e. everything knowable, all of which comes into range of the Buddha's knowledge of omniscience; (ii) the all of the sense bases (aayatanasabba), i.e. the phenomena of the four planes; (iii) the all of personal identity (sakkaayasabba), i.e. the phenomena of the three planes; and (iv) the partial all (padesabba), i.e. the five physical sense objects. Each of these, from (i) to (iv), has a successively narrower range than its predecessor. In this sutta the all of the sense bases is intended. The four planes are the three mundane planes (see n.4 'the sensuous plane, the form plane, and the formless plane') and the supramundane plane (the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbana)." Me: "Do you mean to say that the Sabbasutta.m supports the view that Nibbaana is not 'classified' by the Buddha?" H: "Exactly. And that the commentators have overshot the runway by a few hundred miles." Scott: Do you consider Nibbaana to have been known by the Buddha? Doesn't the Buddha refer quite a bit to Nibbaana? What's wrong with clarifying that there are the 'three mundane planes - the sensuous plane (kaamaavacarabhuumi), the form plane (ruupaavacarabhuumi), and the formless plane (aruupavacarabhuumi) - the 'all' noted in the sutta, and noting that 'the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbaana' (lokuttarabhuumi) are a fourth? How does this 'overshoot the runway'? The Buddha taught Nibbaana. The Commentarial note to the phrase 'Because, bhikkhus, that would not be within his domain' (Yathaa ta.m, bhikkhave, avisayasmi''nti): Note 8, pp. 1399-1400, Spk: "People become vexed when they go outside their domain. Just as it is outside one's domain to cross a deep body of water while carrying a stone palace on one's head, or to drag the sun and moon off their course, and one would only meet with vexation in the attempt, so too in this case." Scott: Okay, so we're going to become vexed trying to discuss Nibbaana - its way outside our range. We already know this. Where do you think Nibbaana fits into things? How do you conceive of the experience of Nibbaana, and of the Path and Fruits taught by the Buddha - the one within whose range the teaching of Nibbaana falls? Sincerely, Scott. #93427 From: "sprlrt" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 4:47 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas sprlrt Hi Herman, H: It is my understanding that the Buddha did not teach a complex theory of perception, as the scholastics have done. His teaching is simply this: "When, ....., for you in the seen is merely what is seen... in the cognized is merely what is cognized, then, ......, you will not be 'with that.' When, ........, you are not 'with that,' then, ......, you will not be 'in that.' When, ......, you are not 'in that,' then, ......., you will be neither here nor beyond nor in between the two. Just this is the end of suffering." A: I think that theory, which it is recorded in the tipitaka, which I find complex, shouldn't be dismissed lightly (especially when it doesn't conform with one's views) since it should preceeds practice, and on which its quality depends. H: It was you who said "take a table", not me :-) Furthermore, as in the Bahiya Sutta, the Buddha does not deny what is seen, heard, felt, thought etc. What is denied is what is not there ie a self in experience. A: There's no need to deny anything when there isn't such thing there, not even the self when it's not there, and when the self (or the table etc.) is there it's not of much use denying is there. Both are conditioned, not under anyone's control, their absence by panna their presence by avijja. H: Sorry, the above doesn't address what I was unclear about. Let me rephrase it. You wrote: Sanna is real, it arises for a moment and can provide an object to the mind to think about, when there are conditions for this to happen. And then you wrote: that rupa, visible object, get recognized by sanna, which has experienced that rupa many many times before in this lifetime In the first sanna is momentary In the second, sanna persists to know many rupas, again and again, over long periods of time. They can't both be right. Surely you understand that to recognise means to know again. How can a momentary arising know anything again, without there being a preservation of past "knowings" in some way? We started this discussion around your claim that each citta vanishes without trace. I am simply pointing out that the function of sanna is not possible in that scenario. A: It's a complex matter :-) I'll try to explain it again later. Alberto #93428 From: "Scott" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 5:30 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "The below is not a position I appreciate or endorse. But I appreciate you taking the time to send it." Scott: You're welcome, but I had a reason for this: "Time...is motionless, and without beginning or end. That it has motion and is the cause of change is an illusion. Indeed it is itself really an illusion, for except to the narrow sight of beings in limited dimensions there are no such things as past, present and future. Men think of time only because of what they call change, yet that too is an illusion. All that was, and is, and is to be, exists simultaneously..." Scott: Of course, this has to be tongue-in-cheek. There is nothing in this fiction. I am serious, though, when I suggest to you, as I have many times, that, just like the prose above, I find the views conceived of by you to be the product of prosaic thinking. You are making it all up. I reiterate this since I think, given the time you take to express yourself here - to offer up your theories as an alternative, equal time can be taken to challenge views that seem outre. For example, you say: TG: "All 'conditions' are impermanent. But I'm curious...how does a 'conditioned dhamma' HAVE the impermanence characteristic?" Scott: Here, again, you've amalgamated everything into something you call 'conditions' - your entire premise. I read you to repeatedly deny that there can be characteristics of anything. I read you to repeatedly avow that concepts are the same as actualities. I read you to repeatedly assert that 'conditions' are all there is. I read you to repeatedly suggest that 'conditions' are akin to energy. As I've noted many times, I read you to have made up a theory in which: (i) Everything is nothing and this is 'conditions'; (ii) Nothing at all is always changing by 'conditions'; and (iii) Nothing ('conditions') is the cause ('condition') of this change ('condition') while nothing ('conditions') actually changes (by 'conditions') when it does. Scott: Finally, you offer yourself and your thinking as the authority on these matters, while claiming that everything in the Suttas says exactly what you think it says, every time. This is, of course, an unassailable position, rendering your posts impervious to reasonable examination. While railing against the Commentaries, and laughing-out-loud a lot, you set yourself up as a Commentator who ought to be given more weight than the Scholastics you so despise. Your main arguments are that the Commentators suck and that you know better than they because the Suttas say what you say. Why should one take these views of yours any more seriously? You may be a thinker but you can't possibly have the depth. I know for sure that I don't have the depth either so I'm not trying to insult you - just bring you back down to earth. Thinking too much and thinking too much of the product of one's thinking too much is just too much thinking. Sincerely, Scott. #93429 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 5:36 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Rajgir nilovg Dear Azita, Thank you for your travel report. This causes me to remember vividly the vists to Ellora and Ajanta when the late Ven. Dhammadharo was still alive. He was very interested in Ajanta. Nina. Op 12-dec-2008, om 9:35 heeft gazita2002 het volgende geschreven: > We are all feeling a tad ragged but do plan on going to > the Ellora and Ajanta caves which are Buddhist in origin and quite > old. #93430 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 12:50 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Alberto (and Herman) - In a message dated 12/12/2008 7:47:54 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, sprlrt@... writes: Hi Herman, H: It is my understanding that the Buddha did not teach a complex theory of perception, as the scholastics have done. His teaching is simply this: "When, ....., for you in the seen is merely what is seen... in the cognized is merely what is cognized, then, ......, you will not be 'with that.' When, ........, you are not 'with that,' then, ......, you will not be 'in that.' When, ......, you are not 'in that,' then, ......., you will be neither here nor beyond nor in between the two. Just this is the end of suffering." A: I think that theory, which it is recorded in the tipitaka, which I find complex, shouldn't be dismissed lightly (especially when it doesn't conform with one's views) since it should preceeds practice, and on which its quality depends. H: It was you who said "take a table", not me :-) Furthermore, as in the Bahiya Sutta, the Buddha does not deny what is seen, heard, felt, thought etc. What is denied is what is not there ie a self in experience. A: There's no need to deny anything when there isn't such thing there, not even the self when it's not there, and when the self (or the table etc.) is there it's not of much use denying is there. Both are conditioned, not under anyone's control, their absence by panna their presence by avijja. -------------------------------------------------- Howard One needs to deny what has been proposed as existing but actually does not in order to point out the error and point to the truth. Besides that, I have questions about the preceding: 1) You seem to be saying that "the self" and "the table" are nonexistent but conditioned, which makes no sense to me, it being contradictory. What does not exist is neither conditioned nor unconditioned nor anything at all. 2) While I agree that there is no self in anything, I do not agree that there are no tables. There are actualities corresponding to our conceived-of "tables," but they are not as they seem, being merely constantly altering, rupic aggregations of a specific sort. As such, they do exist, as opposed to the seemingly permanent "tables that are thought of," which are mentally projected but nonexistent, seemingly individual entities. The basis for these latter, merely conceived-of "tables" consists of the actual tables that are dynamic, patterned collections of interrelated rupas. The "tables" we seem to see and that we "sit at" are concept-only, mere mental concoctions, but they are not cut from whole cloth. They do have a basis in experiential reality. ----------------------------------------------- H: Sorry, the above doesn't address what I was unclear about. Let me rephrase it. You wrote: Sanna is real, it arises for a moment and can provide an object to the mind to think about, when there are conditions for this to happen. And then you wrote: that rupa, visible object, get recognized by sanna, which has experienced that rupa many many times before in this lifetime In the first sanna is momentary In the second, sanna persists to know many rupas, again and again, over long periods of time. They can't both be right. Surely you understand that to recognise means to know again. How can a momentary arising know anything again, without there being a preservation of past "knowings" in some way? We started this discussion around your claim that each citta vanishes without trace. I am simply pointing out that the function of sanna is not possible in that scenario. A: It's a complex matter :-) I'll try to explain it again later. --------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't think it is quite so complex: There are phenomena that are similar to each other, and that similarity is what recognition deals with. When a patterned stream of sounds (an aggregation of rupas) occurs, a melody for example, mind-door sa~n~na notes it ("marks" it), and that operation, then and there serves to condition future recognition of similar sound streams. More simply, when a taste occurs, tongue-door sa~n~na marks it, enabling future recognition of similar tastes. It is not the same recognizing occurring again and again, but differing instances of recognition, and it is not the same object (or aggregation of objects) that is recognized, but similar ones. --------------------------------------------------- Alberto =========================== With metta, Howard #93431 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 5:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts nilovg Hi Howard, Op 11-dec-2008, om 23:16 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > After explaining conditioned dhammas, citta, cetasika and rupa, he > says: > Nibbaana however is termed supramundane and is to be realized by the > wisdom of the four Paths.> > --------------------------------------------- > Howard: > But what has that to do with its being included in the Compendium of > Matter? > -------------------------------------------- > N: This is said at the end of matter, thus, you can see that > nibbaana is not included in matter. > That is why I want to point out the word: however, in Pali: pana: > nibbaana.m pana. > Pana can indicate a contrast. What follows after citta, cetasika > and matter is something new, nibbaana. The word pana, meaning > however, is placed before the section on nibbaana. > ---------------------------------------- > N: I use the Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Ven. Narada, it also has the > Pali. > Do you remember the discussions with Dieter? > ------------------------------------------ > Howard: > No, I do not. ------ N: You both had a noble project: the Compendium. Dieter was not happy that nibbaana is classified as the fourth paramattha dhamma. We had discussions about this, and then you both discontinued the project, alas. If you like to continue with this project, you do not have much to type, the text is on Rob's web vipassana and it gives all the Pali: Nina. #93432 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 6:10 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Re: Series Survey Quote. nilovg Dear Lukas, Op 11-dec-2008, om 10:53 heeft szmicio het volgende geschreven: > L: When citta experiences a concept(pa~n~nati), can sati arise and > know this citta? ------ N: Citta that thinks is a reality and thus it can be object of awareness and understanding. ---------- > L: Can sati arise and know a concept which is an object for this > citta? --------- N: There can be thinking of a concept, but thinking is not awareness. Sati is direct awareness of what is real, and concept which is not a reality can only be an object of thinking. --------- > L: Still has a lot of doubts about pa~n~nati. What is it? ------- N: I wrote in my Conditions: ---------- > L: I can smell, i can see, i can hear, i can think, but what is a > concept? > Citta thinks and we can "touch" it, but we cant "touch" a concept. > I think its good to know that there are a realities and a concepts. > Realities are real, concepts not. But how citta can experience > something that isn't a paramattha dhamma? How long a concept lasts? ------- N: But you can think now of a person or a street, and in this way you know that citta can think of concepts, why not? When citta, cetasika, rupa or nibbaana is not the object of citta, a concept is the object of citta. Thus, smelling smells odour which is rupa, not a concept. Tangible object is experienced by body- consciousness, and this is rupa, not a concept. ---------- > > L: what is a nimitta of thinking? ------- N: Nimitta has several meanings, depending on the context. I think you mean sankhaara nimitta that was discussed before. All condiitoned dhammas, the five khandhas, arise and fall very quickly and what remains is a sign or nimitta. The citta that is thinking is vi~n~naa.nakkhandha, and there is vi~n~naa.na nimitta. -------- > > L: What is a characteristic, manifestation, function and proximate > cause > of pa~n~nati? ---------- N: It does not have these, since it is not a paramattha dhamma. Pa~n~natti is manifold, there are so many kinds. I quote from Survey (read for nn: ~n~n): 1. That which is made known (pannapiyatta) 2. That which makes known (pannapanato). The name or term (sadda pannatti) which makes known the meaning of things. 21 The four noble truths are: dukkha (suffering), the origin of dukkha, the cessation of dukkha, the way leading to the cessation of dukkha. 22 Indriya (faculties): see Visuddhimagga XVI, 1 See footnote Dhammasangani (translated as Buddhist Psychological Ethics by PTS.) par.1306. If we remember these two classes of concepts it will be easier to understand what a concept is. There are many kinds of concepts and they can be classified in different ways. One way of classifying them is the following (see Abhidhammattha Sangaha Ch VIII, section 4, on pannattis): i) formal concept (santhana pannatti corresponding to the form of things, such as land, mountain or tree, which are so designated on account of the mode of transition of the elements. ii) collective concept (samuha pannatti), corresponding to modes of construction of materials, to a collection of things, such as a vehicle or a chariot. iii) conventional concept (sammutti pannatti), such as person or individual, which is derived from the five khandhas. iv) local concept (disa pannatti), a notion or idea de rived from the revolving of the moon, such as the directions of East or West. v) concept of time (kala pannatti), such as morning, evening. vi) concept of season (masa pannatti), notions corresponding to seasons and months. The months are designated by names, such as Vesakha. vii) concept of space (akasa), such as a well or a cave. It is derived from space which is not contacted by the four Great Elements. viii) nimitta pannatti, the mental image which is acquired through the development of samatha, such as the nimitta of a kasina. We read in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha: All such different things, although they do not exist in the ultimate sense, become objects of thought in the form of shadows of ultimate things. They are called pannatti be cause they are thought of, reckoned, understood, expressed, and made known on account of, in consideration of, with respect to, this or that mode. This kind of pannatti is so called because it is made known. As it makes known, it is described as name concept, name, name-made. (end quote) Nina. #93433 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 1:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 12/12/2008 8:58:44 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi Howard, Op 11-dec-2008, om 23:16 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > After explaining conditioned dhammas, citta, cetasika and rupa, he > says: > Nibbaana however is termed supramundane and is to be realized by the > wisdom of the four Paths.> > --------------------------------------------- > Howard: > But what has that to do with its being included in the Compendium of > Matter? > -------------------------------------------- > N: This is said at the end of matter, thus, you can see that > nibbaana is not included in matter. > That is why I want to point out the word: however, in Pali: pana: > nibbaana.m pana. > Pana can indicate a contrast. What follows after citta, cetasika > and matter is something new, nibbaana. The word pana, meaning > however, is placed before the section on nibbaana. > ---------------------------------------- > N: I use the Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Ven. Narada, it also has the > Pali. > Do you remember the discussions with Dieter? > ------------------------------------------ > Howard: > No, I do not. ------ N: You both had a noble project: the Compendium. Dieter was not happy that nibbaana is classified as the fourth paramattha dhamma. We had discussions about this, and then you both discontinued the project, alas. If you like to continue with this project, you do not have much to type, the text is on Rob's web vipassana and it gives all the Pali: _http://www.vipassana.info/sangaha.htm_ (http://www.vipassana.info/sangaha.htm) --------------------------------------------------- Howard: Nina, I appreciate your suggesting this. Unfortunately, and I blame only myself for this, after several attempts, I still find this material too "dry" and insufficiently related to the matter of awakening for me to generate to willingness to plunge into the material in an adequately detailed way. I'm not asserting here any objective condemnation of the material at all, but just indicating an impediment of distaste on my part. Perhaps this will cease to be the case at some point. ------------------------------------------------- Nina. ========================== With metta, Howard #93434 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 6:37 am Subject: [dsg] Sangiiti Sutta Threes (31-33) and commentary, part 2. nilovg Dear friends, Sutta: DN 33.1.10(33) 'Three more fires: the fire of those to be revered, of the householder, of those worthy of offerings*1039. ( Aparepi tayo aggii - aahuneyyaggi, gahapataggi, dakkhi.neyyaggi.) -------------- N: The Co states that the fire of oblation is said to be honour. Those worthy of honour should be honoured. Parents deserve honour because they are of great assistance to their children. Children who treat them badly will be reborn in hell planes. Therefore, if someone does not burn a sacrificial fire for his parents (does not honour them) this will be a condition for him to burn (in Hell), thus, a fire in Hell awaits him. This is the story of Mittavindika (Ja. 439, Pali Proper Names II, p. 632). He was the son of a rich merchant in Varaanasii. When his father died he discontinued to give alms. His mother promised him a thousand if he would keep the Uposatha Day by going to the Temple and listen to the Dhamma preaching all night. He went to the Temple because he was attached to money and slept all night. He accepted the money from his mother. Later on he wanted to go by ship on a trading voayage and when his mother tried to restrain him he knocked her down. When the ship did not move in mid-ocean the lot fell upon him to be set out on a raft and then he reached an island with female ghosts. They passed seven days in bliss and seven days in sorrow. He went to other islands where he met an increasing number of ghosts and finally he went to Ussada Hell where he saw a man supporting on his head a wheel sharp as a razor. But it appeared to him as a lotus flower. He wanted to take this wheel from the man and when he put it on his head he experienced the torments of hell. This was the result of his greed and his bad conduct to his mother. N: We learn that each kamma produces its appropriate result. This story is not told to frighten people, but it instills a sense of urgency and is an exhortation to honour ones parents. -------- As to the honour due to a householder, the co states that he is of great assistance to his wife in giving her a sleeping place, the things she needs and ornaments. When his wife betrays him in committing adultery she is reborn in Hell. Just as in the case of honour to parents, if someone does not burn a sacrificial fire for her husband (does not honour him) this will be a condition for her to burn (in Hell), thus, a fire in Hell awaits her. Here is a story. At the time of Kassapa Buddha a wife betrayed her husband who was a sotaapanna, in committing adultery. He said: Why did you act like that? She answered: If I have acted in that way may a verocious dog bite me. She died and was reborn as a vemaanika ghost (with a heavenly palace who spends half of the time in bliss and half in suffering) near Ka.n.namu.n.daka lake (one of the seven great lakes in the Himalaya). During the day she experienced bliss and during the night suffering. The King of Varaanasii went hunting, entered the wood and gradually reached that lake where he experienced happiness with this ghost. She concealed it that during the night she had to suffer. He was wondering where she was going and followed her step by step, departing from that lake and when he saw that a dog was biting her, he cut it in two pieces with a sword. Then there were two dogs. When he cut them up again there were four, eight, sixteen dogs. She asked: What are you doing, husband? She spat a lump of saliva on the earth, rubbed it in with her foot and then the dogs disappeared. During the day her kamma was exhausted. Then King went off after having expressed regret. N: By this story it has been explained that honour is due to a husband and if a wife disregards this, in betraying her husband, she will have an unhappy rebirth. ------------ Co: Aahuneyyaggiitiaadiisu aahuna.m vuccati sakkaaro, aahuna.m arahantiiti aahuneyyaa. Maataapitaro hi puttaana.m bahuupakaarataaya aahuna.m arahanti. Tesu vippa.tipajjamaanaa puttaa nirayaadiisu nibbattanti.... (to be continued) ---------- Nina #93435 From: TGrand458@... Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 4:26 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas TGrand458@... Hi Scott In a message dated 12/12/2008 6:30:45 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Scott: Of course, this has to be tongue-in-cheek. There is nothing in this fiction. I am serious, though, when I suggest to you, as I have many times, that, just like the prose above, I find the views conceived of by you to be the product of prosaic thinking. You are making it all up. I reiterate this since I think, given the time you take to express yourself here - to offer up your theories as an alternative, equal time can be taken to challenge views that seem outre. For example, you say: TG: "All 'conditions' are impermanent. But I'm curious...how does a 'conditioned dhamma' HAVE the impermanence characteristic?' Scott: Here, again, you've amalgamated everything into something you call 'conditions' - your entire premise. I read you to repeatedly deny that there can be characteristics of anything. I read you to repeatedly avow that concepts are the same as actualities. I read you to repeatedly assert that 'conditions' are all there is. I read you to repeatedly suggest that 'conditions' are akin to energy. As I've noted many times, I read you to have made up a theory in which: (i) Everything is nothing and this is 'conditions'( ........................................ TG: Wrong .......................................... (ii) Nothing at all is always changing by 'conditions'(ii) Noth ........................................... TG: Wrong ................................................... (iii) Nothing ('conditions'(iii) Nothing ('conditions') while nothing ('condition') whi 'conditions''conditions') ..................................................... TG: Wrong ..................................................... Scott: Finally, you offer yourself and your thinking as the authority on these matters, while claiming that everything in the Suttas says exactly what you think it says, every time. This is, of course, an unassailable position, rendering your posts impervious to reasonable examination. ...................................................... TG: You are welcome to your opinion. ....................................................... While railing against the Commentaries, and laughing-out-While raili you set yourself up as a Commentator who ought to be given more weight than the Scholastics you so despise. Your main arguments are that the Commentators suck and that you know better than they because the Suttas say what you say. ................................................... TG: You're really on a roll today Scott. LOL ....................................................... Why should one take these views of yours any more seriously? You may be a thinker but you can't possibly have the depth. I know for sure that I don't have the depth either so I'm not trying to insult you - just bring you back down to earth. .......................................................... TG: That's the o'l Buddha method! Tell the listeners that they can't possible understand him. LOL I can hear the Buddha now... "You can't possibly understand me. To think you can is the height of arrogance. I just want to let you know this to bring you back to Earth." I can see them all lining up to hear that! ............................................................. Thinking too much and thinking too much of the product of one's thinking too much is just too much thinking. ................................................................ TG: LOL I think you're frustrated Scott because you haven't learned how to see your way out of self view yet. Your posts indicate that. You might think you have though. TG OUT #93436 From: "sprlrt" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 9:27 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas sprlrt Hi Howard, (and Herman), --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Alberto (and Herman) - > > In a message dated 12/12/2008 7:47:54 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, > sprlrt@... writes: > > Hi Herman, > > H: It is my understanding that the Buddha did not teach a complex theory > of perception, as the scholastics have done. His teaching is simply > this: "When, ....., for you in the seen is merely what is seen... in > the cognized is merely what is cognized, then, ......, you will not be > 'with that.' When, ........, you are not 'with that,' then, ......, > you will not be 'in that.' When, ......, you are not 'in that,' then, > ......., you will be neither here nor beyond nor in between the two. > Just this is the end of suffering." > > A: I think that theory, which it is recorded in the tipitaka, which I > find complex, shouldn't be dismissed lightly (especially when it > doesn't conform with one's views) since it should preceeds practice, > and on which its quality depends. > > H: It was you who said "take a table", not me :-) Furthermore, as in the > Bahiya Sutta, the Buddha does not deny what is seen, heard, felt, > thought etc. What is denied is what is not there ie a self in > experience. > > A: There's no need to deny anything when there isn't such thing there, > not even the self when it's not there, and when the self (or the table > etc.) is there it's not of much use denying is there. Both are > conditioned, not under anyone's control, their absence by panna their > presence by avijja. > -------------------------------------------------- > Howard > One needs to deny what has been proposed as existing but actually does not > in order to point out the error and point to the truth. > Besides that, I have questions about the preceding: > 1) You seem to be saying that "the self" and "the table" are nonexistent > but conditioned, which makes no sense to me, it being contradictory. What > does not exist is neither conditioned nor unconditioned nor anything at all. A: An intricate subject pannati, concepts are paccaya, conditions for dhammas to arise in future, but concepts are not paccayuppanna, the (dhammas that) result because of past conditions. And they aren't sankhara either, conditioned to arise, since they don't. So I agreee, conditioned isn't the best word to use when dealing with concepts since it can be taken to mean paccayuppanna (the result of past conditions) or sankhara (the dhamma that arises because of conditions & then falls away). Alberto #93437 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 4:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Alberto (and Herman) - ... A: An intricate subject pannati, concepts are paccaya, conditions for dhammas to arise in future, but concepts are not paccayuppanna, the (dhammas that) result because of past conditions. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: It is the thinking that is conditioned and that also serves as condition. When thinking, there is just the thinking. The alleged objects of thought are mere projections, sometimes based on realities, sometimes not - but it is only the thinking that is occurring. When I think about hardness, warmth, my family, or whatever, there is just the thinking. ----------------------------------------------- And they aren't sankhara either, conditioned to arise, since they don't. ----------------------------------------------- Howard: That's right. But the thinking does occur, and often it is based on realities. ---------------------------------------------- So I agreee, conditioned isn't the best word to use when dealing with concepts since it can be taken to mean paccayuppanna (the result of past conditions) or sankhara (the dhamma that arises because of conditions & then falls away). Alberto =========================== With metta, Howard #93438 From: TGrand458@... Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 5:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas TGrand458@... Hi Scott I forgot to comment on this and I meant to. In a message dated 12/12/2008 10:26:44 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: TG: "All 'conditions' are impermanent. But I'm curious...how does a 'conditioned dhamma' HAVE the impermanence characteristic?' Scott: Here, again, you've amalgamated everything into something you call 'conditions' - your entire premise. .......................................................................... TG: You may be the only Buddhist I have encountered who has a problem dealing with the term "conditions." I realize you have this need to delineate CONDITIONS into "active players" or "entities" that come to town all loaded to bear with "their own characteristics." From my point of view, that outlook is the very delusion the Buddha is trying to lead us from. I'll continue to use "conditions," as I think most here are privy enough to realize that such refers to "whatever arises, alters, ceases," including delusion. You're just going to have to live with it or ignore it I guess. :-) TG OUT #93439 From: TGrand458@... Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 5:36 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas TGrand458@... Hi Scott Correction... In a message dated 12/12/2008 11:07:46 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: I realize you have this need to delineate CONDITIONS into "active players" or "entities" that come to town all loaded to bear with "their own characteristics.ch .................................................................. TG: This should have read -- "...loaded FOR bear with their own characteristics." How clumsy of me. TG OUT #93440 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 1:11 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: how to view the self kenhowardau Hi Herman, Sorry for the delay, I have been planning to buy a new ukulele. I've narrowed it down to three. Decisions, decisions, decisions! But now on to more important matters: --------- <. . .> H: > Please correct me where I have misunderstood you. There is pleasant red, and unpleasant red. --------- I said that about sense rupas, not about the concept, red. But I think you are using "red" as a name for one particular sense rupa, and so I suppose we can work with that. :-) --------------------------------- H: > The pleasance and unpleasance are in the red. But that is two characteristics, not one. --------------------------------- No, a sense rupa is either pleasant or unpleasant, not both. If there are two rupas that you have given the name "red" to then one could be pleasant red the other, unpleasant red. ------------------------------------------------ H: > Pleasant red is pleasant and red. Unpleasant red is unpleasant and red. Therefore, pleasant red and unpleasant red are not absolute. They are reducible. ------------------------------------------------- Sorry, you've lost me! ------------------------------------------- > -------------------------- > KH: > > Yes; it's now or never. > > H: > I agree with you. And, I believe, it is craving and aversion, > that continually removes us from the present. > -------------------------- > KH: > > Them too, but ignorance of paramattha dhammas is the real killer. H: > Well, is there anything else besides paramattha dhammas? If paramattha dhammas are ignorant of paramattha dhammas, so be it. ------------------------------------------- That's the conclusion I have reached, too. And I think it is the conclusion the DSG dinosaurs reached long ago: 'Understanding the way things are,' that's want it's all about! Welcome aboard! :-) Ken H #93441 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 3:02 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas kenhowardau Hi Herman, ------------ KH: > > Nagarjuna > and his followers didn't want anything to do with final cessation. > Not many people do. > H: > Cessation is cessation. Final cessation is no more cessation than just cessation. There is no difference between absent and totally absent. Can we agree on that? ---------------- Yes, each nama or rupa arises, performs its functions and ceases. The term 'final cessation' refers to the process. After the death-citta of an arahant no other citta arises to take its place. As I was saying, people don't like that. I remember talking off list to a former DSG member who maintained that the illusion of a continuing self was at least better than nothing. :-) -------------------- H: > In the interest of fairness, though, I do think that the folks who invented the bhavanga citta, the unknown knowing, are the ones who fear cessation more than anyone. All constructive comments are welcome. ------------------- I had a comment, but I won't say it now. There is nothing constructive in "silly old duffer" is there? :-) Ken H #93442 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 11:40 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Ken (and Herman) - In a message dated 12/12/2008 6:02:59 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, kenhowardau@... writes: Hi Herman, ------------ KH: > > Nagarjuna > and his followers didn't want anything to do with final cessation. > Not many people do. > H: > Cessation is cessation. Final cessation is no more cessation than just cessation. There is no difference between absent and totally absent. Can we agree on that? ---------------- Yes, each nama or rupa arises, performs its functions and ceases. The term 'final cessation' refers to the process. After the death-citta of an arahant no other citta arises to take its place. ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: Ken, you and some others here who presume separate, self-existent citta-packets accept the idea of annihilation every moment followed immediately by a god-like creation of something from nothing in the next moment, except for some time in the far distant future where annihilation is not followed by anything. The main problem with that is that the Buddha did not teach annihilation. He taught a middle way that avoided both annihilation and self-existence by avoiding both nihilism and substantialism. Samsara is the appearance realm of separate things - of apparent separate and discrete objects and personal selves that know them, crave their presence or absence, and cling to and grasp at what are in reality neither separate nor graspable. Nibbana (or freedom) is the actual nature of reality - seamless, open, free and vast, with no separate facets to be grasped at and no beings who grasp. Here there is nothing that stands alone or self-existent, nothing substantial to be annihilated, and nothing substantial that is created. May we realize this reality, for here is perfect peace. ------------------------------------------------------- As I was saying, people don't like that. I remember talking off list to a former DSG member who maintained that the illusion of a continuing self was at least better than nothing. :-) -------------------- H: > In the interest of fairness, though, I do think that the folks who invented the bhavanga citta, the unknown knowing, are the ones who fear cessation more than anyone. All constructive comments are welcome. ------------------- I had a comment, but I won't say it now. There is nothing constructive in "silly old duffer" is there? :-) Ken H ============================ With metta, Howard #93443 From: "connie" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 7:57 pm Subject: Vis. Revisited. nichiconn look, TG! another piece of velocity: << PPn iv,53. Herein, wise attention given to the profitable, etc., is attention occurring in penetration of individual essences and of [the three] general characteristics. Wise attention given to the element of initiative, etc., is attention occurring in the arousing of the element of initiative, and so on. Herein, initial energy is called the element of initiative. The element of launching is stronger than that because it launches out from idleness. The element of persistence is still stronger than that because it goes on persisting in successive later stages. States productive of the happiness enlightenment factor is a name for happiness itself; and attention that arouses that is wise attention. >> end quote be happy, man. connie #93444 From: "Robert" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 10:18 pm Subject: Re: how to view the self avalo1968 Hello Ken, Thank you for your answer. I am not seeing it, but that is OK. You are speaking of an inherently pleasant sense experience while I am thinking that sense experience is going to be conditioned and therefore not inherently anything, but never mind. Cheers, Robert A. #93445 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Fri Dec 12, 2008 9:56 pm Subject: Not Clinging! bhikkhu0 Friends: Completely Comprehending & Leaving the All is the Crucial Core Capability! At Savatthi the Blessed Buddha said this: Bhikkhus, without directly knowing & completely comprehending The All, without being disgusted with it and leaving it all behind, one is incapable of eliminating any suffering... Without directly knowing & completely comprehending the eye, forms, ear, sounds, nose, smells, tongue, tastes, body, touches, mind, ideas and all metal states, any consciousness all forms of contact and whatever kind of feeling arised caused by such sense-contacts, without becoming disgusted with it, without relinquishing it all, & without letting it all go, one is incapable of eradicating any suffering irreversibly... This, friends, is that All, which without directly knowing, without completely comprehending, without being disgusted by & without leaving, one is incapable of eliminating all suffering... Comments: The radical rationality of the Buddha-Dhamma here shines forth, wiping all empty babble away! Since what is suffering? The five Clusters of Clinging are suffering! Body, Feeling, Perception, Construction & Consciousness and thus also the 6 senses, their 6 objects, & 6 kinds of consciousnesses, their 6 kinds of contact and their 6 kinds of feeling are all suffering... Why is all that suffering? Because all that is inherently impermanent and thus always lost, decaying, & vanishing by itself... Clinging is an intensified Form of Craving... Craving grows into the Cause of Misery!!! <.....> Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings by the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book IV [17-8] The 6 senses section 35. Thread on Complete Comprehension: Parijānāna Sutta (26) http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=948507 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/index.html Have a nice day! Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) ... #93446 From: "sprlrt" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 12:18 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas sprlrt Hi Howard (Herman), Howard: It is the thinking that is conditioned and that also serves as condition. When thinking, there is just the thinking. The alleged objects of thought are mere projections, sometimes based on realities, sometimes not - but it is only the thinking that is occurring. When I think about hardness, warmth, my family, or whatever, there is just the thinking. A: Sankhara dhammas (nama and rupa) arise because of several conditions, not just one. At the moment of arising sankhara dhammas are conditions (paccaya) for the arising of other sankhara dhammas, both in that present instant, as object condtion, object/arammana paccaya for instance, also sahajata paccaya etc., and in the future, habits/pakatupanissaya paccaya for instance, also (nanakkhnika) kamma paccaya etc.. Object condition is a necessary condition for all cittas to be able to arise, including bhavanga/life-continuum, i.e. without an object to experience nama dhammas can't arise. The sankhara dhamma that hasn't fallen away yet, i.e. the present one, is both paccaya (it conditions the arising of other sankhara dhammas in the present and, for some, also in the future) and paccayuppanna (i.e. it is the sankhara dhamma conditioned to arise by conditions, both present and, for some, also past) ----------------------------------------------- Howard: That's right. But the thinking does occur, and often it is based on realities. A: Just in the first of the many mind door processes that follow a sense door one. Alberto #93447 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 2:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: That's all there is to know, and a revisit to Vis. . nilovg Hi Howard, Op 11-dec-2008, om 22:24 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: (re the sutta about The All): > As I see it, > this sutta is a straightforwardly ontological one that rules out > anything > not directly referred in the sutta. It is basically a "This is it, > baby! There > just ain't nuthin' else!" sutta. The matter of insight just doesn't > happen to > enter into this particular sutta. ------- N: That's all there is to know: the twelve aayatanas, and all cittas are included in mindbase, manaayatana. This sutta gives us all the material that can be object of awareness and right understanding, but we should not be negligent. Also this sutta points to satipatthaana. The Buddha taught satipatthaana from the moment of his enlightenment until his parinibbaana. Even on his long way to Kusinara he never stopped teaching satipatthaana, because this is the only way to know that seeing, visible object, all realities are non-self. Seeing, visible object etc. are the realities appearing now in daily life. I heard Kh Sujin say this morning that this is not taught in other religions. They do not teach realities, only stories about realities. We have to consider each word of the Tipitaka. Seeing is not self, visible object is not self, hearing and the other aayatanas are not self. We have to consider these in all details, until there is firm understanding of them. This is the way to eliminate ignorance. The Abhidhamma teaches in detail what appears at this moment. When you can relate this to daily life you may not find the Abhidhammattha Sangaha dry any more. We have accumulated more ignorance than we ever thought, we are blinded by ignorance, but with each moment of understanding just a little ignorance is eliminated. ------ Here is a revisit to Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 118, 119. Text Vis. 118. Thus he figures, blinded by ignorance. He is like a blind man who wanders about the earth, encountering now right and now wrong paths, now heights and now hollows, now even and now uneven ground, and so he forms formations now of merit, now of demerit, now imperturbable. -------- N: The Tiika adds to the words, Thus he figures, blinded by ignorance, that with these ways of (wrong) thinking ignorance is the cause of akusala citta and conditions beings to perform formations of merit, and so on. The words and so on or to begin with (aadi) include formations of demerit and of the imperturbable. The Tiika adds that explaining the meaning of the foregoing, he said: blinded by ignorance (avijjaaya andhiikato). ------------------ Text Vis. 119: Hence this is said: As one born blind, who gropes along Without assistance from a guide, --------- N: The Tiika explains being without a guide as without the good friend in Dhamma (kalyaa.namitta) who has reached arahatship. The guide teaches the final knowledge of the arahat or the understanding of what is even and uneven and leads beings to nibbaana. According to the Tiika without a guide means without such a person who is a good guide. The good guide teaches what is even and what is uneven (samavisama), what is right and what is wrong. -------- Text Vis.: Chooses a road that may be right At one time, at another wrong, So while the foolish man pursues The round of births without a guide, Now to do merit he may choose And now demerit in such plight. But when the Dhamma he comes to know And penetrates the truths besides, ---------- N: The Tiika elaborates on the words: But when the Dhamma he comes to know (~natvaa so dhamma.m), stating that he has understood the Dhamma he has heard, the explanation of the four Truths, when dwelling with a noble person (sappurisa), or that he has penetrated the most excellent of all dhammas, nibbaana dhamma, by pa~n~naa accompanying maggacitta (magga-~naa.na). ---------- Text Vis.: Then ignorance is put to flight At last, and he in peace may go. This is the detailed explanation of the clause 'With ignorance as condition there are formations'. ---------- N: As to the expression, he will walk in peace (upasanto), the Tiika adds that he is in peace after he has completely overcome ignorance (avijjuupasama) by the attainment of what is most excellent (agga-m- agga).The Tiika refers to the two elements of nibbaana: sa- upaadisesanibbaanadhaatu: the element of nibbaana with the khandhas remaining, and anupaadisesanibbaanadhaatu: nibbaana without the khandhas remaining, which pertains to the final passing away of an arahat. The Tiika explains that when the arahat is still alive he leads his life for the welfare of other beings (sattaana.m hitacariyaaya), and he will dwell in happiness in this world (di.t.thadhammasukhavihaara). --------- Nina. #93448 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 3:01 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts sarahprocter... Hi Howard, --- On Fri, 12/12/08, upasaka@... wrote: H:> > In any case, the inclusion of nibbana in the Compendium of Matter certainly makes it not a species of nama. .... S: I think it is only included at the end of this chapter for conveninece because the text just deals briefly with the fourth ultimate reality, Nibbana after rupa. If you look at ch VIII, you'll see the text makes it very clear that nibbana is nama. I quoted the following recently (when making the point that concepts are not paramattha dhammas): There have been some suggestions recently that concepts(pa~n~natti) are somehow included amongst the conditioned dhammas which make up the 5 khandhas. There is a misunderstanding that the khandhas refer to anything other than namas and rupas, or to cittas, cetasikas and rupas. S:> In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (C.M.A., ed. by B.Bodhi), Ch VIII, "Analysis ofConcepts" (Pa~n~nattibheda), it says: "Tattha ruupadhammaa ruupakkhandho va; cittacetasikasankhaataa cattaaro aruupinokhandhaa nibbaana~n caa ti pa~ncavidham pi aruupan ti ca naamana ti ca pavuccati. "Tato avasesa pa~n~natti pana pa~n~naapiyattaa pa~n~natti, pa~n~napanato pa~n~natti ti ca duvidhaa hoti." "Therein, the material phenomena are just the aggregate of matter. Consciousness and mental factors, which comprise the four immaterial aggregates, and Nibbaana, are the five kinds that are immaterial. They are also called "name." [S: naama]. "What remains are concepts, which are twofold: concept as that which is made known, and concept as that which makes known." ***** The Guide note (inc. by the editors) states here: " 'They are also called 'name' ': The four immaterial aggregates are called naama, 'name', in the sense of bending (namana) because they bend towards the object in the act of cognizing it. They are also called naama in the sense of causing to bend (naamana) since they cause one another to bend on to the object. Nibbaana is called naama solely in the sense of causing to bend. For Nibbaana causes faultless states - that is, the supramundane cittas and cetasikas - to bend on to itself by acting as an objective predominance condition."[see Asl.392; Expos., p.501]. Metta, Sarah ======== #93449 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 3:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts sarahprocter... Hi Alex, --- On Fri, 12/12/08, Alex wrote: >> S: Any my advice to you and everyone is to really consider what is > said in the Suttas and other parts of the Tipitaka and ancient > commentaries carefully. A:> As an orthodox Buddhist one cannot take the above seriously. Only the Buddha is The unfallible Authority on Buddhism. .... S: I'd say 'orthodox Buddhism' was according to the Buddha and Theras as found in the Theravada teachings above. ... A:> In DN16 he has said to compare any teaching said to be "his" with the SUTTAS. ... S: As discussed before, you have to know what is meant in context by terms such as 'suttas'. There's no point in re-hashing it all. Clearly he encouraged his disciples such as Maha-Kaccana and Sariputta to elaborate on the discourses too. Many such elaborations formed the core of the commentaries and Abhidhamma you despise so much. Metta, Sarah ======== #93450 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 3:23 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts sarahprocter... Hi Alex, --- On Fri, 12/12/08, Alex wrote: >> S: Sorry, but it doesn't settle the issue. Nyantiloka's dictionary has always been a wonderful asset, but it does contain errors and this is a glaring one. > A:> And how Sarah, do you know what is true and what is false here? Are you better than Ven. Nyantiloka? ... S: It's not a question of 'who is better'! It's a question of what the Tipitaka and ancient commentaries (the sources for the dictionary)state. .... A:> If someone could find a sutta quote saying that concepts are eternal, not subject to change, beyond 5 khandas, etc etc than I would gladly change my view that ALL things, concepts included, are Anicca dukkha Anatta. ... S: No one will find the sutta you're looking for because your assumptions are erroneous. That which is conceptualised or conceived of cannot be said to be impermanent, permanent, eternal or to have any other characteristics, except in a conventional sense, such as when we might superficially say 'my pen disappeared' or 'my pen has lasted forever'. Metta, Sarah ========== #93451 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 3:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All egberdina Hi Scott, 2008/12/12 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Scott: Do you consider Nibbaana to have been known by the Buddha? Yes, and this is how Nibbana is known AN 9:34 "Now there is the case where a monk quite withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful qualities enters & remains in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. If, as he remains there, he is beset with attention to perceptions dealing with sensuality, that is an affliction for him. Just as pain arises as an affliction in a healthy person for his affliction, even so the attention to perceptions dealing with sensuality that beset the monk is an affliction for him. Now, the Blessed One has said that whatever is an affliction is stress. So by this line of reasoning it may be known how Unbinding is pleasant. all the way to "Furthermore, there is the case where a monk, with the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, enters & remains in the cessation of perception & feeling. And, having seen [that] with discernment, his mental fermentations are completely ended. So by this line of reasoning it may be known how Unbinding is pleasant." > Doesn't the Buddha refer quite a bit to Nibbaana? Yes What's wrong with > clarifying that there are the 'three mundane planes - the sensuous > plane (kaamaavacarabhuumi), the form plane (ruupaavacarabhuumi), and > the formless plane (aruupavacarabhuumi) - These are ways of thinking about things. There is nothing wrong with thinking about things as long as it is realised that "this is thinking about things". But to one inclined to grasping, the thought will occur that planes are realities. In that circumstance, these statements are not clarifying, but an impediment, a hindrance, a millstone hung around the neck. the 'all' noted in the > sutta, and noting that 'the four paths, their fruits, and Nibbaana' > (lokuttarabhuumi) are a fourth? How does this 'overshoot the runway'? The sutta says what it says. The commentary says things the sutta doesn't say, all the while maintaining this is what the sutta really says. Give me a break. I find it fascinating that in order to discuss Buddhism with you, I have to discuss commentaries. Was the Buddha really such an incompetent fool, that he needed all these latter-day bright lights to clear things up for him? Cheers Herman #93452 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 3:51 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self egberdina Hi KenH, 2008/12/13 kenhowardau : > Hi Herman, > > Sorry for the delay, I have been planning to buy a new ukulele. I've > narrowed it down to three. Decisions, decisions, decisions! > It sounds like an awful predicament :-) >> >> H: > I agree with you. And, I believe, it is craving and aversion, >> that continually removes us from the present. >> -------------------------- >> > KH: > > Them too, but ignorance of paramattha dhammas is the real > killer. > > > H: > Well, is there anything else besides paramattha dhammas? If > paramattha > dhammas are ignorant of paramattha dhammas, so be it. > ------------------------------------------- > > That's the conclusion I have reached, too. And I think it is the > conclusion the DSG dinosaurs reached long ago: 'Understanding the > way things are,' that's want it's all about! > > Welcome aboard! :-) > Thanks, Ken. But, politely, you are a silly old duffer. The pursuit of understanding is no less dukkha than the quest to acquire a midget guitar. Cheers Herman #93453 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 3:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts sarahprocter... Hi TG, --- On Fri, 12/12/08, TGrand458@... wrote: >>S:The dhatus (elements) only include paramattha dhammas, dhammas which arise and fall in an absolute sense and can be directly known by insight. ............ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... >TG: Sutta source for this assertion please? If no Sutta source is forthcoming, then I consider it an assertion that is groundless in terms of being the Buddha's teaching. .... S: I'll play the 'Sutta only source', just once more for this thread, in brief: "There are, Ananda, these two elements: the conditioned element and the unconditioned element. When he knows and sees these two elements, a bhikkhu can be called skilled in the elements." (M 115, again!) "Form, Ananda, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, to vanishing, to fading away, to cessation. Through its cessation, cessation is spoken of. "Feeling.....Perception....volitional formations are impermanent..... consciousness is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, to vanishing, to fading away, to cessation. Through its cessation, cessation is spoken of. "It is through the cessation of these things, Ananda, that cessation is spoken of." (SN 22:21) S: These are the khandhas, the conditioned element, which are conditioned, impemanent and can be directly known by the wise (or skilled). The Buddha is not referring to being skilled in the knowledge of the impermanence or cessation of pencils, purple elephants, people or philosophical fantasies:-). Metta, Sarah =========== #93454 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 4:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas egberdina Hi KenH, 2008/12/13 kenhowardau : > Hi Herman, > > ------------ > KH: > > Nagarjuna >> and his followers didn't want anything to do with final cessation. >> Not many people do. >> > > H: > Cessation is cessation. Final cessation is no more cessation > than just cessation. There is no difference between absent and > totally absent. Can we agree on that? > ---------------- > > Yes, each nama or rupa arises, performs its functions and ceases. The > term 'final cessation' refers to the process. After the death-citta > of an arahant no other citta arises to take its place. > > As I was saying, people don't like that. I remember talking off list > to a former DSG member who maintained that the illusion of a > continuing self was at least better than nothing. :-) > > -------------------- > H: > In the interest of fairness, though, I do think that the folks > who invented the bhavanga citta, the unknown knowing, are the ones who > fear cessation more than anyone. > > All constructive comments are welcome. > ------------------- > > I had a comment, but I won't say it now. There is nothing > constructive in "silly old duffer" is there? :-) > No, not on it's own. But if you were to say that I was a silly old duffer because ..... and you put forward some cogent arguments, then that would be constructive. As it stands, the bhavanga citta is the unknown known which provides the continuity that the citta-vitthi theory needs, right? Cheers Herman #93455 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 4:14 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas egberdina Hi Alberto, 2008/12/12 sprlrt : > Hi Herman, > > > A: It's a complex matter :-) > I'll try to explain it again later. > Sometimes things appear complex when in fact they are contradictory. Enjoy the thicket :-) Cheers Herman #93456 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 4:40 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas egberdina Hi Howard (and Alberto), 2008/12/13 : > Hi, Alberto (and Herman) - > > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't think it is quite so complex: There are phenomena that are > similar to each other, and that similarity is what recognition deals with. When a > patterned stream of sounds (an aggregation of rupas) occurs, a melody for > example, mind-door sa~n~na notes it ("marks" it), and that operation, then and > there serves to condition future recognition of similar sound streams. More > simply, when a taste occurs, tongue-door sa~n~na marks it, enabling future > recognition of similar tastes. It is not the same recognizing occurring again and > again, but differing instances of recognition, and it is not the same object > (or aggregation of objects) that is recognized, but similar ones. > --------------------------------------------------- I think you are saying, and I agree, that recognition requires the comparison of one thing against other things, a pattern matching so to speak. In that process, phenomena are not whatever they are, but become an instance of a category. In Alberto's complex theory, he has it that every remembered pattern, against which all arising phenomena are compared, vanishes without trace every moment. Then, somehow, magically, the next moment sees not only the arising of whatever new "reality", but also the arising of the entire database of remembered patterns. That is convoluted enough in itself, but his theory also has it that the database of patterns that has just vanished is not the same as the one that has just arisen. Oh no, that couldn't be, for that would constitute identity. Complex? Nah! BS? Right on! Cheers Herman #93457 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 4:53 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: That's all there is to know, and a revisit to Vis. . egberdina Hi Nina, > I heard Kh Sujin say this morning that this is not taught in other > religions. Should I assume that you are visiting Kh Sujin, or that she is visiting you? Cheers Herman #93458 From: "jonoabb" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 5:17 am Subject: Re: Suttas in which the Buddha held back the deep teaching? jonoabb Hi Alex > While it is possible for there to be a momentary jhana that allows a > high level induvidial to become an Ariyan without major prior > practice, I am very unsure that for US today the above is applicable. I believe you are saying the following: - for the "high level individual", enlightenment may be attained without mundane jhana first being attained; for such an individual, the development of insight alone is sufficient, and the jhana occurs as momentary jhana at the path moment; - for the rest (including everyone living at this time), mundane jhana must be attained before enlightenment can be attained. What is the sutta basis for this distinction? Do the texts mention the case of the "high level individual"? > Meditation and its deliberate cultivation is required for all those > who aren't Ariyans here and have lots of kilesas to remove. Thanks, Alex. Could you explain a little more about the connection between the development of jhana and the removal of kilesas, as you understand it? Thanks. Jon #93459 From: "jonoabb" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 5:18 am Subject: [dsg] Re: On Concepts jonoabb Hi TG > So what is your understanding of "leading to detachment", in this > context? Detachment from what? > > TG: Detachment from all conditions. Turning away from all conditions. > Seeing conditions as an 'affliction' "leads" to detachment. Isn't this > obvious? How is a condition known? What is the textual basis for the view that the development of insight is the knowing of conditions (if that's what you're saying), or that all conditions are an 'affliction'? Jon #93460 From: "jonoabb" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 5:21 am Subject: Q. [dsg] Re: Series Survey Quote. jonoabb Hi Howard > Thanks for the sutta reference. This is one of the suttas I > mentioned in an earlier post that is found in the Salayatana ("six > sense-bases")-samyutta of the SN. > > In this sutta, "the All" refers to the six sense-bases. > ------------------------------------------ > Howard: > Not the 6, Jon, but the 12 (internal and external), and, implicitly, the > 18 (including the 6 categories of vi~n~nana) > ------------------------------------------- Yes, correct. I was using the literal translation of the Pali term for the samyutta. I should perhaps have said the 6 *pairs* of sense- bases. > As the > commentary explains (according to a footnote in the BB translation), > the all of the six sense-bases ("aayatana-sabba") has a narrower > range than the all-inclusive all ("sabba-sabba"), i.e., everything > knowable, being that which comes into range of the Buddha's knowledge > of omniscience. > --------------------------------------------- > Howard: > What would that include other than what is mentioned in the Sabba Sutta? > Are you now saying that nibbana is NOT known through the mind door? > ------------------------------------------ No, I'm not saying that. I'm simply quoting from the commentary (since quoted in full by Scott in a recent post). > As with the other suttas in the salayatana-samyutta, I would see this > sutta as talking about matters directly relevant to the development > of insight. > --------------------------------------------- > Howard: > What is there in that sutta that makes you see it this way? As I see it, > this sutta is a straightforwardly ontological one that rules out anything > not directly referred in the sutta. It is basically a "This is it, baby! There > just ain't nuthin' else!" sutta. The matter of insight just doesn't happen to > enter into this particular sutta. > ---------------------------------------------- From the many other suttas dealing with the ayatanas, I understand them to be a way of classifying what is to be understood by wisdom, what is to be the object of insight. Jon #93461 From: "Scott" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 6:05 am Subject: Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "You may be the only Buddhist I have encountered who has a problem dealing with the term 'conditions." Scott: I only have a problem insofar as the way in which you have reformulated conditional relations - and you certainly have. Maybe you haven't told others about your theory in enough detail for them to become dismayed. ;-) You seem to imagine that you've understood the Pa.t.thaana and corrected the errors you've found there. I don't claim to know the profundity of conditionality by any means but I do know when a view is off the mark and the one which expresses you definitely is. TG: "I realize you have this need to delineate CONDITIONS into 'active players' or 'entities' that come to town all loaded for bear with 'their own characteristics.'" Scott: And you have a need to reify dynamics. The way in which cause and effect operates, TG, describes the way in which states (dhammas) act on each other. You have somehow managed to do away with states (dhammas) entirely. You have created something you call 'conditions.' In this view, with no states (dhammas), there can only be a nebulous and untenable miasma. It is states (dhammas) which condition and states (dhammas) which are conditioned and these states (dhammas) are effected due to the forces related to this interaction. I'm not sure but the view which expresses you may be caught up in giving more weight to these 'forces' which are part of the way in which states (dhammas) effect each other. When you deny the existence of states (dhammas) with characteristics, which you do, you do away with the very realities which serve as 'conditions.' TG: "I'll continue to use 'conditions,' as I think most here are privy enough to realize that such refers to 'whatever arises, alters, ceases,' including delusion..." Scott: Then this refers to states (dhmammas) since these are what arise, alter, and cease. Not 'conditions.' Delusion, for example is a mental factor - moha. It arises, changes, and ceases and, in so doing, is sometimes a conditioning state (dhamma), sometimes a conditioned state (dhamma). You do away with states (dhammas). It is a state (dhamma) that arises, alters, and ceases. This state (dhamma), and the ones which it effects, are central to 'conditions', as you call it. What is 'delusion' in the scheme you propose? How does 'delusion' fit into 'conditions?' Nina wrote to you the other day: N: "One reality conditions another reality by way of...root, object, predominance, conascence...etc. It is clearer to say that a condition is a way , a mode, by which one reality influences another, or produces it, or maintains it. Better than saying: all conditions are impermanent. Then it looks like you are replacing the terms realities or dhammas by conditions, as if conditions are things that do this or that.." Scott: I agree with Nina, and especially her last statement, which mirrors what I have been saying to you: "...it looks like you are replacing the terms realities or dhammas by conditions, as if conditions are things that do this or that..." Sincerely, Scott. #93462 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 2:38 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self upasaka_howard Hi, Robert (and Ken) - In a message dated 12/13/2008 1:18:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, avalo1968@... writes: Hello Ken, Thank you for your answer. I am not seeing it, but that is OK. You are speaking of an inherently pleasant sense experience while I am thinking that sense experience is going to be conditioned and therefore not inherently anything, but never mind. Cheers, Robert A. =========================== Robert, in your sense of 'inherent', your position is in agreement with mine and TG's: For whatever is conditioned, everything but nibbana, there is no self, no "own-ness", and no inherency. However, when Ken says that the pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality of feeling for dhammas is inherent, what I believe he means is that it isn't determined by the operation of vedana (which is the detecting of that affective "feel"), but is part and parcel of the dhamma that is felt. (The dhamma is still, in its very presence and characteristics, entirely the result of conditions, and not "it's own thing," but the affective feel of the dhamma is an aspect of the dhamma and not of the "mind that feels the dhamma.") With metta, Howard P. S. I have no opinion as to whether the affective feel is inherent or imposed, for I just don't know. The common-sense view is that it is "in the eye of the beholder" to a large extent, but not entirely. #93463 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 2:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Alberto - In a message dated 12/13/2008 3:19:10 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, sprlrt@... writes: Hi Howard (Herman), Howard: It is the thinking that is conditioned and that also serves as condition. When thinking, there is just the thinking. The alleged objects of thought are mere projections, sometimes based on realities, sometimes not - but it is only the thinking that is occurring. When I think about hardness, warmth, my family, or whatever, there is just the thinking. A: Sankhara dhammas (nama and rupa) arise because of several conditions, not just one. At the moment of arising sankhara dhammas are conditions (paccaya) for the arising of other sankhara dhammas, both in that present instant, as object condtion, object/arammana paccaya for instance, also sahajata paccaya etc., and in the future, habits/pakatupanissaya paccaya for instance, also (nanakkhnika) kamma paccaya etc.. Object condition is a necessary condition for all cittas to be able to arise, including bhavanga/life-continuum, i.e. without an object to experience nama dhammas can't arise. ----------------------------------------------- Howard: You're being a good reciter here, Alberto, but rote repetition doesn't dictate reality. There needs to be direct examination of what actually occurs, and there needs to be contemplation. The so-called object of thought is only metaphorically an "object," as there is no actual phenomenon present that is literal object of consciousness while thinking. When one imagines, thinks of, or recalls heat, for example, there is neither heat nor a mental heat-facsimile that is present - there is just thinking. When one plans a project, there are no cognitive, mental creations arising and falling outside of the thinking itself. Any mental images, internalized speech, and so on, are all part of the thinking. Now, of course, vedana may operate in the midst of the thinking, and emotions may arise, but they are affective, not cognitive, and not part of the thinking. All the "things that are thought of" during the thinking are, in fact, imagined only, and thus only metaphorical objects of thought. Of course, one is free to speak of "them" conventionally as objects, provided that one realizes that "they" really do not exist. ---------------------------------------------- The sankhara dhamma that hasn't fallen away yet, i.e. the present one, is both paccaya (it conditions the arising of other sankhara dhammas in the present and, for some, also in the future) and paccayuppanna (i.e. it is the sankhara dhamma conditioned to arise by conditions, both present and, for some, also past) ----------------------------------------------- Howard: That's right. But the thinking does occur, and often it is based on realities. A: Just in the first of the many mind door processes that follow a sense door one. ============================= With metta, Howard #93464 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 3:14 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Alberto) - In a message dated 12/13/2008 7:40:53 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard (and Alberto), 2008/12/13 : > Hi, Alberto (and Herman) - > > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't think it is quite so complex: There are phenomena that are > similar to each other, and that similarity is what recognition deals with. When a > patterned stream of sounds (an aggregation of rupas) occurs, a melody for > example, mind-door sa~n~na notes it ("marks" it), and that operation, then and > there serves to condition future recognition of similar sound streams. More > simply, when a taste occurs, tongue-door sa~n~na marks it, enabling future > recognition of similar tastes. It is not the same recognizing occurring again and > again, but differing instances of recognition, and it is not the same object > (or aggregation of objects) that is recognized, but similar ones. > --------------------------------------------------- I think you are saying, and I agree, that recognition requires the comparison of one thing against other things, a pattern matching so to speak. In that process, phenomena are not whatever they are, but become an instance of a category. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, certainly. Though do take note of my words "then and there" in what you quote above. ------------------------------------------ In Alberto's complex theory, he has it that every remembered pattern, against which all arising phenomena are compared, vanishes without trace every moment. Then, somehow, magically, the next moment sees not only the arising of whatever new "reality", but also the arising of the entire database of remembered patterns. That is convoluted enough in itself, but his theory also has it that the database of patterns that has just vanished is not the same as the one that has just arisen. Oh no, that couldn't be, for that would constitute identity. Complex? Nah! BS? Right on! -------------------------------------------- Howard: Here I am not so certain. I suspect the possibility that no "copy" of the originally noted phenomenon needs to be literally passed along or resurrected for comparison purposes, but rather that the original "marking" right then and there conditions the mind, affecting mind state, in such a way that when similar phenomena arise, recognition is possible even without conscious recollection. I, of course, don't know the facts of the matter. Stranger things, though, are hypothesized, and apparently born out, in quantum mechanics, and I do not rule out various kinds of "action at a distance". ------------------------------------------------ Cheers Herman ========================== With metta, Howard #93465 From: "Scott" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 9:17 am Subject: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Me: "Do you consider Nibbaana to have been known by the Buddha?" H: "Yes, and this is how Nibbana is known" AN 9:34 Nibbaanasukhasutta.m "...Furthermore, there is the case where a monk, with the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, enters & remains in the cessation of perception & feeling (nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana.m ). And, having seen [that] with discernment (pa~n~naaya), his mental fermentations are completely ended. So by this line of reasoning it may be known (veditabba.m) how Unbinding is pleasant." ...Puna capara.m, aavuso, bhikkhu sabbaso nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana.m samatikkamma sa~n~naavedayitanirodha.m upasampajja viharati, pa~n~naaya cassa disvaa aasavaa parikkhii.naa honti. Iminaapi kho eta.m, aavuso, pariyaayena veditabba.m yathaa sukha.m nibbaana''nti. Scott: How do you understand nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana? Do you think that this is how Nibbaana is known? The two are not the same, as far as I understand. Nibbaana is 'known' (pa~n~naaya) - by pa~n~naa - a mental factor conascent with the lokuttara citta which arises at the moment of the Path. Is this what you mean to say? Or do you suggest that the sutta refers to 'knowing' Nibbaana - or its 'pleasantness' - by 'a line of reasoning'? I'd suggest that the experience (veditabba.m) of nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana is offered to teach (pariyaayena) the 'pleasantness' of Nibbaana by comparison. Let the Pa.li scholars correct me before buying this latter attempt. H: "These are ways of thinking about things. There is nothing wrong with thinking about things as long as it is realised that 'this is thinking about things'. But to one inclined to grasping, the thought will occur that planes are realities. In that circumstance, these statements are not clarifying, but an impediment, a hindrance, a millstone hung around the neck." Scott: Yes, Herman. Thinking about things. What do you consider to be 'realities?' 'Planes' may be concepts but the paramattha dhammas which arise and thus define these planes are not conceptual. H: "The sutta says what it says. The commentary says things the sutta doesn't say, all the while maintaining this is what the sutta really says. Give me a break. I find it fascinating that in order to discuss Buddhism with you, I have to discuss commentaries. Was the Buddha really such an incompetent fool, that he needed all these latter-day bright lights to clear things up for him?" Scott: I'm disappointing you somehow. Sorry. I told you I like to read and learn from the commentaries as well as the suttas and the Abhidhamma, no matter who I'm discussing with. Its what I read and participate on the list to do. How would you like me to discuss? And no, the Buddha wasn't 'an incompetent fool', but *we* are incompetent fools. And you dismiss certain central aspects of the Dhamma, thinking, perhaps, that you know better. One I can easily recall is the whole central tenet that 'mind' is the forerunner. From your materialist/epiphemonenalist viewpoint, you still believe in the centrality of the 'brain' - of ruupa - and reject this aspect of the Dhamma. In fact, no matter how often we interact, I can never get the sense that you *accept* this thing you call 'Buddhism.' Your view seems so shadowy and slippery and so carefully offered that I'd hazard an essential non-acceptance at its base. I'd ask you to come clean but you might not appreciate the request. The suttas are not readily understood, no matter how well one thinks of one's ability to do so. I simply disagree with the way you interpret them. Sincerely, Scott. #93466 From: "connie" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 10:42 am Subject: Vis. Revisited. nichiconn dear friends, another explanation of "conceptual -vs- ultimate": PPn xi,88. << Colour, odour, taste, and nutritive Essence, and the four elements - From combination of these eight There comes the common usage head hairs; And separately from these eight {30} There is no common usage head hairs. Consequently head hairs are only a mere group of eight states. Likewise body hairs, [365] and the rest. A component here that is kamma-originated is a group of ten states, [that is to say, the former eight] together with the life faculty and sex. But it is on account of respective prominence [of farfetchedness or cohesion] that is comes to be styled 'earth element' or 'water element'. This is how they should be given attention 'by groups'. >> The footnote quotes Pm.360: << '"From resolution of these eight": the eight dhammas beginning with colour, when resolved by means of understanding, are apprehendable (upalabbhanti) in the ultimate sense through mutual negation (a~n~nam-a~n~na-vyatrirekena); but head hairs are not apprehendable in the ultimate sense through negation of colour and so on. Consequently the term of common usage "head hairs" is applied to these dhammas in their co-arisen state; but if they are each taken separately "There is no common-usage head hair". The meaning is that it is a mere conventional term. "Only a mere group of eight states" is said, taking the colour, etc., which are real (bhuuta - lit. become), as a unity by means of the concept (pa~n~natti) "a head hair", not only because they are merely the eight states'. >> peace, connie #93467 From: "Robert" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 10:59 am Subject: [dsg] Re: how to view the self avalo1968 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Robert, in your sense of 'inherent', your position is in agreement with > mine and TG's: For whatever is conditioned, everything but nibbana, there is > no self, no "own-ness", and no inherency. > However, when Ken says that the pleasantness, unpleasantness, or > neutrality of feeling for dhammas is inherent, what I believe he means is that it > isn't determined by the operation of vedana (which is the detecting of that > affective "feel"), but is part and parcel of the dhamma that is felt. (The > dhamma is still, in its very presence and characteristics, entirely the result of > conditions, and not "it's own thing," but the affective feel of the dhamma is > an aspect of the dhamma and not of the "mind that feels the dhamma.") > > With metta, > Howard > > P. S. I have no opinion as to whether the affective feel is inherent or > imposed, for I just don't know. The common-sense view is that it is "in the eye > of the beholder" to a large extent, but not entirely. > Hello Howard, Thank you for the clarification. I will have to work on this. What I believe you are saying is that the feeling arises from contact with the dhamma and is totally dependent on the dhamma, with no internal contribution from the mind. This would imply that all minds would experience the same feeling as a result of contact with this particular dhamma, and i am not sure I buy that. Thanks very much to both you and Ken for your insights. Robert A. #93468 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 6:15 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self upasaka_howard Hi, Robert (and Ken) - In a message dated 12/13/2008 1:59:59 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, avalo1968@... writes: Hello Howard, Thank you for the clarification. I will have to work on this. What I believe you are saying is that the feeling arises from contact with the dhamma and is totally dependent on the dhamma, with no internal contribution from the mind. ---------------------------------------- Howard: I'm saying that I think this is Ken's position and the position of the Abhidhamma as described on DSG. -------------------------------------- This would imply that all minds would experience the same feeling as a result of contact with this particular dhamma, and i am not sure I buy that. --------------------------------------- Howard: It would not imply that. The critical expression being "this particular dhamma." The pleasant warmth that A experiences could be a different dhamma from the unpleasant warmth that B experiences, or even from the unpleasant warmth that A experiences a moment later. In fact, what is conventionally "the same rupa" could be in fact two different but corresponding (and perhaps simultaneous) rupas. My phenomenalist perspective would, in fact, view it so, but phenomenalism isn't required to view it so. --------------------------------------- Thanks very much to both you and Ken for your insights. --------------------------------------- Howard: :-) For whatever it is worth - LOL! ------------------------------------- Robert A. ========================= With metta, Howard #93469 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 11:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Vis. Revisited. nilovg Dear Connie, I like these revisits. This is a good passage explaining what concepts are. One difference in my text: In my text: stiffedness instead of farfetchedness. Stiffedness is a way to describe solidity or the earth element, I think. Nina. Op 13-dec-2008, om 19:42 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > PPn xi,88. > << Colour, odour, taste, and nutritive > Essence, and the four elements - > From combination of these eight > There comes the common usage head hairs; > And separately from these eight {30} > There is no common usage head hairs. #93470 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 7:12 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas TGrand458@... Hi Scott In a message dated 12/13/2008 7:06:11 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "You may be the only Buddhist I have encountered who has a problem dealing with the term 'conditions.p Scott: I only have a problem insofar as the way in which you have reformulated conditional relations - and you certainly have. Maybe you haven't told others about your theory in enough detail for them to become dismayed. ;-) ........................................................ TG: Here's how I view "conditional relations." -- "This being, that is. With the arising of this, that arises. This not being, that is not. With the ceasing of this, that ceases." Anything I write or think about conditions, conditional relations, dependent arising, etc. must fall under these guidelines unless I'm screwing up what I wrote or thought. So who's making up what here? Someone's following something "made up," and I don't think its me. :-) ....................................................................... You seem to imagine that you've understood the Pa.t.thaana and corrected the errors you've found there. I don't claim to know the profundity of conditionality by any means but I do know when a view is off the mark and the one which expresses you definitely is. ............................................................................. TG: ROTF First you claim to be no expert, then you claim to have the expertise to know to understand when a view is "off the mark." That IS claiming to be an expert. You haven't a clue as to what "my view" is. LOL Even if I explained it to you, I'm 99.99% confident you still wouldn't have a clue as to what my view is. As we could see from the post of 2 days ago, all your suppositions about my views are totally wrong. This is after what? ... a year or more of reading them? ........................................................................... TG: "I realize you have this need to delineate CONDITIONS into 'active players' or 'entities' that come to town all loaded for bear with 'their own characteristics.'t Scott: And you have a need to reify dynamics. ........................................................ TG: "This being, that is. With the arising of this, that arises. This not being, that is not. With the ceasing of this, that ceases." The above IS dynamic! ........................................................... The way in which cause and effect operates, TG, describes the way in which states (dhammas) act on each other. You have somehow managed to do away with states (dhammas) entirely. .............................................................. TG: Wonderful. Then I'm getting closer. You see, detachment and turning away from conditions requires that "states" are done away with. How are you going to detach while clinging to your precious "individual realities"? I'll answer for you, you can't. Its impossible. You see my friend, knowledge of the 'cause and effect of states' is for the purpose of detachment. Detachment arises BECAUSE those "states" are come to be seen as -- insubstantial, void, hollow, empty, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick, etc. Ahhh yes. The Buddha's discourse you love to diss. LOL If states are seen as "ultimate realities with their own characteristics," this is a "death nail" to progressing toward enlightenment I do believe. :-) ................................................................ You have created something you call 'conditions.Y In this view, with no states (dhammas), there can only be a nebulous and untenable miasma. ................................................................... TG: "Conditions" are the same "states" you experience. You prefer to substantialize then as "realities with their own characteristics." I prefer insubstantialize them as 'dependencies with nothing of THEIR own.' The phenomena is the same. The outlook is different. I'm extremely confident my outlook is far stronger in leading toward detachment than an outlook that sees everything as "having its own characteristics" ... and far more compliant with what the Buddha taught. That means Suttas. And far more in accord with what the phenomena are actually doing. Phenomena are phenomena in spite of whatever we call it. And it does what it does in spite of whatever we think about it. .............................................................................. .. It is states (dhammas) which condition and states (dhammas) which are conditioned and these states (dhammas) are effected due to the forces related to this interaction. I'm not sure but the view which expresses you may be caught up in giving more weight to these 'forces' which are part of the way in which states (dhammas) effect each other. .................................................... TG: Your so called "dhammas" are "themselves" the forces! There is no other "outside force" working upon them. I rather like your above description surprisingly. A clearer view would lead to realization that these "states" are not "their own things;" but rather, a mere amalgamation of interacting and altering forces. Oh yes, and dynamic! Without dynamics, no change. Again, the "dynamics" are not outside of the conditions. The conditions are dynamic. ....................................................... When you deny the existence of states (dhammas) with characteristics, which you do, you do away with the very realities which serve as 'conditions.'c ............................................................ TG: I deny that outlook as being correct. We are looking at the same coin. You see the coin for "its rupa characteristic." I see it as a coreless outgrowth of conditions. One first discerns a quality for direct analysis. (This is the stage where you begin, substantialize, and stop apparently.) Then the conditional nature of that quality is investigated. In doing so, if done well, then THAT quality becomes seen as "having nothing of itself." It becomes seen as empty, hollow, void, insubstantial, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick. BECAUSE... IT is not "itself," it is an amalgamation of conditions. Its IS a mere condition...impermanent, afflicted with impermanence, and nonself. It should be seen as death, a murderer, poison, a disease, a boil, a dart, a raised sword. (Gosh, not an "ultimate reality" in the bunch.) ..................................................... TG: "I'll continue to use 'conditions,TG: "I'll continue to use 'condition enough to realize that such refers to 'whatever arises, alters, ceases,' including delusion..." Scott: Then this refers to states (dhmammas) since these are what arise, alter, and cease. Not 'conditions.ar ......................................................... TG: That's just a point of view your expressing. What arises -- arises. What we call them is irrelevant to those conditions. LOL The only importance in what we call them lies in how much it leads to attachment or detachment. Since I believe the view of "ultimate realities with their own characteristics" leads not to detachment, and not in accordance with the Buddha's teaching, I'll have to reject it as a problem for escaping suffering. .......................................................................... Delusion, for example is a mental factor - moha. It arises, changes, and ceases and, in so doing, is sometimes a conditioning state (dhamma), sometimes a conditioned state (dhamma). You do away with states (dhammas). It is a state (dhamma) that arises, alters, and ceases. This state (dhamma), and the ones which it effects, are central to 'conditions'( as you call it. .................................................................. TG: This criticism doesn't apply to my outlook. I don't do away with phenomena. I do away with reifying it in a substantialist manner. ............................................................ What is 'delusion' in the scheme you propose? How does 'delusion' fit into 'conditions?i Nina wrote to you the other day: N: "One reality conditions another reality by way of...root, object, predominance, conascence..predominance, conascence...etc. It is clea is a way , a mode, by which one reality influences another, or produces it, or maintains it. Better than saying: all conditions are impermanent. Then it looks like you are replacing the terms realities or dhammas by conditions, as if conditions are things that do this or that.." ............................................................ TG: I use the terms elements and aggregates, regularly. They are the way conditions have formed wherever they are found. When I speak of conditions, I refer to the interaction of such. If that helps you. However, a deeper vision shows these very conditions (elements aggregates) to be -- hollow, void, empty, insubstantial, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick, etc. .......................................................... Scott: I agree with Nina, and especially her last statement, which mirrors what I have been saying to you: "...it looks like you are replacing the terms realities or dhammas by conditions, as if conditions are things that do this or that..." ................................................ TG: "Realities and dhammas" are used in this group to signify separate states with their own characteristics. This is antithetical to the vision the Buddha was driving at. However, in order to "see" conditions doing what conditions do, we do take elements and aggregates as 'focal points' to investigate the nature of phenomena. That nature being -- conditioned, impermanent, afflicted, and nonself. TG OUT #93471 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 7:20 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts TGrand458@... Hi Jon In a message dated 12/13/2008 6:19:00 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: How is a condition known? What is the textual basis for the view that the development of insight is the knowing of conditions (if that's what you're saying), or that all conditions are an 'affliction'' Jon ....................................................... TG: Here is a copy of some passages I just wrote to Scott. (Written for Scott.) Maybe it will clarify. Also, the actual post to Scott might help you see what I am responding to... TG: I use the terms elements and aggregates, regularly. They are the way conditions have formed wherever they are found. When I speak of conditions, I refer to the interaction of such. If that helps you. However, a deeper vision shows these very conditions (elements aggregates) to be -- hollow, void, empty, insubstantial, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick, etc. TG: One first discerns a quality for direct analysis. (This is the stage where you begin, substantialize, and stop apparently.) Then the conditional nature of that quality is investigated. In doing so, if done well, then THAT quality becomes seen as "having nothing of itself." It becomes seen as empty, hollow, void, insubstantial, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick. BECAUSE... IT is not "itself," it is an amalgamation of conditions. Its IS a mere condition...condition...impermanent, afflicted with impermanenc It should be seen as death, a murderer, poison, a disease, a boil, a dart, a raised sword. (Gosh, not an "ultimate reality" in the bunch.) TG: "Conditions" are the same "states" you experience. You prefer to substantialize then as "realities with their own characteristics.substantializ insubstantialize them as 'dependencies with nothing of THEIR own.' The phenomena is the same. The outlook is different. I'm extremely confident my outlook is far stronger in leading toward detachment than an outlook that sees everything as "having its own characteristics" ... and far more compliant with what the Buddha taught. That means Suttas. And far more in accord with what the phenomena are actually doing. Phenomena are phenomena in spite of whatever we call it. And it does what it does in spite of whatever we think about it. TG OUT #93472 From: "connie" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 1:45 pm Subject: Re: Vis. Revisited. nichiconn Dear Nina, N: One difference in my text: In my text: stiffedness instead of farfetchedness. Stiffedness is a way to describe solidity or the earth element, I think. c: O, you're right! Thank you for the correction. "Farfetchedness" seems such a strange word to me I guess I just got stuck on it. Footnote 24 (para xi,37) talking about 'air', says << In Ch.XIV,61 it is said to cause thambhana, rendered by 'stiffening'; but there is the description of the earth element as thaddha (e.g., 39; pp. of thambhati, from which the n. thambhana comes), rendered by 'farfetchedness'. It may also be noted that the word sandhaara.na (upholding) is used to describe both the earth element (Ch.XIV,47) and the air element (Ch.XIV,61). >> (: I'll have to do more studying on "characteristic, function, manifestation and proximate cause". connie #93473 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 2:29 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas kenhowardau Hi Howard, -------- <. . .> KH: > > each nama or rupa arises, performs its functions and ceases. The term 'final cessation' refers to the process. After the death- citta of an arahant no other citta arises to take its place. Howard: > Ken, you and some others here who presume separate, self-existent citta-packets -------------------- This might be a minor quibble, but what is a citta packet? Is it the five khandhas - the citta, cetasikas and rupas that exist at any given moment? If so, I don't think a citta packet should be called 'self existent' or 'having its own characteristics.' Only the individual citta, cetasikas and rupas (that make up the packet) could be called that. -------------------------------- H: > accept the idea of annihilation every moment followed immediately by a god-like creation of something from nothing in the next moment, except for some time in the far distant future where annihilation is not followed by anything. -------------------------------- I suppose that is fair criticism in a way. The 'arising' of a dhamma does seem to have some similarities with the creation of a permanent self or soul. The performance by dhammas of their functions (their conditioning work) does seem to be similar to "doing" in the conventional sense, and the 'falling away' of a dhamma does seem similar to the annihilation of something that previously continued on. However, since these words are being applied to dhammas (fleeting, conditioned, soulless phenomena) I don't think the superficial similarities matter. Whether we use the word 'cessation' or the word 'annihilation' the important thing is to know there is no atta - no abiding self - that ceases or gets annihilated. ------------------------------------------- H: > The main problem with that is that the Buddha did not teach annihilation. He taught a middle way that avoided both annihilation and self-existence by avoiding both nihilism and substantialism. -------------------------------------------- I am sure he taught the rise and fall of dhammas. He showed that that was all there was. There was no atta (no lasting entity). ------------------------------------------------------ H: > Samsara is the appearance realm of separate things - of apparent separate and discrete objects and personal selves that know them, crave their presence or absence, and cling to and grasp at what are in reality neither separate nor graspable. Nibbana (or freedom) is the actual nature of reality - seamless, open, free and vast, with no separate facets to be grasped at and no beings who grasp. Here there is nothing that stands alone or self-existent, nothing substantial to be annihilated, and nothing substantial that is created. May we realize this reality, for here is perfect peace. ------------------------------------------------------- These ideas are not found in the original Pali texts. They change what is found in those texts dramatically. I think it is important to see *how* they change them. Ken H #93474 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 2:58 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self egberdina Hi Howard, 2008/12/14 : > Hi, Robert (and Ken) - > > --------------------------------------- > Howard: > It would not imply that. The critical expression being "this particular > dhamma." The pleasant warmth that A experiences could be a different dhamma > from the unpleasant warmth that B experiences, or even from the unpleasant > warmth that A experiences a moment later. In fact, what is conventionally "the > same rupa" could be in fact two different but corresponding (and perhaps > simultaneous) rupas. My phenomenalist perspective would, in fact, view it so, but > phenomenalism isn't required to view it so. > --------------------------------------- Have I read you correctly in concluding that a shared reality is not possible for you? Cheers Herman #93475 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 3:28 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of past cittas egberdina Hi Howard and Alberto, 2008/12/14 : > Hi, Herman (and Alberto) - > > > > > In Alberto's complex theory, he has it that every remembered pattern, > against which all arising phenomena are compared, vanishes without > trace every moment. Then, somehow, magically, the next moment sees not > only the arising of whatever new "reality", but also the arising of > the entire database of remembered patterns. That is convoluted enough > in itself, but his theory also has it that the database of patterns > that has just vanished is not the same as the one that has just > arisen. Oh no, that couldn't be, for that would constitute identity. > > Complex? Nah! > > BS? Right on! > -------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Here I am not so certain. I suspect the possibility that no "copy" of > the originally noted phenomenon needs to be literally passed along or > resurrected for comparison purposes, but rather that the original "marking" right then > and there conditions the mind, affecting mind state, in such a way that when > similar phenomena arise, recognition is possible even without conscious > recollection. Sorry to be such a stickler. But the mind, in Alberto's theory, vanishes each moment without trace. He cannot use comparison words like similar and recognise, because each mind that arises is a new mind. It has no basis for comparing or recognition. Each new arising and vanishing mind has no past. We, sentient beings, on the other hand know our past, we know it to persist (not arise and vanish every moment - the past isn't anicca, the present is), and most of us know the difference between what is past and present. If Alberto's theory cannot account for what is experienced, what is it a theory of? Cheers Herman #93476 From: "colette" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 8:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas (are they monitored by a "prefect" or law officer) ksheri3 Hi Alberto, Ah, the typical game of deception and MISS Appropriation. I can play that game. Odd, though, how you failed to cognize or re-cognize that my Prasangika was showing where I am more than prepared to play that most typical of male games dealing in the brainwashing of HEIRARCHY. Nevertheless, you still may attempt that route so we'll just leave it at the stage where my Prasangika is showing. On to the task at hand which is your attempt to abscond with definitions. <...> > C: Lets qualify that. We're speaking of noumena, thoughts and/or thought > processes > > A: It's ok with me if you call dhammas noumena, but then for me > noumena are not thoughts, colette: FALSE. NOUMENA IS NOTHING MORE THAN THAT WHICH IS IN THE MIND WHILE PHENOMENA IS THAT WHICH IS EXTERNAL. -------------------------------------- i.e. what one thinks about (a table, a > person, a dog, a song's lyrics), which I take to be concepts, not > dhammas, realities. > colette: now we get to your position where you take real and tangible objects to be nothing more than concepts. Song lyrics can and often do take the roll of manifesting a tangible concept within the mind of the listeners (see Mind Games by John Lennon) however song lyrics are created to express a former reality, maybe a PAST DHARMA, to a person that does not have the ability to experience that former dharma. Can a concept cause physical harm to a person? Can a concept cause physical harm to your body, for instance? If you are nothing more than a concept then you are in the wrong forum since now you're playing the MIND-ONLY school of thought and that happens to be very Chinese where we might find I-Pee-Daily lurking about. -------------------------------------------- > C: Since Nama is subordinate to the existance and power of material > objects, aka THINGS, well, I guess > > A: Not necessarily, according to tipitaka there are planes of > existance without rupa khandha (arupa bhumi, the immaterial planes), > which are just "made of" the other four nama khandha only. > colette: I would love to find these writings in the Tipitaka since you have something there. ------------------------------ > I assume you know some Dhamma theory on the doors and its objects, but colette: as a matter of fact I am reading the Dhamma Theory from the BPS at the moment although some material from Sam Webster has taken my focus is his application of a Japanese ceremonial. -------------------------------- colette: I am sorry, but my attention is being distracted here at home and I'll be forced to finish this when I get to the library later today. VEry good reply, THANK YOU. I look forward to further games with you "GAMESTERS OF TRISCILLION" (an old Star Trek show) toodles, colette > I'll recap, just in case: > There are six doors through which nama can experience six > corresponding classes of objects. > > The five sense doors can only experience 7 rupas, four of these five > can experience only one object each. > The eyes, the ears, the nose, and the tongue can only experience one > object each, visible object, ruparammana, etc. > The rupas that can be experienced through the body door are three, > solidity, temperature and motion. Seven objects only for five doors. <....> #93477 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 11:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts TGrand458@... Hi Sarah In a message dated 12/13/2008 4:54:55 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, sarahprocterabbott@... writes: Hi TG, --- On Fri, 12/12/08, _TGrand458@..._ (mailto:TGrand458@...) <_TGrand458@..._ (mailto:TGrand458@...) > wrote: >>S:The dhatus (elements) only include paramattha dhammas, dhammas which arise and fall in an absolute sense and can be directly known by insight. ............ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... >TG: Sutta source for this assertion please? If no Sutta source is forthcoming, then I consider it an assertion that is groundless in terms of being the Buddha's teaching. .... S: I'll play the 'Sutta only source', just once more for this thread, in brief: ................................................ TG: Well, I don't consider referencing the Suttas as the Buddha's teaching a game. But "play away..." .................................................. "There are, Ananda, these two elements: the conditioned element and the unconditioned element. When he knows and sees these two elements, a bhikkhu can be called skilled in the elements." (M 115, again!) "Form, Ananda, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, to vanishing, to fading away, to cessation. Through its cessation, cessation is spoken of. "Feeling...."Feeling...."Feeling.....Perception....volition"Feeling. ....Perception....volitional formations are impermanent..... consciousness is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, to vanishi "It is through the cessation of these things, Ananda, that cessation is spoken of." (SN 22:21) S: These are the khandhas, the conditioned element, which are conditioned, impemanent and can be directly known by the wise (or skilled). ............................................................ TG: I'm with you so far! :-) The Sutta I quote further below shows HOW they should be considered when "directly known." :-) .................................................................. The Buddha is not referring to being skilled in the knowledge of the impermanence or cessation of pencils, purple elephants, people or philosophical fantasies:-)T ........................................................................ TG: As for pencils, purple elephants, people or philosophical fantasies, those are not the particular subjects being discussed. But on many many many occasions we can see the Buddha teaching about impermanence and dependence of "conventional amalagamations," the type of which you indicate here. As far as your demo Sutta goes, it does not support your case, its neutral toward your case. Now, let's see what the Buddha says we SHOULD conclude about the aggregates when investigated carefully... “However one might ponder it -- (form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness) And carefully investigate it, It appears but hollow and void When one views it carefully. Such is this continuum, This illusion, beguiler of fools It is taught to be a murderer; Here no substance can be found.” (The Buddha . . . circa 500 BC. . . . Connected Discourses of the Buddha, vol. 1, pg. 953) TG: This Sutta you selected does not support your case, its neutral toward your case. Only a slanted view would leave someone to think it was supportive of a "ultimate realities with their own characteristics" viewpoint. You pick and choose just the Suttas that you want to support your case with, and then often comment way beyond where they go. You ignore other Suttas, so very many that don't support your contentions, actually contradict them. Even in the Satipatthana Sutta itself, there are so many passages that contradict your outlook that it is staggering. I've pointed them out many times. But you have those "ultimate reality viewpoints" to uphold I suppose. The entire 4 Great Nikayas need to be taken into account. "Separate sects" of Buddhism spring forth because of folks that pick and choose what they want to be important...and then slap the "conventional" label on the rest. LOL Either that or they conclude its too hard...and make up some chant that's going to free them. LOL The rest of us deal with the Suttas as the authority in gauging the Buddha's teaching. I guess its how we like to "play." ;-) TG OUT #93478 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 4:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All egberdina Hi Scott, 2008/12/14 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Me: "Do you consider Nibbaana to have been known by the Buddha?" > > H: "Yes, and this is how Nibbana is known" > > AN 9:34 Nibbaanasukhasutta.m > > "...Furthermore, there is the case where a monk, with the complete > transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor > non-perception, enters & remains in the cessation of perception & > feeling (nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana.m ). And, having seen [that] > with discernment (pa~n~naaya), his mental fermentations are completely > ended. So by this line of reasoning it may be known (veditabba.m) how > Unbinding is pleasant." > > ...Puna capara.m, aavuso, bhikkhu sabbaso > nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana.m samatikkamma sa~n~naavedayitanirodha.m > upasampajja viharati, pa~n~naaya cassa disvaa aasavaa parikkhii.naa > honti. Iminaapi kho eta.m, aavuso, pariyaayena veditabba.m yathaa > sukha.m nibbaana''nti. > > Scott: How do you understand nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana? Do you > think that this is how Nibbaana is known? Nibbana isn't known presently. It is not in the realm of perception, it is not in the all, it is not even in the realm of neither perception and non - perception (I'm not saying there's such a thing as realms). If Nibbana is known, it is known retrospectively, because there is no knowing with the cessation of perception, and nibbana's pleasantness may be known retrospectively, for there is no feeling with the cessation of feeling. The two are not the same, > as far as I understand. Nibbaana is 'known' (pa~n~naaya) - by > pa~n~naa - a mental factor conascent with the lokuttara citta which > arises at the moment of the Path. Is this what you mean to say? No, I don't mean to say that. Neither does the sutta say it. > > Or do you suggest that the sutta refers to 'knowing' Nibbaana - or its > 'pleasantness' - by 'a line of reasoning'? I'd suggest that the > experience (veditabba.m) of nevasa~n~naanaasa~n~naayatana is offered > to teach (pariyaayena) the 'pleasantness' of Nibbaana by comparison. There is no experience with the cessation of experience. That is the end of stress. For those desperate to know what is unknowable, they have to use a line of reasoning, I guess > > Let the Pa.li scholars correct me before buying this latter attempt. > > H: "These are ways of thinking about things. There is nothing wrong > with thinking about things as long as it is realised that 'this is > thinking about things'. But to one inclined to grasping, the thought > will occur that planes are realities. In that circumstance, these > statements are not clarifying, but an impediment, a hindrance, a > millstone hung around the neck." > > Scott: Yes, Herman. Thinking about things. What do you consider to > be 'realities?' 'Planes' may be concepts but the paramattha dhammas > which arise and thus define these planes are not conceptual. There are two realities. There is nibbana ie being, and there is anicca ie knowing/perceiving. I don't buy into the division conceptual / ultimate. Neither do the suttas. MN 43: Perception "'Perception, perception': Thus is it said. To what extent, friend, is it said to be 'perception'?" "'It perceives, it perceives': Thus, friend, it is said to be 'perception.' And what does it perceive? It perceives blue. It perceives yellow. It perceives red. It perceives white. 'It perceives, it perceives': Thus it is said to be 'perception.'" "Feeling, perception, & consciousness, friend: Are these qualities conjoined or disjoined? Is it possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them?" "Feeling, perception, & consciousness are conjoined, friend, not disjoined. It is not possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them. For what one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one cognizes. Therefore these qualities are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is not possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them." > > H: "The sutta says what it says. The commentary says things the sutta > doesn't say, all the while maintaining this is what the sutta really > says. Give me a break. I find it fascinating that in order to discuss > Buddhism with you, I have to discuss commentaries. Was the Buddha > really such an incompetent fool, that he needed all these latter-day > bright lights to clear things up for him?" > > Scott: I'm disappointing you somehow. Sorry. I told you I like to > read and learn from the commentaries as well as the suttas and the > Abhidhamma, no matter who I'm discussing with. Its what I read and > participate on the list to do. How would you like me to discuss? I'm happy for you to discuss in whatever way that you see fit. I take the position that where the commentaries and suttas differ, I side with the suttas. You side with the commentaries. We should expect to clash as often as the suttas and commentaries differ. Quite often, so it seems :-) > > And no, the Buddha wasn't 'an incompetent fool', but *we* are > incompetent fools. And you dismiss certain central aspects of the > Dhamma, thinking, perhaps, that you know better. I certainly do not believe that the commentators know better than the Buddha. One I can easily > recall is the whole central tenet that 'mind' is the forerunner. From > your materialist/epiphemonenalist viewpoint, you still believe in the > centrality of the 'brain' - of ruupa - and reject this aspect of the > Dhamma. > > In fact, no matter how often we interact, I can never get the sense > that you *accept* this thing you call 'Buddhism.' Your view seems so > shadowy and slippery and so carefully offered that I'd hazard an > essential non-acceptance at its base. I'd ask you to come clean but > you might not appreciate the request. I'm not a card-carrying Theravadin, that's for sure. I fully accept the first two noble truths, I fully accept that cessation of knowing is the end of stress, and that such cessation is possible. I see no point in taking a verbal stance on the 8 fold noble path, it's not talking the talk that matters, but walking the walk. It's less what we say, but more what we do that is making our yet untrodden paths. And though some may prefer to hide behind theory and expressions of faith, bit by bit we make known to each other where we have been, and where we are now. > > The suttas are not readily understood, no matter how well one thinks > of one's ability to do so. I simply disagree with the way you > interpret them. I tend to limit myself to suttas that are applicable to my daily life. I am not interested in studying the suttas as an integral work. Cheers Herman #93479 From: "reverendaggacitto" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 5:09 pm Subject: Images of Buddha reverendagga... Hi Everybody! I have a question. Where exactly in the Pali Canon does Venerable Gotama forbid the rendering of images in his likeness? He is asked "How will we pay tribute to your teaching? He then replies by suggesting the stupta (pagada). Thanks! Om Namah Dhamma Gotama! bhikkhu/reverend aggacitto #93480 From: "Alex" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 6:18 pm Subject: On concepts, final nail to the coffin. truth_aerator Hello all, As I was considering this issue I have finally cleared up the matter myself. Concepts like anything are... Impermanent. IN SN there is a sutta which says that the holy life cannot be lived even if as little as a fingernail of something was eternal. Please don't resort to this stupid talk about concepts not being "anything" like those attavadins who claim that Buddha 'taught' Atta that is beyond "anything". That taken together with AN/MN sutta about that stream enterer and higher cannot consider anything as permanent and one of 4 perversion of considering what is impermanent as permanent it is absolutely clear to me that concepts are impermanent as anything else. Concepts are fully conditioned as any other phenomenon in Samsara making them be subject to change, alteration, arising and ceasing. If concepts were permanent then it would neccesarily block even the path to stream entry since at that path one must abandon the delusive concept of Self. Concept of a Self MUST be impermanent and conditioned for the possibility of escape from it. Buddhism isn't metaphysical either, there isn't anything beyond 5 aggregates (5 aggregates which are anicca, dukkha, & anatta). The 5 aggregates are the neccesary thing on which concept (a mental idea) is dependent on. It is as pointless talking about eternal concepts not subject to change being outside of "The All" as it is senseless to talk about a mystical Self being beyond "The All". With best wishes and compassion to those who mistakenly belive in concepts that are nicca. #93481 From: "Alex" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 6:28 pm Subject: Re: Suttas in which the Buddha held back the deep teaching? truth_aerator Dear Jon and all, >> "jonoabb" wrote: > > Hi Alex > I believe you are saying the following: > - for the "high level individual", enlightenment may be attained > without mundane jhana first being attained; for such an individual, > the development of insight alone is sufficient, and the jhana >occurs as momentary jhana at the path moment; By "high level induvidual" I've meant what in Comy is called Ugghatitannu induvidial or someone with already well developed 5 faculties such as Ven. Bahiya, Ven. Sariputta & Ven. MahaMoggallana. > - for the rest (including everyone living at this time), mundane > jhana must be attained before enlightenment can be attained. The rest: Neyya or those whose 5 faculties are not well developed, fetters are strong and thus require stronger measures. > What is the sutta basis for this distinction? Do the texts mention > the case of the "high level individual"? Bahiya is one example. Pukkusati (from MN140) is another. Please note, Pukkusati meditated for couple of hours (most of the night) prior to hearing Buddha's discource and becoming an Anagami immeadetely after. > > Meditation and its deliberate cultivation is required for all those > > who aren't Ariyans here and have lots of kilesas to remove. > > Thanks, Alex. Could you explain a little more about the connection > between the development of jhana and the removal of kilesas, as you > understand it? Thanks. > > Jon Jhana softens the mind & make it workable for insight & considering to be able to reach through. People today have lots of defilements and neurosis and thus it is harder for them to accept the true teachings. 5 Hindrances are stronger today as there is more fuel for them and we don't have a brilliant teacher called Buddha to give us personal guidance. Thus more preliminary work at clearing 'space' must be done. With best wishes, #93482 From: "Alex" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 6:46 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: On Abhidhamma history truth_aerator Hi Sarah, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > Hi Alex, > > --- On Fri, 12/12/08, Alex wrote: > >> S: Any my advice to you and everyone is to really consider what is > > said in the Suttas and other parts of the Tipitaka and ancient > > commentaries carefully. > > A:> As an orthodox Buddhist one cannot take the above seriously. Only the > Buddha is The unfallible Authority on Buddhism. > .... > S: I'd say 'orthodox Buddhism' was according to the Buddha and Theras as found in the Theravada teachings above. > ... Which Thera's? The orthodox Theravada isn't the "earliest" Buddhism. In fact the name is silly when looked in comparison to the 4 Nikayas. As far as I know, the VADA as in doctrine, carries only negative connotations. There is NO doctrine or theory in Buddha Dhamma. His teaching is visible here and now, immeadete, inviting one to come and see, to be personally experienced by the wise and so on. Remember the MN108ish sutta where Ananda remained after Buddha's death and said something that no one has authority on Buddha Dhamma? > > A:> In DN16 he has said to compare any teaching said to be "his" with the SUTTAS. > ... > S: As discussed before, you have to know what is meant in context by terms such as 'suttas'. There's no point in re-hashing it all. Clearly he encouraged his disciples such as Maha-Kaccana and Sariputta to elaborate on the discourses too. Many such elaborations formed the core of the commentaries and Abhidhamma you despise so much. >>> Most of these explanations by his IMMEADEATE disciples were done while the Buddha was alive (and who personally approved the explanations) AND recorded in Sutta-Pitaka. The elaborations that we call 'Abhi' dhamma happened CENTURIES LATER. This is why there were so many schisms over minute philosophical details not at 1st council (teaching were collected, no mention of Abhidhamma by unbiased sources), not at 2nd (vinaya dispute), but at 3rd council! Furthermore I am not convinced by the sectarian account of 1 out of 20 groups regarding which was authentic Abhidhamma and which were not. What makes you think that Mahavihara (or whatever it is called) account of events is more authentic than Sarvastivadin one? There are 2 accounts to every schism (where both sides claim their righteousness). Just because one side has 'lost' and later was destroyed by Invaders and so on, doesn't make it false. Just like Theravadins who claim Abhidhamma was taught by the Buddha to his disciples (Ven. Sariputta and others) is also found in Sarvastivadin account. What makes one chose one over the other? How do we know that one of the lost Buddhist sects didn't have even MORE correct and authentic Abhidhamma? With trainload of Metta, #93483 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 2:37 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 12/13/2008 5:58:50 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard, 2008/12/14 : > Hi, Robert (and Ken) - > > --------------------------------------- > Howard: > It would not imply that. The critical expression being "this particular > dhamma." The pleasant warmth that A experiences could be a different dhamma > from the unpleasant warmth that B experiences, or even from the unpleasant > warmth that A experiences a moment later. In fact, what is conventionally "the > same rupa" could be in fact two different but corresponding (and perhaps > simultaneous) rupas. My phenomenalist perspective would, in fact, view it so, but > phenomenalism isn't required to view it so. > --------------------------------------- Have I read you correctly in concluding that a shared reality is not possible for you? ------------------------------------------------ Howard: No, that's not my view. In fact, interaction among beings is obvious. I tend to like the Indra's Net picture of mutual reflection as my model. I tend to replace objectivity by what some call intersubjectivity. William James, BTW, had a similar perspective. -------------------------------------------- Cheers Herman ======================== With metta, Howard #93484 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 2:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of past cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Alberto) - In a message dated 12/13/2008 6:28:49 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard and Alberto, 2008/12/14 : > Hi, Herman (and Alberto) - > > > > > In Alberto's complex theory, he has it that every remembered pattern, > against which all arising phenomena are compared, vanishes without > trace every moment. Then, somehow, magically, the next moment sees not > only the arising of whatever new "reality", but also the arising of > the entire database of remembered patterns. That is convoluted enough > in itself, but his theory also has it that the database of patterns > that has just vanished is not the same as the one that has just > arisen. Oh no, that couldn't be, for that would constitute identity. > > Complex? Nah! > > BS? Right on! > -------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Here I am not so certain. I suspect the possibility that no "copy" of > the originally noted phenomenon needs to be literally passed along or > resurrected for comparison purposes, but rather that the original "marking" right then > and there conditions the mind, affecting mind state, in such a way that when > similar phenomena arise, recognition is possible even without conscious > recollection. Sorry to be such a stickler. But the mind, in Alberto's theory, vanishes each moment without trace. He cannot use comparison words like similar and recognise, because each mind that arises is a new mind. It has no basis for comparing or recognition. Each new arising and vanishing mind has no past. --------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, I don't know enough of his view to defend it or dispute it. But the "mind" is ever fresh, is it not? I'm not clear on what you are saying here about no past, Herman. Does Alberto deny time and conditionality? -------------------------------------------- We, sentient beings, on the other hand know our past, we know it to persist (not arise and vanish every moment - the past isn't anicca, the present is), and most of us know the difference between what is past and present. -------------------------------------------- Howard: Of course. And we can recall things for purposes of comparison. I just don't know that recollection requires a passing along of information. I suspect that the initial event is already, at the very time of its occurrence, suffi cient condition for re-collection and re-cognition (hyphenation purposeful) in the future. This would be temporal action-at-a-distance. I don't believe that all conditionality reduces to contiguous conditioning. --------------------------------------------- If Alberto's theory cannot account for what is experienced, what is it a theory of? ------------------------------------------ Howard: I'm sorry. I should have paid closer attention to what he was asserting. Perhaps you could reply, Alberto? ----------------------------------------- Cheers Herman ========================= With metta, Howard #93485 From: "connie" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 8:19 pm Subject: Re: On Concepts nichiconn Hi TG, TG: Now, let's see what the Buddha says we SHOULD conclude about the aggregates when investigated carefully... <> - (The Buddha, circa 500 BC., Connected Discourses of the Buddha, vol. 1, pg. 953) c: I like that. Vis ch.xi, 27 says that defining the elements << is given in brief in the Mahaasatipa.t.thaana Sutta (D.ii.294), and in detail in the Mahaahatthipaduupamaa Sutta (M.i.185), the Raahulovaada Sutta (M.i.421) and the Dhaatuvibha'nga Sutta (M.iii.240). >> and goes on to give some details about constituents and characteristic in brief and by analysis. Then, in case we still haven't figured it out, gives 13 ways of giving attention to the elements. One of these is: << ppn xi, 98. (b) Likeness as to great creatures: just as a magician turns water that is not crystal into crystal, and turns a clod that is not gold into gold, and shows them, and being himself neither a spirit or a bird, shows himself as a spirit or a bird so too, being themselves not blue-black, they turn themselves into blue-black derived materiality, being themselves not yellow ... not red ... not white, [367] they turn themselves into white derived materiality and show that. In this way they are 'great primaries (mahaa-bhuuta)' in being like the great creatures (mahaa-bhuuta) of a magician. {38} {38. 'A great primary (maha-bhuuta) is a great wonder (mahanto abbhuto) because it shows various unreal things (abhuuta), various wonders (abbhuta) and various marvels (acchariya). Or alternatively: there are great wonders (abbhuta) here, thus there are magicians. And spirits, etc., are huge (mahant) creatures (bhuuta) owing to being born from them, thus they are great primaries. Or alternatively: this term "great primary" can be regarded as a generic term for all of them. But earth, etc., are great primaries because they deceive, and because, like the huge creatures, their standing place cannot be pointed to. The deception lies in causing the apparent individual essences of blue-black, etc., though they themselves have no such individual essences of blue-black, etc., and it lies in causing the appearance of what has the aspect of woman and man, etc., though they themselves have no such individual essences of woman, man, and so on. Likewise their undemonstrability, since they are not found inside or outside each other though they rely upon each other for support. For if these elements were found inside each other, they would not each perform their particular functions, owing to mutual frustration. And if they were found outside each other, they would be already resolved (separate), and that being so, any description of them as unresolved (inseparable) would be meaningless. So although their standing place is undemonstrable, still each one assists the other by its particular function - the functions of establishing, etc., whereby each becomes a condition for the others as conascence condition and so on' (Pm.363).} 99. And just as, whomsoever the great creatures such as the spirits (yakkha) grasp hold of (possess), they have no standing place either inside him or outside him and yet they have no standing independently of him, so too, these elements are not found to stand either inside or outside each other yet they have no standing independently of one another. Thus they are also great primaries (mahaa-bhuuta) in being equal to the great creatures (mahaa-bhuuta) such as the spirits because they have no thinkable standing place [relative to each other]. 100. And just as the great creatures known as female spirits (yakkhinii) conceal their own fearfulness with a pleasing colour, shape and gesture to deceive beings, so too, these elements conceal each their own characteristic and function classed as hardness, etc., by means of a pleasing skin colour of women's and men's bodies, etc., and pleasing shapes of limbs and pleasing gestures of fingers, toes and eyebrows, and they deceive simple people concealing their own functions and characteristics beginning with hardness and do not allow their individual essences to be seen. Thus they are great primaries (mahaa-bhuuta) in being equal to the great creatures (mahaa-bhuuta), the female spirits, since they are deceivers. c: "such is this continuum"... peace, connie #93486 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 8:13 pm Subject: Guarding the Senses! bhikkhu0 Friends: Any Self-Control starts with Guarding the 6 Sense Doors!!! The Blessed Buddha once explained: Bhikkhus, by possessing three qualities, one lives full of pleasure & Joy in this very life, and one also has laid a solid foundation for elimination of the mental fermentations... What are these three advantageous qualities? I: One guards the doors of the senses, II: One is moderate in eating, and III: One is devoted to wakefulness... And how, Bhikkhus, does one guard the doors of the senses? When seeing a form, hearing a sound, smelling a smell, tasting a taste, touching a thing, or thinking a thought, one does neither get caught up by any of the general features, nor does one become as if gripped, immersed, fixated or captivated by any particular detail of this form, sound, smell, taste, touch, idea or mental state... Since, if one leaves the senses of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body & mind uncontrolled, then evil detrimental states such as greed, lust & discontent invades & dominates the mind! Therefore does one train control of the senses, guarding the senses, holding back the senses, and one keeps in check these 6 wild-running senses... Imagine, Bhikkhus, a horse-wagon, which yoked to two full-blooded horses, was standing ready with whip & goad, on even ground at a crossroads. Any clever tamer of horses could mount it, and, taking the reins in his left hand & the goad in his right, he could drive away and return by whatever way he wanted, whenever he wanted, being in complete control of his direction... Similarly here, the Bhikkhu trains guarding these six senses, trains in controlling them, trains in taming them, trains in pacifying them. It is in this way, Bhikkhus, that a Bhikkhu possess the advantageous mental ability to guard & fully control the six sense doors... The 3 firsts on Basic Self-Control: http://What-Buddha-Said.net/drops/II/Guarding_the_Senses.htm http://What-Buddha-Said.net/drops/II/Moderate_in_Eating.htm http://What-Buddha-Said.net/drops/II/Devoted_to_Wakefulness.htm Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book IV [176-7] Section 35: The 6 Senses. Salayatana. The Horse-Wagon. Rato 239. http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=948507 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/index.html Have a nice day! Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) http://What-Buddha-Said.net Guarding the Senses! #93487 From: "connie" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 9:41 pm Subject: Subject: On concepts, final nail to the coffin. nichiconn Dear Alex, Path of Purification, viii,12 quotes: 'The dew-drop on the blade of grass Vanishes when the sun comes up; Such is a human span of life; So, mother, do not hinder me' (Jaa.iv,122). I wonder what the story is. A version of that verse from "Life is Short (a funeral reading)" reads, in part: "Such is a human span of life; So pay heed." - http://www.mindobserver.com/readings/Readings.php?key=LifeIsShort I'm not sure we're all agreed that the subject is dead. In fact, I see it raising it's ugly head now! << PPn viii,39. 8. As to the shortness of the moment: in the ultimate sense the life-moment of living beings is extremely short, being only as much as the occurrence of a single conscious moment. Just as a chariot wheel, when it is rolling, rolls, [that is, touches the ground,] only on one point of [the circumference of] its tyre, and, when it is at rest, rests only on one point, so too, the life of living beings lasts only for a single conscious moment. When that consciousness has ceased, the being is said to have ceased, according as it is said: 'In a past conscious moment he did live, not he does live, not he will live. In a future conscious moment not he did live, not he does live, he will live. In the present conscious moment not he did live, he does live, not he will live. "Life, person, pleasure, pain - just these alone Join in one conscious moment that flicks by. Ceased aggregates of those dead or alive Are all alike, gone never to return No [world is] born if [consciousness is] not Produced; when that is present, then it lives; When consciousness dissolves, the world is dead: The highest sense this concept will allow" (NdI.42). {11} This is how death should be recollected as to the shortness of the moment. {11}. '"Person (atta-bhaava)" is the states other than the already-mentioned life, feeling and consciousness. The words "just these alone" means that it is unmixed with self (attaa) or permanence' (Pm.242). Atta-bhaava as used in the Suttas and in this work is more or less a synonym for sakkaaya in the sense of person (body and mind) or personality, or individual form. See Pitaka refs. in PTS Dict. and e.g. this chapter 35 and Ch.IX,54. '"When consciousness dissolves, the world is dead": just as in the case of the death-consciousness, this world is also called "dead" in the highest (ultimate) sense with the arrival of any consciousness whatever at its dissolution, since its cessation has no rebirth-linking (is "cessation never to return"). Nevertheless though this is so, "the highest sense this concept will allow (pa~n~natti paramatthiyaa)" - the ultimate sense will allow this concept of continuity, which is what the expression of common usage "Tissa lives, Phussa lives" refers to, and which is based on consciousness [momentarily] existing along with a physical support; this belongs to the ultimate sense here, since, as they say, "It is not the name and surname that lives"' (Pm.242 and 801). Something may be said about the word pa~n~natti here. Twenty-four kinds are dealt with in the Commentary to the Puggalapa~n~natti. The Puggalapa~n~natti Schedule gives the following six pa~n~natti (here a making known, a setting out): of aggregates, bases, elements, truths, faculties, and persons (Pug.1). The Commentary explains the word in this sense as pa~n~naapana (making known) and .thapana (placing), quoting 'He announces, teaches, declares (pa~n~naapeti), establishes' (cf. M.iii,248) and also 'a well-appointed (supa~n~natta) bed and chair' ( ). It continues: 'The making known of a name (naama-pa~n~natti) shows such and such dhammas and places them in such and such compartments, while the making known of the aggregates (khanda-pa~n~natti) and the rest shows in brief the individual form of those makings-known (pa~n~natti)'. It then gives six kinds of pa~n~natti 'according to the commentarial method but not in the texts': (1) Concept of the existent (vijjamaana-pa~n~natti), which is the conceptualization of (making known, a dhamma that is existent, actual, become, in the true and ultimate sense (e.g. aggregates, etc.). (2) Concept of the non-existent, which is, for example, the conceptualizing of 'female', 'male', 'persons', etc., which are non-existent by that standard and are only established by means of current speech in the world; similarly 'such impossibilities as concepts of a fifth Truth or the other sectarians' Atom, Primordial Essence, World Soul, and the like'. (3) Concept of the non-existent based on the existent, e.g., the expression 'One with the three clear-visions', where the 'person' ('one') is non-existent and the 'clear-visions' are existent. (4) Concept of the existent based on the non-existent, e.g., the 'female form', 'visible form'. (= visible datum base) being existent and 'female' non-existent. (5) Concept of the existent based on the existent, e.g., 'eye contact', both 'eye' and 'contact' being existent. (6) Concept of the non-existent based on the non-existent, e.g., 'banker's son', both being non-existent. Again two more sets of six are given as 'according to the Teachers, but not in the Commentaries'. The first is: (1) Derivative concept (upaadaa-pa~n~natti); this for instance, is a 'being', which is a convention derived from the aggregates of materiality, feeling, etc., though it has no individual essence of its own apprehendable in the true ultimate sense, as materiality, say, has in its self-identity and its otherness from feeling, etc.; or 'a house' or a 'fist' or an 'oven' as apart from its component parts, or a 'pitcher' or a 'garment', which are all derived from those same aggregates; or 'time' or 'direction', which are derived from the revolutions of the moon and sun; or the 'learning sign' or 'counterpart sign' founded on some aspect or other, which are a convention derived from some real sign as a benefit of meditative development: these are derived concepts, and this kind is a 'concept (pa~n~natti)' in the sense of 'ability to be set up (pa~n~napetabba = ability to be conceptualized)', but not in the sense of 'making known (pa~n~naapana)'. Under the latter heading this would be a 'concept of the non-existent'. (2) Appositional Concept (upanidhaa-p.): many varieties are listed, namely, Apposition of Reference ('second' as against 'first', 'third' as against 'second', 'long' as against 'short'), Apposition of What is in the Hand ('umbrella-in-hand', 'knife-in-hand'), Apposition of Association ('earring-wearer', 'topknot-wearer', 'crest-wearer'), Apposition of Contents ('Corn-wagon', 'ghee-pot'), Apposition of Proximity ('Indasaalaa Cave', 'Piyangu Cave'), Apposition of Comparison ('golden coloured', 'with a bull's gait'), Apposition of Majority ('Padumassare-Brahman Village'), Apposition of Distinction ('diamond ring'); and so on. (3) Collective Concept (samodhaana-p.), e.g., 'eight-footed', 'pile of riches', (4) Additive Concept (upanikkhitta-p.), e.g., 'one', 'two', 'three'. (5) Verisimilar Concept (tajjaap.): refers to the individual essence of a given dhamma, e.g., 'earth', 'fire': 'hardness', 'heat'. (6) Continuity Concept (santati-p): refers to the length of continuity of life, e.g., 'octogenarian', 'nonagenarian'. In the second set there are: (i) Concept According to Function (kicca-p), e.g., 'preacher', 'expounder of dhamma'. (ii) Concept According to Shape (se.n.thaana-p), e.g., 'thin', 'stout', 'round', 'square'. (iii) Concept According to Gender (li'nga-p), e.g., 'female', 'male', (iv) Concept According to Location (bhuumi-p), e.g., 'of the sense sphere', 'Kosalan'. (v) Concept as Proper Name (paccatta-p), e.g., 'Tissa', 'Naaga', 'Susana', which are makings-known (appellations) by mere name-making. (vi) Concept of the Unformed (asa'nkhata-pa~n~natti), e.g., 'cessation', 'nibbana', etc., which make the unformed dhamma known - an existent concept (From Commentary to Puggalapa~n~natti, condensed - see also Dhs.390f). All this shows that the word pa~n~natti carries the meanings of either appellation or concept or both together, and that no English word quite corresponds. [Conclusion] 40. So while he does his recollecting by means of one or other of these eight ways, his consciousness acquires [the support of] repetition owing to the reiterated attention, mindfulness settles down with death as its object, the hindrances are suppressed, and the jhana factors make their appearance. But since the object is states with individual essences, {12} and since it awakes a sense of urgency, the jhana does not reach absorption and is only access. [239] Now with special development the supramundane jhana and the second and the fourth immaterial jhanas reach absorption even with respect to states with individual essences. For the supramundane reaches absorption by means of progressive development of the Purifications and the immaterial jhanas do so by means of development consisting in the surmounting of the object (see Ch.X) since there [in those two immaterial jhanas] there is merely the surmounting of the object of jhana that had already reached absorption. But here [in mundane mindfulness of death] there is neither, so the jhana only reaches access. And that access is known as 'mindfulness of death' too since it arise through its means. {12}. '"But since the object is state with individual essences": the break up of states with individual essences, their destruction, their fall, - [all] that has to do only with states with individual essences. Hence the Blessed One said "Bhikkhus, ageing-and-death is impermanent, formed, dependently arisen" (S.ii,26) ... If it cannot reach absorption because of [its object being] states with individual essences, then what about the supramundane jhanas and certain of the immaterial jhanas? It was to answer this that he said '"now with special development the supramundane jhana" and so on' (Pm.243). Kasina jhana, for example, has a concept (pa~n~natti) as its object (Ch.IV,29) and a concept is a dhamma without individual essence (asabhaava-dhamma). >> You didn't just scream and run off, did you? connie #93488 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Dec 13, 2008 10:39 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On the chemical nature of consciousness egberdina Hi Scott, > One I can easily > recall is the whole central tenet that 'mind' is the forerunner. From > your materialist/epiphemonenalist viewpoint, you still believe in the > centrality of the 'brain' - of ruupa - and reject this aspect of the > Dhamma. > I think the fifth precept, the precept to refrain from intoxicants, is a fairly straightforward acknowledgment that mind is not any forerunner. Clearly, the precept is required because "mind" is conditioned at any time by any number of substances. Also, much ado (rite and ritual) is made about almsfood in Buddhist societies. There is a tacit understanding that the body, and therefore nutrition, precedes mind. I can go on for a while if it is necessary, but I'm hoping that you have already seen that I'm not just making stuff up. On the other hand, what is your evidence for the pre-eminence of the mind, other than the statements of some who have their hand in one bowl, and their eyes on another one? :-) Cheers Herman #93489 From: "sprlrt" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 12:41 am Subject: Re: The speed of past cittas sprlrt Hi Howard (and Herman) I think that we tend to have a "brain-centered" approach to nama-dhammas, with grey matter, synapsis, a nervous system and neurons physically "traveling" inside it, and memories "stored" somewhere in this piece of hardware, while nama-dhammas actually don't require any hardware (i.e. rupa) to "run". This is the case in arupa bhumi, the immaterial planes with no rupa khandha. With sanna, vedana, sankhara and vinnana khandhas functioning without any rupa whatsoever. True, in the plane of the 5 khandhas, ours, nama-khandhas do require a physical support (rupa khandha) for their arising, it is one of the several conditions required (nissaya paccaya). But in our plane only, so we shouldn't take this local rule as basis on which inferring absolute Dhamma theories. Alberto > > > > In Alberto's complex theory, he has it that every remembered pattern, > > against which all arising phenomena are compared, vanishes without > > trace every moment. Then, somehow, magically, the next moment sees not > > only the arising of whatever new "reality", but also the arising of > > the entire database of remembered patterns. That is convoluted enough > > in itself, but his theory also has it that the database of patterns > > that has just vanished is not the same as the one that has just > > arisen. Oh no, that couldn't be, for that would constitute identity. > > > #93490 From: "robmoult" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 1:19 am Subject: Some interesting questions from an erudite monk... robmoult Hi All, I have been asked the following questions by an erudite monk: Considering cellular memory and the marvellous intelligence behind the intricate physiological processes that keep us alive even without our being conscious of them, is it not possible that some if not all of the five aggregates (khandhas) of a sentient being could have multiple, simultaneous, coexistence? If so, could this existence beyond the gross physical body actually be another manifestation of the five khandhas? In other words, regardless of what it is termed... soul, Higher Self, super-consciousness, atman, spirit, etc. could it still be subject to conditionality and therefore also exhibit the universal characteristics of anicca (impermanence), dukkha (unsatisfactoriness or suffering) and anatta? This was in response to a conference paper that I prepared. I have uploaded a copy of the paper in the files section... it is titled "Understanding Death and Beyond". I would be interested in feedback on the monk's question. Metta, Rob M :-) PS: Sorry for being so inactive of late. #93491 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 1:25 am Subject: [dsg] Sangiiti Sutta Threes (31-33) and commentary, Part 3. nilovg Dear friends, As we have seen, there are the fire of those to be revered, such as ones parents, the fire of the householder, which is the honour a wife should give to her husband. The following section deals with the third fire, the fire of those worthy of offerings, the sangha. The Co. elaborates on the fire of those worthy of offerings, dakkhineyyaggi, stating that this is an offering (dakkhinaa) in the form of the four requisites (robes, food, dwelling place and medicines) and that the order of monks is worthy of offerings. The Co states that laypeople should take the three refuges, observe five or ten precepts, assist parents, and serve righteous recluses, and it explains that such noble dhammas are of great help. Whereas laypeople who practise wrongly, insult and abuse the order of monks will be reborn in hell planes. Thus, just as in the former cases, also this fire of honour to those worthy of offerings should be seen in the same way. N: Just as in the case of honour to parents, and of honour to a householder, also in this case, if someone does not burn a sacrificial fire for those worthy of honour, the Sangha, (does not honour the Sangha), this will be a condition for him to burn (in Hell), thus, a fire in Hell awaits him. The meaning of this is explained in the Stories of the Mansions, V, 2 (52) Vimaanavatthu, the story of Revatii . Nandiya was most generous and performed many deeds of merit, presenting a hall to the Buddha and ministering to the Sangha. His wife Revatii did not have confidence in the Buddha and when Nandiya was away she discontinued almsgiving and tried to get the monks blamed. Nandiya passed away and as a result of his good deeds he obtained a Mansion in the Heaven of the Thirtythree. Revatii continued to abuse and revile the monks. Two yakkas came to fetch her and led her to Nandiyas Mansion but she could not partake in her husbands Mansion, she was thrown into Hell. The warders of Hell said: Formerly you were heedless, now you do lament. You must experience the fruition of the deeds you yourself have done. ------------- N: As we read, laypeople pay honour to the Sangha in taking the three refuges, observing siila and other good works such as helping parents and recluses. They actually revere in these ways the ariyan Sangha, the Sangha of those who attained enlightenment. When understanding of realities is developed, also confidence grows, and one can take ones refuge in the Triple Gem with greater confidence. Pa~n~naa sees the value of right speech and right action and thus there are more conditions to observe precepts. When one has more understanding of the citta arising at the present moment, one becomes more concerned for other people and will not be inclined to hurt them with sharp words or disagreeable conduct. The sotaapanna will never transgress the five precepts. In developing the way leading to eradicate defilements we honour the ariyan Sangha, we burn a sacrificial fire for the Sangha. --------- Co: Dakkhi.neyyaggiiti ettha pana dakkhi.naati cattaaro paccayaa, bhikkhusa"ngho dakkhi.neyyo. So gihiina.m tiisu sara.nesu pa~ncasu siilesu dasasu siilesu maataapituupa.t.thaane dhammikasama.nabraahma.naupa.t.thaaneti evamaadiisu kalyaa.nadhammesu niyojanena bahuupakaaro...... ********* Nina. #93492 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 2:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Rajgir sarahprocter... Hi Azita, (Chittapalo and Ven Gutttasila), I'm enjoying your e-cards from India, thank you very much! --- On Fri, 12/12/08, gazita2002 wrote: >after leaving Bodhgaya, we stayed one nite in Rajgir and climbed the hill where the first council was held, 3 months after Buddhas Parinibbana. .... S: I've always wished to visit this spot, so glad to hear you made it at least! ... >Wonderful view over Rajgir and surrounds. My two travelling companions recited the Ratana Sutta while we sat deep in one of the caves. .... S: I'm sure you could imagine reciting all the Dhamma-Vinaya there as well! ... >Now in Aurangabad in Maharashtra state, and conditions are much better here. We are all feeling a tad ragged but do plan on going to the Ellora and Ajanta caves which are Buddhist in origin and quite old. Ven Guttasila developed a nasty chest infection so we had to take him to a hospital and I was very impressed with his treatment. A lot o the staff are Buddhist and surrounded Ven bed and chanted 'namo tassa bagawato, arahato ....... should be able to put a foto on dsg later of this particular event. Will post more after we visit the caves, depending on conditions.. ..... .... S: Pls wish Ven G a speedy recovery from us. I can certainly sympathise with my tendency for similar in India. Anyway, a nice spot to be sick and glad to hear about the caring treatment. Look f/w to the pic in due course and more e-cards in due course, depending..... Perhaps we'll see you all in Bkk on your return? Depending.... Best wishes to Chittapalo as well and anumodana for the kusala projects. Perhaps he'll feel inspired to de-lurk on DSG and write a note about the trip as well. Are you having dhamma discussions along the way? What topics? Did Chittapalo have any discussion with A.Sujin (after what must be 20 years or so)? Metta, Sarah ========== #93493 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 3:08 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Suttas in which the Buddha held back the deep teaching? sarahprocter... Hi Alex, --- On Fri, 12/12/08, Alex wrote: >Jhana is definately helpful for any and all insight, and in mn43 (or 44) is one of 5 conditions for Arhatship. .... S: I'd have to see the reference to consider what is meant. ... A: >The thing needing to be clarified is if the Buddha has meant that samadhi-indriya is a) Required for Stream .... S: The five faculties (indriyas) of saddhaa, viriya, sati, samaadhi and pa~n~naa are all essential for the Stream. They have to develop and become powers (balas) so that they are unshakable with regard to the insight into the present dhamma appearing. .... b) Always has to include Jhana. .... S: As discussed, samaadhi indriya in the context of the path or bojjhangas (enlightenment factors)is not jhana. However, at the moment of enlightenment, the samaadhi accompanying the lokuttara cittas is equivalent in strength to first jhana (or higher, depending on whether jhana was attained just prior to enlightenment). ... A:> It *may* be possible for Jhana to happen after listening, although it may not be relevant to us now. The suttas are clear that one can remain in sitting meditation for up to 7 days without moving. .... S: The path is about understanding with detachment from any dhamma arising. Whatever experience occurs, it's anicca, dukkha and anatta - not worth clinging onto or craving in any sense. ... A:> The amount of time may vary though, so we should not be to happy to believe that momentary jhana is enough. For some it may, but I believe that we should err on the side of caution especially if we believe that people today are slowerer to understand and realize the path/fruit. .... S: As I've stressed, it's not a question of 'choice' as to what dhamma arises or what should be done. Anatta again! ... A:> The amount of Jhana that may be required to help remove the latent tendencies for lust/hatred. Sotopanna removes 3 latent tendencies (self view, r&r, doubt), Anagami has to remove 2 more (lust/hatred) . .... S: The latent tendencies are removed through the development of right understanding. It is panna accompanying the lokuttara cittas which eradicates such akusala, not Jhana or a person. .... >>S: Isn't it the continuation and development of the same 8-fold path? ... A:> Yes, especially the Samadhi relevant parts for Anagami and Panna relevant parts for Arhat ... S: Panna is the leader from beginning to end. Samma samadhi becomes perfected at the stage of anagami and samma ditthi( or panna) becomes perfected at the stage of arahat. Metta, Sarah ======= #93494 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 5:25 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Some interesting questions from an erudite monk... nilovg Dear Rob M, good to hear from you after quite some time. Op 14-dec-2008, om 10:19 heeft robmoult het volgende geschreven: > Considering cellular memory and the marvellous intelligence behind > the intricate physiological processes that keep us alive even without > our being conscious of them, is it not possible that some if not all > of the five aggregates (khandhas) of a sentient being could have > multiple, simultaneous, coexistence? ------ N: I find it clearer what the Abhidhamma teaches about sa~n~naa, arising with each and every citta. Cellular memory is a scientific term, but perhaps meant is that rupas of the body and citta condition one another. The five khandhas in the human plane coexist all the time, the four namakkhandhas and rupakkhandha. They subsist for a very short moment and then fall away. No doubt. ------- > R: If so, could this existence > beyond the gross physical body actually be another manifestation of > the five khandhas? In other words, regardless of what it is termed... > soul, Higher Self, super-consciousness, atman, spirit, etc. could it > still be subject to conditionality and therefore also exhibit the > universal characteristics of anicca (impermanence), dukkha > (unsatisfactoriness or suffering) and anatta? ------- N: The Q. is not clear about existence beyond the gross physical body...another manifestation of the five khandhas. Why? I see no need for this. There are just the five khandhas, nama and rupa, and these are anicca (impermanence), dukkha (unsatisfactoriness or suffering) and anatta. ------- Nina. #93495 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 5:48 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Subject: On concepts, final nail to the coffin. nilovg Dear Connie, thank you for more on concepts. Op 14-dec-2008, om 6:41 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > Path of Purification, viii,12 quotes: > 'The dew-drop on the blade of grass > Vanishes when the sun comes up; > Such is a human span of life; > So, mother, do not hinder me' (Jaa.iv,122). > > I wonder what the story is. ------- N: Jataka 460, Yudha~njaya Jaataka. The Bodhisatta wanted to go forth and his mother did not like it, wanted to hold him back. Nina. #93496 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 6:08 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts nilovg Dear Connie and TG, Op 14-dec-2008, om 5:19 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > so too, these elements conceal each their own characteristic and > function classed as hardness, etc., by means of a pleasing skin > colour of women's and men's bodies, etc., and pleasing shapes of > limbs and pleasing gestures of fingers, toes and eyebrows, and they > deceive simple people concealing their own functions and > characteristics beginning with hardness and do not allow their > individual essences to be seen. Thus they are great primaries > (mahaa-bhuuta) in being equal to the great creatures (mahaa- > bhuuta), the female spirits, since they are deceivers. > > c: "such is this continuum"... ------------ N: TG , you had this verse: Connie works it out. You perceive a person but what is really there? We have the illusion, believing that persons really exist, but the four great Elements are like magicians, they show what is not real. TG, you trip over 'own characteristic', but it means simply: hardness is not the same as heat, these elements are different. That's all there is. Ultimate realities and concepts: see the previous passage: elements and people with pleasing skin etc. Do not fall over ultimate: it just means: what is there in reality. Ultimate: in the highest sense, parama means highest, attha is meaning. ------- > > TG: Phenomena are phenomena in spite of whatever we call it. And it > does what > it does in spite of whatever we think about it. ------ N: Well said. Dhammas are dhammas, and they have functions, nobody can prevent them performing their functions. Function: this is no entity view. You speak about doing. We need language to express ourselves, but language is limited. Nina. #93497 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 2:34 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On the chemical nature of consciousness upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Scott) - In a message dated 12/14/2008 1:39:29 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Scott, > One I can easily > recall is the whole central tenet that 'mind' is the forerunner. From > your materialist/epiphemonenalist viewpoint, you still believe in the > centrality of the 'brain' - of ruupa - and reject this aspect of the > Dhamma. > I think the fifth precept, the precept to refrain from intoxicants, is a fairly straightforward acknowledgment that mind is not any forerunner. Clearly, the precept is required because "mind" is conditioned at any time by any number of substances. ------------------------------------------- Howard: Mentality & materiality are, quite obviously, mutually conditioning. This comes as no surprise, there being innumerable instances of each readily observable. There are, according to the Buddha, however, realms of experience that are disembodied. Also, the Buddha certainly did refer to mind (in the sense of moral attitude and volition) as "the forerunner," having taught the following as recorded in the Dhammapada (right at the beginning): ****************** Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) phenomena (dhamma). Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox. Mind is the forerunner of (all good) phenomena (dhamma). Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, AFFECTION follows one, even as one's shadow that never leaves. ****************** Note: In the foregoing, I replaced "states" by "phenomena (dhamma)," as the Pali word is 'dhamma'. --------------------------------------------- Also, much ado (rite and ritual) is made about almsfood in Buddhist societies. There is a tacit understanding that the body, and therefore nutrition, precedes mind. I can go on for a while if it is necessary, but I'm hoping that you have already seen that I'm not just making stuff up. On the other hand, what is your evidence for the pre-eminence of the mind, other than the statements of some who have their hand in one bowl, and their eyes on another one? :-) ------------------------------------------- Howard: It seems to me that overwhelmingly throughout the suttas, the Buddha makes mind preeminent. This is true especially from the fundamental perspective that the entire goal of the Dhamma is liberating the mind, freeing it from defilements and suffering. It is mind that is cultivated by Dhamma practice, and mind that is freed, not body. ------------------------------------------ Cheers Herman =========================== With metta, Howard #93498 From: "Scott" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 7:36 am Subject: Re: On Concepts, The All scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Thanks for the reply: H: "Nibbana isn't known presently. It is not in the realm of perception, it is not in the all, it is not even in the realm of neither perception and non-perception (I'm not saying there's such a thing as realms)... " Scott: 'Nibbaana isn't known presently.' What do you mean here? I'm assuming you deny that it is known, at the arising of the Path, by pa~n~naa, when it is known, and that this would be a knowing that is 'present' (as in not past and not future). It is not to be perceived by any of the five senses, as you say. This leaves Nibbaana an object of the mind. What say you? Nibbaana is to be known only by consciousness and mental factors through the mind-door - naama. H: "...If Nibbana is known, it is known retrospectively, because there is no knowing with the cessation of perception, and nibbana's pleasantness may be known retrospectively, for there is no feeling with the cessation of feeling." Scott: How does this 'retrospective knowing' to come to pass? Can you elaborate please? When you say 'there is no knowing with the cessation of perception,' are you referring to Nibbaana? H: "There is no experience with the cessation of experience. That is the end of stress. For those desperate to know what is unknowable, they have to use a line of reasoning, I guess" Scott: Nibbaana is an object of consciousness. After the death of the arahat, there is no experience. 'Arahat' is the designation for the one in whom the Path and Fruit have arisen and eradication of the defilements is complete. With the ending of the life of the arahat, I'd say experience ceases. Is this what you are saying? H: "There are two realities. There is nibbana i.e. being, and there is anicca i.e. knowing/perceiving. I don't buy into the division conceptual/ultimate. Neither do the suttas." Scott: I don't follow you when you say that Nibbaana is 'being.' From whence do you get such a notion? I've asked before, methinks, what you mean by this. Did you tell me already? We'll agree to disagree on the latter point. I see plenty of ultimates mentioned in the suttas. I'll not budge on this and neither will you. I'm right, you're wrong, and that's all she wrote. ;-) MN 43 Mahaavedallasutta.m "'Perception, perception': Thus is it said. To what extent, friend, is it said to be 'perception'?" ~Naa.namoli/Bodhi (N/B): "'Perception, perception,' is said, friend. With reference to what is 'perception' said?" ["'Sa~n~naa sa~n~naa'ti, aavuso, vuccati. Kittaavataa nu kho, aavuso, sa~n~naati vuccatii''ti?"] Scott: "Sa~n~naa (f.) [fr. saŋ+j~naa] (pl. sa~n~naayo and sa~n~naa -- 1. sense, consciousness, perception, being the third khandha...2. sense, perception, discernment, recognition, assimilation of sensations, awareness...3. consciousness...4. conception, idea, notion...5. sign, gesture token, mark "'It perceives, it perceives': Thus, friend, it is said to be 'perception.' And what does it perceive? It perceives blue. It perceives yellow. It perceives red. It perceives white. 'It perceives, it perceives': Thus it is said to be 'perception.'" N/B: "'It perceives, it perceives.' friend, that is why 'perception' is said. What does it perceive? It perceives blue, it perceives yellow, it perceives red, and it perceives white. 'It perceives, it perceives,' friend, that is why 'perception' is said." ["'Sa~njaanaati sa~njaanaatii'ti kho, aavuso, tasmaa sa~n~naati vuccati. Ki~nca sa~njaanaati? Niilakampi sa~njaanaati, piitakampi sa~njaanaati, lohitakampi sa~njaanaati, odaatampi sa~njaanaati. 'Sa~njaanaati sa~njaanaatii'ti kho, aavuso, tasmaa sa~n~naati vuccatii''ti."] Scott: "Sa~njaanaati [saŋ+jaanaaati] 1. to recognize, perceive, know, to be aware of, (PTS PED)." "Feeling, perception, & consciousness, friend: Are these qualities conjoined or disjoined? Is it possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them?" N/B: "Feeling, perception, and consciousness friend - are these states conjoined or disjoined? And is it possible to separate each of these states from the other in order to describe the difference between them?" ["'Yaa caavuso, vedanaa yaa ca sa~n~naa ya~nca vi~n~naa.na.m " ime dhammaa sa.msa.t.thaa udaahu visa.msa.t.thaa? Labbhaa ca panimesa.m dhammaana.m vinibbhujitvaa vinibbhujitvaa naanaakara.na.m pa~n~naapetu''nti?"] "Feeling, perception, & consciousness are conjoined, friend, not disjoined. It is not possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them. For what one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one cognizes. Therefore these qualities are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is not possible, having separated them one from another, to delineate the difference among them." N/B: "Feeling, perception, and consciousness, friend - these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the others in order to describe the difference between them. For what one feels, that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one feels, that one cognizes. That is why these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the others in order to describe the difference between them." "'Yaa caavuso, vedanaa yaa ca sa~n~naa ya~nca vi~n`naa.na.m " ime dhammaa sa.msa.t.thaa, no visa.msa.t.thaa. Na ca labbhaa imesa.m dhamm.mna.m vinibbhujitvaa vinibbhujitvaa naanaakara.na.m pa~n~naapetu.m. Ya.m haavuso, vedeti ta.m sa~njaanaati, ya.m sa~njaanaati ta.m vijaanaati. Tasmaa ime dhammaa sa.msa.t.thaa no visa.msa.t.thaa. Na ca labbhaa imesa.m dhammaana.m vinibbhujitvaa vinibbhujitvaa naanaakara.na.m pa~n~naapetu''nti."] Scott: I think the above uses 'vi~n~naa.naa' in the sense of khandha (vi~n~naa.na-khandha); and that vedanaa and sa~n~naa as well are used in this sense (sankhaara-khandha). The sutta refers to the fact that citta ('mind') and cetasikas (mental factors) arise conascently, never separately, and are, as such, condition each for the arising of the other. What did you want to indicate in offering this particular excerpt from the sutta? H: "I'm happy for you to discuss in whatever way that you see fit. I take the position that where the commentaries and suttas differ, I side with the suttas. You side with the commentaries. We should expect to clash as often as the suttas and commentaries differ. Quite often, so it seems :-)" Scott: Okay. Good one. H: "I'm not a card-carrying Theravadin, that's for sure. I fully accept the first two noble truths, I fully accept that cessation of knowing is the end of stress, and that such cessation is possible. I see no point in taking a verbal stance on the 8 fold noble path, it's not talking the talk that matters, but walking the walk. It's less what we say, but more what we do that is making our yet untrodden paths. And though some may prefer to hide behind theory and expressions of faith, bit by bit we make known to each other where we have been, and where we are now." Scott: Thanks for the above. I'd say, bit by bit one thinks about an 'other' and thinks one has an idea of 'where an other has been' but its likely not relevant. We likely consider 'study' in different ways (and 'practise,' for that matter). And it is a given that kamma leads to result. The distinction between 'walking the walk' and 'talking the talk' is senseless when applied to discussion of a forum devoted to discussing Dhamma. When one is discussing theory its a theoretical discussion. We also likely differ greatly in the way in which 'faith' is understood, and the way in which 'faith' has a function in life. There is nothing to be done about this. What one considers 'hiding behind expression of faith' might be an expression of despair that 'faith' has no conditions to arise in that one and such an expression might reflect simple craving. And there is nothing to be done about that either. (See above on the relevance of thinking about an 'other'.) H: "I tend to limit myself to suttas that are applicable to my daily life. I am not interested in studying the suttas as an integral work." Scott: Fair enough. Over to you... Sincerely, Scott. #93499 From: "connie" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 7:38 am Subject: PPn xii,2 nichiconn dear friends, before I go ahead and change my copy according to my own thoughts, I'd appreciate it if one of you would post PPn xii, 2 so I could follow that instead. thank you in advance, connie #93500 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 2:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of past cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Alberto (and Herman) - In a message dated 12/14/2008 3:41:51 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, sprlrt@... writes: Hi Howard (and Herman) I think that we tend to have a "brain-centered" approach to nama-dhammas, with grey matter, synapsis, a nervous system and neurons physically "traveling" inside it, and memories "stored" somewhere in this piece of hardware, while nama-dhammas actually don't require any hardware (i.e. rupa) to "run". This is the case in arupa bhumi, the immaterial planes with no rupa khandha. With sanna, vedana, sankhara and vinnana khandhas functioning without any rupa whatsoever. True, in the plane of the 5 khandhas, ours, nama-khandhas do require a physical support (rupa khandha) for their arising, it is one of the several conditions required (nissaya paccaya). But in our plane only, so we shouldn't take this local rule as basis on which inferring absolute Dhamma theories. Alberto =========================== Alberto, while the fact of materiality conditioning mentality is clear to me, and, IMO, indisputable, I do agree with what you write here. In that regard, please see the reply I just sent to Herman's post "On the Chemical Nature of Consciousness." With metta, Howard #93501 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 7:45 am Subject: Re: [dsg] PPn xii,2 nilovg Dear Connie, I try, perhaps tonight. Nina. Op 14-dec-2008, om 16:38 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > before I go ahead and change my copy according to my own thoughts, > I'd appreciate it if one of you would post PPn xii, 2 so I could > follow that instead. > thank you in advanc #93502 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 3:12 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 12/13/2008 5:29:44 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, kenhowardau@... writes: Hi Howard, -------- <. . .> KH: > > each nama or rupa arises, performs its functions and ceases. The term 'final cessation' refers to the process. After the death- citta of an arahant no other citta arises to take its place. Howard: > Ken, you and some others here who presume separate, self-existent citta-packets -------------------- This might be a minor quibble, but what is a citta packet? Is it the five khandhas - the citta, cetasikas and rupas that exist at any given moment? If so, I don't think a citta packet should be called 'self existent' or 'having its own characteristics.' Only the individual citta, cetasikas and rupas (that make up the packet) could be called that. ----------------------------------------------- Howard: I had in mind the cluster of citta & cetasikas present at any moment that is viewed by many on DSG as arising from nothing in an instant, continuing for a time interval (that strikes me as immeasurable, since no change occurs) and then utterly ceasing, like a discrete sequence of bits: 1,0,1,0,1,0, ... ---------------------------------------------- -------------------------------- H: > accept the idea of annihilation every moment followed immediately by a god-like creation of something from nothing in the next moment, except for some time in the far distant future where annihilation is not followed by anything. -------------------------------- I suppose that is fair criticism in a way. The 'arising' of a dhamma does seem to have some similarities with the creation of a permanent self or soul. The performance by dhammas of their functions (their conditioning work) does seem to be similar to "doing" in the conventional sense, and the 'falling away' of a dhamma does seem similar to the annihilation of something that previously continued on. -------------------------------------------- Howard: I applaud you, Ken, for the flexibility of thought you exhibit in the foregoing. --------------------------------------------- However, since these words are being applied to dhammas (fleeting, conditioned, soulless phenomena) I don't think the superficial similarities matter. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: But it is exactly the nature of dhammas that is of issue here. You accept dhammas as being substantial realities, true entities that arise from nothing (true existent arising from "the void") and then being entirely annihilated (true existent with own-being then utterly destroyed), as 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0 ... This is not my perspective. I view dhammas as interdependent, constantly changing mental and physical qualities and activities, each of which has a middle-way, contingent mode of existence characterized by anicca and anatta, seamlessly connected to what preceded it and what will follow, with hard, discrete separation being imposed by us and not the reality. Our mind chops up the unrelenting flow of existence, mentally fragmenting it in an attempt at control. ------------------------------------------- Whether we use the word 'cessation' or the word 'annihilation' the important thing is to know there is no atta - no abiding self - that ceases or gets annihilated. ------------------------------------------- Howard: Exactly so. But that is not the view of dhammas and cittas expressed by many on DSG. ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------- H: > The main problem with that is that the Buddha did not teach annihilation. He taught a middle way that avoided both annihilation and self-existence by avoiding both nihilism and substantialism. -------------------------------------------- I am sure he taught the rise and fall of dhammas. He showed that that was all there was. There was no atta (no lasting entity). -------------------------------------------------- Howard: No lasting entity for any time at all. A middle way between existence and nonexistence. -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------ H: > Samsara is the appearance realm of separate things - of apparent separate and discrete objects and personal selves that know them, crave their presence or absence, and cling to and grasp at what are in reality neither separate nor graspable. Nibbana (or freedom) is the actual nature of reality - seamless, open, free and vast, with no separate facets to be grasped at and no beings who grasp. Here there is nothing that stands alone or self-existent, nothing substantial to be annihilated, and nothing substantial that is created. May we realize this reality, for here is perfect peace. ------------------------------------------------------- These ideas are not found in the original Pali texts. They change what is found in those texts dramatically. I think it is important to see *how* they change them. Ken H =========================== With metta, Howard #93503 From: "connie" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 8:17 am Subject: Re: PPn xii,2 nichiconn Thanks, Nina, It's not really a big deal, just some goof-ball numbering in my copy: <<[The Five Kinds of Direct Knowledge] 2. In order to show the benefits of developing concentration to clansmen whose concentration has reached the fourth jhana, and in order to teach progressively refined Dhamma, five kinds of mundane direct-knowledge have been described by the Blessed One. They are (1) the kinds of Supernormal Power, described in the way beginning 'When his concentrated mind is thus purified, bright, unblemished, rid of defilement, and has become malleable, wieldy, steady, and attained to imperturbability, {1} he directs, he inclines, his mind to the kinds of supernormal power. He wields the various kinds of supernormal power. Having been one, he becomes many ...' (D.i,77), the knowledge of the Divine Ear Element, (2) the knowledge of Penetration of Minds, (4) the knowledge of Recollection of Past Life, and (5) the knowledge of the Passing Away and Reappearance of Beings. {1}. 'Aane~nja - imperturbability': a term normally used for the four immaterial states, together with the fourth jhana. See also 16f., and M.Sutta 106. >> connie ps: thanks for the pointer to Jaa 460, too. #93504 From: "Scott" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 9:20 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "Here's how I view 'conditional relations.'--'This being, that is. With the arising of this, that arises. This not being, that is not. With the ceasing of this, that ceases.' Anything I write or think about conditions, conditional relations, dependent arising, etc. must fall under these guidelines unless I'm screwing up what I wrote or thought." Scott: You are conflating methods of teaching, TG. The above is the method of teaching known as Dependent Origination ('conditional relations' is another method, as will be shown). Consider (Guide to Conditional Relations, Part 1, U Naarada, PTS, 1996, pp. 5-6): "...Dependent Origination is the teaching about all that happens in one existence. Therefore it teaches about: (i) the causes for coming into this present existence. These are ignorance and formations of past existences; (ii) the causes for the change to another existence. This is kamma-becoming which brings about birth, decay, and death in another existence; (iii) the present existence. These are consciousness, mentality-materiality, six bases, contact, feeling, craving, and attachment. "Just as the taste of water in the ocean can be know by tasting a drop of water in it, so also, what happens in each and every existence can be known when everything that happens in one existence is known. "In this Dependent Origination, the primary cause of the round of rebirths is ignorance. And so, the causes and effects are here expounded in the manner: Ignorance is the cause and formations are the effect and so on. "...In the Conditional Relations method all the states are treated with reference to 24 conditions to show how the causes and their effects are related. Here it is expounded that such-and-such a state, as cause, is related to such-and-such a state, as effect, by such-and-such a conditioning force. "Note. The cause and effect expounded in these...methods of teaching must be considered separately, each in its own way. If they are taken together and any inter-relation between them is sought there will be doubt and perplexity...Thus the...methods of teaching must be understood so as to be clear as to which method is applicable in any particular case of cause and effect." TG: "'This being, that is. With the arising of this, that arises. This not being, that is not. With the ceasing of this, that ceases.' The above IS dynamic!" Scott: What is the 'this' and what is the 'that,' TG? TG: "...You see, detachment and turning away from conditions requires that 'states' are done away with. How are you going to detach while clinging to your precious 'individual realities'? I'll answer for you, you can't. Its impossible. You see my friend, knowledge of the 'cause and effect of states' is for the purpose of detachment. Detachment arises BECAUSE those 'states' are come to be seen as -- insubstantial, void, hollow, empty, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick, etc...If states are seen as 'ultimate realities with their own characteristics,' this is a 'death nail' to progressing toward enlightenment I do believe." Scott: That would be 'death knell' I believe. Sorry, couldn't help myself. Bong. And as for the above - just words, TG. Discussing theory, studying theory, learning the Dhamma in this fashion - it is all just intellectual - thinking about Dhamma. The 'states' you finally acknowledge in the above (yay TG!) are sine quibus non endowed with the characteristic you note above - void of self. These states are so whether it is known or not. And it is by virtue of the function of an impersonal state known as pa~n~naa that such a characteristic becomes known (knowledge of the 'cause and effect of states,' as you put it). These are the causes and effects in relation to states of which you are speaking. This is no intellectual exercise. 'Detachment' is a function of pa~n~naa - a state, I'll remind you, devoid of self but definitely a state. TG: "'Conditions' are the same 'states' you experience. You prefer to substantialize then as 'realities with their own characteristics.' I prefer [to] insubstantialize them as 'dependencies with nothing of THEIR own.' The phenomena is the same. The outlook is different. I'm extremely confident my outlook is far stronger in leading toward detachment than an outlook that sees everything as 'having its own characteristics' ... and far more compliant with what the Buddha taught. That means Suttas. And far more in accord with what the phenomena are actually doing. Phenomena are phenomena in spite of whatever we call it. And it does what it does in spite of whatever we think about it." Scott: Now, TG, the above is mixed up, and shows your perplexity. You equate 'conditions' and 'states.' Then you throw in the notion of 'experience,' suggesting that states can be the object of experience. Then you posit an intellectual exercise you label 'insubstantialisation,' suggesting that this is superior while, at the same time, asserting that the 'phenonena are the same.' You use the term 'phenomena' as a synonym for 'state.' You are only talking about a way of thinking, TG, and suggesting that thinking in your way somehow leads to detachment. You go on to posit something known as 'dependencies.' What are these? Is this yet another synonym for 'states?' TG: "Your so called 'dhammas' are 'themselves' the forces! There is no other 'outside force' working upon them. I rather like your above description surprisingly. A clearer view would lead to realization that these 'states' are not 'their own things;' but rather, a mere amalgamation of interacting and altering forces. Oh yes, and dynamic! Without dynamics, no change. Again, the 'dynamics' are not outside of the conditions. The conditions are dynamic." Scott: No, the dhammas are not the forces, TG. This is because they are realities. The 'forces' relates to the way in which these realities effect each other. Dynamics occur between things. TG: "I deny that outlook as being correct. We are looking at the same coin. You see the coin for 'its rupa characteristic.' I see it as a coreless outgrowth of conditions. One first discerns a quality for direct analysis. (This is the stage where you begin, substantialize, and stop apparently.) Then the conditional nature of that quality is investigated. In doing so, if done well, then THAT quality becomes seen as 'having nothing of itself.' It becomes seen as empty, hollow, void, insubstantial, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick. BECAUSE...IT is not 'itself,' it is an amalgamation of conditions. Its IS a mere condition...impermanent, afflicted with impermanence, and nonself. It should be seen as death, a murderer, poison, a disease, a boil, a dart, a raised sword. (Gosh, not an 'ultimate reality' in the bunch.)" Scott: Similes, TG. And all concepts - conventional speech, man. Not paramattha dhammas. TG: "That's just a point of view your expressing. What arises -- arises. What we call them is irrelevant to those conditions...The only importance in what we call them lies in how much it leads to attachment or detachment. Since I believe the view of 'ultimate realities with their own characteristics' leads not to detachment, and not in accordance with the Buddha's teaching, I'll have to reject it as a problem for escaping suffering." Scott: I'm beginning to see more and more how you really do think that detachment comes from thinking about things. This is deluded (in the psychiatric sense) since you can't change a thing by virtue of applying thought to it. 'You' can't escape suffering, TG. Not by sheer dint of 'thinking the right way.' Yes, there is a 'right way' to see things, but this is a function of pa~n~naa - not 'you' thinking. TG: "This criticism doesn't apply to my outlook. I don't do away with phenomena. I do away with reifying it in a substantialist manner." Scott: No, you 'insubstantialise' it in a cognitive manner. TG: I use the terms elements and aggregates, regularly. They are the way conditions have formed wherever they are found. When I speak of conditions, I refer to the interaction of such. If that helps you. However, a deeper vision shows these very conditions (elements aggregates) to be -- hollow, void, empty, insubstantial, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick, etc." Scott: Here you suggest that 'elements' and 'aggregates' are 'the way conditions have formed.' Is this like a chemical reaction? Thanks for the new wrinkle in your theory but its even more outre than the last. TG: "'Realities and dhammas' are used in this group to signify separate states with their own characteristics. This is antithetical to the vision the Buddha was driving at. However, in order to 'see' conditions doing what conditions do, we do take elements and aggregates as 'focal points' to investigate the nature of phenomena. That nature being -- conditioned, impermanent, afflicted, and nonself." Scott: I still find the insubstantialist view to be seriously flawed. Now you suggest that we think up things like elements and aggregates simply as some (unconscious?) intellectual exercise? Honestly... Sincerely, Scott. #93505 From: "Robert" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 9:41 am Subject: [dsg] Re: how to view the self avalo1968 Hello again Howard and thanks again for the clarification. Just to be sure I understood correctly: Howard: The critical expression being "this particular dhamma." The pleasant warmth that A experiences could be a different dhamma from the unpleasant warmth that B experiences, or even from the unpleasant warmth that A experiences a moment later. In fact, what is conventionally "the same rupa" could be in fact two different but corresponding (and perhaps simultaneous) rupas. My phenomenalist perspective would, in fact, view it so, but phenomenalism isn't required to view it so. Robert A: Above you said 'could be a different dhamma' which implies that it also could be the same dhamma experienced by A and B. So, my question still remains. If it is the same dhamma experienced by A and B, must A and B both experience this dhamma as pleasant or unpleasant independent of any contribution to this experience from the mind of A and B? I believe you said this was the position of Ken and the denizens of DSG. Thanks again. Robert A. #93506 From: "Scott" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 9:43 am Subject: Re: On Concepts, The All scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: Me: "I think the above uses 'vi~n~naa.naa' in the sense of khandha (vi~n~naa.na-khandha); and that vedanaa and sa~n~naa as well are used in this sense (sankhaara-khandha)." Scott: I know vedanaa and sa~n~naa are not sankhaara-khandha. Sorry. Sincerely, Scott. #93507 From: "Scott" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 9:53 am Subject: [dsg] Re: how to view the self scottduncan2 Dear Robert A: R: "...I believe you said this was the position of Ken and the denizens of DSG." Scott: (From the Oxford dictionary): denizen /denniz’n/ • noun 1 formal or humorous an inhabitant or occupant. 2 Brit. historical a foreigner allowed certain rights in their adopted country. " ORIGIN from Old French deinz ‘within’. Scott: You're 'here' too, are you also a 'denizen? Or just 'a foreigner allowed certain rights? ;-) Sincerely, Denizen Scott. #93508 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 5:13 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self upasaka_howard Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/14/2008 12:41:39 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, avalo1968@... writes: Hello again Howard and thanks again for the clarification. Just to be sure I understood correctly: Howard: The critical expression being "this particular dhamma." The pleasant warmth that A experiences could be a different dhamma from the unpleasant warmth that B experiences, or even from the unpleasant warmth that A experiences a moment later. In fact, what is conventionally "the same rupa" could be in fact two different but corresponding (and perhaps simultaneous) rupas. My phenomenalist perspective would, in fact, view it so, but phenomenalism isn't required to view it so. Robert A: Above you said 'could be a different dhamma' which implies that it also could be the same dhamma experienced by A and B. So, my question still remains. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, my belief is that what two different "beings" experience is never the same dhamma, but what one experiences may well *correspond* to what the other experiences. Beings with similar kamma tend toward similar experience. I do not view rupas, for example, as independent things "out there," but as physical elements of experience within a given namarupic stream. These streams, though, are not independent, but, in fact, are interdependent and interacting, like mirrors reflecting images of one another. Of course, even if rupas exist as more than mere elements of experience, it is possible that the rupas of one namarupic stream are distinct from those of another, but I find the phenomenalist perspective as more strongly indicative of correspondence as opposed to identity than are objectivist perspectives. ----------------------------------------- If it is the same dhamma experienced by A and B, must A and B both experience this dhamma as pleasant or unpleasant independent of any contribution to this experience from the mind of A and B? --------------------------------------- Howard: Your point is well taken. For example, if two people are experiencing "the same" room temperature, and if pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality of affective feel is inherent in the temperature, then the two people would have to feel that temperature in the same way. But, of course, that is NOT how people react. So, the solution must be either that 1) rupas are objective, "external" phenomena, independent of being experienced, but affective feel is extrinsic to the rupa and imposed by the observing consciousness, or 2) rupas are objective, "external" phenomena, but with differently felt rupas being distinct rupas associated with different mind streams, or 3) rupas are merely physical elements of experience within mind streams, unshared by other mind streams, though with similar (corresponding) rupas often arising within different mind streams. I see (1) as the commonsense view, (2) as the view of DSG Abhidhammikas, and (3) as my phenomenalist view. ---------------------------------------- I believe you said this was the position of Ken and the denizens of DSG. ------------------------------------- Howard: I think that view (2) mentioned above may be the view of Ken, Jon, and other Abhidhammikas here. -------------------------------------- Thanks again. Robert A. ========================= With metta, Howard #93509 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 5:15 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Some interesting questions from an erudite monk... TGrand458@... Hi Rob M. In a message dated 12/14/2008 2:19:57 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, rob.moult@... writes: Hi All, I have been asked the following questions by an erudite monk: Considering cellular memory and the marvellous intelligence behind the intricate physiological processes that keep us alive even without our being conscious of them, is it not possible that some­ if not all­ of the five aggregates (khandhas) of a sentient being could have multiple, simultaneous, coexistence? If so, could this existence beyond the gross physical body actually be another manifestation of the five khandhas? In other words, regardless of what it is termed­... soul, Higher Self, super-consciousnesssoul, Higher Self, su­ could it still be subject to conditionality and therefore also exhibit the universal characteristics of anicca (impermanence)universal cha (unsatisfactoriness or suffering) and anatta? .............................................................................. . TG: After rereading the question, I have decided I don't really understand it, so the comments that follow may not be what this monk is looking for. But the comments apply to 'all conditions' so maybe they have some bearing. There is 'no-control' and 'no-controller' because what arises is propagated in pure dependence. The mind is no exception. The mind merely follows the course of the conditions that are being encountered. The mind may "think" it is "in charge," but it is really just continually responding to conditions. The body/mind complex has many interactive systems that are simultaneously functioning together to support the "whole" complex. But all of these 'systematic activities' and the "whole" system (body/mind complex) are mere conditional outgrowths of natural forces. The mind cannot overcome self-view by 'dealing' with THAT view. The mind needs to investigate 'conditions': the causes for why things appear and change as they do. Self view then falls away because the "carpet is pulled out from under it." (This comment is made because the questing question seems to be born from a type of self-view.) When conditions are seen, this 'mind/body complex' is seen as just another interactive system. Like a storm, a whirlpool, a sun, etc. True, its a 'different system' than those...but it is, what it is, in pure dependence on conditions. As the conditions are different from the other examples; so too, the system is different from the other examples. And the 'other example' are all different from "each other" due to the different conditions "they" are encountering. Good to see you Rob M. TG OUT #93510 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 5:30 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts TGrand458@... Hi Nina In a message dated 12/14/2008 7:09:08 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: > so too, these elements conceal each their own characteristic and > function classed as hardness, etc., by means of a pleasing skin > colour of women's and men's bodies, etc., and pleasing shapes of > limbs and pleasing gestures of fingers, toes and eyebrows, and they > deceive simple people concealing their own functions and > characteristics beginning with hardness and do not allow their > individual essences to be seen. Thus they are great primaries > (mahaa-bhuuta) in being equal to the great creatures (mahaa- > bhuuta), the female spirits, since they are deceivers. > > c: "such is this continuum".. ------------ N: TG , you had this verse: Connie works it out. You perceive a person but what is really there? We have the illusion, believing that persons really exist, but the four great Elements are like magicians, they show what is not real. TG, you trip over 'own characteristic'TG, you trip over 'own chara is not the same as heat, these elements are different. That's all there is. ........................................................ TG: There's much more to it than that. There is this whole notion of seeing these things as "individual realities" which is the exact wrong outlook to be inculcating IMO. If you were stating that "own characteristics" merely indicated differences in 'formational outcomes', then I'd have no problem with the outlook, but only a problem with the term "own." But I am quite aware there is more to it than your statement above. ........................................................ Ultimate realities and concepts: see the previous passage: elements and people with pleasing skin etc. Do not fall over ultimate: it just means: what is there in reality. Ultimate: in the highest sense, parama means highest, attha is meaning. ------- > > TG: Phenomena are phenomena in spite of whatever we call it. And it > does what > it does in spite of whatever we think about it. ------ N: Well said. Dhammas are dhammas, and they have functions, nobody can prevent them performing their functions. Function: this is no entity view. You speak about doing. We need language to express ourselves, but language is limited. ............................................................................ TG: Even though we are communicating in English, you will never let go of those "dhammas" because you see them as "individual entities" and the term "dhammas" neatly conceals that viewpoint. Nothing "has" functions. Phenomena 'function' in mere dependence on conditions. "Having anything" is exactly what all phenomena DO NOT HAVE. But we differ. And I do appreciate your communications even though it might sound like I don't. TG OUT #93511 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 10:47 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: PPn xii,2 nilovg Dear Connie, You have typed it already, I see. Or is there still something you need? I did not know you also have the ~Nanaamoli copy. It seems that you have typed the greater part of the Visuddhimagga? Nina. Op 14-dec-2008, om 17:17 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > It's not really a big deal, just some goof-ball numbering in my copy: > <<[The Five Kinds of Direct Knowledge] > 2. In order to show the benefits of developing concentration to > clansmen whose concentration has reached the fourth jhana #93512 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 11:07 am Subject: Lodewijk's Diary, 1. nilovg Dear friends. Lodewijk was reading to me from his diary November 1989, when we were living in Vienna. It was just the time of the end of the Berlin Wall and we heard it all on the radio. I was going to India and I had beforehand written some Dhamma reminders in Lodewijk's diary I will share with you. Lodewijk was going to a Schubert Concert: N: Lodewijk: 'This morning to the office, yelling, had to type out a speech...meetings, receptions...' N: Nina. #93513 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 6:33 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas TGrand458@... Hi Scott In a message dated 12/14/2008 10:20:50 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "Here's how I view 'conditional relations.'-TG: "Here's how I is. With the arising of this, that arises. This not being, that is not. With the ceasing of this, that ceases.' Anything I write or think about conditions, conditional relations, dependent arising, etc. must fall under these guidelines unless I'm screwing up what I wrote or thought." Scott: You are conflating methods of teaching, TG. The above is the method of teaching known as Dependent Origination ('conditional relations' is another method, as will be shown). .................................................... TG: I'm not confusing them. I well aware of the differences. I am clarifying how I view "conditional relations" not as a "method" or "theory" put forth in Abhidhamma, but as how it is happening in the real world! To my knowledge, Abhidhamma does not have a trade mark on the term. What is actually happening is actually happening. I am telling you that the principles of conditional relations set forth by the Suttas are how I view conditionality, and the correct representation of actual occurrences IMO. The Patthana's presentation is just an elaboration that apparently has several problems with redundancy, among others. ........................................................ TG: "'Conditions' are the same 'states' you experience. You prefer to substantialize then as 'realities with their own characteristics.t I prefer [to] insubstantialize them as 'dependencies with nothing of THEIR own.' The phenomena is the same. The outlook is different. I'm extremely confident my outlook is far stronger in leading toward detachment than an outlook that sees everything as 'having its own characteristics' ... and far more compliant with what the Buddha taught. That means Suttas. And far more in accord with what the phenomena are actually doing. Phenomena are phenomena in spite of whatever we call it. And it does what it does in spite of whatever we think about it." Scott: Now, TG, the above is mixed up, and shows your perplexity. You equate 'conditions' and 'states.' Then you throw in the notion of 'experience,'experience,' suggesting that states can be the object o Then you posit an intellectual exercise you label 'insubstantialisati'insubstantialisation,' suggesting that this is su same time, asserting that the 'phenonena are the same.' You use the term 'phenomena' as a synonym for 'state.' You are only talking about a way of thinking, TG, and suggesting that thinking in your way somehow leads to detachment. You go on to posit something known as 'dependencies.'dependencies.' What are these? Is this yet anot 'states?' ...................................................... TG: What a tangled mess the above is. I guess this is the result of scholarship. Hummm. Good thing I stayed away from it. It seems you have a very compartmentalized view of phenomena; each as its own separate thing. Even 'conditions' as being separate from 'states' ... as if there were "conditioning faculties" doing the "conditioning" of "separate states." Perhaps our presentational outlooks are just incompatible, and we are not actually as far apart as it would appear. Then again... ........................................................................... TG: "Your so called 'dhammas' are 'themselves' the forces! There is no other 'outside force' working upon them. I rather like your above description surprisingly. A clearer view would lead to realization that these 'states' are not 'their own things;' but rather, a mere amalgamation of interacting and altering forces. Oh yes, and dynamic! Without dynamics, no change. Again, the 'dynamics' are not outside of the conditions. The conditions are dynamic." Scott: No, the dhammas are not the forces, TG. This is because they are realities. The 'forces' relates to the way in which these realities effect each other. Dynamics occur between things. .......................................................... TG: Fascinating. Just as I has described above! You say -- dynamics "occur between" "things"? This is a "mind-boggling" statement from my point of view. This reveals a "complete entity view," no holes barred. I think your "entity view" is probably stronger than even Nina's and Sarah's...from what I can gather. We are NOT close with mere different presentations. We are light years apart. .................................................................... TG: "I deny that outlook as being correct. We are looking at the same coin. You see the coin for 'its rupa characteristic.same coin. You as a coreless outgrowth of conditions. One first discerns a quality for direct analysis. (This is the stage where you begin, substantialize, and stop apparently.) Then the conditional nature of that quality is investigated. In doing so, if done well, then THAT quality becomes seen as 'having nothing of itself.' It becomes seen as empty, hollow, void, insubstantial, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick. BECAUSE...IT is not 'itself,' it is an amalgamation of conditions. Its IS a mere condition...of conditions. Its IS a impermanence, and nonself. It should be seen as death, a murderer, poison, a disease, a boil, a dart, a raised sword. (Gosh, not an 'ultimate reality' in the bunch.)" Scott: Similes, TG. And all concepts - conventional speech, man. Not paramattha dhammas. ....................................................... TG: Let's now view what Ven. Sariputta said we needed to continually reflect of to become enlightened... “Friend Sariputta, what are the things that a virtuous bhikkhu should attend to?” Friend Kotthita, a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to the five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the volitional formations aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. A virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend the these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. When, friend, a virtuous bhikkhi carefully attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of stream-entry. “But, friend Sariputta, what are the things that a bhikkhu who is a stream-enterer should carefully attend to?” (The same formula is repeated all the way up through Arahantship...i.e., full enlightenment.) (Sariputta . . . Connected Discourse of the Buddha, vol. 1, pg. 970 – 971) TG: Besides impermanent, suffering, and nonself, Sariputta says we should see the Five Aggregates as -- "a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty" Let's see...what are these terms? ... similes, concepts. There's no advice to see the Five Aggregates as "realities" whatsoever!!! It is THIS vision that Sariputta says leads to Arahatship! Gee, and the so-called "Father of Abhidhamma" too. Must be a bitter pill to swallow. LOL You're got some explaining to do Scott... Good luck! ......................................................................... TG: "That's just a point of view your expressing. What arises -- arises. What we call them is irrelevant to those conditions..aris only importance in what we call them lies in how much it leads to attachment or detachment. Since I believe the view of 'ultimate realities with their own characteristics' leads not to detachment, and not in accordance with the Buddha's teaching, I'll have to reject it as a problem for escaping suffering." Scott: I'm beginning to see more and more how you really do think that detachment comes from thinking about things. This is deluded (in the psychiatric sense) since you can't change a thing by virtue of applying thought to it. 'You' can't escape suffering, TG. Not by sheer dint of 'thinking the right way.' Yes, there is a 'right way' to see things, but this is a function of pa~n~naa - not 'you' thinking. ..................................................... TG: See the above deluded method of Sariputta. LOL However, to disclaim your accusation, I claim "direct experience" combined with understanding of 'what that experience is' to be how detachment comes about. Insight is realized through both the mind and body. I'm ending here since what you posted afterward expressed zero understanding of where I'm coming from and I've dealt with enough of that for today. TG OUT #93514 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 6:41 am Subject: Similes and Concepts that lead to Arahantship! TGrand458@... Hi All TG: Here's what Ven. Sariputta said we needed to continually reflect on to become an Arahant... “Friend Sariputta, what are the things that a virtuous bhikkhu should attend to?” Friend Kotthita, a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to the five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the volitional formations aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. A virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend the these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. When, friend, a virtuous bhikkhi carefully attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of stream-entry. “But, friend Sariputta, what are the things that a bhikkhu who is a stream-enterer should carefully attend to?” (The same formula is repeated all the way up through Arahantship...i.e., full enlightenment.) (Sariputta . . . Connected Discourse of the Buddha, vol. 1, pg. 970 – 971) TG: Besides impermanent, suffering, and nonself, Sariputta says we should see the Five Aggregates as -- "a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty" Let's see...what are these terms? ... similes, concepts. There's no advice to see the Five Aggregates as "realities" whatsoever!!! It is THIS vision that Sariputta says leads to Arahatship! Gee, and the so-called "Father of Abhidhamma" too. I'm tearing up. TG OUT #93515 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 11:45 am Subject: Re: Subject: On concepts, final nail to the coffin. truth_aerator Dear Connie and all, can you please summarize on how this relates to the issue we have at hand, "are concepts permanent or impermanent." I KNOW, not believe, that concepts as anything are fully conditioned. The arise due to causes and cease due to causes. An awakened 'being' sees through them and all concepts cease in parinibbana. re: "'In a past conscious moment he did live, not he does live, not he will live. In a future conscious moment not he did live, not he does live, he will live. In the present conscious moment not he did live, he does live, not he will live." This is linguistic, analysis of tense. If by 'present' we mean actual, then of course the actual is actual and only present is. re: Jhana supramandane vs normal. There is a POV (I am not sure to believe it, there are few difficulties) that Jhana is only found in Buddha's dispensation. Thus it may be that it is impossible for a non- Buddhist to 'do' it and it is Comy invention that non-Buddhist can achieve Jhana. With best wishes, #93516 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 11:50 am Subject: Re: Similes and Concepts that lead to Arahantship! truth_aerator >--- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, TGrand458@... wrote: > > Let's see...what are these terms? ... similes, concepts. There's no >advice to see the Five Aggregates as "realities" whatsoever!!! > > >It is THIS vision that Sariputta says leads to Arahatship! Gee, >and the so-called "Father of Abhidhamma" too. I'm tearing up. > > > TG OUT > You are right TG. I agree 100%. "There are these five facts that one should reflect on often, whether one is a woman or a man, lay or ordained. Which five? "'I am subject to aging, have not gone beyond aging.' This is the first fact that one should reflect on often, whether one is a woman or a man, lay or ordained. "'I am subject to illness, have not gone beyond illness.' ... "'I am subject to death, have not gone beyond death.' ... "'I will grow different, separate from all that is dear and appealing to me.' ... "'I am the owner of my actions,1 heir to my actions, born of my actions, related through my actions, and have my actions as my arbitrator. Whatever I do, for good or for evil, to that will I fall heir.' ... "These are the five facts that one should reflect on often, whether one is a woman or a man, lay or ordained. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an05/an05.057.than.html Or how about Furthermore, the monk living in the wilderness reminds himself of this: I am now living alone in the wilderness. While I am living alone in the wilderness, I might meet up with youths on their way to committing a crime or on their way back. They might take my life. That would be how my death would come about. That would be an obstruction for me. So let me make an effort for the attaining of the as-yet-unattained, the reaching of the as-yet-unreached, the realization of the as-yet-unrealized. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an05/an05.077.than.html #93517 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 11:55 am Subject: Re: Suttas in which the Buddha held back the deep teaching? truth_aerator Hi Sarah, > > Hi Alex, > > --- On Fri, 12/12/08, Alex wrote: > >Jhana is definately helpful for any and all insight, and in mn43 (or > 44) is one of 5 conditions for Arhatship. > .... > S: I'd have to see the reference to consider what is meant. > ... "Assisted by five factors, right view has awareness-release as its fruit & reward, and discernment-release as its fruit & reward. There is the case where right view is assisted by virtue, assisted by learning, assisted by discussion, assisted by tranquility, assisted by insight. Assisted by these five factors, right view has awareness-release as its fruit & reward, and discernment-release as its fruit & reward." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.043.than.html #93518 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 1:10 pm Subject: Re: how to view the self kenhowardau Hi Robert, I am a bit behind in my reading, so I will reply to this post now and catch up with the rest of the thread later. ---------------- RA: > Thank you for your answer. I am not seeing it, but that is OK. You are speaking of an inherently pleasant sense experience while I am thinking that sense experience is going to be conditioned and therefore not inherently anything, but never mind. ------------------ One clarification: it is not the sense-door *experience* that has a pleasant/unpleasant (or desirable/undesirable) characteristic, it is the rupa *object* of that experience. Also, I wonder what you mean by "sense experience is going to be conditioned and therefore not inherently anything." Are you thinking that conditioned dhammas don't have any inherent characteristics at all? Not even the tilakkhana (the three basic characteristics of all conditioned dhammas)? If so, what could the Buddha have meant when he said dhammas *were* anicca, dukkha and anatta? How else could they have those characteristics if not inherently? Ken H #93519 From: "connie" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 3:17 pm Subject: On concepts, final nail to the coffin. nichiconn Dear Alex, re: "'In a past conscious moment he did live, not he does live, not he will live. In a future conscious moment not he did live, not he does live, he will live. In the present conscious moment not he did live, he does live, not he will live." This is linguistic, analysis of tense. If by 'present' we mean actual, then of course the actual is actual and only present is. c: interesting, the concept of time and what is meant by, say, 'arisen'... stay tuned for a study corner from Nyanaponika's 'Abhidhamma Studies'. Rather than summarizing my over-long quote, i will just repeat the last part of ch.8's footnote 12: << a concept is a dhamma without individual essence (asabhaava-dhamma). >> A: re: Jhana supramandane vs normal. There is a POV (I am not sure to believe it, there are few difficulties) that Jhana is only found in Buddha's dispensation. Thus it may be that it is impossible for a non-Buddhist to 'do' it and it is Comy invention that non-Buddhist can achieve Jhana. c: i've heard people make the distinction 'jhana' and 'buddhist jhana' but have never given it much thought; for one thing, 'buddhist' anything, in my strict opinion, can only really be said to be known by ariyans. the rest of us are still 'blind from birth' and taking our own thinking too seriously. well, enough of my opinions! peace, connie #93520 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 10:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] On concepts, final nail to the coffin. upasaka_howard Hi, Connie - In a message dated 12/14/2008 6:17:41 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, nichicon@... writes: Rather than summarizing my over-long quote, i will just repeat the last part of ch.8's footnote 12: << a concept is a dhamma without individual essence (asabhaava-dhamma). >> ============================= If that is so, then I view all dhammas as concepts! ;-) With metta, Howard #93521 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 11:56 am Subject: Re: [dsg] On concepts, final nail to the coffin. TGrand458@... Hi Howard and Connie In a message dated 12/14/2008 4:28:31 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: a concept is a dhamma without individual essence (asabhaava-dhamma)(asabh>> ============================= If that is so, then I view all dhammas as concepts! ;-) With metta, Howard ......................................... TG: Actually, Connie unwittingly makes a correct statement here. Of course the point of this statement is to try to support a view that is incorrect. But we can pretend it isn't. ;-) TG OUT #93522 From: "connie" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 4:58 pm Subject: Re: PPn xii,2 nichiconn Dear Nina, N: You have typed it already, I see. Or is there still something you need? c: I didn't want you to be afraid of how much more homework I was asking you to do! It's the numbering I'm unhappy about - my copy reads: << They are (1) the kinds of Supernormal Power, Having been one, he becomes many ...' (D.i,77), the knowledge of the Divine Ear Element, (2) the knowledge of Penetration of Minds, (4) the knowledge of Recollection of Past Life, and (5) the knowledge of the Passing Away and Reappearance of Beings. >> Instead, I think it should be: < They are the kinds of Supernormal Power (1) Having been one, he becomes many, (2) the knowledge of the Divine Ear Element, (3) the knowledge of Penetration of Minds > By rights, I should just leave it as it is; anyway (smiling)- it only bothers me when I think about it - ditto, the 'nearby rode' in the verse section of iv,18. N: I did not know you also have the ~Nanaamoli copy. It seems that you have typed the greater part of the Visuddhimagga? c: Actually, I've had 'Purification' longer than 'Purity' but usually have quoted more from 'Purity' because I figure fewer people have PMTin's translation. In the beginning, I only planned to copy a couple of the chapters from Understanding from PPn, but yes, now I've got typed copies of the main body of both... and still find more typos every time I go back through; better yet, I get a little bit more out of it. If anyone wanted to start a study corner on any particular chapter, I'd be happy to send them that, but I don't know how far "fair use" really goes. My PPn doesn't have any copyright notice in it, but I've been advised that that doesn't mean it isn't copyrighted anyway. peace, connie #93523 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 5:22 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self egberdina Hi Howard and Robert, 2008/12/15 : > Hi, Robert - > > Howard: > Your point is well taken. For example, if two people are experiencing > "the same" room temperature, and if pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality > of affective feel is inherent in the temperature, then the two people would > have to feel that temperature in the same way. But, of course, that is NOT > how people react. So, the solution must be either that 1) rupas are objective, > "external" phenomena, independent of being experienced, but affective feel is > extrinsic to the rupa and imposed by the observing consciousness, or 2) > rupas are objective, "external" phenomena, but with differently felt rupas being > distinct rupas associated with different mind streams, or 3) rupas are merely > physical elements of experience within mind streams, unshared by other mind > streams, though with similar (corresponding) rupas often arising within > different mind streams. > I see (1) as the commonsense view, (2) as the view of DSG Abhidhammikas, > and (3) as my phenomenalist view. > ---------------------------------------- I tend to think that (1) is also the sutta view. Take this from MN28: "Now if internally the eye is intact but externally forms do not come into range, nor is there a corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, and there is a corresponding engagement, then there is the appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness." in combination with this, from MN136: To begin with it was the three kinds of feeling that were asked about by the wanderer Potaliputta. If, when this misguided man Samiddhi was asked, he had answered the wanderer Potaliputta thus:'After doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pleasure, he feels pleasure; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pain, he feels pain; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as neither-pain-nor-pleasure, he feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure' by answering him thus, Ananda, the misguided man Samiddhi would have given the wanderer Potaliputta the right answer. Cheers Herman #93524 From: "Scott" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 6:30 pm Subject: Re: On Concepts, The All, Nibbaana scottduncan2 Dear Herman, All, (I) From Sammohavinodanii (pp.61-64): 251. "('Herein, which is the unformed element? It is the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion')...the unformed element is nibbaana, whose nature (sabhaava) is unformed. But because greed and so on are destroyed on coming to this (eta.m aagamma), it is therefore called 'the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion'. This is the agreed commentary of the Teachers. 252. "But a contraversialist (vita.n.davaadin) said: 'There is no independent nibbaana; nibbaana is just the destruction of the defilements.' He said: 'Quote a sutta.' The Jambukhaadaka-sutta was quoted thus: "'Nibbaana' is said, friend Saariputta; what, friend, is nibbaana? That which is the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion - that is called nibbaana' (S iv 251). [Then] he said: 'By this sutta it should be understood that there is no independent nibbaana; nibbaana is just the destruction of the defilements.' He should be asked: 'But how? Is the meaning according to this sutta [literally] so? Surely he will say: 'Yes, there is no meaning apart from the sutta.' 253. "Then he should be told: 'Now this sutta has been quoted by you; quote the next one to that.' The next sutta to that [says:] "'Arahatship' is said, friend Saariputta, what, friend, is Arahatship? That which is the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion - that is called Arahatship (S iv 251). This is the sutta quoted next to that. But on this being quoted, they said to him: 'Nibbaana is a mental datum included in the mental data base; Arahatship is the four [immaterial] aggregates. The General of the Norm [i.e. Saariputta] who had realised nibbaana and on being asked about Arahatship, said it was just the destruction of the defilements. But how? What, then, are nibbaana and Arahatship, one or multiple? Whether they are one or multiple, what according to you who make excessively fine distinctions is the meaning here? You do not know what is one and what is multiple. Surely when that is known, it is good?' Being thus questioned again and again, being unable to deceive, he said: 'It is because of its being arisen in one who has destroyed greed, etc. that Arahatship is called the destruction of greed, hate, and delusion.' 254. "Then they said to him: 'A great work has been done by you! And even one getting you to say that by giving a reward, would have got you to say just that. And just as this [sutta] has been explained to you, so to [you should] discern that. For it is on coming to nibbaana that greed, etc. are destroyed, and so nibbaana is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion. And these are just three terms for nibbaana.'" Scott: Continued... Sincerely, Scott. #93525 From: "Scott" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 6:30 pm Subject: Re: On Concepts, The All, Nibbaana scottduncan2 Dear Herman, All, (II) (Sammohavinodanii excerpt cont'd.) 255. "If even when this is said and he is convinced (sa~n~nati.m gacchatti), it is well. If not, he should be made to work with a plurality of nibbaanas. How? This should be firstly asked: 'Is the destruction of greed the destruction of greed only, or is it that of hate and delusion? Is the destruction of hate the destruction of hate only, or is it that of greed and delusion? Is the destruction of delusion the destruction of delusion only, or is it that of greed and hate?. Surely he will say: 'The destruction of greed is the destruction of greed; the destruction of hate is the destruction of hate; the destruction of delusion is the destruction of delusion.' Thereupon he should be told: 'According to your assertion, destruction of greed is one nibbaana, destruction of hate is another nibbaana, and destruction of delusion is another nibbaana. In the destruction of the three roots of the unprofitable, three nibbaanas come to be; in the destruction of the four clingings four [nibbaanas]; in the destruction of the five hindrances, five; in the destruction of the six groups of craving, six; in the destruction of the seven inherent tendencies, seven; in the destruction of the eight wrongnesses, eight; in the destruction of the nine things rooted in craving, nine; in the destruction of the ten fetters, ten; in the destruction of the 1500 defilements, there being a special nibbaana for each, many nibbaanas come to be. But there is no limit to these nibbaanas. But instead of taking it thus, [saying rather:] 'It is on coming to nibbaana that greed etc. are destroyed,' it is the same one nibbaana that is called destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion. Take these three as just three terms for nibbaana.' 256. "If when this is said he does not discern it, he should be made to work with grossness. How? 'Blind fools and also bears, leopards, deer, monkeys, etc., being invaded by defilements, fornicate (vatthu.m pa.tisavanti). Then, when their fornicating is over, the defilement subsides. According you your assertion, bears, leopards, deer, monkeys, etc. have [then] reached nibbaana. Gross indeed is you nibbaana, anc coarse; the only thing is, you cannot adorn your ear with it. But instead of taking it thus, [saying rather:] 'It is on coming to nibbaana that greed, etc. are destroyed,' it is the same one nibbaana that is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion. Take these three as just three terms for nibbaana.' 257. "But if even when this is said he does not discern it, he should be made to work with change of lineage (gotrabhuu). How? He should first be questioned thus: 'Do you assert that change of lineage exists?' 'Yes I do.' 'At that moment of change of lineage, have the defilements been destroyed, are they being destroyed, or will they be destroyed.' 'The have not been destroyed, the are not being destroyed, but rather they will be destroyed.' 'But what does change of lineage make its object?' 'Nibbaana.' 'In your moment of change of lineage defilements have not been destroyed, but rather they will be destroyed; while the defilements are still undestroyed you make known nibbaana which is the destruction of the defilements; while the inherent tendencies are still unabandoned, you make known nibbaana which is the abandoning of the inherent tendencies. This does not agree. But instead of taking it thus [saying rather:] 'It is on coming to nibbaana that greed, etc. are destroyed,' it is the same one nibbaana that is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion. Take these three as just three terms for nibbaana.' 258. "But if even this is said and he does not discern it, he should be made to work with the path. How? He should first be questioned thus: 'Do you assert the path?' 'Yes, I do.' 'At the moment of the path, have the defilements been destroyed, are they being destroyed, or will they be destroyed?' 'Knowing he will say: 'It is not right to say that they have been destroyed or that they will be destroyed, it is right to say that they are being destroyed.' 'If this is so of the path, which is the nibbaana that is the destruction of the defilements?' 'Which are the defilements that are destroyed by the path? Which defilements does the path cause to be destroyed by making which nibbaana as destruction of the defilements its object? Therefore do not take it thus. [Saying rather:] 'It is on coming to nibbaana that greed etc. are destroyed,' it is the same one nibbaana that is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, and the destruction of delusion. These three are just three terms for nibbaana.'" Sincerely, Scott. #93526 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 7:06 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: PPn xii,2 lbidd2 Hi Connie, This is how my book reads: "...They are (1) the kinds of supernormal power, Having been one, he becomes many ...' (D.i,77), (2) the knowledge of the divine ear element, (3) the knowledge of penetration of minds, (4) the knowledge of recollection of past life, and (5) the knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of beings." It took me a while to figure out "PPn" :-)) Larry #93527 From: "Scott" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 7:20 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: SN 22 122 (10) Siila sutta.m "Friend Saariputta, what are the things that a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to"? [...siilavataa aavuso saariputta, bhikkhunaa katame dhammaa yoniso manasikaatabbaa] "Friend Ko.t.thita, a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to the five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumour, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. [Siilavataavuso ko.t.thata, bhikkhunaa sa~nacupaadaanakkhandhaa aniccato dukkhato rogato ga.n.dato sallato aghato aabaadhato parato palokato su~n~nato anattato yoniso manasikaatabbaa]. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the volitional formations aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. A virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent...as nonself..." Scott: The sutta is about yoniso manasikaara, TG. What is yoniso manasikaara? Can you define it? Sincerely, Scott. #93528 From: "connie" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 7:30 pm Subject: On concepts, final nail to the coffin. nichiconn Hi, Howard, a concept is a dhamma without individual essence (asabhaava-dhamma)(asabh>> ============================= H: If that is so, then I view all dhammas as concepts! ;-) c: Exactly the position of all of us, isn't it - caught up in the net while floundering in the sea of concepts. peace, connie #93529 From: "connie" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 7:34 pm Subject: Re: PPn xii,2 nichiconn Many thanks for the correction, Larry. L: It took me a while to figure out "PPn" :-)) c: Sorry about my laziness. I tend to call the other one PoP. peace, connie #93530 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 2:36 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 12/14/2008 8:23:19 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard and Robert, 2008/12/15 : > Hi, Robert - > > Howard: > Your point is well taken. For example, if two people are experiencing > "the same" room temperature, and if pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality > of affective feel is inherent in the temperature, then the two people would > have to feel that temperature in the same way. But, of course, that is NOT > how people react. So, the solution must be either that 1) rupas are objective, > "external" phenomena, independent of being experienced, but affective feel is > extrinsic to the rupa and imposed by the observing consciousness, or 2) > rupas are objective, "external" phenomena, but with differently felt rupas being > distinct rupas associated with different mind streams, or 3) rupas are merely > physical elements of experience within mind streams, unshared by other mind > streams, though with similar (corresponding) rupas often arising within > different mind streams. > I see (1) as the commonsense view, (2) as the view of DSG Abhidhammikas, > and (3) as my phenomenalist view. > ---------------------------------------- I tend to think that (1) is also the sutta view. Take this from MN28: "Now if internally the eye is intact but externally forms do not come into range, nor is there a corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, and there is a corresponding engagement, then there is the appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness." ------------------------------------------------ Howard: The interpretation of the preceding depends on the understanding of 'externally'. One possible understanding of 'external' that does not necessarily presume an "external world" in the usual sense is simply "pertaining to what is experienced," whereas 'internal' pertains to consciousness or medium of consciousness. Thus, one may say that no sight comes into range at a time that a sound is experienced. The "coming into range" can be viewed as arising as object of consciousness. So, the "external" usage is not necessarily incompatible with a phenomenalist perspective. ----------------------------------------------- in combination with this, from MN136: To begin with it was the three kinds of feeling that were asked about by the wanderer Potaliputta. If, when this misguided man Samiddhi was asked, he had answered the wanderer Potaliputta thus:'After doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pleasure, he feels pleasure; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as pain, he feels pain; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as neither-pain-nor-pleasure, he feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure' — by answering him thus, Ananda, the misguided man Samiddhi would have given the wanderer Potaliputta the right answer. ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: But the foregoing is neutral with regard to whether the kamma determines the affective nature of the particular dhamma to arise or determines the operation of vedana on the dhamma. So, I don't consider that quoted material as definitive as regards the inherent versus extrinsic issue as regards affective feel of dhammas. ---------------------------------------------------- Cheers Herman =========================== With metta, Howard #93531 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 7:42 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Some interesting questions from an erudite monk... lbidd2 Hi Rob, Good to see you. Here is my stab at this question: "Considering cellular memory and the marvellous intelligence behind the intricate physiological processes that keep us alive even without our being conscious of them, is it not possible that some if not all of the five aggregates (khandhas) of a sentient being could have multiple, simultaneous, coexistence? If so, could this existence beyond the gross physical body actually be another manifestation of the five khandhas? In other words, regardless of what it is termed... soul, Higher Self, super-consciousness, atman, spirit, etc. could it still be subject to conditionality and therefore also exhibit the universal characteristics of anicca (impermanence), dukkha (unsatisfactoriness or suffering) and anatta?" Larry: Yes and no. I think he is asking does one particular cetasika, for example, manifest in different sizes simultaneously, and if so, is each size of this one multifaceted cetasika a complex of all 5 khandhas and therefore a manifestation of the 3 general characteristics. Sort of a fractal view. Yes, whatever arises is characterized as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not self. No, a feeling is not also a compound of rupa, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness. Feeling is just a feeling. Feeling arises with all 5 khandhas at the same time in the sensuous plane, but only one dhamma at a time is experienced. Larry #93532 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 2:56 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas TGrand458@... Hi Scott In a message dated 12/14/2008 8:21:13 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear TG, Regarding: SN 22 122 (10) Siila sutta.m "Friend Saariputta, what are the things that a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to"? [...siilavataa aavuso saariputta, bhikkhunaa katame dhammaa yoniso manasikaatabbaa] "Friend Ko.t.thita, a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to the five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumour, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. [Siilavataavuso ko.t.thata, bhikkhunaa sa~nacupaadaanakkhako.t.thata, bhikkhunaa sa~n rogato ga.n.dato sallato aghato aabaadhato parato palokato su~n~nato anattato yoniso manasikaatabbaa]anattato yoniso manasikaatabbaa] Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 8:19 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: SN 22 122 (10) Siila sutta.m "Friend Saariputta, what are the things that a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to"? [...siilavataa aavuso saariputta, bhikkhunaa katame dhammaa yoniso manasikaatabbaa]..." TG: "No more silly games. This Sutta is about attaining arahantship. I'll accept this response of yours as a concession that you have no response that explains the similes and concepts incorporated as leading to arahantship." Scott: As you can see in the Pa.li above, the sutta refers to the things which must be 'carefully attended to.' This is, as you can see, 'yoniso manasikaara.' Before getting to the similes, TG, I think that we ought to have some sort of common ground as to what 'carefully attend to' is, don't you? I do, since it is this 'careful attention' that is recommended. Can you please tell me what you think 'careful attention' (yoniso manasikaara) is? I fail to see why this is such an unreasonable question in a slow and precise sort of discussion. Are you in a hurry or something? Sincerely, Scott. #93534 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 8:58 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of past cittas egberdina Hi Alberto, 2008/12/14 sprlrt : > Hi Howard (and Herman) > > I think that we tend to have a "brain-centered" approach to > nama-dhammas, with grey matter, synapsis, a nervous system and neurons > physically "traveling" inside it, and memories "stored" somewhere in > this piece of hardware, while nama-dhammas actually don't require any > hardware (i.e. rupa) to "run". This is the case in arupa bhumi, the > immaterial planes with no rupa khandha. With sanna, vedana, sankhara > and vinnana khandhas functioning without any rupa whatsoever. What is the case for a jhana practitioner in the formless jhanas? Is their body not there? Has one being become two? Cheers Me, myself, I #93535 From: "Robert" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 9:04 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: how to view the self avalo1968 Hello Scott, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Scott" wrote: > > Dear Robert A: > > R: "...I believe you said this was the position of Ken and the > denizens of DSG." > > Scott: (From the Oxford dictionary): > > denizen > > /denniz’n/ > > • noun 1 formal or humorous an inhabitant or occupant. 2 Brit. > historical a foreigner allowed certain rights in their adopted country. > > " ORIGIN from Old French deinz ‘within’. > > Scott: You're 'here' too, are you also a 'denizen? Or just 'a > foreigner allowed certain rights? ;-) > > Sincerely, > > Denizen Scott. > I am just the annoying tourist. Robert A. #93536 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 4:05 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas TGrand458@... Hi Scott About 8 months ago I went all through yoniso manasikaara in multiple posts. Don't wish to do so here and it is not relevant to the Sutta or issue in question. Its a regular pattern of yours to not answer my questions or deal with the issues I present, but instead to return a counter question or counter issue. I feel the Sutta presents a complete expression of its intentions. The concepts and similes that Ven Sariputta lists, and recommends seeing the Five Aggregates as such, as the way to attain arahantship, is the issue. These concepts and similes, when wisely reflected on, lead to detachment. That is the bottom line. TG OUT #93537 From: "Robert" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 9:13 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: how to view the self avalo1968 Hello Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Robert A > If it is the same dhamma > experienced by A and B, must A and B both experience this dhamma as pleasant > or > unpleasant independent of any contribution to this experience from the mind > of A and B? > --------------------------------------- > Howard: > Your point is well taken. For example, if two people are experiencing > "the same" room temperature, and if pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality > of affective feel is inherent in the temperature, then the two people would > have to feel that temperature in the same way. But, of course, that is NOT > how people react. So, the solution must be either that 1) rupas are objective, > "external" phenomena, independent of being experienced, but affective feel is > extrinsic to the rupa and imposed by the observing consciousness, or 2) > rupas are objective, "external" phenomena, but with differently felt rupas being > distinct rupas associated with different mind streams, or 3) rupas are merely > physical elements of experience within mind streams, unshared by other mind > streams, though with similar (corresponding) rupas often arising within > different mind streams. > I see (1) as the commonsense view, (2) as the view of DSG Abhidhammikas, > and (3) as my phenomenalist view. > ---------------------------------------- > I would say again that the experience of the dhamma is both from the dhamma and from the mind and conditioned by both. Thanks, Robert A. #93538 From: "Robert" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 9:16 pm Subject: Re: how to view the self avalo1968 Hello Ken, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > One clarification: it is not the sense-door *experience* that has a > pleasant/unpleasant (or desirable/undesirable) characteristic, it is > the rupa *object* of that experience. > > Also, I wonder what you mean by "sense experience is going to be > conditioned and therefore not inherently anything." Are you thinking > that conditioned dhammas don't have any inherent characteristics at > all? Not even the tilakkhana (the three basic characteristics of all > conditioned dhammas)? If so, what could the Buddha have meant when he > said dhammas *were* anicca, dukkha and anatta? How else could they > have those characteristics if not inherently? > > Ken H > Certainly the characteristics you cited are inherent to all conditioned dhammas, but to say that some characteristics are inherent is not to say that all characteristics are inherent. Thanks, Robert A. #93539 From: "reverendaggacitto" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 10:08 pm Subject: A Sutta Question reverendagga... Hi Everybody and thanks for your help! i have another sutta question and would be very grateful if someone could assist me. Where exactly in the Pali Canon does Venerable Gotama instruct his deciples NOT to make any statues or renderings of him after his final nibbana? They then want to know how they are to pay tribute to his teaching and i believe he suggests the stupta(pagoda). Thanks ! bhikkhu/reverend aggacitto #93540 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 11:28 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: PPn xii,2 nilovg Dear Connie, Op 15-dec-2008, om 1:58 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > If anyone wanted to start a study corner on any particular chapter, > I'd be happy to send them that, but I don't know how far "fair use" > really goes. My PPn doesn't have any copyright notice in it, but > I've been advised that that doesn't mean it isn't copyrighted anyway. ------ N: I am inclined to think that it is OK when it is just for studying purposes on line. Nina. #93541 From: "sprlrt" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 12:48 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of past cittas sprlrt Hi Herman, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Alberto, > > 2008/12/14 sprlrt : > > Hi Howard (and Herman) > > > > I think that we tend to have a "brain-centered" approach to > > nama-dhammas, with grey matter, synapsis, a nervous system and neurons > > physically "traveling" inside it, and memories "stored" somewhere in > > this piece of hardware, while nama-dhammas actually don't require any > > hardware (i.e. rupa) to "run". This is the case in arupa bhumi, the > > immaterial planes with no rupa khandha. With sanna, vedana, sankhara > > and vinnana khandhas functioning without any rupa whatsoever. > > What is the case for a jhana practitioner in the formless jhanas? Is > their body not there? Has one being become two? > > Cheers > > Me, myself, I > According to tipitaka samsara evolves in three different and separate bhumi/planes of existance: kama/sensous (with all 28 rupa in it), rupa/fine material (without the 3 pasada rupa/senses of nose, tongue and body), and arupa/immaterial (with no rupa, nama only), we are in the first and lowest of the three. In these three planes, according to tipitaka there can be only 89 (or 121) cittas (+ its cetasikas=nama) at most, which can be classified or grouped according the plane they operate. So we have the group of 54 kamavacara cittas (tipically) operating in the kama bhumi/plane, the group of 15 rupa/fine material (jhana) cittas pertaining to this plane, and there is the group of 12 arupa/immaterial (jhana) cittas of that plane. The planes of existence are three, but the planes of citta are four, wich includes the 8 (or 40) lokuttara/supramundane cittas that nibbana nibbana as their object. Each of the 89 cittas (+ its cetaiskas) arises because there are all the conditions for its arising. There are conditions for arising of akusala citta, (other) conditions for the arising of kusala cittas, and still other for the arising of jhana citta of the fine-material sphere, still other for the arising of the citta of the immaterial sphere, and still other for the arising of the cittas of the lokuttara. If the condtions for the arising of a citta of a different, superior, level of existence, in samsara, are there, then that jhana citta will arise, even in our kama plane. But the development of the conditions for the arising of lokuttara/supramundane cittas (the enlightment factors) require the presence of rupa as well, because rupa dhammas needs to be distinguished and separated from nama dhammas, as anatta and through the mind door, this is the first stage of vipassana nana, namarupa pariccheda, before panna can progress any further. Which explains why the Buddha was born as a human being, instead than as a brahma god. So develop your jhanas responsibly, you might end up stuck in an immaterial existence, which is still samsara, for aeons :-) Alberto #93542 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 10:39 pm Subject: What is the Atom of Experience: Discrete States: A-Z+@ bhikkhu0 Friends: The Quantum of Empirical Existence: Discrete States (Dhammã)! Any being bound for awakening, fixed in destiny, knows & understands: Mere discrete states alone exist, devoid of any self and of any substance! These states arise and terminate in accordance with their inherent nature and the conditions that caused them to emerge.. They do not come from anywhere, they do not go anywhere, they are not established anywhere! There is no agency in anything, in any phenomena whatsoever! The fundamental Axioms on Discrete Dhammā-States, whether mental or material: A: Dhammā-States bear their particular characteristic essence. B: These states are effects born and conditioned by their specific causes. C: They are not fully separable entities, but fully distinguishable qualities. D: They come into being not having been, & vanish without trace going nowhere. E: Dhammā-States are totally still and does not change or vary during time. F: Apparent change of a quality are rather a series of altered momentary states. G: Mental and Material states do neither move from nor to different locations. H: Illusory 'movement' are states, that arises & ceases in adjacent locations. I: When state A is present, then state B can come into being. J: When state A is absent, then state B cannot come into being. K: When state A arises, then state B necessarily also emerges. L: When state A ceases, then state B necessarily also vanish. M: Causally conditioned states have thus no power or autonomy over themselves. N: Their are no distinct agency or instrumentality apart from the state itself. O: Thinking itself thinks. Knowing itself knows. Consciousness itself is aware. P: There is no function, agent, doer or actor separate from the state itself. Q: Dhammā-States cannot emerge from or be caused by a state of opposite nature. R: Dhammā-States cannot ever transfer any essential nature to another state. S: Not state is solitary. States always emerge as a multiple group of states. T: All states are positionally inseparable like salt & sugar mixed in the same solution. U: All states can be distinguished by their different quality, just like unlike flavors. V: One cannot ever indentify an absolute origin or first cause of a chain of Dhammā-States. W: All states are caused. No state arises randomly by chance, spontaneously, or fortuitously. X: No state arises from a single cause. All states arise from a multiplicity of causes. Y: No state has a single effect. All states cause and condition a plurality of effects. Z: A network matrix of multiple mutually dependent states produce a new network of states. @: States have no substance & can only be discerned by applying both analysis & synthesis. A chain of discrete non-identical events. <....> Objective States is an always changing network matrix of qualities perceived by mind. Further resources on the 'Atom' of Experienced Existence: The Theory of Discrete States (Dhammā) for the Beginner: The Dhamma Theory: The Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma Y. Karunadasa. Wheel 412/413 Buddhist Publication Society http://www.bps.lk/ http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=403412 For the Moderate: Introduction to: A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma. B. Bodhi http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/bps/misc/abhiman.html For the Advanced: An introduction to Therāvada Abhidhamma. G.D. Sumanapala, Singapore 1998. The Theory of Discrete States (Dhammā) for the Expert: Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma by R. Gethin & R.P. Wijeratne http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=134121 In Time: Multiple causes turns into multi effects. Discrete Dhammā-States: A-Z+@ Have a nice day! Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) ... #93543 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 1:48 am Subject: Lodewijk's Diary, 2. nilovg Dear friends, L: I did not hear from Nina, how annoying. A very heavy day... N: You live in this world. Dont think of the big, solid world with all the people in it. There is only one moment of seeing, of hearing, of thinking. It goes away immediately. Everyone lives in his own world, the world of thinking. One makes up long stories about what one saw or heard.... ------- Nina. #93544 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 2:33 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Revisit Vis. , was On concepts, final nail to the coffin. nilovg Hi Howard, Op 15-dec-2008, om 0:28 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Rather than summarizing my over-long quote, i will just repeat the > last part > of ch.8's footnote 12: << a concept is a dhamma without individual > essence > (asabhaava-dhamma). >> > ============================= > If that is so, then I view all dhammas as concepts! ;-) ------- N: Howard, I understand, you rightly say: dhammas have no core, no essence. It is actually the translation of asabhava as 'without individual essence' that people are falling over. I try to avoid this translation. Without a distinct characteristic is what I would prefer. This gives me an excuse to revisit Visuddhimagga Ch XIV, 224 etc.: < Text Vis.: In detail [that is, individually] matter should be regarded as a lump of froth because it will not stand squeezing, feeling as a bubble on water because it can only be enjoyed for an instant, perception as a mirage because it causes illusion, formations as a plantain trunk because it has no core, and consciousness as a conjuring trick because it deceives (S.iii,140-42). ------- N: The Tiika elaborates on these similes, and the text is partly similar to the Dispeller of Delusion (p. 36-38). Ruupa is just like a lump of froth without any substance and it cannot be grasped, since it breaks up immediately. Ruupa is like wood surrounding the pith of a tree, without core or substance, it is weak, and it should not be taken as I or mine. Ruupa continually breaks up from the first stage of a foetus on, until it finally breaks up at death. The Dispeller adds: Feeling is like a bubble of water. Just as a bubble of water is unsubstantial, is ungraspable, and does not last long, so is feeling. Just as a bubble arises due to four causes: the water surface, the drop of water, wetness of the water and the air which holds it up by drawing it together as an envelope, just so feeling also arises due to four causes: the physical base, the object, the flame of defilements and the impact of contact (phassa). The Tiika states that here feeling is meant that is connected with the cycle (va.t.ta), while the rootcause are the defilements that are not eradicated and the object is food for it. Feeling can only be enjoyed for a short while. Saaa is like a mirage, since it is unsubstantial and cannot be grasped. One cannot grasp it, drink it, wash in it, bathe in it or fill a pot with it. A mirage quivers and deceives many people. The Dispeller of Delusion adds that it makes people say that they saw a full lake or a full river. Saaa deceives the world by being a cause of wrong view, of seeing things as beautiful, happiness, permanent and self. The khandha of formations is like a plantain stem since it is unsubstantial and cannot be grasped. Just as a plantain stem is a combination of many sheets and is without core, evenso the khandha of formations which is a combination of many dhammas, the cetasikas, it is without core, and cannot be grasped. It cannot be taken as permanent, etc. By combining the characteristic of contact and other characteristics of volition and so on, it is called the khandha of formations. N: The Dispeller adds: And just as a plantain stem has many characteristics, for one has the appearance of an outer sheath of leaf, but there is another within and another within that, so indeed the formations aggregate... The plantain tree has no pith, no core. Evenso the khandha of formations that is a combination of many cetasikas, has no core. The khandha of consciousness, viaa.na, is like an illusion (maya). It is without substance or core, and it cannot be grasped. Just as an illusion is changeable and appears swiftly, so is citta. The Dispeller adds that citta is more changeable and appears more briefly. Just as an illusion deceives many people and causes them to see as a jewel what is not a jewel, evenso citta that is without a core and swift to change deceives people and makes them think that there is one lasting citta at the time of coming, going, standing and sitting. However, there is another citta during each of these postures. Thus citta is like an illusion. > -------- Nina. #93545 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 10:59 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of past cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Alberto) - In a message dated 12/14/2008 11:59:10 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Alberto, 2008/12/14 sprlrt : > Hi Howard (and Herman) > > I think that we tend to have a "brain-centered" approach to > nama-dhammas, with grey matter, synapsis, a nervous system and neurons > physically "traveling" inside it, and memories "stored" somewhere in > this piece of hardware, while nama-dhammas actually don't require any > hardware (i.e. rupa) to "run". This is the case in arupa bhumi, the > immaterial planes with no rupa khandha. With sanna, vedana, sankhara > and vinnana khandhas functioning without any rupa whatsoever. What is the case for a jhana practitioner in the formless jhanas? Is their body not there? Has one being become two? Cheers Me, myself, I ============================= Here's the story: The formless jhanas and the formless realms are not identical. The formless jhanas are realms into which there may be birth, like the hell realms, this realm, various heaven realms etc. There is said to be a correspondence between the formless jhanas and the formless realms, but not identity. With metta, Howard #93546 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 11:14 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self upasaka_howard Hi, Robert - In a message dated 12/15/2008 12:13:31 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, avalo1968@... writes: Hello Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Robert A > If it is the same dhamma > experienced by A and B, must A and B both experience this dhamma as pleasant > or > unpleasant independent of any contribution to this experience from the mind > of A and B? > --------------------------------------- > Howard: > Your point is well taken. For example, if two people are experiencing > "the same" room temperature, and if pleasantness, unpleasantness, or neutrality > of affective feel is inherent in the temperature, then the two people would > have to feel that temperature in the same way. But, of course, that is NOT > how people react. So, the solution must be either that 1) rupas are objective, > "external" phenomena, independent of being experienced, but affective feel is > extrinsic to the rupa and imposed by the observing consciousness, or 2) > rupas are objective, "external" phenomena, but with differently felt rupas being > distinct rupas associated with different mind streams, or 3) rupas are merely > physical elements of experience within mind streams, unshared by other mind > streams, though with similar (corresponding) rupas often arising within > different mind streams. > I see (1) as the commonsense view, (2) as the view of DSG Abhidhammikas, > and (3) as my phenomenalist view. > ---------------------------------------- > I would say again that the experience of the dhamma is both from the dhamma and from the mind and conditioned by both. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, a reasonable view. It is a modification of (1) that maintains conditioning of affective feel by "the mind that is feeling," but adds on a contribution from the dhamma itself. It changes (1), I believe, to read as follows: 4) Rupas are objective, "external" phenomena, independent of being experienced, but their affective feel is partly extrinsic to the rupa - imposed by the observing consciousness, and partly intrinsic, conditioned by the rupa itself. That is probably closer to what is the usual way of viewing the matter. If I were not a phenomenalist, that is the formulation I would be most inclined to. ------------------------------------------------ Thanks, Robert A. ========================== With metta, Howard #93547 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Dec 14, 2008 11:23 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Revisit Vis. , was On concepts, final nail to the coffin. upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 12/15/2008 5:33:36 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi Howard, Op 15-dec-2008, om 0:28 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Rather than summarizing my over-long quote, i will just repeat the > last part > of ch.8's footnote 12: << a concept is a dhamma without individual > essence > (asabhaava-dhamma). >> > ============================= > If that is so, then I view all dhammas as concepts! ;-) ------- N: Howard, I understand, you rightly say: dhammas have no core, no essence. It is actually the translation of asabhava as 'without individual essence' that people are falling over. I try to avoid this translation. Without a distinct characteristic is what I would prefer. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: You understood me well, Nina. And I agree that your translation makes more sense. ---------------------------------------------- This gives me an excuse to revisit Visuddhimagga Ch XIV, 224 etc.: --------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm glad that this "excuse" has come about! ;-) Then following quotes you present are worthwhile and are appreciated by me. :) ------------------------------------------ < Text Vis.: In detail [that is, individually] matter should be regarded as a lump of froth because it will not stand squeezing, feeling as a bubble on water because it can only be enjoyed for an instant, perception as a mirage because it causes illusion, formations as a plantain trunk because it has no core, and consciousness as a conjuring trick because it deceives (S.iii,140-42). ------- N: The Tiika elaborates on these similes, and the text is partly similar to the ‘Dispeller of Delusion’ (p. 36-38). Ruupa is just like a lump of froth without any substance and it cannot be grasped, since it breaks up immediately. Ruupa is like wood surrounding the pith of a tree, without core or substance, it is weak, and it should not be taken as “I” or “mine”. Ruupa continually breaks up from the first stage of a foetus on, until it finally breaks up at death. The Dispeller adds: Feeling is like a bubble of water. Just as a bubble of water is unsubstantial, is ungraspable, and does not last long, so is feeling. Just as a bubble arises due to four causes: the water surface, the drop of water, wetness of the water and the air which holds it up by drawing it together as an envelope, just so feeling also arises due to four causes: the physical base, the object, the flame of defilements and the impact of contact (phassa). The Tiika states that here feeling is meant that is connected with the cycle (va.t.ta), while the rootcause are the defilements that are not eradicated and the object is food for it. Feeling can only be enjoyed for a short while. Saññaa is like a mirage, since it is unsubstantial and cannot be grasped. One cannot grasp it, drink it, wash in it, bathe in it or fill a pot with it. A mirage quivers and deceives many people. The Dispeller of Delusion adds that it makes people say that they saw a full lake or a full river. Saññaa deceives the world by being a cause of wrong view, of seeing things as beautiful, happiness, permanent and self. The khandha of formations is like a plantain stem since it is unsubstantial and cannot be grasped. Just as a plantain stem is a combination of many sheets and is without core, evenso the khandha of formations which is a combination of many dhammas, the cetasikas, it is without core, and cannot be grasped. It cannot be taken as permanent, etc. By combining the characteristic of contact and other characteristics of volition and so on, it is called the khandha of formations. N: The Dispeller adds: ‘And just as a plantain stem has many characteristics, for one has the appearance of an outer sheath of leaf, but there is another within and another within that, so indeed the formations aggregate...’ The plantain tree has no pith, no core. Evenso the khandha of formations that is a combination of many cetasikas, has no core. The khandha of consciousness, viññaa.na, is like an illusion (maya). It is without substance or core, and it cannot be grasped. Just as an illusion is changeable and appears swiftly, so is citta. The Dispeller adds that citta is more changeable and appears more briefly. Just as an illusion deceives many people and causes them to see as a jewel what is not a jewel, evenso citta that is without a core and swift to change deceives people and makes them think that there is one lasting citta at the time of coming, going, standing and sitting. However, there is another citta during each of these postures. Thus citta is like an illusion. > -------- Nina. ========================== With metta, Howard #93548 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 6:45 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas: 'Conditions' are about dhammas scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "About 8 months ago I went all through yoniso manasikaara in multiple posts. Don't wish to do so here and it is not relevant to the Sutta or issue in question." Scott: I found this, below, but it is like the remainder of the posts in October and dealt with 'sati.' This is not yoniso manasikaara. Old TG: "By focusing of conditionality, the aggregates and elements become seen as insubstantial, void, hollow, empty, like a mirage, etc. By focusing on the aggregates or elements, without a strong oversight of conditionality, these thing become seen as 'ultimate realities with their own characteristics.' My understanding -- Mindfulness restrains the 'conceptual propagation' and the 'fictional narrative' that are driven on by ignorance and delusion. These are more subtle factors of delusion, then say, those based on -- performing unsavory actions. Being that mindfulness restrains even the more subtle factors, it would also restrain any of the grosser factors at the same time. While mindfulness restrains these delusional factors, it is insight that can destroy them. This makes insight the highest virtue." Scott: Do you equate sati and yoniso manasikaara or have I missed the salient posts? Any reference numbers? Thanks. Sincerely, Scott. #93549 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 7:05 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: PPn xii,2 nilovg Dear Connie, Op 15-dec-2008, om 1:58 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > I didn't want you to be afraid of how much more homework I was > asking you to do! -------- N: I use this as an argument to explain people that this project should have precedence. No need to be concerned. Once I join a project I feel I should do it systematically, although it can be tough. Missing already the Vis. project, but I should not take on too much. I like the Tiika style of Dhammapala very much. --------- > It's the numbering I'm unhappy about - my copy reads: > << > They are (1) the kinds of Supernormal Power, Having been > one, he becomes many ...' (D.i,77), the knowledge of the Divine Ear > Element, (2) the knowledge of Penetration of Minds, (4) the > knowledge of Recollection of Past Life, and (5) the knowledge of > the Passing Away and Reappearance of Beings. > >> > > Instead, I think it should be: > < They are the kinds of Supernormal Power (1) Having been > one, he becomes many, (2) the knowledge of the Divine Ear Element, > (3) the knowledge of Penetration of Minds > ------ N: The translator made a mistake here and you are right. We should compare the Pali. He forgot to put no. 3. Compare with the Buddhist Dictionary. And no 6 is the eradication of all defilements. ------------- > > C: By rights, I should just leave it as it is; anyway (smiling)- it > only bothers me when I think about it - ditto, the 'nearby rode' in > the verse section of iv,18. ------ N: One near a road, but he wanted to make it rhyme with abode. ----------- > > c: > If anyone wanted to start a study corner on any particular chapter, > I'd be happy to send them that, but I don't know how far "fair use" > really goes. My PPn doesn't have any copyright notice in it, but > I've been advised that that doesn't mean it isn't copyrighted anyway. ------ N: This was once discussed on Pali group, and there were different opinions, since on line is a new situation. It got so complicated that I did not follow it. Let us ask Jon, he is the moderator and lawyer. Rob K was not allowed the whole Vis. on his web, but part was OK. But if one mentions the name of the translator, and we did, it may be in order. It is best to ask Larry which part he is interested in. I think the ones on insight, where Ken stopped. Nina. #93550 From: "szmicio" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 8:36 am Subject: Re: Lodewijk's Diary, 2. szmicio Dear Nina, > L: I did not hear from Nina, how annoying. A very heavy day... > > N: You live in this world. Don't think of the big, solid world with > all the people in it. There is only one moment of seeing, of hearing, > of thinking. It goes away immediately. Everyone lives in his own > world, the world of thinking. One makes up long stories about what > one saw or heard.... sadu! That's really important. The true Dhamma, applied in daily life. We forget about it so often. Best wishes Lukas #93551 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 3:53 am Subject: Re: [dsg] A Sutta Question TGrand458@... Hi Ven. Aggacitto In a message dated 12/14/2008 11:08:27 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, reverendaggacitto@... writes: Where exactly in the Pali Canon does Venerable Gotama instruct his deciples NOT to make any statues or renderings of him after his final nibbana? They then want to know how they are to pay tribute to his teaching and i believe he suggests the stupta(pagoda)t Thanks ! bhikkhu/reverend aggacitto ..................................................... TG: Someone else might help you better. I'm not aware of the Buddha instructing anyone not to make statues or renderings of him. The instructions about Stupas are probably in the Parinibbana Sutta. Digha Nikaya. TG OUT #93552 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 4:00 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Similes and Concepts that lead to Arahantship! TGrand458@... Reposting to Scott, (All) Please deal with this or your silence will be considered a concession that concepts and similes are an important aspect leading to final liberation! TG: Here's what Ven. Sariputta said we needed to continually reflect on to become an Arahant... “Friend Sariputta, what are the things that a virtuous bhikkhu should attend to?” Friend Kotthita, a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to the five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the volitional formations aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. A virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend the these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. When, friend, a virtuous bhikkhi carefully attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of stream-entry. “But, friend Sariputta, what are the things that a bhikkhu who is a stream-enterer should carefully attend to?” (The same formula is repeated all the way up through Arahantship.(The sam full enlightenment.fu (Sariputta . . . Connected Discourse of the Buddha, vol. 1, pg. 970 – 971) TG: Besides impermanent, suffering, and nonself, Sariputta says we should see the Five Aggregates as -- "a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty" Let's see...what are these terms? ... similes, concepts. There's no advice to see the Five Aggregates as "realities" whatsoever!!t It is THIS vision that Sariputta says leads to Arahatship! Gee, and the so-called "Father of Abhidhamma" too. I'm tearing up. TG OUT #93553 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 10:46 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Similes and Concepts that lead to Arahantship! scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "Please deal with this or your silence will be considered a concession that concepts and similes are an important aspect leading to final liberation!" Scott: What, is this the junior high school debating club or something? ;-) SN 22 122 (10) Siila sutta.m "Friend Saariputta, what are the things that a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to"? [...siilavataa aavuso saariputta, bhikkhunaa katame dhammaa yoniso manasikaatabbaa...] "Friend Ko.t.thita, a virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to the five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumour, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. [Siilavataavuso ko.t.thata, bhikkhunaa sa~nacupaadaanakkhandhaa aniccato dukkhato rogato ga.n.dato sallato aghato aabaadhato parato palokato su~n~nato anattato yoniso manasikaatabbaa.] What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the volitional formations aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. A virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend to these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent...as nonself..." Scott: There is no doubt that the sutta refers to yoniso manasikaara. Yoniso manasikaara is definitely a basis for the enlightenment factor of mindfulness. But yoniso manasikaara is not the same as manasikaara cetasika. Whether or not the attention is 'wise' or 'unwise' is shown by whether sobhana dhammas arise during the javana sequence which follows 'perception.' The javana sequence is often translated as 'apperception.' Sati, viriya, and, at times, pa~n~naa are also involved in the process which is known as yoniso manasikaara. Manasikaara cetasika itself functions to hold the citta and other mental factors to the object. Manasikaara cetasika is a universal and arises with each citta. Manasikaara cetasika is not yoniso manasikaara. Yoniso manasikaara, as kusala javana with associated kusala states, is not subject to control. Yes, it is conditioning of sati, but sati also only arises with kusala states. You simply cannot start attending wisely because you want to. If you think that one can choose to attend wisely then you've missed the boat. In throwing out the Abhidhamma you've thrown out the baby with the bathwater. The main condition responsible for the arising of yoniso manasikaara is that of pakatupanissaya. And over this no one has control. TG: "Besides impermanent, suffering, and nonself, Sariputta says we should see the Five Aggregates as -- 'a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty.' Let's see...what are these terms? ... similes, concepts. There's no advice to see the Five Aggregates as 'realities' whatsoever!!" Scott: The five aggregates (form, perception, feelings, volitional formations, consciousness) subject to clinging are each realites. Clinging itself is a reality. These realities are what they do. In the list some of the terms refer to characteristics of dhammas which can be known. The 'bhikkhu' referred to in the sutta is, ultimately, the kusala javana process which contributes to what is known as yoniso manasikaara. 'Concepts and similes' are not the only aspects leading to final liberation, TG. These are objects of consciousness. Wise consideration (yoniso manasikaara) - the impersonal unfolding of kusala dhammas during apperception (javana), real in the ultimate sense - is the factor being discussed here. This complex and mutually conditioned/conditioning dynamic interaction of dhammas known as yoniso manasikaara is the point of the sutta. With the functioning of these states come conditions, eventually, for final liberation. Concepts can be object of consciousness but, being asabhaava, are not relevant in the movement of paramattha dhammas which attain liberation. This is why I asked you for your definition of yoniso manasikaara. By the way, I don't know why I looked in October for your posts on yoniso manasikaara when you said eight months ago. I'll keep looking unless you wish to highlight a post you think is representative of your view on the subject. Sincerely, Scott. #93554 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 11:08 am Subject: Re: [dsg] A Sutta Question nilovg Venerable Bhikkhu Aggacitto --------- > Where exactly in the Pali Canon does Venerable Gotama instruct his > deciples NOT to make any statues or renderings of him after his final > nibbana? They then want to know how they are to pay tribute to his > teaching and i believe he suggests the stupta(pagoda) ---------- N: I only know of the Ananda's Bo tree in Savatthi. People wanted to pay respect to the Buddha also when he was not there and the Buddha suggested a Bodhitree. But this probably does not answer your question. I heard that at first after the Buddha's parinibbaana there were no statues. With respect, Nina. #93555 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 11:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts nilovg Hi TG, Op 14-dec-2008, om 19:30 heeft TGrand458@... het volgende geschreven: > TG: There's much more to it than that. There is this whole notion of > seeing these things as "individual realities" which is the exact > wrong outlook to > be inculcating IMO. > > > If you were stating that "own characteristics" merely indicated > differences > in 'formational outcomes', then I'd have no problem with the > outlook, but > only a problem with the term "own." --------- N: No problem then. Own: just this one, that one, and they are different. > > > TG:But I am quite aware there is more to it than your statement above. ------- N: Afraid of substantialism, not leading to detachment? Realities arise and fall away too fast, nothing remains of them, how could they have a core or substance? As to detachment, awareness and understanding will lead to detachment from the idea of self, but only very gradually. There is a very slight degree, hardly notceable, when we are less absorbed in stories and begin to be aware. As posted today: world, the world of thinking. One makes up long stories about what > one saw or heard....> These long stories: just clinging to ideas. Less stories would be better but this cannot happen at will. Awareness is not thinking. When the Buddha asked: 'Is seeing permanent or impermanent?' his disciples did not realize this by mere thinking. Seeing should be realized as it is while seeing now. We need not *talk* about characteristics, they are to be directly realized. Important to know the difference between awareness, no names, and thinking. When there is awareness of one reality presenting itself through one of the six doors there is no clinging to a concept of a person, animal or thing. No names, no stories. So, we can learn the difference between such moments and that is the beginning leading up to insight in the three characteristics of realities. > > ....................................................... > > > TG: Even though we are communicating in English, you will never let > go of > those "dhammas" because you see them as "individual entities" and > the term > "dhammas" neatly conceals that viewpoint. ------ N: When there can be direct awareness of realities names are redundant. Just characteristics that are objects of right understanding. But lobha follows us all the time, our whole life. After seeing or hearing there is bound to be very subtle lobha we may not notice. ------------ > > TG: Nothing "has" functions. Phenomena 'function' in mere > dependence on > conditions. "Having anything" is exactly what all phenomena DO NOT > HAVE. > --------- N: I have no problem to use the verb function. When one understands more about realities, awareness, object of awareness, understanding, it matters less and less what names are used. Even when there is an odd translation in a text, we can know what is meant and do not mind this. Less irritation about words, I find. -------- TG: A virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend the these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. When, friend, a virtuous bhikkhi carefully attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of stream-entry. ------------ N: Never without the development of insight. The object: the five khandhas of grasping, or, all physical and mental phenomena. It is striking, that the object is the same up to arahatship. The object of sati and pa~n~naa is the same, but understanding grows until it is perfected. Ven. Bodhi has a note about these eleven names, impermanent, suffering etc: p. 1091, note 225: Thus, all these terms or concepts help us to understand the three characteristics which eventually have to be directly realized. But always characteristics of seeing, hearing, of any of the khandhas of grasping. Not characteristics sec, characteristics *of* a dhamma. ------------ Nina. #93556 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 7:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts upasaka_howard Hi, Nina (and TG) - In a message dated 12/15/2008 2:55:01 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: N: Afraid of substantialism, not leading to detachment? Realities arise and fall away too fast, nothing remains of them, how could they have a core or substance? ============================== That's excellent, Nina! I like it a lot! But I think the emptiness goes even farther than that: As I see it, nothing remains exactly as is for any time at all - not even for even an instant, and moreover, whatever quality is present or operation is in effect at any time, it is so entirely in dependence on conditions, which makes nothing at all graspable or distinguishable-as-a-separate-entity, as a thing in itself. With metta, Howard #93557 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 2:13 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts egberdina Hi Nina, 2008/12/16 Nina van Gorkom : > Hi TG, > Op 14-dec-2008, om 19:30 heeft TGrand458@... het volgende > geschreven: > > N: Afraid of substantialism, not leading to detachment? > Realities arise and fall away too fast, nothing remains of them, how > could they have a core or substance? > As to detachment, awareness and understanding will lead to detachment > from the idea of self, but only very gradually. There is a very > slight degree, hardly notceable, when we are less absorbed in stories > and begin to be aware. As posted today: seeing, of > hearing, of thinking. It goes away immediately. Everyone lives in his > own > > world, the world of thinking. One makes up long stories about what > > one saw or heard....> > These long stories: just clinging to ideas. Less stories would be > better but this cannot happen at will. This is not a criticism, but an observation. The unfortunate, and inescapable fact is that each time you write, you defeat the very goal you write about. The more you talk about it and write about it, the more it slips away. Given that, why would you still believe that somehow there will be a gradual accomplishment of that goal? Cheers Herman #93558 From: "connie" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 2:58 pm Subject: Cariyapitaka iii.1 nichiconn dear friends of the library, > Path of Purification, viii,12 quotes: > 'The dew-drop on the blade of grass > Vanishes when the sun comes up; > Such is a human span of life; > So, mother, do not hinder me' (Jaa.iv,122). > > I wonder what the story is. ------- N: Jataka 460, Yudha~njaya Jaataka. The Bodhisatta wanted to go forth and his mother did not like it, wanted to hold him back. c: Thanks, Nina. Here is the version from Minor Anthologies III: Basket of Conduct, Division III: The Perfection of Renunciation (Nikkhammapaaramitaa) 1. Conduct of Yudha~njaya (Yudha~njayacariya'm) 1. When I was Yudha~njaya, the king's own son, of immeasurable renown, I thrilled when I saw a dew-drop fallen down in the warmth of the sun.* 2. Taking that itself as the sign I increased the thrill. Honouring my mother and father I requested (their consent) for the going forth. 3. Their hands folded, with the citizens, with the inhabitants of the kingdom, they begged me, "Son, this very day take care of the great estate** which is rich and prosperous". 4. While the (multitude) together with the king, the court ladies, the citizens and the inhabitants of the kingdom, were lamenting piteously, I went forth without expectation. 5. It was for the sake of Awakening itself that, renouncing the sovereignty of the entire earth, relations, retinue, reknown, I did not think (anything about it***). 6. Mother and father were not disagreeable to me, and nor was the great retinue disagreeable to me. Omniscience was dear to me, therefore I gave up the kingdom. * He thought of impermanence and the brevity of life, CpA.183 ** mahaamahi'm, lit. the great earth, i.e. kingdom *** Only of attaining Awakening, CpA 185 peace, connie #93559 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 12:13 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Similes and Concepts that lead to Arahantship! TGrand458@... Hi Scott In a message dated 12/15/2008 11:47:38 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: 'Concepts and similes' are not the only aspects leading to final liberation, TG. These are objects of consciousness. Wise consideration (yoniso manasikaara) ........................................................... TG: Ahhh, this is progress. I never thought I'd see the day. An honest admission that concepts and similes are aspects that lead to final liberation. Absolutely of course they are not the ONLY aspects that lead to final liberation. They are the "cattle prods" which prompt the mind toward liberation. Reflecting off of these 'wise considerations,' and direct experience of the elements and aggregates, and wise consideration of their causal factors, are all factors leading to detachment. This is all very important because generally the KS side of this DSG wants to completely dismiss the conceptual aspect of insight. This is a mistake. It is painfully obvious that the Buddha's teaching in the Suttas makes no apologies whatsoever in employing concepts and similes at very advanced levels progressing towards Arahantship. This whole notion of dichotomizing "realities" from "non-realities" and focusing solely on the former and rejecting that latter is not only a non-issue in the Suttas, its a huge mistake in cultivating insight, and in fact, takes half the steam out of the process. Developing insight is hard enough without needlessly forfeiting half of your weapons. ....................................................................... - the impersonal unfolding of kusala dhammas during apperception (javana), real in the ultimate sense - is the factor being discussed here. This complex and mutually conditioned/mutually conditioned/conditioning dynamic i known as yoniso manasikaara is the point of the sutta. ...................................................................... TG: I have to happily point out that you are starting to regularly use the word "dynamic" now. When I can get you to start dealing with 'momentums,' then I'll actually feel there's hope. ;-) ................................................................... With the functioning of these states come conditions, eventually, for final liberation. Concepts can be object of consciousness but, being asabhaava, are not relevant in the movement of paramattha dhammas which attain liberation. ....................................................... TG: I'm in basic agreement as to your overall analysis here and the previous passage. My Abhidhamma is quite rusty, but I don't find what you've said objectionable. At this stage in my practice, I find the "hyper-analysis" not adding enough inducement toward detachment to justify taking the time away from other approaches...Sutta oriented approaches. Once again, I'm happy to see here, that you are giving 'concepts' their due, and actually in what I consider a very good proportionate manner. .............................................................. This is why I asked you for your definition of yoniso manasikaara. By the way, I don't know why I looked in October for your posts on yoniso manasikaara when you said eight months ago. I'll keep looking unless you wish to highlight a post you think is representative of your view on the subject. ................................................................ TG: I viewed reviewing it as a distraction from more critical investigations. Once the distraction takes hold, it takes on a life of its own and the core topic is sometimes lost. TG OUT #93560 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 5:52 pm Subject: Q. [dsg] Re: Series Survey Quote. buddhatrue Hi Nina, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Hi James, > Op 6-dec-2008, om 2:00 heeft buddhatrue het volgende geschreven: > > > I think that we make a mistake if we assume that everytime > > the Buddha mentions the six doorways that he is talking about > > satipatthana. In the following sutta you quote, Ananda is clearly > > talking about satipatthana: using the six doorways to see the three > > characteristics. But, this does not translate into the same thing > > in the sutta "The All" because there is no lesson there about the > > three characteristics. Therefore that sutta isn't about > > satipatthana. > -------- > N: Your post made me reflect further on the sutta of The All. As you > say, the first of this series does not mention the three > characteristics, and if you look at B.B.'s notes: here, in the first > sutta, the All refers to the sensebases. The following suttas deal > with the pari~n~nas, clear comprehension, which develops in the > course of the stages of insight. James: Thank you for admitting that there is a difference between the content and purposes of the two types of suttas. > > As to the first sutta on The All, when the Buddha preached this, was > it meant to just hear about it? To have just intellectual > understanding of the experiences of the objects through the six > doors? I do not think so. What the Buddha said is completely new. James: The purpose of the sutta is clear enough. The Buddha wanted to refute those who stated that there exists a different reality than the one we experience through the six senses. In the Buddha's time, there must have been those who stated that there exists such a different reality. The Buddha explains that such a philosophy or view cannot be supported because it is "beyond range". Again, this sutta has nothing to do with satipatthana or insight. Nina, I know that you want it to be addressing satipatthana, even non-directly, but it obviously doesn't. "The All" is the six sense doors and their objects. Metta, James #93561 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 5:54 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self egberdina Hi Howard, 2008/12/15 : > Hi, Herman - > > In a message dated 12/14/2008 8:23:19 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, > hhofmeister@... writes: > > > I tend to think that (1) is also the sutta view. Take this from MN28: > > "Now if internally the eye is intact but externally forms do not come > into range, nor is there a corresponding engagement, then there is no > appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. If internally > the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, but there is > no corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the > corresponding type of consciousness. But when internally the eye is > intact and externally forms come into range, and there is a > corresponding engagement, then there is the appearing of the > corresponding type of consciousness." > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > The interpretation of the preceding depends on the understanding of > 'externally'. One possible understanding of 'external' that does not necessarily > presume an "external world" in the usual sense is simply "pertaining to what > is experienced," whereas 'internal' pertains to consciousness or medium of > consciousness. Thus, one may say that no sight comes into range at a time that > a sound is experienced. The "coming into range" can be viewed as arising as > object of consciousness. So, the "external" usage is not necessarily > incompatible with a phenomenalist perspective. > ----------------------------------------------- The sutta itself gives some indication as to how to understand internal and external. MN28: "And what is the liquid property? The liquid property may be either internal or external. What is the internal liquid property? Whatever internal, belonging to oneself, is liquid, watery, & sustained: bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, skin-oil, saliva, mucus, fluid in the joints, urine, or whatever else internal, within oneself, is liquid, watery, & sustained: This is called the internal liquid property. Now both the internal liquid property and the external liquid property are simply liquid property. And that should be seen as it actually is present with right discernment: 'This is not mine, this is not me, this is not my self.' When one sees it thus as it actually is present with right discernment, one becomes disenchanted with the liquid property and makes the mind dispassionate toward the liquid property. "Now there comes a time, friends, when the external liquid property is provoked and washes away village, town, city, district, & country. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean drops down one hundred leagues, two hundred... three hundred... four hundred... five hundred... six hundred... seven hundred leagues. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean stands seven palm-trees deep, six... five... four... three... two palm-trees deep, one palm-tree deep. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean stands seven fathoms deep, six... five... four... three... two fathoms deep, one fathom deep. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean stands half a fathom deep, hip-deep, knee-deep, ankle deep. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean is not even the depth of the first joint of a finger. "So when even in the external liquid property so vast inconstancy will be discerned, destructibility will be discerned, a tendency to decay will be discerned, changeability will be discerned, then what in this short-lasting body, sustained by clinging, is 'I' or 'mine' or 'what I am'? It has here only a 'no.' > > in combination with this, from MN136: > > To begin with it was the three kinds of feeling that were asked about > by the wanderer Potaliputta. If, when this misguided man Samiddhi was > asked, he had answered the wanderer Potaliputta thus:'After doing an > intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to > be felt as pleasure, he feels pleasure; after doing an intentional > kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as > pain, he feels pain; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, > speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as > neither-pain-nor-pleasure, he feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure' by > answering him thus, Ananda, the misguided man Samiddhi would have > given the wanderer Potaliputta the right answer. > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > But the foregoing is neutral with regard to whether the kamma determines > the affective nature of the particular dhamma to arise or determines the > operation of vedana on the dhamma. So, I don't consider that quoted material as > definitive as regards the inherent versus extrinsic issue as regards > affective feel of dhammas. > ---------------------------------------------------- OK. How about this little snippet you quoted for me in another thread the other day? "Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) phenomena (dhamma). Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox. Mind is the forerunner of (all good) phenomena (dhamma). Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, AFFECTION follows one, even as one's shadow that never leaves. ****************** Note: In the foregoing, I replaced "states" by "phenomena (dhamma)," as the Pali word is 'dhamma'." Cheers Me, Myself, I #93562 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 12:54 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts TGrand458@... Hi Nina In a message dated 12/15/2008 12:55:02 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi TG,> TG:But I am quite aware there is more to it than your statement above. ------- N: Afraid of substantialism, not leading to detachment? Realities arise and fall away too fast, nothing remains of them, how could they have a core or substance? ...................................................... TG" The lack of core and substance has as much to do with 'dependency' as it does 'impermanence.' But I expect you would agree with that. Due to 'dependency' and 'impermanence,' I would drop the term "realities" as heavily giving the 'wrong impression.' I don't think you could have picked a more "substantialist" term than "realities." Despite your denial of core or substance, the term "realities" leads me to think that you have not actually taken measures to remove a substantialist outlook regarding "dhammas." The theory of "dhammas" arising and ceasing super fast does not in itself remove a view of seeing those "moments" as having their own core. ........................................................ As to detachment, awareness and understanding will lead to detachment from the idea of self, but only very gradually. There is a very slight degree, hardly notceable, when we are less absorbed in stories and begin to be aware. ......................................................... TG: I agree. .................................................. As posted today: world, the world of thinking. One makes up long stories about what > one saw or heard....> These long stories: just clinging to ideas. Less stories would be better but this cannot happen at will. .................................................... TG: I agree. ................................................ Awareness is not thinking. When the Buddha asked: 'Is seeing permanent or impermanent?permanent or impermanent?' his disciples did thinking. Seeing should be realized as it is while seeing now. We need not *talk* about characteristics, they are to be directly realized. Important to know the difference between awareness, no names, and thinking. .......................................................... TG: I agree. This is all very basic knowledge to me at this point. Thank goodness. ......................................................... When there is awareness of one reality presenting itself through one of the six doors there is no clinging to a concept of a person, animal or thing. No names, no stories. So, we can learn the difference between such moments and that is the beginning leading up to insight in the three characteristics of realities. ................................................. TG: I agree with the gist of your statement. .................................................. -------- TG: A virtuous bhikkhu should carefully attend the these five aggregates subject to clinging as impermanent, as suffering, as a disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as empty, as nonself. When, friend, a virtuous bhikkhi carefully attends to these five aggregates subject to clinging, it is possible that he may realize the fruit of stream-entry. ------------ N: Never without the development of insight. The object: the five khandhas of grasping, or, all physical and mental phenomena. It is striking, that the object is the same up to arahatship. The object of sati and pa~n~naa is the same, but understanding grows until it is perfected. Ven. Bodhi has a note about these eleven names, impermanent, suffering etc: p. 1091, note 225: Thus, all these terms or concepts help us to understand the three characteristics which eventually have to be directly realized. But always characteristics of seeing, hearing, of any of the khandhas of grasping. Not characteristics sec, characteristics *of* a dhamma. .................................................................... TG: I disagree with the Ps III comment. These terms -- disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as misery, as an affliction, as alien, -- do not help us to understand the three characteristics. No. The three characteristics, are in fact, what lead to being able to understand and use these terms to induce detachment. These terms do not at all lead to understanding the three characteristics. In would need to be after directly understanding the 3 characteristics, to some degree or another, that these more "motivational terms" would come in to play to further prompt detachment. Otherwise they could not possibly be understood and would make absolutely no sense. Thanks for the conversation Nina. TG OUT #93563 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 5:59 pm Subject: Q. [dsg] Re: Series Survey Quote. buddhatrue Hi Jon (and Howard), --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "jonoabb" wrote: > > As with the other suttas in the salayatana-samyutta, I would see this > sutta as talking about matters directly relevant to the development > of insight. > Why? Metta, James #93564 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 7:00 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All egberdina Hi Scott, 2008/12/15 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Thanks for the reply: > > > Scott: 'Nibbaana isn't known presently.' What do you mean here? I'm > assuming you deny that it is known, at the arising of the Path, by > pa~n~naa, when it is known, and that this would be a knowing that is > 'present' (as in not past and not future). It is not to be perceived > by any of the five senses, as you say. This leaves Nibbaana an object > of the mind. What say you? Nibbaana is to be known only by > consciousness and mental factors through the mind-door - naama. How about we approach it differently? Why don't we wait until such time that you have known nibbana, and then you tell me about nibbana. At that time whatever you are going to refer to, I will deny as being nibbana, because nibbana has no features, it has no characteristics. Nibbana is the absence of all features/characteristics. And that is not a feature. > > H: "...If Nibbana is known, it is known retrospectively, because there > is no knowing with the cessation of perception, and nibbana's > pleasantness may be known retrospectively, for there is no feeling > with the cessation of feeling." > > Scott: How does this 'retrospective knowing' to come to pass? I have no idea. We here all readily acknowledge that we have no idea what the next moment will be, so how could anyone possibly claim to know how the present has come to pass. :-) Can you > elaborate please? When you say 'there is no knowing with the > cessation of perception,' are you referring to Nibbaana? Yes. > > H: "There is no experience with the cessation of experience. That is > the end of stress. For those desperate to know what is unknowable, > they have to use a line of reasoning, I guess" > > Scott: Nibbaana is an object of consciousness. So you keep saying. What is it that is known when nibbana is an object of consciousness? After the death of > the arahat, there is no experience. 'Arahat' is the designation for > the one in whom the Path and Fruit have arisen and eradication of the > defilements is complete. With the ending of the life of the arahat, > I'd say experience ceases. Is this what you are saying? Yes, but this does not need to be limited to the end of a life. Not all jhana practitioners die with cessation. > > H: "There are two realities. There is nibbana i.e. being, and there is > anicca i.e. knowing/perceiving. I don't buy into the division > conceptual/ultimate. Neither do the suttas." > > Scott: I don't follow you when you say that Nibbaana is 'being.' From > whence do you get such a notion? It is what I understand the Buddha to be saying in the "nibbana" bits of the Udana. I've asked before, methinks, what > you mean by this. Did you tell me already? > Check out the nibbana bits of the Udana. > We'll agree to disagree on the latter point. I see plenty of > ultimates mentioned in the suttas. I'll not budge on this and neither > will you. I'm right, you're wrong, and that's all she wrote. ;-) > :-) > N/B: "Feeling, perception, and consciousness, friend - these states > are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of > these states from the others in order to describe the difference > between them. For what one feels, that one perceives; and what one > perceives, that one feels, that one cognizes. That is why these > states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate > each of these states from the others in order to describe the > difference between them." > > "'Yaa caavuso, vedanaa yaa ca sa~n~naa ya~nca vi~n`naa.na.m " ime > dhammaa sa.msa.t.thaa, no visa.msa.t.thaa. Na ca labbhaa imesa.m > dhamm.mna.m vinibbhujitvaa vinibbhujitvaa naanaakara.na.m > pa~n~naapetu.m. Ya.m haavuso, vedeti ta.m sa~njaanaati, ya.m > sa~njaanaati ta.m vijaanaati. Tasmaa ime dhammaa sa.msa.t.thaa no > visa.msa.t.thaa. Na ca labbhaa imesa.m dhammaana.m vinibbhujitvaa > vinibbhujitvaa naanaakara.na.m pa~n~naapetu''nti."] > > Scott: I think the above uses 'vi~n~naa.naa' in the sense of khandha > (vi~n~naa.na-khandha); and that vedanaa and sa~n~naa as well are used > in this sense (sankhaara-khandha). The sutta refers to the fact that > citta ('mind') and cetasikas (mental factors) arise conascently, never > separately, and are, as such, condition each for the arising of the > other. What did you want to indicate in offering this particular > excerpt from the sutta? The sutta doesn't mention what you says it does. What it does say is that it is impossible to know parramattha bits of experience one by one from whatever is perceived. I'll reply to the rest later. Cheers Me, myself, I #93565 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 5:43 pm Subject: In praise of the Mangala Sutta ( was Re: Lodewijk's Diary, 2.) philofillet Dear Nina and Lodewijk and all > L: I did not hear from Nina, how annoying. A very heavy day... > > N: You live in this world. Don't think of the big, solid world with > all the people in it. There is only one moment of seeing, of hearing, > of thinking. It goes away immediately. Everyone lives in his own > world, the world of thinking. One makes up long stories about what > one saw or heard.... Ph: I found this message to Lodewijk a little troubling, Nina. The word "perverse" kept coming to me. So I had to write. Telling a man who devoted his life to diplomatic service "don't think of the big, solid world with all the people in it" is perverse. Again, as people often say, I know you don't *really* tell him not to do that, it would be insulting to him and his career. And yes, the kind of deep reflection indicated above can arise. But to aim at the kind of penetrative panna that is indicated above ("there is only one moment of seeing, of hearing, of thinking") in order to find consolation on a "heavy day" is the mis-use of the Dhamma that I often point at. There are other ways the Buddha offers consolation and encouragement that are more appropriate for lay followers of the Buddha's teaching! Let me share the sutta that is hugely impressive for me these days. It is the mangala sutta from the sutta nitapa (2.4) Here is a link to one of the four translations availlable at access to insight http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.2.04.nara.html But I would like to type out the 38 blessings taught by the Buddha in this sutta. First, the background. The devas overheard humans debating about what the blessings/auspicious things are and they join the debate and it goes on and on and on. According to Bhikhhu Bodhi's introduction to his series of talks on this sutta (available here http://www.bodhimonastery.net/bm/about-buddhism/audio/84-sutta- nipata.html thanku thanku thanku again Connie) the auspicious things they are debating about are superstitious items akin to our four leaf clover and horseshoe etc, that was the meaning of "mangala" in India before the Buddha came. A deva is sent to ask the Buddha. (Ilove a detail here - every night after finishing his busy schedule for the day, the Buddha put a couple of hours aside after midnight for the Devas, he would sit out in the temple yard and wait for them to come, cascading their radiant light in the night as they came) The Buddha's answer turns the question on its head. What he answers is a list of 38 blessings with BB's translation of each. (I have heard different translations for them, so if there are any here that you think are not valid, please say so.) first verse 1. asevanaa baalaanam. (not to associate with the foolish 2. panditiinam sevanaa (to associate with the wise) 3. puujaa puujaniyaanam (to venerate those worthy of veneration) second verse 4. patiruupadesavaasa (dwelling in a suitable locality) 5. pubbe katapunnataa (merits done in the past) 6.attasammaapanidhi (right resolution - to set oneself on the right course9 third verse 7. baahuhsacca (abundant learning) 8. sippa (learning a craf or profession) 9. vinaya suskikkhita (a code of discipline that has been well trained in) 10. subhaasitaa vaacaa (well-spoken speech) fourth verse 11. maataapitu-upatthaana (supporting one's mother and father 12. puttadaarasangaha (maintining a spouse and children) 13. anaakulaa kammantaa (a harmless occupation. *this is one I want to stress in the context of this post. I have heard different translations such as "an occupation that does not cause confusion" and "works that are not left unfinished" so I don't know. But it certainly refers to right livelihood) fifth verse 14. daana (generosity) 15. dhammavariyaa (dutiful conduct) 16. nnattakaanam sangaha (helping of relatives and friends) 17. anavajjaani kammaani (blamesless actions) sixth verse 18. aarati paapaa (ceasing from evil) 19. viratai paapaa (abstaining from evil) 20. majjapaanaa samyama (abstention from intoxicating drinks) 21. appamaado dhammaesu (diligenece in wholesome practices)))) seventh verse 22. gaarava (reverence) 23. nivaata (humility) 24. santutthi (contentment) 25. katannutaa (gratitude) 26. kaalena dhammassavana (timely hearing of the Dhamma) 27. khanti (patience) 28. sovacassataa (being amenable to advice) 29. sammanaanam dassanam (seeing renunciants) 30 kaalena dhammasaakacchaa (timely discussions on the Dhamma) eight verse 31. tapa (austerity) 32. brahmacariya (celibacy, the holy life) 33. ariyasaccaanadassana (seeing the noble truths) 34. nibbaanasacchikiriyaa (realization of nibbana) ninth verse 35. phutthassa lokadhammehi cittam yassa na kampati (a mind that is unshaken by changing worldly conditions) 36. asokam (a mind that is sorrowless) 37. virajam (a mind that is passionless, dust-free) 38. khemam (a mind that is secure) Now, when I reflect on these mangala, I can feel very grateful to understand that some are there for me already, and others are being developed. Yes, that is the wonderful thing about these mangala - although they are usually translated as "blessings", they are "blessings" that are developed by followers of the Buddha. I think I know how you will respond to this sutta, Nina. I think you will say something like "Lodewijk and I are very fond of this sutta, we were impressed when we heard the monks chant it at so and so place" but as always you will just be paying lip service to the sutta, because the advice you gave Lodewijk above is not in line with the sutta. We should be very grateful for the mundane aspects of our Buddhist practice, for the way it leads to harmonious relations with people (yes, yes, yes, I know, insight into "there is only one world of seeing" etc etc leads to harmonious relations, you say, I say it is dangerous to count on one's feeble panna to fulfill the duty to have harmonious relations with others) in addition to the other mundane factors listed near the beginning of the sutta. I think Acharn Sujin is too eager to have people consider themselves to have phutthassa lokadhammehi mehi cittam yassa na kampati, minds that are unshaken by changing worldly conditions because of the kind of insight into "ultimate realities" that Nina urges on Lodewijk above. You will say as always that I have failed to understand Acharn Sujin and I will say as always that because of your clinging to her you are blind to the perverse way of Buddhist practice that she pushes on you. The truth lies somewhere between these two extremes, so let's not worry about it. I will let you respond and leave it there, because I don't want to get caught up again. But I sincerely hope Lodewijk and you and everyone else appreciate the message of this beautiful sutta. Metta, Phil #93566 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 8:11 pm Subject: Refuge is Rescue! bhikkhu0 Friends: Taking Refuge: The Winner move for Blinded Beings!!! The Venerable Mahamoggallana once told a large group of young devas : Advantageous indeed is taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dhamma & the Sangha… Because of taking refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha some beings here, at the break-up of the body, right after death, are reborn in a divine destination, in a heavenly world! There they surpass the other devas in ten respects: In life span, in divine beauty, in divine happiness, in divine fame, in divine power, and in enjoying divine forms, sounds, odours, tastes, and touchable objects… Advantageous indeed is therefore this taking refuge in the 3 Jewels : The Buddha, the Dhamma & the Sangha… The 3 jewels: Buddha, Dhamma & Sangha Comments: Good to know for all beings, who do neither know from where they came, nor what brought them there, and who do neither know, where they are going after death, nor what causes, will bring them there! There are 31 levels of existence. Take care! The Dhammacakka: The Wheel of the Law! ... Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book IV [256] section 40:10 On Sakka ... http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=948507 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/index.html Have a nice day! Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) #93567 From: "connie" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 8:27 pm Subject: On concepts, final nail to the coffin. nichiconn dear friends, AS (that's Andy Shaw), in PaliWords, doesn't use the word "own" in the definition he gives for < sabhaava: nature; condition; disposition; reality. > I think also "essence" is a nice word, as in the phrase "passing with its own kind of moment, which is what establishes its individual essence." (see footnote 21, Vis. xii). peace, connie PPn xii, 130. He converts his mind according to his body: he converts the mind to accord with the material body; taking the consciousness of the basic jhana, he mounts it upon the body, he makes its going slow to coincide with that of the body; for the body's mode of going is slow. 131. He arrives at blissful perception and light perception: he arrives at, enters, makes contact with, reaches, the perception of bliss and perception of lightness that are conascent with the consciousness whose object is the basic jhana. And it is perception associated with equanimity that is called 'perception of bliss'; for equanimity is called 'bliss' since it is peaceful. And that same perception should be understood to be called 'perception of lightness' too because it is liberated from hindrances and from the things that oppose it beginning with applied thought. But when he arrives at that state, his physical body too becomes as light as a tuft of cotton. He goes to the Brahmaa World thus with a visible body as light as a tuft of cotton wafted by the wind. 132. As he goes thus, if he wishes, he creates a path in space by means of the earth kasina and goes on foot. If he wishes, he resolves by means of the air kasina that there shall be air, and he goes by air like a tuft of cotton. Moreover the desire to go is the measure here. When there is the desire to go, one who has made his mental resolve in this way goes visibly, carried by the force of the resolution like an arrow shot by an archer. [405] 133. He converts his body to accord with his mind: he takes the body and mounts it on the mind. He makes its going swift to coincide with that of the mind; for the mind's mode of going is swift. He arrives at blissful perception and light perception: he arrives at perception of bliss and perception of lightness that are conascent with the supernormal-power consciousness whose object is the material body. The rest should be understood in the way already described. But here there is only the going consciousness. {21} {21}. '"There is only the going of consciousness": there is only a going that is the same as that of the mind. But how does the body, whose going [being that of matter] is slow, come to have the same going as the mind, which quickly passes? Its going is not the same in all respects; for in the case of converting the mind to conform with the body the mind does not come to have the same going as the body in all respects. For it is not that the mind then occurs with the moment of a material state, which passes slowly, instead of passing with its own kind of moment, which is what establishes its individual essence. But rather the mind is called "converted to accord with the going of the body" as long as it goes on occurring in a continuity that conforms with body until the desired place is arrived at. This is because its passing occurs paralleled with that of the body, whose going is slow, owing to the resolution "Let the mind be like this body". And likewise, it is while the body keeps occurring in suchwise that its arrival at the desired place comes about in only a few quick passes of the mind instead of passing slowly, as in those who have not developed the roads to power - and this mode of occurrence is due to the possession of the perception of lightness, to say nothing of the resolve "Let this body be like this mind" - that the body is called "converted to accord with the going of the mind," not because it arrives at the desired place in a single consciousness moment. And when taken thus the simile "Just as a strong man might stretch out his bent arm, or bend his outstretched arm" (Vin.i,5) can be taken literally. And this must be accepted in this way without reserve, otherwise there is conflict with the Suttas, the Abhidhamma and the Commentary, as well as contradiction of natural law (dhammataa). "Bhikkhus, I see no other one thing that is so quickly transformed as the mind" (A.i,10) - here it is material states that are referred to by the word "other" because they do not pass quickly. And in the Abhidhamma only matter is called prenascence condition and only consciousness postnascence condition. And wherever states (dhamma) arise, there they dissolve. There is no transmigration to an adjacent location (desantara-sa'nkamana), nor does the individual essence become other. For it is not possible to effect any alteration of the characteristics of dhammas by force of the roads to power. But it is possible to effect alteration of the mode in which they are present (bhaava)." (Pm.397). #93568 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 9:04 pm Subject: DN 31 Layman's Code of Discipline (was In praise of the Mangala Sutta ) philofillet Hello again Nina, Lodewijk and all I was looking at the translation I provided, and it comes from something called "Everyman's Ethics - four discourses of the Buddha" which can be found here. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/narada/wheel014.html I'm particularly interested in having a closer look at DN31, titled in English "the Layman's Code of Discipline" about which the editor Narada Thera writes the following: "Commenting on this Sutta, the Venerable Buddhaghosa says, "Nothing in the duties of a householder is left unmentioned. This Sutta is called the Vinaya of the householder. Hence in one who practices what he has been taught in it, growth is to be looked for, not decay." And Mrs. Rhys Davids adds: "The Buddha's doctrine of love and goodwill between man and man is here set forth in a domestic and social ethics with more comprehensive detail than elsewhere. And truly we may say even now of this Vinaya or code of discipline, so fundamental are the human interests involved, so sane and wide is the wisdom that envisages them, that the utterances are as fresh and practically as binding today and here as they were then at Rajagaha. 'Happy would have been the village or clan on the banks of the Ganges where the people were full of the kindly spirit of fellow-feeling, the noble spirit of justice which breathes through these naive and simple sayings.' Not less happy would be the village, or the family on the banks of the Thames today, of which this could be said." (end quote) Ph: I haven't read the sutta yet so won't comment further, but looks interesting for helping us consider the way the Buddha encouraged lay followers to approach the teaching. I'm not saying that there cannot be deeper consideration of Abhidhamma, for example. But we will see what the Buddha urges when we read this sutta. Will students of A.S insist after reading it that it is all about paramattha dhammas rather than people who do not yet have insight into paramattha dhammas in a way that does away with people? That is a rhetorical question because of course you will! That is your doctrine and fair enough! But I will attempt now and then to open other doors. :) Metta, Phil --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Phil" wrote: > > > Dear Nina and Lodewijk and all > > > L: I did not hear from Nina, how annoying. A very heavy day... > > > > N: You live in this world. Don't think of the big, solid world > with > > all the people in it. #93569 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 4:33 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 12/15/2008 8:54:33 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard, 2008/12/15 : > Hi, Herman - > > In a message dated 12/14/2008 8:23:19 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, > hhofmeister@... writes: > > > I tend to think that (1) is also the sutta view. Take this from MN28: > > "Now if internally the eye is intact but externally forms do not come > into range, nor is there a corresponding engagement, then there is no > appearing of the corresponding type of consciousness. If internally > the eye is intact and externally forms come into range, but there is > no corresponding engagement, then there is no appearing of the > corresponding type of consciousness. But when internally the eye is > intact and externally forms come into range, and there is a > corresponding engagement, then there is the appearing of the > corresponding type of consciousness." > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > The interpretation of the preceding depends on the understanding of > 'externally'. One possible understanding of 'external' that does not necessarily > presume an "external world" in the usual sense is simply "pertaining to what > is experienced," whereas 'internal' pertains to consciousness or medium of > consciousness. Thus, one may say that no sight comes into range at a time that > a sound is experienced. The "coming into range" can be viewed as arising as > object of consciousness. So, the "external" usage is not necessarily > incompatible with a phenomenalist perspective. > ----------------------------------------------- The sutta itself gives some indication as to how to understand internal and external. MN28: "And what is the liquid property? The liquid property may be either internal or external. What is the internal liquid property? Whatever internal, belonging to oneself, is liquid, watery, & sustained: bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, skin-oil, saliva, mucus, fluid in the joints, urine, or whatever else internal, within oneself, is liquid, watery, & sustained: This is called the internal liquid property. Now both the internal liquid property and the external liquid property are simply liquid property. And that should be seen as it actually is present with right discernment: 'This is not mine, this is not me, this is not my self.' When one sees it thus as it actually is present with right discernment, one becomes disenchanted with the liquid property and makes the mind dispassionate toward the liquid property. "Now there comes a time, friends, when the external liquid property is provoked and washes away village, town, city, district, & country. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean drops down one hundred leagues, two hundred... three hundred... four hundred... five hundred... six hundred... seven hundred leagues. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean stands seven palm-trees deep, six... five... four... three... two palm-trees deep, one palm-tree deep. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean stands seven fathoms deep, six... five... four... three... two fathoms deep, one fathom deep. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean stands half a fathom deep, hip-deep, knee-deep, ankle deep. There comes a time when the water in the great ocean is not even the depth of the first joint of a finger. "So when even in the external liquid property — so vast — inconstancy will be discerned, destructibility will be discerned, a tendency to decay will be discerned, changeability will be discerned, then what in this short-lasting body, sustained by clinging, is 'I' or 'mine' or 'what I am'? It has here only a 'no.' ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Mmm, okay, I see your point. Certainly in what you quote right above, the Buddha's using 'internal' to mean in the body, and 'external' to mean outside of the body. But I'm a bit bothered in applying that sense in the earlier quoted material: There are *always* forms with range of the eye, if you're speaking of what is data to the physical eye, even when the eyes are closed. For example, when we are hearing (so that there is no seeing), but our eyes are open, according to common sense and optics light impinges on the eye and forms come into range. So, I'm not at all sure that is the meaning the Buddha was giving to 'internal' and 'external' in the material you quote about seeing. ---------------------------------------------- > > in combination with this, from MN136: > > To begin with it was the three kinds of feeling that were asked about > by the wanderer Potaliputta. If, when this misguided man Samiddhi was > asked, he had answered the wanderer Potaliputta thus:'After doing an > intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to > be felt as pleasure, he feels pleasure; after doing an intentional > kamma by way of body, speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as > pain, he feels pain; after doing an intentional kamma by way of body, > speech and mind (whose result is) to be felt as > neither-pain-nor-pleasure, he feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure' — by > answering him thus, Ananda, the misguided man Samiddhi would have > given the wanderer Potaliputta the right answer. > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > But the foregoing is neutral with regard to whether the kamma determines > the affective nature of the particular dhamma to arise or determines the > operation of vedana on the dhamma. So, I don't consider that quoted material as > definitive as regards the inherent versus extrinsic issue as regards > affective feel of dhammas. > ---------------------------------------------------- OK. How about this little snippet you quoted for me in another thread the other day? "Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) phenomena (dhamma). Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox. Mind is the forerunner of (all good) phenomena (dhamma). Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, AFFECTION follows one, even as one's shadow that never leaves. ****************** Note: In the foregoing, I replaced "states" by "phenomena (dhamma)," as the Pali word is 'dhamma'." ---------------------------------------------- Howard: What about it? That can be interpreted to mean that unpleasant dhammas arise as the result of unwholesome kamma etc. This is also neutral as to whether affective feel is intrinsic to the dhamma or mentally imposed. ------------------------------------------------ Cheers Me, Myself, I ============================= With metta, Not-me, not-myself, not-I ;-)) #93570 From: "connie" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 9:36 pm Subject: In praise of the Mangala Sutta nichiconn Dear Phil, P: (Ilove a detail here - every night after finishing his busy schedule for the day, the Buddha put a couple of hours aside after midnight for the Devas, he would sit out in the temple yard and wait for them to come, cascading their radiant light in the night as they came) c: me too. I was looking in the Chronicle of Buddhas today and thought of you when I saw "That of the Lord Ma'ngala". The end is very beatiful: 27. The (normal) life-span lasted then for ninety thousand years. Living so long he caused many people to cross over. 28. Just as it is not possible to count the waves of the ocean so it was not possible to count his disciples. 29. For as long as the leader named Ma'ngala, the Self-Awakened One, was alive there was no dying then with defilements (present) in his Dispensation. 30. Having carried the torch of Dhamma and caused the great populace to cross, he, of a great retinue, blazing like a column of fire waned out. 31. Having shown devas and men the essential nature of the constructions, blazing like a mass of fire, as the setting sun, 32. the Buddha Man'ngala waned out in the park named Vessara. A Conqueror's thuupa to him there was thirty yojanas high. P: We should be very grateful for the mundane aspects of our Buddhist practice, for the way it leads to harmonious relations with people ... c: Speaking of himself as Suruci after the Buddha M'angala had given him the prediction of Buddhahood, he said, "When I had heard his words too, all the more did I incline my mind. I resolutely determined on further practice for fulfilling the ten perfections." These are the same words he repeats after the predictions of Sumana, Revata, Sumedha & Piyadassin. Almost the same under Sujaata, but then it's "all the more did I rejoice". Under Anomadassin, Paduma & Atthadassin, it is slightly different: "When I had heard his words, exultant, stirred in mind, I resolutely determined on further practice for fulfilling the ten perfections." Under Naarada & Padumuttara: "When I heard his words, all the more gladdened in mind, I resolutely determined on the strenuous practice for fulfilling the ten perfections." Those are just the next dozen or so stories after Ma'ngala, but you get the idea. Isn't this what Nina always preaches? Even when the emphasis is on understanding? peace, connie #93571 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 12:14 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Cariyapitaka iii.1 nilovg Dear Connie, Thank you. Op 15-dec-2008, om 23:58 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > Basket of Conduct, Division III: The Perfection of Renunciation > (Nikkhammapaaramitaa) > > 1. Conduct of Yudha~njaya (Yudha~njayacariya'm) > > 1. When I was Yudha~njaya, the king's own son, of immeasurable > renown, I thrilled when I saw a dew-drop fallen down in the warmth > of the sun.* > 2. Taking that itself as the sign I increased the thrill. Honouring > my mother and father I requested (their consent) for the going forth. -------- And this is from Kh Sujin's Perfections, Ch 4, The Perfection of Wisdom: < If we develop satipatthna time and again, pa will be gradually accumulated so that it becomes keener, and reaches the degree of a perfection which realizes the four noble Truths. We read in the Khuddhaka Nikya in the Commentary to the Basket of Conduct, the Conduct of Yudajaya, about the beginning of the development of pa during the life the Bodhisatta was young Yudajaya 1 : In his life when the Bodhisatta was Yudajaya, he was the eldest son of the King and had the rank of the viceroy. He fulfilled every day mah-dna 2, the giving of an abundance of gifts. One day when he visited the royal park he saw the dewdrops hanging like a string of pearls on the tree-tops, the grass-tips, the end of the branches and on the spiders webs. The prince enjoyed himself in the royal park and when the sun rose higher all the dewdrops that were hanging there disintegrated and disappeared. He reflected thus: These dewdrops came into being and then disappeared. Evenso are conditioned realities, the lives of all beings; they are like the dewdrops hanging on the grass-tips. He felt a sense of urgency and became disenchanted with worldly life, so that he took leave of his parents and became a recluse. From this story we can learn that people have different degrees of understanding. We may see dew drops hanging on grass-tips, but who has pa to the degree of causing a sense of urgency and disenchantment when he compares his own life with the evanescent dew? We read: The Bodhisatta realized the impermanence of the dewdrops and made this predominant in accumulating a sense of urgency and disenchantment; it arose once and then became a condition leading to its arising very often. When right understanding with a sense of urgency arises we should not let it pass by without paying attention to it. We should reflect on the conditions for this sense of urgency so that it can arise more often. The thought of death and impermanence can be a condition for further developing the perfections. The Commentary to the Conduct of Yudajaya explains about the beginning of pa in that life of the Bodhisatta. We read: By offering mah-dna before he retired from the world and by his giving up of the kingdom he fulfilled the perfection of giving. By his restraint in action and speech he fulfilled the perfection of sla. By his going forth from worldly life and by his attainment of jhna he fulfilled the perfection of renunciation. In that life he began to develop pa by wise consideration of impermanence so that eventually the higher powers (abhis) could be attained; he developed pa which could distinguish the dhammas that were beneficial from those that were not beneficial for the development of generosity and so on. In that way he fulfilled the perfection of pa. By energy for the accomplishment of what was beneficial in all his undertakings he fulfilled the perfection of energy. By patience associated with pa (na khanti) and by endurance (adhivasana khanti) he fulfilled the perfection of patience. By not speaking wrongly, not deviating from what he had promised, he fulfilled the perfection of truthfulness. By his unshakable determination in all that he undertook and observed, he fulfilled the perfection of determination. By the power of the divine abiding of loving-kindness, thinking only of the benefit of all beings, he fulfilled the perfection of loving- kindness. By his evenmindedness towards beings contrarious behaviour, and by the divine abiding of equanimity, he fulfilled the perfection of equanimity. These are the ways by which he fulfilled the ten perfections.> ---------- (end quote) N: A remark about patience associated with pa~n~naa: we need so much patience in developing understanding litle by little, not becoming discouraged. It is by clinging to a self that one may become disheartened, thinking of 'my understanding' that should be more accomplished. Patience as to one's surroundings (adhivasana khanti), when there is understanding of the six worlds appearing one at a time through the six doors, there will be more patience with regard to the worldly conditions. ****** Nina. #93572 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 12:17 am Subject: Re: [dsg] In praise of the Mangala Sutta nilovg Dear Connie, Wish I would practise what I 'preach'. Nina Op 16-dec-2008, om 6:36 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > Isn't this what Nina always preaches? Even when the emphasis is on > understanding? #93573 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 10:20 pm Subject: In praise of the Mangala Sutta ( was Re: Lodewijk's Diary, 2.) philofillet Hi again Nina and Lodewijk Sorry if my screed was aggressive in tone. I like the way I am compelled to share Dhamma, but haven't got the tone quite right! I'm confident that that will come, gradually. I like to note consistencies. I write a post to share something that I think will be helpful, then come back to apologize for my overbearing way. It's very consistent. I like that! I just heard BB talk about 4 aspects that should be involved in criticizing. One of them is to be sure that the criticism is correct. I know that I don't really make an effort to follow up on my criticism of A.S to provide it is justified, so I should abstain from now on. One good Dhamma friend I know has succeeded (so far!) in a resolution to participate here without mentionning A.S by name. Maybe I will get there. Not yet, though. Another of the aspects is to be gentle in tone. That is something that can come sooner. metta, Phil #93574 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 10:40 pm Subject: Re: In praise of the Mangala Sutta philofillet Hi Connie > > P: (Ilove a detail here - every night after finishing his busy schedule for the day, the Buddha put a couple of hours aside after midnight for the Devas, he would sit out in the temple yard and wait for them to come, cascading their radiant light in the night as they came) > > c: me too. Ph: It's really beautiful the way BB describes it in the talks you linked us too. > > I was looking in the Chronicle of Buddhas today and thought of you when I saw "That of the Lord Ma'ngala". The end is very beatiful: > > 27. The (normal) life-span lasted then for ninety thousand years. Living so long he caused many people to cross over. > 28. Just as it is not possible to count the waves of the ocean so it was not possible to count his disciples. > 29. For as long as the leader named Ma'ngala, the Self-Awakened One, was alive there was no dying then with defilements (present) in his Dispensation. > 30. Having carried the torch of Dhamma and caused the great populace to cross, he, of a great retinue, blazing like a column of fire waned out. > 31. Having shown devas and men the essential nature of the constructions, blazing like a mass of fire, as the setting sun, > 32. the Buddha Man'ngala waned out in the park named Vessara. A Conqueror's thuupa to him there was thirty yojanas high. Ph: Sorry Connie. This doesn't ring my bell, but might be too frenzied right now too read/listen properly! :) > P: We should be very grateful for the mundane aspects of our Buddhist practice, for the way it leads to harmonious relations with people ... > > c: Speaking of himself as Suruci after the Buddha M'angala had given him the prediction of Buddhahood, he said, "When I had heard his words too, all the more did I incline my mind. I resolutely determined on further practice for fulfilling the ten perfections." These are the same words he repeats after the predictions of Sumana, Revata, Sumedha & Piyadassin. Almost the same under Sujaata, but then it's "all the more did I rejoice". > > Under Anomadassin, Paduma & Atthadassin, it is slightly different: > > "When I had heard his words, exultant, stirred in mind, I resolutely determined on further practice for fulfilling the ten perfections." > > Under Naarada & Padumuttara: "When I heard his words, all the more gladdened in mind, I resolutely determined on the strenuous practice for fulfilling the ten perfections." > > Those are just the next dozen or so stories after Ma'ngala, but you get the idea. > > Isn't this what Nina always preaches? Even when the emphasis is on understanding? Ph: I guess so. I don't know. I think there are too many concerns about sakkaya-ditthi involved in Nina's approach and that because of these concerns "strenuous practice" is not possible. I don't think it's possible to have "strenuous practice for the fulfillment of the ten perfections" AND say, as Nina said to Lukas(?) as I think she did that "you are listening and considering, you are doing enough." She said something like that. I'm sure there are many wrong aspects in the way "strenuous practice" is pushed on people these days, I can see the wrong aspects in all the teachers I have heard (for example Mahasi.Sayadaw, Th. Bhikkhu.) There is too much about moving into attainments in all those approaches. But still "you are doing enough by listening and considering" is not right either, I feel. I am pretty sure she said that to Lukas (sorry, I forget his name, he is our friend from Poland.) Strenuous practice of the perfections involves (at the beginning) going against the stream of our gross defilements, and that is hard work. It is very rare that a person can say with confidence "I am doing enough" and a Dhamma friend that tells one "you are doing enough" is very unlikely to be giving good advice, in my opinion. "I am doing enough/you are doing enough" sounds disastrous to me. But I suppose if one is really intent on eliminating sakkaya-ditthi from the beginning "you are doing enough" has got to be all right because otherwise there will necessarily be self involved, people doing actions, etc. I am aware of the danger of sakkaya-ditthi but I am aware of greater dangers as well. First things first. I suppose I should forget about the Perfections because according to BB's talk they have to be completely selfless, and my kusala certainly isn't. I sometimes wonder why bother to study the perfections, perhaps it's enough for me to practice in line with such things as 10 kusala kamma patha and 10 bases of merit and things like that. Thanks Connie, and Nina and Lukas if that is your name! :) Last word to you. This has been my weekly or monthly appearance at DSG. Metta, Phil #93575 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 1:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] In praise of the Mangala Sutta ( was Re: Lodewijk's Diary, 2.) nilovg Dear Phil, I also read your later posts and do not worry I take your remarks amiss. I am used to your style and you mean well. Op 16-dec-2008, om 2:43 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > I think I know how you will respond to this sutta, Nina. I think > you will say something like "Lodewijk and I are very fond of this > sutta, we were impressed when we heard the monks chant it at so and > so place" but as always you will just be paying lip service to the > sutta, because the advice you gave Lodewijk above is not in line > with the sutta. We should be very grateful for the mundane aspects > of our Buddhist practice, for the way it leads to harmonious > relations with people (yes, yes, yes, I know, insight into "there is > only one world of seeing" etc etc leads to harmonious relations, you > say, I say it is dangerous to count on one's feeble panna to fulfill > the duty to have harmonious relations with others) ------- N: I wrote about this sutta on the highest blessings in my first book, Buddhism in Daily Life. I quote from it, it is the last Ch: Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 1:44 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: In praise of the Mangala Sutta nilovg Dear Phil, Op 16-dec-2008, om 7:40 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > I sometimes wonder why bother to study the perfections, perhaps it's > enough for me to practice in line with such things as 10 kusala > kamma patha and 10 bases of merit and things like that. ------- N: Enough for you ? :-)) Ten bases of merit are a great enterprise. Especially bhavana, this is not without pa~n~naa. Nina. #93577 From: "sprlrt" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 2:00 am Subject: Re: how to view the self sprlrt Hi Robert (and Ken), This is what I came up with, in tipitaka the definition of rupa dhammas includes that they cannot experience anything and that they must have a shape and form, while the definition of nama dhammas includes the opposite, that they must experience an object and that they cannot have any shape or form. The objects (arammana) that nama must experience, which include rupa dhammas experienced through all the 6 doors as well as other classes of objects experienced through the sixth door only, the mind, can in their turn be classified or grouped as pleasant, very pleasant or unpleasant, ithhi, atithhi or anitthi arammana, and this classifies the objects of nama in relation to one of the nama dhamma that experience it, the vedana khandha, feeling, which accompanies each citta, kusala, akusala, vipaka or kiriya. Pleasant objects of citta can be further classified whether intrinsically plesant and not, sabhava or parikamma ittharammana, this when considering object-predominance condition, arammanadhipati paccaya. The subject can get really complicate and controversial when taking into account causes and results, kamma and vipaka, including birth consciousness/patisandhi and life-continuum/bhavanga citta, still interested? Alberto --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Robert" wrote: > > Hello Ken, > > Please elaborate on what you were referring to below as an inherently pleasant rupa. I think I > can understand when you say kusala namas are inherently different from akusala namas, but > I am having trouble picturing what would be an inherently pleasant rupa. I have always > understood rupa as being that which can be experienced through the five senses and that > could not be inherently pleasant or unpleasant. What is the correct definition of rupa? > > Thank you - Robert A. > > > But Shakespeare didn't know about namas and rupas. They have absolute > > characteristics. Pleasant rupas are inherently different from > > unpleasant rupas. Kusala namas are inherently different from akusala > > namas . . . It's a wonderful, profound, unique, new teaching! > > > #93578 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Dec 15, 2008 9:12 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self upasaka_howard Hi, Alberto - In a message dated 12/16/2008 5:01:06 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, sprlrt@... writes: Hi Robert (and Ken), This is what I came up with, in tipitaka the definition of rupa dhammas includes that they cannot experience anything and that they must have a shape and form, while the definition of nama dhammas includes the opposite, that they must experience an object and that they cannot have any shape or form. --------------------------------------------- Howard: What are the shapes of heat, hardness, air, and sound? ---------------------------------------------- Alberto ======================== With metta, Howard #93579 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 2:14 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All part II egberdina Hi Scott, 2008/12/15 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Thanks for the reply: > > > H: "I'm not a card-carrying Theravadin, that's for sure. I fully > accept the first two noble truths, I fully accept that cessation of > knowing is the end of stress, and that such cessation is possible. I > see no point in taking a verbal stance on the 8 fold noble path, it's > not talking the talk that matters, but walking the walk. It's less > what we say, but more what we do that is making our yet untrodden > paths. And though some may prefer to hide behind theory and > expressions of faith, bit by bit we make known to each other where we > have been, and where we are now." > > Scott: Thanks for the above. I'd say, bit by bit one thinks about an > 'other' and thinks one has an idea of 'where an other has been' but > its likely not relevant. I would say it in the reverse direction. Bit by bit, one questions what one has already thought. An analysis of the past doesn't alter the fact of it's occurrence, though. I would say that such post-hoc analysis is quite irrelevant, and removes one from the present. Panna is not for the sake of knowing the past, but for the sake of abandoning the present. > We likely consider 'study' in different ways > (and 'practise,' for that matter). And it is a given that kamma leads > to result. The distinction between 'walking the walk' and 'talking > the talk' is senseless when applied to discussion of a forum devoted > to discussing Dhamma. When one is discussing theory its a theoretical > discussion. > When Nina, Jon, Sarah, Scott, colette, Howard, KenH, TG, Alex, Phil, Larry, connie, James (no particular order, sorry for omissions, sorry for where anyone was placed :-)) discuss theory, it is immediately obvious who is saying what, and not because of whose name appears at the sign off stage. The notion of pure theory is debunked by all of us. > We also likely differ greatly in the way in which 'faith' is > understood, and the way in which 'faith' has a function in life. > There is nothing to be done about this. What one considers 'hiding > behind expression of faith' might be an expression of despair that > 'faith' has no conditions to arise in that one and such an expression > might reflect simple craving. And there is nothing to be done about > that either. (See above on the relevance of thinking about an 'other'.) I do not understand what role "there is nothing to be done" has in a paragraph about faith. Is faith like a large birth mark on your penis, something you are born with and put up with? > > H: "I tend to limit myself to suttas that are applicable to my daily > life. I am not interested in studying the suttas as an integral work." > > Scott: Fair enough. Over to you... > My turn to ask you about you. What gives with the unbridled conviction that you approximate a true Buddhist? Cheers Herman #93580 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 2:32 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self egberdina Hi Alberto, 2008/12/16 sprlrt : > Hi Robert (and Ken), > > > The subject can get really complicate and controversial when taking > into account causes and results, kamma and vipaka, including birth > consciousness/patisandhi and life-continuum/bhavanga citta, still > interested? > As it stands, most of what you have dispensed is pure definition. By that I mean that it lacks any empirical content, it doesn't refer to anything knowable in the real world you and I share. If you can cope with that being pointed out to you, then I'm sure things won't get too controversial. Cheers Herman #93581 From: "Phil" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 2:32 am Subject: [dsg] In praise of the Mangala Sutta ( was Re: Lodewijk's Diary, 2.) philofillet Hi Nina Thanks for the below. As I expected, it interprets the sutta in a much more paramattha way than I see (or, based on his talks, much more than BB sees or chooses to share with his listeners anyways) but that is ok. You are wonderfully consistent! Thank you also for your encouragement re bases of merit. You'll recall that I posted a series about A.S's book on them. So until the next time I rant... Metta, Phil > ------- > N: I wrote about this sutta on the highest blessings in my first > book, Buddhism in Daily Life. > I quote from it, it is the last Ch: > can change the relationship between parents and children, hus- band > and wife, relatives and friends. There is bound to be attach-ment and > displeasure or anger in one's relationship with others, but when > satipaEhna is developed there will be less clinging to the concept > of self and this will bear also on our relationship with others. When > other people treat us badly we can remember that in the ultimate > sense there is no self or person who suffers, and that there is no > person who behaves in a disagreeable way. #93582 From: "sprlrt" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 3:26 am Subject: [dsg] Re: how to view the self sprlrt Hi Howard, --------------------------------------------- Howard: What are the shapes of heat, hardness, air, and sound? ---------------------------------------------- A: Right, one rupa only has shape, visible object, though this rupa arises, being one of the inseparables, in all gropus/kalapa, including those you mentioned, thanks for the correction, though. Alberto #93583 From: "sprlrt" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 3:27 am Subject: [dsg] Re: how to view the self sprlrt Hi Herman H: As it stands, most of what you have dispensed is pure definition. A: That's right H: By that I mean that it lacks any empirical content, it doesn't refer to anything knowable in the real world you and I share. A: The worlds of concepts, one for each of us. Alberto #93584 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 3:56 am Subject: Lodewijk's Diary, 3. nilovg Dear friends, L: Great Excitement in Cecho-Slovakia, hundred thousands of people on the street. Dubcek back in Prague (Nov. 1989). Feverishly busy the whole day. ---------- N: When we realize our anger we can see its disadvantage and then develop metta instantly. The self is in the way all the time. Metta helps us to be less selfish. We are inclined to judge someone else so fast, but we should remember that he has accumulated such or such particular feature, he is conditioned in that way. When we see someone else who looks strange in his appearance or outfit, is there conceit? Or do we see him as a friend? The value of patience: when there is more metta there is also more patience. How do we think about others? With kusala citta or with akusala citta? Through satipatthaana we come to know cittas more in detail. Through metta one can become more humble. Sariputta considered himself as a dustrag. We are not somebody, but rather a nobody, anatta. -------- Nina. #93585 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 4:14 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts sarahprocter... Hi TG, --- On Sun, 14/12/08, TGrand458@... wrote: S:>>The Buddha is not referring to being skilled in the knowledge of the impermanence or cessation of pencils, purple elephants, people or philosophical fantasies:-) T ............ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ...... >TG: As for pencils, purple elephants, people or philosophical fantasies, those are not the particular subjects being discussed. .... S: The particular subject being discussed by us is whether or not concepts are included in the dhatus. I indicated why they aren't. The Buddha's teachings are not for the purpose of developing insight into the above. ... TG:> But on many many many occasions we can see the Buddha teaching about impermanence and dependence of "conventional amalagamations, " the type of which you indicate here. ... S: This is why we have to read the suttas very carefully and consider exactly what is meant. Otherwise, as Scott has been pointing out repeatedly, it's just thinking about ideas of impermanence and dependence. .... >TG: This Sutta you selected does not support your case, its neutral toward your case. Only a slanted view would leave someone to think it was supportive of a "ultimate realities with their own characteristics" viewpoint. You pick and choose just the Suttas that you want to support your case with, and then often comment way beyond where they go. .... S: You asked for a sutta to indicate where the Buddha said that 'conditioned dhammas' or 'elements' only refer to paramattha dhammas. I re-quoted from the sutta you and Alex had referred us to which indicated that elements are conditioned or the unconditioned (i.e nibbana). I further quoted from a sutta on the khandhas which clearly indicated that the conditioned and impermanent dhammas refer to the 5 khandhas only and not to concepts. Next time, perhaps I'll just pass:-) Have a peaceful and wise holiday season, TG. Metta, Sarah ======= #93586 From: "jonoabb" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:10 am Subject: [dsg] Re: On Concepts jonoabb Hi TG > TG: Here is a copy of some passages I just wrote to Scott. (Written for > Scott.) Maybe it will clarify. Also, the actual post to Scott might help you > see what I am responding to... I'm afraid it doesn't clarify much, because it is an "interpretation" of the suttas, without any textual basis for its particular idiosyncracies. Nor have you explained why dhammas (i.e., khandhas, ayatanas, elements) are rejected as being object of insight development. > TG: One first discerns a quality for direct analysis. (This is the stage > where > you begin, substantialize, and stop apparently.) Then the conditional nature > of that quality is investigated. In doing so, if done well, then THAT > quality becomes seen as "having nothing of itself." You are fond of the bogeyman of "substantialization" (of dhammas?). But there is no such 'sin' (i.e., wrong view) mentioned in the texts, as far as I'm aware. What exactly is meant by this? Likewise the seeing of something as "having nothing of itself" is not found in the texts. Can you explain this in terms the language used in the suttas or commentaries? > It becomes seen as empty, > hollow, void, insubstantial, like a mirage, like a conjurer's trick. > BECAUSE... > IT is not "itself," it is an amalgamation of conditions. Its IS a mere > condition...condition...impermanent, afflicted with impermanenc Again, is the expression <>, or an equivalent, found in the texts? Could you restate this in terms of the teachings as we have them? > It should be seen as death, a murderer, poison, a disease, a boil, a dart, a > raised sword. (Gosh, not an "ultimate reality" in the bunch.) But isn't it dhammas that are being described here? Jon #93587 From: "jonoabb" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:12 am Subject: Re: Suttas in which the Buddha held back the deep teaching? jonoabb Hi Alex > By "high level induvidual" I've meant what in Comy is called > Ugghatitannu induvidial or someone with already well developed 5 > faculties such as Ven. Bahiya, Ven. Sariputta & Ven. MahaMoggallana. > > > - for the rest (including everyone living at this time), mundane > > jhana must be attained before enlightenment can be attained. > > The rest: Neyya or those whose 5 faculties are not well developed, > fetters are strong and thus require stronger measures. I'm not disputing the commentarial classification of the 4 types of individuals. But I'm not aware of any text that says that the individual with stronger fetters needs jhana while the individual with well-developed faculties may not. Can you show me where this is stated (or implied) in the texts? > > What is the sutta basis for this distinction? Do the texts mention > > the case of the "high level individual"? > > Bahiya is one example. Pukkusati (from MN140) is another. Please > note, Pukkusati meditated for couple of hours (most of the night) > prior to hearing Buddha's discource and becoming an Anagami > immeadetely after. I'm not sure what you mean by "meditated" in this context. But in any event, how does this support the distinction you are trying to make? Pukkusati, like many others, became enlightened while listening to the Buddha's discourse, in this case a discourse on the theme "One should not neglect wisdom, should preserve truth, should cultivate relinquishment, and should train for peace." > Jhana softens the mind & make it workable for insight & considering > to be able to reach through. It is true that that there are many instances in the texts of monks with jhana attaining enlightenment. But it should not be deduced from this that jhana is the preferred path for the attaining of enlightenment. If it were, the Buddha would have said so. But he didn't. He encouraged the development of jhana for its own sake, just as he encouraged the development of other kinds of kusala. And he encouraged the development of insight without in any way tying it to the development of jhana. > People today have lots of defilements and neurosis and thus it is > harder for them to accept the true teachings. 5 Hindrances are > stronger today as there is more fuel for them and we don't have a > brilliant teacher called Buddha to give us personal guidance. > > Thus more preliminary work at clearing 'space' must be done. You are correct in saying that that it is harder for people nowadays to accept the true teachings. This is because of wrong view. It is wrong view, not the 5 hindrances, that is the greatest impediment to the development of insight. Jon #93588 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:15 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All sarahprocter... Dear Scott (& Herman), --- On Sun, 14/12/08, Scott wrote: >AN 9:34 Nibbaanasukhasutta. m <...> ...Puna capara.m, aavuso, bhikkhu sabbaso nevasa~n~naanaasa~ n~naayatana. m samatikkamma sa~n~naavedayitanir odha.m upasampajja viharati, pa~n~naaya cassa disvaa aasavaa parikkhii.naa honti. Iminaapi kho eta.m, aavuso, pariyaayena veditabba.m yathaa sukha.m nibbaana''nti. .... Sarah: Try this, perhaps: "...Furthermore, there is the case where a monk, with the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception(nevasa~n~naanaasa~ n~naayatana. m ), enters & remains in the cessation of perception & feeling (sa~n~naavedayitanirodha.m upasampajja viharati). And, having seen [that]with discernment (pa~n~naaya cassa disvaa ), his mental fermentations are completely ended (aasavaa parikkhii.naa honti). So by this line of reasoning it may be known (veditabba.m) how Unbinding is pleasant (sukha.m nibbaana''nti_." .... Sarah: I understand the sutta to be referring to the attainment of arahantship whereby the highest jhana is the basis for such attainment. I remember discussing AN 9s, 36 before. From B.Bodhi's translation: "The Destruction of the Taints" "I declare, O monks, that the destruction of the taints occurs in dependence on the first jhaana, the second jhaana, the third jhaana, the fourth jhaana; in dependence on the base of the infinity of space, the base of the infinity of consciousnesss, the base of nothingness, the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; in dependence on the cessation of perception and feeling. <...> "Thus monks, the penetration to final knowledge takes place to the extent that there are the attainments with perception. But as to these two bases - the attainment of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, and the cessation of perception and feeling - I say that these are to be extolled by those monks who are meditators, skilled in their attainment and in emerging from the attainment, after they have attained them and emerged from them." BB's note: "The base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is too subtle to be explored by insight knowledge, and the cessation of perception and feeling is altogether devoid of mental constituents. Thus these two attainments cannot be directly taken as objects for investigation with insight. But both can be used as means for achieving temporary purification of the mind, on the basis of which the meditator can practise insight meditation on grosser objects and thereby attain arahantship." .... Sarah: I suppose that relative to nirodha samapatti, even the arupa jhana cittas would be "grosser objects". Well beyond my range.... Metta, Sarah ======= #93589 From: "jonoabb" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:18 am Subject: Q. [dsg] Re: Series Survey Quote. jonoabb Hi James > > As with the other suttas in the salayatana-samyutta, I would see this > > sutta as talking about matters directly relevant to the development > > of insight. > > > > Why? I understand the ayatanas to be a way of classifying what is to be understood by wisdom, what is to be the object of insight. This I think becomes apparent from a general look at the suttas of the salayatana-samyutta. Jon #93590 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 12:20 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts upasaka_howard Hi, Jon (and TG) - In a message dated 12/16/2008 8:11:02 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: You are fond of the bogeyman of "substantialization" (of dhammas?). But there is no such 'sin' (i.e., wrong view) mentioned in the texts, as far as I'm aware. What exactly is meant by this? Likewise the seeing of something as "having nothing of itself" is not found in the texts. Can you explain this in terms the language used in the suttas or commentaries? ============================== If I may butt in: As I see it, and as I understand TG to see it, substantialization of dhammas is seeming to find self/essence/core/own-being in them. It is a species of atta-view. It is not a bogeyman, but something truly to look out for, for it is contrary to dependent origination. The Buddha repeatedly hammered against true existence as an extreme (for example in the Kaccayanagotta Sutta) and against substantialism (as in the Uraga Sutta). With metta, Howard #93591 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:24 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas sarahprocter... Hi Alberto (& Howard), You've been having some useful discussions together. Just a quick comment here: --- On Sat, 13/12/08, sprlrt wrote: >>Howard: That's right. But the thinking does occur, and often it is based on realities. >A: Just in the first of the many mind door processes that follow a sense door one. .... S: I think we can say that all thinking, directly or indirectly, is based on realities. Without the khandhas, without namas and rupas, there'd be no thinking at all. As for when thinking immediately follows the experiencing of a reality, the first mind-door process directly experiences the characteristic of the same rupa (just experienced through the sense door). This is likely to be followed by thinking, but there can also be the experience of a reality through the mind door, followed by more thinking. For example, attachment may be experienced as object (with or without awareness, usually without of course), followed by thinking about the story. Any thoughts? Metta, Sarah ===== #93592 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 12:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts upasaka_howard Hi again, Jon (and TG) - In a message dated 12/16/2008 8:20:41 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Hi, Jon (and TG) - In a message dated 12/16/2008 8:11:02 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: You are fond of the bogeyman of "substantialization" (of dhammas?). But there is no such 'sin' (i.e., wrong view) mentioned in the texts, as far as I'm aware. What exactly is meant by this? Likewise the seeing of something as "having nothing of itself" is not found in the texts. Can you explain this in terms the language used in the suttas or commentaries? ============================== If I may butt in: As I see it, and as I understand TG to see it, substantialization of dhammas is seeming to find self/essence/core/own-being in them. It is a species of atta-view. It is not a bogeyman, but something truly to look out for, for it is contrary to dependent origination. The Buddha repeatedly hammered against true existence as an extreme (for example in the Kaccayanagotta Sutta) and against substantialism (as in the Uraga Sutta). With metta, Howard ================================= Another important sutta clearly arguing against true-existence view is the Channa Sutta, and another sutta screaming out against substantialism is the Phena Sutta (with explicit regard to paramattha dhammas), to wit: Form is like a glob of foam; feeling, a bubble; perception, a mirage; fabrications, a banana tree; consciousness, a magic trick — this has been taught by the Kinsman of the Sun. However you observe them, appropriately examine them, they're empty, void to whoever sees them appropriately. So, you tell me, Jon - doesn't the Buddha rather much makes substantialism, in your words, "a sin"? With metta, Howard #93593 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:36 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The speed of cittas sarahprocter... Hi TG, I was also interested in this comment that you wrote to Scott: --- On Sat, 13/12/08, TGrand458@... wrote: >I'll continue to use "conditions, " as I think most here are privy enough to realize that such refers to "whatever arises, alters, ceases," including delusion. You're just going to have to live with it or ignore it I guess. :-) ... S: 'Whatever' as in whatever dhamma? So is delusion a dhamma or a 'whatever' that arises? Does it have any characteristic of any kind? If so what? "Of those things (dhammaa) that arise from a cause, The Tathaagata has told the cause, And also what their cessation is: This is the doctrine of the Great Recluse." "Ye dhammaa hetupphabbhavaa tesa"m hetu"m tathaagato aaha, tesa~n ca yo nirodho eva"mvaadii mahaasama.no." Metta, Sarah ======= #93594 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:39 am Subject: Q. [dsg] Re: Series Survey Quote. buddhatrue Hi Jon, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "jonoabb" wrote: > > Hi James > > > > As with the other suttas in the salayatana-samyutta, I would see > this > > > sutta as talking about matters directly relevant to the > development > > > of insight. > > > > > > > Why? > > I understand the ayatanas to be a way of classifying what is to be > understood by wisdom, what is to be the object of insight. This I > think becomes apparent from a general look at the suttas of the > salayatana-samyutta. > Do you think it is a good idea to evaluate suttas based on generalizations? Metta, James #93595 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 12:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas upasaka_howard Hi, Sarah (and Alberto) - In a message dated 12/16/2008 8:24:44 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, sarahprocterabbott@... writes: Hi Alberto (& Howard), You've been having some useful discussions together. Just a quick comment here: --- On Sat, 13/12/08, sprlrt wrote: >>Howard: That's right. But the thinking does occur, and often it is based on realities. >A: Just in the first of the many mind door processes that follow a sense door one. .... S: I think we can say that all thinking, directly or indirectly, is based on realities. Without the khandhas, without namas and rupas, there'd be no thinking at all. ----------------------------------------------- Howard: I agree entirely, though, like TG, I'm not a fan of reality terminology. ----------------------------------------------- As for when thinking immediately follows the experiencing of a reality, the first mind-door process directly experiences the characteristic of the same rupa (just experienced through the sense door). -------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not sure I'd call that thinking. It is fresh recollection and recognition. ------------------------------------------------- This is likely to be followed by thinking, but there can also be the experience of a reality through the mind door, followed by more thinking. For example, attachment may be experienced as object (with or without awareness, usually without of course), followed by thinking about the story. ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes - as the Buddha points out in the Ball of Honey Sutta, when ignorance is operative, recognition follows in the wake of feeling, and then cogni tive and affective proliferation. Specifically, the Buddha teaches "What one feels, one perceives (labels in the mind). What one perceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one complicates. Based on what a person complicates, the perceptions & categories of complication assail him/her with regard to past, present, & future forms cognizable via the eye." --------------------------------------------------- Any thoughts? Metta, Sarah =============================== With metta, Howard #93596 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The speed of cittas sarahprocter... Hi Alberto, Howard & all, This was the kind of discussion in which I thought you were both making useful points which I'd like to highlight again for others' benefit:-) **** >A: An intricate subject pannati, concepts are paccaya, conditions for dhammas to arise in future, but concepts are not paccayuppanna, the (dhammas that) result because of past conditions. ------------ --------- --------- --------- ------- >Howard: It is the thinking that is conditioned and that also serves as condition. When thinking, there is just the thinking. The alleged objects of thought are mere projections, sometimes based on realities, sometimes not - but it is only the thinking that is occurring. When I think about hardness, warmth, my family, or whatever, there is just the thinking. ------------ --------- --------- --------- -------- >A:And they aren't sankhara either, conditioned to arise, since they don't. ------------ --------- --------- --------- -------- >Howard: That's right. But the thinking does occur, and often it is based on realities. ------------ --------- --------- --------- ------- A:> So I agreee, conditioned isn't the best word to use when dealing with concepts since it can be taken to mean paccayuppanna (the result of past conditions) or sankhara (the dhamma that arises because of conditions & then falls away). ***** Metta, Sarah =========== #93597 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 5:46 am Subject: Re: Similes and Concepts that lead to Arahantship! scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: Me: 'Concepts and similes' are not the only aspects leading to final liberation..." TG: Ahhh, this is progress. I never thought I'd see the day. An honest admission that concepts and similes are aspects that lead to final liberation. Absolutely of course they are not the ONLY aspects that lead to final liberation. They are the 'cattle prods' which prompt the mind toward liberation." Scott: I'm done for, I guess, TG. ;-) Actually, no offense but there is no way we are in agreement. I'm pretty sure we understand 'mind' differently - so differently, in fact, that we must be living in separate universes. I do, however, admire the adaptation of responding to dissonance with incorporation, you wee cannibal, you. Saves on food bills I'd warrant. ;-) TG: "Reflecting off of these 'wise considerations,' and direct experience of the elements and aggregates, and wise consideration of their causal factors, are all factors leading to detachment." Scott: In the above you write the term 'wise considerations.' This is not yoniso manasikaara. In the sense you seem to be using the term, you are referring to conventional thinking. TG: "This is all very important because generally the KS side of this DSG wants to completely dismiss the conceptual aspect of insight. This is a mistake. It is painfully obvious that the Buddha's teaching in the Suttas makes no apologies whatsoever in employing concepts and similes at very advanced levels progressing towards Arahantship." Scott: Pedagogy, TG, and good stuff no doubt. It is *direct insight* (pa~n~naa cetasika - a paramattha dhamma with unique characteristic) taking as object an other paramattha dhamma and knowing one of the three characteristics of conditioned dhammas that leads to liberation. Reflecting on the Dhamma, thinking about the Dhamma - understood as a mundane conceptual and cognitive endeavour - this has to serve as an indirect preparation but it is not the final arbitrator. As I understand it, English words, take 'contemplation', for example, which seem to imply something about thinking about something in a certain manner - again, a conventional notion. I think you rely heavily on the literal, mundane definitions of English words for Pa.li terms, and in this go wrong. The Pa.li, 'anupassati,' has a different meaning (correction by real Pa.li scholars required). Consider this explanation, Sammohavinodanii (p. 323): "1207. Herein, Tattha katamaa anupassanaa? Yaa pa~n~naa pajaananaa ('Herein, which is contemplation? That which is understanding, act of understanding'), etc. is said in order to point out by means of what sort of contemplation he is one who contemplates the body...Herein, pa~n~naa pajaananaa (understanding, act of understanding)...should be understood in the same way as in the commentary on the Section on Thought Arisings (cittupaada), (in Asl...)." Atthasaalinii (p. 195): "In the exposition of the 'faculty of understanding' understanding is so called in the sense of knowing plainly, i.e., making plain the meaning of various things. Or, understanding is that which knows states under various aspects as impermantent, etc. This is the primary word. The behaviour of mind in knowing widely is 'wisdom.'" Scott: It is clear that 'contemplation' is, like wise attention, a process in which pa~n~naa plays a role - a kusala state and not one to be engaged in simply by deciding to attend wisely or to contemplate. I suspect that it is the javana sequence, kusala and with such wholesome mental factors as sati and pa~n~naa, that forms the nexus of true contemplation or wise attention and these moments come unbidden by 'you' or 'I.' Manasikaara 'brings to mind' that is focuses citta and cetasikas on the object and when these aspects of consciousness are kusala, then it is wise attention. Let's see you make that happen by virtue of will. ;-) Consider MN 43 Mahaavedallasutta.m "Friend, how many conditions are there for the arising of right view? "Friend, there are two conditions for the arising of right view: The voice of another and wise attention (parato ca ghoso, yoniso ca manasikaaro). These are the two conditions for the arising of right view. "Friend, by how many factors is right view assisted when it has deliverance of mind for its fruit, deliverance of mind for its fruit and benefit, when it has deliverance by wisdom for its fruit, deliverance by wisdom for its fruit and benefit? "Friend, right view is assisted by five factors when it has deliverance of mind for its fruit...when it has deliverance by wisdom for its fruit and benefit. Here, friend, right view is assisted by virtue (siilaanuggahitaa), learning (sutaanuggahitaa), discussion (saakacchaanuggahitaa), serenity (samathaanuggahitaa), and insight (vipassanaanuggahitaa)..." [Kati panaavuso, paccayaa sammaadi.t.thiyaa uppaadaayaa''ti? Dve kho, aavuso, paccayaa sammaadi.t.thiyaa uppaadāya " parato ca ghoso, yoniso ca manasikaaro. Ime kho, aavuso, dve paccayaa sammaadi.t.thiyaa uppaadaayaa''ti. Katihi panaavuso, a"ngehi anuggahitaa sammaadi.t.thi cetovimuttiphalaa ca hoti cetovimuttiphalaanisa.msaa ca, pa~n~naavimuttiphalaa ca hoti pa~n~naavimuttiphalaanisa.msaa caa''ti? Pa~ncahi kho, aavuso, a"ngehi anuggahitaa sammaadi.t.thi cetovimuttiphalaa ca hoti cetovimuttiphalaanisa.msaa ca, pa~n~naavimuttiphalaa ca hoti pa~n~naavimuttiphalaanisa.msaa ca. Idhaavuso, sammaadi.t.thi siilaanuggahitaa ca hoti, sutaanuggahitaa ca hoti, saakacchaanuggahitaa ca hoti, samathaanuggahitaa ca hoti, vipassanaanuggahitaa ca hoti. Imehi kho, aavuso, pa~ncaha"ngehi anuggahitaa sammaadi.t.thi cetovimuttiphalaa ca hoti cetovimuttiphalaanisa.msaa ca, pa~n~naavimuttiphalaa ca hoti pa~n`naavimuttiphalaanisa.msaa caa''ti.] Scott: Hearing the voice of another, and the function of manisikaara as condition for the arising of kusala javana states are condition for right view, which must come first. TG: "This whole notion of dichotomizing 'realities' from 'non-realities' and focusing solely on the former and rejecting that latter is not only a non-issue in the Suttas, its a huge mistake in cultivating insight, and in fact, takes half the steam out of the process. Developing insight is hard enough without needlessly forfeiting half of your weapons." Scott: You seem to think that 'developing insight' is something you can do of your own volition. Pa~n~naa - an impersonal dhamma - develops, alright, but not because 'you' set out to do it. When it comes to the function of pa~n~naa, whether you like it or not, it only takes realities as objects, and only as conditions (a la Pa.t.thaana, not a la TG) allow. I'd say that a failure to learn that this is the case at a level of pariyatti would impede the development of pa~n~naa. This is one way of pointing to the link between indirect and direct 'understanding'. Right view has always to come first. TG: "I have to happily point out that you are starting to regularly use the word 'dynamic' now. When I can get you to start dealing with 'momentums,' then I'll actually feel there's hope." Scott: Ha. Good one. 'Momentums.' A little salt, perhaps, TG? ;-) I've never not used the word 'dynamic,' but use it in a sense which differs from you since I consider the 'dynamics' to describe the ongoing succession of variously constellated moments of consciousness - which moments contain substantive realities with characteristics. You refer to the insubstantial constantly morphing precipitates of conditions dynamically flowing in an interrupted quasi-permanent fashion. We still differ mightily. TG: "I'm in basic agreement as to your overall analysis here and the previous passage. My Abhidhamma is quite rusty, but I don't find what you've said objectionable. At this stage in my practice, I find the 'hyper-analysis' not adding enough inducement toward detachment to justify taking the time away from other approaches...Sutta oriented approaches...I viewed reviewing it as a distraction from more critical investigations. Once the distraction takes hold, it takes on a life of its own and the core topic is sometimes lost." Scott: I'm glad you seem to agree, yet find it difficult to see. You seem to view study as 'practise' - as an 'approach', which I don't. I don't buy the whole 'deliberate practise' thing. As such, the above is, to me, irrelevant and ill-conceived. Reading about the Dhamma is no distraction. Wrong views are. Sorry. TG: "Once again, I'm happy to see here, that you are giving 'concepts' their due, and actually in what I consider a very good proportionate manner." Scott: Mm. Mm. What a meal. ;-) Sincerely, Scott. #93598 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 6:28 am Subject: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "...I do not understand what role 'there is nothing to be done' has in a paragraph about faith. Is faith like a large birth mark on your penis, something you are born with and put up with?" Scott: You cannot will saddha to arise in you. H: "My turn to ask you about you. What gives with the unbridled conviction that you approximate a true Buddhist?" Scott: You are becoming testy, restive, and apparently bored, Herman (and this observation is a function of unwise attention, is, therefore a projection of mine, and so, it is I who am becoming testy, restive, and bored with you). From past observation, soon you will become increasingly caustic and then, after a flurry of angry posts, you will take a break from the list. I'm sorry to have, yet again, failed to engage you in useful discourse. To be fair, though, I find you have failed to engage me. The notion of 'a true Buddhist' is nonsense. We could always switch to discussing 'faith' some time, but for now, I'm taking a break. Late, dude. Sincerely, Scott. #93599 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Dec 16, 2008 2:59 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Concepts, The All upasaka_howard Hi, Scott (and Herman) - In a message dated 12/16/2008 9:29:06 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "...I do not understand what role 'there is nothing to be done' has in a paragraph about faith. Is faith like a large birth mark on your penis, something you are born with and put up with?" Scott: You cannot will saddha to arise in you. =========================== I see that as uncontestably true. However, what I also see as true is that faith (or, better, confidence) in particular teachings arises when observing the way things are and acting according to the teachings results in what the teachings predict. In particular, testing out (ehipassiko) as regards the Dhamma does lead to saddha. At least it has for me. With metta, Howard