11800 From: Lucy Date: Mon Mar 11, 2002 3:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi all What a start ! No-self (anatta), impermanence (anicca), concepts (pannati), conceptual truth , ultimate truth (sorry about the mixed up terminology - don't know whether these two terms are used in an Abhidhamma context), dhammas, right view, etc. etc. all thrown in a few lines. Multitude of questions ... but this is an introduction and the terms will be explained later, so I'll let the questions simmer... Funny. Larry stopped at about the same point where last night I told myself : whoah! stop right there, this is too much already !... Is this saying: the whole world we experience and the experiencer are made out of parts arising, coming together and passing. These parts are either mental (nama) or physical / material (rupa)...? Still, the world looked quite solid to me today, "I" & "others" felt solid and substantial, things looked solid and substantial... ---------- I found this in "The Dhamma Theory" by Y. Karunadasa (Wheel publication 412) "All the different modes of analysis and classification found in the Abhidhamma stem from a single philosophical principle, which gave direction and shape to the entire project of systematization. This principle is the notion that all the phenomena of empirical existence are made up of a number of elementary constituents, the ultimate realities behind the manifest phenomena. These elementary constituents, the building blocks of experience, are called dhammas." The first section of this booklet gives a nice explanation of the various ways of dissecting beings and things into constituents. The article is at: http://watthai.net/talon/wheel.htm (scroll to the bottom of the page to find Wheel 412) ----------- Disparate random thoughts - sorry, been working on 3 reports at a time and this brain is like slime...will be back tomorrow. Lucy the concept ----- Original Message ----- From: Here's the first little bit. Chapter 1 THE FOUR PARAMATTHA DHAMMAS There are two kinds of reality: mental phenomena (nama) and physical phenomena (rupa). Nama experiences something; rupa does not experience anything. Seeing is, for example, a type of nama; it experiences visible object. Visible object itself is rupa; it does not experience anything. What we take for self are only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. The 'Visuddhimagga' ('Path of Purity', a commentary) explains (Ch. XVIII, 25): For this has been said: . 'As with the assembly of parts The word "chariot" is countenanced, So, When the khandhas are present, 'A being' is said in common usage' (Kindred Sayings I, 135. The five khandhas (aggregates) are nothing else but nama and rupa. See Ch.2.) .So in many hundred suttas there is only mentality-materiality which is illustrated, not a being, not a person. Therefore, just as when the component parts (of a chariot) such as axles, wheels, frame, poles... are arranged in a certain way, there comes to be the mere conventional term 'chariot', yet in the ultimate sense, when each part is examined, there is no chariot, ...so too,... there comes to be the mere conventional term 'a being', 'a person', yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is examined, there is no being as a basis for the assumption ' I am' or ' I ' ; in the ultimate sense there is only mentality-materiality. The vision of one who sees in this way is called correct vision. 11801 From: johnrloganis Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 5:24pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi all, Layman John (the title is to distinguish me from other Johns who may or may not be present) here. Lucy was kind enough to turn me on to this study. I. First Response As I read this first section a thought (Nama, I suppose) rises. Isn't considering constituent parts something like dissecting a body. Once a body (of anything) is dissecting it no longer exists as a body of anything. Take a car apart and lay all the pieces out on the ground to look at them -- and there is no car and it surely won't run. The existence of the car is precisely in the assembly of the parts. So the existence of a person (a being) consists in the fact of its component parts joined in an assembly. Thus the "soul" or "vital essence" of something does not exist in any part. There would seem to be three possibilities: 1. Take something apart and it truly dies. There is no further continuance. 2. That which is the "vital essence" or "soul" is prior to the assemblage and directs the assembly process to create a "being". 3. The existence of the "assembly" brings into existence a "vital essence" or "soul" (I don't have any better term right now so please bear with it) which, having been created in assembly, then persists after dissolution of the assembly into its elements. This "essence" becomes the creative force for "rebirth". How does the Abhidhamma deal with the questions which this analysis brings up? II. Second Response "Nama" and "rupa" being the basic elements of consciousness and existence by definition raises the following question: In the 12 fold cycle of Dependent Origination there is persistence of consciousness and thus rebirth leading to death. There must have been a first act creating the first "nama" and "rupa". So ... what started the first Nama-Rupa? ... I wish I had answers instead of questions...besides all these questions just makes my head hurt. Fortunately the rest of me is just a bunch of parts and they don't hurt -- only my head. But then thinking always does that to me. (Oops, I don't really exist except in a very transitory fashion.....:-D) With metta, Layman John PS Protocol questions --------------------- How shall we handle our posts? By that I mean shall we trim them severely or completely and refer to that to which we are responding by message number. Is there going to be some kind of referee to keep things sorted out? Sort of a group leader? I only ask these questions because I haven't done this kind of thing before. Thanks all. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Lucy" wrote: > Hi all > > What a start ! No-self (anatta), impermanence (anicca), concepts > (pannati), conceptual truth , ultimate truth (sorry about the mixed up > terminology - don't know whether these two terms are used in an Abhidhamma > context), dhammas, right view, etc. etc. all thrown in a few lines. > > Multitude of questions ... but this is an introduction and the > terms will be explained later, so I'll let the questions simmer... > > Funny. Larry stopped at about the same point where last night I told myself > : whoah! stop right there, this is too much already !... > > Is this saying: > the whole world we experience and the experiencer are made out of parts > arising, coming together and passing. These parts are either mental (nama) > or physical / material (rupa)...? > > Still, the world looked quite solid to me today, "I" & "others" felt solid > and substantial, things looked solid and substantial... > > ---------- > I found this in "The Dhamma Theory" by Y. Karunadasa (Wheel publication > 412) > > "All the different modes of analysis and classification found in the > Abhidhamma stem from a single philosophical principle, which gave direction > and shape to the entire project of systematization. This principle is the > notion that all the phenomena of empirical existence are made up of a > number of elementary constituents, the ultimate realities behind the > manifest phenomena. These elementary constituents, the building blocks of > experience, are called dhammas." > > The first section of this booklet gives a nice explanation of the various > ways of dissecting beings and things into constituents. The article is at: > http://watthai.net/talon/wheel.htm (scroll to the bottom of the page to > find Wheel 412) > > ----------- > Disparate random thoughts - sorry, been working on 3 reports at a time and > this brain is like slime...will be back tomorrow. > > Lucy the concept > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: > Here's the first little bit. > > Chapter 1 > > THE FOUR PARAMATTHA DHAMMAS > > There are two kinds of reality: mental phenomena (nama) and physical > phenomena (rupa). Nama experiences something; rupa does not experience > anything. Seeing is, for example, a type of nama; it experiences visible > object. Visible object itself is rupa; it does not experience anything. > What we take for self are only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. > The 'Visuddhimagga' ('Path of Purity', a commentary) explains (Ch. > XVIII, 25): > > For this has been said: . > 'As with the assembly of parts > The word "chariot" is countenanced, > So, When the khandhas are present, > 'A being' is said in common usage' > > (Kindred Sayings I, 135. The five khandhas (aggregates) are nothing else > but nama and rupa. See Ch.2.) > > .So in many hundred suttas there is only > mentality-materiality which is illustrated, not a being, > not a person. Therefore, just as when the component > parts (of a chariot) such as axles, wheels, frame, poles... > are arranged in a certain way, there comes to be the > mere conventional term 'chariot', yet in the ultimate > sense, when each part is examined, there is no > chariot, ...so too,... there comes to be the mere > conventional term 'a being', 'a person', yet in the ultimate > sense, when each component is examined, there is > no being as a basis for the assumption ' I am' or ' I ' ; > in the ultimate sense there is only mentality-materiality. > The vision of one who sees in this way is called correct vision. 11802 From: Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 0:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi, John - In a message dated 3/12/02 8:25:45 PM Eastern Standard Time, johnrloganis@y... writes: > In the 12 fold cycle of Dependent Origination there is persistence of > consciousness and thus rebirth leading to death. There must have been > a first act creating the first "nama" and "rupa". > > ========================== Why? ;-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11803 From: yuzhonghao Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 6:01pm Subject: Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment Hi Christine, Replied in context. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Group, > > Discussions I have read on this and other lists have raised a few > questions in my mind. I thought that some of you, particularly those > whose interest in Abhidhamma is relatively recent, may wonder about > the same things too. I hope that more experienced members of dsg may > be able clarify some points. It is mainly with regard to Formal > Sitting Meditation that I have questions. > > Formal Sitting Mediation being defined (for the purpose of the > questions) as, or as similar to, - "regular daily half to one hour > sessions of going to a quiet place, sitting on a cushion, in any > variation of a cross legged position, eyes closed, watching a > primary object (such as the breath at the abdomen or nose) and > anything that arises (bodily feelings, thoughts, sounds etc.) as a > secondary object. Always returning to the breath, after the secondary > object passes away or diminishes." > If anyone has the time to answer any question, could they please > give the scriptural quotes that support their answer? > > 1. Is Formal sitting meditation unarguably and indisputably shown > by the scriptures to be the necessary and only way to gain > Enlightenment? And do these scriptural references unequivocably > mean 'formal sitting meditation.' Hmmm, the only way to achieve liberation/cessation of dukkha, to gain enlightenment, as I see it, is the noble eightfold path. As for the formal sitting meditation as described above, the Buddha's instructions that I found is most close to the description of formal sitting medition above can be found in some of the references in the link below. (Please note my search criteria.) http://www.google.com/search? hl=en&as_qdr=all&q=folding+legs+crosswise+site% 3Awww.accesstoinsight.org I also find Thannisaro Bhikkhu's exposition on The Four Frames of Reference helpful. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2b.html > > 2. Is attainment of any level of Jhana - beforehand - necessary for > Enlightenment? Perhap the question can be rephrased as "Is right concentration necessary for enlightenment?" Can Jhana be attained only via Formal Sitting > Meditation - or does it happen any other way? > I wouldn't worry about this question at all. I would just do my best to follow the instruction of the Buddha as recorded in the discourses. > 3. Are the words *concentration*, *contemplation* *awareness*, > *mindfulness* and *meditation* in the Buddhist scriptures > interchangeable? How are they similar, and how do they differ? > I think question #3 is interesting. Is it possible to provide the contexts in which these words are used? > > metta, > Christine Regards, Victor 11804 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 7:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concentration Hi Howard With due respect, there are the same :). regards Ken O --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Ken - > > In a message dated 3/6/02 11:26:49 PM Eastern Standard Time, > ashkenn@y... writes: > > > > Hi Victor and Howard > > > > In my own opinion, if a mind is truly mindful, it is called right > > concentration, resulting there is no difference. > -------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > With all respect, I disagree with the literal meaning of what you > say > here. Right Concentration is specifically defined in the suttas as the > first > four jhanas. Right Mindfulness is basic to the arising of Right > Concentration > (and Right Concentration supports mindfulness), but they are not the > same. > -------------------------------------------------------- > 11805 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 7:16pm Subject: Re: meditation vs. Re: [dsg] dhammastudy Hi Frank Without single point of attention, we won't be able to function at all. It is a universal citta. When we are doing mindfullness, single pointnesses is already there. To some of us, it needs to be developed. To me let it comes:). kind regards Ken O > If I was only interested in tempering dukkha > dukkha, then I wouldn't be studying buddhism. The > radical reduction of dukkha and eventual cessation of > it can not happen without deeply penetrating the > workings of reality at the level of intellectual > understanding AND direct experience/realization. My > main point is that the intellectual understanding > alone is not enough, and the direct > experience/realization of dukkha can not happen > without sufficient level of right concentration. > Washing dishes and other mundane activities may be a > good exercise for mindfulness, but not single pointed > attention. Single pointed attention does not have to > be developed by sitting meditation (one could stand), > but it's certainly a time honored way and the most > relaxed and natural posture for sustained and > prolonged sessions. > > -fk 11806 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 7:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Paticasamuppada VII Hi Robert K, > It might surprise you Christine, but the longer my Buddhist life goes > the less concerened I am about whether states are kusala or akusala. > My focus has been inching towards insighting any state as a > conditioned dhamma, rather than trying to have more kusala. k: hmm trying hard my friend:) hmm it still sounds like a purpose volition :) kind regards Ken O 11807 From: Kenneth Ong Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 7:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Paticasamuppada VII Hi Christine Reflection is better than no reflection at all :). Keep up the good work, don't stress yourself unnecessary :). As long as there is awareness arise in, there is no need to worry whether what kind of object it is or whether it is crucial. It is more crucial if we are aware of it in the first instance. Kind regards Ken O > Awareness in daily life, what objects we pay attention to, and the > kind of attention (wise or unwise) we pay to these objects, seems to > be crucial. > I frequently experience and act on, quick unwholesome reactions to > daily events and have been trying to have more 'good' roots - by > attempting to remember not to react with aversion to certain > situations - and failing in the attempt. Or not remembering until too > late. So I guess that is the unwise attention.... The wise attention > seems to arrive shortly (or a long while) afterwards, when I may have > some understanding and compassion for others involved in the events. > But this would seem to be more Reflection than Attention. > > Learning what I can from these posts, Robert, > Thank-you > > metta, > Christine 11808 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 8:26pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Paticasamuppada VII --- Thanks, Ken. good point. robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong wrote: > Hi Robert K, > > > > It might surprise you Christine, but the longer my Buddhist life goes > > the less concerened I am about whether states are kusala or akusala. > > My focus has been inching towards insighting any state as a > > conditioned dhamma, rather than trying to have more kusala. > > k: hmm trying hard my friend:) hmm it still sounds like a purpose volition > :) > > > > kind regards > Ken O > 11809 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 9:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Contemplating death Hi Ken O, I'm really impressed by some of your comments recently like the one below and a couple of your ones today;-) They're very perceptive (as I see them) and sugggest a lot of careful consideration has been going on during your long holiday from posting. Reminds me of Num (about the highest compliment I know;-)) Look f/w to more, Sarah ============= --- Kenneth Ong wrote: > > Please don't stress yourself. Don't purposely be mindful, let it come > into you naturally. It will come naturally and slowly. Take dhamma > practise at your own leisure place as we are not those pple who practise > dhamma two thousands years ago where a few sentences could make one to > the > path of enlightment. > > Relax and enjoy practising dhamma and don't be encumber by them (as it > defeats the purpose of practising dhamma in the first place). Take your > time and enjoy it :). Don't worry abt knowing of it before an automatic > response. > 11810 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 9:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] subconscious influence or just lack of mindfulness? Dear Frank, I had meant to add a comment here: --- frank kuan wrote: > In a discussion group the other day, the topic of > subconscious thoughts came up. > > What is subconscious as understood in modern > psychology and how does it relate to buddhism? Usually in modern psychology, it refers to an underlying consciousness as I recall. Nina recently discussed bhavanga cittas (life continuum consciousness) in more detail with Lucy recently. These have often been translated as ‘subconscious’ and I find this translation used a lot in the abhidhamma texts. However, I think it’s very misleading as it suggests there are bhavanga cittas underlying other cittas which is not correct. As Nina just said: “The term sub-consciousness is not correct, not precise, it suggests another consciousness existing at the same time, and there can only be one citta at a time experiencing one object.” Actually, Frank, although I majored in psychology, I don’t find it helpful to relate it to Buddhism or abhidhamma to be honest and I'm very out of date with modern psychology now. > My understanding is that subconscious thought is > thought related to really long term memory > unexpectedly rising into immediate awareness. > > However, it seems that people use the concept of > "subconscious" more broadly than it means, or very > likely I don't have a complete definition of what it > means (in modern psychology). What many people refer > to as subconscious motivation to me seems like a > simple case of lack of mindfulness. > > I don't believe consciousness and unconscious activity > occur simultaneously. How do you abidhamma people > understand this? I agree that often when we speak of ‘unconscious’ or ‘subconscious’ it suggests a ‘simple lack of mindfulness’ at any level. I’m not at all sure I’m an ‘abhidhamma person’, but I think these uses of conscious and unconscious are quite different from citta (consciousness) as discussed in the texts. From an abhidhamma perspective, there is citta at every single moment regardless of whether there is any awareness or not. Even bhavanga cittas in between other sense and mind processes are ‘conscious’ according to this explanation. Of course, we can also discuss latent tendencies (anusaya) and accumulations and so on, but this is another topic. I’m always impressed by the number of threads you’re considering at any time. Hope you join Larry et al’s ADL study group too. You could add useful relevant sutta links, I’m sure;-) Sarah ====== 11811 From: Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 4:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Concentration Hi, Ken - In a message dated 3/12/02 10:12:07 PM Eastern Standard Time, ashkenn@y... writes: > Hi Howard > > With due respect, there are the same :). > > > regards > Ken O > ====================== Okay, if it pleases you! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11812 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 9:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear Larry, L.John and Victor, Larry, I think it's really helpful, as you did with the first extract, to type out a one page segment at a time and leave it for a few days/a week for discussion. As Lucy said..plenty of meat already and no point in racing through. As I've mentioned (read:bored everyone) before, the one page you quote has had more impact on my life and understanding of dhamma than any other page of any text or book I've read before of since. It helped me to see 'anatta' as the very key or cornerstone of the Teachings and of life itself. .......... Victor, I really hope you can also contribute and join the study group and I'd be interested particularly to hear any of your comments on the first page Larry quoted. .......... --- johnrloganis wrote: > Hi all, > Layman John (the title is to distinguish me from other Johns who may > or may not be present) here. L.John, yes, we do have a problem with a few names and this is helpful. (Hope you don't mind if it gets a little abbreviated...?) > Lucy was kind enough to turn me on to this study. I'm sure everyone is very glad and will welcome anyone at any time. Great questions which I'm sure others will give helpful responses to. > PS Protocol questions > --------------------- > How shall we handle our posts? By that > I mean shall we trim them severely or > completely and refer to that to which we are responding by message > number. Do you think a 'middle way' would be possible?? No need to trim 'severley and completely, but a little more than you did before, just keeping those parts necessary for your reply. > Is there going to be some kind of referee to keep things sorted out? > Sort of a group leader? > > I only ask these questions because I haven't done this kind of thing > before. I think Larry & Lucy will be setting the pace and keeping any order quite well..... whether things will be 'sorted out' without any enlightenment along the way, is another question;-)) L.John, glad to have you here and look forward to responses to your qus. Sarah ============ 11813 From: Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 10:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: study program Hi Christine and all, As soon as I started reading, it occurred to me that there is way too much material to discuss the whole chapter at once. But I don't know exactly how to proceed. I was thinking maybe just a couple of paragraphs or so a week. What do you, and everyone else, want to do? On a procedural note, if it's not too much trouble, someone could email the section we are going to study in html without comment so it's exactly the same as the web version and we could also number the paragraphs so there would be an archived version with numbered paragraphs, making it easy to search. I don't know how to do this; it's a little difficult with my gear. So someone else would have to do it if you think it is worth while. What's the consensus? Any of you teachers, or anyone else, have any suggestions? Larry 11814 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 10:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory Dear KKT, Firstly, welcome to dsg...I think this is your first post here;-) --- phamdluan@a... wrote: > > Dear everyone, > > > I have a question: > > What is exactly memory in Abhidhamma? > > Thank you. Usually memory is a translation of sa~n~na cetasika (mental factor of perception/memory). As I was discussing with Frank, the way we use these terms normally or in psychology or medicine is rather different from how they are used in the Suttas and Abhidhamma. In these texts, perception/memory arises at every single moment with the citta (consciousness), lasts a very brief instant and falls away. Its task is to mark the object like a 'woodcutter marking logs'. So, actually, even when it seems that there is no memory or we're 'unconscious' of what we're doing, there is still at these moments sanna (perception) performing its marking task. Good places to read more are: 1) Cetasikas, Ch 3 http://www.abhidhamma.org/ 2) Sanna (perception, memory) http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts .......... If you would care to share any more info re where you live, particular interest in dhamma or whatever, we'd be glad to hear. Look f/w to more questions and comments. You may also be interested to follow the ADL study program just starting as a thread (see Larry's recent post on Ch 1). Sanna will be coming up in it very soon;-) Sarah ====== 11815 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 10:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhana- Herman Dear Herman, --- egberdina wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > Thank you for this. But..........where's the but.....??? (withdrawal symptoms....) > I recently read an unreferenced statement along these lines : Only a > person who has a rebirth thought with three roots can experience > jhana. Any ideas what sutta or comentary this would be based on? I think this would relate to whether at birth consciousness (patisandhi citta) --which is a result of kamma-- is accompanied by 2 or 3 hetus (roots). In the human realm, it is always the result of kusala (wholesome) kamma and always accompanied by the roots of alobha (non-attachment) and adosa (non-aversion), but not necessarily by wisdom. This will be an important factor in determining whether wisdom can be developed and whether these attainments are even theoretically possible. It's all covered in ADL ch 11, so you may wish to look ahead or follow the study group until they get there;-) (Actually I doubt any of us would be here if there were only 2 roots, but we'll consider more when we get to it as I'd need to check before saying anything else.) Ciao too, Sarah ============================================= 11816 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 10:46pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: jhana- Herman Dear Sarah, Ah ha. Gotcha. ;-) > -----Original Message----- > From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...] > > (roots). In the human realm, it is always the > result of kusala (wholesome) > kamma and always accompanied by the roots of > alobha (non-attachment) and > adosa (non-aversion), but not necessarily by > wisdom. There is also the third ahetuka (not accompanied by the roots) kusala vipaka, which will result in rebirth in the lower pleasant realm (human and the first heavenly plane), but with some deficiency (mute, deaf, blind, mentally-deficient, etc.). kom 11817 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 10:49pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Paticasamuppada VII (maybe duplicate...) Dear Ken O, > -----Original Message----- > From: Kenneth Ong [mailto:ashkenn@y...] > > > It might surprise you Christine, but the longer > my Buddhist life goes > > the less concerened I am about whether states > are kusala or akusala. > > My focus has been inching towards insighting > any state as a > > conditioned dhamma, rather than trying to have > more kusala. > > k: hmm trying hard my friend:) hmm it still > sounds like a purpose volition > :) > Thanks for this reminder. This reminds me of A. Sujin's response to the question: so if we shouldn't force/intend/purpose to have sati, shouldn't we just let Sati arise? Her answer was, who's doing the letting? Tanha/Mana/Dithi attaches to any objects. Just like when we learn, having all these conditioned kandhas (dukkhas) is having suffering. So, we may think to ourself, it's better not to have any, not knowing that it is the more subtle (or maybe not so subtle!) tanha that thinks this thought. Appreciative, kom 11818 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 10:50pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Concentration Dear Ken O, > -----Original Message----- > From: Kenneth Ong [mailto:ashkenn@y...] > Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2002 7:10 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] Concentration > > > Hi Howard > > With due respect, there are the same :). > > regards > Ken O > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Ken - > > > > In a message dated 3/6/02 11:26:49 PM Eastern > Standard Time, > > ashkenn@y... writes: > > > > > > > Hi Victor and Howard > > > > > > In my own opinion, if a mind is truly > mindful, it is called right > > > concentration, resulting there is no difference. > > -------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > With all respect, I disagree with the > literal meaning of what you > > say > > here. Right Concentration is specifically > defined in the suttas as the > > first > > four jhanas. Right Mindfulness is basic to the > arising of Right > > Concentration > > (and Right Concentration supports mindfulness), > but they are not the > > same. > > -------------------------------------------------------- In the abhidhamma classification, mindfullness (sati) is distinctly different from concentration (samathi). Right concentration necessarily co-arises with right mindfulness, but they have distinct characteristics, albeit conditioned by one another. From Nina's Cetasikas: Sati: Mindfulness has “not floating away” as its characteristic, unforgetfulness as its function, guarding, or the state of facing the object, as its manifestation, firm remembrance (saññå) or application in mindfulness as regards the body, etc. , as proximate cause. It should be regarded as a door-post from being firmly established in the object, and as a door-keeper from guarding the door of the senses. Samathi: This concentration, known as one-pointedness of mind, has non-scattering (of itself) or non-distraction (of associated states) as characteristic, the welding together of the coexistent states as function, as water kneads bath-powder into a paste, and peace of mind or knowledge as manifestation. For it has been said: ‘He who is concentrated knows, sees according to the truth.’ It is distinguished by having ease (sukha) (usually) as proximate cause 2. Like thesteadiness of a lamp in the absence of wind, so should steadfastness of mind be understood. kom 11819 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 10:27pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Paticasamuppada VII Dear Ken O, > -----Original Message----- > From: Kenneth Ong [mailto:ashkenn@y...] > > > It might surprise you Christine, but the longer > my Buddhist life goes > > the less concerened I am about whether states > are kusala or akusala. > > My focus has been inching towards insighting > any state as a > > conditioned dhamma, rather than trying to have > more kusala. > > k: hmm trying hard my friend:) hmm it still > sounds like a purpose volition > :) > Thanks for this reminder. This reminds me of A. Sujin's response to the question: so if we shouldn't force/intend/purpose to have sati, shouldn't we just let Sati arise? Her answer was, who's doing the letting? Tanha/Mana/Dithi attaches to any objects. Just like when we learn, having all these conditioned kandhas (dukkhas) is having suffering. So, we may think to ourself, it's better not to have any, not knowing that it is the more subtle (or maybe not so subtle!) tanha that thinks this thought. Appreciative, kom 11820 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 10:34pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Concentration Dear Ken O, > -----Original Message----- > From: Kenneth Ong [mailto:ashkenn@y...] > Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2002 7:10 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] Concentration > > > Hi Howard > > With due respect, there are the same :). > > regards > Ken O > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Ken - > > > > In a message dated 3/6/02 11:26:49 PM Eastern > Standard Time, > > ashkenn@y... writes: > > > > > > > Hi Victor and Howard > > > > > > In my own opinion, if a mind is truly > mindful, it is called right > > > concentration, resulting there is no difference. > > -------------------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > With all respect, I disagree with the > literal meaning of what you > > say > > here. Right Concentration is specifically > defined in the suttas as the > > first > > four jhanas. Right Mindfulness is basic to the > arising of Right > > Concentration > > (and Right Concentration supports mindfulness), > but they are not the > > same. > > -------------------------------------------------------- In the abhidhamma classification, mindfullness (sati) is distinctly different from concentration (samathi). Right concentration necessarily co-arises with right mindfulness, but they have distinct characteristics, albeit conditioned by one another. From Nina's Cetasikas: Sati: Mindfulness has “not floating away” as its characteristic, unforgetfulness as its function, guarding, or the state of facing the object, as its manifestation, firm remembrance (saññå) or application in mindfulness as regards the body, etc. , as proximate cause. It should be regarded as a door-post from being firmly established in the object, and as a door-keeper from guarding the door of the senses. Samathi: This concentration, known as one-pointedness of mind, has non-scattering (of itself) or non-distraction (of associated states) as characteristic, the welding together of the coexistent states as function, as water kneads bath-powder into a paste, and peace of mind or knowledge as manifestation. For it has been said: ‘He who is concentrated knows, sees according to the truth.’ It is distinguished by having ease (sukha) (usually) as proximate cause 2. Like thesteadiness of a lamp in the absence of wind, so should steadfastness of mind be understood. kom 11821 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 11:20pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: jhana- Herman Thanks Kom:-) Take your word for it (I was being a little lazy to pull out and check).. Like my 'guardian angel' watching over me..... Look f/w to more Hey Herman, pls address the tricky ones to Kom;-) Sarah --- Kom Tukovinit wrote: > Dear Sarah, > > Ah ha. Gotcha. ;-) > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...] > > > > (roots). In the human realm, it is always the > > result of kusala (wholesome) > > kamma and always accompanied by the roots of > > alobha (non-attachment) and > > adosa (non-aversion), but not necessarily by > > wisdom. > > There is also the third ahetuka (not accompanied by the > roots) kusala vipaka, which will result in rebirth in the > lower pleasant realm (human and the first heavenly plane), > but with some deficiency (mute, deaf, blind, > mentally-deficient, etc.). > > kom > > 11822 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 11:44pm Subject: [dsg] Re: study program Hi Larry, Yes, I think Chapter 1 will take a while. But don't stress about it, just post and ask questions until we all feel that it's time to move on. I already have more thoughts to consider from Lucy and L. Johns' posts. And every chapter will take a different length of time. I think I'll just take KenO's advice and relax with it all... :-) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Christine and all, > > As soon as I started reading, it occurred to me that there is way too > much material to discuss the whole chapter at once. But I don't know > exactly how to proceed. I was thinking maybe just a couple of paragraphs > or so a week. What do you, and everyone else, want to do? > > On a procedural note, if it's not too much trouble, someone could email > the section we are going to study in html without comment so it's > exactly the same as the web version and we could also number the > paragraphs so there would be an archived version with numbered > paragraphs, making it easy to search. I don't know how to do this; it's > a little difficult with my gear. So someone else would have to do it if > you think it is worth while. > > What's the consensus? Any of you teachers, or anyone else, have any > suggestions? > > Larry 11823 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 11:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear Group, I started with the Preface first. (A habit developed when reading Bhikkhu Bodhi - often his prefaces and introductions are just as interesting as the rest of the book.) On page 1 in ADL when talking about the Tipitaka that "Not only monks but also laypeople should study the Vinaya." I wonder what could the daily Rule written for renunciate males a couple of thousand years ago, in a culture that no longer exists, have of value for a 21st Century woman? I *can* see the point of reading about examples of lobha, dosa and moha as reminders of our own defilements.....but reading the whole thing......worth taking a closer look....? [Just an aside......the only English word in the whole of the Canon that grates on me is "stinginess" - why not use miserliness, or meanness? On second thought, there's two of them - 'horripilation' is the other one.] The gem embedded in the Preface is the reiteration of the real purpose of the study of realities: "The theory (pariyatti) should encourage us to practice (patipatti) which is necessary for the realization of the truth (pativedha). While we are studying the different namas and rupas and while we are pondering over them, we can be reminded to be aware of nama and rupa appearing at that moment. In this way we will discover more and more that the Abhidhamma is about everything which is real, that is, the worlds' appearing through the six sense doors." And that this study "is a process which continues all through life." ADL CH.1 "The Four Paramattha Dhammas" The illustration of the chariot broken down into component parts used to refute the idea of 'a person' or 'a being' is effective, to a degree. It increases understanding that what we take for self are only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. (But, still...., why, at some level is there a lingering wondering whether it is possible that 'consciousness' might not retain some on-going identity?). In developing understanding of Anatta, what has been of most benefit to me is continuing to study 'conditionality' and gradually being brought to accept that I have no certain, solitary, independent, control of any thing. I think I am having some difficulty with rupa, physical phenomena, the third paramattha dhamma - with the understanding of the 'rising and falling away' part, of seemingly solid objects. I used to try to understand this by visualising the 'beaming up process' in Star Trek (sorry Sarah & Jon!) - Where the object is composed of twinkling, temporary but immediately replaced effervesences.....but, if rupa only arises when there are right conditions....How do solid objects last over time? is there an example of conditions changing for a solid visible object? The distinction between nama and rupa is deceptively simple, don't you think? Nama is mental phenomena, rupa physical phenomena - it is so easy to (as I did) slip into thinking rupa is therefore a solid object, which meant initially I used to think of 'sound' as nama. So - going back to basics and looking at the full definition "Nama experiences something; rupa does not experience anything", has been clarifying and 'sound' is clearly seen to be rupa. metta, Christine 11824 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 11:57pm Subject: KenO Hi KenO, Just to comment you sound soooo relaxed. What's your secret? A Dhamma break-through you should tell us about? Whatever it is, your posts are having a very soothing effect on me...... Thanks and metta, Chris 11825 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 0:41am Subject: Abhidhamma articles, books, websites Dear Group, Here is a link to articles, books, and websites on Abhidhamma that may be useful: http://www.btinternet.com/~maunglwin/tptkabdm.htm metta, Christine 11826 From: Sarah and Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 4:07am Subject: Yahoo Groups suspension of service this weekend Dear All As Larry has already mentioned, there will be a suspension of the Yahoo Groups service this weekend (Friday, March 15, 9:00 PM PST (GMT-8) until the morning of Sunday March 17). Please keep posting as usual if you can, but expect some delay as it can take several days for posts to come through to the list (please avoid reposting your message during this period). Jon & Sarah -------------------------------------------------------- Yahoo Notice The Yahoo! Groups service will be down for scheduled maintenance Friday, March 15, 9:00 PM PST (GMT-8) as we move our servers to a new facility. We expect the service to be restored the morning of Sunday March 17. During this time the web site will be unavailable and email will not be delivered. (Some users may experience email non-delivery notices while the service is down, but all email should be delivered once service is resumed.) Please note: once the service is restored, there will be email delays due to backlog. We expect these delays to last no longer than 1 day. Please do not re-send email to your group as this will only add to delays. We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause. -------------------------------------------------------- 11827 From: mikebrotherto Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 8:55am Subject: Deluded clarification assistance Greetings! I have been mindfully reflecting on the seemingly subtle differences between three deluded mental experiences. I currently feel that it is skillful to reflect even on one's deluded experiences (in my case, what else is there to reflect on?!?). With that, could someone help me differentiate between: 1. ego/mano/conceit (I think these are the same, yes/no?) 2. sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief 3. atta - self I was on retreat the past 8 days with Bhante Gunaratana. (Look in the dictionary under mindfulness and you see his picture. Even when he pulled his socks up, I went into complete body mudra bliss.) I asked him how the word "ego" fit into Buddhist psychology. He told me that "ego" was the same as conceit - one of the last fetters to go; that one will have a sense of ego even if one is a "non-returner". That helped because I have been confusing atta with ego for the past 30 years. Now, I can't seem to fit personality belief - sakkaya-ditthi - into the scheme of insanity. Could someone gently help clarify these experiences? Thank you so much. With Metta, Mike B. 11828 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: conditions for jhana- Herman op 12-03-2002 05:39 schreef egberdina op hhofman@d...: > Dear Sarah,.... > I recently read an unreferenced statement along these lines : Only a > person who has a rebirth thought with three roots can experience > jhana. Any ideas what sutta or comentary this would be based on? > Ha Herman, I had to laugh when reading your post, because I thought of Mount Everest. I do not want to discourage you. Sarah, I hope you do not mind that I am butting in here, my excuse is Mount Everest. The Vis. V, 40, : 'No kasina can be developed by any living being described as follows: Beings hindered by kamma, by defilement or by kamma-result, who lack faith, zeal and understanding, will be incapable of entering into the certainty of rightness in profitable states." (Vibhanga. 341) Here the Vis. quotes from the Vibhanga, the Book of Analysis, the second Book of the Abhidhamma, but there it is spoken of in the context of attaining enlightenment. In par. 41, the Vis gives further explanations, kamma being very heavy kamma such as murder of parents, that have an immediate effect. And as to vipaka: "By kamma-result: who have had a rebirth-linking with no profitable root-cause or with only two profitable root-causes." Thus, those who are not born with three beautiful roots, including pa~n~naa, cannot attain jhana nor enlightenment. In Vis. par. 42: "And this does not apply only to kasinas; for none of them will succeed in developing any meditation subject at all. So the task of devotion to a meditation subject must be undertaken by a clansman who has no hindrance by kamma-result, who shuns hindrance by kamma and by defilement, and who fosters faith, zeal and understanding by listening to the Dhamma, frequenting good men, and so on." End quote. Hindrance by defilement applies to the defilement of fixed wrong view, this was explained before. We do not know whether we were born with wisdom or not. This conditions our whole life, because the succeeding life-continuum is of the same type of vipakacitta and so on throughout life. The wisdom someone is born with is vipaka, result, but still, it conditions one's life. We are born with different potentialities, we cannot choose this. But also those born with two beautiful roots can develop understanding and also samatha in daily life. For samatha to the degree of jhana great understanding is needed: pa~n~naa has to know exactly when the citta is kusala and when akusala, and it has to know all the different conditions for attaining calm by means of a meditation subject. Seeing conditionality in all things is sobering. Speaking of conditions, I admired the way you took the troubles with your job. I enjoyed your Dhamma letter off list you wrote some time ago, being reminded by gardening (like Christine) of conditions that have to be right for the growing of plants. I hope conditions are favorable for your new business. My father appreciated your regards, and Oscar, very thoughtful. We played the Haydn Variations of Brahms for two pianos, and this could distract my father from the sufferings of his extremely old age. Here we see again that cittas are entirely different because of different conditions. Best wishes from Nina. 11829 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 10:00am Subject: India Ch 7, no. 4 We read in the ³Kindred Sayings² (V, The Great Chapter, Kindred Sayings about the Truths, Ch 2, The Foundation of the Kingdom of the Dhamma), that the Buddha, when he was dwelling at Isipatana, in the Deer-park, explained to the five disciples the four noble Truths. The Commentary to this Sutta, the ³Såratthappakåsiní, explains about three ³rounds² or intertwined phases 1 of realizing the four noble Truths: knowledge of the truth, sacca ñåna knowledge of the task that has to be performed, kicca ñåna knowledge of the task that has been done, kata ñåna 2 We read in the Sutta referred to above (in § 2) that the Buddha, after he explained the four noble Truths, said: Monks, at the thought: This is the noble Truth about dukkha, - there arose in me, concerning things unlearnt before by Tathågatas 3, vision, insight, understanding and wisdom, there arose in me light. Monks, at the thought: This noble Truth about dukkha is to be understood... At the thought: This noble Truth about dukkha has been understood (by me),- there arose in me, concerning things unlearnt before by Tathågatas, vision, insight, understanding and wisdom, there arose in me light. Monks, at the thought: This is the noble Truth about the arising of dukkha... there arose in me light. Monks, at the thought: This arising of dukkha must be put away... Monks, at the thought: This arising of dukkha has been put away... there arose in me light. In the same way the Buddha explained about the third noble Truth, the ceasing of dukkha: the comprehension of it, knowledge of the task, namely, that it is to be realized, and knowledge that it has been realized. He explained about the fourth noble Truth, the way leading to the ceasing of dukkha: the comprehension of it, knowledge of the task, namely that it has to be developed, and knowledge that it has been developed. Acharn Sujin referred very often to these three ³rounds² or phases and explained that without the first phase, the firm understanding of what the four noble Truths are, there cannot be the second phase, the performing of the task, that is, satipatthåna, nor the third phase, the fruit of the practice, that is, the penetration of the true nature of realities. With regard to the first phase, she said that there should be the firm intellectual understanding of the first noble Truth, and that means understanding that there is dhamma at this moment, that everything that appears is dhamma. Dukkha is the characteristic of dhamma that arises and falls away at this moment. We cannot control what has arisen because of conditions. It only lasts for an extremely short time, it has to fall away. When seeing appears there cannot be hearing, hearing must have fallen away. There can only be one citta at a time experiencing an object. Seeing, hearing or thinking are insignificant dhammas that arise just for an extremely short moment and are then gone. They are impermanent and thus dukkha, unsatisfactory. 11830 From: Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 6:48am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory Dear Sarah, << From: sarahdhhk@y... (Sarah) Dear KKT, Firstly, welcome to dsg...I think this is your first post here;-) KKT: Thanks for the welcome :-) --------------- --- phamdluan@a... wrote: > > Dear everyone, > > > I have a question: > > What is exactly memory in Abhidhamma? > > Thank you. Usually memory is a translation of sa~n~na cetasika (mental factor of perception/memory). As I was discussing with Frank, the way we use these terms normally or in psychology or medicine is rather different from how they are used in the Suttas and Abhidhamma. In these texts, perception/memory arises at every single moment with the citta (consciousness), lasts a very brief instant and falls away. Its task is to mark the object like a 'woodcutter marking logs'. So, actually, even when it seems that there is no memory or we're 'unconscious' of what we're doing, there is still at these moments sanna (perception) performing its marking task. >> KKT: The reason of my question is that: If memory is a cetasika and lasts a very brief instant and then falls away then how does << recollection >> or << recognition >> work? Suppose I meet Mr. X, an image of X is a cetasika making a mark in my 'mind' but lasts only a fleeting moment. The next time I meet Mr. X, there is a << recollection >> or a << recognition >> that I've already known Mr. X, that means the << old image >> of X must be somewhere in order to have a << comparison >> between the new image and the old one. Hope that it makes sense :-)) Best regards, KKT 11831 From: Lucy Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 0:08pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: BEGINNERS study program Hi all ----- Original Message ----- From: > As soon as I started reading, it occurred to me that there is way too > much material to discuss the whole chapter at once. But I don't know > exactly how to proceed. I was thinking maybe just a couple of paragraphs > or so a week. What do you, and everyone else, want to do? Sounds sensible. We don't need a schedule, do we? When we're all happy we can move on to the next paragraph, we do. The same points will keep on coming again & again, so perhaps we shouldn't be too worried about understanding the whole paragraph thoroughly before moving onto the next - Especially when the one we start with seems to have the whole of the Dhamma compressed into a few lines : ) > > On a procedural note, if it's not too much trouble, someone could email > the section we are going to study in html without comment so it's > exactly the same as the web version and we could also number the > paragraphs so there would be an archived version with numbered > paragraphs, making it easy to search. I don't know how to do this; it's > a little difficult with my gear. So someone else would have to do it if > you think it is worth while. A good idea to keep the topics and discussions in a way that they can be found easily. How about using the "Files" section? There could be a "beginners study" folder and in it all the relevant files and e-mails. I can make html files easily, no problemo amigo. I'll have plenty of time this w/end with no list mail : ) But we need the author's permission to put up material from her book in these files- Nina? could we, please? Lucy 11832 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 1:03pm Subject: Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment/Victor Hi Victor, Thanks for your reply, it's good to hear from you. I am not sure that I have found what you were refering to in your first link. I put 'meditation+folding+legs+crosswise'into Google search, and found only http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/meditation.html was this what you wanted me to read? I don't have specific quotes for the words in #3, just that I've often read them in various contexts, and when trying to find more precise meanings in the dictionary end up with finding something that doesn't clearly explain anything, like this: concentration: samádhi (q.v.) - right°, s. sacca (IV. 8), magga (8). - wrong°, s. micchá-magga (8). You say: <> And, then I'm back to question #3 - the definition of 'right concentration'. :-) metta,Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > Replied in context. > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear Group, > > > > Discussions I have read on this and other lists have raised a few > > questions in my mind. I thought that some of you, particularly those > > whose interest in Abhidhamma is relatively recent, may wonder about > > the same things too. I hope that more experienced members of dsg > may > > be able clarify some points. It is mainly with regard to Formal > > Sitting Meditation that I have questions. > > > > Formal Sitting Mediation being defined (for the purpose of the > > questions) as, or as similar to, - "regular daily half to one hour > > sessions of going to a quiet place, sitting on a cushion, in any > > variation of a cross legged position, eyes closed, watching a > > primary object (such as the breath at the abdomen or nose) and > > anything that arises (bodily feelings, thoughts, sounds etc.) as a > > secondary object. Always returning to the breath, after the secondary > > object passes away or diminishes." > > If anyone has the time to answer any question, could they please > > give the scriptural quotes that support their answer? > > > > 1. Is Formal sitting meditation unarguably and indisputably shown > > by the scriptures to be the necessary and only way to gain > > Enlightenment? And do these scriptural references unequivocably > > mean 'formal sitting meditation.' > > Hmmm, the only way to achieve liberation/cessation of dukkha, to gain > enlightenment, as I see it, is the noble eightfold path. > > As for the formal sitting meditation as described above, the Buddha's > instructions that I found is most close to the description of formal sitting > medition above can be found in some of the references in the link > below. (Please note my search criteria.) > > http://www.google.com/search? > hl=en&as_qdr=all&q=folding+legs+crosswise+site% > 3Awww.accesstoinsight.org > > I also find Thannisaro Bhikkhu's exposition on The Four Frames of > Reference helpful. > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2b.html > > > > > > 2. Is attainment of any level of Jhana - beforehand - necessary for > > Enlightenment? > > Perhap the question can be rephrased as "Is right concentration > necessary for enlightenment?" > > > Can Jhana be attained only via Formal Sitting > > Meditation - or does it happen any other way? > > > > I wouldn't worry about this question at all. I would just do my best to > follow the instruction of the Buddha as recorded in the discourses. > > > > 3. Are the words *concentration*, *contemplation* *awareness*, > > *mindfulness* and *meditation* in the Buddhist scriptures > > interchangeable? How are they similar, and how do they differ? > > > > I think question #3 is interesting. Is it possible to provide the contexts in > which these words are used? > > > > > metta, > > Christine > > Regards, > Victor 11833 From: Lucy Date: Tue Mar 12, 2002 1:14pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi Group What an astute lady Christine, starting with the preface. And then Chris and L John dive straight into 'self' & 'non-self' - My impression is that we're still talking 'theory' - we want to know what's there when all the parts fall apart - but we won't really know until we see it in the "field". And that might not happen for a good time yet. OTH, even without any deep understanding, this deconstruction seems to lessen the importance we give to the "me" and "mine", and when this starts happening (almost imperceptibly), the suffering that comes from the attachment to "me" and "mine" tends to lessen. Although it's easy to take a chariot or a car to bits, studying the components of 'self' isn't going to have the same effect that easily...And though one knows the car is made out of parts and so-on, we still drive cars and travel in them. Somehow, seems to be the same with 'self' at this stage... I would go for option 1 out of your 3, L John ...but that would be nihilism, wouldn't it? As for the 12 links --- it helps to see it as a circle, no beginning, no end until it's cut...but how can it be "cut" for one individual being without being cut for all and everything??? Are there infinite circles of 12 links in infinite Universes??? Oooooh! I need a paracetamol too... Why are these components called "realities" ? I've read explanations before and at the time they made sense, but every time the word "reality" crops up, I flinch...which means, I don't really understand it... Pass on rupa for now. Best wishes Lucy 11834 From: tikmok Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 4:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear Christine, Don't mind if I add to your excellent thoughts. > -----Original Message----- > From: christine_forsyth [mailto:cforsyth@v...] > Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2002 11:49 PM > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 > > > Dear Group, > > On page 1 in ADL when talking about the Tipitaka that "Not only monks > but also laypeople should study the Vinaya." I wonder what could the > daily Rule written for renunciate males a couple of thousand years > ago, in a culture that no longer exists, have of value for a 21st > Century woman? I *can* see the point of reading about examples of > lobha, dosa and moha as reminders of our own defilements.....but > reading the whole thing......worth taking a closer look....? I think if we remember that the Buddha taught dhammas for 45 years of his life so that all beings (capable of understanding his dhammas) can too penetrate (eventually) the dhammas as he has (or close enough!), then we can figure out whether or not to read a particular piece of teaching. When reading any teaching, be it Vinaya, Suttanta, or Abhidhamma, each of us may: 1) Misunderstand it 2) Understand it, at different levels, according to his/her own accumulations 3) A mixture of the above One teaching that doesn't benefit me (immediately) may benefit you substantially and vice versa. That's why you may hear from people like Nina or Jonothan about the "no rules" part, as we benefit (or not) according to our own accumulations. > [Just an aside......the only English word in the whole of the Canon > that grates on me is "stinginess" - why not use miserliness, or > meanness? On second thought, there's two of them - 'horripilation' is > the other one.] Another thing that I keep hearing from different people is not to worry too much about the word if we can understand the meaning. Stinginess has the particular characteristic no matter what we call it. If we understand what stinginess is, then no word is required to study stinginess. The gem embedded in the Preface is the reiteration of the real > purpose of the study of realities: > "The theory (pariyatti) should encourage us to practice (patipatti) > which is necessary for the realization of the truth (pativedha). > While we are studying the different namas and rupas and while we are > pondering over them, we can be reminded to be aware of nama and rupa > appearing at that moment. In this way we will discover more and more > that the Abhidhamma is about everything which is real, that is, the > worlds' appearing through the six sense doors." > And that this study "is a process which continues all through life." It is amazing how you could always pick up the most important point. If we don't understand this point, then our study of the dhamma is not fruitful, and can be harmful, like holding a poisonous snake at its tail. Studying the dhamma for the wrong reason happens often for me, even if I understand the above statement, in varying degrees. That's why I get reminded by many many people... > > The illustration of the chariot broken down into component parts used > to refute the idea of 'a person' or 'a being' is effective, to a > degree. It increases understanding that what we take for self are > only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. (But, still...., why, > at some level is there a lingering wondering whether it is possible > that 'consciousness' might not retain some on-going identity?). In The lingering thought/wrong-views about self will continue until we become sotapanna. As far as I know, even sotapanna still have lingering thoughts about "this is mine". This tells you how deep rooted our ignorance is. > I think I am having some difficulty with rupa, physical phenomena, > the third paramattha dhamma - with the understanding of the 'rising > and falling away' part, of seemingly solid objects. I used to try to > understand this by visualising the 'beaming up process' in Star Trek > (sorry Sarah & Jon!) - Where the object is composed of twinkling, > temporary but immediately replaced effervesences.....but, if rupa > only arises when there are right conditions....How do solid objects > last over time? is there an example of conditions changing for a > solid visible object? I think we will continue to have doubts of various degress about this point until the vipassana nana that insights the falling away of rupa arises. Otherwise, we can always deduce. For example, my weight always fluctuates over a year, sometimes less, sometimes more. This is because there are varying conditions that cause the rupa to arise. Although some of the conditions are so similar that I can't tell the difference (with the conventional observation), but because of the differnt conditions, the rupas that are the results of the conditions are different. I also have skin defects that keep surprising me, hey, that wasn't there a few days ago! The other way, I think, is to study quantum physics. It seems to me that how matters are defined are moving toward what the Buddha says about rupa rising and falling away, but I will be quiet here, as I know very little about quantum physics anyway. kom 11835 From: Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 7:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] India Ch 7, no. 4 Hello Nina, I've been enjoying this India series very much. One of the many things I can't get straight in my head is this. You wrote: "Dukkha is the characteristic of dhamma that arises and falls away at this moment." Is dukkha the characteristic of dhamma that arises and falls away at this moment, or is dukkha the characteristic of ignorance of dhamma that arises and falls away at this moment? Another way of asking this is, is dhamma ignorance, or, are the ultimate realities of nama and rupa fundamentally untrue? I tend to think of dukkha as resulting from error so correct view ought to lead to elimination of dukkha but this quotation seems to say correct view leads to illumination of dukkha. Would you sort this out for me? Thanks very much, Larry 11836 From: Victor Yu Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 7:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment/Victor Hi Christine, I realized that the link didn't really work after I sent out the message. Anyway, what I did was that I searched for the words "folding", "legs", and "crosswise" in www.accesstoinsight.org with Google and came up with the following results: DN 22: Maha-satipatthana Sutta ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: the ... Description: The Great Frames of Reference Sutra. Category: Society > Religion and Spirituality > Buddhism > Teachings > Sutras www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn22.html - 33k - 13 Mar 2002 - Cached - Similar pages MN 119: Kayagata-sati Sutta ... the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful ... Description: Sutra on Mindfulness immersing in the body. Category: Society > Religion and Spirituality > Buddhism > Teachings > Sutras www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn119.html - 24k - Cached - Similar pages Right Mindfulness ... the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful ... www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/samma-sati.html - 9k - Cached - Similar pages MN 140: Dhatu-vibhanga Sutta ... shed and, setting out a spread of grass to one side, sat down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. He spent ... www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn140.html - 22k - Cached - Similar pages AN X.60: Girimananda Sutta ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always ... www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an10-060.html - 10k - Cached - Similar pages Wings to Awakening: Part II-B ... the foot of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [parimukham: in ... www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2b.html - 97k - Cached - Similar pages The Mind Like Fire Unbound ... to the shade of a tree or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect, & keeping mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful ... www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/likefire/2-3.html - 101k - Cached - Similar pages Study Guide: The Four Noble Truths ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: to the ... www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/truths.html - 88k - Cached - Similar pages I find the description "sitting down folding his legs crosswise, hold his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore" is closest to what you have described as formal sitting meditation. And this description, as I see it so far, is always in the context of mindfulness, specifically mindfulness of breathing. As for the definition of right concentration... "And what is right concentration? There is the case where a monk -- quite withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful (mental) qualities -- enters & remains in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. With the stilling of directed thought & evaluation, he enters & remains in the second jhana: rapture & pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free from directed thought & evaluation -- internal assurance. With the fading of rapture he remains in equanimity, mindful, & fully alert, and physically sensitive of pleasure. He enters & remains in the third jhana, and of him the Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous & mindful, he has a pleasurable abiding.' With the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. This is called right concentration." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn45-008.html As I see it, one is mindful in each jhana. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "christine_forsyth" To: Sent: Wednesday, March 13, 2002 4:03 PM Subject: [dsg] Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment/Victor Hi Victor, Thanks for your reply, it's good to hear from you. I am not sure that I have found what you were refering to in your first link. I put 'meditation+folding+legs+crosswise'into Google search, and found only http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/meditation.html was this what you wanted me to read? I don't have specific quotes for the words in #3, just that I've often read them in various contexts, and when trying to find more precise meanings in the dictionary end up with finding something that doesn't clearly explain anything, like this: concentration: samádhi (q.v.) - right°, s. sacca (IV. 8), magga (8). - wrong°, s. micchá-magga (8). You say: <> And, then I'm back to question #3 - the definition of 'right concentration'. :-) metta,Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > Replied in context. > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear Group, > > > > Discussions I have read on this and other lists have raised a few > > questions in my mind. I thought that some of you, particularly those > > whose interest in Abhidhamma is relatively recent, may wonder about > > the same things too. I hope that more experienced members of dsg > may > > be able clarify some points. It is mainly with regard to Formal > > Sitting Meditation that I have questions. > > > > Formal Sitting Mediation being defined (for the purpose of the > > questions) as, or as similar to, - "regular daily half to one hour > > sessions of going to a quiet place, sitting on a cushion, in any > > variation of a cross legged position, eyes closed, watching a > > primary object (such as the breath at the abdomen or nose) and > > anything that arises (bodily feelings, thoughts, sounds etc.) as a > > secondary object. Always returning to the breath, after the secondary > > object passes away or diminishes." > > If anyone has the time to answer any question, could they please > > give the scriptural quotes that support their answer? > > > > 1. Is Formal sitting meditation unarguably and indisputably shown > > by the scriptures to be the necessary and only way to gain > > Enlightenment? And do these scriptural references unequivocably > > mean 'formal sitting meditation.' > > Hmmm, the only way to achieve liberation/cessation of dukkha, to gain > enlightenment, as I see it, is the noble eightfold path. > > As for the formal sitting meditation as described above, the Buddha's > instructions that I found is most close to the description of formal sitting > medition above can be found in some of the references in the link > below. (Please note my search criteria.) > > http://www.google.com/search? > hl=en&as_qdr=all&q=folding+legs+crosswise+site% > 3Awww.accesstoinsight.org > > I also find Thannisaro Bhikkhu's exposition on The Four Frames of > Reference helpful. > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2b.html > > > > > > 2. Is attainment of any level of Jhana - beforehand - necessary for > > Enlightenment? > > Perhap the question can be rephrased as "Is right concentration > necessary for enlightenment?" > > > Can Jhana be attained only via Formal Sitting > > Meditation - or does it happen any other way? > > > > I wouldn't worry about this question at all. I would just do my best to > follow the instruction of the Buddha as recorded in the discourses. > > > > 3. Are the words *concentration*, *contemplation* *awareness*, > > *mindfulness* and *meditation* in the Buddhist scriptures > > interchangeable? How are they similar, and how do they differ? > > > > I think question #3 is interesting. Is it possible to provide the contexts in > which these words are used? > > > > > metta, > > Christine > > Regards, > Victor 11837 From: Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 7:22pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: BEGINNERS study program Lucy, I'm sure whatever you have in mind would be great. I'm ready to move on to the next chunk of dhamma. Do you want to put something up? Larry ------------- >Lucy:...A good idea to keep the topics and discussions in a way that they can be found easily. How about using the "Files" section? There could be a "beginners study" folder and in it all the relevant files and e-mails. I can make html files easily, no problemo amigo. I'll have plenty of time this w/end with no list mail : ) But we need the author's permission to put up material from her book in these files- Nina? could we, please? Lucy 11838 From: Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 7:42pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi all, I'm not sure what we (or the Buddha) mean by "self". There is a conventional chariot and a conventional person but is there a conventional "self"? By conventional I mean something everyone agrees on, even though agreements can be short lived. The Buddha says a self has to be permanent; why is that? Do we really _conventionally_ believe that our self is permanent? What if I say my self is impermanent patterned attachment (lobha) and aversion (dosa). Does that make me real? more grist for the mill, Larry ps: I had been taking to heart this idea that all I am is the momentary arising of nama and rupa and I found it very hard to formulate anything. I couldn't formulate understanding and I couldn't formulate bewilderment. But, as you can see,I snapped out of it. L. 11839 From: johnrloganis Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 9:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 - to Howard --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, John - > > In a message dated 3/12/02 8:25:45 PM Eastern Standard Time, > johnrloganis@y... writes: > > > > In the 12 fold cycle of Dependent Origination there is persistence of > > consciousness and thus rebirth leading to death. There must have been > > a first act creating the first "nama" and "rupa". > > > > > ========================== > Why? ;-) > > With metta, > Howard Hi Howard, Because! Seriously because it is a "causal" chain. So there must be a First Cause, something which started it all in the "first" place. This is not something like 2+2 = 4 which is a principle which is true whether or not anything exists. Ignorance is ignorance of the Dhamma, as I understand it. The "unborn" is living it and so is not "ignorant" of the Dhamma. The question really points to "How did it all begin?" Layman John 11840 From: Sarah Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 10:08pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear Christine, Appreciating all the ADL comments and reflections;-) --- christine_forsyth wrote: > On page 1 in ADL when talking about the Tipitaka that "Not only monks > but also laypeople should study the Vinaya." I wonder what could the > daily Rule written for renunciate males a couple of thousand years > ago, in a culture that no longer exists, have of value for a 21st > Century woman? I *can* see the point of reading about examples of > lobha, dosa and moha as reminders of our own defilements.....but > reading the whole thing......worth taking a closer look....? I think the whole Tipitaka is worth taking ‘a closer look’. I went through a phase of really studying the Vinaya. This was a very long time ago which is why I can’t quickly find references and quotes. I think you’d find it very interesting and not difficult reading. It’s rather like reading the stories behind the Dhammapada verses. They take on a new meaning and lead to some useful reflection. The rules, as you suggest, may seem quite irrelevant to us, but when one considers the descriptions of human nature which led to the rules being laid down for the monks, there are so many lessons for us to learn. You’ll soon see that human nature hasn’t changed at all and some of the stories would be X-rated today;-) Let me try to add one or two examples I find helpful: 1) As you work in a hospital, let me give a relevant quote about what makes a good patient and a difficult patient, which I referred to in an earlier post. (It is followed by the description and rule about when a monk should tend the sick and how he should do so which I quoted in message 9364) This is taken from Book of Discipline, Part 4, MahavaggaV111 <301>, transl by Miss Horner. .......... “Endowed with five qualities, monks does one who is ill become difficult to tend; he becomes one who does not do what is beneficial; he does not know moderation in what is beneficial; he becomes one who does not take medicine; he becomes one who does not make clear the disease just as it comes to be one who tends the sick and who wishes him well, saying as it is getting worse, ‘It is getting worse’, or as it is getting better, ‘it is getting better’, or as it is stationary, ‘It is stationary’; he becomes not the kind (of man) who endures bodily feelings which, arising, are painful, acute, sharp, shooting, disagreeable, miserable, deadly. Endowed with these five qualities, monks, does one who is ill become difficult to tend. “Endowed with five qualities, monks, does one who is ill become easy to tend: he becomes one who does what is beneficial; he knows moderation in what is beneficial; he becomes one who takes medicine; he makes clear the disease just as it comes to be to one who tends the sick and who wishes him well, saying......: he becomes the kind (of man) who endures bodily feelings which, arising, are painful, acute, sharp, shooting, disagreeable, miserable, deadly. Endowed with these five qualities, monks, does one who is ill become easy to tend.” ********** I started with this reference because the implication is so clear; we can all learn to be good patients. 2) Nina often gives references to aspects of the Vinaya which she finds useful to consider such as table manners, not being an imposition on one’s host/hostess, being easy to please with regard to food, dwelling or other items and so on. We can also read about the guarding of the sense doors and reasons why monks are taught to glance downwards. Rob K refers to the same guarding of the sense doors as we read in the Suttas here: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/2008 3) As a ‘21st century woman’, I have personally always found the rules pertaining to the relationships between monks and women of particular interest and relevance. For example, there are rules relating to a monk not being alone with a woman. Of course, unless we’re with a monk, we don’t need to follow this literally. It’s not a rule for two laypeople. However, when we read the events which led to these rules and consider the implications, we may find some reminders. Let me briefly summarise one story from volX, Part 1, Undetermined 1. The Ven Udayin was being supported by a family in Savatthi. One day he sat alone with the daughter of the family (who was engaged at the time) in ‘a secret place on a secluded, convenient seat, conversing at the right time, speaking dhamma at the right time.’ Visakha (who had ‘many children and many grandhildren’ since becoming a sotapanna, Chris) visited and saw them and said that it was unsuitable for the two of them to sit together in seclusion. ‘Although, honoured sir, the master has no desire for that thing, unbelieving people are difficult to convince.’ Udayin ignored her, other monks were told and were angry and it was reported to the Buddha who gave him the usual ‘foolish man’ rebukes: “How can you, foolish man, sit together with womenfolk.......It is not, foolish man, for the benefit of unbelievers...” ********** In other words, we may have good intentions, but sometimes we don’t know the others’ (and really the Vinaya reads like a chronicle of temptations) and we need to also consider the wagging tongues. To give a driving analogy, we may be an excellent driver even at fast speed, but we always have to consider that other drivers are not so excellent and even if they are, the police have their own guidelines regardless of our justifications. When I read “for the benefit of unbelievers..”, I understand that if we’re trying to help others understand the dhamma, it’ll be harder to do so if they are distracted by behaviour which seems ‘inappropriate’ to them. There are always other people to consider. Hope these comments have added to a little interest in the Vinaya. Perhaps after ADL and Abhidhamattha Sangaha, we can read the Vinaya together..hopefully on the net by then;-) Sarah =============================== 11841 From: egberdina Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 10:21pm Subject: Re: BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear John L and all the other classromm buddies, I will only deal with your first point, and it will probably raise more questions than it answers. Take a chariot apart, and there is no chariot. And from the component parts, it is not obvious what this pile of stuff was, or can be. Take a human being, or any other living thing apart (preferably while it is not living), and you will find in each individual cell all the information (DNA)which is able to reconstruct whatever being it was taken from. And you will also be able to tell much about the progenitors of this being, going back millions of years. The DNA for a human being allows for the possibility of a human being. It is in every part, and can be construed as the vital essence. Human beings live and die, cells live and die, the information stays the same. Information neither lives nor dies, is neither cognisant or not-cognisant, but given the right conditions, information becomes formation. All the best Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "johnrloganis" wrote: > Hi all, > Layman John (the title is to distinguish me from other Johns who may > or may not be present) here. > > Lucy was kind enough to turn me on to this study. > > I. First Response > As I read this first section a thought (Nama, I suppose) rises. > > Isn't considering constituent parts something like dissecting a body. > Once a body (of anything) is dissecting it no longer exists as a body > of anything. Take a car apart and lay all the pieces out on the > ground to look at them -- and there is no car and it surely won't > run. The existence of the car is precisely in the assembly of the > parts. > > So the existence of a person (a being) consists in the fact of its > component parts joined in an assembly. Thus the "soul" or "vital > essence" of something does not exist in any part. > > There would seem to be three possibilities: > > 1. Take something apart and it truly dies. There is no further > continuance. > > 2. That which is the "vital essence" or "soul" is prior to the > assemblage and directs the assembly process to create a "being". > > 3. The existence of the "assembly" brings into existence a "vital > essence" or "soul" (I don't have any better term right now so please > bear with it) which, having been created in assembly, then persists > after dissolution of the assembly into its elements. This "essence" > becomes the creative force for "rebirth". > > How does the Abhidhamma deal with the questions which this analysis > brings up? > 11842 From: Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 5:25pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 - to Howard Hi, John - In a message dated 3/14/02 12:55:21 AM Eastern Standard Time, johnrloganis@y... writes: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, John - > > > > In a message dated 3/12/02 8:25:45 PM Eastern Standard Time, > > johnrloganis@y... writes: > > > > > > > In the 12 fold cycle of Dependent Origination there is > persistence of > > > consciousness and thus rebirth leading to death. There must have > been > > > a first act creating the first "nama" and "rupa". > > > > > > > > ========================== > > Why? ;-) > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > Hi Howard, > > Because! > > Seriously because it is a "causal" chain. So there must be a First > Cause, something which started it all in the "first" place. This is > not something like 2+2 = 4 which is a principle which is true whether > or not anything exists. > > Ignorance is ignorance of the Dhamma, as I understand it. > The "unborn" is living it and so is not "ignorant" of the Dhamma. The > question really points to "How did it all begin?" > > Layman John > > ============================ There *is no need* for a first cause, and the Dhamma does not assume one. The chain of dependent arising is, in fact, not a linear chain, but a cyclic one. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11843 From: jaranoh Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 10:30pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Right Concentration and MN 117 Hi Christine, Victor and All: I was reading the suttas on the following site. I was surprised to find this interesting passage in an unexpected context. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn117.html The Buddha talks the 'right concentration' and explains how it arises and what supports it. One thing I find striking is that the right concentration is when the other seven factors of the 8-fold path are fullfilled. Of the most importance of 8-fold path is always the 'right view' as it is stated many times in the sutta above. The prerequisite of all factors of the Path is 'right view'). On each of the right factor, there two kinds of the right factors: with and without fermentations (asavas). Only those without asavas can together condition the right concentration. Examples of asavas are anger, greed, attachment (to things, forms, rituals, and most relevant here, RESULTS). Best Regards, jaran 11844 From: Sarah Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 10:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: BEGINNERS study program Dear Larry, Lucy and ADLers, --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > On a procedural note, if it's not too much trouble, someone could email > the section we are going to study in html without comment so it's > exactly the same as the web version and we could also number the > paragraphs so there would be an archived version with numbered > paragraphs, making it easy to search. I don't know how to do this; it's > a little difficult with my gear. So someone else would have to do it if > you think it is worth while. > These sound like great ideas, Larry. I think Lucy has already said she can do this and put it in a folder in the ‘Files’. Lucy, I know Nina is always happy for anyone to use material from her books as you are planning. May I suggest that for relevant emails, you consider putting a code in the subject headings such as ‘ADL’ or ‘ADL1’, ‘ADL2’ and then it is very easy to have them all listed in an ADL search on escribe http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/ without needing to add them ALL to the folder which may get a little ‘overwhelmed’ in due course (at the present rate;-). We’re also just a little careful about space which is limited in Files. A member just asked us about putting audio tapes (from India) there, for example, but there isn’t the memory on a yahoo discussion list for these which, with full texts, can easily be accessed on websites by link. If you run into technical probs, you could try asking Kom off-list for tips, but I’m sure he’ll be more than happy to leave it all in your capable hands as he’s always very busy. As predicted, nothing boring about studying Abhidhamma with you lot;-) Sarah =========================== 11845 From: Sarah Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 11:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: conditions for jhana- Herman Dear Nina, --- Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Ha Herman, I had to laugh when reading your post, because I thought of > Mount > Everest. I do not want to discourage you. > Sarah, I hope you do not mind that I am butting in here, my excuse is > Mount > Everest. I'm always delighted when you 'butt in' and never any need for any excuse, but glad Mt Everest provided one all the same;-) You gave some very helpful references, thank you very much. > Thus, those who are not born with three beautiful roots, including > pa~n~naa, > cannot attain jhana nor enlightenment. > This is as I thought. > We do not know whether we were born with wisdom or not. This conditions > our > whole life, because the succeeding life-continuum is of the same type of > vipakacitta and so on throughout life. The wisdom someone is born with > is > vipaka, result, but still, it conditions one's life. We are born with > different potentialities, we cannot choose this. But also those born > with > two beautiful roots can develop understanding and also samatha in daily > life. Yes, quite useless to speculate about whether we were born with 2 or 3 roots I think. > For samatha to the degree of jhana great understanding is needed: > pa~n~naa > has to know exactly when the citta is kusala and when akusala, and it > has to > know all the different conditions for attaining calm by means of a > meditation subject. Yes, understanding whether the citta is kusala or akusala and the connection between the meditation subject and calm has to start now in order for samatha bhavana to develop at all, without desire or choice of course. >My father > appreciated > your regards, and Oscar, very thoughtful. We played the Haydn Variations > of > Brahms for two pianos, and this could distract my father from the > sufferings > of his extremely old age. Here we see again that cittas are entirely > different because of different conditions. For newbies to dsg, Nina’s father is 100 and Oscar is his dog. I hope Oscar is behaving himself these days when he visits your apartment, Nina;-) Best wishes to Lodevick too, Sarah =========== 11846 From: Sarah Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 11:25pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory Dear KKT, --- phamdluan@a... wrote: > > KKT: The reason of my question is that: > > If memory is a cetasika > and lasts a very brief instant > and then falls away then > how does << recollection >> > or << recognition >> work? The simple answer is that each instant of ‘marking’ is accumulated and never lost. Each citta conditions the next citta and all its make-up is collected, gathered and passed on by the work of the 24 conditions, Rob K listed recently. > Suppose I meet Mr. X, > an image of X is a cetasika > making a mark in my 'mind' > but lasts only a fleeting moment. > > The next time I meet Mr. X, > there is a << recollection >> > or a << recognition >> that > I've already known Mr. X, > that means the << old image >> > of X must be somewhere > in order to have a << comparison >> > between the new image and the old one. Exactly so. Howard was recently discussing the seeing of a rose --you could check ‘rose’ in escribe for the relevant posts-- and how the various markings with moments of seeing and thinking, all accompanied by sanna, lead to the idea of seeing a rose. We can say that none of the markings are ever lost, but also that they never last or are ever the same as any other marking. > > Hope that it makes sense :-)) Likewise....good comments of yours. Sarah ====== 11847 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 1:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear Lucy, :-) :-) I've always wanted to do this..... Usually (just about always) I ask a question and end up with lots and lots of reading to do..... (not that I'm complaining..) Joy and delight! Now I can give you some :-) Have a look at Khun Sujins' Realities and Concepts : The Buddha's Explanation of the World I think you will find the first few pages will be of help just at the moment. :-) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Lucy" wrote: > Hi Group <<>>> > Why are these components called "realities" ? I've read explanations before > and at the time they made sense, but every time the word "reality" crops > up, I flinch...which means, I don't really understand it... > > Pass on rupa for now. > > Best wishes > Lucy 11848 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 1:47am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Lucy, Of course, it may be of help if I give you the link: http://www.geocities.com/ganges_sangha/realities.pdf Chris --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear Lucy, :-) :-) > > I've always wanted to do this..... Usually (just about always) I > ask a question and end up with lots and lots of reading to do..... > (not that I'm complaining..) Joy and delight! Now I can give you > some :-) > > Have a look at Khun Sujins' > Realities and Concepts : The Buddha's Explanation of the World > > I think you will find the first few pages will be of help just at the > moment. :-) > > metta, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Lucy" wrote: > > Hi Group > > <<>>> > > Why are these components called "realities" ? I've read > explanations before > > and at the time they made sense, but every time the word "reality" > crops > > up, I flinch...which means, I don't really understand it... > > > > Pass on rupa for now. > > > > Best wishes > > Lucy 11849 From: Sarah Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 5:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear Christine & All, --- christine_forsyth wrote:> > The illustration of the chariot broken down into component parts used > to refute the idea of 'a person' or 'a being' is effective, to a > degree. It increases understanding that what we take for self are > only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. (But, still...., why, > at some level is there a lingering wondering whether it is possible > that 'consciousness' might not retain some on-going identity?). In > developing understanding of Anatta, what has been of most benefit to > me is continuing to study 'conditionality' and gradually being > brought to accept that I have no certain, solitary, independent, > control of any thing. .......... Why the lingering wondering? Because of the deep-rooted ignorance, clinging and wrong view we all have, I think. I’m so very glad to hear, Chris, that you’re finding it so useful to study ‘conditionality’ and gradually the strong clinging to ‘self having control’ begins to get worn away. .......... In the Abhidhamma commentary., Sammohavinodani, We read the following paragraphs which explain how very ‘difficult to penetrate’ anatta is for us all and a little more about no control or ‘no power’ at the end: .......... Ch2, 240 “In such passages as : “Materiality, bhikkhus, is impermanent; what is impermanent is painful; what is painful is not self; what is not self, that is not mine, that am I not, that is not my self” (Siii 82), he taught the characteristic of no-self by means of both the impermanent and suffering. ‘Why? Because of the obviousness of impermanence and suffering. for when a plate or a saucer or whatever it may be falls from the hand and breaks, they say: ‘Ah! Impermanence,’ thus impermanence is obvious. but as regards the person (attabhaava), when boils and carbuncles and the like have sprung up, or when pierced by splinters and thorns, etc, they say: ‘Ah! The pain.’ thus pain is obvious. The characteristic of no-self is unobvious, dark, unclear, dificult to penetrate, difficult to illustrate, difficult to make known. ‘The characteristics of impermanence and pain are made known with or without the arising of the Tathagatas. The characteristic of no-self is not made known without the arising of the Englisghtened Ones; it is made known only on the arising of the Englightened ones.........for the making known of the characteristic of no-self is not the province of anyone else; it is the province of the fully Enlightened Ones only. Thus the characteristic of on-self is unobvious........ ‘But it is owing to not keeping what in mind, owing to non-penetration of what and owing to concealment by what that these characteristics do not appear?...........impermanence...pain.....The characteristic of no-self does not appear owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating the resolution into the various elements (naanaadhaatu-vinibbhoga) owing to its being concealed by compactness...............When resolving of the compact (ghanavinibboga) is effected by resolution into the various elements, the characteristic of no-self appears in accordance with its true essential nature........ ’......Herein, the five aggregates are impermanent. Why? Because they rise and fall and change, or because of their absence after having been. Rise and fall and change are the characteristic of impermanence, or mode of alteration (aakaaravikaara) called absence after having been. ‘But those same five aggregates are painful because of the words “what is impermanent is painful” (S iv 1). Why? Because of continual oppression. the mode of being continually oppressed is the characteristic of pain. ‘But those five aggregates are no-self because of the words “what is painful is no-self” (S iv 1). Why? Because there is no exercising power over them. The mode of insusceptibility to having opower exercised over them is the characteristic of no-self......................” **************** So many useful reflections from everyone at the moment... Sarah ============================================= 11850 From: abhidhammika Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 6:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory: To Sarah And KKT Dear Sarah And KKT How are you? KKT asked: "If memory is a cetasika and lasts a very brief instant and then falls away then how does << recollection >> or << recognition >> work?" KKT gave an example: "Suppose I meet Mr. X, an image of X is a cetasika making a mark in my 'mind' but lasts only a fleeting moment." Sarah has already given a very good answer to KKT's question. I merely wanted to add a little bit. Hope it did not look like adding too much sugar! When we see Mr X, it is true that the first visual consciousness lasts only a fleeting moment. But, to cover the whole of Mr X, the first visual consciousness alone is not enough. There is an uncountable number of visual consciousness cognitive series called "cakkhuviññaanaviithi" to process Mr X. And each cognitive series comes with additional supportive consciousnesses in addition to the visual consciousness. This means that all consciousnesses within each cognitive series come with successive emergences of memory. This also means that there emerge countless reinforcing instances of memory to process Mr X. In short, there has been sufficient mental processing time for the image of Mr X to be available for future retrieval. Now, how could an entirely new future memory in a totally new future consciousness recollect, and recognize an image of Mr X? The answer is to do with the fact that each of us is merely a mental chain that operates as a systemic whole. Every event that happens in one part of the system affects every other part of it. When our visual consciousnesses first processed Mr X, our minds also performed various other actions in addition to merely seeing Mr X. Some of these other actions are efficacious ones called "javanacittas" that are capable of giving rise to future results. As these results are associated with Mr X, even though those results happen in totally new future mental events in totally new future circumstances, an image of Mr X becomes available for new instances of memory to retieve, recollect and recognize. By the way, it pays to remember the function of memory in this context. The function of memory is to retrieve, recollect and recognize the past events. A particular mental phenomenon comes to receive the name "memory" precisely because it is capable of performing the function of memory, which is connecting the present consciousness with the past events (Retrieval, recollection, and recognizing). The lack of such capability is called dementia, a form of mental illness. Therefore, nothing can prevent a future instance of memory from retrieving and remembering the work and result of a past memory as long as the past memory and future memory emerge within the same mental chain. With best wishes, Suan Lu Zaw http://www.bodhiology.org (Recent Denial of service attack to the bodhiology website has now been overcome. During the attack, the Science And Academic Journal Of Bodhiology has been redesigned into yearly archived contents such as Content 2000, Content 2001, and Content 2002. Therefore, old bookmarks for Journal articles are no longer valid. Please kindly update your bookmarks if you had them.) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear KKT, > > --- phamdluan@a... wrote: > > > KKT: The reason of my question is that: > > > > If memory is a cetasika > > and lasts a very brief instant > > and then falls away then > > how does << recollection >> > > or << recognition >> work? > > The simple answer is that each instant of `marking' is accumulated and > never lost. Each citta conditions the next citta and all its make- up is > collected, gathered and passed on by the work of the 24 conditions, Rob K > listed recently. > > > Suppose I meet Mr. X, > > an image of X is a cetasika > > making a mark in my 'mind' > > but lasts only a fleeting moment. > > > > The next time I meet Mr. X, > > there is a << recollection >> > > or a << recognition >> that > > I've already known Mr. X, > > that means the << old image >> > > of X must be somewhere > > in order to have a << comparison >> > > between the new image and the old one. > > Exactly so. Howard was recently discussing the seeing of a rose -- you > could check `rose' in escribe for the relevant posts-- and how the various > markings with moments of seeing and thinking, all accompanied by sanna, > lead to the idea of seeing a rose. We can say that none of the markings > are ever lost, but also that they never last or are ever the same as any > other marking. > > > > Hope that it makes sense :-)) > > Likewise....good comments of yours. > > Sarah > ====== > > > 11851 From: manji Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 6:29am Subject: RE: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 - to Howard This is where emptiness comes into play. The beginning as a thought is a mere conceptual image, a mental image. The mental image is a rupa, however this in particular is a concept. That table does not have that "beginningness" in it, it does not carry that "beginningness". Searching for this "beginningness" is like searching for the tree that made the table. Just so like the table not actually having "tableness" intrinsic to it. There is no table, and no beginning, however there is clearly something that serves the function as table, and with respect to "beginning" what clearly serves the function of beginning? The only thing that comes remotely close is the kamma process, so that which serves the function of beginningness is actually probably right here, under our noses. -manji- -----Original Message----- From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...] Sent: Thursday, March 14, 2002 1:25 AM To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 - to Howard Hi, John - In a message dated 3/14/02 12:55:21 AM Eastern Standard Time, johnrloganis@y... writes: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > Hi, John - > > > > In a message dated 3/12/02 8:25:45 PM Eastern Standard Time, > > johnrloganis@y... writes: > > > > > > > In the 12 fold cycle of Dependent Origination there is > persistence of > > > consciousness and thus rebirth leading to death. There must have > been > > > a first act creating the first "nama" and "rupa". > > > > > > > > ========================== > > Why? ;-) > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > Hi Howard, > > Because! > > Seriously because it is a "causal" chain. So there must be a First > Cause, something which started it all in the "first" place. This is > not something like 2+2 = 4 which is a principle which is true whether > or not anything exists. > > Ignorance is ignorance of the Dhamma, as I understand it. > The "unborn" is living it and so is not "ignorant" of the Dhamma. The > question really points to "How did it all begin?" > > Layman John > > ============================ There *is no need* for a first cause, and the Dhamma does not assume one. The chain of dependent arising is, in fact, not a linear chain, but a cyclic one. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11852 From: Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 2:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory Dear Sarah, Thanks for answering to my question. ------------- << From: sarahdhhk@y... (Sarah) > KKT: The reason of my question is that: > > If memory is a cetasika > and lasts a very brief instant > and then falls away then > how does << recollection >> > or << recognition >> work? The simple answer is that each instant of ‘marking’ is accumulated and never lost. Each citta conditions the next citta and all its make-up is collected, gathered and passed on by the work of the 24 conditions, Rob K listed recently. >> KKT: I note the main point of your answer is: << the markings are never lost >> although they last only for a fleeting moment. This makes me think of kamma which has a broader sense than memory. The question is: If memory and kamma are << never lost >> then logically they must be << stored up >> somewhere ? I know that this << somewhere >> is out of question in Abhidhamma, not like in Yogacara of Mahayana where a Storehouse Consciousness (Alayavijnana) was postulated. So how does Abhidhamma deal with the problem of << never lost >> of memory and kamma without a << storehouse >> ? Best regards, KKT 11853 From: Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 2:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory: To Sarah And KKT Hi, Suan - You express worry below that this post of yours might add too much "sugar". As far as I'm concerned, if this is sugar, then I have very much of a "sweet tooth" for it! I find this to be a *wonderful* post! It's crystal clear to me, and very informative without being overloaded with Pali terminology. Thank you very much. With metta, Howard In a message dated 3/14/02 9:47:11 AM Eastern Standard Time, abhidhammika@y... writes: > > Dear Sarah And KKT > > How are you? > > KKT asked: > > "If memory is a cetasika > and lasts a very brief instant > and then falls away then > how does << recollection >> > or << recognition >> work?" > > KKT gave an example: > > "Suppose I meet Mr. X, > an image of X is a cetasika > making a mark in my 'mind' > but lasts only a fleeting moment." > > Sarah has already given a very good answer to KKT's question. > > I merely wanted to add a little bit. Hope it did not look like adding > too much sugar! > > When we see Mr X, it is true that the first visual consciousness > lasts only a fleeting moment. But, to cover the whole of Mr X, the > first visual consciousness alone is not enough. There is an > uncountable number of visual consciousness cognitive series > called "cakkhuviññaanaviithi" to process Mr X. > > And each cognitive series comes with additional supportive > consciousnesses in addition to the visual consciousness. This means > that all consciousnesses within each cognitive series come with > successive emergences of memory. This also means that there emerge > countless reinforcing instances of memory to process Mr X. > > In short, there has been sufficient mental processing time for the > image of Mr X to be available for future retrieval. > > Now, how could an entirely new future memory in a totally new future > consciousness recollect, and recognize an image of Mr X? > > The answer is to do with the fact that each of us is merely a mental > chain that operates as a systemic whole. Every event that happens in > one part of the system affects every other part of it. > > When our visual consciousnesses first processed Mr X, our minds also > performed various other actions in addition to merely seeing Mr X. > Some of these other actions are efficacious ones > called "javanacittas" that are capable of giving rise to future > results. As these results are associated with Mr X, even though those > results happen in totally new future mental events in totally new > future circumstances, an image of Mr X becomes available for new > instances of memory to retieve, recollect and recognize. > > By the way, it pays to remember the function of memory in this > context. > > The function of memory is to retrieve, recollect and recognize the > past events. A particular mental phenomenon comes to receive the > name "memory" precisely because it is capable of performing the > function of memory, which is connecting the present consciousness > with the past events (Retrieval, recollection, and recognizing). The > lack of such capability is called dementia, a form of mental illness. > > Therefore, nothing can prevent a future instance of memory from > retrieving and remembering the work and result of a past memory as > long as the past memory and future memory emerge within the same > mental chain. > > > With best wishes, > > Suan Lu Zaw > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11854 From: yuzhonghao Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 9:39am Subject: [dsg] Re: Right Concentration and MN 117 Hi Jaran, Thanks very much for this link http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn117.html I find the discourse MN 117 very illuminating and helpful. Regards, Victor --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "jaranoh" wrote: > Hi Christine, Victor and All: > > I was reading the suttas on the following site. I was surprised to > find this interesting passage in an unexpected context. > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn117.html > > The Buddha talks the 'right concentration' and explains how it arises > and what supports it. One thing I find striking is that the right > concentration is when the other seven factors of the 8-fold path are > fullfilled. Of the most importance of 8-fold path is always > the 'right view' as it is stated many times in the sutta above. The > prerequisite of all factors of the Path is 'right view'). > > On each of the right factor, there two kinds of the right factors: > with and without fermentations (asavas). Only those without asavas > can together condition the right concentration. Examples of asavas > are anger, greed, attachment (to things, forms, rituals, and most > relevant here, RESULTS). > > Best Regards, > jaran 11855 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 10:00am Subject: India Ch 7, no. 5 India Ch 7, no. 5. As regards the second noble Truth, we should thoroughly understand that attachment is the cause of dukkha. We should realize it when we cling to the idea of self. When we are seeing, thinking or considering the Dhamma there may be an idea of self who does so. When we are looking for ways and means to have more awareness, we cling to wrong practice, a form of wrong view, ditthi, which causes us to deviate from the right Path. Wrong practice prevents us from naturally developing the understanding of realities. It is necessary to have a keener and more refined knowledge of attachment, otherwise it cannot be eradicated. We can find out that it arises countless times, more often than we ever thought. As regards the third noble Truth, this is nibbåna, and nibbåna means the end of clinging and all other defilements. We should have the firm intellectual understanding that detachment and the eradication of defilements is the goal. We should be convinced that it is possible to attain this goal if we follow the right Path. As regards the fourth Noble Truth, the way leading to the end of dukkha, we should have the firm understanding that the development of satipatthåna is the only way leading to this goal. We should understand the difference between right view and wrong view. When we are really convinced that there is no other way but the development of satipatthåna, we shall not deviate from the right Path. Thus, we should not follow after the past nor desire for the future, we should be aware of any reality appearing now. When we listen to the Dhamma and consider what we hear the intellectual understanding of realities, that is, the first phase, sacca ñåna, gradually develops and then it can condition the arising of satipatthåna. This means that the second phase, knowledge of the task, kicca ñåna, begins to develop. The practice, patipatti, is actually knowledge of the task that is to be performed, kicca ñåna. Thus, there are different levels of paññå: intellectual understanding based on listening to the Dhamma, and paññå accompanied by sati that is directly aware of the characteristics of realities appearing now through one of the six doorways. These are the dhammas we studied and considered before, but now they can gradually be verified and directly understood. Knowing the difference between the moment there is no sati but only thinking about nåma and rúpa, and the moment there is awareness of one characteristic of nåma or rúpa at a time is the beginning of the development of satipatthåna. Gradually we shall realize nåma as nåma, and rúpa as rúpa, we shall realize their different characteristics. When one has reached the second phase, knowledge of the task or the practice, the first phase, intellectual understanding of the truth, is not abandoned but develops further. One understands more deeply what the four noble Truths are and one sees more clearly that satipatthåna, awareness of what appears now is the only way leading to detachment from the idea of self and to nibbåna which is the end of defilements. The clinging to self is deeply accumulated and very persistent. When paññå develops it sees even the more subtle clinging to a self or the clinging to sati. A moment of right awareness is very short and attachment can arise in alternation with clinging. If paññå is not keen enough, one will deviate from the right Path. There cannot be immediately clear understanding of realities, but we can begin to develop understanding of the realities we used to take for people, beings and things. 11856 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 op 13-03-2002 08:48 schreef christine_forsyth op cforsyth@v...: Dear Christine, I appreciate very much your interest. Most questions you raise you answer yourself very well. Just about the Vinaya: it is true we learn more about defilements and there are very good examples of lobha, in behaviour, such as beautifying body and dwellings. It is good to realize this also for laypeople. We take these things for granted, but it is good to know when lobha appears in our behaviour. Knowing, not suppressing. There are suttas and abhidhamma in vinaya. The teachings are one, the Vinaya is part of the Tipitaka. Worth reading also. It gives all the fine shades of different defilements. Someone killed by accident, and had doubts. The Buddha asked him: was it your intention to kill? We may have doubts about killing an insect, did we have the intention? And so there are many points. With appreciation, Nina. Chr: On page 1 in ADL when talking about the Tipitaka that "Not only monks > but also laypeople should study the Vinaya." I wonder what could the > daily Rule written for renunciate males a couple of thousand years > ago, in a culture that no longer exists, have of value for a 21st > Century woman? I *can* see the point of reading about examples of > lobha, dosa and moha as reminders of our own defilements.....but > reading the whole thing......worth taking a closer look....? > 11857 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 op 13-03-2002 02:24 schreef johnrloganis op johnrloganis@y...: Dear L. John, I do appreciate your interest. I will react to some of your points. Your questions were dilemmas also in former times, at the time of the Buddha: concerning annihilation or eternalism. I am glad you brought them up. Beginners Abhidhamma? J: Isn't considering constituent parts something like dissecting a body. > Once a body (of anything) is dissecting it no longer exists as a body > of anything. Take a car apart and lay all the pieces out on the > ground to look at them -- and there is no car and it surely won't > run. The existence of the car is precisely in the assembly of the > parts. N: Yes, it is like dissecting. In the teachings we read about a butcher who dissects a cow, and when the cow is cut up no idea of cow, but only of meat. The point is: there is no person, no self. J: So the existence of a person (a being) consists in the fact of its > component parts joined in an assembly. Thus the "soul" or "vital > essence" of something does not exist in any part. > > There would seem to be three possibilities: > > 1. Take something apart and it truly dies. There is no further > continuance. N:Is that not annihilation? There are conditions for the arising again of nama and rupa. J: That which is the "vital essence" or "soul" is prior to the > assemblage and directs the assembly process to create a "being". > > 3. The existence of the "assembly" brings into existence a "vital > essence" or "soul" (I don't have any better term right now so please > bear with it) which, having been created in assembly, then persists > after dissolution of the assembly into its elements. This "essence" > becomes the creative force for "rebirth". > > How does the Abhidhamma deal with the questions which this analysis > brings up? N: Nama and rupa arise because of their appropriate conditions , fall away, and then, so long as there are conditions present, nama and rupa arise again. As regards citta: it falls away and is then immediately followed by a succeeding citta which is a different one, but conditioned by the preceding one and by many other factors. No annihilation, and no eternal soul. As to rupa, rupa can be produced by kamma, citta, temperature or nutrition. So long as there are conditions old rupas are replaced by new ones. J: II. Second Response > J: "Nama" and "rupa" being the basic elements of consciousness and > existence by definition raises the following question: > > In the 12 fold cycle of Dependent Origination there is persistence of > consciousness and thus rebirth leading to death. There must have been > a first act creating the first "nama" and "rupa". > > So ... what started the first Nama-Rupa? >N: Ignorance of the truth about dhammas is the condition for the cycle of birth and death. What was the first ignorance? These are unanswered questions, because they do not lead to the goal: the cessation of ignorance. .. >J: I wish I had answers instead of questions...besides all these > questions just makes my head hurt. N: Ken O is a very wise man. He would say: relax, enjoy the study. No need for a headache. Let the study sink in, a person cannot understand all at once. It is not too difficult to understand the theory, but as Christine reminded us, it should be the foundation for the practice, patipatti. How do we feel about annihilation at death? We may be afraid that everything is finished, I have such doubts sometimes. But then I learnt that it is only thinking and conditioned. The sotapanna has no more doubt and is not afraid of death. When one has no wrong view of self one is unconcerned of what will happen to a self (which is non-existent) after death.Through the development of mindfulness of nama and rupa these will be seen as elements arising because of their appropriate conditions. When understanding has been developed to the degree of insight knowledge, the arising and falling away will be directly realized. When one realizes arising, no doubt that there is arising again after death in a new life. The Visuddhimagga explains (XVII, 167):< And with a stream of continuity there is neither identity nor otherness. For if there were absolute identity in a stream of continuity, there would be no forming of curd from milk. And yet if there were absolute otherness, the curd would not be derived from milk.> When one realizes the falling away of realities, one knows that they do not last, that there is nothing eternal or permanent. By seeing conditions one keeps the Middle Way: no annihilation belief, no eternalism. As I said, the theory is not too difficult, but the direct realization of the truth is difficult for all of us, it takes a long time. Here comes in the patience, the highest ascetism. Best wishes from Nina. 11858 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: good reminders op 13-03-2002 07:27 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: > Dear Ken O, > >> k: hmm trying hard my friend:) hmm it still >> sounds like a purpose volition >> :) > > Thanks for this reminder. This reminds me of A. Sujin's > response to the question: so if we shouldn't > force/intend/purpose to have sati, shouldn't we just let > Sati arise? Her answer was, who's doing the letting? > Tanha/Mana/Dithi attaches to any objects. Just like when we > learn, having all these conditioned kandhas (dukkhas) is > having suffering. So, we may think to ourself, it's better > not to have any, not knowing that it is the more subtle (or > maybe not so subtle!) tanha that thinks this thought. > > Appreciative, > > kom Dear Ken O. and Kom, I appreciate your good reminders, there is always clinging around the corner. So subtle. Even when we believe we have noble thoughts, wish for the cessation of dukkha, there can be clinging again. I like Ken's reminders to be relaxed, not to force sati, to enjoy study, that it should be fun. Some people may wonder whether such a relaxed attitude is not conducive to laziness. Should we just wait for sati, doing nothing? This is an issue already discussed more than once in this forum. Recently Jon wrote a post to Howard in which he so clearly explained the Middle Way. I would like to quote part of this post, because I find it good food for consideration again and again. < Howard, I'd like to suggest that the idea that awareness or understanding must be or is normally preceded by some form of volitional practice does not give due account to the conditioned nature of realities that is so central to the Buddha’s teaching. I will try to explain what I mean (without being confident that I will succeed). According to the abhidhamma and commentaries, all our tendencies both wholesome and unwholesome are passed from one moment of consciousness to the next and are latent in each moment of consciousness if not actually manifesting. At any given moment, only the kusala or the akusala accumulations/mental factors (i.e., not both) can manifest, and then only certain of those kusala or akusala factors. But whether kusala or akusala, their manifestation requires the right conditions. Obviously, the stronger the particular trait, the more likely to occur, but this is only one of a multitude of factors at play. Now it is implicit in the conditioned nature of things that if the necessary conditions for accumulated qualities wholesome or unwholesome to manifest are in place then they will do so at an appropriate time. As our general experience in life shows, tendencies have a way of choosing their own time and occasion (think of the unwholesome tendencies that pop up at the most unexpected and unwelcome of times). Precisely *when* or *what object* is not something that is within our power to determine, so there is no point in trying to make anything happen to our own timetable and/or selected object. In the case of our all too meagre accumulated store of awareness and understanding, the underlying and most important of the necessary conditions is I should think to have heard the teachings in this lifetime and as a result having some sort of 'sense of urgency' (seeing the danger in the round of existence). I suppose most of us having these discussions have at least a budding notion of this sense of urgency (otherwise we wouldn't spend our time having these discussions), so next come conditions such as having a proper grasp of the teachings at a theoretical/intellectual level as appropriate to our present level of actual understanding. What I am trying to show is that, if the right kind of nurturing is given, our accumulated awareness and understanding can and must arise, and will do so notwithstanding our accumulated kilesa. Even the akusala that is manifesting at one moment need not be an obstacle for the arising of awareness in a subsequent moment, and could indeed be the object taken by that moment of awareness. If that were not so then there would be no prospect of a way out. And we see that in the Satipatthana Sutta even the hindrances are among the mental objects to be known 'as they really are'. One thing is for sure. If we have the idea that awareness can *only* arise when preceded by 'conscious, deliberate or determined practice', and not at other times, this would be an almost insurmountable obstacle to the arising of awareness at moments when no such practice was being undertaken. It is likewise, but perhaps less obviously so, an obstacle to have the idea that awareness is *much more likely* to arise when the circumstance are those we perceive as being more conducive (e.g., our 'practice' time), and not at other ordinary’ times. It is a sobering thought (to me, anyway) that it is not the defilements that are so easily noticeable to us (and which we would very much like to be rid of) that are the real obstacles to the development of insight. It is our wrong view and ignorance -- aspects of our kilesa about which we have relatively very little idea -- that are the major hindrances. The development of the path might be a lot easier if it was a matter of somehow dealing with more obvious kilesa.> End quote. I like the reminder that whatever arises has its own time, thus, we cannot predict anything, be it kusala or akusala.We can verify this for ourselves, with regard to akusala and kusala, so unexpected. Also, even when relaxed, there can still be a sense of urgency. We study what we can understand and what we enjoy. We do not force anything. We develop understanding of conditions for whatever arises. Even a sense of urgency is conditioned, and this does not mean anxiety about our defilements, or, an idea that we better get rid of dukkha soon. It is valuable to develop understanding, that is our sense of urgency. As to the defilements that are more obvious: yes, dosa, for instance. Don't we like to have less aversion, sadness or fear? Ignorance and wrong view are more hidden, but they are the real danger when unnoticed. as Jon says. Ignorance arises with each akusala citta, but we usually notice the pleasant or unpleasant feeling, not the ignorance. Understanding has to become very keen to see such moments. And then wrong view of self, we know in theory that it is not yet eradicated, but we know so little about it. Many points in Jon's post I did not consider enough. Nina. 11859 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 10:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: BEGINNERS study program op 12-03-2002 21:08 schreef Lucy op selene@c...: > Hi all > > > A good idea to keep the topics and discussions in a way that they can be > found easily. How about using the "Files" section? There could be a > "beginners study" folder and in it all the relevant files and e-mails. I > can make html files easily, no problemo amigo. I'll have plenty of time > this w/end with no list mail : ) > > But we need the author's permission to put up material from her book in > these files- Nina? could we, please? Yes, Lucy, of course, with pleasure. Nina 11860 From: Lucy Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 0:17pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory Hi KKT: I was so intrigued by your question last night that I sent it to a friend/mentor who's been studying yogacara for 30 years. I hope nobody minds me posting my friend's reply here, I think it addresses KKT's follow up question and may give a slightly different view of the "Alaya consciousness" which is not too at odds with Abhidhamma. ----------------------------------------------------- KKT: If memory is a cetasika and lasts a very brief instant and then falls away then how does << recollection >> or << recognition >> work? Suppose I meet Mr. X, an image of X is a cetasika making a mark in my 'mind' but lasts only a fleeting moment. The next time I meet Mr. X, there is a << recollection >> or a << recognition >> that I've already known Mr. X, that means the << old image >> of X must be somewhere in order to have a << comparison >> between the new image and the old one. ---------------------------------------------------- My friend's answer: The response depends upon how you accept that past and present moments present themselves to consciousness. Ths is really the same as asking how or where do karmic 'seeds' reside. A cetasika (awareness of a deliberation of mano) does not occur in a vacuum but draws from various sources occurring within the present moment of consciousness. Therefore there must be within present c'ness the seeds for past events to be recreated. Seeds being a metaphor for the agglomeration of latent forces composed of events clung to in the present which have occurred in the past. 'Memories' are simply instances of such seeds being reformed (re-collected) into a present moment of c'ness and acknowledged (re-cognised) Because each process is 'new' there is the possibility of error in one's memory. . ---------------------------------------------- KKT (2): If memory and kamma are << never lost >> then logically they must be << stored up >> somewhere ? I know that this << somewhere >> is out of question in Abhidhamma, not like in Yogacara of Mahayana where a Storehouse Consciousness (Alayavijnana) was postulated. ------------------------------------------- In my friend's (and other people's) interpretation, based on the original works of Asanga and Vasubandhu, the "Storehouse Consciousness" is not a static, unchanging "store" of past events (that would be more the Sarvastivadin view). It is a dynamic, always changing, trail of "latencies" - Note my friend talks of "seeds" being "re-formed", they arise anew in a present moment based on present conditions and latent forces created by past kamma / events. They're not picked up by consciousness from anywhere else. Thus, the "memory" is never identical to the past event. Best wishes Lucy 11861 From: Lucy Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 0:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - Another useful link Hi folks Just found this summary of the seven books of the Ahidhamma Pitaka in buddhanet http://www.buddhanet.net/abhidham.htm Lucy 11862 From: mikebrotherto Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 1:40pm Subject: Re: Deluded clarification assistance --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "mikebrotherto" wrote: > > > Greetings! > > I have been mindfully reflecting on the seemingly subtle differences > between three deluded mental experiences. I currently feel that it is > skillful to reflect even on one's deluded experiences (in my case, > what else is there to reflect on?!?). With that, could someone help me > differentiate between: > > 1. ego/mano/conceit (I think these are the same, yes/no?) > 2. sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief > 3. atta - self > > I was on retreat the past 8 days with Bhante Gunaratana. (Look in the > dictionary under mindfulness and you see his picture. Even when he > pulled his socks up, I went into complete body mudra bliss.) I asked > him how the word "ego" fit into Buddhist psychology. He told me that > "ego" was the same as conceit - one of the last fetters to go; that > one will have a sense of ego even if one is a "non-returner". > > That helped because I have been confusing atta with ego for the past > 30 years. Now, I can't seem to fit personality belief - sakkaya-ditthi > - into the scheme of insanity. Could someone gently help clarify > these experiences? Thank you so much. > > With Metta, > Mike B. Is anyone able to help me out? Primarily, I'm trying to discern the difference between sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief.... and mano-conceit. Which would be considered the ego? Thanks, Mike B. 11863 From: Victor Yu Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 2:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi Larry, I find the following discourses might be helpful: Dhammapada 12 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10 Ananda Sutta To Ananda http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html Samyutta Nikaya XXII.59 Anatta-lakkhana Sutta The Discourse on the Not-self Characteristic http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html Regards, Victor > Hi all, > > I'm not sure what we (or the Buddha) mean by "self". There is a > conventional chariot and a conventional person but is there a > conventional "self"? By conventional I mean something everyone agrees > on, even though agreements can be short lived. The Buddha says a self > has to be permanent; why is that? Do we really _conventionally_ believe > that our self is permanent? What if I say my self is impermanent > patterned attachment (lobha) and aversion (dosa). Does that make me > real? > > more grist for the mill, > > Larry > ps: I had been taking to heart this idea that all I am is the momentary > arising of nama and rupa and I found it very hard to formulate anything. > I couldn't formulate understanding and I couldn't formulate > bewilderment. But, as you can see,I snapped out of it. > L. 11864 From: Lucy Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 3:08pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Hi all Since Larry suggested. Here's the next chunk. Obviously we're not satisfied that we've cleared all the questions the first chunk brought up --- the questions have multiplied...Did anyone expect it to be otherwise? (questions are very healthy ! - remember the old Ch'an / Zen saying: "the greater the questions, the greater the Enlightenment") Let's read on... (I've taken the liberty to break the paragraph into very small bits (that's the way I can follow it better - maybe it helps others too? [one suggestion here - we have to try not to get too side-tracked into other topics, most will come later. Have a quick look into the contents of the book and check the topics that will be coming up later...and save the questions and comments for that time] [methinks the main topic here is "realities" (paramatha dhamma) vs. "concepts" (pannatti)] ---------------------------------------------------------------- All phenomena in and around ourselves are only nåma and rúpa which arise and fall away; they are impermanent. Nåma and rúpa are absolute realities , in Påli: paramattha dhammas . We can experience their characteristics when they appear, no matter how we name them; we do not necessarily have to call them nåma and rúpa. Those who have developed "insight" can experience them as they really are: impermanent and not self. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, experiencing tangible object through the bodysense and thinking, all these nåmas are impermanent. We are used to thinking that there is a self who performs different functions such as seeing, hearing or thinking; but where is the self? Is it one of those nåmas? The more we know different nåmas and rúpas by experiencing their characteristics, the more will we see that "self" is only a concept; it is not a paramattha dhamma (absolute or ultimate reality). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11865 From: Lucy Date: Wed Mar 13, 2002 3:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 ----- Original Message ----- From: "christine_forsyth" > > I've always wanted to do this..... Usually (just about always) I > ask a question and end up with lots and lots of reading to do..... > (not that I'm complaining..) Joy and delight! Now I can give you > some :-) > > Have a look at Khun Sujins' > Realities and Concepts : The Buddha's Explanation of the World > Guess what ! I did last night even before reading your post --- telepathy? Also Nina's "Understanding Realities" http://www.abhidhamma.org/understanding%20reality.html thanks for the suggestion ! Lucy 11866 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 3:23pm Subject: Re: Deluded clarification assistance Hello Mike, You ask about: 1. ego/mano/conceit (I think these are the same, yes/no?) > 2. sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief > 3. atta - self Mana (conceit) was a surprise to me, when my kalyána-mitta (good friends in dhamma) were trying tactfully to bring mine to my attention, I couldn't see that I had any. :-) Wasn't I alway acknowledging the truth of how little I knew about Buddhism, compared to everyone else? Wasn't this humility, not conceit? Unfortunately, no. Much of the problem is that in Western culture, the everyday meaning of conceit is seen as only being a sort of 'a pretentious false belief in ones own superiority over others'. Self- disparagement disguised as humility is an art form in Australia - e.g. if someone tells a woman her dress is lovely and really suits her - the predictable reply will be "Oh, this old thing, first thing I grabbed out of the closet, actually it's starting to fray along this seam", or if a man is told he played exceptionally well at cricket - the predictable reply will be "Bit of a miracle eh? Should see my usual game - six ducks last season" (a duck = 'out for no score') Just a cultural thing..... and this is why I found my friends alluding to the term 'omana' for inferiority-conceit quite startling.....what, me? Oh, no, couldn't be! (or 'under estimator' as a friend kindly put it.) The dictionary meanings below may help with your query, and I am sure others will assist. Perhaps a similarity is that anyone infected with personality or ego belief or the defilement of conceit, is not able to recognise the anatta-ness of all things. http://www.budsas.org/ebud/bud-dict/dic_idx.htm metta, Christine ditthi (lit. 'sight'; Ö dis, to see): view, belief, speculative opinion, insight. If not qualified by sammá, 'right', it mostly refers to wrong and evil view or opinion, and only in a few instances to right view, understanding or insight (e.g. ditthi-ppatta, q.v.; ditthi-visuddhi, purification of insight; ditthi-sampanna, possessed of insight). Numerous speculative opinions and theories, which at all times have influenced and still are influencing mankind, are quoted in the sutta-texts. Amongst them, however, the wrong view which everywhere, and at all times, has most misled and deluded mankind is the personality-belief, the ego-illusion. This personality- belief (sakkáya-ditthi), or ego-illusion (atta-ditthi), is of 2 kinds: eternity-belief and annihilation-belief. Eternity-belief (sassata-ditthi) is the belief in the existence of a persisting ego- entity, soul or personality, existing independently of those physical and mental processes that constitute life and continuing even after death. Annihilation-belief (uccheda-ditthi), on the other hand, is the belief in the existence of an ego-entity or personality as being more or less identical with those physical and mental processes, and which therefore, at the dissolution at death, will come to be annihilated. - For the 20 kinds of personality-belief, see sakkáya- ditthi. Now, the Buddha neither teaches a personality which will continue after death, nor does he teach a personality which will be annihilated at death, but he shows us that 'personality', 'ego', 'individual', 'man', etc., are nothing but mere conventional designations (vohára-vacana) and that in the ultimate sense (s. paramattha-sacca) there is only this self- consuming process of physical and mental phenomena which continually arise and again disappear immediately. - For further details, s. anattá, khandha, paticcasamuppáda. mána: 'conceit', pride, is one of the 10 fetters binding to existence (s. samyojana). It vanishes completely only at the entrance to Arahatship, or Holiness (cf. asmi-mána). It is further one of the proclivities (s. anusaya) and defilements (s. kilesa). The (equality- ) conceit (mána), the inferiority-conceit (omána) and the superiority- conceit (atimána): this threefold conceit should be overcome. For, after overcoming this threefold conceit, the monk, through the full penetration of conceit, is said to have put an end suffering" (A. VI, 49)."Those ascetics and brahman priests who, relying on this impermanent, miserable and transitory nature of corporeality, feelings, perceptions, mental formations and consciousness, fancy: 'Better am I', or 'Equal am I', or 'Worse am I', all these imagine thus through not understanding reality" (S. XXII, 49).In reality no ego-entity is to be found. Cf. anattá. sakkáya-ditthi: 'personality-belief', is the first of the 10 fetters (samyojana). It is entirely abandoned only on reaching the path of Stream-winning (sotápatti-magga; s. ariya-puggala). There are 20 kinds of personality-belief, which are obtained by applying 4 types of that belief to each of the 5 groups of existence (khandha, q.v.): (1-5) the belief to be identical with corporeality, feeling, perception, mental formations or consciousness; (6-10) to be contained in them; (11-15) to be independent of them; (16-20) to be the owner of them (M. 44; S. XXII. 1). See prec., ditthi, upádána 4. --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "mikebrotherto" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "mikebrotherto" wrote: > > > > > > Greetings! > > > > I have been mindfully reflecting on the seemingly subtle differences > > between three deluded mental experiences. I currently feel that it > is > > skillful to reflect even on one's deluded experiences (in my case, > > what else is there to reflect on?!?). With that, could someone help > me > > differentiate between: > > > > 1. ego/mano/conceit (I think these are the same, yes/no?) > > 2. sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief > > 3. atta - self > > > > I was on retreat the past 8 days with Bhante Gunaratana. (Look in > the > > dictionary under mindfulness and you see his picture. Even when he > > pulled his socks up, I went into complete body mudra bliss.) I asked > > him how the word "ego" fit into Buddhist psychology. He told me that > > "ego" was the same as conceit - one of the last fetters to go; that > > one will have a sense of ego even if one is a "non-returner". > > > > That helped because I have been confusing atta with ego for the past > > 30 years. Now, I can't seem to fit personality belief - > sakkaya-ditthi > > - into the scheme of insanity. Could someone gently help clarify > > these experiences? Thank you so much. > > > > With Metta, > > Mike B. > > Is anyone able to help me out? Primarily, I'm trying to discern the > difference between sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief.... and > mano-conceit. Which would be considered the ego? > > Thanks, > Mike B. 11867 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 4:14pm Subject: RE: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1: Commentaries from Sammohavinodani Dear Sarah, I would like to comment on the quote you have from the commentaries, to see if my understandings of the text matches what the commentaries may expand further (but left unmentioned here), or if it matches other people's interpretation... So, any critics are welcome. ;-) > -----Original Message----- > From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...] > > In the Abhidhamma commentary., Sammohavinodani, We read the following > paragraphs which explain how very ‘difficult to penetrate’ anatta is for > us all and a little more about no control or ‘no power’ at the end: > .......... > Ch2, 240 > “In such passages as : “Materiality, bhikkhus, is impermanent; what is > impermanent is painful; what is painful is not self; what is not self, > that is not mine, that am I not, that is not my self” (Siii 82), he taught > the characteristic of no-self by means of both the impermanent and > suffering. > > ‘Why? Because of the obviousness of impermanence and suffering. for when > a plate or a saucer or whatever it may be falls from the hand and breaks, > they say: ‘Ah! Impermanence,’ thus impermanence is obvious. but as > regards the person (attabhaava), when boils and carbuncles and the like > have sprung up, or when pierced by splinters and thorns, etc, they say: > ‘Ah! The pain.’ thus pain is obvious. This seems to match that some other belief systems, especially from India, also incorporates "impermanence" and "suffering" (dukha dukha) into their teaching. The above passage seems to correspond. > ‘The characteristics of impermanence and pain are made known with or > without the arising of the Tathagatas. The characteristic of no-self is > not made known without the arising of the Englisghtened Ones; it is made > known only on the arising of the Englightened ones.........for the making > known of the characteristic of no-self is not the province of anyone else; > it is the province of the fully Enlightened Ones only. Thus the > characteristic of on-self is unobvious........ It is clear from the above passage that making known the characteristics of non-self (anatta) is unique to the Buddhas (sammasam-buddha only?). I wonder if there are any significance between the usage of "Tathagatas" and "Englightened ones" above. Do the Englightened Ones include all Sammasam-buddha, paceka-buddha, and savaka-buddha? > ‘But it is owing to not keeping what in mind, owing to non-penetration of > what and owing to concealment by what that these characteristics do not > appear?...........impermanence...pain.....The characteristic of no-self > does not appear owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating the > resolution into the various elements (naanaadhaatu-vinibbhoga) owing to > its being concealed by compactness...............When resolving of the > compact (ghanavinibboga) is effected by resolution into the various > elements, the characteristic of no-self appears in accordance with its > true essential nature........ When I first read "compactness", I thought this may refer to the speed of the rising and falling away of the dhamma. However, the second compact is explained to be ghanavinibboga, which I assume to mean the combination (aggregation of many into one) of those rapidly rising/falling states. Do you have more information on this point? At any rate, this basically says that the characteristic of no-self doesn't appear until there is a resolution of different dhatu. I think this matches A. Sujin explanation that the anattaness of dhamma is not truly known until the first vipassana nana, the distinction (resolution?) of nama and rupa, arises. > ‘But those same five aggregates are painful because of the words “what is > impermanent is painful” (S iv 1). Why? Because of continual oppression. > the mode of being continually oppressed is the characteristic of pain. Now I understand better why dukkhas are called suffering, because suffering cannot be endured, which is like dukkhas (all the 5 kandhas) which cannot be endured from the the sense that they don't endure. > > ‘But those five aggregates are no-self because of the words “what is > painful is no-self” (S iv 1). Why? Because there is no exercising power > over them. The mode of insusceptibility to having opower exercised over > them is the characteristic of no-self......................” > **************** Even after hearing this again and again, we (I) still always seem to have lingering thoughts that we can exercise powers over these realities. I want to have kusala states. I want to have sati. I want to have more/sharper panna, and I can make this happen. I don't think I can ever hear this enough! > > So many useful reflections from everyone at the moment... > Thanks for the quote, Sarah. Hopefully, you will have comments for me as well! kom 11868 From: Sarah Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 8:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Deluded clarification assistance Dear Mike B, --- mikebrotherto wrote: > > > > > > Greetings! > > > > I have been mindfully reflecting on the seemingly subtle differences > > between three deluded mental experiences. I currently feel that it > is > > skillful to reflect even on one's deluded experiences (in my case, > > what else is there to reflect on?!?). With that, could someone help > me > > differentiate between: > > > > 1. ego/mano/conceit (I think these are the same, yes/no?) > > 2. sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief > > 3. atta - self I expect you’ll receive many comments now after your reminder;-) There are so many good comments and questions vying for attention at the moment and some are a little easier than others;-) I see Christine has already added her usual witty response and helpful dictionary entries, (many thanks, Chris). When we were in Bangkok recently we also had a little discussion about “This is mine, this am I, this is my self” as often quoted. “This is mine” refers to craving, taking objects as belonging to self. “This am I” refers to mana, conceit and “This is my self” refers to the personality belief, sakkaya ditthi, identified with the 5 khandhas. Nina elaborates on these at: http://www.abhidhamma.org/ibs2.html She writes: “In the "Discourse on the Characteristic of Non-Self" quoted above, we read that the Buddha said to the monks: "But is it fit to consider that which is impermanent, dukkha, of a nature to change, as 'This is mine, this am I, this is my self'?" This phrase, often recurring in the scriptures, is deep in meaning. "This is mine" implies craving which appropriates things as the property of self. "This am I" implies conceit, the tendency to compare oneself with others. "This is myself" is a formulation of the personality view, the belief in an abiding self, subsequently identified with the five khandhas. We learn from the Abhidhamma that craving may arise with wrong view or without it. We may, for example, think of "my arms and legs" with attachment, without there necessarily being wrong view. We should know that there is not wrong view all the time when we think of ourselves. Conceit accompanies lobha-mulacitta, citta rooted in attachment. At the moment of conceit there cannot be wrong view at the same time. The ariyans who are not arahats may still have conceit; they have eradicated wrong view but they still may compare themselves with others.” ********** Recently in her India series (ch 6, no 2), she also wrote a little more on this theme, with more helpful reminders about conceit, so again, please let me be a parrot (as Num would say): Nina: “Attachment to sense objects can only be eradicated at the attainment of the third stage of enlightenment, the stage of the non-returner, anågåmí. First wrong view of realities, diììhi, has to be eradicated before other defilements can be eradicated. We have the latent tendency of wrong view, diììhanussaya, and this can condition the arising of lobha-múla-citta (citta rooted in attachment) that is accompanied by wrong view. When we have studied the Dhamma we may have intellectual understanding of the Buddha?s teaching on nåma and rúpa, but we may still follow the wrong practice instead of developing right understanding of what appears now. Wrong practice is a way of wrong view, diììhi. We may engage in wrong practic e without noticing this. We may, for example, believe that we should visit th e holy sites and pay respect to the Buddha?s relics in order to have more s ati of satipatthåna. Acharn Supee reminded us that we may try to induce sati by acting in a specific way. That is not the right Path. He explained that the ?teacher lobha may tell us to follow special techniques in order to ga in more understanding, but that this is not the development of right understanding of realities that are conditioned and appear now. Acharn Sujin always stresses that we cannot do anything to have sati, it arises because of its own conditions. When we listen to the Dhamma conditions for the arising of sati are accumulated. However, we may still unknowingly try to be aware. It is paññå that can detect such moments . Conceit, måna, is another akusala cetasika that can arise with lobha-múla-citta. When there is conceit we attach importance to ourselve s. Because of conceit we compare ourselves with others: we think ourselves better, equal or less than someone else. However, also when we do not compare ourselves with others we may find ourselves important and then ther e is conceit. Acharn Sujin reminded us that even when we laugh, conceit may arise. When we laugh about the way someone else is dressed, there can be conceit: we may find that he is dressed in a funny way while we are well dressed. Also when we are with other people who tell us stories and we join in their laughter we may find ourselves important, we may attach importance to our way of laughing, our manners. Acharn Supee explained that when there is a sense of ?me and ?he there may already be conceit. Conceit m ay arise when we think of someone else who takes medicine while we do not have to take it; when we think of ourselves who perspire in the hot climate of India, while others do not; when we think of ourselves who have taken the food from the buffet table already while others have not yet; when we think of ourselves who visit the holy sites, while others do not. There are countless instances of thinking with conceit, but these are very intricate. When there is a thought of ?me and the others and our objective is not dåna, síla or bhåvanå, conceit is bound to arise very often. Even w hen we think, ?He sits there and I am here, there can already be conceit, Ach arn Supee said. When we have mettå, loving kindness, for someone else, we do not think wi th conceit, thus this is a way to have less akusala when we are with others. However, cittas arise and fall away very rapidly, and there may even be clinging to the idea of trying to have mettå instead of conceit. Mettå and conceit can arise very rapidly one after the other. Only paññå can kn ow these different moments.” ********** Mike B, I think your questions and points below are very helpful to consider and I hope the distinctions are a little clearer now. We can begin to see how very deep rooted sakkaya ditthi and mana are. If you have any follow up questions or comments, I’ll be very glad to hear. I’m also glad to hear the retreat was a condition for so much wise reflection. Sorry for the delay;-) Sarah ============== > > I was on retreat the past 8 days with Bhante Gunaratana. (Look in > the > > dictionary under mindfulness and you see his picture. Even when he > > pulled his socks up, I went into complete body mudra bliss.) I asked > > him how the word "ego" fit into Buddhist psychology. He told me that > > "ego" was the same as conceit - one of the last fetters to go; that > > one will have a sense of ego even if one is a "non-returner". > > > > That helped because I have been confusing atta with ego for the past > > 30 years. Now, I can't seem to fit personality belief - > sakkaya-ditthi > > - into the scheme of insanity. Could someone gently help clarify > > these experiences? Thank you so much. > > > > With Metta, > > Mike B. > > Is anyone able to help me out? Primarily, I'm trying to discern the > difference between sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief.... and > mano-conceit. Which would be considered the ego? > > Thanks, > Mike B. ................................................................................................................... 11869 From: Sarah Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 8:53pm Subject: Re:[dsg] Ayatanas revisited All-warning!: unless you’ve been following the ‘ayatana’ thread, this is guaranteed to confuse you as I haven’t attempted to explain the quotes - pls skip if so;-) Dear Num, Further to my other comments, let me just add one or two more quotes from texts related to your questions rather than speculate further; 1. Sammohavinodani 222 “This is what is said: since the eye and so on are also mental data (dhamma), this being so why is “the twelve bases” said instead of just “mental-data base”? Because of defining door-cum-object for the arising of the consciousness groups. For here, it is precisely because of defining the six consciousness groups by the state of door and the state of object that they come to be divided up in this way; thus they are called the twelve. For only the eye base is the door of arising, and only the visible-data base is the object of the consciousness group which is included in a cognitive series (vithi) of eye-consciousness. Like wise the others in the case of the others. But only the part of the mind bae called the life-continuum (bhavanga) mind is the door of arising, and only the mental data base wich is not common to all is the object of the sixth consciousness group......” 2. Vibhanga 2. Analysis of the Bases 167 “Therein what is ideational base? The aggregate of feeling, aggregate of perception, aggregate of mental concomitants and that invisible non-impingement quality included in the ideational base; the unconditional element.” later: “Therein what is invisible non-impingent matter included in ideational base? the controlling faculty of femininity, controlling faculty of masculinity; the nutrient factor of food. this is called invisible non-impingent matter include in ideational base.” 3. Visuddhimagga XV 10“But only one part of the mind base, in other words, the life-continuum mind, is the door of arising......” 14 “The mental data base is of many kinds when classified according to the several individual essences of feeling, perception, formations, subtle matter, and nibbana” ********** .For me, I don’t have a question about the bhavanga part, but your second question about pasada rupa (eyesense and so on) as included under ‘subtle rupas’ in mental data base/ideational base (dhammayatana) is a little confusing. Probably beyond my limits here (as Nina would say;-)) and not sure it matters very much! so just leaving it here with you for now, Sarah ============================== 11870 From: Victor Yu Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 9:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi Sarah, > Victor, I really hope you can also contribute and join the study group and > I'd be interested particularly to hear any of your comments on the first > page Larry quoted. I would like to make sure if the what you referred as the first page Larry quoted is the following passage. Regards, Victor Chapter 1 THE FOUR PARAMATTHA DHAMMAS There are two kinds of reality: mental phenomena (nama) and physical phenomena (rupa). Nama experiences something; rupa does not experience anything. Seeing is, for example, a type of nama; it experiences visible object. Visible object itself is rupa; it does not experience anything. What we take for self are only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. The 'Visuddhimagga' ('Path of Purity', a commentary) explains (Ch. XVIII, 25): For this has been said: . 'As with the assembly of parts The word "chariot" is countenanced, So, When the khandhas are present, 'A being' is said in common usage' (Kindred Sayings I, 135. The five khandhas (aggregates) are nothing else but nama and rupa. See Ch.2.) .So in many hundred suttas there is only mentality-materiality which is illustrated, not a being, not a person. Therefore, just as when the component parts (of a chariot) such as axles, wheels, frame, poles... are arranged in a certain way, there comes to be the mere conventional term 'chariot', yet in the ultimate sense, when each part is examined, there is no chariot, ...so too,... there comes to be the mere conventional term 'a being', 'a person', yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is examined, there is no being as a basis for the assumption ' I am' or ' I ' ; in the ultimate sense there is only mentality-materiality. The vision of one who sees in this way is called correct vision. 11871 From: Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 9:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Deluded clarification assistance Sarah, Thanks for this reply to Mike's question, and thanks for Nina's explanation. Thanks to these I think I'm beginning to see a way of untangling my recuring question about what is "self". Nina wrote, ""This is myself" is a formulation of the personality view, the belief in an abiding self, subsequently identified with the five khandhas." This suggests to me that there is a slight difference between "self" and conventional reality. "Self" is not the same as "a person" because "self" is a belief. Is there a difference between a concept and a belief in abhidamma? Is this reasonable reasoning? Larry 11872 From: Sarah Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 9:22pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi Victor, Yes and especially any comments on the 2nd sutta quote. Sarah --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > > Victor, I really hope you can also contribute and join the study group > and > > I'd be interested particularly to hear any of your comments on the > first > > page Larry quoted. > > > I would like to make sure if the what you referred as the first page > Larry > quoted is the following passage. > > Regards, > Victor > > Chapter 1 > > THE FOUR PARAMATTHA DHAMMAS > > There are two kinds of reality: mental phenomena (nama) and physical > phenomena (rupa). Nama experiences something; rupa does not experience > anything. Seeing is, for example, a type of nama; it experiences visible > object. Visible object itself is rupa; it does not experience anything. > What we take for self are only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. > The 'Visuddhimagga' ('Path of Purity', a commentary) explains (Ch. > XVIII, 25): > > For this has been said: . > 'As with the assembly of parts > The word "chariot" is countenanced, > So, When the khandhas are present, > 'A being' is said in common usage' > > (Kindred Sayings I, 135. The five khandhas (aggregates) are nothing else > but nama and rupa. See Ch.2.) > > .So in many hundred suttas there is only > mentality-materiality which is illustrated, not a being, > not a person. Therefore, just as when the component > parts (of a chariot) such as axles, wheels, frame, poles... > are arranged in a certain way, there comes to be the > mere conventional term 'chariot', yet in the ultimate > sense, when each part is examined, there is no > chariot, ...so too,... there comes to be the mere > conventional term 'a being', 'a person', yet in the ultimate > sense, when each component is examined, there is > no being as a basis for the assumption ' I am' or ' I ' ; > in the ultimate sense there is only mentality-materiality. > The vision of one who sees in this way is called correct vision. > > 11873 From: johnrloganis Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 9:25pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 - to Nina Hi Nina, Thank you for your thoughtful responses. And I receive your message about relaxing and being patient letting it unfold. One question. I have heard the phrase expressed in the Dhamma as Causes - Conditions - Effects In western philosophy the phrasing is Causes - Effects I see a difference and have my own interpretation of the Causes - Conditions - Effects description. I would like a better understanding of "Conditions" in this context. Would you please elucidate or point me to a place where that is discussed? Thank you, L. John (I kind of like the L., I never was completely comfortable with Layman, though I was inspired by several prominent laymen who were most enlightened, hoping some of it would rub off, especially since I am not likely to become a monk in this lifetime.) --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 13-03-2002 02:24 schreef johnrloganis op johnrloganis@y...: > > Dear L. John, I do appreciate your interest. I will react to some of your > points. Your questions were dilemmas also in former times, at the time of > the Buddha: concerning annihilation or eternalism. I am glad you brought > them up. Beginners Abhidhamma? 11874 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 10:11pm Subject: India Ch 7, no. 6 India 7, no. 6. Acharn Sujin reminded us that we should not move away from the present moment and that we should abandon desire for sati. She said that it seems that we wish to develop sati, reach the stages of insight and attain enlightenment, all for our own sake. However, the goal of the development of satipatthåna should be understanding of the truth of anattå, thus, the truth that there is no ³me². When the first stage of insight knowledge arises, paññå has reached a higher level. At the first stage of insight the difference between nåma and rúpa is realized, but not yet their arising and falling away. As we have seen, there is at that moment no notion of self, no world, only nåma and rúpa. Although there is some result of the development of satipatthåna, paññå has to be developed further. One begins to realize the arising and falling away of realities at the third stage of insight knowledge, and more fully at the fourth stage that is called the first stage of mahå-vipassanå ñåna. In the course of the different stages of insight paññå penetrates more thoroughly the three characteristics of impermanence, dukkha and anattå, and it realizes the danger and disadvantages of conditioned dhammas, of nåma and rúpa. Paññå sees the unconditioned dhamma, nibbåna, as true peace, as the deliverance from conditioned dhammas. When finally nibbåna is attained, the four noble Truths are penetrated, and the third phase, kata ñåna, which through the successive stages of insight knowledge has gradually been developing, has been fulfilled. Then, the task that had to be done has been done. When the third phase develops, the first and the second phases are not finished or abandoned, they also develop together with it. Thus we see that there are many degrees in each of the three phases of knowledge of the four noble Truths. They are intertwined phases. When the first stage of enlightenment, the stage of the ³streamwinner², sotåpanna, is attained, the latent tendency of wrong view and of doubt about realities is completely eradicated. However, before enlightenment was attained, the tendencies to wrong view and doubt were gradually being eliminated by the development of insight, otherwise they could not become completely eradicated. After the first stage of enlightenment has been attained, paññå has to develop further to the second, the third and the fourth stage of enlightenment. At the stage of arahatship the task has been completely fulfilled: what had to be understood has been fully penetrated and what had to be abandoned has been completely eradicated. Acharn Sujin stressed the importance of the three phases because they make it apparent that sati and paññå of satipatthåna can only arise when there are the right conditions, a firm foundation knowledge of what the objects of satipatthåna are and of the way of its development, that is, the development of right understanding of dhamma appearing now. The three phases make it clear that the development of satipatthåna is very gradual and they remind us of the importance of the goal of the development of understanding: detachment from the clinging to self and the abandonment of all defilements. In the following sutta we are reminded that ignorance and wrong view give rise to all kinds of akusala, whereas right understanding leads to freedom from all defilements. The ³streamwinner², sotåpanna, who has attained the first stage of enlightenment, has eradicated wrong view and wrong practice, he cannot deviate from the right Path. He has no more conditions to commit evil deeds leading to an unhappy rebirth. We read in the ³Gradual Sayings² (Book of the Tens, Ch XI, § 5, By knowledge): Monks, when ignorance leads the way, by the reaching of states unprofitable, shamelessness and recklessness follow in its train. In one who is swayed by ignorance and is void of sense, wrong view springs up. Wrong view gives rise to wrong thinking, wrong thinking to wrong speech, wrong speech to wrong action, wrong action to wrong livelihood, wrong livelihood to wrong effort, wrong effort to wrong mindfulness, wrong mindfulness to wrong concentration, that to wrong knowledge, and that to wrong release. But, monks, when knowledge leads the way, by the attainment of profitable states, the sense of shame and self-restraint follow in its train. In one who is swayed by knowledge and has good sense, right view springs up. Right view gives rise to right thinking... right concentration gives rise to right knowledge, and that to right release. ****** Footnotes 1. In Påli parivattam, which means cycle or round. There are three rounds or intertwined phases, that is to say, one phase runs into the next one. As will be explained, when there is the second phase, the first phase is not abandoned, and when there is the third phase, the first and the second phases are not abandoned. 2. Sacca means truth and ñåna means knowledge; kicca means task; kata means what has been done. 3. Tathågata or ³thus gone², an epithet of the Buddha ****** 11875 From: Victor Yu Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 10:47pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Hi Sarah, For the most part I quoted some passages from the discourses that might be relevant to the first page in ADL. > Hi Victor, > > Yes and especially any comments on the 2nd sutta quote. > > Sarah > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > > > > Victor, I really hope you can also contribute and join the study group > > and > > > I'd be interested particularly to hear any of your comments on the > > first > > > page Larry quoted. > > > > > > I would like to make sure if the what you referred as the first page > > Larry > > quoted is the following passage. > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > > > Chapter 1 > > > > THE FOUR PARAMATTHA DHAMMAS > > > > There are two kinds of reality: mental phenomena (nama) and physical > > phenomena (rupa). In terms of aggregates, there are form, feeling, perception, fabrications, and consciousness. Nama experiences something; rupa does not experience > > anything. Seeing is, for example, a type of nama; it experiences visible > > object. Visible object itself is rupa; it does not experience anything. > > What we take for self are only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. To quote from Samyutta Nikaya XXII.79 Khajjaniya Sutta Chewed Up "And why do you call it 'form' (rupa)? Because it is afflicted (ruppati), thus it is called 'form.' Afflicted with what? With cold & heat & hunger & thirst, with the touch of flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, & reptiles. Because it is afflicted, it is called form. "And why do you call it 'feeling'? Because it feels, thus it is called 'feeling.' What does it feel? It feels pleasure, it feels ?ain, it feels neither-pleasure-nor-pain. Because it feels, it is called feeling. "And why do you call it 'perception'? Because it perceives, thus it is called 'perception.' What does it perceive? It perceives blue, it perceives yellow, it perceives red, it perceives white. Because it perceives, it is called perception. "And why do you call them 'fabrications'? Because they fabricate fabricated things, thus they are called 'fabrications.' What do they fabricate into a fabricated thing? From form-ness, they fabricate form into a fabricated thing. From feeling-ness, they fabricate feeling into a fabricated thing. From perception-hood...From fabrication-hood...From consciousness-hood, they fabricate consciousness into a fabricated thing. Because they fabricate fabricated things, they are called fabrications. [1] "And why do you call it 'consciousness'? Because it cognizes, thus it is called consciousness. What does it cognize? It cognizes what is sour, b?tter, pungent, sweet, alkaline, non-alkaline, salty, & unsalty. Because it cognizes, it is called consciousness. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-079.html Each and every aggregate is impermanent, is dukkha, is not self, is to be seen as it actually is thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my self." > > The 'Visuddhimagga' ('Path of Purity', a commentary) explains (Ch. > > XVIII, 25): > > > > For this has been said: . > > 'As with the assembly of parts > > The word "chariot" is countenanced, > > So, When the khandhas are present, > > 'A being' is said in common usage' > > > > (Kindred Sayings I, 135. The five khandhas (aggregates) are nothing else > > but nama and rupa. See Ch.2.) > > > > .So in many hundred suttas there is only > > mentality-materiality which is illustrated, not a being, > > not a person. Therefore, just as when the component > > parts (of a chariot) such as axles, wheels, frame, poles... > > are arranged in a certain way, there comes to be the > > mere conventional term 'chariot', yet in the ultimate > > sense, when each part is examined, there is no > > chariot, ...so too,... there comes to be the mere > > conventional term 'a being', 'a person', yet in the ultimate > > sense, when each component is examined, there is > > no being as a basis for the assumption ' I am' or ' I ' ; > > in the ultimate sense there is only mentality-materiality. > > The vision of one who sees in this way is called correct vision. To quote from Majjhima Nikaya 117 Maha-cattarisaka Sutta The Great Forty "[1] Of those, right view is the forerunner. And how is right view the forerunner? One discerns wrong view as wrong view, and right view as right view. This is one's right view. And what is wrong view? 'There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed. There is no fruit or result of good or bad actions. There is no this world, no next world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously reborn beings; no priests or contemplatives who, faring rightly & practicing rightly, proclaim this world & the next after having directly known & realized it for themselves.' This is wrong view. "And what is right view? Right view, I tell you, is of two sorts: There is right view with fermentations [asava], siding with merit, resulting in the acquisitions [of becoming]; and there is noble right view, without fermentations, transcendent, a factor of the path. "And what is the right view that has fermentations, sides with merit, & results in acquisitions? 'There is what is given, what is offered, what is sacrificed. There are fruits & results of good & bad actions. There is this world & the next world. There is mother & father. There are spontaneously reborn beings; there are priests & contemplatives who, faring rightly & practicing rightly, proclaim this world & the next after having directly known & realized it for themselves.' This is the right view that has fermentations, sides with merit, & results in acquisitions. "And what is the right view that is without fermentations, transcendent, a factor of the path? The discernment, the faculty of discernment, the strength of discernment, analysis of qualities as a factor for Awakening, the path factor of right view in one developing the noble path whose mind is noble, whose mind is free from fermentations, who is fully possessed of the noble path. This is the right view that is without fermentations, transcendent, a factor of the path. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn117.html Regards, Victor 11876 From: egberdina Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 11:10pm Subject: Re: BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 - to Howard --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > There *is no need* for a first cause, and the Dhamma does not assume > one. The chain of dependent arising is, in fact, not a linear chain, but a > cyclic one. > > With metta, > Howard > Dear Howard, Does the Dhamma, in your opinion, posit a last cause, or perhaps better stated, the end of causation? All the best Herman 11877 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 11:43pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment/Victor Hi Victor, Thanks for the links, they will keep me reading for quite a while ......It's clear so far that sitting in the traditional cross legged position was mentioned often. I wonder why? Was it because it was the usual way people sat, it looked more dignified than sprawling everywhere, prevented falling asleep, did away with the need to own and carry a seat about, was easier to breath in that position, gave more energy, signalled to people that you weren't to be interrupted, looked tidier when there was a group of people?......or, some other reason? Or was it not important at all, maybe just a literary convention? or to paint a word picture? Is it possible that it could become a rite, a mechanical ritual? For instance, in a number of suttas, the Atthakarana Sutta, Loka Sutta, Appaka Sutta, Appamada Sutta, Atta-rakkhita Sutta, Piya Sutta, Issattha Sutta, and Nakhasikha Sutta (and, no doubt, many others), people are mentioned as 'sitting to one side' in the presence of the Buddha. Everyone did it - whether royal - e.g. King Pasenadi Kosala - or an everyday monk or layperson. Would this have been cross legged? If so, why isn't this copied in social gatherings of Buddhists today, I wonder, if the Buddha did it? Why only for sitting meditation? Exceptions seem to have been Devas, or sons of Devas, and Devata, in the Arañña Sutta, Uttara Sutta, and the Ghatva Sutta, among others where they 'stood' to one side. And I know this is not of earth shattering importance......but why the difference? Were Devas of lower importance - they weren't allowed to sit? or of higher importance than humans, so they could stand when a Buddha was sitting? did they stay for such a brief time that it was hardly worth the effort of sitting and arranging themselves? Can Devas sit at all? (never seen one, so I don't know). Sorry to ramble on Victor - grasshopper mind again. :-) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > I realized that the link didn't really work after I sent out the message. > Anyway, what I did was that I searched for the words "folding", "legs", and > "crosswise" in www.accesstoinsight.org with Google and came up with the > following results: > > DN 22: Maha-satipatthana Sutta > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: the ... > Description: The Great Frames of Reference Sutra. > Category: Society > Religion and Spirituality > Buddhism > Teachings > > Sutras > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn22.html - 33k - 13 Mar 2002 - Cached - > Similar pages > > MN 119: Kayagata-sati Sutta > ... the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful > ... > Description: Sutra on Mindfulness immersing in the body. > Category: Society > Religion and Spirituality > Buddhism > Teachings > > Sutras > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn119.html - 24k - Cached - Similar > pages > > Right Mindfulness > ... the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs > crosswise, > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful > ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/samma-sati.html - 9k - Cached - Similar pages > > MN 140: Dhatu-vibhanga Sutta > ... shed and, setting out a spread of grass to one side, sat down folding > his legs crosswise, > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. He spent ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn140.html - 22k - Cached - Similar > pages > > AN X.60: Girimananda Sutta > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an10-060.html - 10k - Cached - > Similar pages > > Wings to Awakening: Part II-B > ... the foot of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [parimukham: in > ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2b.html - 97k - Cached - Similar > pages > > The Mind Like Fire Unbound > ... to the shade of a tree or to an empty building, sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect, & keeping mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful > ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/likefire/2-3.html - 101k - Cached - > Similar pages > > Study Guide: The Four Noble Truths > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: to the ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/truths.html - 88k - Cached - Similar pages > > > I find the description "sitting down folding his legs crosswise, hold his > body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore" is closest to what you have > described as formal sitting meditation. And this description, as I see it > so far, is always in the context of mindfulness, specifically mindfulness of > breathing. > > As for the definition of right concentration... > > "And what is right concentration? There is the case where a monk -- quite > withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful (mental) qualities -- > enters & remains in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from > withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. With the stilling > of directed thought & evaluation, he enters & remains in the second jhana: > rapture & pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free from > directed thought & evaluation -- internal assurance. With the fading of > rapture he remains in equanimity, mindful, & fully alert, and physically > sensitive of pleasure. He enters & remains in the third jhana, and of him > the Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous & mindful, he has a pleasurable > abiding.' With the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier > disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth > jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. This > is called right concentration." > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn45-008.html > > As I see it, one is mindful in each jhana. > > Regards, > Victor 11878 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 11:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear Nina and Sarah, Your posts did give me a rather different perspective on the usefulness of reading and considering the Vinaya. Thanks for this reminder Nina "there are very good examples of lobha, in behaviour, such as beautifying body and dwellings. It is good to realize this also for laypeople. We take these things for granted, but it is good to know when lobha appears in our behaviour. Knowing, not suppressing." So often I try to suppress/change unwanted feelings/desires - but it is the 'knowing' of them that is important........ All the quotes, but especially those about the patients in ancient days, underline the fact that human nature hasn't changed in all those thousands of years.... I'm tempted to print the paras. and give them to some colleagues at work. From the descriptions given, I think there are quite a few direct descendants of those 'difficult to tend' patients still hanging about down here.... So much for the theories of slowly, ever improving, human nature! - it seems distance in time and geography makes no difference..... (Thanks Sarah for the link to RobertK's post, very illuminating as well.) And the Buddha saying "How can you, foolish man, sit together with womenfolk.......It is not, foolish man, for the benefit of unbelievers..." together with your examples, show that appearances DO matter. The followers of the Teachings, especially Bhikkhus, must not only be virtuous, but must be seen to be virtuous.....it's a little like the modern saying "Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done." Otherwise confidence is undermined. Thank-you both..... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 13-03-2002 08:48 schreef christine_forsyth op cforsyth@v...: > Dear Christine, I appreciate very much your interest. Most questions you > raise you answer yourself very well. Just about the Vinaya: it is true we > learn more about defilements and there are very good examples of lobha, in > behaviour, such as beautifying body and dwellings. It is good to realize > this also for laypeople. We take these things for granted, but it is good to > know when lobha appears in our behaviour. Knowing, not suppressing. There > are suttas and abhidhamma in vinaya. The teachings are one, the Vinaya is > part of the Tipitaka. Worth reading also. It gives all the fine shades of > different defilements. Someone killed by accident, and had doubts. The > Buddha asked him: was it your intention to kill? We may have doubts about > killing an insect, did we have the intention? And so there are many points. > With appreciation, Nina. > > Chr: On page 1 in ADL when talking about the Tipitaka that "Not only monks > > but also laypeople should study the Vinaya." I wonder what could the > > daily Rule written for renunciate males a couple of thousand years > > ago, in a culture that no longer exists, have of value for a 21st > > Century woman? I *can* see the point of reading about examples of > > lobha, dosa and moha as reminders of our own defilements.....but > > reading the whole thing......worth taking a closer look....? > > 11879 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 11:53pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Right Concentration and MN 117 Hi Jaran, The Maha-cattarisaka Sutta is a surprise, I don't recall reading it previously, it is certainly comprehensive. Thank you.... What, then, are the implications for practice? I wonder what the 'Any" is in the quote "ANY singleness of mind equipped with these seven factors..........is called noble right concentration with its supports and requisite conditions". Must mean something, don't you think - otherwise wouldn't it have been written "WHEN singleness of mind is equipped...." Every support and requisite condition has two versions mentioned - the one with fermentations siding with merit, resulting in the acquisitions [of becoming]; and the Noble one without fermentations, transcendent, a factor of the path. But with regard to concentration only one version - Noble Right Concentration is mentioned.......is their any significance in that. Or is it that right view, resolve, speech, action, livelihood, effort and mindfulness with fermentations = right concentration with fermentations? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "jaranoh" wrote: > Hi Christine, Victor and All: > > I was reading the suttas on the following site. I was surprised to > find this interesting passage in an unexpected context. > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn117.html > > The Buddha talks the 'right concentration' and explains how it arises > and what supports it. One thing I find striking is that the right > concentration is when the other seven factors of the 8-fold path are > fullfilled. Of the most importance of 8-fold path is always > the 'right view' as it is stated many times in the sutta above. The > prerequisite of all factors of the Path is 'right view'). > > On each of the right factor, there two kinds of the right factors: > with and without fermentations (asavas). Only those without asavas > can together condition the right concentration. Examples of asavas > are anger, greed, attachment (to things, forms, rituals, and most > relevant here, RESULTS). > > Best Regards, > jaran 11880 From: christine_forsyth Date: Thu Mar 14, 2002 11:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 Dear Kom, I'm so glad you added your comments, - it is true about the three levels of understanding (or lack of it). Often I can read something a second time with a gap of several weeks/months, and find it very clear and interesting and wonder why I didn't understand it the first time. Thanks for your reminders that if the characteristic of something is known, it doesn't matter which word or sound is used to describe it. And good to know I can relax a little as some wrong view about self still continues until we are sotapanna. :-) I'm sure vipassana nana isn't in Ch. 1 Kom - and Lucy doesn't want us to skip ahead..... That's my excuse for leaving it a little while....:)) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "tikmok" wrote: > Dear Christine, > > Don't mind if I add to your excellent thoughts. > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: christine_forsyth [mailto:cforsyth@v...] > > Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2002 11:49 PM > > To: dhammastudygroup@y... > > Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 > > > > > > Dear Group, > > > > On page 1 in ADL when talking about the Tipitaka that "Not only > monks > > but also laypeople should study the Vinaya." I wonder what could the > > daily Rule written for renunciate males a couple of thousand years > > ago, in a culture that no longer exists, have of value for a 21st > > Century woman? I *can* see the point of reading about examples of > > lobha, dosa and moha as reminders of our own defilements.....but > > reading the whole thing......worth taking a closer look....? > > I think if we remember that the Buddha taught dhammas for 45 years of > his life so that all beings (capable of understanding his dhammas) can > too penetrate (eventually) the dhammas as he has (or close enough!), > then we can figure out whether or not to read a particular piece of > teaching. When reading any teaching, be it Vinaya, Suttanta, or > Abhidhamma, each of us may: > 1) Misunderstand it > 2) Understand it, at different levels, according to his/her own > accumulations > 3) A mixture of the above > > One teaching that doesn't benefit me (immediately) may benefit you > substantially and vice versa. That's why you may hear from people like > Nina or Jonothan about the "no rules" part, as we benefit (or not) > according to our own accumulations. > > > [Just an aside......the only English word in the whole of the Canon > > that grates on me is "stinginess" - why not use miserliness, or > > meanness? On second thought, there's two of them - 'horripilation' is > > the other one.] > > Another thing that I keep hearing from different people is not to worry > too much about the word if we can understand the meaning. Stinginess > has the particular characteristic no matter what we call it. If we > understand what stinginess is, then no word is required to study > stinginess. > > The gem embedded in the Preface is the reiteration of the real > > purpose of the study of realities: > > "The theory (pariyatti) should encourage us to practice (patipatti) > > which is necessary for the realization of the truth (pativedha). > > While we are studying the different namas and rupas and while we > are > > pondering over them, we can be reminded to be aware of nama and > rupa > > appearing at that moment. In this way we will discover more and > more > > that the Abhidhamma is about everything which is real, that is, the > > worlds' appearing through the six sense doors." > > And that this study "is a process which continues all through life." > > It is amazing how you could always pick up the most important point. If > we don't understand this point, then our study of the dhamma is not > fruitful, and can be harmful, like holding a poisonous snake at its tail. > Studying the dhamma for the wrong reason happens often for me, even > if I understand the above statement, in varying degrees. That's why I > get reminded by many many people... > > > > > The illustration of the chariot broken down into component parts used > > to refute the idea of 'a person' or 'a being' is effective, to a > > degree. It increases understanding that what we take for self are > > only nama and rupa which arise and fall away. (But, still...., why, > > at some level is there a lingering wondering whether it is possible > > that 'consciousness' might not retain some on-going identity?). In > > The lingering thought/wrong-views about self will continue until we > become sotapanna. As far as I know, even sotapanna still have > lingering thoughts about "this is mine". This tells you how deep rooted > our ignorance is. > > > I think I am having some difficulty with rupa, physical phenomena, > > the third paramattha dhamma - with the understanding of the 'rising > > and falling away' part, of seemingly solid objects. I used to try to > > understand this by visualising the 'beaming up process' in Star Trek > > (sorry Sarah & Jon!) - Where the object is composed of twinkling, > > temporary but immediately replaced effervesences.....but, if rupa > > only arises when there are right conditions....How do solid objects > > last over time? is there an example of conditions changing for a > > solid visible object? > > I think we will continue to have doubts of various degress about this > point until the vipassana nana that insights the falling away of rupa > arises. Otherwise, we can always deduce. For example, my weight > always fluctuates over a year, sometimes less, sometimes more. This is > because there are varying conditions that cause the rupa to arise. > Although some of the conditions are so similar that I can't tell the > difference (with the conventional observation), but because of the > differnt conditions, the rupas that are the results of the conditions are > different. I also have skin defects that keep surprising me, hey, that > wasn't there a few days ago! > > The other way, I think, is to study quantum physics. It seems to me > that how matters are defined are moving toward what the Buddha says > about rupa rising and falling away, but I will be quiet here, as I know > very little about quantum physics anyway. > > kom 11881 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 6:33am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Deluded clarification assistance Sarah, I don't know if this will reach you before the deadline, but I've slept on it and this is my conclusion. The Buddha accepted both persons and gods but rejected self because it entailed the false concepts of permanence and control (and because the concepts of permanence and control lead to suffering?). So he didn't reject concepts but he did reject false concepts. Larry ------------------- >Larry wrote: Sarah, Thanks for this reply to Mike's question, and thanks for Nina's explanation. Thanks to these I think I'm beginning to see a way of untangling my recuring question about what is "self". Nina wrote, ""This is myself" is a formulation of the personality view, the belief in an abiding self, subsequently identified with the five khandhas." This suggests to me that there is a slight difference between "self" and conventional reality. "Self" is not the same as "a person" because "self" is a belief. Is there a difference between a concept and a belief in abhidamma? Is this reasonable reasoning? Larry 11882 From: abhidhammika Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 6:43am Subject: Re: Memory: To Howard Dear Howard How are you? You replied to my post as follows: "I find this to be a *wonderful* post! It's crystal clear to me, and very informative without being overloaded with Pali terminology.Thank you very much." You are very welcome. I am also glad to know that you found it useful and transparent my description of how new instances of memory could pick up where the past instances of memory left off. Thank you for your reply of encouragement. With regards, Suan --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Suan - > > You express worry below that this post of yours might add too much > "sugar". As far as I'm concerned, if this is sugar, then I have very much of > a "sweet tooth" for it! I find this to be a *wonderful* post! It's crystal > clear to me, and very informative without being overloaded with Pali > terminology. Thank you very much. > > With metta, > Howard > > In a message dated 3/14/02 9:47:11 AM Eastern Standard Time, > abhidhammika@y... writes: > > > > > > Dear Sarah And KKT > > > > How are you? > > > > KKT asked: > > > > "If memory is a cetasika > > and lasts a very brief instant > > and then falls away then > > how does << recollection >> > > or << recognition >> work?" > > > > KKT gave an example: > > > > "Suppose I meet Mr. X, > > an image of X is a cetasika > > making a mark in my 'mind' > > but lasts only a fleeting moment." > > > > Sarah has already given a very good answer to KKT's question. > > > > I merely wanted to add a little bit. Hope it did not look like adding > > too much sugar! > > > > When we see Mr X, it is true that the first visual consciousness > > lasts only a fleeting moment. But, to cover the whole of Mr X, the > > first visual consciousness alone is not enough. There is an > > uncountable number of visual consciousness cognitive series > > called "cakkhuviññaanaviithi" to process Mr X. > > > > And each cognitive series comes with additional supportive > > consciousnesses in addition to the visual consciousness. This means > > that all consciousnesses within each cognitive series come with > > successive emergences of memory. This also means that there emerge > > countless reinforcing instances of memory to process Mr X. > > > > In short, there has been sufficient mental processing time for the > > image of Mr X to be available for future retrieval. > > > > Now, how could an entirely new future memory in a totally new future > > consciousness recollect, and recognize an image of Mr X? > > > > The answer is to do with the fact that each of us is merely a mental > > chain that operates as a systemic whole. Every event that happens in > > one part of the system affects every other part of it. > > > > When our visual consciousnesses first processed Mr X, our minds also > > performed various other actions in addition to merely seeing Mr X. > > Some of these other actions are efficacious ones > > called "javanacittas" that are capable of giving rise to future > > results. As these results are associated with Mr X, even though those > > results happen in totally new future mental events in totally new > > future circumstances, an image of Mr X becomes available for new > > instances of memory to retieve, recollect and recognize. > > > > By the way, it pays to remember the function of memory in this > > context. > > > > The function of memory is to retrieve, recollect and recognize the > > past events. A particular mental phenomenon comes to receive the > > name "memory" precisely because it is capable of performing the > > function of memory, which is connecting the present consciousness > > with the past events (Retrieval, recollection, and recognizing). The > > lack of such capability is called dementia, a form of mental illness. > > > > Therefore, nothing can prevent a future instance of memory from > > retrieving and remembering the work and result of a past memory as > > long as the past memory and future memory emerge within the same > > mental chain. > > > > > > With best wishes, > > > > Suan Lu Zaw > > > > > > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble > in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a > phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) > > > > > 11883 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 1:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory: To Sarah And KKT Dear Suan, << From: abhidhammika@y... (abhidhammika) Dear Sarah And KKT How are you? KKT asked: "If memory is a cetasika and lasts a very brief instant and then falls away then how does << recollection >> or << recognition >> work?" KKT gave an example: "Suppose I meet Mr. X, an image of X is a cetasika making a mark in my 'mind' but lasts only a fleeting moment." Sarah has already given a very good answer to KKT's question. I merely wanted to add a little bit. Hope it did not look like adding too much sugar! When we see Mr X, it is true that the first visual consciousness lasts only a fleeting moment. But, to cover the whole of Mr X, the first visual consciousness alone is not enough. There is an uncountable number of visual consciousness cognitive series called "cakkhuviññaanaviithi" to process Mr X. And each cognitive series comes with additional supportive consciousnesses in addition to the visual consciousness. This means that all consciousnesses within each cognitive series come with successive emergences of memory. This also means that there emerge countless reinforcing instances of memory to process Mr X. In short, there has been sufficient mental processing time for the image of Mr X to be available for future retrieval. Now, how could an entirely new future memory in a totally new future consciousness recollect, and recognize an image of Mr X? The answer is to do with the fact that each of us is merely a mental chain that operates as a systemic whole. Every event that happens in one part of the system affects every other part of it. When our visual consciousnesses first processed Mr X, our minds also performed various other actions in addition to merely seeing Mr X. Some of these other actions are efficacious ones called "javanacittas" that are capable of giving rise to future results. As these results are associated with Mr X, even though those results happen in totally new future mental events in totally new future circumstances, an image of Mr X becomes available for new instances of memory to retieve, recollect and recognize. By the way, it pays to remember the function of memory in this context. The function of memory is to retrieve, recollect and recognize the past events. A particular mental phenomenon comes to receive the name "memory" precisely because it is capable of performing the function of memory, which is connecting the present consciousness with the past events (Retrieval, recollection, and recognizing). The lack of such capability is called dementia, a form of mental illness. Therefore, nothing can prevent a future instance of memory from retrieving and remembering the work and result of a past memory as long as the past memory and future memory emerge within the same mental chain. With best wishes, Suan Lu Zaw >> KKT: Thank you very much for answering to my question with a long explanation. I read and re-read your post many times trying to figure out what you want to convey. First, you talk of << the fact that each of us is merely a mental chain that operates as a systemic whole >> Is this << chain >> a chain of successive consciousnesses (citta, cetasika) from past to present and future? (Correct me if I'm wrong) Therefore one can retrieve, recollect and recognize << the old image of X >> which is no other than a past << cognitive series >> (as you state above) of this chain. This raises a question: Citta & cetasika rise and fall away in a brief instant but continue to << exist >> in the past so that one can retrieve, recollect, recognize them, right? Is this the meaning of << never lost >> ? If the answer is 'Yes' to these above questions then how to understand the meaning of << exist in the past >> ? Thanks for enlightening me. Best regards, KKT 11884 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 1:43am Subject: Time Dear everyone, I have another question: What is Time in Abhidhamma? Thank you. Best regards, KKT 11885 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 2:35am Subject: Re:[dsg] Ayatanas revisited Dear Sarah, Appreciate your hard work finding from multiple sources. I am quite caught up after returning from the trip. There are some more mails I'd like to respond but time is a limiting resource for me. Hope you do not mind me putting 3 of your mails together. <> To me the words dhammaramana, dhammadhatu and dhammayatana have somewhat slightly different meaning. I am still not so clear with the difference between dhammadhatu and dhammayatana. As I said, my question is somewhat theoretical. As you quoted from Vibanga, all cetasikas listed under dhammayatana (external ayatana). So if one can have cetasika as aramana(not just as pannati), citta should be able to be an aramana as well. Pannatti (concept) is not listed here, although it can be aramanapaccaya for citta(only manodvara), I think Nina mentioned that is because it's not a reality. Another possibility is if one attains cetovimutti stage and can another person's mind, my understanding is he can have another person's mind as his arammana. In satipatthana-sutta, the Buddha mentioned both internal and external mind as well. <> I am too, it's not clear yet to me. <> I agree with you that pasada-rupa should be able to fit in dhammayatana category but this is only my own assumption. I will investigate into this more and will keep you post (if it's not beyond my limit :) ) Much appreciate. Have to run!!! Num 11886 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 8:51am Subject: RE: [dsg] Time Dear KKT, > -----Original Message----- > From: phamdluan@a... [mailto:phamdluan@a...] > > Dear everyone, > > > I have another question: > > What is Time in Abhidhamma? > The 5 kandhas are grouped together because each of its constituent (materiality, memory, felling, sankhara, consciousness) has 11 characteristics including: being past (has already fallen away), being future (has not yet arisen), and being present (has alrady risen but has not fallen away). From this we can deduce (rightly or wrongly!) that time exists because things rise and fall away immediately. If the world only comprises of things that don't rise and fall away, then the world would be timeless (just like nibanna is said to be timeless, as it doesn't rise or fall away). If nibbana doesn't rise or fall away, which part of nibbana do we think of as past, future, or present? It's interesting that we measure passage of time by changes, like sunrise/sunset, the pulse of the quartz, and the changes observed in cesium. In the Buddha's teaching (I believe), nothing is really changed (each reality has its own unchangeable, uncontrollable characteristics), but it is replaced by something else that is similar in characteristics. Changes are manifestations of things rising and falling away. I believe time is also a manifestation of things rising and falling away (this statement probably doesn't agree with the physicist too well.). kom 11887 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 4:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 - to Howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 3/15/02 2:12:15 AM Eastern Standard Time, hhofman@d... writes: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > > There *is no need* for a first cause, and the Dhamma does > not assume > > one. The chain of dependent arising is, in fact, not a linear > chain, but a > > cyclic one. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > > > Dear Howard, > > Does the Dhamma, in your opinion, posit a last cause, or perhaps > better stated, the end of causation? > > All the best > > > Herman > ========================= That's an interesting question. At least according to Theravada interpretation, I think it does. It seems to me that parinibbana marks the final cessation of all conditions, and with the cessation of conditions comes the cessation of conditionalization and of time. What woud be "left", to use inadequate and misleading language, would be nibbana, but that would be a mere absence, or, better perhaps, consciousness of absence (for nibbana is classified as nama). Of course, for worldlings and for those ariyans who have not yet gone to final nibbana, both time and conditions continue, hence conditionalization continues. Note: I'm using 'conditionalization' here instead of 'causation' only to avoid any sense of "causal power" subsumed under the notion of causality. I recall that in some sutta, when the Buddha was asked about whether one can ever reach the end of the world, the Buddha said something along the lines that the world is the five khandhas, and that the world ends only with the cessation of the five khandhas. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11888 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch 1: Commentaries from Sammohavinodani, dukkha. op 15-03-2002 01:14 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...: Kom: Even after hearing this again and again, we (I) still always seem to have > lingering thoughts that we can exercise powers over these realities. I want > to have kusala states. I want to have sati. I want to have more/sharper > panna, and I can make this happen. I don't think I can ever hear this > enough! Dear Sarah and Kom, I am joining Kom, and appreciate what he says about never hearing enough of such reminders. I enjoyed Sarah's quotes from the Dispeller so much. I had read them, but now it seems that they are new. I have the same feeling as Num, what we read always seem to be new, thus, in this sense, we never read the same book again. Even when others quote something I had written: it is as if I did not consider enough myself what I wrote. Thus, there is always something to learn here in this forum, which I enjoy very much. I was wondering what the Pali term is for oppressing, dukkha as oppressing, some trouble with that term. A. Sujin always explains: it is impermanent and thus dukkha, hence a close connection of these two characteristics. A. Sujin also said: what arises and falls away is not beautiful, here we come to Franc's dilemma, the seeing of beauty in what is not beautiful. The example of old age and wrinkles will be helpful here. Well, there will always be questions.I believe Enlightened Ones in this context could refer to the Sammasambuddha, since Paccheka Buddhas do not teach the truth of anatta. Thank you for the very useful quote, how easily we overlook passages in textbooks. Nina. 11889 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] dukkha op 14-03-2002 04:09 schreef LBIDD@w... op LBIDD@w...: > You wrote: "Dukkha is the characteristic of dhamma that arises and falls > away at this moment." > > Is dukkha the characteristic of dhamma that arises and falls away at > this moment, or is dukkha the characteristic of ignorance of dhamma that > arises and falls away at this moment? Another way of asking this is, is > dhamma ignorance, or, are the ultimate realities of nama and rupa > fundamentally untrue? I tend to think of dukkha as resulting from error > so correct view ought to lead to elimination of dukkha but this > quotation seems to say correct view leads to elimination of dukkha. > Dear Larry, the dhamma appearing at this moment arises and falls away, and thus, it is dukkha, unsatisfacory, suffering or oppressing. Seeing appears at this moment, it appears for such an infinitesimally short while, and then it is gone. We find it so important, my seeing, but it is an insignificant dhamma, not worth clinging to. Here we speak about the noble Truth of dukkha: what is impermanent is dukkha. There are different kinds of dukkha: intrinsic suffering, that is bodily and mental pain, suffering in change and the noble Truth of dukkha. So long as we are, because of ignorance and clinging, in the cycle of birth and death, there is arising and falling away of dhammas, beginning at rebirth, and thus there is dukkha. It is the elimination of ignorance that leads to the end of the cycle, thus, to the end of dukkha. Nina. 11890 From: frank kuan Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 0:51pm Subject: tibetan tanka question My ashtanga yoga teachers have a tibetan tanka (cloth painting of a buddha) hanging in the studio. There's a yellow/red curtain thingie at the top of the tanka that's currently rolled up, and they wanted to know what the proper way to drape the curtain around the painting. Does anyone know the answer? Someone with quicker lama access than me? Thanks. While I'm personally not a big fan of peripheral aspects of cultural buddhist rites and rituals, it doesn't hurt to make some brownie points with my yoga friends. Help me look smart :-) Besides, now that they've asked me to advise on this thinking I'm a Buddhist who knows stuff, I would hate to give erroneous advice and have one of the wrathful dharma protectors come down from the deva realms to kick my ass. Actually, that would be pretty cool. Devas don't mess with dhamma practitioners who haven't accomplished anything, so if I get attacked, it means I'm signifigant enough to warrant their attention :-) -fk 11891 From: Victor Yu Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 1:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment/Victor Hi Christine, What do you think?? Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "christine_forsyth" To: Sent: Friday, March 15, 2002 2:43 AM Subject: [dsg] Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment/Victor Hi Victor, Thanks for the links, they will keep me reading for quite a while ......It's clear so far that sitting in the traditional cross legged position was mentioned often. I wonder why? Was it because it was the usual way people sat, it looked more dignified than sprawling everywhere, prevented falling asleep, did away with the need to own and carry a seat about, was easier to breath in that position, gave more energy, signalled to people that you weren't to be interrupted, looked tidier when there was a group of people?......or, some other reason? Or was it not important at all, maybe just a literary convention? or to paint a word picture? Is it possible that it could become a rite, a mechanical ritual? For instance, in a number of suttas, the Atthakarana Sutta, Loka Sutta, Appaka Sutta, Appamada Sutta, Atta-rakkhita Sutta, Piya Sutta, Issattha Sutta, and Nakhasikha Sutta (and, no doubt, many others), people are mentioned as 'sitting to one side' in the presence of the Buddha. Everyone did it - whether royal - e.g. King Pasenadi Kosala - or an everyday monk or layperson. Would this have been cross legged? If so, why isn't this copied in social gatherings of Buddhists today, I wonder, if the Buddha did it? Why only for sitting meditation? Exceptions seem to have been Devas, or sons of Devas, and Devata, in the Arañña Sutta, Uttara Sutta, and the Ghatva Sutta, among others where they 'stood' to one side. And I know this is not of earth shattering importance......but why the difference? Were Devas of lower importance - they weren't allowed to sit? or of higher importance than humans, so they could stand when a Buddha was sitting? did they stay for such a brief time that it was hardly worth the effort of sitting and arranging themselves? Can Devas sit at all? (never seen one, so I don't know). Sorry to ramble on Victor - grasshopper mind again. :-) metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > I realized that the link didn't really work after I sent out the message. > Anyway, what I did was that I searched for the words "folding", "legs", and > "crosswise" in www.accesstoinsight.org with Google and came up with the > following results: > > DN 22: Maha-satipatthana Sutta > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: the ... > Description: The Great Frames of Reference Sutra. > Category: Society > Religion and Spirituality > Buddhism > Teachings > > Sutras > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn22.html - 33k - 13 Mar 2002 - Cached - > Similar pages > > MN 119: Kayagata-sati Sutta > ... the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful > ... > Description: Sutra on Mindfulness immersing in the body. > Category: Society > Religion and Spirituality > Buddhism > Teachings > > Sutras > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn119.html - 24k - Cached - Similar > pages > > Right Mindfulness > ... the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his legs > crosswise, > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful > ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/samma-sati.html - 9k - Cached - Similar pages > > MN 140: Dhatu-vibhanga Sutta > ... shed and, setting out a spread of grass to one side, sat down folding > his legs crosswise, > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. He spent ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn140.html - 22k - Cached - Similar > pages > > AN X.60: Girimananda Sutta > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an10-060.html - 10k - Cached - > Similar pages > > Wings to Awakening: Part II-B > ... the foot of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [parimukham: in > ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2b.html - 97k - Cached - Similar > pages > > The Mind Like Fire Unbound > ... to the shade of a tree or to an empty building, sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect, & keeping mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful > ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/likefire/2-3.html - 101k - Cached - > Similar pages > > Study Guide: The Four Noble Truths > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding his > legs crosswise, > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: to the ... > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/truths.html - 88k - Cached - Similar pages > > > I find the description "sitting down folding his legs crosswise, hold his > body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore" is closest to what you have > described as formal sitting meditation. And this description, as I see it > so far, is always in the context of mindfulness, specifically mindfulness of > breathing. > > As for the definition of right concentration... > > "And what is right concentration? There is the case where a monk -- quite > withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful (mental) qualities -- > enters & remains in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from > withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. With the stilling > of directed thought & evaluation, he enters & remains in the second jhana: > rapture & pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free from > directed thought & evaluation -- internal assurance. With the fading of > rapture he remains in equanimity, mindful, & fully alert, and physically > sensitive of pleasure. He enters & remains in the third jhana, and of him > the Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous & mindful, he has a pleasurable > abiding.' With the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier > disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth > jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. This > is called right concentration." > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn45-008.html > > As I see it, one is mindful in each jhana. > > Regards, > Victor 11892 From: Victor Yu Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 1:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) > > The more we know different nåmas and > rúpas by experiencing their characteristics, the more will we see > that "self" is only a concept; it is not a paramattha dhamma > (absolute or ultimate reality). Concept is not self. 11893 From: christine_forsyth Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 2:16pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment/Victor Well-fielded Victor! But I asked first.... :-) Personally, I think it (sitting) doesn't particularly matter, anymore than anything matters..... metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > Hi Christine, > > What do you think?? > > Regards, > Victor > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "christine_forsyth" > To: > Sent: Friday, March 15, 2002 2:43 AM > Subject: [dsg] Re: Formal sitting meditation/Enlightenment/Victor > > > Hi Victor, > > Thanks for the links, they will keep me reading for quite a > while ......It's clear so far that sitting in the traditional cross > legged position was mentioned often. I wonder why? Was it because > it was the usual way people sat, it looked more dignified than > sprawling everywhere, prevented falling asleep, did away with the > need to own and carry a seat about, was easier to breath in that > position, gave more energy, signalled to people that you weren't to > be interrupted, looked tidier when there was a group of > people?......or, some other reason? Or was it not important at all, > maybe just a literary convention? or to paint a word picture? > Is it possible that it could become a rite, a mechanical ritual? > For instance, in a number of suttas, the Atthakarana Sutta, Loka > Sutta, Appaka Sutta, Appamada Sutta, Atta-rakkhita Sutta, Piya Sutta, > Issattha Sutta, and Nakhasikha Sutta (and, no doubt, many others), > people are mentioned as 'sitting to one side' in the presence of the > Buddha. Everyone did it - whether royal - e.g. King Pasenadi Kosala - > or an everyday monk or layperson. Would this have been cross > legged? If so, why isn't this copied in social gatherings of > Buddhists today, I wonder, if the Buddha did it? Why only for sitting > meditation? > Exceptions seem to have been Devas, or sons of Devas, and Devata, in > the Arañña Sutta, Uttara Sutta, and the Ghatva Sutta, among others > where they 'stood' to one side. > And I know this is not of earth shattering importance......but why > the difference? Were Devas of lower importance - they weren't allowed > to sit? or of higher importance than humans, so they could stand when > a Buddha was sitting? did they stay for such a brief time that it was > hardly worth the effort of sitting and arranging themselves? Can > Devas sit at all? (never seen one, so I don't know). Sorry to ramble > on Victor - grasshopper mind again. :-) > > metta, > Christine > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Victor Yu" wrote: > > Hi Christine, > > > > I realized that the link didn't really work after I sent out the > message. > > Anyway, what I did was that I searched for the > words "folding", "legs", and > > "crosswise" in www.accesstoinsight.org with Google and came up with > the > > following results: > > > > DN 22: Maha-satipatthana Sutta > > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down > folding his > > legs crosswise, > > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: > the ... > > Description: The Great Frames of Reference Sutra. > > Category: Society > Religion and Spirituality > Buddhism > > Teachings > > > Sutras > > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/digha/dn22.html - 33k - 13 Mar 2002 - > Cached - > > Similar pages > > > > MN 119: Kayagata-sati Sutta > > ... the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down > folding his > > legs crosswise, > > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always > mindful > > ... > > Description: Sutra on Mindfulness immersing in the body. > > Category: Society > Religion and Spirituality > Buddhism > > Teachings > > > Sutras > > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn119.html - 24k - Cached - > Similar > > pages > > > > Right Mindfulness > > ... the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down folding > his legs > > crosswise, > > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always > mindful > > ... > > www.accesstoinsight.org/ptf/samma-sati.html - 9k - Cached - Similar > pages > > > > MN 140: Dhatu-vibhanga Sutta > > ... shed and, setting out a spread of grass to one side, sat down > folding > > his legs crosswise, > > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. He > spent ... > > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn140.html - 22k - Cached - > Similar > > pages > > > > AN X.60: Girimananda Sutta > > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down > folding his > > legs crosswise, > > holding his body erect, and setting mindfulness to the fore. > Always ... > > www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an10-060.html - 10k - > Cached - > > Similar pages > > > > Wings to Awakening: Part II-B > > ... the foot of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down > folding his > > legs crosswise, > > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore > [parimukham: in > > ... > > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/wings/2b.html - 97k - Cached - > Similar > > pages > > > > The Mind Like Fire Unbound > > ... to the shade of a tree or to an empty building, sits down > folding his > > legs crosswise, > > holding his body erect, & keeping mindfulness to the fore. Always > mindful > > ... > > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/likefire/2-3.html - 101k - > Cached - > > Similar pages > > > > Study Guide: The Four Noble Truths > > ... to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building, sits down > folding his > > legs crosswise, > > holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: to > the ... > > www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/study/truths.html - 88k - Cached - > Similar pages > > > > > > I find the description "sitting down folding his legs crosswise, > hold his > > body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore" is closest to what > you have > > described as formal sitting meditation. And this description, as I > see it > > so far, is always in the context of mindfulness, specifically > mindfulness of > > breathing. > > > > As for the definition of right concentration... > > > > "And what is right concentration? There is the case where a monk - - > quite > > withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful (mental) > qualities -- > > enters & remains in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from > > withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. With the > stilling > > of directed thought & evaluation, he enters & remains in the second > jhana: > > rapture & pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free > from > > directed thought & evaluation -- internal assurance. With the > fading of > > rapture he remains in equanimity, mindful, & fully alert, and > physically > > sensitive of pleasure. He enters & remains in the third jhana, and > of him > > the Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous & mindful, he has a pleasurable > > abiding.' With the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the > earlier > > disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the > fourth > > jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither pleasure nor > pain. This > > is called right concentration." > > > > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn45-008.html > > > > As I see it, one is mindful in each jhana. > > > > Regards, > > Victor 11894 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 10:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Time Hi, Kom (and KKT) - I agree with your assessment *exactly*! With metta, Howard In a message dated 3/15/02 11:53:38 AM Eastern Standard Time, tikmok@y... writes: > > Dear KKT, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: phamdluan@a... [mailto:phamdluan@a...] > > > > Dear everyone, > > > > > > I have another question: > > > > What is Time in Abhidhamma? > > > > The 5 kandhas are grouped together because each of its > constituent (materiality, memory, felling, sankhara, > consciousness) has 11 characteristics including: being past > (has already fallen away), being future (has not yet > arisen), and being present (has alrady risen but has not > fallen away). From this we can deduce (rightly or wrongly!) > that time exists because things rise and fall away > immediately. If the world only comprises of things that > don't rise and fall away, then the world would be timeless > (just like nibanna is said to be timeless, as it doesn't > rise or fall away). > > If nibbana doesn't rise or fall away, which part of nibbana > do we think of as past, future, or present? > > It's interesting that we measure passage of time by changes, > like sunrise/sunset, the pulse of the quartz, and the > changes observed in cesium. In the Buddha's teaching (I > believe), nothing is really changed (each reality has its > own unchangeable, uncontrollable characteristics), but it is > replaced by something else that is similar in > characteristics. Changes are manifestations of things > rising and falling away. I believe time is also a > manifestation of things rising and falling away (this > statement probably doesn't agree with the physicist too > well.). > > kom > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11895 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 10:09am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 << 3) As a '21st century woman', I have personally always found the rules pertaining to the relationships between monks and women of particular interest and relevance. For example, there are rules relating to a monk not being alone with a woman. Of course, unless we're with a monk, we don't need to follow this literally. It's not a rule for two laypeople. However, when we read the events which led to these rules and consider the implications, we may find some reminders. ………… In other words, we may have good intentions, but sometimes we don't know the others' (and really the Vinaya reads like a chronicle of temptations) and we need to also consider the wagging tongues. To give a driving analogy, we may be an excellent driver even at fast speed, but we always have to consider that other drivers are not so excellent and even if they are, the police have their own guidelines regardless of our justifications. When I read "for the benefit of unbelievers..", I understand that if we're trying to help others understand the dhamma, it'll be harder to do so if they are distracted by behaviour which seems 'inappropriate' to them. There are always other people to consider. Hope these comments have added to a little interest in the Vinaya. Perhaps after ADL and Abhidhamattha Sangaha, we can read the Vinaya together..hopefully on the net by then;-) >> Hi Christine, Sarah, Nina and everyone, Let me share with you how much I appreciate vinaya. I like it a lot. As other said, vinaya is a very good reminder of our own defilement. Nina put it together very nicely in her introduction pages on ADL. Akusala is subtle and well hidden, hard to really and it can be so well disguised. I had the same idea as your before I read vinaya, I am not a monk-why bother reading vinaya, but after I heard and read it, I really like it. Again, as Nina pointed out, there are a lot of hidden treasures in vinaya, the suttanta and abhidhamma are in vinaya and the vinaya is also in suttanta and abhidhamma. To perfect sila needs a lot of right understanding (panna). The sotapana can no longer commit a course offense. The arahat has completely got rid of avijja, so he can no longer commit any offenses. Again my usual statement, right understanding (panna) is the key, not the self or clinging to be good. I have only read bits and pieces of vinaya. For example about Ven. Udayi he had commited a lot of offenses (sanghadiseso), which made the Buddha set down rules. One good thing about him is when the Buddha asked him whether he did it, he always admitted and never told the Buddha a lie. The stories about Ven. Udayi are pretty naughty. One time Ubolvana asked him to bring the Buddha a meal and he asked for her inner robe as a fee !!! (This is a pretty minor one !!) He is quite popular among some upasikas. Or in jataka, there are stories about ascetics who attained jhanna as well as supernatural power (5 abinna and 8 samapatti) but lost his power after he broke down the restraint and commit akusala acts. Some stories made me really laugh. I thought who would do this. After I read more, as long as we have a dormant, fermented tendency (anusaya) and it has not been uprooted, or there are enough conditions, I can commit any akusala acts as well. The Buddha always reminded his audiences to see the disadvantage of akusala no matter how small, minor or how well disguised it is. Reminded me of a deva accused a monk that he stole an odor of a lotus by sniffing. Lobha is well disguised and deep rooted. I like the analogy of the monkey and the monkey-lime a lot. From Nina's Cetasika : <> Lobha, dosa and moha are roots of breaking sila. Have to go. Best wishes. Num 11896 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 0:03pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Time Hi Group Just a quick question on the following; ---------------------------- >Kom writes >In the Buddha's teaching (I believe), nothing is really changed (each reality has its >own unchangeable, uncontrollable characteristics), but it is >replaced by something else that is similar in characteristics. --------------------------- As pertaining to this Sutta: "There are 3 characteristics of what is conditioned (sankhatassa lakkhana): an arising (uppado) is apparent, a passing away (vayo) is apparent, a change in the existing (thitassa annathattam: Com. = ageing) is apparent" ;Anguttara Nikaya III, 47-- Question is, is there "a change in the existing" as pertaining to a single citta? Thank-you Stegan > >It's interesting that we measure passage of time by changes, > >like sunrise/sunset, the pulse of the quartz, and the > >changes observed in cesium. In the Buddha's teaching (I > >believe), nothing is really changed (each reality has its > >own unchangeable, uncontrollable characteristics), but it is > >replaced by something else that is similar in > >characteristics. Changes are manifestations of things > >rising and falling away. I believe time is also a > >manifestation of things rising and falling away (this > >statement probably doesn't agree with the physicist too > >well.). > > >kom > 11897 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 1:08pm Subject: Puzzle Dear everyone, It seems that my questions on Memory are not based on solid ground because I myself get confused :-)) So I try to return to some << bases >> (correct me if I'm wrong) First, in Abhidhamma we accept that reality is only Paramattha Dhammas (PD) or Ultimate Realities which are rupa, citta, cetasika that rise and fall away in a brief instant. The rising and falling of those PD are due to << CONDITIONS >> The past PD << condition >> the rising of the present PD which in turn << conditions >> the rising of other future PD. Thus << CONDITION >> is the << key >> to understand the whole system of Buddhism. Those statements are the << bases >> So if I meet Mr. X today and regconize him then the act of recollection is only the << result >> of some PD in the past. Some series of PD in the past had << conditioned >> the rising of another series of PD in the actual present which is the act of recollection. If this statement is correct then could one say that << THERE IS NOT A THING AS MEMORY AT ALL >> ? Reality is only a series of successive PD, each one is << conditioned >> by others and in turn << condition >> other PD. There is absolutely no soul, no self involved. A surrealistic view ? :-)) Best regards, KKT 11898 From: Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 1:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Time Dear Kom, Thank you very much for your thoughtful answer. --------------- << From: tikmok@y... (Kom Tukovinit) Dear KKT, > From: phamdluan@a... [mailto:phamdluan@a...] > > Dear everyone, > > > I have another question: > > What is Time in Abhidhamma? > The 5 kandhas are grouped together because each of its constituent (materiality, memory, felling, sankhara, consciousness) has 11 characteristics including: being past (has already fallen away), being future (has not yet arisen), and being present (has alrady risen but has not fallen away). From this we can deduce (rightly or wrongly!) that time exists because things rise and fall away immediately. If the world only comprises of things that don't rise and fall away, then the world would be timeless (just like nibanna is said to be timeless, as it doesn't rise or fall away). KKT: Can I see in the above statement the affirmation that time exists as past, present and future? ------------ If nibbana doesn't rise or fall away, which part of nibbana do we think of as past, future, or present? It's interesting that we measure passage of time by changes, like sunrise/sunset, the pulse of the quartz, and the changes observed in cesium. In the Buddha's teaching (I believe), nothing is really changed (each reality has its own unchangeable, uncontrollable characteristics), KKT: Do you mean that Paramattha Dhammas are << unchangeable, uncontrollable >> ? So if I say that PD are << permanent >> in a brief instant then is this statement correct? -------------- but it is replaced by something else that is similar in characteristics. Changes are manifestations of things rising and falling away. I believe time is also a manifestation of things rising and falling away (this statement probably doesn't agree with the physicist too well.). kom >> KKT: PD exist in the present but also exist in the past and future. Is this statement correct? Best regards, KKT 11899 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Directed attention to dhammas (was: The Two Truths (for Howard) (II)) Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > I can't give you specific references. I have heard, from many > sources > and repeatedly, that an ongoing practice of samatha bhavana leads to a > general calming of the mind, not just during a jhana, by means of > suppression > as opposed to uprooting (which requires path consciousness). One *can* > note > that in DN 2, in the section immediately following the Jhanas, there is > the > following: > *********************************************************** > "With his mind thus concentrated, purified, and bright, unblemished, > free > from defects, pliant, malleable, steady, and attained to > imperturbability, he > directs and inclines it to knowledge and vision.... ... > **************************************************** > > There is also the following from Bodhi Leaves 15: > > **************************************************** > Samatha Bhavana > Samatha bhavana, the development of mental tranquillity with > concentration, > is accompanied by three benefits; it gives happiness in the present > life, a > favorable rebirth, and the freedom from mental defilements which is a > prerequisite for attainment of insight. ... ... > ******************************************************* > > I found the above two in one minute. I'd expect that a thorough > search > could do much better. There's no argument from me on the basic merit of samatha, Howard. Samatha bhavana is a very high degree of kuslala, well praised by the Buddha, and expressly encouraged on occasion (to selected audiences, I believe). It is a subject I am very interestd in, and happy to discuss any time. Where we have a difference, however, is whether samatha bhavana was taught as a *necessary* part of vipassana bhavana, according to a proper understanding of the teachings. Do you have any sutta (or commentary) texts to bring up on this very specific point (apart from the description of Right Concentration in the explanation of the Noble Eightfold Path, mentioned in your next post)? > -------------------------------------------------------- > Also,> > > I would be interested to know what you see as being the significance > of > > the 'non-reactiveness' (and what dhamma would this be, I wonder?). > ------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Non-reactiveness isn't a dhamma; it is an absence, the absence of > the > tendency to react with craving, aversion, and clinging. When we react > with > craving, aversion, clinging, and with an active sense of "I" and "mine", > the > meditative process is short-circuited. This is quite evident to those > who > meditate. Isn’t this is a slightly circular statement? If non-reactiveness is seen as the aim of meditation then, by definition, the meditative process will be seen as 'short-circuited' if craving, aversion and clinging are noticed. I suspect that what many people take for non-reactiveness is a subtle form of suppression. It begins by being induced (i.e., willed) when first undertaken, probably because it is seen as being a useful or even necessary step to awareness and understanding. Thus, even though with constant practice over the years it becomes more intuitive and ingrained, the fact that it was built on clinging and wrong view in the first place means it remains essentially the same in nature (for obvious reasons, though, the practitioner does not see this). You imply, I think, that non-reactiveness tends to go together with an absence of, or a reduced intensity of, a sense of self. I would question whether this is so. There can still be a strong (though not readily apparent to its ‘owner’) idea of ‘self who is not reacting’. As you point out in your next segment (below), a sense of 'self' is an integral part of us as we now are (and the same could also be said for craving, aversion and clinging). Is that sense of self likely to be increased or reduced by undertaking a program of practice that appears to bring the ‘right’ results immediately? > ------------------------------------------------------- ... > > In any event, it is I think important to bear in mind that the 5 > > hindrances do not include the wrong view that is the 'sense of self' > (your > > post above). The significance of this should be evident. It measn > that > > the suppression of the hindrances (something that constitutes such a > > significant aspect of some people's idea of the development of the > path) > > can have no impact as regards the defilement of wrong view -- yet > wrong > > view is one of the defilements to be eradicated at the first level of > > enlightenment. > > > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, until stream-entry there is the view of "self", and until > full > enlightenment there is the sense of "self". If the absence of these were > a > requirement for progress on the path, then one would already have to be > at > stream-entry to even begin; that is, in order to get to S we'd already > have > to *be* at S - an impossibility. > -------------------------------------------------- We are in agreement here, Howard ;-)). But as I understand it, the view of self is by no means present all the time. As just one example, it does not arise with the vipaka moments that are seeing, hearing etc., nor with kusala moments (although it may of course arise immediately following such moments). Even at moments of akusala, there may or may not be an idea of self. (Some people equate conceptualising about people and things with a sense of self, but conceptualising need not involve any sense of self.) The fact that we still have a (strong) latent tendency to a view of self (or indeed to any other form of kilesa) is not an insurmountable obstacle to the arising of beginning awareness. The point in my earlier post was just this. One of the first kilesa to be eradicated, ie., to be directly and fully known as it really is, is this wrong view of self. The argument that kilesas need to be suppressed in order for awareness or understanding to be developed seems to ignore the fact that the wrong view of self is not suppressed when the hindrances are, and yet it is among the first of the kilesas to be known as they really are. Jon 11900 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:14pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Samvega Christine --- christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear Sarah & Jon, and All, > Dear All, > A couple of articles on death, further to the recent posts on death > contemplation...... > > Sarah & Jon - with regard to 'Samvega' mentioned briefly in BKK - it > seems common (?) in the context of an experience of death......... > (mentioned in Bhikku Thitapunnos' article below) > > "The many kinds of suffering experienced by sentient beings in > general, and on account of death in particular, may trigger the > motivation for the emergence of a sense of spiritual urgency > (samvega) and may be the cause for the arising of faith (saddha). > When these are present, an individual may embark in a search for > answers that may be conducive to the end of suffering and death." Yes, a sense of urgency is often mentioned in writings on death. I think in these instances it refers to a kind of conscious reflection. However, I believe it can also be understood in the sense of an underlying motivation that we may not even be aware of but which is a mental factor (kusala, of course) arising with the moment(s) of consciousness. (Thus, as Nina and Ken O remind us, a relaxed attitude and a sense of urgency are not mutually exclusive!) > http://www.hundredmountain.com/Pages/siteindex.html > scroll down to DharmaTalking "What is this thing called Death" by > Bhikku Thitapunno Winter/01 > and, "Keeping an eye on Death: A Dharma talk by Bhante Rahula: > Winter/00 Thanks for these references also, Christine. I haven't had a chance to check them out yet, but will keep them handy. Jon 11901 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Kkandhas and realities Victor --- Victor Yu wrote: > > Jon, > > Texts asides, do you see what is impermanent > stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha? > > Regards, > Victor But what a particular person sees (or *thinks* they see) can surely be of no relevance to an understanding of the Buddha's word. The question here, I think, Victor, is what the Buddha meant when he said that sankhara dhammas are impermanent and hence unsatisfactory. Or do you see it differently? Jon > > Victor > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Jon, > > > > > > Yes. Nama is impermanent. Is what is impermanent easeful or > > > stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha? > > > > According to the texts, Victor, the answer is 'yes'. > > > > Jon 11902 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:24pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Directed attention to dhammas (was: The Two Truths (for Howard) (II)) Manji --- manji wrote: > I'd like to share some experience from martial arts, > > When doing iron shirt training there is pain (body unpleasant) and there > is unpleasant feeling. However the body pain is a different "world" > compared to the body pain that "you" think "you" experience. It doesn't > feel painful in the conventional sense. Yes, there's inevitably a lot of mental (non-bodily) pain associated with any bodily pain. The mental pain is the unpleasant feeling that arises with dosa -- aversion towards the bodily pain. > Sticking the hands in boiling water, the hotness is different than > "hot". Once this hotness is truly felt, it ceases to cause mental pain. > Then there is no pain, of course... no suggesting running around putting > hands in molten lead, boiling water or getting struck. :) Don't worry, there’s no chance I'm about to try!! > This started when stepping out of the shower into the cold freezing air > in the dojo. There is a tensing up and an unpleasant feeling. However, > the "coldness" is different than "cold". Again, once this coldness is > truly felt, there is no mental anguish. The coldness as an object (which > is however brief) is different than "cold". I did however try a cold shower to see if I could replicate your experience. But too much aversion, I'm afraid, which conditioned the hot water tap to be quickly turned on. > There is an underlying tendency to interpret this "coldness" as "cold" > and then "I am this" then "get away" then maybe "get warm". I can confirm this (and the ensuing pleasant feeling accompanying attachment when this is achieved) … > After thinking a bit, perhaps we associate a mentally unpleasant feeling > with bodily unpleasant feeling. The bodily unpleasant feeling is not > "mentally unpleasant", yet there certainly is a feeling that can give > "immediate rise" to "mentally unpleasant feeling". How it gets > conditioned that way is a good question. I suppose there's a lot of accumulated aversion towards bodily feeling that is unpleasant, so it just pops up when the opportunity (unpleasant bodily feeling) is there. ;-). Jon PS It took me a while to figure out ‘iron shirt training’. All I could think of at first was ironing shirts. Then I saw a TV programme on a man in China who has ‘iron pieces hands’, and the penny suddenly dropped. 11903 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Kkandhas and realities Lucy --- Lucy wrote: > Hi Jon > > (from a weekend poster to another) So you've noticed! > From: "Jonothan Abbott" > > > > These realities are called 'ultimate' realities ('paramattha' dhammas) > > because they are irreducible i.e., incapable of being broken down into > any > > further component part. > > > > I think that by studying more and reflecting on the matter we can > confirm > > whether, for example, the sound now being experienced through the ears > or > > the hardness now being experienced through the body-sense is a reality > and > > furthermore whether it is capable of experiencing an object. > -------------------------------- > It'll take me a lot more observation !!! - it isn't clear yet because I > haven't got the skill to distinguish between the object, the perception > and > the concept. They are glued to each other in one solid mass of > "experience". Reflection continues .... and continues ... and .... Yep, that's the only way, I believe. And this is where the patience and confidence comes into it. Only with confidence that development of understanding of present realities is the key can there be the necessary patience. (As Nina reminds us, patience is the highest asceticism.) > -------------------------------- > > Lucy, when you say 'what I see etc. as rupa is not rupa', I wonder if > you > > are referring also to the fact that although we can understand about > namas > > and rupas in theory, in practice we continue to see the world in terms > of > > objects (people and things) rather than as different rupas. > > > --------------------------------- > > That's one aspect of the tangle. But on a deeper level, there's also the > fact that all perceptions are processed by consciousness (vinnana) - as > such, every perception is conditioned --- Sankara paccaya vinnanam / > Vinnana paccaya namarupam--- and if it's conditioned, it's not pure > perception of an object but a construct of citta --- don't know whether > this is coming out clear at all... will try again if not.... I suspect what you say here reflects the M tradition. In the Pali texts, consciousness and perception (as I understand you to mean it here) are not separate functions or realities. Consciousness experiences an object -- that is its function and it is the primary means by which any object is experienced. For example, at a moment of seeing, seeing consciousness simply experiences visible object; at a moment of hearing, hearing consciousness simply experiences sound. It is the many, many moments of thinking that follow the initial moments of *bare experiencing* that the processing you mention takes place. So, as I understand it, there is 'pure' (= bare) perception of realties (but not of an object in the conventional sense, since conventional objects as we think of them are a construct of our thinking). > > Personally, I find it helpful to assume that all my ideas about > reality > > and the practice are likely to be flawed. It's amazing how much > > superimposing of concepts can be noticed at some level or another if > we > > are not trying to convince ourselves how little we are prone to this > > particular tendency. > > > ------------------------- > he-he-he Nice comment (I think). > Lucy Jon 11904 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:31pm Subject: Re: meditation vs. dhammastudy Frank Thanks for the excellent description of the meditative experience. I can see why it has the great allure it does (especially when compared to your description of much-less-effective intellectual study!). I notice that you would regard a 'perception of impermanence and dukkha' (or 'reduction of dukkha' in your earlier post) as the yardstick for gauging progress in your meditation practice. I would be interested to know what importance you would give to an understanding of the characteristic of the different realties that make up the present moment, as a possible indicator of one’s development, and how this relates to the reduction of dukkha that is your major concern. As far as intellectual study is concerned, no-one of course is suggesting that mere intellectual study is itself the development of the understudying taught by the Buddha. But a degree of intellectual understanding is a necessary if there is to be any right understanding at the level of practice. I’m just trying to indicate that it is not a matter of comparing one method with the other, since study and practice are complimentary and mutually supportive, rather than alternatives to each other. Jon --- frank kuan wrote: > > --- Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > I'd be interested to know what you mean here by > > reduction of dukkha in > > moment to moment experience, Frank. Would you mind > > sharing some examples > > with us? Thanks. > > After intensive meditation, my perception of > impermanence and dukkha is much more keen. As my > present experience unfolds moment to moment, that > awareness has a profound impact on how I see things. > Seeing dukkha becomes instinct, and I can avoid > behavior that leads to suffering without having to > think about it. The results are also noticable in my > idle state - both body and mind are much more relaxed, > more open. > With only intellectual study of dhamma devoid of > meditation, when confronted with the same potential > dukkha situations, my alleviation of dukkha is much > more strained. That is, my impermanence awareness is > more conscious repetitive thinking than instinct, and > there is much more clinging and obsessiveness with the > situation. I have to keep reminding myself > (intellectually), that is dukkha, not worth clinging > to, impermanent, etc. Huge difference. With > meditation, the intellectual knowledge of the 3 marks > solidifies and becomes more instinctive, and much less > obsessive reflection of pain-inducing situation after > the event. Naturally I let events go and don't obsess > afterwards if I did the right thing, etc. > With meditation, witnessing the 3 marks seems to > happen without thought and concepts. Without > meditation and only intellectual dhammic > understanding, it's like I'm a third party observer > reviewing things in tape delay, and trying to > understand the mind of another person. With > meditation, I'm in first person, directly experiencing > the moment. 11905 From: Victor Yu Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:34pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Kkandhas and realities Hi Jon, My question was straightforward. The Buddha meant what he said. Regards, Victor ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jonothan Abbott" To: Sent: Friday, March 15, 2002 10:19 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Kkandhas and realities > Victor > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > Jon, > > > > Texts asides, do you see what is impermanent > > stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha? > > > > Regards, > > Victor > > But what a particular person sees (or *thinks* they see) can surely be of > no relevance to an understanding of the Buddha's word. The question here, > I think, Victor, is what the Buddha meant when he said that sankhara > dhammas are impermanent and hence unsatisfactory. > > Or do you see it differently? > > Jon > > > > Victor > > > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Jon, > > > > > > > > Yes. Nama is impermanent. Is what is impermanent easeful or > > > > stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha? > > > > > > According to the texts, Victor, the answer is 'yes'. > > > > > > Jon 11906 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:39pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Kkandhas and realities Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > In a message dated 3/9/02 3:15:40 AM Eastern Standard Time, > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > According to the teachings, the present moment comprises different > > realities (dhammas) which are either namas or rupas, where namas are > > realities that experience an object and rupas are realities that are > not > > capable of experiencing an object. > > > > These realities are called 'ultimate' realities ('paramattha' dhammas) > > because they are irreducible i.e., incapable of being broken down into > any > > further component part. > > > ============================ > This is certainly correct. But because of frequent > misunderstanding of > the Theravadin position, I think?that it is always useful to point out > that > while the paramattha dhammas are irreducible, they are not independent, > depending as they do on each other, with a mutual dependence between > vi~n~nana and namarupa, with various inredependencies among the > cetasikas > within a given mind-moment, and with dependencies holding between > earlier and > later mind-moments. Thus even the paramattha dhammas are not independent > > self-existent units, but are things-in relation, arisen dependently, and > > impermanent. > > With metta, > Howard Thanks for these comments. I appreciate your pointing out things that might be helpful to someone coming from a different dhamma background. I think that when you say 'not independent' you mean 'conditioned', and that your references to mutual dependence etc can be read accordingly. If so, I think I would agree with your comments here, with the possible exception of the reference to 'not self-existent units' – I was not sure exactly what quality or attribute this refers to. Thanks again, Howard. Jon 11907 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 7:48pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Kkandhas and realities Victor --- Victor Yu wrote: > Hi Jon, > > My question was straightforward. No-one could ever suggest your posts were other than straightforward, Victor! But I was questioning the relevance of this line of inquiry. ;-) > The Buddha meant what he said. Thanks for the straightforward response. ;-) For those of us who do not find the Buddha's true meaning quite so easy to discern, could you elaborate as regards the particular passage in question. Thanks. Jon > Regards, > Victor > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Jonothan Abbott" > To: > Sent: Friday, March 15, 2002 10:19 PM > Subject: Re: [dsg] Kkandhas and realities > > > > Victor > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > > > > Jon, > > > > > > Texts asides, do you see what is impermanent > > > stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha? > > > > > > Regards, > > > Victor > > > > But what a particular person sees (or *thinks* they see) can surely be > of > > no relevance to an understanding of the Buddha's word. The question > here, > > I think, Victor, is what the Buddha meant when he said that sankhara > > dhammas are impermanent and hence unsatisfactory. > > > > Or do you see it differently? > > > > Jon > > > > > > Victor > > > > > > > > --- Victor Yu wrote: > Jon, > > > > > > > > > > Yes. Nama is impermanent. Is what is impermanent easeful or > > > > > stressful/unsatisfactory/dukkha? > > > > > > > > According to the texts, Victor, the answer is 'yes'. > > > > > > > > Jon 11908 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Fri Mar 15, 2002 8:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Puzzle (?) KKT Hello and welcome from me. Without knowing whether what you say is strictly accurate, since the texts sem a little sparse on this area, it sounds good to me. One part of your summary in particular we can be fairly certain is correct, is when you say: > If this statement is correct > then could one say that > << THERE IS NOT A THING AS MEMORY AT ALL >> ? Yes, there is no *thing* called memory. There is a mental factor (1 or more) that allows the function of memory as we conceive of it to be performed. You also say: > Reality is only a series of > successive PD, each one > is << conditioned >> by others > and in turn << condition >> other PD. This is so too, I believe, although in a slightly stricter sense reality is just the *presently appearing* dhamma (although this is perhaps what you had in mind anyway). Thanks for the good questions and comments on memory. Jon PS Not quite sure why you find it such a puzzle, though! --- phamdluan@a... wrote: > > Dear everyone, > > > It seems that my questions > on Memory are not based > on solid ground because I > myself get confused :-)) > > > So I try to return to some << bases >> > (correct me if I'm wrong) > > > First, in Abhidhamma we accept > that reality is only Paramattha Dhammas > (PD) or Ultimate Realities which > are rupa, citta, cetasika that rise > and fall away in a brief instant. > > > The rising and falling of those > PD are due to << CONDITIONS >> > > > The past PD << condition >> > the rising of the present PD > which in turn << conditions >> > the rising of other future PD. > > > Thus << CONDITION >> is > the << key >> to understand > the whole system of Buddhism. > > > Those statements are the << bases >> > > > So if I meet Mr. X today and > regconize him then the act of > recollection is only the << result >> > of some PD in the past. > > Some series of PD in the past > had << conditioned >> the rising > of another series of PD in the > actual present which is the act > of recollection. > > > If this statement is correct > then could one say that > << THERE IS NOT A THING AS MEMORY AT ALL >> ? > > > Reality is only a series of > successive PD, each one > is << conditioned >> by others > and in turn << condition >> other PD. > > There is absolutely no soul, no self involved. > > > A surrealistic view ? :-)) > > > Best regards, > > > KKT 11909 From: abhidhammika Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 6:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory: To Sarah And KKT 2 Dear KKT How are you? You asked: "Is this << chain >> a chain of successive consciousnesses (citta, cetasika)from past to present and future? (Correct me if I'm wrong) Yes, KKT. But, the emergent link of this mental chain is only in the present. You also wrote by way of interpretation and conclusion: "Therefore one can retrieve, recollect and recognize << the old image of X >> which is no other than a past << cognitive series >> (as you state above) of this chain." I would not draw such a conclusion. From what I wrote, I would not interpret "the old image of X" as a past cognitive series. This is because the old image can only be a past object or stimulus (aarammana or aalambana). You also raised a question by writing the following: "This raises a question: Citta & cetasika rise and fall away in a brief instant but continue to << exist >> in the past so that one can retrieve, recollect, recognize them, right?" I believe you needed to raise the above question because you drew a rather inappropriate conclusion from what I wrote. Obviously, the question you raised was wrong, I am afraid. This is because what have fallen away or vanished do not continue to exist in the past as you concluded. And because you had drawn the wrong conclusions from what I wrote, any questions based on those wrong conclusions also became meaningless. Therefore, the following questions you raised became meaningless and unanswerable, I am afraid. "Is this the meaning of << never lost >> ? If the answer is 'Yes' to these above questions then how to understand the meaning of << exist in the past >> ?" Sorry to have disappointed you on this occasion! I hope I will be able to offer you better answers the next time when you pose meaningful questions by drawing correct conclusions from my original explanation. Good luck, And With best wishes, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., phamdluan@a... wrote: > > Dear Suan, > > > << > From: abhidhammika@y... (abhidhammika) > > > > Dear Sarah And KKT > > How are you? > > KKT asked: > > "If memory is a cetasika > and lasts a very brief instant > and then falls away then > how does << recollection >> > or << recognition >> work?" > > KKT gave an example: > > "Suppose I meet Mr. X, > an image of X is a cetasika > making a mark in my 'mind' > but lasts only a fleeting moment." > > Sarah has already given a very good answer to KKT's question. > > I merely wanted to add a little bit. Hope it did not look like adding > too much sugar! > > When we see Mr X, it is true that the first visual consciousness > lasts only a fleeting moment. But, to cover the whole of Mr X, the > first visual consciousness alone is not enough. There is an > uncountable number of visual consciousness cognitive series > called "cakkhuviññaanaviithi" to process Mr X. > > And each cognitive series comes with additional supportive > consciousnesses in addition to the visual consciousness. This means > that all consciousnesses within each cognitive series come with > successive emergences of memory. This also means that there emerge > countless reinforcing instances of memory to process Mr X. > > In short, there has been sufficient mental processing time for the > image of Mr X to be available for future retrieval. > > Now, how could an entirely new future memory in a totally new future > consciousness recollect, and recognize an image of Mr X? > > The answer is to do with the fact that each of us is merely a mental > chain that operates as a systemic whole. Every event that happens in > one part of the system affects every other part of it. > > When our visual consciousnesses first processed Mr X, our minds also > performed various other actions in addition to merely seeing Mr X. > Some of these other actions are efficacious ones > called "javanacittas" that are capable of giving rise to future > results. As these results are associated with Mr X, even though those > results happen in totally new future mental events in totally new > future circumstances, an image of Mr X becomes available for new > instances of memory to retieve, recollect and recognize. > > By the way, it pays to remember the function of memory in this > context. > > The function of memory is to retrieve, recollect and recognize the > past events. A particular mental phenomenon comes to receive the > name "memory" precisely because it is capable of performing the > function of memory, which is connecting the present consciousness > with the past events (Retrieval, recollection, and recognizing). The > lack of such capability is called dementia, a form of mental illness. > > Therefore, nothing can prevent a future instance of memory from > retrieving and remembering the work and result of a past memory as > long as the past memory and future memory emerge within the same > mental chain. > > > With best wishes, > > Suan Lu Zaw > > >> > > > > > KKT: Thank you very much > for answering to my question > with a long explanation. > > > I read and re-read your post > many times trying to figure out > what you want to convey. > > > First, you talk of > > << the fact that each of us is merely a mental > chain that operates as a systemic whole >> > > > Is this << chain >> a chain of successive > consciousnesses (citta, cetasika) > from past to present and future? > (Correct me if I'm wrong) > > > Therefore one can retrieve, recollect > and recognize << the old image of X >> > which is no other than a past << cognitive series >> > (as you state above) of this chain. > > > This raises a question: > > Citta & cetasika rise and fall away > in a brief instant but continue > to << exist >> in the past so that one can > retrieve, recollect, recognize them, right? > > Is this the meaning of << never lost >> ? > > > If the answer is 'Yes' to these > above questions then > how to understand the meaning > of << exist in the past >> ? > > > Thanks for enlightening me. > > > Best regards, > > > KKT 11910 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Sat Mar 16, 2002 6:52am Subject: RE: [dsg] Time Dear KKT, > -----Original Message----- > From: phamdluan@a... [mailto:phamdluan@a...] > The 5 kandhas are grouped together because each of its > constituent (materiality, memory, felling, sankhara, > consciousness) has 11 characteristics including: > being past > (has already fallen away), being future (has not yet > arisen), and being present (has alrady risen but has not > fallen away). From this we can deduce (rightly > or wrongly!) > that time exists because things rise and fall away > immediately. If the world only comprises of things that > don't rise and fall away, then the world would > be timeless > (just like nibanna is said to be timeless, as it doesn't > rise or fall away). > > KKT: Can I see in the above > statement the affirmation that > time exists as past, present and future? > ------------ I think it would be closer if you say that kandhas are past, present, and future. Time is just a manifestation of the kandhas. > changes observed in cesium. In the Buddha's teaching (I > believe), nothing is really changed (each reality has its > own unchangeable, uncontrollable characteristics), > > KKT: Do you mean that > Paramattha Dhammas are > << unchangeable, uncontrollable >> ? Yes. > > So if I say that PD are > << permanent >> in a brief instant > then is this statement correct? > -------------- I am not sure what you are driving at. But let me ask you this. Would you put into a normal conversation like, this ink is permanent (sticks really steadfastly), but would stick to the target only for an instant? For me, they are somewhat opposite of each other. > KKT: PD exist in the present > but also exist in the past and future. > > Is this statement correct? Mostly no (I think). A dhamma exists only for an infinitesmally small amount of time. The past dhamma has already fallen away (no longer exists), and the future dhamma has not yet arisen (has not come to be). On the other hand, if a dhamma has risen and already fallen away (it does no longer exist), do we deny that it has never existed? Obviously not. Furthermore, in the abhidhamma model, realities that no longer exist (like kamma, for example), can condition the realities that are arisign now. Does that kamma exist or not exist? I hope other people would contribute clearer thoughts to this point. kom 11911 From: Date: Sat Mar 16, 2002 5:38pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Directed attention to dhammas (was: The Two Truths (for Howard) (II)) Jon: "Where we have a difference, however, is whether samatha bhavana was taught as a *necessary* part of vipassana bhavana, according to a proper understanding of the teachings." ------------------ I think it is. It is even taught here in this forum. Not making special efforts and waiting around for aeons for results is samatha bhavana. Larry 11912 From: Purnomo . Date: Sat Mar 16, 2002 0:03am Subject: RE: [dsg] Time dear friends, I think 'time' is ''. Do you know I mean ? This is ''. I hope you understand. metta, purnomo >From: "Kom Tukovinit" >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com >To: >Subject: RE: [dsg] Time >Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2002 08:51:33 -0800 > >Dear KKT, > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: phamdluan@a... [mailto:phamdluan@a...] > > > > Dear everyone, > > > > > > I have another question: > > > > What is Time in Abhidhamma? > > > >The 5 kandhas are grouped together because each of its >constituent (materiality, memory, felling, sankhara, >consciousness) has 11 characteristics including: being past >(has already fallen away), being future (has not yet >arisen), and being present (has alrady risen but has not >fallen away). From this we can deduce (rightly or wrongly!) >that time exists because things rise and fall away >immediately. If the world only comprises of things that >don't rise and fall away, then the world would be timeless >(just like nibanna is said to be timeless, as it doesn't >rise or fall away). > >If nibbana doesn't rise or fall away, which part of nibbana >do we think of as past, future, or present? > >It's interesting that we measure passage of time by changes, >like sunrise/sunset, the pulse of the quartz, and the >changes observed in cesium. In the Buddha's teaching (I >believe), nothing is really changed (each reality has its >own unchangeable, uncontrollable characteristics), but it is >replaced by something else that is similar in >characteristics. Changes are manifestations of things >rising and falling away. I believe time is also a >manifestation of things rising and falling away (this >statement probably doesn't agree with the physicist too >well.). > >kom > > 11913 From: Victor Yu Date: Sat Mar 16, 2002 11:17am Subject: Re: [dsg] Directed attention to dhammas (was: The Two Truths (for Howard) (II)) Hi all, I find the article One Tool Among Many The Place of Vipassana in Buddhist Practice by Thanissaro Bhikkhu http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/thanissaro/onetool.html might be relevant to the discussion on samatha and vipassana. Regards, Victor > There's no argument from me on the basic merit of samatha, Howard. > Samatha bhavana is a very high degree of kuslala, well praised by the > Buddha, and expressly encouraged on occasion (to selected audiences, I > believe). It is a subject I am very interestd in, and happy to discuss > any time. > > Where we have a difference, however, is whether samatha bhavana was taught > as a *necessary* part of vipassana bhavana, according to a proper > understanding of the teachings. Do you have any sutta (or commentary) > texts to bring up on this very specific point (apart from the description > of Right Concentration in the explanation of the Noble Eightfold Path, > mentioned in your next post)? 11914 From: Date: Sat Mar 16, 2002 10:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) "Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, experiencing tangible object through the bodysense and thinking, all these nåmas are impermanent." Hi namarupa, What I take most for self is thought. Is thought a reality or a concept? Larry 11915 From: Date: Sat Mar 16, 2002 5:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Puzzle KKT:<< THERE IS NOT A THING AS MEMORY AT ALL >> ? ---------------- Hi KKT, I agree there is no permanent thing called memory but there is memory of some sort. Without memory we wouldn't know impermanence. I didn't understand Sarah and Suan's explanations. I think memory is more than seeing movement. It seems there has to be some facsimile of grasping and holding going on, a data base or something. Is there any record keeping involved in phassa (contact or impression)? Sanna seems like it is data entry and retrieval but not storage. Could memory be rupa? Larry 11916 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 6:58am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ayatanas again, to Num Dear Num, I am butting in. op 15-03-2002 05:53 schreef Sarah op sarahdhhk@y...: Sarah to Num on ayatanas: > .For me, I don’t have a question about the bhavanga part, but your second > question about pasada rupa (eyesense and so on) as included under ‘subtle > rupas’ in mental data base/ideational base (dhammayatana) is a little > confusing. Nina: The classification of ayatanas, sense-fields, is different from the classification of objects (arammana) or elements (dhatus). As to ayatanas, the Buddha teaches here the meeting or association of object, base and the relevant citta that experiences an object. The eyebase is not a subtle rupa, it is a coarse rupa, the senses and the sense objects are coarse rupas. The eyesense is not classified as dhammayatana but as cakkhayatana, the base of the eye. Evenso for the other sensebases. A sense object impinges on the relevant sensebase and thus a sense-cognition arises. This is not theoretical at all. A rupa lasts as long as seventeen moments of citta, when we compare the duration of rupa and citta. We could not count, of course. Thus, visible object that has not fallen away but is still there for several moments, impinges on the eyebase that has not fallen away yet and is still present, and then several cittas of the eye-door process, including seeing-consciousness, experience the visible object. When we consider this we can be amazed that there is such a coincidence of ayatanas, that it is possible to experience an object. Manayatana, as you know, includes all cittas. Dhammayatana includes as you mentioned, cetasikas, subtle rupas and nibbana. You were wondering about dhammarammana and dhammadhatu. These belong to other classifications, not in the context of ayatanas. Classification of arammana: here the Buddha teaches about objects that can be experienced. Dhammarammana : the five sense organs, the subtle rupas, citta, cetasika, nibbana, concepts. These are the objects only experienced through the mind-door. The classification of elements, dhatus, here the Buddha teaches about realities as elements, devoid of self. Dhammadhatu:cetasikas, subtle rupas and nibbana. Citta is not included here, because cittas have been classified separately as different elements (seeing-consciousness-element, etc., mind-element, mano-dhatu, mind-consciousness element, mano-vi~n~naa.na-dhaatu). Concept is not an element, it is not real in the ultimate sense. (See ADL Ch 18). It is helpful to see different subjects of study in their own context. You mentioned mindfulness of the citta of someone else, as an outward object, seeing citta in citta, no matter one's own or someone else's. And then under mental objects, dhammas, seeing the inner and outward ayatanas internally, and externally. Here again we should beware of the different contexts. There are inner and outward ayatanas, in the context of ayatanas. There is awareness of one's own rupa, feeling, citta or dhamma, or those of someone else, and this is another context, the context of the objects of mindfulness. Now coming back to awareness of someone else's citta: this is not restricted to the special super power of penetrationg someone else's mind. When we notice someone else's outbreak of anger, the angry voice, this can bring us back to the reality appearing at the present moment: there can be awareness of our thinking of his citta as merely a conditioned nama, or of sound, as only a conditioned element. This helps us to become an understanding person, to be patient. As I understood from A. Sujin's explanations, anything that appears, even the citta or feeling of someone else can bring us back to the present reality. The Commentary does not explain about this, but I do not know the subcommentary. I am glad to hear about additional explanations of this rather difficult point. Could perhaps your aunt ask A. Sujin again, if there is an opportunity? I hope this clarifies a few of your points. I am reading now the co. to the Sivaka Sutta on kamma and vipaka, and I am so surprised at what I am reading here. We have to place this sutta in the context of the 108 kinds of feelings, as one can see. Otherwise we shall not understand this sutta. I come back later to the Sutta. I must run now!! My father will come (101 years old) and I have to play Telemann on the tenor recorder. Best wishes, Nina. 11917 From: mikebrotherto Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 3:14pm Subject: Re: Deluded clarification assistance --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Hello Mike, > > You ask about: 1. ego/mana/conceit (I think these are the same, > yes/no?) > > 2. sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief > > 3. atta - self > > Christine, Sarah, and Larry, Thank you so much for your thoughtful responses. Here is my understanding of how the concepts relate to each other. If I am off the mark, I would appreciate some more feedback. I have consolidated everyone's responses including Bhante Gunaratana's and have decided on a position that makes sense me. The question is: Where does the Western term "ego" fit in with the terms mana (conceit), sakkaya-ditthi (personality belief), and atta (self)? The answer: Atta and ego must have the same meaning. They are the "umbrella" that holds the other subsets of sakkaya ditthi and mana. The 20 types of personality belief - sakkaya ditthi - are certainly related to ego, but cannot be the only definition of ego. If that were so then, when sakkaya-ditthi - the 1st fetter - is removed when one becomes a stream-enterer, ego would no longer be. However, Bhante tells me that ego is mana - conceit, the 8th fetter. If that is the case (and I have no grounds on which to dispute him) ego must still remain until the nonreturner drops the fetter of conceit. Once conceit is removed then there is anatta or egolessness or nonself. I'm comfortable with that. Ego remains until conceit flickers out but personality belief fades away long before. Conceit fades away some time before Arahantship. What do you think? Also, I need to keep up with you folks. I would like to learn Pali. Could someone suggest an appropriate university level text (are there any tapes for proper pronunciation) that I can use at home? What is the best Pali to English dictionary in your opinion? With metta, Mike Brotherton 11918 From: onco111 Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 8:43pm Subject: What's in a nama? Dear All, In his book "Mere Christianity," C.S. Lewis asks "whether the universe simply happens to be what it is for no reason or whether there is a power behind it that makes it what it is." Because he can't see any other way around it, he concludes that there has to be "a Somebody or Something behind the Moral Law." After all, how can the world be such an amazing place unless someone truly magnificent created it? That magnificent being he calls "God." That argument has always been entirely flat to me. I can't see any reason why the amazingness of the universe and its Good Law (Dhamma) imply a creator, a first cause, a "God." Similarly, I sometimes hear people ask about "who" experiences hearing and seeing? "Who" is it that is angry? "Who" reaps the fruits of kamma? "Who" is reborn? Again, it is so very difficult to see how the experiencing must imply that there is an experiencer. It just doesn't make sense. There certainly is hearing, anger, vipaka, patisandhi, etc., but just what that "who" who experiences these things could possibly be is quite a mystery. Can it be the sound (rupa), or the hearing (viññana), or the sense of recognition associated with the hearing (sañña), or the feeling associated with the sound (vedana), or the reaction to the feeling associated with the sound (sankhara)? None of these things constitute a satisfactory "who", nor is their confluence adequate as a "who" either. But there isn't anything outside these. Just hearing. No need to try to imagine a hearer. As S.N. Goenka puts it: [paraphrase] "A naive Western philosopher once said, 'I think, therefore I am'" --- No "I." Just thinking (citta) and the characteristics of thinking (cetasika)... Then again, it is clear that there is a very strong urge to think there must be some individual agent to experience the experiences: "I hear", "My anger", "My vipaka/vedana/volition," etc. But the Buddha taught that these phenomena have no agent (anatta), that they are void of any experiencer (suññata), that the idea of an agent is strictly a concept--and a particularly tenacious concept at that. He also taught that the grasping at the agent concept (sakayaditthi) is a powerful source of suffering. That's one reason why I find Nina's ADL such a difficult read. Over and over I read things like: "Citta knows or experiences an object," (p. 6) and "Nama experiences something" (p. 4). How does this citta that experiences things differ from the actual experience of things? If it differs, then how does it differ from a self? If it doesn't differ, then what of the distinction, "Citta experiences" ? My strong urge to posit an agent is fed and cultivated by the subject/verb, agent/action construction because now I have a name for "who" does the experiencing--it's "citta" ! It's good to hear that citta is not "I", but it's a bit spooky to read that it's a *something* that "experiences". So I did a little reading. In Yamaka (II, p. 273; cited in Ledi Sadaw's "Some points in Buddhist Doctrine", JPTS VII, p. 152), the question is asked: "Are mind (citta) and thinking (cintanakriya) both one and the same, or diverse? If he reply: 'Diverse,' then mind is just mind, and is not a mode of thinking....If that is so, the mental factor 'contact' would possess the act of touching; 'feeling' (vedana) would possess feeling (vedayitakaro); perception would possess perceiving, etc. ...All these actions, or conditions, would have to be regarded as things apart or distinct from those mentioned. And mind would possess several modes of thinking." Ven. Ledi Sayadaw continues (p. 158), "But in Abhidhamma, from the standpoint of ultimate truth, there is no difference between act and agent. The mode 'thinking' is the act 'thinking.' The mind (citta), or thinking agent, is not different from the act 'thinking.' ... Even the four categories of ultimates--citta, cetasika, rupa, Nibbana--are only acts." In the commentaries (e.g. Asl. (Expositor), p. 84), citta is defined "in three ways: as agent, as instrument, and as activity. As the agent, citta is that which cognizes an object (arammanam cinteti ti cittam)....As an activity, citta is itself nothing other than the process of congnizing the object (cintanamattam cittam). The third definition, in terms of sheer activity, is regarded as the most adequate of the three: that is, citta is fundamentally an activity or process of cognizing or knowing an object. It is not an agent or instrument possessing actual being in intself apart from the activity of cognizing. The definitions in terms of agent and instrument are proposed to refuts the wrong view of those who hold that a permanent self or ego is the agent and instrument of cognition. The Buddhist thinkers point out, by means of these definitions, that it is not a self that performs the act of cognition, but citta or consciousness. This citta is nothing other than the act of cognizing" (BB's CMA, p. 27-28). To me, this seems like an absolutely critical point that is muddied by talk of "citta knows" and "nama experiences" because subject/verb strongly evokes a concept of a subject that acts, especially since I already have such a tendency to evoke that concept in the first place. Dan 11919 From: onco111 Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 8:44pm Subject: "unpleasant words" Dear All, Nina writes (ADL, p. 7): "When we hear unpleasant words, the moment of experiencing the sound is akusala vipaka, the result of unwholesome deeds we performed in our lives." And on p. 78: "When we see something unpleasant there must be a condition for it: it is the result of akusala kamma." I find this quite puzzling. Aren't the 'words' we hear and the things we see just sound and color, and the hearing and seeing accompanied strictly by upekkha? The sounds and colors themselves are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. It's only when we construct concepts around the words and colors that we view them as "unpleasant" or "pleasant." In other words, there is nothing intrinsically unpleasant or pleasant about the actual hearing-consciousnes (as there would be with the body-consciousness associated with a punch in the nose), and the unpleasant/pleasant aspect is mental feeling derived from our aversion/attachment to the concepts we associate with the particular sounds we hear. But domanassa and somanassa are kamma rather than vipaka. How can we say that "unpleasant words" are akusala vipaka when they are strictly neutral sounds until domanassa arises with concept in javana process? Another way to look at it is to ask: What are 'unpleasant words'? The only thing I can come up with is that they are a particular type of concept associated with domanassa. 'Unpleasant words' do not arise through the ear door, they arise through the mind door, and the construction of them is kamma. Thus, when I read "When we hear unpleasant words,..." I think: "When domanassa arises in association with a concept constructed with input from hearing-consciousness,..." In this context, the moment of 'hearing', then, is not hearing at all (sotaviññanam), but dosamulacittam. The commentaries struggle with this too, because approximations to "unpleasant words" appear in the suttas (e.g. SN IV [129, Ghosita], BB trans. p. 1200): "There exists the ear element, and sounds that are disagreeable, and ear-consciousness: in dependence on a contact to be experienced as painful, a painful feeling arises." So the sounds are not really disagreeable themselves but only some later contact is? By convention, then, we just call the sounds themselves "unpleasant" ? The commentary explains (for "dependence on a contact to be experienced as pleasant"): "That is, a contact asociated with eye-consciousness that functions as a condition, by way of decisive support (upanissaya), for a pleasant feeling in the javana phase. The pleasant feeling arises in the javana phase in dependence on a single contact. The same method applies in the following passages." So, putting this together with Nina's quotes, the best I can come up with is that "hearing unpleasant words" is "akusala vipaka" because in later akusala kamma the words are interpreted as "unpleasant." Thus, a previous akusala vipaka (sotaviññanam) is a result of a later kamma? That does sound peculiar indeed! Can anyone help me out of this jam? Dan 11920 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 9:06pm Subject: Pali websites was Re: Deluded clarification assistance Hi Mike, A few links that I hope may be worthwhile for you. Others may have additional information Regards, Christine The Metta Sutta - see English and Pali text (side by side) while hearing it read in Pali on RealAudio. (...perhaps with a slight Polish accent?) http://jagor.srce.hr/~kmajor/zzekovic/text.htm There is a dsg glossary, which is very useful for reading posts containing Pali: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Pali_Glossary The basic on-line Buddhist Dictionary is a Manual of Buddhist Terms by Nyanatiloka Mahathera: http://www.budsas.org/ebud/bud-dict/dic_idx.htm Access to Insight has "A guide to learning the Pali language" (with links to other web-sites) http://www.accesstoinsight.org/pali/index.html There is a Yahoo group for those wishing to study Pali with others. If you join, Lesson One begins at Post number 341, the group is up to Lesson 14 or 15 - but there can be benefits in starting later - all the questions people have asked are in the message list archive :-) The books used are "Pali Primer" by Dr. Lily de Silva and, "A New Course in Reading Pali" James W. Gair and W. S. Karunatillake http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Pali/ The following lessons are transcribed from Ven.Narada's grammar and not completey edited, The Tutorial Guides were written by Prof. Dhammavihari, Sri Lanka.) http://www.transmillennium.net/pali/index.html Where you can buy some books: http://www.tipitaka.net/store/subj04.htm The Pali Text Society http://www.palitext.demon.co.uk/ Pali Translator Mailing List seems to be moribund with only one post since last November. Though past posts may be of assistance. http://www.smartgroups.com/groups/palitrans --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "mikebrotherto" wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Hello Mike, > > > > You ask about: 1. ego/mana/conceit (I think these are the same, > > yes/no?) > > > 2. sakkaya-ditthi - personality belief > > > 3. atta - self > > > > > Christine, Sarah, and Larry, > Thank you so much for your thoughtful responses. Here is my > understanding of how the concepts relate to each other. If I am off > the mark, I would appreciate some more feedback. I have consolidated > everyone's responses including Bhante Gunaratana's and have decided on > a position that makes sense me. > > The question is: Where does the Western term "ego" fit in with the > terms mana (conceit), sakkaya-ditthi (personality belief), and atta > (self)? > > The answer: > Atta and ego must have the same meaning. They are the "umbrella" that > holds the other subsets of sakkaya ditthi and mana. > > The 20 types of personality belief - sakkaya ditthi - are certainly > related to ego, but cannot be the only definition of ego. If that were > so then, when sakkaya-ditthi - the 1st fetter - is removed when one > becomes a stream-enterer, ego would no longer be. However, Bhante > tells me that ego is mana - conceit, the 8th fetter. If that is the > case (and I have no grounds on which to dispute him) ego must still > remain until the nonreturner drops the fetter of conceit. Once conceit > is removed then there is anatta or egolessness or nonself. > > I'm comfortable with that. Ego remains until conceit flickers out but > personality belief fades away long before. Conceit fades away some > time before Arahantship. What do you think? > > Also, I need to keep up with you folks. I would like to learn Pali. > Could someone suggest an appropriate university level text (are there > any tapes for proper pronunciation) that I can use at home? > > What is the best Pali to English dictionary in your opinion? > > With metta, > > Mike Brotherton 11921 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 9:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA -Conditions op 15-03-2002 06:25 schreef johnrloganis op johnrloganis@y...: > One question. I have heard the phrase expressed in the Dhamma as > Causes - Conditions - Effects > > In western philosophy the phrasing is > Causes - Effects > > I see a difference and have my own interpretation of the > Causes - Conditions - Effects > description. I would like a better understanding of "Conditions" in > this context. Would you please elucidate or point me to a place where > that is discussed? Dear L. John, Condition is more a general notion, including many different kinds of factors influencing other dhammas in diverse ways. There are the conditioning dhammas (paccaya dhammas) and the conditioned dhammas (paccayupanna dhammas) and there are twentyfour main classes of conditions, ways by which a dhamma conditions another dhamma. We can speak of cause and result or cause and effect, but we have to know more details of the ways in which causes bring their appropriate results. I wrote about Conditions and this is available from websites (Zolag or Abhidhamma. org). It is an outline of conditions that can be an introduction to further study. Considering conditions helps to understand that realities, be they kusala or akusala choose their own time to arise, no self who could direct them. It teaches us patience too, understanding can be developed, but it cannot be forced or hastened. Best wishes from Nina. 11922 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 9:16pm Subject: India Ch 8, no. 1 India Ch 8, no 1: Chapter 8 The Cycle of Birth and Death In Lumbini we sat down for a Dhamma discussion near the pool that reminds us of the two streams of water coming down from the sky which were used as a water libation for the Bodhisatta and his mother, just after he was born. As we read in the Commentary to the ³Chronicle of Buddhas² (the ³Clarifier of Sweet Meaning²), the Bodhisatta took seven strides and, scanning all the quarters of the world, he said: ²I am chief in the world, I am best in the world, I am eldest in the world. This is the last birth, there is not now again-becoming.² We still cling to rebirth and we are very far from reaching the end of rebirth. We cling to the five khandhas that constitute what we call a ³person². One of our friends asked Acharn Sujin why the five khandhas are a burden. She was referring to the following sutta: ³The Burden² (Kindred Sayings III, Khandhå-vagga, Kindred Sayings on Elements, First Fifty, Ch 3, §22) 1. We read: Monks, I will explain to you the burden, the laying hold of the burden, the holding on to the burden, the laying down of the burden. Listen. What, monks, is the burden? ³The five khandhas of clinging² is the answer. Which five? They are the khandha of clinging to corporeality... to feelings... to perceptions... to mental formations... to consciousness. This, monks, is called ³the burden². What is the laying hold of the burden? The answer is that it is the person, the Venerable So-and-so, of such-and-such a family. This, monks, is called ³the laying hold of the burden². What is the holding on to the burden? The answer is that it is that craving which gives rise to fresh rebirth and, bound up with lust and greed, now here now there finds ever fresh delight. It is sensual craving, craving for existence, craving for non-existence. This, monks, is called ³the holding on to the burden.² What is the laying down of the burden? It is the complete fading away and extinction of this craving, its forsaking and giving up, liberation and detachment from it. This, monks, is called ³the laying down of the burden.² Thus said the Blessed One, the Wellfarere spoke thus; the Teacher then said: The five khandhas are the heavy load, The seizing of the load is man. Holding it is dukkha, Laying down the load is bliss (sukha). Laying down this heavy load, And no other taking up, By uprooting all desire, Hunger is stilled, Nibbåna is gained. Acharn Sujin said about seeing the five khandhas as a burden: ³The body, rúpakkhandha, is a burden, because we have to look after it from birth to death. Also the nåma-khandhas are a burden, but we do not consider them as a burden. We have to see and we have to hear already for countless aeons. We are not tired of seeing, it is not self. It must arise, it lasts for an extremely short while and then it must fall away, it is dukkha. Visible object impinges just for a moment on the eyesense, it is seen and then it falls away. Realities appear through the six doors very shortly and then fall away, there is nothing left. We keep on thinking on account of what is experienced through the six doors, but there is no self who thinks. There must be right understanding so that the khandhas can be seen as a burden.² So long as there is ignorance and clinging the khandhas have to arise again and again, there will be the continuation of the cycle of birth and death. The khandhas have to arise and to fall away, and thus, they are dukkha. In the above-quoted sutta it is explained that craving, the second noble Truth is the cause of dukkha and that the extinction of craving means the ceasing of dukkha. After our discussion we showed our respect to the Buddha by walking three times around in the area of the pillar erected by King Asoka. This pillar, impressive because of its simplicity, has the inscription commemorating King Asoka¹s visit: ³By His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King when he had been consecrated twenty years, having come in person and reverence having been done- inasmuch as ŒHere was born Buddha, the sage of the Såkyas¹- a stone bearing a horse was cause to be made and a stone pillar was erected. Inasmuch as ŒHere the Holy One was born,¹ the village of Lummini was released from religious cesses and required to pay one-eighth as land revenue.² One can still see the small remnant of an old statue placed on the ground next to the pillar. 11923 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 9:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory: To Suan op 14-03-2002 15:21 schreef abhidhammika op abhidhammika@y...: > > When we see Mr X, it is true that the first visual consciousness > lasts only a fleeting moment. But, to cover the whole of Mr X, the > first visual consciousness alone is not enough. There is an > uncountable number of visual consciousness cognitive series > called "cakkhuviññaanaviithi" to process Mr X. > > And each cognitive series comes with additional supportive > consciousnesses in addition to the visual consciousness. This means > that all consciousnesses within each cognitive series come with > successive emergences of memory. This also means that there emerge > countless reinforcing instances of memory to process Mr X. Dear Suan, Thank you very much for your clearly expounded post on memory. It is such a good reminder of the fact that countless processes of citta arise so rapidly one after the other, and that memory accompanies each citta performing the task of marking the object and recognizing it. As you stress, past, present and future are connected. Each citta conditions the next one by way of contiguity-condition (anantara paccaya) and in this way past experiences are carried on from the past to the present and then to the future. Your post also make me consider other conditions for memory that come into play: feelings. Pleasant and unpleasant feelings can be so strong, and what is strongly felt is remembered more vivdly. Once A. Sujin gave the following Sutta as example: Path of Discrimination, Patisambhidamagga, Treatise on Knowledge, Ch IXI, Ideas (Dhammas): § 411: Nine kinds of difference: Another factor conditioning remembrance is understanding. We may try to memorize texts, but, without understanding we forget. What we really understand we do not forget. Here we see again that different cetasikas condition one another: by conascence, sahajata, by reciproxity, a~n~nama~n~na, and by other conditions. It is all so fascinating, it is daily life. Your post was food for consideration of the Dhamma. With much appreciation, Nina. 11924 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 9:19pm Subject: Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Dear All, It was an all-day Workshop at the Hospital last Saturday.... My mind was concentrating on what was to come. A colleague sat next to me, and after the usual courtesies, looked at me quite seriously and said 'Chris, I heard you have become a Buddhist, and I wanted to ask you, What is the Purpose of Life?' And he wasn't joking. So fortunately, I didn't give my first choice of answer, 'Just getting through 'til lunchtime'. ..... He didn't seem to think 'err, umm' and 'well, that's a bit hard to answer' was sufficient. I said I was just a beginner and I really wasn't the person to ask, and wouldn't he rather I loaned him a book or two?....he would't accept reading references, he wanted to talk.......So, I launched into a rather mixed response about what suffering really was, and the Path leading to its cessation, and was saved by the facilitator starting the presentation. But, there was no escape, the questioner was back at the tea and lunch-breaks ....by the end of it, I had run through MY understanding of kamma, conditions, death, meditation, reality, and even anatta..... He wouldn't stop asking questions. Each answer brought MORE questions. (This is beginning to remind me of something....... sounds like dsg......:-)........so THIS is what vipaka in the present life is!!). I am only thankful that I had enough sense to steer clear of 'nibbana', 'no-control' and 'dependent origination'.... And I wish I'd left anatta out...... I have a feeling that the poor, confused man went away having found out that "the Buddha isn't an omnipotent God, though, yes, there possibly are some 'gods'. And, no, there is no soul, but we are each an accumulating process of good and bad tendencies and results of intentional action - sort of like information progressively stored on a computer and then forwarded (in a zip file) to a new computer (the next life) - though we don't remember previous lives (except some do...no, not me), or how we accumulated the accumulations, but you still inherit the consequences of what the zip file accumulated (fair? well, it IS fair, but most of all it just IS) - 'the same but not the same'. And, the purpose is not to live eternally, not to be annihilated at death, but to eventually not be re-born"......I think he was exhausted at that point, I know I was! Scary isn't it! ( Moral of this sad story - Be thankful that the first Buddhist you ever met was not me.) It is amazing just how little of what I 'know' is intelligible, when I'm asked to explain it. ....... I think I need help!! Are there unpleasant kammic consequences from trying to answer, and answering unskillfully? Maybe we can work out something simple and I can carry 'flash cards' or a FAQ sheet to refer to. :-) Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... metta, 11925 From: Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 4:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Directed attention to dhammas (was: The Two Truths (for Howard) (II)) (Re-sent Message) Hi, Jon - In a message dated 3/15/02 10:13:39 PM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > > > I can't give you specific references. I have heard, from many > > sources > > and repeatedly, that an ongoing practice of samatha bhavana leads to a > > general calming of the mind, not just during a jhana, by means of > > suppression > > as opposed to uprooting (which requires path consciousness). One *can* > > note > > that in DN 2, in the section immediately following the Jhanas, there is > > the > > following: > > *********************************************************** > > "With his mind thus concentrated, purified, and bright, unblemished, > > free > > from defects, pliant, malleable, steady, and attained to > > imperturbability, he > > directs and inclines it to knowledge and vision.... > ... > > **************************************************** > > > > There is also the following from Bodhi Leaves 15: > > > > **************************************************** > > Samatha Bhavana > > Samatha bhavana, the development of mental tranquillity with > > concentration, > > is accompanied by three benefits; it gives happiness in the present > > life, a > > favorable rebirth, and the freedom from mental defilements which is a > > prerequisite for attainment of insight. ... > ... > > ******************************************************* > > > > I found the above two in one minute. I'd expect that a thorough > > search > > could do much better. > > There's no argument from me on the basic merit of samatha, Howard. > Samatha bhavana is a very high degree of kuslala, well praised by the > Buddha, and expressly encouraged on occasion (to selected audiences, I > believe). It is a subject I am very interestd in, and happy to discuss > any time. > > Where we have a difference, xowever, is whether samatha bhavana was taught > as a *necessary* part of vipassana bhavana, according to a proper > understanding of the teachings. Do you have any sutta (or commentary) > texts to bring up on this very specific point (apart from the description > of Right Concentration in the explanation of the Noble Eightfold Path, > mentioned in your next post)? > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: My point is only the following: Right Concentration is one arm of the 8-fold path, and Right Concentration, defined as the first four jhanas, was advocated repeatedly. I have never read of any of the eight arms being dismissed by the Buddha as unneccesary. Some folks have written that sila, for example, is eliminable. I don't believe that either. The Buddha taught all eight steps, and never backed off from that as far as I know. ----------------------------------------------------- > > > -------------------------------------------------------- > Also,> > > I would be interested to know what you see as being the significance > of > > the 'non-reactiveness' (and what dhamma would this be, I wonder?). > ------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Non-reactiveness isn't a dhamma; it is an absence, the absence of > the > tendency to react with craving, aversion, and clinging. When we react > with > craving, aversion, clinging, and with an active sense of "I" and "mine", > the > meditative process is short-circuited. This is quite evident to those > who > meditate. Isn’t this is a slightly circular statement? If non-reactiveness is seen as the aim of meditation then, by definition, the meditative process will be seen as 'short-circuited' if craving, aversion and clinging are noticed. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't think there is any circularity here. Things are matters of degree. By calming the mind through concentration, there is less reactiveness. By suppressing the hindrances, there is less reactiveness. By means of *wisdom*, eventually all defilements are uprooted and there is then never any reactiveness. ------------------------------------------------ > > I suspect that what many people take for non-reactiveness is a subtle form > of suppression. > ------------------------------------------------- Howard I don't think it is subtle at all. Samatha bhavana suppresses the hindrances. This is nothing but suppression - no uprooting at all. -------------------------------------------------- It begins by being induced (i.e., willed) when first > > undertaken, probably because it is seen as being a useful or even > necessary step to awareness and understanding. Thus, even though with > constant practice over the years it becomes more intuitive and ingrained, > the fact that it was built on clinging and wrong view in the first place > means it remains essentially the same in nature (for obvious reasons, > though, the practitioner does not see this). > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: If the suppression were the whole story, I would agree. But the suppression of the hindrances makes even further concentration, calm and mindfulness possible, and under those conditions, investigation of dhammas can proceed effectively, wisdom can arise, and liberation result. ------------------------------------------------------ > > You imply, I think, that non-reactiveness tends to go together with an > absence of, or a reduced intensity of, a sense of self. > -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: What I maintain is that calm and (relative) non-reactiveness provide a needed basis for investigation of dhammas to lead to the arising of wisdom, and the blade of wisdom to then cut away the defilements. ------------------------------------------------------- I would question > > whether this is so. There can still be a strong (though not readily > apparent to its ‘owner’) idea of ‘self who is not reacting’. As you > point > out in your next segment (below), a sense of 'self' is an integral part of > us as we now are (and the same could also be said for craving, aversion > and clinging). Is that sense of self likely to be increased or reduced by > undertaking a program of practice that appears to bring the ‘right’ > results immediately? > ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: Any achievements *can* magnify conceit. Only wisdom removes the sense of self. If I implied otherwise, I was in error. ---------------------------------------------------- > > > ------------------------------------------------------- ... > > In any event, it is I think important to bear in mind that the 5 > > hindrances do not include the wrong view that is the 'sense of self' > (your > > post above). The significance of this should be evident. It measn > that > > the suppression of the hindrances (something that constitutes such a > > significant aspect of some people's idea of the development of the > path) > > can have no impact as regards the defilement of wrong view -- yet > wrong > > view is one of the defilements to be eradicated at the first level of > > enlightenment. > > > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, until stream-entry there is the view of "self", and until > full > enlightenment there is the sense of "self". If the absence of these were > a > requirement for progress on the path, then one would already have to be > at > stream-entry to even begin; that is, in order to get to S we'd already > have > to *be* at S - an impossibility. > -------------------------------------------------- We are in agreement here, Howard ;-)). But as I understand it, the view of self is by no means present all the time. As just one example, it does not arise with the vipaka moments that are seeing, hearing etc., nor with kusala moments (although it may of course arise immediately following such moments). Even at moments of akusala, there may or may not be an idea of self. (Some people equate conceptualising about people and things with a sense of self, but conceptualising need not involve any sense of self.) The fact that we still have a (strong) latent tendency to a view of self (or indeed to any other form of kilesa) is not an insurmountable obstacle to the arising of beginning awareness. ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I certainly agree with that. If it were an insurmountable obstacle, then liberation would be impossible. ------------------------------------------------------ > > The point in my earlier post was just this. One of the first kilesa to be > eradicated, ie., to be directly and fully known as it really is, is this > wrong view of self. The argument that kilesas need to be suppressed in > order for awareness or understanding to be developed seems to ignore the > fact that the wrong view of self is not suppressed when the hindrances > are, and yet it is among the first of the kilesas to be known as they > really are. > > Jon > ============================ With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11926 From: Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 4:38pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Kkandhas and realities (Re-sent message) Hi, Jon - In a message dated 3/15/02 10:39:57 PM Eastern Standard Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > > Howard > > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > > > In a message dated 3/9/02 3:15:40 AM Eastern Standard Time, > > jonoabb@y... writes: > > > > > > > According to the teachings, the present moment comprises different > > > realities (dhammas) which are either namas or rupas, where namas are > > > realities that experience an object and rupas are realities that are > > not > > > capable of experiencing an object. > > > > > > These realities are called 'ultimate' realities ('paramattha' dhammas) > > > because they are irreducible i.e., incapable of being broken down into > > any > > > further component part. > > > > > ============================ > > This is certainly correct. But because of frequent > > misunderstanding of > > the Theravadin position, I think that it is always useful to point out > > that > > while the paramattha dhammas are irreducible, they are not independent, > > depending as they do on each other, with a mutual dependence between > > vi~n~nana and namarupa, with various inredependencies among the > > cetasikas > > within a given mind-moment, and with dependencies holding between > > earlier and > > later mind-moments. Thus even the paramattha dhammas are not independent > > > > self-existent units, but are things-in relation, arisen dependently, and > > > > impermanent. > > > > With metta, > > Howard > > Thanks for these comments. I appreciate your pointing out things that > might be helpful to someone coming from a different dhamma background. > > I think that when you say 'not independent' you mean 'conditioned', and > that your references to mutual dependence etc can be read accordingly. If > so, I think I would agree with your comments here, with the possible > exception of the reference to 'not self-existent units' – I was not sure > exactly what quality or attribute this refers to. > ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: The key term here is "self-existent", by which I mean "independent" or "unconditioned". -------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks again, Howard. > > Jon > > ======================== With metta, Howard 11927 From: Sarah Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 9:40pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Time Dear Kom, KKT , Purnomo and all, --- Kom Tukovinit wrote > ........... A dhamma exists only for an > infinitesmally small amount of time. The past dhamma has > already fallen away (no longer exists), and the future > dhamma has not yet arisen (has not come to be). On the > other hand, if a dhamma has risen and already fallen away > (it does no longer exist), do we deny that it has never > existed? Obviously not. Furthermore, in the abhidhamma > model, realities that no longer exist (like kamma, for > example), can condition the realities that are arisign now. > Does that kamma exist or not exist? I hope other people > would contribute clearer thoughts to this point. > ********** In the Kathavathu, Points of Controversy (an Abhidhamma Text), there is a very helpful section on Time. I’ll just add a few selected quotes as there is far too much to quote in full: From “To Purge (Abstract time) Ideas.” 2 “Again, taking all in terms of time, you affirm that the past exists, the future exists, the present exists. but is not the past (something that has) ceased - that is, departed, changed, gone away, utterly away? How then can you say ‘the past exists’? Again, is not the future (something that is ) not yet born, not yet come to be, not yet come to pass, has not happened, not befallen, is not manifested? How then can you say ‘the future exists’?” 7. “If you assert that the material aggregate (rupa) retains its materiality, you must admit that the material aggregate is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. You know the opposite is true; hence it should not be said that materiality is retained. 8. Nibbana does not abandon its state as Nibbana - by this we mean Nibbana is permanent, persistent, eternal, not subject to change. And you ought to mean this, too, in the case of material-aggregate, if you say the latter does not abandon its materiality.” ********** Actually, there is a lot of deep and interesting discussion which continues. I can perhaps add more if anyone requests. Under “Time and Space” in Mrs Rhys David’s Appendix to the Kathavatthu, she writes: “In the Abhidhaanappadiipika-suuci time is defined under three aspects;- '1. ‘time is a concept by which the terms of life, etc, are counted or reckoned. 2..’time is that “passing by” reckoned as “so much has pased,” etc 3; ‘time is eventuation or happening, there being no such thing as time exempt from events.’ 'The second aspect refers to the fact of change or impermanence; the third brings up the fact of perpetual becoming.(mahaa-kaala)........ 'Now it is clear from the Kathavathu that, for Buddhism, time-distinctions have no objective existence of their own, and that reality is confined to the present. The past reality has perished; the future reality is not yet become......... '....In Ledi Sayadaw’s words: “As in our present state there is, so in our past has there been, so in the future will there be, just a succession of purely phenomenal happenings, proceedings, consisting solely of arisings and ceasings, hard to discern...because the procedure is ever obscured by our notion of continuity.” .. 'Thus they who have not penetrated reality ‘see only a continuous and static condition in these phenomena.’ ‘...the laws or principles discernible in these mental continua of the citta-niyaama are, according to Buddhist philosophy, five of the twenty-four causal relations (paccayaa), to wit, ‘contiguity,’ immediate contiguity (in time), absence, abeyance, sufficing condition. Explained without such technicalities, the past state, albeit it is absent, gone, has become wrought up into its immediate successor, the present state, as a new whole. These five are compared to the five strands of a thread on which are strung the pearls of a necklace. but each indivisible whole was real only while it lasted.” *********** This is just a taste of some of the material contained in this PTS text. Let me add one more quote from the first text section and KKT, I hope it will now be apparent why there can be no storehouse: 59. S (other sect): - "Is it wrong to say ‘the past exists,’ ‘the future exists’? 'Th. - Yes. 'S. -But was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘Whatsoever material quality, bhikkhus, whether past, future, or present, is either internal or external, gross or subtle, common or excellent, distant or near, is called the material aggregate. Whatsoever feeling......?” MN,iii.16f 'S:Surely then the past exists, the future exists. 'Th. - But was it not said by the Exalted One: ‘These three modes in word, term, or name, bhikkhus, which have been distinct in the past, are now distinct, and will be distinct, are not condemmed by recluses and brahmins who are wise. Which three? 1) That material aggregated which is past, which has ceased, which is changed, is reckoned, termed, named “has been”; it is not reckoned as “exists”, nor as “will be”. And so for the aggregates of feeling........ 2) That material aggregate which is not yet born, and which has not appeared, is reckoned, termed, named “will be” , but is not reckoned as “exists” nor as “has been”.......3) that material body which has come to birth, has appeared, is reckoned, termed, named “exists”, but is not reckoned as “has been”, nor as “will be”......Verily these three modes in word, term, or name, bhikkhus, are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are not, will not, be condemned by recluses and brahmins who are wise.” ********** I was reading several of the controversies contained in this text at the weekend. So many of the topics (which were all raised by different Sects before the 3rd Council, I believe) are just the same as the topics we discuss on dsg. This is a new edition (2001) of this 5th book of the Abhidhamma, and I think many of you would find it interesting, especially perhaps, those from a Mahayana background. There is also a long introduction on the various Sects, but I get quite confused and prefer reading the text itself. I’ll try to give more quotes if appropriate. Sarah ================================= 11928 From: christine_forsyth Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 9:55pm Subject: Beginners Abhidhamma Study Group Dear Beginners Group and All, I'm not clear about how we agreed to do this..... but I think it is becoming evident that we all have different learning styles..... So could we re-visit the timetable? As there are 24 Chapters in the book, is it reasonable to allow one week per chapter, moving on to the next chapter each Saturday, but allowing questions to be posted about past chapters at any time? I am sure new questions will occur several weeks or even months after moving further through the book. This way the book will only take six months to read. I think my attention might wander if it takes any longer! :-) And could the subject heading of posts clearly show "Ch1 ADL Beginners Abhidhamma Study" or "Ch22 ADL Beginners Abhidhamma Study" so that those who wish to can easily follow the threads for different chapters? What do you reckon? metta, Christine 11929 From: Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 5:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ayatanas again Dear Nina, <> :):):) please always do not hesitate to drop in. I am always appreciated your input. <> Thanks Nina. I agree that we have to look at the context of the teaching and also who are the audiences in the discourse. Yes, I always amaze by how the Buddha gave such details in various aspects of dhamma. It's really amazing. Some terms are synonymous, some have close meaning but slightly different. Dhamma is really hard to really see and understand. I think that why the Buddha gave the discourse in multiple aspects, to help us be able to see and understand better. I usually like to step back and look at the whole picture. As I mentioned before that at times I got carried away by the detail and stories in pratipitaka. I usually like to analyze thing in detail and then re-synthesize it back. Well, the whole is not equal the sum of its parts (like in chariot analogy). To me there are some common aspects in 6 dvara, 6 arammana, 6 vatthu, 5 khandha, 18 dhatu, 12 ayatana, 12 links of the paticcasamuppada, 22 indriya, 24 paccaya and 4 ariyasacca. Yes, I agree there are some differences between each of them, depends on the context and references. But they point to same direction, to trilakana: anicca-dukka-anatta. As far as I can get it, nothing is static, they all depend on relations and conditions, internally and externally. <> I like the way you put the various aspects of these in Ch 16, 17 and 18. As I said before, I always get something new every time I reread the text. Yes, I see that when I back-cross between ayatana, dhatu, arammana, internal-external objects, it does not completely fit or complement each other. I think that it is a good mental exercise and it is very helpful to see the differences. <> Did you mean that to know citta or cetasika of other does not mean to know just by concept (pannatti)? I agree that citta or feeling of other can bring us back to present reality. The reason I referred to satipatthana sutta because I tried to make a point that citta and cetasika of other (as paramattha) can be an arammana of another person, the same to our own previous citta. <> Yes, I will try to do that. My aunt told me that in the archive of the lecturer discussion, there are some topics related to the ayatana questions as well. Have you got it from K.Duangdeun? <> Yes, I completely agree. Each sutta is very deep and rich in hidden treasure, both literally and semantically. Is 108 from 6 dvara, 3 kinds of vedana (sukkha, dukkha and neutral), 3 tense (past-present-future), 2 locations (internal and external)? Hope to hear more about the meaning of this sutta then. I have never listened to Telmann's composition. I enjoy listening to music a lot. Ohoh, everybody is on a run now !!!! Better go to bed. Bon nuit. Appreciate, Num. 11930 From: Mike Brotherton Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 10:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Christine, Thanks so much for the info. I'm on the case. Last week in our Bhante Gunarantara was asked "What is the Purpose of Life?" He simply replied that our purpose in this life is "to liberate ourselves from all suffering". Then he went on to the next question. Mike B. christine_forsyth wrote: > Dear All, > > It was an all-day Workshop at the Hospital last Saturday.... My mind > was concentrating on what was to come. A colleague sat next to me, > and after the usual courtesies, looked at me quite seriously and > said 'Chris, I heard you have become a Buddhist, and I wanted to ask > you, What is the Purpose of Life?' And he wasn't joking. So > fortunately, I didn't give my first choice of answer, 'Just getting > through 'til lunchtime'. > ..... He didn't seem to think 'err, umm' and 'well, that's a bit hard > to answer' was sufficient. I said I was just a beginner and I really > wasn't the person to ask, and wouldn't he rather I loaned him a book > or two?....he would't accept reading references, he wanted to > talk.......So, I launched into a rather mixed response about what > suffering really was, and the Path leading to its cessation, and was > saved by the facilitator starting the presentation. > But, there was no escape, the questioner was back at the tea and > lunch-breaks ....by the end of it, I had run through MY understanding > of kamma, conditions, death, meditation, reality, and even > anatta..... He wouldn't stop asking questions. Each answer brought > MORE questions. (This is beginning to remind me of something....... > sounds like dsg......:-)........so THIS is what vipaka in the present > life is!!). I am only thankful that I had enough sense to steer > clear of 'nibbana', 'no-control' and 'dependent origination'.... And > I wish I'd left anatta out...... > I have a feeling that the poor, confused man went away having > found out that "the Buddha isn't an omnipotent God, though, yes, > there possibly are some 'gods'. And, no, there is no soul, but we > are each an accumulating process of good and bad tendencies and > results of intentional action - sort of like information > progressively stored on a computer and then forwarded (in a zip > file) to a new computer (the next life) - though we don't remember > previous lives (except some do...no, not me), or how we accumulated > the accumulations, but you still inherit the consequences of what the > zip file accumulated (fair? well, it IS fair, but most of all it just > IS) - 'the same but not the same'. And, the purpose is not to live > eternally, not to be annihilated at death, but to eventually not be > re-born"......I think he was exhausted at that point, I know I > was! Scary isn't it! > ( Moral of this sad story - Be thankful that the first Buddhist you > ever met was not me.) > It is amazing just how little of what I 'know' is intelligible, when > I'm asked to explain it. ....... I think I need help!! > Are there unpleasant kammic consequences from trying to answer, and > answering unskillfully? Maybe we can work out something simple and > I can carry 'flash cards' or a FAQ sheet to refer to. :-) > Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... > > metta, > > > 11931 From: Sarah Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 10:54pm Subject: RE: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1: Commentaries from Sammohavinodani Dear Kom, Nina and All, Kom wrote: >Even after hearing this again and again, we (I) still always seem to have lingering thoughts that we can exercise powers over these realities. I want to have kusala states. I want to have sati. I want to have more/sharper panna, and I can make this happen. I don't think I can ever hear this enough!< You both mentioned that you appreciated the quotes from the Sammohavinodani (Dispeller), Commentary to the Vibhanga (2nd Book of the Abhidhamma). Actually the quote comes under the Section on Ayatanas (bases) as you know. I skipped some parts to save typing (rather late, before) and because I was stressing those parts relevant to the points on anatta and control. I’d like to quote an excellent section which elaborates on anicca, dukkha and anatta and precedes the other one.(This actually follows the wonderful analogy to the internal bases as the ‘empty village’ and the external bases as the ‘village-raiding robbers’). I think that from this quote, followed by a repetition of the last one in which I’ll include the missing parts, any lingering questions will be clarified, Kom. Please let us know if not. Many thanks, Nina for your comments too. Christine, there is more on ‘powerlessness’ for you here ;-) For others, apologies for a rather long quote now.....;-) ********** From ‘Classification of Bases’, (b) Impermanence etc, 230ff “Now in order to point out their aspect to be seen by insight he said: Cakkhu.m anicca.m (“Eye is impermanent”) and so on. Herein, in the first place the eye should be understood as imprmanent in the sense of absence after having become. It is also impermanent for four other reasons, (namely,) because of being possessed of rise and fall, because of change (vipari.naama), because of temporariness (taavakaalika) and because of exclusion of permanence (niccapa.tikkhepa). In itself it is suffering (dukkha) in the sense of oppressing. Or because this being arisen reaches presence (.thitti) and during presence grows old and worn out and on reaching old age breaks up, therefore it is suffering for these four reasons, (namely) because of constantly oppressing, because of being borne with difficulty (dukkhama), because of having suffering as its basis and because of exclusion of pleasure. But it is no-self (anattaa) in the sense of powerlessnes. Or because there is no exercise of power in these three instances, (namely) “this being arisen, let it not reach presence; having reached presence, let it not grow old; having grown old, let it not break up”; and it is void of this quality of having power exercised over it (vasavattana). Therefore it is no-self for these four reasons, (namely) because it is void, because it has no owner, because of not behaving as desired (akaamakaariya) (and) because of exclusion of self. It is subject to change because of having non-existence as its destiny, because of successively going by way of the transition from existence to existence and because of abandoning its original nature. This is only a synonym for the impermanent. As regards ruupaa aniccaa (“visible date are impermanent’) and so on, too, the method is the same............... ........But what is taught by the Tathaagata in this suttanta Division? The characteristic of no-self in the twelve bases. For the fully Englightened One, when teaching the characteristic of no-self, teaches it by means of the impermanent, or by means of suffering, or by means of (both) the impermanent and suffering.” ********** This section is followed by Sutta examples from Miii282 and Siii67 in which anatta is taught first by means of the imprmanent and then by means of suffering. These are followed by the ones I quoted before. This time I’ll try to correct my typos and fill in missing parts you asked about: .......... Ch2, 240 “In such passages as : “Materiality, bhikkhus, is impermanent; what is impermanent is painful; what is painful is not self; what is not self, that is not mine, that am I not, that is not my self” (Siii 82), he taught the characteristic of no-self by means of both the impermanent and suffering. Why? Because of the obviousness of impermanence and suffering. For when a plate or a saucer or whatever it may be falls from the hand and breaks, they say: ‘Ah! Impermanence,’ thus impermanence is obvious. But as regards the person (attabhaava), when boils and carbuncles and the like have sprung up, or when pierced by splinters and thorns, etc, they say: ‘Ah! The pain.’ thus pain is obvious. The characteristic of no-self is unobvious, dark, unclear, dificult to penetrate, difficult to illustrate, difficult to make known. The characteristics of impermanence and pain are made known with or without the arising of the Tathagatas. The characteristic of no-self is not made known without the arising of the Englightened Ones; it is made known only on the arising of the Enlightened ones. For such wanderers and ascetics (taapasa) as the master Sarabhanga are mighty and powerful and are able to express “the impermanent and painful”: (but) they are unable to express “no-self”. For if they were able to express “no-self” in a present assembly there would be penetration of path and fruition in the present assembly..For the making known of the characteristic of no-self is not the province of anyone else; it is the province of the Fully Enlightened Ones only. Thus the characteristic of no-self is unobvious..That is why the Master, when teaching the characteristic of no-self, taught it by means of impermanence or by means of pain or by means of both impermanence and pain. But here it should be understood that he taught it by means of both impermanence and pain. But it is owing to not keeping what in mind, owing to non-penetration of what and owing to concealment by what that these characteristics do not appear?..Firstly the characteristic of impermanence does not appear owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating rise and fall owing to its being concealed by continuity (santati). The characteristic of pain does not appear owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating continuous oppression and owing to its being concealed by the postures (iriyaapatha)..The characteristic of no-self does not appear owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating the resolution into the various elements (naanaadhaatu-vinibbhoga) owing to its being concealed by compactness..But when continuity is dissected by laying hold of rise and fall, the characteristic of impermanence appears in accordance with its true essential nature. When the postures are exposed (ugghaa.tita) by keeping in mind continual oppression, the characteristic of pain appears in accordance with its true essential nature..When resolving of the compact (ghanavinibboga) is effected by resolution into the various elements, the characteristic of no-self appears in accordance with its true essential nature. And here the following difference should be understood: impermanence and the characteristic of impermanence, pain and the characteristic of pain, no-self and the characteristic of no-self. Herein, the five aggregates (pa~ncakhandha) are impermanent. Why? Because they rise and fall and change, or because of their absence after having been. Rise and fall and change are the characteristic of impermanence, or mode of alteration (aakaaravikaara) called absence after having been. But those same five aggregates are painful because of the words “what is impermanent is painful” (S iv 1). Why? Because of continual oppression. the mode of being continually oppressed is the characteristic of pain. But those five aggregates are no-self because of the words “what is painful is no-self” (S iv 1). Why? Because there is no exercising power over them. The mode of insusceptibility to having power exercised over them is the characteristic of no-self. That is why the impermanent, the painful and the no-self are one thing and the characteristics of impermanence, pain and no-self are another. For that which consists of the five aggregates, the twelve bases, the eighteeen elements is allimpermanent, painful and no-self; the modes of alteration of the kind aforesaid are the characteristics of impermanence, pain and no-self. But here in brief. ten bases are of the sense sphere; two are of three planes. But the procedure of comprehension (sammasanacaaro; cf Vis 607, 609,6d11) should be understood to be expounded in respect of all.”. **************** Hope it’s clearer, Kom and many thanks for yours and Nina’s comments. Would you kindly let us know if you still have comments/questions which still haven’t been addressed as they’re always helpful to consider further. Sarah ============================================= 11932 From: Sarah Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 11:04pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginners Abhidhamma Study Group Dear Chris, Lucy & Larry, --- christine_forsyth wrote > And could the subject heading of posts clearly show "Ch1 ADL > Beginners Abhidhamma Study" or "Ch22 ADL Beginners Abhidhamma Study" > so that those who wish to can easily follow the threads for different > chapters? This sounds sensible. I had an off-list queery about what ADL was, so as people tend to drop in and out on dsg at different times, perhaps each time a new chapter or segement is posted, it would be a good idea-- at the top or bottom-- to give a repeat announcement about what ADL stands for, links to one or more websites to find it and a link to Lucy's very helpful new folder with extracts to date in the files section at:http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ to save confusion for those just joining. I'll leave you all to set your own pace.... With many thanks, Sarah 11933 From: Sarah Date: Sun Mar 17, 2002 11:38pm Subject: Sri lanka, USA, OZ All, 1.Sri Lanka We have just had it confirmed that K.Sujin and a very large number group from Bkk will be goin on a tour in Sri lanka for 5 days only from 10th June. They’ll be visiting Anuradhapura, Polunnaruwa (see Gayan’s photo in album). Sigiriya, Kandy and Colombo mainly. Jon and I are planning to join. For those of you (Gayan?, Ranil?, Sumane? anyone else?) in Colombo or able to get to Colombo on 14th June (Friday ), K.Sujin said this would be the best chance for an English discussion with you. Of course we’d love to meet you all. Let’s liaise off-list and hopefully I’ll be able to tell you where we’re staying before we leave. I’ve just this moment been faxed details. If anyone would like these, pls send me a fax number off-list. 2.USA K.Sujin (and group) will also be joining a tour in the US organised by Jack in September. Most the tour will be in Thai, but if anyone would like to have the details, please ask Kom (off-list). For anyone close to San Francisco, New York or Toronto, they’ll be passing through and I’m sure if you’re interested, Jack will try to arrange an English informal discussion in these places. Maybe Kom, you could mention the relevant dates here (sorry I don’t have them handy) and help anyone coordinate. It's unlikely we'll be able to join I think. 3. Oz Just an idea only.....we are thinking of spending a week in somewhere like Noosa (Qld) in July/Aug to combine dhamma, surf and bush-walking.....Pls let us know off-list if you’d be interested to join us there and any dates that would be/wouldn’t be possible. Sarah =========== _______________ 11934 From: christine_forsyth Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 0:10am Subject: Ch 2 ADL Beginners Abhidhamma Study Dear All, {Dear Beginners' Group: Please don't think I am pre-empting any decision by the group on 'when' to post 'what'. Still waiting for your discussion on when to start the new chapter.....It's just that I couldn't resist asking a bit about this topic.} Nina, how interesting this Chapter is for me! Vedanakkhanda - the bane of my life....... So much to explore here.... It's not the reading of the ADL chapters that takes the time - it is all the by-ways and lanes that are wandered down to follow-up other thoughts and references raised by the subject-matter in ADL.. So, just a few questions on Vedanna in this post ...... In following up Kindred sayings about Feelings in the Salayatana-vaga at Access to Insight http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/index.html#Salayatana it was sort of comforting to find (from the many, many suttas there), that my awareness of just how powerful the influence of emotions is on my life, must also be an awareness widely experienced by others. I don't usually speak aloud when I'm by myself - but this next paragraph (p.18) caused me to comment "That's true, that's absolutely true!" "If we know about different ways of classifying feelings it will help us to realize that feeling is only a mental phenomenon which arises because of conditions. We are inclined to cling to the feeling which has fallen away instead of being aware of the reality of the present moment as it appears through eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body-sense or mind. In the passage of the 'Visuddhimagga' which was quoted above (XX. 96) nama and rupa are compared to the sound of a lute which does not come from any 'store' when it arises, nor goes in any direction when it ceases, nor persists as a 'store' when it has ceased. However, we cling so much to feelings that we do not realize that the feeling which has fallen away does not exist any more, that it has ceased completely. Vedanakkhandha (feeling) is impermanent." According to Nyanatiloka Mahatheras' Buddist Dictionary: http://www.budsas.org/ebud/bud-dict/dic_idx.htm "upádána: 'clinging', according to Vis.M. XVII, is an intensified degree of craving (tanhá, q.v.). The 4 kinds of clinging are: sensuous clinging (kámupádána), clinging to views (ditthupádána), clinging to mere rules and ritual (sílabbatupádána), clinging to the personaljty-belief (atta-vádupádána)." If experiencing dislike, annoyance, envy, resentment or any other (usually unpleasant) feeling - dwelling on it and going over and over the circumstances, and telling sympathetic others about it, makes it seem as if it is one giant extended feeling lasting hours, what is actually happening? clinging causing multiple recurrences of the feeling?........ I don't seem to have such a 'skill' with pleasant feelings :-) Perhaps I am not understanding what relationship 'clinging' has to 'no control'........ Isn't 'clinging' implying some sort of control - of grasping attention making the feeling re-arise so we take it to be continuous?..... It took me a long while, and many patient explanations, to accept that others didn't 'cause' my bad feelings and actions, or control their own, that they simply arose because of conditions. It is not so clear to me from the dictionary .... Would clinging to vedanakkhandha be 'sensuous clinging'? I seem to have always associated sensuous clinging with desire and attachment. But is being sunk in loss and grief also really clinging to feelings? Compared to dislike, annoyance, envy, resentment - sorrow and grief have often been regarded as 'worthy and noble' emotions.....though I know within Buddhism they are seen as 'unskillful'. metta, Christine ___________________________________________________________ ADL = "Abhidhamma in Daily Life" by Nina van Gorkom Extracts from previous posts at:http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ The Book is on-line at: http://www.abhidhamma.org/abhid.html http://www.dhammastudy.com/abhid.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/adlfinal.pdf ___________________________________________________________ 11935 From: rikpa21 Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 3:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] Directed attention to dhammas (was: The Two Truths (for Howard) (II)) Hey Howard (grat to see you on dhamma-l too BTW, where we can still get the benefit of the wisdom of the incomparable Richard Hayes), Just a couple of comments... > Howard: > My point is only the following: Right Concentration is one arm of the > 8-fold path, and Right Concentration, defined as the first four jhanas, was > advocated repeatedly. I have never read of any of the eight arms being > dismissed by the Buddha as unneccesary. Some folks have written that sila, > for example, is eliminable. I don't believe that either. The Buddha taught > all eight steps, and never backed off from that as far as I know. Nor as far as I know. In fact, the Buddha repeatedly mentioned that liberation is obtained through this eightfold path. Not sevenfold. Nor fivefold. Nor singular. But rather the path comprises the necessary elements determined by the omniscient mind of the Buddha to lead to the cessation of dukkha. You can build what appears to be a perfect automobile, but if you forget some element, like the carbueretor, the crankshaft, whatever, you have a nice showroom piece you can ogle; but you won't have anything that gets you from point A (suffering) to point B (kilesa nirodha). The Eighfold path contains all the essential components to do just that: "And what is the noble truth of the path of practice leading to the cessation of stress? Just this very noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration." "And what is right concentration? There is the case where a monk -- quite withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful (mental) qualities -- enters & remains in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. With the stilling of directed thought & evaluation, he enters & remains in the second jhana: rapture & pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free from directed thought & evaluation -- internal assurance. With the fading of rapture he remains in equanimity, mindful & alert, physically sensitive of pleasure. He enters & remains in the third jhana, of which the Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous & mindful, he has a pleasurable abiding.' With the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither pleasure nor pain. This is called right concentration. That these passages should generate such controversy is hard for me to swallow. Certainly there is no denial of the need for just this from my Tibetan or Zen or Theravada teachers. On this they all agree completely. So what gives here in DSG? So then, to be direct, why is what's stated plainly here such a problem for some here in DSG? Why? Who's more likely to be on the mark? The one who actually takes what the Buddha taught directly and applies it as instructed to the point of gnosis, or those who argue over whether or not concentration to the degree SPECIFICALLY taught by the Buddha in everyone's favorite Sutta (Maha Satipatthana) is necessary? If I had to lay my bets on what's accurate Dhamma, I'd lay it on the words reputed to be PLAINLY spoken by the Buddha (how ambiguous is the section on right concentration--it's obviously jhana!), not on interpretations of those who do not give these teachings their proper due (by actually putting them into practice, which would reveal just how effective these tools are, by the way). If I could be sure in some way, through some sort of clear evidence that some of the methods advocated here in DSG led to gnosis you'd see no quarrel from me. I am open to all kinds of methods that can lead to understanding and cessation of suffering after thorough investigation. After months of careful sifting, testing, trying out, listening, reflecting, I only have more questions now than I ever have whether some of the methods advocated here lead to gnosis and liberation, or someplace else. Rather than feeling like I'm hearing the Dhamma I feel like I'm hearing something that sounds, due to its complexity and intellectual subtlety--what sounds very close to the Dhamma. But in my gut I can't shake the feeling that it is just off enough to miss the mark, the spirit, the essence, if you will, of the intent and meaning the Buddha was trying to transmit. As one Zen master said, to miss by the distance of a hair is to miss by the distance of heaven and earth. And I know them's fightin' words for some, perhaps, but I feel a need to say things as I see them. And anyway, this is just one nobody's opinion, so it's of no real importance anyway. > Howard: > If the suppression were the whole story, I would agree. But the > suppression of the hindrances makes even further concentration, calm and > mindfulness possible, and under those conditions, investigation of dhammas > can proceed effectively, wisdom can arise, and liberation result. Sadhu! Sadhu! Sadhu! Off in the corner, Mister Bojangles is strummin' his seven-stringed lute in perfect pitch. 11936 From: abhidhammika Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 5:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory: To Nina Dear Nina How are you? You wrote: "Your post also make me consider other conditions for memory that come into play: feelings. Pleasant and unpleasant feelings can be so strong, and what is strongly felt is remembered more vivdly." That is very true. There are many many different memory aids for our consciousness and memory to deal with the past events that long vanished. Yet, many people want to use memory as a loophole to attack the key features of Buddhism which are impermanence (immediate vanishment of phenomena or their momentariness) and selflessness. Thank you for your additional information and discussion on memory. With regards, Suan --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom wrote: > op 14-03-2002 15:21 schreef abhidhammika op abhidhammika@y...: > > > > When we see Mr X, it is true that the first visual consciousness > > lasts only a fleeting moment. But, to cover the whole of Mr X, the > > first visual consciousness alone is not enough. There is an > > uncountable number of visual consciousness cognitive series > > called "cakkhuviññaanaviithi" to process Mr X. > > > > And each cognitive series comes with additional supportive > > consciousnesses in addition to the visual consciousness. This means > > that all consciousnesses within each cognitive series come with > > successive emergences of memory. This also means that there emerge > > countless reinforcing instances of memory to process Mr X. > > Dear Suan, > Thank you very much for your clearly expounded post on memory. It is such a > good reminder of the fact that countless processes of citta arise so rapidly > one after the other, and that memory accompanies each citta performing the > task of marking the object and recognizing it. As you stress, past, present > and future are connected. Each citta conditions the next one by way of > contiguity-condition (anantara paccaya) and in this way past experiences are > carried on from the past to the present and then to the future. Your post > also make me consider other conditions for memory that come into play: > feelings. Pleasant and unpleasant feelings can be so strong, and what is > strongly felt is remembered more vivdly. Once A. Sujin gave the following > Sutta as example: Path of Discrimination, Patisambhidamagga, Treatise on > Knowledge, Ch IXI, Ideas (Dhammas): § 411: Nine kinds of difference: > arises. Due to difference of contact difference of feeling arises. Due to > difference of feeling difference of perception (sa~n~naa, remembrance or > memory) arises. Due to difference of perception difference of thinking > arises. Due to difference of thinking difference of zeal (chanda) arises. > Due to difference of zeal difference of anguish arises. Due to difference of > anguish difference of search arises. Due to difference of search difference > of gain arises.> > Another factor conditioning remembrance is understanding. We may try to > memorize texts, but, without understanding we forget. What we really > understand we do not forget. Here we see again that different cetasikas > condition one another: by conascence, sahajata, by reciproxity, > a~n~nama~n~na, and by other conditions. > It is all so fascinating, it is daily life. Your post was food for > consideration of the Dhamma. > With much appreciation, > Nina. 11937 From: Sarah Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 5:46am Subject: Re: [dsg] Time Dear Stegan, Welcome to dsg. I hadn't seen your post when I quoted on Time earlier. > --------------------------- > As pertaining to this Sutta: > "There are 3 characteristics of what is conditioned (sankhatassa > lakkhana): an arising (uppado) is apparent, a passing away (vayo) is > apparent, a change in the existing (thitassa annathattam: Com. = ageing) > is apparent" ;Anguttara Nikaya III, 47-- > > Question is, is there "a change in the existing" as pertaining to a > single > citta? I'd like to leave it to Kom as it was a post of his that encouraged you to send a post, but let me say it's a good reference and question. As your quote suggests, I understand there is always a change in all these characteristics of every reality (paramattha dhamma) with the exception of nibbana, of course. The Visuddhimagga also gives more detail on these 3 phases. (Sorry, refs aren't to hand) Stegan, it's apparent that you've really considered the dhamma very carefully. I really look f/w to hearing more from you and would be very interested to hear anything about your background if and when you care to share. Sarah ===== p.s Dan 'n Erik, good to see your both on the scene too;-) 11938 From: azita gill Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 6:18am Subject: Re: [dsg] Sri lanka, USA, OZ --- Sarah wrote: > All, > > > in somewhere like > Noosa (Qld) in July/Aug to combine dhamma, surf and > bush-walking.....Pls > let us know off-list if you’d be interested to join > us there and any dates > that would be/wouldn’t be possible. > > Sarah > =========== > _______________ > This one I could make! Couldn't give dates a at this stage but would certainly be able to attend. To precious to miss. Want to write more but have just returned home from work [midnight], and need some sleep. I could round up a few more dhamma friends. a catcha Azita. > 11939 From: Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 1:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Hi, Mike and Christine - In a message dated 3/18/02 1:35:16 AM Eastern Standard Time, mike@p... writes: > Christine, > > Thanks so much for the info. I'm on the case. > > Last week in our Bhante Gunarantara was asked "What is the Purpose of > Life?" > He simply replied that our purpose in this life is "to liberate ourselves > from all suffering". > Then he went on to the next question. > Mike B. > ============================ I think Bhante G's answer was fine, because it pointed to what was important. I might have added that the "purpose" of something presumes a creator of that thing who had that purpose in mind. The "purpose" of a chair is its intended use, namely sitting, and that is what the designer had in mind (primarily). In that sense, one's life does not have a purpose - or better, it has a multiplicity of purposes, inasmuch as it is a joint creation of the kamma of many beings, but especially of one's own kamma. The ultimate *goal* (paramattha?) of one's life, however, ought to be the transcending all mundane purposes and conditions which is the supermundane cessation of nibbana and the end of suffering. Bhante G was more succinct, hey? ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11940 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) op 15-03-2002 22:29 schreef Victor Yu op victoryu@s...: >> >Victor quotes: The more we know different nåmas and >> rúpas by experiencing their characteristics, the more will we see >> that "self" is only a concept; it is not a paramattha dhamma >> (absolute or ultimate reality). > >Victor: Concept is not self. > Hello Victor, very good. In India we discussed this with A. Sujin, and we were wondering about this. We can say of realities that they are impermanent, dukkha and anatta, but A. Sujin said, Now this may seem in contradiction with what I wrote above: self is only a concept, but I mean here: we form up just an idea that seeing or hearing are self, I see, I hear, but this I is not reality. This idea of self is not a paramattha dhamma. In this context I can say: self is only a concept. But you may not find this logical thinking, I am afraid :) . Nina. 11941 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 0:03pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Time Dear Sarah, I found the quotes to be most helpful. > -----Original Message----- > From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...] > Actually, there is a lot of deep and interesting discussion which > continues. I can perhaps add more if anyone requests. I wouldn't mind if you add more, if it is not too taxing on your time! kom 11942 From: Kom Tukovinit Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 1:07pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Time Dear Stegan, First of all, welcome to DSG. Thanks for the correction/reminder about the "unchangeable" part. > -----Original Message----- > From: Bodhi2500@a... [mailto:Bodhi2500@a...] > ---------------------------- > >Kom writes > >In the Buddha's teaching (I believe), nothing is really changed (each > reality has its > >own unchangeable, uncontrollable characteristics), but it is > >replaced by something else that is similar in characteristics. > --------------------------- > As pertaining to this Sutta: > "There are 3 characteristics of what is conditioned (sankhatassa > lakkhana): an arising (uppado) is apparent, a passing away (vayo) is > apparent, a change in the existing (thitassa annathattam: Com. = ageing) > is apparent" ;Anguttara Nikaya III, 47-- > > Question is, is there "a change in the existing" as pertaining > to a single > citta? > When I said unchangeable, what it should be interpreted is that it is what it is, nothing can change what it is to something else that it isn't. Sarah posted a quote from Abhidhamma that says that once a dhamma has arisen, nobody can change it by wishing that it doesn't arise, or wishing that it doesn't fall away. Dhamma is what it is because of conditions. On the other hand, does a dhamma differ in its minute characterstics over its very short lifetime? For materiality, this is conceptually obvious, because of the 4 age-related characteristics of arising, developing, deteriorating, and falling away. These are the 4 minute characteristics of a sabhava (lasting 17 citta moments) rupa over its lifetime. For mentality, it is conceptually less obvious. However, as you quoted, the characteristic of the dhamma falling away (a characteristic penetrated by vipassana nana) must be observable (I think), otherwise, it would be impossible that the vipassana nana can penetrate the chracteristic. kom 11943 From: Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 9:47am Subject: Re:[dsg] "unpleasant words" <> Dear Dan, I asked myself the same question before. Rupa is always avayakata and as you mention the vedana of cakkhu-, sota-, gantha- and jiha-vinnana is always upekkha both in kusala and akusala vipaka moment. Only somanassa and upekkha (not domanassa) can be vipaka-jati in panca- and manodvara-vithi (I mean not during the javana moment) as in satirana- and tadalampana-moment. Somanassa can also be in kiriya-jati (not kamma) in javana process of an arahant. The following is what I got from reading abhidhammatthasangaha. In general to know what is ittaramana (pleasant object) or anittharamana (unpleasant object) can be approximated by the two definitions: the reality, which is a result of kusaladhamma, is an ittharamana, the reality, which is a result of akusaladhamma, is an anittharamana. Anyway this is not definite. For example a strong smell of a dead deer is an ittharamana for the vulture but not for the human. In this case the dead dear is called parikappa-ittharamana for a vulture. Or like an anchovy, some people really like it and some cannot even stand the taste and the smell of an anchovy. In atthakatha there is a list of 5 criteria as a guideline to define what is ittharamana and what is anittharamana. 1.as to vipaka citta 2.as to a norm in general 3.as to dvara 4.as to aramana 5.as to time (kala) 1.As to vipaka citta. If the vipaka citta is a kusala vipaka, that aramana is an ittharamana. If the vipaka citta is akusala vipaka, that aramana is an anittharamana. The problem with this criterion is, who can know which vipaka moment is kusala or akusala vipaka? Probably only the Budhha and his great disciples can know this. You mentioned javana process, which is not a vipaka moment. Javana can be associated or disassociated with vipaka. For example, an arahant no longer has kusala or akusala but still can experience akusala vipaka. Or in sullathasutta, although one has akusla (painful) kayavinnana, it does not mean that the akusala-javana is always the case to follow. 2.As to a norm in general: this one depends on a norm of general population according to their background. Blood is sweet for the mosquito or fermented food is attractive to the fly. Most people think sweetness is pleasant and bitterness is unpleasant. 3.As to dvara. Pepper is nice to look at because it's colorful but capsaicin can burn your tongue or your skin. So by eye-base, it's an ittharamana. By kaya-base, it's an anittharamana. The javana in manodvara that follows the eye-base, in this case has an object as ittharamana, the javana of mano-dvara that follows the kaya-base has an object as anittharamana. 4.As to aramana. For example some flowers look very pretty but their smell can be really bad. 5.As to time (kala). Water in general a pleasant object e.g. when we are hot or thirsty but during the flood, water becomes anittharamana. Bright light during the working hour is pleasant but to leave a light on when we go to bed can be very unpleasant. For me it's still not completely clear. The bottom line is it's hard to really know by thinking or assuming. I may try to deduct by combination of the above criterion but the most definite on is probably the first one, by knowing nature of vipaka at that moment, which I think is a panna in vipassana-nnana. That all I can come up with. Hope it is somewhat relevant to your questions. May be other can add clearer and more concise definitions/criteria. Num 11944 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 4:10pm Subject: Re: What's in a nama? --- Dear Dan, Thanks for this post which shows us how deeply ingrained is the ides of self. ADL explains that all conditioned phenomena can be classified as the five khandas or as simply nama and rupa; thus there is no 'who', there is only nama that experiences. But as you say there is still the tendency to posit a 'who' somewhere; and the development of right understanding begins with seeing that this is a fiction. I wrote something earlier in the month which you might find relevant: The person uninstructed in the Buddha's law assumes that he is consciousness (or any of the other khandas) or consciousness is apart from him, or is in him, or is not 'him' but'him' is something else. The wise disciple sees it differently. He sees whatever khanda arises as "a disease, a boil, a dart, as calamity, as an affliction, as alien, as no protection, as empty, as void, as having no core, as Mara's bait, as not self...."Patisambhidhimagga XXIX8 This is hard to comprehend and so even some who have heard the Buddha's teaching misunderstand and assume (perhaps in disguised ways) that avijja or formations or feelings or the other links on the path are something happening to 'them' or... (Samyuttanikaya Nidana Moliyaphagguna p541 bodhi): "'With the six bases (salayatana)as condition contact comes to be'. Ven. Moliyaphagguna: 'Venerable sir, who makes contact?' Buddha: 'I do not say 'One makes contact'. If I should say 'One makes contact' in that case this would be a valid question.....In this case the valid answer is 'With the six sense bases as condition, contact[comes to be]; with contact as condition feeling'. Moliyaphagguna: 'venerable sir, who feels?.." endquote And so the sutta carries on with venerable Moliyaphagguna vainly searching for a self in the Paticcasamuppada. He feels that there should be 'someone' who craves, 'someone' who clings, who feels, who ages, who has sorrow, who dies. The Buddha says (SN 12:35 Bodhi p.575) that with the eradication of ignorance such ideas and vacillations as "what now are volitional formations (sankhara) , and for 'whom' are there volitional formations? or'Volitional formations are one thing, the one for whom there are these volitional formations is another'--all these are abandoned, cut off at the root...."endquote. The Visuddhimagga notes about the development of vipassana: "there is no removal of false view in one who takes it thus "I see with insight, my insight'..there is removal of false view in one who takes it thus 'only formations see formations with insight, comprehend, define, discern and delimit them." XX83 Venerable Moliyaphagguna later left the order of monks (SN 12:32.) The commentary notes that this is because he had not attained any of the paths (sotapanna, sakadagami, anagami , arahant) "for if he had attained them he would not have reverted to the lower life". So difficult is it to step out of this perversion of view (vipallasa). Thinking thinks "'I' have insight, 'I' see or 'I' am ignorant, 'I' don't see" not realising that the thinking is occuring without any agent. There is no knower behind the knowing, no self continuing along the cycle. There are empty factors arising and ceasing bound momentarily only by the conditions of the dependent origination itself. It should be noted that although there is no self this does not mean that terms such as I, mine and self are to be discarded. These are necessary for communication even when discussing Dhamma. Thus the Buddha and arahants use them too; but without any misconceptions that they refer to something real. "These, Citta, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. And of these a Tathagata makes use indeed, but he does not misapprehend them" Digha 9. For us, on the otherhand, it may be easy enough to think or say 'There is no self' but to the degree that we have underlying attachment that in subtle or hidden ways believes that it is still 'me' thinking or speaking we are caught in the whirl of view. These hallucinations are gradually uprooted as they are seen and if satipatthana is correctly developed. It is natural enough, having confidence in the sublime Dhamma of the Buddha, that one wishes to bring the round to a quick halt. However,...: "In beings subject to birth, the wish arises, 'O, may we not be subject to birth, and may birth not come to us.' But this is not be achieved by wishing. This is the stress of not getting what one wants. In beings subject to aging... illness... death... sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair, the wish arises, 'O, may we not be subject to aging... illness... death... sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair, and may aging... illness... death... sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair not come to us.' But this is not be achieved by wishing. This is the stress of not getting what one wants." Mahasatipatthana sutta. robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" wrote: > Dear All, > In his book "Mere Christianity," C.S. Lewis asks "whether the > universe simply happens to be what it is for no reason or whether > there is a power behind it that makes it what it is." Because he > can't see any other way around it, he concludes that there has to > be "a Somebody or Something behind the Moral Law." After all, how can > the world be such an amazing place unless someone truly magnificent > created it? That magnificent being he calls "God." > > That argument has always been entirely flat to me. I can't see any > reason why the amazingness of the universe and its Good Law (Dhamma) > imply a creator, a first cause, a "God." > > Similarly, I sometimes hear people ask about "who" experiences > hearing and seeing? "Who" is it that is angry? "Who" reaps the fruits > of kamma? "Who" is reborn? Again, it is so very difficult to see how > the experiencing must imply that there is an experiencer. It just > doesn't make sense. > > There certainly is hearing, anger, vipaka, patisandhi, etc., but just > what that "who" who experiences these things could possibly be is > quite a mystery. Can it be the sound (rupa), or the hearing > (viññana), or the sense of recognition associated with the hearing > (sañña), or the feeling associated with the sound (vedana), or the > reaction to the feeling associated with the sound (sankhara)? None of > these things constitute a satisfactory "who", nor is their confluence > adequate as a "who" either. But there isn't anything outside these. > Just hearing. No need to try to imagine a hearer. As S.N. Goenka puts > it: [paraphrase] "A naive Western philosopher once said, 'I think, > therefore I am'" --- No "I." Just thinking (citta) and the > characteristics of thinking (cetasika)... > > Then again, it is clear that there is a very strong urge to think > there must be some individual agent to experience the experiences: "I > hear", "My anger", "My vipaka/vedana/volition," etc. But the Buddha > taught that these phenomena have no agent (anatta), that they are > void of any experiencer (suññata), that the idea of an agent is > strictly a concept--and a particularly tenacious concept at that. He > also taught that the grasping at the agent concept (sakayaditthi) is > a powerful source of suffering. > > That's one reason why I find Nina's ADL such a difficult read. Over > and over I read things like: "Citta knows or experiences an object," > (p. 6) and "Nama experiences something" (p. 4). How does this citta > that experiences things differ from the actual experience of things? > If it differs, then how does it differ from a self? If it doesn't > differ, then what of the distinction, "Citta experiences" ? My strong > urge to posit an agent is fed and cultivated by the subject/verb, > agent/action construction because now I have a name for "who" does > the experiencing--it's "citta" ! > > It's good to hear that citta is not "I", but it's a bit spooky to > read that it's a *something* that "experiences". So I did a little > reading. In Yamaka (II, p. 273; cited in Ledi Sadaw's "Some points in > Buddhist Doctrine", JPTS VII, p. 152), the question is asked: "Are > mind (citta) and thinking (cintanakriya) both one and the same, or > diverse? If he reply: 'Diverse,' then mind is just mind, and is not a > mode of thinking....If that is so, the mental factor 'contact' would > possess the act of touching; 'feeling' (vedana) would possess feeling > (vedayitakaro); perception would possess perceiving, etc. ...All > these actions, or conditions, would have to be regarded as things > apart or distinct from those mentioned. And mind would possess > several modes of thinking." Ven. Ledi Sayadaw continues (p. > 158), "But in Abhidhamma, from the standpoint of ultimate truth, > there is no difference between act and agent. The mode 'thinking' is > the act 'thinking.' The mind (citta), or thinking agent, is not > different from the act 'thinking.' ... Even the four categories of > ultimates--citta, cetasika, rupa, Nibbana--are only acts." In the > commentaries (e.g. Asl. (Expositor), p. 84), citta is defined "in > three ways: as agent, as instrument, and as activity. As the agent, > citta is that which cognizes an object (arammanam cinteti ti > cittam)....As an activity, citta is itself nothing other than the > process of congnizing the object (cintanamattam cittam). The third > definition, in terms of sheer activity, is regarded as the most > adequate of the three: that is, citta is fundamentally an activity or > process of cognizing or knowing an object. It is not an agent or > instrument possessing actual being in intself apart from the activity > of cognizing. The definitions in terms of agent and instrument are > proposed to refuts the wrong view of those who hold that a permanent > self or ego is the agent and instrument of cognition. The Buddhist > thinkers point out, by means of these definitions, that it is not a > self that performs the act of cognition, but citta or consciousness. > This citta is nothing other than the act of cognizing" (BB's CMA, p. > 27-28). To me, this seems like an absolutely critical point that is > muddied by talk of "citta knows" and "nama experiences" because > subject/verb strongly evokes a concept of a subject that acts, > especially since I already have such a tendency to evoke that concept > in the first place. > > Dan 11945 From: Victor Yu Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 6:04pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) op 15-03-2002 22:29 schreef Victor Yu op victoryu@s...: >> >Victor quotes: The more we know different nåmas and >> rúpas by experiencing their characteristics, the more will we see >> that "self" is only a concept; it is not a paramattha dhamma >> (absolute or ultimate reality). > >Victor: Concept is not self. > Hello Victor, very good. In India we discussed this with A. Sujin, and we were wondering about this. We can say of realities that they are impermanent, dukkha and anatta, but A. Sujin said, Now this may seem in contradiction with what I wrote above: self is only a concept, but I mean here: we form up just an idea that seeing or hearing are self, I see, I hear, but this I is not reality. This idea of self is not a paramattha dhamma. In this context I can say: self is only a concept. But you may not find this logical thinking, I am afraid :) . Nina. Nina, The idea of self is impermanent, is dukkha, is not self. Victor 11946 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 6:04pm Subject: Re: What's in a nama? Dear Dan, You wrote: "I find Nina's ADL such a difficult read. Over > > and over I read things like: "Citta knows or experiences an > object," > > (p. 6) and "Nama experiences something" (p. 4). How does this citta > > that experiences things differ from the actual experience of > things?" Of course, there is no difference, that is the whole point of the Abhidhamma. Here is a section from the Mulapariyaya sutta (bodhi p38-39): The Exposition of the Root of all dhammas (sabbadhammamulapariyaya): The Majjhimanikaya-atthakatha (commentary) explains dhammas "they bear their own characteristics, thus they are dhammas." Now this quote from the commentary may make you wonder if the characteristics are something different from the actual dhammas but of course this is not the case. The majjhimanikaya-tika says "these dhammas are discovered as ultimately real actualities. And though there is no real distinction (between these dhammas and their characteristics), still, in order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device (upacaramatta)." best wishes robert > > If it differs, then how does it differ from a self? If it doesn't > > differ, then what of the distinction, "Citta experiences" ? My > strong > > urge to posit an agent is fed and cultivated by the subject/verb, > > agent/action construction because now I have a name for "who" does > > the experiencing--it's "citta" ! > > > > It's good to hear that citta is not "I", but it's a bit spooky to > > read that it's a *something* that "experiences". Ven. Ledi Sayadaw continues (p. > > 158), "But in Abhidhamma, from the standpoint of ultimate truth, > > there is no difference between act and agent. The mode 'thinking' > is > > the act 'thinking.' The mind (citta), or thinking agent, is not > > different from the act 'thinking.' ... Even the four categories of > > ultimates--citta, cetasika, rupa, Nibbana--are only acts." In the > > commentaries (e.g. Asl. (Expositor), p. 84), citta is defined "in > > three ways: as agent, as instrument, and as activity. As the agent, > > citta is that which cognizes an object (arammanam cinteti ti > > cittam)....As an activity, citta is itself nothing other than the > > process of congnizing the object (cintanamattam cittam). The third > > definition, in terms of sheer activity, is regarded as the most > > adequate of the three: that is, citta is fundamentally an activity > or > > process of cognizing or knowing an object. It is not an agent or > > instrument possessing actual being in intself apart from the > activity > > of cognizing. The definitions in terms of agent and instrument are > > proposed to refuts the wrong view of those who hold that a > permanent > > self or ego is the agent and instrument of cognition. The Buddhist > > thinkers point out, by means of these definitions, that it is not a > > self that performs the act of cognition, but citta or > consciousness. > > This citta is nothing other than the act of cognizing" (BB's CMA, > p. > > 27-28). To me, this seems like an absolutely critical point that is > > muddied by talk of "citta knows" and "nama experiences" because > > subject/verb strongly evokes a concept of a subject that acts, > > especially since I already have such a tendency to evoke that > concept > > in the first place. > ____________ 11947 From: Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 6:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginners Abhidhamma Study Group Dear Christine, I don't know. Where are we going anyway? If we get to the end of the book without understanding it we will just have to read another book. As far as I can tell all these books say the same thing. I would rather go thru it slowly and understand every paragraph. Then when we get to the end, Bam! Nibbana. No more books. Larry ------------------------ >Christine wrote: Dear Beginners Group and All, I'm not clear about how we agreed to do this..... but I think it is becoming evident that we all have different learning styles..... So could we re-visit the timetable? As there are 24 Chapters in the book, is it reasonable to allow one week per chapter, moving on to the next chapter each Saturday, but allowing questions to be posted about past chapters at any time? I am sure new questions will occur several weeks or even months after moving further through the book. This way the book will only take six months to read. I think my attention might wander if it takes any longer! :-) And could the subject heading of posts clearly show "Ch1 ADL Beginners Abhidhamma Study" or "Ch22 ADL Beginners Abhidhamma Study" so that those who wish to can easily follow the threads for different chapters? What do you reckon? metta, Christine 11948 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 6:23pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Right Concentration (was, Directed attention to dhammas) [This is a re-post of a message sent during the recent Yahoo Groups shutdown] Howard --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi again, Jon - > > Just one more point. The Buddha said that all he taught was > suffering > and the end of suffering. He also said that his teaching consisted only > of > the handful of leaves needed for liberation. He included Right > Concentration,*repeatedly defined in the suttas as the first four > jhanas*, as > one of the eight steps of his program. The conclusion is immediate. > > With metta, > Howard It is of course true that Right Concentration of the Noble Eightfold Path is repeatedly defined in the suttas in terms of the 4 jhanas. But I suggest we should not rush to draw an 'immediate conclusion' from this without a proper understanding of what the Noble Eightfold Path is all about. I would be fairly confident that nowhere in the suttas or the ancient commentaries is the Noble Eightfold Path described as an *eight-step program*. On the other hand, there are suttas that indicate that: - The Noble Eightfold Path is the ‘stream’ of stream-entry, that its attainment is in fact the culmination of the development of insight rather than a description of factors for the development of that insight (reference A below). and - The various factors of the Noble Eightfold Path do not arise separately but only arise together with other path factors in mutual support (B). While your immediate conclusion has superficial appeal, I think a careful reading of other suttas and the Tipitaka as a whole, putting aside one’s own intuition and prejudices, would soon cast doubt on the interpretation of an 8-step program, and its corollary of the mundane jhanas as one of those steps. I am of course aware that your interpretation is one that is widely held by contemporary commentators and teachers, but it is not one that is expressly stated in the suttas nor, as far as I know, found in any of the ancient commentaries. Does this not raise a question in your mind, Howard? Jon A. Samyutta Nikaya LV, 5, 55 – 61. The ‘factors for stream-entry’ “What is a factor for stream-entry? “Association with superior persons is a factor for stream-entry. Hearing the true Dhamma is a factor for stream-entry. Careful attention is a factor for stream-entry. Practice in accordance with the Dhamma is a factor for stream-entry. “What is the stream? “This Noble Eightfold Path is the stream; that is, right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, fright mindfulness, right concentration. “What is a stream-enterer? “One who possesses this Noble Eightfold Path is a stream-enterer: this venerable one of such a name and clan.” [This sutta has been mentioned in recent posts – will give links when Yahoo Groups is back up again.] B. Majjhima Nikaya 117 -- The Great Forty sutta [This is the sutta referrred to in Jaran’s and Christine’s recent posts on FSM] There is an extract and some discussion in the following earlier posts. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9758 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9765 11949 From: Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 2:04pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: What's in a nama? Hi, Robert and Dan - Good question, and good answer. I guess an equivalent way of putting the matter is that there is neither person nor thing experiencing an object - there is just the experiencing. (That experiencing is *called* citta.) With metta, Howard In a message dated 3/18/02 9:08:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > Dear Dan, > You wrote: "I find Nina's ADL such a difficult read. Over > > > and over I read things like: "Citta knows or experiences an > > object," > > > (p. 6) and "Nama experiences something" (p. 4). How does this > citta > > > that experiences things differ from the actual experience of > > things?" > > Of course, there is no difference, that is the whole point of the > Abhidhamma. > Here is a section from the Mulapariyaya sutta (bodhi p38-39): > The Exposition of the Root of all dhammas (sabbadhammamulapariyaya): > The Majjhimanikaya-atthakatha (commentary) explains dhammas "they > bear their own characteristics, thus they are dhammas." > Now this quote from the commentary may make you wonder if the > characteristics are something different from the actual dhammas but > of course this is not the case. The majjhimanikaya-tika says "these > dhammas are discovered as ultimately real actualities. And though > there is no real distinction (between these dhammas and their > characteristics), still, in order to facilitate understanding, the > exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device > (upacaramatta)." > best wishes > robert > > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11950 From: Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 2:15pm Subject: Messages 11925 and 11926 Hi, Jon - Two messages, replies to posts of yours, Jon, which I sent just before Yahoo groups went down never got delivered. I resent them about 10 hours ago, but I haven't rec'd them from the list in my in-box. However, I do see that they are posted on the web site (nos. 11925 and 11926) in case you, Jon, or anyone else wishes to read them. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11951 From: Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 8:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Hi Larry, I would say thought is a complex process that may include concepts. And I would go further and say that concepts are realities insofar as they are experienced. However, this is a little bit tricky. Take the concept "one". "One" doesn't actually exist in *nature*. It is something we add on, to an apple say, to make nature manageable. But "one" has a meaning and this meaning can be experienced _as meaning_. I also take thought for self and find that I am very attached to my thoughts. I think this is a very common affliction. Luckily we have three antidotes for this instead of the usual two: 1. noticing the impermanence of thought, 2. noticing that thought neither controls or is controlled, and 3. noticing that thought is merely concepts. Of course I could be wrong. Corrections? metta, Larry -------------------- >Larry wrote: "Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, experiencing tangible object through the bodysense and thinking, all these nåmas are impermanent." Hi namarupa, What I take most for self is thought. Is thought a reality or a concept? Larry 11952 From: Sarah Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 9:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginners Abhidhamma Study Group Dear Larry & Chris, Excuse my butting in as usual;-) --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > > I don't know. Where are we going anyway? If we get to the end of the > book without understanding it we will just have to read another book. As > far as I can tell all these books say the same thing. I would rather go > thru it slowly and understand every paragraph. Then when we get to the > end, Bam! Nibbana. No more books. May I just comment that I think this is a very sensible approach..the slow-and-one-extract-at-a-time approach without worry about whether one ever finishes. Maybe Larry & Lucy should continue to set the pace as they are doing, taking it in turns to give the extract. Meanwhile anyone else can jump ahead, behind, onto other topics or whatever....We all have different styles and ways of study and people like Num and Chris with super-powered grass-hopper brains could never be restricted to any mundane style of study;-) just my thoughts.....You're free to ignore them;-) Sarah ===== 11953 From: Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 9:10pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) "All phenomena in and around ourselves are only nåma and rúpa which arise and fall away; they are impermanent. Nåma and rúpa are absolute realities , in Påli: paramattha dhammas ." Greetings all, Two questions: 1. Could someone elaborate on what "absolute reality" means. I have a vague notion of irreducability on an atomic level. However I would like to know what it means on a "daily life" level. 2. Where is the reality of nibbana? Here, not here, both, neither? thanks, Larry 11954 From: Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 9:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginners Abhidhamma Study Group Hi Sarah, I agree. People can jump ahead and discuss anything they want but we could also keep a slow thorough grind going on in some dusty corner of the list. Lucy must be busy. I'm sure she will have some ideas. We are kind of making this up as we go along. The only other online study groups I've seen was one on the Bhagavad Gita and one on Harry Potter. The Gita one they would post a stanza a week and people would pitch in. In the Harry Potter group someone would volunteer to summarize a chapter then everyone would comment on the summarization and the chapter. This material is so technical it seems like it merits a pretty close reading. Also I think there is something to be said for being systematic. Hopefully a more comprehensive understanding will emerge, instead of a basket of bits and pieces--which is what I have now. Maybe if the paragraphs are short or are best read together we could post several at a time. And we could do two posts a week if it seems like we covered everything. Christine, Num, anyone else, what do you think? Larry 11955 From: Sarah Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 10:25pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Dear Larry, Let me try to follow our formula that your email censor likes and give very quick answers to many of your unanswered posts I have in front of me. I notice that in one you’re even having to answer yourself;-) I won’t try to find and repost all the questions, but just give my comments. 1.”Absolute reality “ refers to the namas and rupas (mental and physical phenomena) that exist in daily life and can be proved to exist by rt. awareness and rt.understanding..So thinking, exists, but concepts don’t except as manifestations of thinking. 2. Nibbana right now is a concept, so again it is just in the imagination. If it is directly experienced by the sotapanna’s magga citta (first time), there is no concern about where it is. (Maybe leave nibbana qus til end of ADL?) 3.You asked about thought and thought as self and/or concept. Thinking is real. Concept isn’t. Anything (reality or concept) can be the object of wrong view and taken for self. 4.Just because concepts are experienced (by thinking), doesn’t make them real. You say “one” has a meaning which is experienced. There cannot be direct awareness of “one” however. It doesn’t have a characteristic which can be known. 5. Usually we can talk about the characteristics of impermanence and so on as applying to realities but not to concepts. So we can say’ thinking’ is real and is conditioned, but not ‘thoughts’ experienced by thinking. 6.Memory or sanna is nama, not rupa (you asked ‘could memory be rupa?) It’s quite correct as you say, that without sanna, we wouldn’t know impermanence. We wouldn’t be able to function at all without the momentary marking. It doesn’t ‘grasp or hold on’ however.This is the job of lobha (attachment) and other cetasikas. It merely ‘marks’. There is no data base or store house as such and yet each marking accumulates and conditions the next set of marking. I suppose you could consider this as a kind of data entry and retrieval system w’out storage as you suggest. Phassa (contact) touches or impacts. It doesn’t keep records. .......... VismXX,96: “‘there is no heap or store of unarisen mentality-materiality (existing) pior to its arising. When it arises, it does not come from any heap or store; and when it ceases, it does not go in any direction. There is nowhere any depository in the way of a heap or store or hoard of what has ceased....” .......... 7.You asked about a conventional self. Yes, we can both agree that “Larry’ represents the recipient of this message. Conventionally it’s correct. I don’t think the Buddha says (as you suggest) that a self ‘has to be permanent’.What he says is that a self is merely a concept which can be used for convenience with no wrong understanding but is usually taken to actually exist with wrong understanding. If you say ‘myself’ is xyz, it never makes ‘you’ real even if xyz are real. You mention you’re ‘taking to heart’ the idea that ‘you’ are merely nama and rupa. Perhaps we can put it even more precisely and say that only nama and rupa exist and there is no ‘you’ to be anything. 8.You asked about belief in ‘self’ and belief in ‘abhidhamma’. Belief in ‘self’ existing is always micha ditthi (wrong view). Belief in ‘abhidhamma’ maybe attachment or maybe saddha (confidence) based on a level of understanding. It’s hard (for me) to see how it could be micha ditthi. 9. You also asked about persons and gods, concepts and false concepts;-) If we talk about self, persons or gods and take these as entities that exist, there is micha ditthi. However, we can use the same words and discuss ‘Larry’, ‘the Buddha’, ‘devas’ with no wrong view too. Lucy’s link to the first few pages of ‘Concepts and Realities’ would be helpful as would the recent posts to Mike B. on ego and self. ********** Tricky questions, Larry. Actually I think it is the slow speed of replies to tricky questions like yours that slow the ADL study group down.....Sorry for that and hope I haven’t reached beyond your censor’s limit;-) Sarah ======= --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > "All phenomena in and around ourselves are only nåma and rúpa which > arise and fall away; they are impermanent. Nåma and rúpa are > absolute realities , in Påli: paramattha dhammas ." > > Greetings all, > > Two questions: > 1. Could someone elaborate on what "absolute reality" means. I have a > vague notion of irreducability on an atomic level. However I would like > to know what it means on a "daily life" level. > > 2. Where is the reality of nibbana? Here, not here, both, neither? > > thanks, Larry ......................... 11956 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Mon Mar 18, 2002 10:54pm Subject: [dsg] Re: What's in a nama? I like the way you put this, Howard: "there is just the experiencing. (That experiencing is *called* citta.)" I was listening to a tape where T.A. Sujin gave the example of hearing . This is called sotavinnana in pali but she noted that while we are trying to identify it or find out where it is happening that this is still involved in thinking about the hearing. And there doesnt have to be any thinking for insight to understand that experience (that we think of as "hearing"). We need words to convey and understand dhamma at the level of pariyatti but not for the direct experience. robert In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert and Dan - > > Good question, and good answer. I guess an equivalent way of putting > the matter is that there is neither person nor thing experiencing an object - > there is just the experiencing. (That experiencing is *called* citta.) > > With metta, > Howard > > In a message dated 3/18/02 9:08:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes: > > > > > > Dear Dan, > > You wrote: "I find Nina's ADL such a difficult read. Over > > > > and over I read things like: "Citta knows or experiences an > > > object," > > > > (p. 6) and "Nama experiences something" (p. 4). How does this > > citta > > > > that experiences things differ from the actual experience of > > > things?" > > > > Of course, there is no difference, that is the whole point of the > > Abhidhamma. > > Here is a section from the Mulapariyaya sutta (bodhi p38-39): > > The Exposition of the Root of all dhammas (sabbadhammamulapariyaya): > > The Majjhimanikaya-atthakatha (commentary) explains dhammas "they > > bear their own characteristics, thus they are dhammas." > > Now this quote from the commentary may make you wonder if the > > characteristics are something different from the actual dhammas but > > of course this is not the case. The majjhimanikaya-tika says "these > > dhammas are discovered as ultimately real actualities. And though > > there is no real distinction (between these dhammas and their > > characteristics), still, in order to facilitate understanding, the > > exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device > > (upacaramatta)." > > best wishes > > robert 11957 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 1:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginners Abhidhamma Study Group Hi Larry, I'm really happy to do whatever is most helpful for all ..... The best part of this is studying with others, and how long it takes is really only secondary. However, because of the different temperaments involved and varying ways that adults learn - e.g. some cover a small area in a methodical, and well organised way until completely mastered - others cover a large area superficially, and then go back to things that interest/puzzle them - I think some flexibility may be warranted to avoid any possibility of frustration developing.....( none so far. :-)) Any further thoughts? metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > I agree. People can jump ahead and discuss anything they want but we > could also keep a slow thorough grind going on in some dusty corner of > the list. > > Lucy must be busy. I'm sure she will have some ideas. > > We are kind of making this up as we go along. The only other online > study groups I've seen was one on the Bhagavad Gita and one on Harry > Potter. The Gita one they would post a stanza a week and people would > pitch in. In the Harry Potter group someone would volunteer to summarize > a chapter then everyone would comment on the summarization and the > chapter. > > This material is so technical it seems like it merits a pretty close > reading. Also I think there is something to be said for being > systematic. Hopefully a more comprehensive understanding will emerge, > instead of a basket of bits and pieces--which is what I have now. > > Maybe if the paragraphs are short or are best read together we could > post several at a time. And we could do two posts a week if it seems > like we covered everything. > > Christine, Num, anyone else, what do you think? > > Larry 11958 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 1:30am Subject: Re: [dsg] Messages 11925 and 11926 Thanks, Howard, for mentioning this. I've now got them. Jon --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon - > > Two messages, replies to posts of yours, Jon, which I sent just > before > Yahoo groups went down never got delivered. I resent them about 10 hours > ago, > but I haven't rec'd them from the list in my in-box. However, I do see > that > they are posted on the web site (nos. 11925 and 11926) in case you, Jon, > or > anyone else wishes to read them. > > With metta, > Howard 11959 From: egberdina Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 2:27am Subject: Re:[dsg] "unpleasant words" Dear Num/Dan, I am sorry to be straight forward, but I would very much like to understand your reply to Dan, as I also do not understand how phenomena can be said to have intrinsic qualities along the pleasant/unpleasant line. A warm dogshit for a frost-bitten finger tip may be delightful, not? Could I ask you to provide a non-Pali answer? Sorry for the trouble. Cheers Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., srnsk@a... wrote: > < we see just sound and color, and the hearing and seeing accompanied > strictly by upekkha? The sounds and colors themselves are neither > pleasant nor unpleasant. It's only when we construct concepts around > the words and colors that we view them as "unpleasant" or "pleasant." > In other words, there is nothing intrinsically unpleasant or pleasant > about the actual hearing-consciousnes (as there would be with the > body-consciousness associated with a punch in the nose), and the > unpleasant/pleasant aspect is mental feeling derived from our > aversion/attachment to the concepts we associate with the particular > sounds we hear. But domanassa and somanassa are kamma rather than > vipaka. How can we say that "unpleasant words" are akusala vipaka > when they are strictly neutral sounds until domanassa arises with > concept in javana process? >> > > > Dear Dan, > > I asked myself the same question before. Rupa is always avayakata and as you > mention the vedana of cakkhu-, sota-, gantha- and jiha-vinnana is always > upekkha both in kusala and akusala vipaka moment. Only somanassa and upekkha > (not domanassa) can be vipaka-jati in panca- and manodvara-vithi (I mean not > during the javana moment) as in satirana- and tadalampana-moment. Somanassa > can also be in kiriya-jati (not kamma) in javana process of an arahant. > > The following is what I got from reading abhidhammatthasangaha. In general to > know what is ittaramana (pleasant object) or anittharamana (unpleasant > object) can be approximated by the two definitions: the reality, which is a > result of kusaladhamma, is an ittharamana, the reality, which is a result of > akusaladhamma, is an anittharamana. Anyway this is not definite. For > example a strong smell of a dead deer is an ittharamana for the vulture but > not for the human. In this case the dead dear is called parikappa- ittharamana > for a vulture. Or like an anchovy, some people really like it and some cannot > even stand the taste and the smell of an anchovy. > > In atthakatha there is a list of 5 criteria as a guideline to define what is > ittharamana and what is anittharamana. > 1.as to vipaka citta > 2.as to a norm in general > 3.as to dvara > 4.as to aramana > 5.as to time (kala) > > 1.As to vipaka citta. If the vipaka citta is a kusala vipaka, that aramana is > an ittharamana. If the vipaka citta is akusala vipaka, that aramana is an > anittharamana. The problem with this criterion is, who can know which vipaka > moment is kusala or akusala vipaka? Probably only the Budhha and his great > disciples can know this. You mentioned javana process, which is not a vipaka > moment. Javana can be associated or disassociated with vipaka. For example, > an arahant no longer has kusala or akusala but still can experience akusala > vipaka. Or in sullathasutta, although one has akusla (painful) kayavinnana, > it does not mean that the akusala-javana is always the case to follow. > > 2.As to a norm in general: this one depends on a norm of general population > according to their background. Blood is sweet for the mosquito or fermented > food is attractive to the fly. Most people think sweetness is pleasant and > bitterness is unpleasant. > > 3.As to dvara. Pepper is nice to look at because it's colorful but capsaicin > can burn your tongue or your skin. So by eye-base, it's an ittharamana. By > kaya-base, it's an anittharamana. The javana in manodvara that follows the > eye-base, in this case has an object as ittharamana, the javana of mano-dvara > that follows the kaya-base has an object as anittharamana. > > 4.As to aramana. For example some flowers look very pretty but their smell > can be really bad. > > 5.As to time (kala). Water in general a pleasant object e.g. when we are hot > or thirsty but during the flood, water becomes anittharamana. Bright light > during the working hour is pleasant but to leave a light on when we go to bed > can be very unpleasant. > > For me it's still not completely clear. The bottom line is it's hard to > really know by thinking or assuming. I may try to deduct by combination of > the above criterion but the most definite on is probably the first one, by > knowing nature of vipaka at that moment, which I think is a panna in > vipassana-nnana. > > That all I can come up with. Hope it is somewhat relevant to your questions. > May be other can add clearer and more concise definitions/criteria. > > Num 11960 From: egberdina Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 2:41am Subject: Re: Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Dear Christine, There are no right answers to the questions you were being asked. The answers you gave were the answers you gave. No need to control the outcome. Words are like seeds, drifitng in the wind, some land here, some land there. You can sow, but you cannot make it rain :-) If I signed off saying, Cheers, big ears, would that that be too familiar? Cheers Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" wrote: > Dear All, > > It was an all-day Workshop at the Hospital last Saturday.... My mind > was concentrating on what was to come. A colleague sat next to me, > and after the usual courtesies, looked at me quite seriously and > said 'Chris, I heard you have become a Buddhist, and I wanted to ask > you, What is the Purpose of Life?' And he wasn't joking. So > fortunately, I didn't give my first choice of answer, 'Just getting > through 'til lunchtime'. > ..... He didn't seem to think 'err, umm' and 'well, that's a bit hard > to answer' was sufficient. I said I was just a beginner and I really > wasn't the person to ask, and wouldn't he rather I loaned him a book > or two?....he would't accept reading references, he wanted to > talk.......So, I launched into a rather mixed response about what > suffering really was, and the Path leading to its cessation, and was > saved by the facilitator starting the presentation. > But, there was no escape, the questioner was back at the tea and > lunch-breaks ....by the end of it, I had run through MY understanding > of kamma, conditions, death, meditation, reality, and even > anatta..... He wouldn't stop asking questions. Each answer brought > MORE questions. (This is beginning to remind me of something....... > sounds like dsg......:-)........so THIS is what vipaka in the present > life is!!). I am only thankful that I had enough sense to steer > clear of 'nibbana', 'no-control' and 'dependent origination'.... And > I wish I'd left anatta out...... > I have a feeling that the poor, confused man went away having > found out that "the Buddha isn't an omnipotent God, though, yes, > there possibly are some 'gods'. And, no, there is no soul, but we > are each an accumulating process of good and bad tendencies and > results of intentional action - sort of like information > progressively stored on a computer and then forwarded (in a zip > file) to a new computer (the next life) - though we don't remember > previous lives (except some do...no, not me), or how we accumulated > the accumulations, but you still inherit the consequences of what the > zip file accumulated (fair? well, it IS fair, but most of all it just > IS) - 'the same but not the same'. And, the purpose is not to live > eternally, not to be annihilated at death, but to eventually not be > re-born"......I think he was exhausted at that point, I know I > was! Scary isn't it! > ( Moral of this sad story - Be thankful that the first Buddhist you > ever met was not me.) > It is amazing just how little of what I 'know' is intelligible, when > I'm asked to explain it. ....... I think I need help!! > Are there unpleasant kammic consequences from trying to answer, and > answering unskillfully? Maybe we can work out something simple and > I can carry 'flash cards' or a FAQ sheet to refer to. :-) > Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... > > metta, 11961 From: azita gill Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 3:15am Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginners Abhidhamma Study Group --- Sarah wrote: > Dear Larry & Chris, > > > May I just comment that I think this is a very > sensible approach..the > slow-and-one-extract-at-a-time approach without > worry about whether one > ever finishes. > ===== > dear all, m I agree with Sarah. Slow and repetative. Remember what it was like when you first learnt to read or count --- over and over again until it became second nature. I believe that learning abouy nama and rupa is no different. We have to be very patient and not desire results NOW. I think this path is very long, and we always have now, right this moment to begin. Panna does grow and at "it's" own pace, there is no me or you to force it to grow faster, as we would desire. h Patience, courage and good cheer, wise words from Khun Sujin. , cheers, Azita.> > 11962 From: onco111 Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 4:03am Subject: Re:[dsg] "unpleasant words" Thanks for the helpful reply, Num. It looks to me like the first two of your five criteria can be used as definitions. The first is reliable, but unworkable. I'm not sure anyone understands conditions deeply enough to know "this sotaviññana is kusala-vipaka; that sotaviññana is akusala-vipaka". It is tempting to use the second criterion as a pointer to the first, but the "norm of general population" is elusive and unreliable. Thus, unless the sounds themselves can be directly apprehended regarding their intrinsic nature as kusala-vipaka or akusala-v. in accordance with your definition #1 -- something that is clearly far, far beyond my capabilities (didn't Buddha say such things were the province of sammasambuddhas alone?) -- it is best to take "pleasant words" as conventional language and not a piece of Abhidhamma we can observe in daily life. Dan ------------ Num: "1.As to vipaka citta. If the vipaka citta is a kusala vipaka, that aramana is an ittharamana. If the vipaka citta is akusala vipaka, that aramana is an anittharamana. 2.As to a norm in general: this one depends on a norm of general population according to their background." ------------ 11963 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 6:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] What's in a nama? Dan Some comments on selected parts of your interesting post. > Similarly, I sometimes hear people ask about "who" experiences > hearing and seeing? "Who" is it that is angry? "Who" reaps the fruits > of kamma? "Who" is reborn? Again, it is so very difficult to see how > the experiencing must imply that there is an experiencer. It just > doesn't make sense. I have always taken it that such questions were rhetorical, intended to remind the other person that in fact there is no experiencer. > Then again, it is clear that there is a very strong urge to think > there must be some individual agent to experience the experiences: "I > hear", "My anger", "My vipaka/vedana/volition," etc. But the Buddha > taught that these phenomena have no agent (anatta), that they are > void of any experiencer (suññata), that the idea of an agent is > strictly a concept--and a particularly tenacious concept at that. He > also taught that the grasping at the agent concept (sakayaditthi) is > a powerful source of suffering. Yes, we all have this 'strong urge' you mention. This is wrong view. It is the reason we need to have things so carefully spelled out, as in the commentaries and the abhidhamma, and why even then we can understand only a little at a time. On the other hand, those who are on the verge of enlightenment (as were many at the time of the Buddha) did not have the same strong wrong view, and were able to understand the Buddha's message from hearing it explained in conventional language (the language of the suttas). > That's one reason why I find Nina's ADL such a difficult read. Over > and over I read things like: "Citta knows or experiences an object," > (p. 6) and "Nama experiences something" (p. 4). How does this citta > that experiences things differ from the actual experience of things? > If it differs, then how does it differ from a self? If it doesn't > differ, then what of the distinction, "Citta experiences" ? My strong > urge to posit an agent is fed and cultivated by the subject/verb, > agent/action construction because now I have a name for "who" does > the experiencing--it's "citta" ! I would like to quote a little more from BB's CMA pp 27-28 which you refer to in your post. It also says there: "The Pali word 'citta' is derived from the verbal root citi, to cognize, to know. … "In the case of citta, its characteristic is the knowing of an object (vijaanana). Its function is to be a "forerunner" (pubbangama) of the mental factors in that it presides over them and is always accompanied by them. … "[Citta] has a single characteristic … the cognizing of an object, a characteristic that remains the same in all of its diverse manifestations…" Both this description from the Abhidhammattha Sangaha and the passage from Nina's book appear in the context of an explanation of the basic 4-fold classification of dhammas found in the abhidhamma, namely, citta, cetasika, rupa and nibbana. Whether for this purpose one says 'citta experiences an object' (Nina) or 'citta is the experiencing of an object' (Abhidhammattha Sangaha), I think the point being made is the same -- citta has a characteristic that distinguishes it from rupa. This distinction is an extremely important one to grasp. Are we aware of this difference as regards the present moment? Is one of the 2 explanations less helpful in this regard than the other? Certainly not to my way of thinking. Is one of the 2 descriptions less likely to feed our wrong view? Well, as I noted above, the more strongly entrenched our wrong view, the more helpful it is to have things spelt out in precise, specific terms. But to expect the same exact formulation to be used in all contexts is perhaps a bit much. (On that basis, Dan, you would even find fault with the conventional language of the Buddha's discourses!) But thanks for bringing the point up. I find the reminder about the nature of citta as 'an activity, … nothing other than the process of cognizing the object' (your post below) a very useful one, worth being repeated often. Jon --- onco111 wrote: > Dear All, > In his book "Mere Christianity," C.S. Lewis asks "whether the > universe simply happens to be what it is for no reason or whether > there is a power behind it that makes it what it is." Because he > can't see any other way around it, he concludes that there has to > be "a Somebody or Something behind the Moral Law." After all, how can > the world be such an amazing place unless someone truly magnificent > created it? That magnificent being he calls "God." > > That argument has always been entirely flat to me. I can't see any > reason why the amazingness of the universe and its Good Law (Dhamma) > imply a creator, a first cause, a "God." > > Similarly, I sometimes hear people ask about "who" experiences > hearing and seeing? "Who" is it that is angry? "Who" reaps the fruits > of kamma? "Who" is reborn? Again, it is so very difficult to see how > the experiencing must imply that there is an experiencer. It just > doesn't make sense. > > There certainly is hearing, anger, vipaka, patisandhi, etc., but just > what that "who" who experiences these things could possibly be is > quite a mystery. Can it be the sound (rupa), or the hearing > (viññana), or the sense of recognition associated with the hearing > (sañña), or the feeling associated with the sound (vedana), or the > reaction to the feeling associated with the sound (sankhara)? None of > these things constitute a satisfactory "who", nor is their confluence > adequate as a "who" either. But there isn't anything outside these. > Just hearing. No need to try to imagine a hearer. As S.N. Goenka puts > it: [paraphrase] "A naive Western philosopher once said, 'I think, > therefore I am'" --- No "I." Just thinking (citta) and the > characteristics of thinking (cetasika)... > > Then again, it is clear that there is a very strong urge to think > there must be some individual agent to experience the experiences: "I > hear", "My anger", "My vipaka/vedana/volition," etc. But the Buddha > taught that these phenomena have no agent (anatta), that they are > void of any experiencer (suññata), that the idea of an agent is > strictly a concept--and a particularly tenacious concept at that. He > also taught that the grasping at the agent concept (sakayaditthi) is > a powerful source of suffering. > > That's one reason why I find Nina's ADL such a difficult read. Over > and over I read things like: "Citta knows or experiences an object," > (p. 6) and "Nama experiences something" (p. 4). How does this citta > that experiences things differ from the actual experience of things? > If it differs, then how does it differ from a self? If it doesn't > differ, then what of the distinction, "Citta experiences" ? My strong > urge to posit an agent is fed and cultivated by the subject/verb, > agent/action construction because now I have a name for "who" does > the experiencing--it's "citta" ! > > It's good to hear that citta is not "I", but it's a bit spooky to > read that it's a *something* that "experiences". So I did a little > reading. In Yamaka (II, p. 273; cited in Ledi Sadaw's "Some points in > Buddhist Doctrine", JPTS VII, p. 152), the question is asked: "Are > mind (citta) and thinking (cintanakriya) both one and the same, or > diverse? If he reply: 'Diverse,' then mind is just mind, and is not a > mode of thinking....If that is so, the mental factor 'contact' would > possess the act of touching; 'feeling' (vedana) would possess feeling > (vedayitakaro); perception would possess perceiving, etc. ...All > these actions, or conditions, would have to be regarded as things > apart or distinct from those mentioned. And mind would possess > several modes of thinking." Ven. Ledi Sayadaw continues (p. > 158), "But in Abhidhamma, from the standpoint of ultimate truth, > there is no difference between act and agent. The mode 'thinking' is > the act 'thinking.' The mind (citta), or thinking agent, is not > different from the act 'thinking.' ... Even the four categories of > ultimates--citta, cetasika, rupa, Nibbana--are only acts." In the > commentaries (e.g. Asl. (Expositor), p. 84), citta is defined "in > three ways: as agent, as instrument, and as activity. As the agent, > citta is that which cognizes an object (arammanam cinteti ti > cittam)....As an activity, citta is itself nothing other than the > process of congnizing the object (cintanamattam cittam). The third > definition, in terms of sheer activity, is regarded as the most > adequate of the three: that is, citta is fundamentally an activity or > process of cognizing or knowing an object. It is not an agent or > instrument possessing actual being in intself apart from the activity > of cognizing. The definitions in terms of agent and instrument are > proposed to refuts the wrong view of those who hold that a permanent > self or ego is the agent and instrument of cognition. The Buddhist > thinkers point out, by means of these definitions, that it is not a > self that performs the act of cognition, but citta or consciousness. > This citta is nothing other than the act of cognizing" (BB's CMA, p. > 27-28). To me, this seems like an absolutely critical point that is > muddied by talk of "citta knows" and "nama experiences" because > subject/verb strongly evokes a concept of a subject that acts, > especially since I already have such a tendency to evoke that concept > in the first place. > > Dan > 11964 From: Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 1:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Hi, Sarah (and Larry) - In the post of yours, Sarah, which I quote at the end of this post, you speak about "concepts". To me, concepts are general ideas, each of which is constructed by the mind from a (usually) large body of interrelated (memories of) directly experienced dhammas, some rupic, some namic and from other concepts. These concepts/ideas, once the "seeds" or "patterns" for them (sankharas) have already been formed and can be passed along from one mindstate to another, may arise at any time in the mind when conditions are in place for them to do so; and when such a concept arises it does so as an object at the mind door and discerned by the function of vi~n~nana, just as vi~n~nana can discern sights, sounds etc. The main differences are that (1) concepts are not only mind-observed, but are also mind-constructed (whereas other dhammas, paramattha dhammas, while mind-observed and while conditioned (except for nibbana), are *not* mind-constructed, and (2) concepts, being constructs built from piecing together various mental elements, are reducible, and hence not paramattha dhammas. But it seems to me that it is necessary also to distinguish between concepts-as-ideas, and instances of them which are, in fact, "percepts-affected-by-concept" (or, perhaps, "percepts-organized-by-concept"). For example, we have the pattern in our mind for the concept of 'tree', and, whenever we turn our mind in that direction, that concept can arise in the mind; and, also, whenever we see certain sights, that concept can arise, unbidden, to overlay and distort our perception resulting in our "seeing a tree", and that would be an instance of percept-affected-by-concept. I introduced this notion of "percept-affected-by-concept" in a post on another list which I copy here: ********************************************************** As I sit here in the den in front of the computer monitor, I look at the lamp on the round table in the living room. What I call "the lamp" is a part of my field of vision. All that is actually perceived initially are certain colors and shapes mentally assembled into a unit and "carved out" from the general field of vision. Then sa~n~na then comes into play. In this application of sa~n~na, the mind *superimposes* the concept of 'lamp' on the percept. The percept is liable to change. But the concept of 'lamp' is quite stable, and it "lends" its stability to the percept. The superimposition of the concept 'lamp' on our experience causes us to see through a conceptual filter, a filter which lends the sense of independent existence and permanence to what is dependent and impermanent. Part of the point I'm making here is that there is a difference between percepts-affected-by-concept and concepts themselves. There is the concept of 'tree'. This is purely mental, and it tends to be very stable. There is also the tree in my garden. It is not at all stable, yet it somehow seems to retain a stable identity. It is actually changing constantly right in front of my eyes, with branches bending in the wind and leaves flapping and falling. What is actually discerned when I look at the tree is a constantly shifting mosaic of direct visual experiences. But the mind groups them all into one "thing", the "tree in my garden" as the result of conceptual superimposition.This percept, actually not at all stable yet somehow seeming to retain its identity, is percept-affected-by-concept. Does this make sense? ********************************************** Any thoughts on this, Sarah, or anyone? (Your post follows below, Sarah.) With metta, Howard In a message dated 3/19/02 1:29:05 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... om.hk writes: > Dear Larry, > > Let me try to follow our formula that your email censor likes and give > very quick answers to many of your unanswered posts I have in front of me. > I notice that in one you’re even having to answer yourself;-) I won’t try > to find and repost all the questions, but just give my comments. > > 1.â€?Absolute reality “ refers to the namas and rupas > (mental and physical phenomena) that exist in daily life and can be proved > to exist by rt. awareness and rt.understanding..So thinking, exists, but > concepts don’t except as manifestations of thinking. > > 2. Nibbana right now is a concept, so again it is just in the imagination. > If it is directly experienced by the sotapanna’s magga citta (first time), > there is no concern about where it is. (Maybe leave nibbana qus til end of > ADL?) > > 3.You asked about thought and thought as self and/or concept. Thinking is > real. Concept isn’t. Anything (reality or concept) can be the object of > wrong view and taken for self. > > 4.Just because concepts are experienced (by thinking), doesn’t make them > real. You say “oneâ€? has a meaning which is experienced. There cannot be > direct awareness of “oneâ€? however. It doesn’t have a characteristic which > can be known. > > 5. Usually we can talk about the characteristics of impermanence and so on > as applying to realities but not to concepts. So we can say’ thinking’ is > real and is conditioned, but not ‘thoughts’ experienced by thinking. > > 6.Memory or sanna is nama, not rupa (you asked ‘could memory be rupa?) > It’s quite correct as you say, that without sanna, we wouldn’t know > impermanence. We wouldn’t be able to function at all without the momentary > marking. It doesn’t ‘grasp or hold on’ however.This is the job of lobha > (attachment) and other cetasikas. It merely ‘marks’. There is no data base > or store house as such and yet each marking accumulates and conditions the > next set of marking. I suppose you could consider this as a kind of data > entry and retrieval system w’out storage as you suggest. Phassa (contact) > touches or impacts. It doesn’t keep records. > .......... > VismXX,96: > “‘there is no heap or store of unarisen mentality-materiality (existing) > pior to its arising. When it arises, it does not come from any heap or > store; and when it ceases, it does not go in any direction. There is > nowhere any depository in the way of a heap or store or hoard of what has > ceased....â€? > .......... > > 7.You asked about a conventional self. Yes, we can both agree that “Larry’ > represents the recipient of this message. Conventionally it’s correct. I > don’t think the Buddha says (as you suggest) that a self ‘has to be > permanent’.What he says is that a self is merely a concept which can be > used for convenience with no wrong understanding but is usually taken to > actually exist with wrong understanding. If you say ‘myself’ is xyz, it > never makes ‘you’ real even if xyz are real. You mention you’re ‘taking > to > heart’ the idea that ‘you’ are merely nama and rupa. Perhaps we can put it > even more precisely and say that only nama and rupa exist and there is no > ‘you’ to be anything. > > 8.You asked about belief in ‘self’ and belief in ‘abhidhamma’. Belief in > ‘self’ existing is always micha ditthi (wrong view). Belief in > ‘abhidhamma’ maybe attachment or maybe saddha (confidence) based on a > level of understanding. It’s hard (for me) to see how it could be micha > ditthi. > > 9. You also asked about persons and gods, concepts and false concepts;-) > If we talk about self, persons or gods and take these as entities that > exist, there is micha ditthi. However, we can use the same words and > discuss ‘Larry’, ‘the Buddha’, ‘devas’ with no wrong view too. Lucy’s > link > to the first few pages of ‘Concepts and Realities’ would be helpful as > would the recent posts to Mike B. on ego and self. > ********** > > Tricky questions, Larry. Actually I think it is the slow speed of replies > to tricky questions like yours that slow the ADL study group > down.....Sorry for that and hope I haven’t reached beyond your censor’s > limit;-) > > Sarah > ======= > --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > "All phenomena in and around ourselves are > only nÃ¥ma and rúpa which > > arise and fall away; they are impermanent. NÃ¥ma and rúpa are > > absolute realities , in PÃ¥li: paramattha dhammas ." > > > > Greetings all, > > > > Two questions: > > 1. Could someone elaborate on what "absolute reality" means. I have a > > vague notion of irreducability on an atomic level. However I would like > > to know what it means on a "daily life" level. > > > > 2. Where is the reality of nibbana? Here, not here, both, neither? > > > > thanks, Larry > ......................... > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11965 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 6:36am Subject: Re: [dsg] "unpleasant words" Dan --- onco111 wrote: > Dear All, > Nina writes (ADL, p. 7): "When we hear unpleasant words, the moment > of experiencing the sound is akusala vipaka, the result of > unwholesome deeds we performed in our lives." And on p. 78: "When we > see something unpleasant there must be a condition for it: it is the > result of akusala kamma." > > I find this quite puzzling. Aren't the 'words' we hear and the things > we see just sound and color, and the hearing and seeing accompanied > strictly by upekkha? The sounds and colors themselves are neither > pleasant nor unpleasant. It's only when we construct concepts around > the words and colors that we view them as "unpleasant" or "pleasant." > In other words, there is nothing intrinsically unpleasant or pleasant > about the actual hearing-consciousnes (as there would be with the > body-consciousness associated with a punch in the nose), and the > unpleasant/pleasant aspect is mental feeling derived from our > aversion/attachment to the concepts we associate with the particular > sounds we hear. But domanassa and somanassa are kamma rather than > vipaka. How can we say that "unpleasant words" are akusala vipaka > when they are strictly neutral sounds until domanassa arises with > concept in javana process? My understanding (which I think is confirmed by Num's very informative post) is that every sense-object that is experienced through the 5 sense-doors is intrinsically either pleasant or unpleasant in its nature, being either kusala vipaka or akusala vipaka. (However, this intrinsic pleasantness of unpleasantness is not always apparent to us -- and there is nothing to be gained by trying to figure this out). In this respect there is no difference between the body door and the other sense-doors. There is, however, as you suggest, a difference in the *feeling* that accompanies those moments of sense-door experience. The feeling that accompanies experience through the body-door is either pleasant or unpleasant feeling, depending on the (pleasant or unpleasant) nature of the object at that moment, while the feeling that accompanies the moment of experience through the other sense-doors is always neutral feeling. But this does not reflect any difference in the intrinsic pleasantness or unpleasantness of the objects experienced through the different sense-doors. You are right in suggesting that, when talking about vipaka through the ear-door, we need to distinguish between the *sound that is the voice of the speaker* and the *words spoken and their meaning* (only the experiencing of the former is a moment of vipaka citta). Thus, 'bad news' could be delivered by pleasant speech conditioned by kusala citta, or vice versa. But in the case of unpleaseant speech cnditioned by dosa, I would assume that the sound in question would be unpleasant by nature, and therefore akusala vipaka (and this would be so for everyone within earshot and not just the person to whom the (unpleasant) words themselves are directed). I believe that in your sutta quote from SN IV (Ghosita), 'sounds disagreeable' would refer, in our example, to the sound of the speaker's voice and not the meaning of the words. Just my thoughts on the matter. Jon > Another way to look at it is to ask: What are 'unpleasant words'? The > only thing I can come up with is that they are a particular type of > concept associated with domanassa. 'Unpleasant words' do not arise > through the ear door, they arise through the mind door, and the > construction of them is kamma. Thus, when I read "When we hear > unpleasant words,..." I think: "When domanassa arises in association > with a concept constructed with input from hearing-consciousness,..." > In this context, the moment of 'hearing', then, is not hearing at all > (sotaviññanam), but dosamulacittam. > > The commentaries struggle with this too, because approximations > to "unpleasant words" appear in the suttas (e.g. SN IV [129, > Ghosita], BB trans. p. 1200): "There exists the ear element, and > sounds that are disagreeable, and ear-consciousness: in dependence on > a contact to be experienced as painful, a painful feeling arises." So > the sounds are not really disagreeable themselves but only some later > contact is? By convention, then, we just call the sounds > themselves "unpleasant" ? The commentary explains (for "dependence on > a contact to be experienced as pleasant"): "That is, a contact > asociated with eye-consciousness that functions as a condition, by > way of decisive support (upanissaya), for a pleasant feeling in the > javana phase. The pleasant feeling arises in the javana phase in > dependence on a single contact. The same method applies in the > following passages." So, putting this together with Nina's quotes, > the best I can come up with is that "hearing unpleasant words" > is "akusala vipaka" because in later akusala kamma the words are > interpreted as "unpleasant." Thus, a previous akusala vipaka > (sotaviññanam) is a result of a later kamma? That does sound peculiar > indeed! Can anyone help me out of this jam? > > Dan 11966 From: zipdrive14850 Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 8:05am Subject: ADL and metaphorical language [Robert] Dear Robert, It's nice to hear from you. Thanks for all your help in my struggles with Nina's ADL. As you correctly noticed, the trouble is mostly a clash of styles. What makes it difficult for a skeptical Dan is that the metaphorical language is so strongly intertwined with her sometimes precise, technical language that I feel I always must be on guard so as not to be misled into mistaking the metaphorical for the actual. E.g.: "Citta experiences..." [Actually, citta IS the experience] "When we see something unpleasant..., it is the result of akusala kamma" [If the unpleasant thing is truly unpleasant as defined abhidhammically, then this is a tautology. Otherwise, this can easily be read (mistakenly) as: "When I don't like something, it is vipaka" - - a nastily dangerous view!] "when we see insects there may be dosa-mula-cittas...thus, there is ayoniso manasikara" [Actually, ayoniso manasikara precedes the javana cittas and conditions the dosa-mula-cittas, rather than arising with them -- The "there is" is metaphorical, but it is difficult to discern that. Nina certainly knows it, but if I didn't know better, I would read it as ayoniso manasikara is a cetasika of dosa-mula-citta.] "The dosa may be so strong that one wants to kill the insects; then there is akusala kamma" [Yes, but the dosa-mula-citta itself is akusala kamma without having to be 'so strong'.] And on and on... It seems like I have to put so many filters on that I can't trust the reading. I don't mean to say, "I'm very wise and smart and Nina is messed up" -- if anything, the opposite is true. Instead, I just mean to say that her informal, metaphorical style doesn't mesh well with my skeptical nature. I'm delighted that it works so well for so many people. More direct comments on your post: > ...Patisambhidhimagga XXIX8 > ...Samyuttanikaya Nidana Moliyaphagguna p541 bodhi > ...Visuddhimagga XX83 Very nice and pertinent quotes, Robert. > of course this is not the case. The majjhimanikaya-tika says "these > dhammas are discovered as ultimately real actualities. And though > there is no real distinction (between these dhammas and their > characteristics), still, in order to facilitate understanding, the > exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device > (upacaramatta)." So true! However, my problem with ADL is not that I think Nina does not understand her metaphors as metaphors (I think she indeed does), it is just that the degree to which she enmeshes the metaphorical usage in technical language makes me feel like I always have to be wary of what she's written. Nina, I trust that you are not offended by my unwise attention conditioning dosa when I read your classic book. I am really grateful at all the work you've done to help people understand and appreciate Dhamma. Thank-you! Dan 11967 From: zipdrive14850 Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 8:07am Subject: Thanks, Jon Jon, Thanks for weighing in here. I appreciate your comments. Taking up the conversation in progress... _______________________ Dan: Similarly, I sometimes hear people ask about "who" experiences hearing and seeing? "Who" is it that is angry? "Who" reaps the fruits of kamma? "Who" is reborn? Again, it is so very difficult to see how the experiencing must imply that there is an experiencer. It just doesn't make sense. _______________________ Jon: I have always taken it that such questions were rhetorical, intended to remind the other person that in fact there is no experiencer. _______________________ Dan: Well, I see that happening too. But my comments were about people who are just beginning to hear Dhamma and are confused that Buddha would say there is no "who" because "someone" has to do the experiencing. *********************** _______________________ Dan: Then again, it is clear that there is a very strong urge to think there must be some individual agent to experience the experiences: "I hear", "My anger", "My vipaka/vedana/volition," etc. But the Buddha taught that these phenomena have no agent (anatta), that they are void of any experiencer (suññata), that the idea of an agent is strictly a concept--and a particularly tenacious concept at that. He also taught that the grasping at the agent concept (sakayaditthi) is a powerful source of suffering. ________________________ Jon: Yes, we all have this 'strong urge' you mention. This is wrong view. It is the reason we need to have things so carefully spelled out, as in the commentaries and the abhidhamma, and why even then we can understand only a little at a time. ________________________ Dan: Sometimes this 'strong urge' is a manifestation of wrong view. Sometimes it is also mana, as the sense of self continues to arise even when the conviction of self (i.e. wrong view) has been eradicated. *********************** _______________________ Jon: Well, as I noted above, the more strongly entrenched our wrong view, the more helpful it is to have things spelt out in precise, specific terms. But to expect the same exact formulation to be used in all contexts is perhaps a bit much. (On that basis, Dan, you would even find fault with the conventional language of the Buddha's discourses!) _______________________ Dan: I agree that on that basis, I would find fault in the conventional language in the Buddha's discourses. Since I don't have any problem at all with that language, the most logical conclusion to make would be that your assumption about the basis I am working from is just plain wrong. You may find helpful my recent response to Robert where my point is spelt out in more precise, specific terms for you. Thanks again, Jon. Dan 11968 From: christine_forsyth Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 0:29pm Subject: Re: Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Thanks Mike, Howard and Herman - and Herman.....you made me smile at 6.00 a.m., no mean feat! Cheers, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > Dear Christine, > > There are no right answers to the questions you were being asked. The > answers you gave were the answers you gave. No need to control the > outcome. Words are like seeds, drifitng in the wind, some land here, > some land there. You can sow, but you cannot make it rain :-) > > If I signed off saying, Cheers, big ears, would that that be too > familiar? > > Cheers > > Herman > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "christine_forsyth" > wrote: > > Dear All, > > > > It was an all-day Workshop at the Hospital last Saturday.... My > mind > > was concentrating on what was to come. A colleague sat next to me, > > and after the usual courtesies, looked at me quite seriously and > > said 'Chris, I heard you have become a Buddhist, and I wanted to > ask > > you, What is the Purpose of Life?' And he wasn't joking. So > > fortunately, I didn't give my first choice of answer, 'Just getting > > through 'til lunchtime'. > > ..... He didn't seem to think 'err, umm' and 'well, that's a bit > hard > > to answer' was sufficient. I said I was just a beginner and I > really > > wasn't the person to ask, and wouldn't he rather I loaned him a > book > > or two?....he would't accept reading references, he wanted to > > talk.......So, I launched into a rather mixed response about what > > suffering really was, and the Path leading to its cessation, and > was > > saved by the facilitator starting the presentation. > > But, there was no escape, the questioner was back at the tea and > > lunch-breaks ....by the end of it, I had run through MY > understanding > > of kamma, conditions, death, meditation, reality, and even > > anatta..... He wouldn't stop asking questions. Each answer > brought > > MORE questions. (This is beginning to remind me of > something....... > > sounds like dsg......:-)........so THIS is what vipaka in the > present > > life is!!). I am only thankful that I had enough sense to steer > > clear of 'nibbana', 'no-control' and 'dependent origination'.... > And > > I wish I'd left anatta out...... > > I have a feeling that the poor, confused man went away having > > found out that "the Buddha isn't an omnipotent God, though, yes, > > there possibly are some 'gods'. And, no, there is no soul, but we > > are each an accumulating process of good and bad tendencies and > > results of intentional action - sort of like information > > progressively stored on a computer and then forwarded (in a zip > > file) to a new computer (the next life) - though we don't remember > > previous lives (except some do...no, not me), or how we accumulated > > the accumulations, but you still inherit the consequences of what > the > > zip file accumulated (fair? well, it IS fair, but most of all it > just > > IS) - 'the same but not the same'. And, the purpose is not to live > > eternally, not to be annihilated at death, but to eventually not be > > re-born"......I think he was exhausted at that point, I know I > > was! Scary isn't it! > > ( Moral of this sad story - Be thankful that the first Buddhist > you > > ever met was not me.) > > It is amazing just how little of what I 'know' is intelligible, > when > > I'm asked to explain it. ....... I think I need help!! > > Are there unpleasant kammic consequences from trying to answer, > and > > answering unskillfully? Maybe we can work out something simple > and > > I can carry 'flash cards' or a FAQ sheet to refer to. :-) > > Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... > > > > metta, 11969 From: bodhi2500 Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 1:28pm Subject: [dsg] Intro. Thank-you Sarah and Kom for your answers. A quick note about these Khandha's, I am 34 yo living on the Sunshine coast in Queensland,Australia(perhapes another contender for the S.E.QLD DSG Christine?) I first came in contact with the Buddha's teachings about 10 years ago, My interest grew during trips to India and Thailand, and have returned to Thailand regularly to pursue a better understanding of Dhamma, going again in Oct.(impermanence permitting). I'm a bit of a lurker on these groups as I find most questions that arise can be answered by doing a bit of study. I find the ancient commentaries to be a great help in understanding the Dhamma. I am definantly in the Beginners corner when it comes to the complexities of Abhidhamma. I also enjoy studying Pali. I'd like to thank everyone in the group for helping me accumulate a better understanding of the Buddha's teachings. Anumodana :0) Well it's back to the Lurkers corner for now. Mettena Stigan 11970 From: Lucy Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 2:11pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Beginners Abhidhamma Study Group Hiya nama-rupa & concepts ! I'm back. Sorry - little samsaric entanglement (=work) got on the way. Now I have to catch up with the mail. Good to see you've all been busy. Chris - I join Larry on the slow lane to nibbana (anyway, remember I'm a deviant "M" - not supposed to reach nibbana, only get close). But don't worry, we don't have to be too strict or 'organised'. A little chaos is to be expected (and fun) - as long as we have a chance to ask questions and sort out the basics - it's OK. [where's the Harry Potter list, Larry ?] Follows... Lucy 11971 From: Lucy Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 2:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) ----- Original Message ----- From: "All phenomena in and around ourselves are only nåma and rúpa which arise and fall away; they are impermanent. Nåma and rúpa are absolute realities , in Påli: paramattha dhammas ." Could someone elaborate on what "absolute reality" means. I have a vague notion of irreducability on an atomic level. However I would like to know what it means on a "daily life" level. ---------------------------- Hi Larry & all I can't answer those questions, but can try adding to the confusion... Are these "paramattha dhamma" like building blocks of experience - that's why they're "irreducible"? And then there are all the different ways of classification : 4 paramattha dhamma, OR five khandha (aggregates) OR dhattu OR etc. It may be like classifying what makes up a building into frames, walls and space OR into bricks and mortar OR into steel, wood, sand, cement.. All 4 "realities" are anatta. Three of them are conditioned / caused, impermanent, dukkha. The 4th, nibbana, is unconditioned / uncaused, unchanging, not-dukkha - it's an altogether different sort of "experience". What's common to all 4? Or, why is nibbana in the same classification system as nama & rupa ? Is it because they can all be experienced directly (outside the flow of conceptual thought - like in a meditative state)? [yes, better leave Nibbana till last !!! ] These "realities" are also said to be universal. For an ant, a little mound of earth would be a "mountain" (concept), for a human it's a "little mound of earth" (concept) - so a same object is different for the ant and the human, the common thing is that the object is "rupa" - and it would be rupa for any other being. Or, my cat: for me she's a "friend" (concept), for another human, she's a "cat" (concept), for a flea she's "lodging and food" (concept), the cat believes she's a "self" (concept) --- the concepts are very different, but what's common to all observers and observed objects is : nama-rupa... Off to read more messages and nurse a headache. Lucy 11972 From: Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 11:32am Subject: Re: ADL ch 1 (2) Hi Larry and ADL study group, <> I think one chapter a week sounds pretty good to me. My idea is if we can lay down the schedule for the whole 24 weeks, it would be easier. Because if I have to be out off town or busy doing crazy stuffs, I still have some guidelines of what chapters I supposed to read while I am away. I agree it should be flexible but some structure might be a good idea as well. We can make a schedule month to month. One thing I have learnt from reading is that sometimes I cannot understand everything the first time I read but later as I read more, even from the same book, I get some more idea. I think if we try to get every little detail from each chapter, it might take a very long time to finish the book. Just my idea, let me know what do you think? << > 1. Could someone elaborate on what "absolute reality" means. I have a > vague notion of irreducability on an atomic level. However I would like > to know what it means on a "daily life" level. >> Let me hand in some homework then :-). I will pick up from what Sarah said. << 1."Absolute reality " refers to the namas and rupas (mental and physical phenomena) that exist in daily life and can be proved to exist by rt. awareness and rt.understanding..So thinking, exists, but concepts don't except as manifestations of thinking. >> I completely agree with Sarah. A thousand words are not worth a single look (awareness/understanding). I mean all I am about to say is just a thousand words, it's still not a paramattha-dhamma anyway. Sarah, hope you do not mind me adding a little more. Realities - There are two realities - apparent and ultimate. Apparent reality is ordinary conventional truth (pannatti-dhamma). Ultimate reality is abstract truth (paramattha-dhamma). Paramattha-dhamma is immutable. There are 4 paramattha-dhamma: citta, cetasika, rupa and nibbana. Pannatti-dhamma (concept/signification/name) is something we take for calling, for communication (vohara-sacca) or for thinking conceptually (sammatti-sacca). A table is hard. Hardness is real. Visual object is real. They do not need to be named. A table is pannatti. We call it a table by taking a sign from what we see and from our previous experiences (nama-memory and/or perception). The reason I said paramattha is immutable there has 2 main basic properties. 1.Commonl property (samanna-lakkhana) 2.Unique property (visesa-lakkhana) Common property (samanna-lakkhana): there are 3 common properties, Anicca (impermanence) Dukkha (suffering/ being not durable) Anatta (non-self/ uncontrollable) Citta, cetasika and rupa have all three common properties (tri-lakkhana). It's said that nibbana has only one property, anatta. Unique property (visesa-lakkhana): this property is unique for each paramattha-dhamma. There are four unique properties (lakkhanaticcatuka) Lakkhana (specific or generic attribute) Rasa (function or achievement) Paccupat-thana (manifestation or appearance or effect). Padatthana (proximate cause) Citta, cetasika and rupa have all four unique properties. It's said that nibbana does not have proximate cause (padatthana) b/c nibbana does not arise or fall away. Pannatti does not have any of the four unique properties. Pannatti also does not have commom properties of anicca and dukkha but it still falls in anatta category. Alright, feed back is appreciated. Did I put too much Thai/Pali in my writing? (thanks Herman for reminding me, appreciate) Num 11973 From: Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 11:35am Subject: Re:[dsg] "unpleasant words" <> Dear Herman, Thanks for being straight forward, you have always been :-) . I like that. Opps, let me say sorry for forgetting to put a translation next to each Thai/Pali word. I was in a rush. My train of thought can move a whole lot faster than my fingers. Thanks for reminding me about my carelessness, please always do, appreciate. At times I prefer to use the Pali term b/c it represents clearer and deeper meaning. I have a problem with reading the English translation b/c at times different translators translate the same word differently and I was confused!! Hope you get some clearer points from Dan and Jon's posts. This is a hard topic for me as well. In brief, all rupa (material) are avayakata(neutral). 5 sense-door experiences (citta) are always accompanied by upekkha-vedana(again translated as neutral feeling, which reminds me of proton, electron and neutron :-). ) I think the message I tried to say is it's very hard to know at that moment whether we experience pleasant or unpleasant object. As Dan said, the best thing I can come up with is if we hav e ability to know the nature of vipaka-citta(resulting-conscious) at that moment whether it's a result of kusala or akusala, that's probably the most definite one. I do not know how best to answer your question. The best I can do is just to guess. For me, my understanding, no matter it's a pleasant or unpleasant object, it does not mean that kusala has to follow a perception of pleasant object, nor akusala has to follow a perception of unpleasant object. When I was in school, I saw a lot of blood and feces. I general it should be very unpleasant, but it did not bother me at all. You know to see the first bowel movement or urine of the newborn can be a pleasant object b/c I then knew that his systems were working right. Alright, I am not sure I clarified any points. Better stop here. My max. capacity is probably 2 mails a days. Thanks for a reminder. Appreciate. Num 11974 From: johnrloganis Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 5:00pm Subject: Re: Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Hi Christine, Perhaps a useful approach would be to ask the question, gently of course, "Why do you want to know?" He is obviously looking for something. What was it really? That he kept asking questions indicates that he had not yet asked the "right question". He wasn't getting the answer he wanted or needed. So you could never answer or satisfy him until he asked the "real" question, and you found out what that was. Until then you were as has been said, "planting seeds". Your receptivity will have encouraged him to continue seeking the answer to the question he is searching for. When he finally gets to the real question, HE will know the answer! This reminds me of a Zen story. The disciple comes to the master and says, "I have a disturbed and angry mind. I want to make it peaceful." The master asks, "Show me your disturbed mind." The disciple responds, "I can't find it. It is not disturbed right now." The master then says, "There, your mind is now at peace." Christine, your compassionate Buddha nature wanted to fill the emptiness in him and in empathy is feeling disatisfied with your performance when the emptiness is IN HIM! with Karuna, Layman John > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" wrote: > > Dear Christine, > > > > There are no right answers to the questions you were being asked. > The > > answers you gave were the answers you gave. No need to control the > > outcome. Words are like seeds, drifitng in the wind, some land > here, > > some land there. You can sow, but you cannot make it rain :-) > > Cheers > > Herman 11975 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 4:07pm Subject: Re: ADL and metaphorical language [Robert]1 In dhammastudygroup@y..., "zipdrive14850" wrote: > > > "The dosa may be so strong that one wants to kill the insects; then > there is akusala kamma" > [Yes, but the dosa-mula-citta itself is akusala kamma without having > to be 'so strong'.] > > And on and on... > > _____________ Dear Dan, I'm just on my way to work so I reply to one point and will look at the others tonight. In the example above I think what Nina is explaining is that when seeing an insect there may be slight dosa but this is not yet akusala kamma patha. It only reaches that level when/if one actually starts thinking of ways to harm it. The texts make distinctions in these matters. Dosa-mula-citta comes in many degrees: sometimes there is a very slight uneasiness or boredom , this is dosa but it does not have the strength that it could condition patisandhi citta, it is not akusala kamma patha yet. Or it could be of the strength of muderous rage during which actual harm is done to another; this is akusala kamma patha and may condition patisandhi citta. best wishes robert 11976 From: Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 4:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Hi Sarah, Thanks for an excellent list of answers. I feel a little guilty taking up so much of your time; I guess no one else knows anything. (?) I would like to make a couple of comments on two of your answers: Sarah: "5. Usually we can talk about the characteristics of impermanence and so on as applying to realities but not to concepts. So we can say' thinking' is real and is conditioned, but not 'thoughts' experienced by thinking." Larry: If we subtract the thoughts from the thinking what is left? Sarah: "6.Memory or sanna is nama, not rupa (you asked 'could memory be rupa?) It's quite correct as you say, that without sanna, we wouldn't know impermanence. We wouldn't be able to function at all without the momentary marking. It doesn't 'grasp or hold on' however.This is the job of lobha (attachment) and other cetasikas. It merely 'marks'. There is no data base or store house as such and yet each marking accumulates and conditions the next set of marking. I suppose you could consider this as a kind of data entry and retrieval system w'out storage as you suggest. Phassa (contact) touches or impacts. It doesn't keep records." Larry: So are you saying every conscious event of every life I have lived is encoded or "marked" onto my next citta? What does "accumulate" mean? I assume when I become an arahat I will be able to remember why I asked all those questions, but for now, I've forgotten:-)) thanks, Larry 11977 From: Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 2:55pm Subject: Test - No Content /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11978 From: Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 7:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ADL ch 1 (2) Hi Num, Nice to see you. Here's some feedback from your excellent email; I learned a lot. First, I don't understand why ultimate realities are immutable based on the two properties, common properties and unique properties. Common properties: anicca, anatta, dukkha. Unique properties: attribute, function, manifesation, proximate cause. There is change in all these properties so why are ultimate realities immutable? Second, you wrote, "Pannatti does not have any of the four unique properties. Pannatti also does not have commom properties of anicca and dukkha but it still falls in anatta category." Doesn't language have an attribute, a function, a manifestation, and a proxmate cause? Isn't language impermanent and unsatisfactory? thanks, Larry 11979 From: Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 8:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Hi Howard, you wrote in part: "Part of the point I'm making here is that there is a difference between percepts-affected-by-concept and concepts themselves. There is the concept of 'tree'. This is purely mental, and it tends to be very stable. There is also the tree in my garden. It is not at all stable, yet it somehow seems to retain a stable identity. It is actually changing constantly right in front of my eyes, with branches bending in the wind and leaves flapping and falling. What is actually discerned when I look at the tree is a constantly shifting mosaic of direct visual experiences. But the mind groups them all into one "thing", the "tree in my garden" as the result of conceptual superimposition.This percept, actually not at all stable yet somehow seeming to retain its identity, is percept-affected-by-concept. Does this make sense?" Larry: I would say that your experience of the tree in your garden is entirely nonlinguistic and entirely cognitive. So I guess I don't understand what a concept is. Is concept just language? Names? Or is it something else. Are we saying that the senses are a better means to reality than reason? Larry 11980 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 8:39pm Subject: Re: ADL and metaphorical language [Robert]1 --- when I said akusala kamma patha the first time this should probably have been akusala kamma (only). In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: > In dhammastudygroup@y..., "zipdrive14850" wrote: > > > > > > "The dosa may be so strong that one wants to kill the insects; then > > there is akusala kamma" > > [Yes, but the dosa-mula-citta itself is akusala kamma without > having > > to be 'so strong'.] > > > > And on and on... > > > > _____________ > Dear Dan, > I'm just on my way to work so I reply to one point and will look at > the others tonight. > In the example above I think what Nina is explaining is that when > seeing an insect there may be slight dosa but this is not yet akusala > kamma patha. It only reaches that level when/if one actually starts > thinking of ways to harm it. The texts make distinctions in these > matters. > Dosa-mula-citta comes in many degrees: sometimes there is a very > slight uneasiness or boredom , this is dosa but it does not have the > strength that it could condition patisandhi citta, it is not akusala > kamma patha yet. Or it could be of the strength of muderous rage > during which actual harm is done to another; this is akusala kamma > patha and may condition patisandhi citta. > best wishes > robert 11981 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 9:06pm Subject: India Ch 8, no. 2 India Ch 8, no 2: During our pilgrimages in India we always discussed the perfections, påramís, accumulated by the Buddha during his lives as a Bodhisatta. The perfections are most important, because if they are not developed together with satipatthåna defilements cannot be eradicated. Each of the perfections helps to eliminate the clinging to the idea of self and they can support the paññå which can eventually eradicate all defilements. The perfections are: liberality, morality, renunciation, wisdom, energy, patience, truthfulness, resolution, loving kindness and equanimity. These qualities are only perfections when they are developed without thinking to gain something for oneself. They should be developed with the aim of having less selfishness, less defilements. Acharn Sujin explained that we should not think, ³Now I shall develop this perfection, then that², because then we try to develop them with an idea of self. The development of the perfections is conditioned by listening to the Dhamma. If we do not listen and study there is a concept of self who performs kusala. She said: ³When we listen to the Dhamma there is the perfection of patience already. There can be perfections at each moment of our life, and there is no need to think of a specific perfection. There can be more patience. We accumulate the perfections and see ever more clearly the ugliness of akusala. However, when there are conditions, akusala arises.² Dåna is opposed to lobha, dosa and moha. When we are generous, there is alobha, non-attachment, otherwise we would not be able to give. There is also adosa, non-aversion: there is no aversion or sadness when the receiver is unkind and does not appreciate our gift. When we are angry, we are absorbed in an idea of a person instead of being aware of nåma and rúpa. At the moment of generosity there cannot be moha, the cetasika arising with all akusala cittas. All perfections are opposed to lobha, dosa and moha. When satipatthåna arises at the moments we perform wholesome deeds, the idea of self who performs them can be eliminated. When mettå arises, there is also patience, patience with regard to people and circumstances. In Savatthí we had a bad hotel room full of insects everywhere, even in bed. One of our friends laughed about it that these crawled into her ears. Acharn Sujin reminded me that if we would complain and ask for a change of room, someone else would have the uncomfortable room and thus, we would have lack of mettå, we would think of ourselves instead of other people. When we see the value of mettå we can develop it. We can understand that whatever happens arises because of conditions. Akusala kamma conditions akusala vipåka and kusala kamma conditions kusala vipåka, nobody can prevent this. Sometimes we have to experience an unpleasant object and sometimes a pleasant object. We admired Acharn Sujin¹s great patience when she had to pose for the cameras countless times. Sometimes she could not take any step without the cameras being focussed on her. She told me that she just thinks of the happiness of others. Thus, mettå conditions patience. When we were in Kusinåra, in the temple of the reclining Buddha, we recollected the Buddha¹s parinibbåna. Ever since the moment of his enlightenment until his passing away he had taught satipatthåna, the only way leading to the end of the cycle of birth and death, and he himself had reached the end of the cycle. The monk held a long discourse and it was extremely hot in this temple. Acharn Sujin reminded me that we should have mettå for the monk who held the discourse. If there is mettå we have no aversion. 11982 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 9:06pm Subject: Re: [dsg] What's in a name? to Dan op 18-03-2002 05:43 schreef onco111 op dalthorp@o...: I sometimes hear people ask about "who" experiences > hearing and seeing? "Who" is it that is angry? "Who" reaps the fruits > of kamma? "Who" is reborn? Again, it is so very difficult to see how > the experiencing must imply that there is an experiencer. It just > doesn't make sense. Dear Dan, I would like to try to answer some of your points. Allow me to go first to the end of what you write after a quote from Ledi Sayadaw: This citta is nothing other than the act of cognizing" (BB's CMA, p. > 27-28). To me, this seems like an absolutely critical point that is > muddied by talk of "citta knows" and "nama experiences" because > subject/verb strongly evokes a concept of a subject that acts, > especially since I already have such a tendency to evoke that concept > in the first place.> N: If I understand your point, you see a danger of "citta knows", namely the old self may enter again through a backdoor, now in the disguise of citta as subject. There is a danger, when we just repeat: citta knows, and we still take citta for self. Excellent reminder, Dan. Indeed if we would only study: citta knows, nama knows, it is not enough. We need to study many details about citta. What does citta know, through which doorway, does citta last, is it an owner or controller, how many kinds of citta are there, what functions does it perform,what are the conditions for its arising? That is why the Buddha taught for fortyfive years. Now I try to go over some of your points. > > Then again, it is clear that there is a very strong urge to think > there must be some individual agent to experience the experiences: "I > hear", "My anger", "My vipaka/vedana/volition," etc. But the Buddha > taught that these phenomena have no agent (anatta), that they are > void of any experiencer (suññata), that the idea of an agent is > strictly a concept--and a particularly tenacious concept at that. He > also taught that the grasping at the agent concept (sakayaditthi) is > a powerful source of suffering. > N: yes how strong is the urge to think of my experience, my feeling, my remembrance. > >D: That's one reason why I find Nina's ADL such a difficult read. Over > and over I read things like: "Citta knows or experiences an object," > (p. 6) and "Nama experiences something" (p. 4). How does this citta > that experiences things differ from the actual experience of things? > If it differs, then how does it differ from a self? If it doesn't > differ, then what of the distinction, "Citta experiences" ? My strong > urge to posit an agent is fed and cultivated by the subject/verb, > agent/action construction because now I have a name for "who" does > the experiencing--it's "citta" ! > It may be clearer when I use examples now. The hearing hears, not a person. The seeing sees, not a person. But it will take a very long time to realize: it is only the hearing that hears, the seeing that sees. Hearing, an actual experience, is a reality and it is called citta, but you may also use another name. The characteristic is unalterable, no matter what name we use. Hearing experiences an object: sound. Hearing experiences sound through a doorway: the earbase or the organ of earsense. You ask, how do they differ from a self? Citta is so ephemeral, it arises, experiences an object and is then gone. The Buddha asked: "Can what is impermanent be self?" It could not control anything or own anything. So we need to know more details of citta. Each citta experiences an object through a doorway: Seeing experiences visible object through the eye-door, it does not experience sound, and it does not experience visible object through the ear-door. Citta is the actual experience, and it must experience an object, the object is one of the conditions for the arising of citta, there could not be any citta without experiencing an object. Citta is nama, it experiences or it is the act of experiencing, or the experience, or the element that experiences, and visible object is rupa: it has no curiosity, it does not know: I am seen by seeing-consciousness. Ledi Sayadaw, under "Fifty-four kinds of mental phenomena (Vipassana Dipani) explains: " citta means the faculty (indriya) of investigating an object or the faculty of taking possession of an object, or the faculty of knowing an object, or the faculty of being conscious of an object." Here he explains the aspect of citta as faculty or leader. Citta is the leader in its own field, namely in the cognizing of an object. But we should remember that it performs its function for an infinitesimally short while, and then gone, never to come back. For some people the aspect of faculty or indriya is more appealing, for others the aspect of element, dhatu, or the aspect of ayatana or of khandha. It all depends on someone's accumulated inclinations. That is why the Buddha used endless classifications of realities. Realities can be classified as ayatanas, sensefields and this shows that they just arise for an extremely short moment, because of their appropriate conditions. Sarah reminded us of the ayatanas: ********** We read in Vis. XXII, 72: No store of broken states, no future stock; Those born balance like seeds on needle points. Break-up of states is foredoomed at their birth; Those present decay, unmingled with those past. They come from nowhere, break up, nowhere go; Flash in and out, as lightning in the sky. Considering the ayatanas helps me to understand the seed balancing on a needle point: the visible object impinges on the eyesense and then seeing-consciousness arises, and the meeting or association of them is unthinkably short. You then quote from Yamaka, as cited by Ledi Sayadaw. I will not quote all, but only a part: Dan: Ven. Ledi Sayadaw continues (p. > 158), "But in Abhidhamma, from the standpoint of ultimate truth, > there is no difference between act and agent. The mode 'thinking' is > the act 'thinking.' The mind (citta), or thinking agent, is not > different from the act 'thinking.' ... Even the four categories of > ultimates--citta, cetasika, rupa, Nibbana--are only acts." In the > commentaries (e.g. Asl. (Expositor), p. 84), citta is defined "in > three ways: as agent, as instrument, and as activity. As the agent, > citta is that which cognizes an object (arammanam cinteti ti > cittam)....As an activity, citta is itself nothing other than the > process of congnizing the object (cintanamattam cittam). The third > definition, in terms of sheer activity, is regarded as the most > adequate of the three: that is, citta is fundamentally an activity or > process of cognizing or knowing an object. It is not an agent or > instrument possessing actual being in intself apart from the activity > of cognizing. The definitions in terms of agent and instrument are > proposed to refuts the wrong view of those who hold that a permanent > self or ego is the agent and instrument of cognition. The Buddhist > thinkers point out, by means of these definitions, that it is not a > self that performs the act of cognition, but citta or consciousness. > N: I have no problems with what is written here. Only about nibbana as an act I believe is questionable, it depends on what he means by that. Nibbana is the unconditioned dhamma, it is the object of lokuttara citta. But now I would like to explain the reason why I write: nama knows and rupa does not know anything. The purpose of our study is: the development of direct understanding of realities, so that there is a decrease in clinging to the self. The first stage of this direct understanding, insight knowledge, is distinguishing between the characteristic of nama and of rupa, not just by intellectual understanding. Nama and rupa have characteristics that appear, and these can be objects of awareness. We need words to explain them, but then, when there is right awareness no words are needed: it is directly known: a reality that knows, a reality that does not know. They do not appear together, as it may seem now, but one at a time as they are realized by awareness and right understanding. We have to become used to their different characteristics: it knows and it does not know. Seeing is different from visible object: seeing experiences or knows, visible object does not know anything. With this purpose in mind, we can use simple terms denoting nama and rupa, such as: it knows, it does not know. If we think too much on agent or act, activity, we get involved in thinking, and thinking, on and on. No matter what words or definitions we use, by thinking the deeply accumulated notion of self is not abandoned, and, this is the real danger, we do not notice this. So long as we take nama and rupa together, as a unity, there is the notion of self. Dont we take hearing and sound together? The first stage of insight is only the first step towards abandoning the notion of a self who experiences, and at a later stage impermanence, the arising and falling away of one nama and one rupa at a time can be penetrated. This has to concern one nama at a time and one rupa at a time, the understanding has to be very keen and precise, and therefore, this stage cannot arise so long as we still mix up nama and rupa and take them together as a whole. At that stage of insight it will be clearer that what is impermanent is not self. But there are characteristics, now, they appear and can be experienced. We should not forget this. There is likely to be thinking in terms of: it knows, it does not know, but there can also in between be direct awareness of the reality that knows and the reality that does not know. Are there not many sounds now? Do they know or experience? If you do not mind to use these expressions: it experiences or it does not experience, or: nama or rupa, or: mind and matter if you like these words better; it does not matter what words are used to denote characteristics of realities that appear now.We can use different words, but the characteristics of nama and rupa do not change: nama is always nama and rupa is always rupa. But as a foundation for awareness and direct understanding we need study and intellectual understanding: we have to study details: different cittas, cetasikas, their objects, doorways, conditions, we have to study rupas. In the first chapter I do not explain all. But no matter how much we study, the truth of non-self cannot be clear without the development of vipassana, stage by stage, and the first stage comes first. With appreciation for your reminders that are very useful to consider dhammas more and more, Nina. > > 11983 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 9:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Dear L.John and Christine, --- johnrloganis wrote: > Hi Christine, > Perhaps a useful approach would be to ask the question, gently of > course, "Why do you want to know?" This would be *exactly* my approach....... maybe followed by: - "What do you mean by purpose?" -"What is life?" - "what do you think?" -"why do you think that?" and so on, listening first to what his ideas are so one has a better idea of how to respond...... Often when I read the Suttas, I reflect on how much even the Buddha listened before attempting to respond, even though he knew just where everyone was 'coming from'. > He is obviously looking for something. What was it really? That he > kept asking questions indicates that he had not yet asked the "right > question". He wasn't getting the answer he wanted or needed. > > So you could never answer or satisfy him until he asked the "real" > question, and you found out what that was. Until then you were as has > been said, "planting seeds". Your receptivity will have encouraged > him to continue seeking the answer to the question he is searching > for. When he finally gets to the real question, HE will know the > answer! Yes, if my students tell me it's been a good lesson, it's usually when they've heard very little from me-- perhaps just a few directions--but by exploring, questioning and answering themselves, they've developed some confidence and feel they've *learnt*. On the otherhand, he must have been very appreciative of Christine's kind, patient and useful responses in order to keep coming back for more;-) And her *fine* reputation obviously encouraged him to start with;-) > This reminds me of a Zen story. The disciple comes to the master and > says, "I have a disturbed and angry mind. I want to make it peaceful." > > The master asks, "Show me your disturbed mind." > > The disciple responds, "I can't find it. It is not disturbed right > now." > > The master then says, "There, your mind is now at peace." Yes, I'm smiling.....aren't we always worrying about the past and forgetting about the present reality? > Christine, your compassionate Buddha nature wanted to fill the > emptiness in him and in empathy is feeling disatisfied with your > performance when the emptiness is IN HIM! You're making some really good points, L.John, that I had thought of mentioning (far less eloquently) myself. Look f/w to more, Sarah ============= 11984 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 10:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ayatanas again Dear Num & Nina, Num:> :):):) please always do not hesitate to drop in. I am always appreciated > your > input. Likewise, many thanks, Nina, for coming to my rescue;-)) Num:> Did you mean that to know citta or cetasika of other does not mean to > know > just by concept (pannatti)? I agree that citta or feeling of other can > > bring us back to present reality. The reason I referred to satipatthana > > sutta because I tried to make a point that citta and cetasika of other > (as > paramattha) can be an arammana of another person, the same to our own > previous citta. Now let me butt in and add a little of my understanding, ready for any correction as usual;-) In the Satipatthana sutta, when we read the phrases which start with “iti ajjhattam” (“Thus internally”) with reference to his own or the other’s mental objects. feelings, consciousness or rupas and so on, I understand that: 1. It is always ‘one’s own’ paramattha dhammas that are object of sati 2. we think about others (and as we’re not enlightened, used to thinking in terms of people). At these times, there can still be sati of ‘our’ paramattha dhammas. 3. The Satip. Sutta refers to all ‘situations’ and daily ‘occurrences’ including thoughts of others. .......... Even if someone has clairvoyant or telepathic or mind-reading ability or powers to recall past lives and so on, still there are only the same paramattha dhammas appearing now to be known. It is not the past cittas or another’s mind that can be directly experienced (exept as concept). For example, I may be recalling what happened yesterday. The reality is the present thinking. If someone with jhanic powers recalls previous lives, in the same way the present cittas are what can be known and what exist. This is also true of the future too. When we read in the texts about experiencing ‘earlier cittas’ or ‘the cittas of other beings’ this is also how I understand it. Even when we read about knowledge of past and future by way of actual experience, it is still the present cittas only that exist at that moment, even though with the combination of the jhanic powers and wisdom, these ‘objective fields’ can be taken as nimitta (as I understand;-). I’m getting into deep water, so will await any corrections. .......... In the appendix of Kathavatthu (quoted from yest.) there is a helpful definition of nimitta which I’ll add as I think someone (Christine was asking about it ages ago): “Nimitta is derived by some from ni+maa, to limit; and is defined as ‘that which limits its own fruit (effect)’: attano phalam niminaateeti (Abhidhaanappadiipikaa-suucii). According to this definition it denotes a causal factor, limiting, determining, conditioning, characterizing, etc, its own effect. Hence anything entering into a causal relation, by which its effect is signified, marked, or characterized, is a nimitta. An object, image, or concept which, on being meditated upon, induces samadhi (jhana) is nimitta. False opinion (di.t.thi) engendered by hallucination concerning impermanence - in other words, a perverted view of things as permanent - is a nimitta......Emancipation from this nimitta is termed animittavimokkha.......” (many cross refs given to Abhid. texts in this para.) Ohoh, everybody is on a run now !!!! Num, I think you’ve got us all on the ‘hop’ and the 'run'..... Sarah ================================= 11985 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 10:27pm Subject: dsg friends- Mike Nease Old DSGers, I've been meaning to add a note to another post-- but keep forgetting-- to say that I heard from Mike a few days ago and he's fine, back in the States. I mention it here as several people have asked on or off-list. He only has 'occasional, unpredictable and brief internet connection' and expects this for the 'forseeable future'. Rob K and Nina,-- (if you haven't heard)-- he mentions he still has a copy of his last work editing 'Survey of Paramattha Dhammas' but hasn't had time to review it (he plans to redo the TOC and index). He hopes to attend to this in the 'near future' but is busy for now. Sarah ======== 11986 From: johnrloganis Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 10:40pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Hi Sarah, Said he blushing at your kind words. I really liked your extensions of the questions. I know Christine's consciousness through her posts and I think we, Sarah and I, are onto something important. That is, being able to see ourselves clearly when the situation isn't clear. I wish I were really smart about this but then experience is the best teacher. I had a friend and she would go "strange" and I would get crazy! Fortunately she picked up on it and explained that it wasn't my problem -- I was tuning in to her craziness and thought it was my own. After that I began to watch various relationships and transactions and noticed that people who meditated a lot (any method) would "tune in" to others and think that they had the problem. It goes deeper than that in the Dhamma because our heart opens up and we want to relieve the suffering of others partly because we have been liberated a little and we then are more sensitive to the sufferings of others. As we grow in the Dhamma we recognize our interdependency more and more and we begin to experience more of the suffering in the world even on the scale of one on one. At least that is my humble opinion (OK so it is not so humble ;-D). L. John --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: 11987 From: Sarah Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 11:45pm Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Dear Howard, I’m very glad to read the reflections in your post. I’ll intersperse a few comments, aware that it may be rather long and without any of your eloquence ;-) I think the subject matter nicely follows on from our 'rose' posts;-) .......... --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah (and Larry) - > > In the post of yours, Sarah, which I quote at the end of this > post, > you speak about "concepts". To me, concepts are general ideas, each of > which > is constructed by the mind from a (usually) large body of interrelated > (memories of) directly experienced dhammas, some rupic, some namic and > from > other concepts. These concepts/ideas, once the "seeds" or "patterns" for > them > (sankharas) have already been formed and can be passed along from one > mindstate to another, may arise at any time in the mind when conditions > are > in place for them to do so; and when such a concept arises it does so as > an > object at the mind door and discerned by the function of vi~n~nana, just > as > vi~n~nana can discern sights, sounds etc. .......... This suggests an idea of concepts or patterns which can be stored and retrieved. In fact, as I understand, it is the cittas and cetasikas that are formed, passed on and arise when ‘conditions are in place’. Without cittas, cetasikas and rupas arising all the time, there couldn't be any concepts. Furthermore, a concept doesn’t *exist* and therefore cannot be formed, conditioned or passed on. For example, we live with the illusion that Chinese or Tai Chi is real, has been learnt and is passed on. In fact, what is real is the thinking, the marking and remembering, the hearing and sounds, the seeing and visible objects and so on. When these paramatha dhammas are combined together in particular ways and without any awareness, the particular concepts are taken to exist. If by discern you mean *experience* (sorry, I’ve just got confused between your and Ken O’s definitions again), it’s true that vinnana discerns concepts. If you mean *be aware of*, then awareness accompanying vinnana can only be aware of realities, but I think you don’t accept this? .......... >The main differences are that > (1) > concepts are not only mind-observed, but are also mind-constructed > (whereas > other dhammas, paramattha dhammas, while mind-observed and while > conditioned > (except for nibbana), are *not* mind-constructed, and (2) concepts, > being > constructs built from piecing together various mental elements, are > reducible, and hence not paramattha dhammas. .......... It’s true that concepts are mind-constucted. I’d add that I think the main difference is that paramattha dhammas have characteristics which can be directly observed whereas concepts don’t. Concepts don’t have sabhava (essence) and therefore don’t exist as objects that can be known. .......... > But it seems to me that it is necessary also to distinguish > between > concepts-as-ideas, and instances of them which are, in fact, > "percepts-affected-by-concept" (or, perhaps, > "percepts-organized-by-concept"). For example, we have the pattern in > our > mind for the concept of 'tree', and, whenever we turn our mind in that > direction, that concept can arise in the mind; and, also, whenever we > see > certain sights, that concept can arise, unbidden, to overlay and distort > our > perception resulting in our "seeing a tree", and that would be an > instance of > percept-affected-by-concept. I introduced this notion of > "percept-affected-by-concept" in a post on another list which I copy > here: .......... We can differentiate between all the different kinds of concepts as we’ve listed before, but in the end, they’re all still concepts and the task is to understand paramattha dhammas and to thus differentiate them from concepts. The distortion lies therefore--as Frank and others were discussing recently-- in the sanna and citta and especially in the wrong view, rather than in the concept or pattern. This may seem like nit-picking and I’m afraid I may not be expressing myself in appropriate language. > ********************************************************** > As I sit here in the den in front of the computer monitor, I look at > the lamp on the round table in the living room. What I call "the lamp" > is a > part of my field of vision. All that is actually perceived initially > are > certain colors and shapes mentally assembled into a unit and "carved > out" > from the general field of vision. Then sa~n~na then comes into play. In > this > application of sa~n~na, the mind *superimposes* the concept of 'lamp' on > the > percept. The percept is liable to change. But the concept of 'lamp' is > quite > stable, and it "lends" its stability to the percept. The superimposition > of > the concept 'lamp' on our experience causes us to see through a > conceptual > filter, a filter which lends the sense of independent existence and > permanence to what is dependent and impermanent. .......... I can just ‘see’ you in your den now in the concepts and images of ‘my’ mind;-) This is a helpful explanation, but again I’d just question your comments at the end. It is not, I believe, the concept ‘lamp’ which causes any of the illusion, but rather any illusion or wrong view that may accompany the thinking of ‘lamp’. As awareness grows, concepts of lamps don’t shrink in other words;-) Apologies if I misunderstand you. .......... > Part of the point I'm making here is that there is a difference > between percepts-affected-by-concept and concepts themselves. There is > the > concept of 'tree'. This is purely mental, and it tends to be very > stable. > There is also the tree in my garden. It is not at all stable, yet it > somehow > seems to retain a stable identity. It is actually changing constantly > right > in front of my eyes, with branches bending in the wind and leaves > flapping > and falling. What is actually discerned when I look at the tree is a > constantly shifting mosaic of direct visual experiences. But the mind > groups > them all into one "thing", the "tree in my garden" as the result of > conceptual superimposition.This percept, actually not at all stable yet > somehow seeming to retain its identity, is percept-affected-by-concept. > Does > this make sense? .......... I think you explain the seeing of visual objects very clearly and well. Again , I think the reason for studying concepts and realities is not for the purpose of deconstructing mental processes or for abandoning concepts, but in order to understand what appears at the present moment and to know the difference between conventional and ultimate realities. > ********************************************** > > Any thoughts on this, Sarah, or anyone? .......... You make many very useful points with some helpful examples for us all to consider. I think we mostly agree on: - the seeing of visual objects or colours in the field of vision -the importance of sanna (memory or ‘marking’) in determining how the visual object is perceived -the distinction between concepts and realities -the various kinds of concept which are ‘mind-constructed’, based on reality or other concepts -concepts being mind-experienced only .......... Where we may differ is: -whether concepts can ever be directly known or an object of satipatthana -whether concepts cause any of the problems or *suffering* -whether concepts can be accumulated, retrieved and so on -whether realities and not concepts have sabhava (essence) .......... Apologies for any mis-understanding on my part. I think these are key issues and very compex ones. I’ll be very happy to discuss any of the differences further or to hear from anyone else. Sarah =========== 11988 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Tue Mar 19, 2002 11:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ayatanas again --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: > Dear Num & Nina, > >> > Even if someone has clairvoyant or telepathic or mind-reading ability or > powers to recall past lives and so on, still there are only the same > paramattha dhammas appearing now to be known. It is not the past cittas or > another's mind that can be directly experienced (exept as concept). For > example, I may be recalling what happened yesterday. The reality is the > present thinking. If someone with jhanic powers recalls previous lives, in > the same way the present cittas are what can be known and what exist. This > is also true of the future too. > > When we read in the texts about experiencing `earlier cittas' or `the > cittas of other beings' this is also how I understand it. Even when we > read about knowledge of past and future by way of actual experience, it is > still the present cittas only that exist at that moment, even though with > the combination of the jhanic powers and wisdom, these `objective fields' > can be taken as nimitta (as I understand;-). I'm getting into deep water, > so will await any corrections. > .......... Dear Sarah, I think we have to be careful here. This may be true in general but the Buddha has direct knowledge of others. From the paramatthamanjusa (note vii7 of visuddhimagga) "All dhammas are available to the adverting of the Blessed one, are available to his thought'(PSii195) And the blessed one's knowledge that has the past and future as its objective field is entirely actual experience since it is devoid of assumption based on inference, tradition or conjecture". best wishes robert 11989 From: christine_forsyth Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 1:22am Subject: [dsg] Re: Some are teachers, and some are just plain incapable ....... Hi Sarah and L.John, Thanks for your thoughts on this matter, amazing how in hindsight I can see what would have been a better choice of action......(mainly because of all the good counsel from Dhamma friends.) :-) - I see him occasionally, and I know it is only a matter of time before the subject is raised again. This time I'll be better prepared. I agree with what you said John: " I think we, Sarah and I, are onto > something important. That is, being able to see ourselves clearly > when the situation isn't clear." metta, Christine --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "johnrloganis" wrote: > Hi Sarah, > Said he blushing at your kind words. > I really liked your extensions of the questions. I know Christine's > consciousness through her posts and I think we, Sarah and I, are onto > something important. That is, being able to see ourselves clearly > when the situation isn't clear. > > I wish I were really smart about this but then experience is the best > teacher. I had a friend and she would go "strange" and I would get > crazy! Fortunately she picked up on it and explained that it wasn't > my problem -- I was tuning in to her craziness and thought it was my > own. After that I began to watch various relationships and > transactions and noticed that people who meditated a lot (any method) > would "tune in" to others and think that they had the problem. > > It goes deeper than that in the Dhamma because our heart opens up and > we want to relieve the suffering of others partly because we have > been liberated a little and we then are more sensitive to the > sufferings of others. As we grow in the Dhamma we recognize our > interdependency more and more and we begin to experience more of the > suffering in the world even on the scale of one on one. > > At least that is my humble opinion (OK so it is not so humble ;-D). > > L. John > > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah wrote: 11990 From: Sarah Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 1:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ayatanas again Dear Rob K, Always good to hear from you. Any chance of joining us on the Sri Lanka trip? --- "robertkirkpatrick.rm" wrote: S:> > When we read in the texts about experiencing `earlier cittas' > or `the > > cittas of other beings' this is also how I understand it. Even > when we > > read about knowledge of past and future by way of actual > experience, it is > > still the present cittas only that exist at that moment, even > though with > > the combination of the jhanic powers and wisdom, these `objective > fields' > > can be taken as nimitta (as I understand;-). I'm getting into deep > water, > > so will await any corrections. > > .......... R:> Dear Sarah, > I think we have to be careful here. This may be true in general but > the Buddha has direct knowledge of others. From the paramatthamanjusa > (note vii7 of visuddhimagga) > "All dhammas are available to the adverting of the Blessed one, are > available to his thought'(PSii195) And the blessed one's knowledge > that has the past and future as its objective field is entirely > actual experience since it is devoid of assumption based on > inference, tradition or conjecture". ********** Yes, I’ve often considered these references in VisV11,note7 (all further quotes below are from this same section). As it also says: “The objective field of enlightened Ones is unthinkable, it cannot be thought out; anyone who tried to think it out would reap madness and frustration” (Aii,80). I’d better be careful;-) It’s a very difficult area and I once raised these quotes with K.Sujin and she seemed to stress again one’s own citta (or the Buddha’s citta here) and present realities and concepts. It was one of those very quick responses interrupted by an unrelated question which I planned to return to, but never had the ‘right’ opportunity. Maybe one of us will later. She did mention the part about jhanas with ~nana and nimitta though, I remember. We also have to consider carefully (at least I certainly do) because we read further: “All dhammas are available to the adverting of the Enlightened One, the Blessed One, are available at his wish, are available to his attention, are available to his thought” (Ps.ii.195). Earlier there was a reference also to ‘every objective field’ to include ‘formed dhammas classed as past, future and present, internal and external, etc and unformed and conventional (conceptual) dhammas.....’. So dhammas are referring here to concepts as well as realities. There was also a reference to objects with the ‘characteristic of presence’ excluding past, future and conventional dhammas (as we would expect and as I just discussed with Howard). We read about the omniscience of the Buddha and ability of “unobstructed knowledge” , unhindered universally, to penetrate all dhammas without exception. Usually, as we read it is only by understanding dhammas in succession that they are differentiated and there is contrast between realities and concepts. I understand that for the Buddha “the objective field is purified and it is unthinkable” and this contrast is unnecessary; “So, although it occurs with all dhammas as object, it nevertheless does so making those dhammas quite clearly defined, as though it had a single dhamma as its object. this is what is unthinkable here.” It’s been fun exploring further. I don’t have any of the answers, but I’ve managed to put off a lot of paperwork and return phone calls. Nina and Num may be able to help further and I’m always very glad to hear further comments of yours, Rob. Sarah ==================== 11991 From: onco111 Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 2:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] What's in a nama? to Dan Dear Nina, Thank you for the clear explanation. You are saying that hearing only occurs if there is something to be heard, i.e. that hearing must have an object and that hearing cannot be a self or taken as evidence of a self or taken as proof of a self. This is clear to me. I've tried to read such things as "the hearing hears", "citta experiences", etc. with that in mind. However, I still can't see the need to think about a something that hears. You write: "It will take a very long time to realize: it is only the hearing that hears, the seeing that sees." This sounds peculiar to me because there really is no thing that hears. There is only hearing. Sotaviññana is not a thing that hears. It is hearing. There is no thing that hears. Only hearing. Sotaviññana is not a rupa; it is not a "thing"; there is no substance to it; it is only "hearing". Strictly due to the subject/verb grammatical structure and common usage, in my mind the phrase "Sotaviññana hears" or "hearing hears" tends to evoke a substance for the citta, i.e. to muddy the distinction between nama and matter. I think of nama as the experience and the objects of five- sense-door experience as rupa. I don't find it helpful to think in terms of nama is a thing that experiences and rupa is a thing that can't experience because neither nama nor rupa are *things*. Instead, they are dhammas, or phenomena. That's why I ask: "What's in a nama?" Apart from itself, apart from the experience, there is nothing. With appreciation, Dan 11992 From: onco111 Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 2:42am Subject: Re: ADL and metaphorical language [Robert]1 Dear Robert, In your comments, you originally wrote: > In the example above I think what Nina is explaining is that when > seeing an insect there may be slight dosa but this is not yet akusala > kamma patha. It only reaches that level when/if one actually starts > thinking of ways to harm it. The texts make distinctions in these > matters. > Dosa-mula-citta comes in many degrees: sometimes there is a very > slight uneasiness or boredom , this is dosa but it does not have the > strength that it could condition patisandhi citta, it is not akusala > kamma patha yet. Or it could be of the strength of muderous rage > during which actual harm is done to another; this is akusala kamma > patha and may condition patisandhi citta. You later correct yourself by excising the "patha" from your explanation above. Your original version is mostly correct, but it does require the "patha." Kamma is volition (cetana). It arises with every kusala or akusala citta, including those with a very slight uneasiness or boredom. "It [kamma] harmonizes, arranges, coordinates, thinks, stimulates and decides. This being so, what does the volition of the fivefold external sense harmonize, arrange, co-ordinate? The co-existent factors...The volition which is accomplished in that door, by which we take up covetousness, ill-will, wrong views, or non- covetousness, good-will, and right views: this volition is an act of thought." (Expositor, p. 117-118). The mental act of coordinating cetasikas that include any of the six roots is kamma. Not all kamma is capable of conditioning patisandhi citta; only the kamma that constitutes a full course of action (kamma patha) does. > Or it could be of the strength of muderous rage > during which actual harm is done to another; this is akusala kamma > patha and may condition patisandhi citta. Strong dosa that drives a murderous rage that causes actual harm to another would certainly qualify as akusala kamma patha (bodily), but so would a more subtle dosa that is only a brief moment of wishing harm to another (ill-will). [BB's CMA has a nice discussion of this.] Dan 11993 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 6:10am Subject: Re: ADL and metaphorical language [Robert] Dear dan, As we've discussed it is very important that one understand that there is no distinction between dhammas (eg. feeling, citta etc) and their characteristics. I am glad you bought this up as subtle wrong ideas in can remain hidden for years. On a different point I remember when I first studied patthana that I had an idea that the paccaya (conditions) were something somehow different from paramattha dhammas - and it took me awhile to realise that of course they are not. You feel that ninas writing mixes precise technical language with metaphorical language and this is confusing: (Dan: "the trouble is mostly a clash of styles. What makes it difficult for a skeptical Dan is that the metaphorical language is so strongly intertwined with her sometimes precise, technical language that I feel I always must be on guard so as not to be misled into mistaking the metaphorical for the actual. ") Dan: E.g.: ADL "Citta experiences..." [Actually, citta IS the experience] ____ I think then you must also have problems with some of the pali text translations; For example: "it is feeling that feels by making the basis the object" (Dispeller of delusion p325). Or from Bodhi CMA p41 "Eye-consciousness[a citta] arises based upon eye-sensitivity.Its function is simply to see, to cognize directly and immediately" p78 "[phassa] is the mental factor by which consciousness mentally touches the object that has appeared" p79 "feeling is the mental factor that feels the object.... feeling is said to have the mental quality of being felt. Its function is experiencing.." sanna : the characteristic of perception is the perceiving of the qualities of the object.Its function is to make a sign as a condition for perceiving again that 'this is the same'.. From the atthasalini: Contact means 'it touches'. It has touching as its salient characteristic, impact as its function.." Perception has the characteristic of perceiving by an act of general inclusion, and the function of making marks as a condition for repeated perception..".."it has the characteristic of noting and the function of recogisning what has been previously noted" best wishes robert " 11994 From: Sarah Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 6:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Intro. Dear Stigan, --- bodhi2500 wrote: > Thank-you Sarah and Kom for your answers. > A quick note about these Khandha's, I am 34 yo living on the Sunshine > coast in Queensland,Australia(perhapes another contender for the > S.E.QLD DSG Christine?) I know she'll be delighted to have another member in this branch. Stigan, Azita, Ken H, we're looking closely at the last weekend in July in Noosa, so pls mark your diaries and Azita, pls pass the word to old dhamma friends too. We'll coordinate off-list further. (Herman..would be great if you and Vicki could join, but not so simple I know;-) > I first came in contact with the Buddha's teachings about 10 years > ago, My interest grew during trips to India and Thailand, and have > returned to Thailand regularly to pursue a better understanding of > Dhamma, going again in Oct.(impermanence permitting). That's interesting...if you have any spare time in Bkk you may wish to meet K.Sujin and other friends there. >I'm a bit of a > lurker on these groups as I find most questions that arise can be > answered by doing a bit of study. I find the ancient commentaries to > be a great help in understanding the Dhamma. I am definantly in the > Beginners corner when it comes to the complexities of Abhidhamma. I > also enjoy studying Pali. > I'd like to thank everyone in the group for helping me accumulate a > better understanding of the Buddha's teachings. Anumodana :0) More and more interesting. Which ancient commentaries do you like reading? Do you read them in Pali? We're always looking for Pali help here too;-) > Well it's back to the Lurkers corner for now. I'm sure we all look f/w to being further inspired by you and to hearing further neat comments and references like the one to Kom. So hope to see you in all the corners, not just the Lurkers'. (meanwhile, if you bump into other friends there, pls give them a nudge too;-)) Thanks for the intro with so little prompting......Now if we can encourage any of the SE QLD DSG to add photos to the album (with or without surfboards), we'll all be in 'Sunshine Coast' mode. Sarah ======= 11995 From: Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 1:51am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Hi, Larry - In a message dated 3/19/02 11:31:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > Hi Howard, you wrote in part: > > "Part of the point I'm making here is that there is a difference between > percepts-affected-by-concept and concepts themselves. There is the > concept of 'tree'. This is purely mental, and it tends to be very > stable. There is also the tree in my garden. It is not at all stable, > yet it somehow seems to retain a stable identity. It is actually > changing constantly right in front of my eyes, with branches bending in > the wind and leaves flapping and falling. What is actually discerned > when I look at the tree is a constantly shifting mosaic of direct visual > experiences. But the mind groups them all into one "thing", the "tree in > my garden" as the result of conceptual superimposition.This percept, > actually not at all stable yet somehow seeming to retain its identity, > is percept-affected-by-concept. Does this make sense?" > > Larry: I would say that your experience of the tree in your garden is > entirely nonlinguistic and entirely cognitive. So I guess I don't > understand what a concept is. Is concept just language? Names? Or is it > something else. > ---------------------------------------------------- Whatever else a concept is, it is a mental *construct*, obtained from more direct experiences. Concepts have names associated with them (as linguistic tags), and then these names are used linguistically by our thinking processes and for communication purposes. Because of the naming, higher-level concepts mix in linguistic elements with the direct-experience elements. ------------------------------------------------------ Are we saying that the senses are a better means to> > reality than reason? > ---------------------------------------------------- Both are useful. The senses provide the material mentally constructed into concepts. We could not function in our world without concepts precisely because "our world" IS a world of (that is, created by) concepts. --------------------------------------------------- > > Larry > ========================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11996 From: Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 2:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] BEGINNERS ABHIDHAMMA - ADL ch 1 (2) Hi, Sarah - In a message dated 3/20/02 2:47:06 AM Eastern Standard Time, sarahdhhk@y... writes: > > Dear Howard, > > I’m very glad to read the reflections in your post. I’ll intersperse a > few comments, aware that it may be rather long and without any of your > eloquence ;-) I think the subject matter nicely follows on from our 'rose' > posts;-) > .......... > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah (and Larry) - > > > > In the post of yours, Sarah, which I quote at the end of this > > post, > > you speak about "concepts". To me, concepts are general ideas, each of > > which > > is constructed by the mind from a (usually) large body of interrelated > > (memories of) directly experienced dhammas, some rupic, some namic and > > from > > other concepts. These concepts/ideas, once the "seeds" or "patterns" for > > them > > (sankharas) have already been formed and can be passed along from one > > mindstate to another, may arise at any time in the mind when conditions > > are > > in place for them to do so; and when such a concept arises it does so as > > an > > object at the mind door and discerned by the function of vi~n~nana, just > > as > > vi~n~nana can discern sights, sounds etc. > .......... > This suggests an idea of concepts or patterns which can be stored and > retrieved. In fact, as I understand, it is the cittas and cetasikas that > are formed, passed on and arise when ‘conditions are in place’. Without > cittas, cetasikas and rupas arising all the time, there couldn't be any > concepts. > > Furthermore, a concept doesn’t *exist* and therefore cannot be formed, > conditioned or passed on. For example, we live with the illusion that > Chinese or Tai Chi is real, has been learnt and is passed on. In fact, > what is real is the thinking, the marking and remembering, the hearing and > sounds, the seeing and visible objects and so on. When these paramatha > dhammas are combined together in particular ways and without any > awareness, the particular concepts are taken to exist. > ---------------------------------------------------------- Howard: You are missing, I think, what I mean by 'concept'. By a concept I mean a type of THOUGHT! I do not mean the alleged referent of that thought. The thought of "tree" is a mental construct that can arise in the mind as a mental object. It is just a thought that is an object at the mind door, as a color can be an object at the eye door. When I look outside and "see a tree", my mind is mixing that thought into the my visual experience; there is a superimposition which creates the impression of seeing a thing that I *call* "the tree in my garden". ---------------------------------------------------- > > If by discern you mean *experience* (sorry, I’ve just got confused between > your and Ken O’s definitions again), it’s true that vinnana discerns > concepts. If you mean *be aware of*, then awareness accompanying vinnana > can only be aware of realities, but I think you don’t accept this? > ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: Vi~n~nana can discern the *thought* of "tree" - whn it does so, it is discerning a mental object. Vi~n~nana can also discern the mind-object which is "the tree in my garden which I see right now through the window". That is a percept-affected-by-concept. Note that I describe this as a MIND-object. There is no actual tree in my garden which I see right now through the window *except in a manner of speaking*, that is, *except conventionally*. ---------------------------------------------------- > .......... > >The main differences are that > > (1) > > concepts are not only mind-observed, but are also mind-constructed > > (whereas > > other dhammas, paramattha dhammas, while mind-observed and while > > conditioned > > (except for nibbana), are *not* mind-constructed, and (2) concepts, > > being > > constructs built from piecing together various mental elements, are > > reducible, and hence not paramattha dhammas. > .......... > It’s true that concepts are mind-constucted. I’d add that I think the main > difference is that paramattha dhammas have characteristics which can be > directly observed whereas concepts don’t. Concepts don’t have sabhava > (essence) and therefore don’t exist as objects that can be known. > ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Again, we are using the term 'concept' in different ways. Concepts in the sense of thoughts do, indeed, have directly observable characteristics. Some are clear and well-defined, while others are fuzzy. Some are mathematical concpets, while others are bilogical concepts. Some are easily describable in Pali, but hard to describe in English. Some, like 'hardness' correspond to paramattha dhammas, but others, like 'tree' do not. One can go on and on with a list of characteristics of concepts. -------------------------------------------------- > .......... > > But it seems to me that it is necessary also to distinguish > > between > > concepts-as-ideas, and instances of them which are, in fact, > > "percepts-affected-by-concept" (or, perhaps, > > "percepts-organized-by-concept"). For example, we have the pattern in > > our > > mind for the concept of 'tree', and, whenever we turn our mind in that > > direction, that concept can arise in the mind; and, also, whenever we > > see > > certain sights, that concept can arise, unbidden, to overlay and distort > > our > > perception resulting in our "seeing a tree", and that would be an > > instance of > > percept-affected-by-concept. I introduced this notion of > > "percept-affected-by-concept" in a post on another list which I copy > > here: > .......... > We can differentiate between all the different kinds of concepts as we’ve > listed before, but in the end, they’re all still concepts and the task is > to understand paramattha dhammas and to thus differentiate them from > concepts. The distortion lies therefore--as Frank and others were > discussing recently-- in the sanna and citta and especially in the wrong > view, rather than in the concept or pattern. > > This may seem like nit-picking and I’m afraid I may not be expressing > myself in appropriate language. > --------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I think our entire conversation is at cross-purposes, because we are using different terminlogy. I suspect that we would actually agree if we were using the same terminology. --------------------------------------------------------- > > > ********************************************************** > > As I sit here in the den in front of the computer monitor, I look at > > the lamp on the round table in the living room. What I call "the lamp" > > is a > > part of my field of vision. All that is actually perceived initially > > are > > certain colors and shapes mentally assembled into a unit and "carved > > out" > > from the general field of vision. Then sa~n~na then comes into play. In > > this > > application of sa~n~na, the mind *superimposes* the concept of 'lamp' on > > the > > percept. The percept is liable to change. But the concept of 'lamp' is > > quite > > stable, and it "lends" its stability to the percept. The superimposition > > of > > the concept 'lamp' on our experience causes us to see through a > > conceptual > > filter, a filter which lends the sense of independent existence and > > permanence to what is dependent and impermanent. > .......... > I can just ‘see’ you in your den now in the concepts and images of ‘my’ > mind;-) > This is a helpful explanation, but again I’d just question your comments > at the end. It is not, I believe, the concept ‘lamp’ which causes any of > the illusion, but rather any illusion or wrong view that may accompany the > thinking of ‘lamp’. As awareness grows, concepts of lamps don’t shrink in > other words;-) Apologies if I misunderstand you. > .......... > > Part of the point I'm making here is that there is a difference > > between percepts-affected-by-concept and concepts themselves. There is > > the > > concept of 'tree'. This is purely mental, and it tends to be very > > stable. > > There is also the tree in my garden. It is not at all stable, yet it > > somehow > > seems to retain a stable identity. It is actually changing constantly > > right > > in front of my eyes, with branches bending in the wind and leaves > > flapping > > and falling. What is actually discerned when I look at the tree is a > > constantly shifting mosaic of direct visual experiences. But the mind > > groups > > them all into one "thing", the "tree in my garden" as the result of > > conceptual superimposition.This percept, actually not at all stable yet > > somehow seeming to retain its identity, is percept-affected-by-concept. > > Does > > this make sense? > .......... > I think you explain the seeing of visual objects very clearly and well. > Again , I think the reason for studying concepts and realities is not for > the purpose of deconstructing mental processes or for abandoning concepts, > but in order to understand what appears at the present moment and to know > the difference between conventional and ultimate realities. > > > ********************************************** > > > > Any thoughts on this, Sarah, or anyone? > .......... > You make many very useful points with some helpful examples for us all to > consider. > > I think we mostly agree on: > - the seeing of visual objects or colours in the field of vision > -the importance of sanna (memory or ‘marking’) in determining how the > visual object is perceived > -the distinction between concepts and realities > -the various kinds of concept which are ‘mind-constructed’, based on > reality or other concepts > -concepts being mind-experienced only > .......... > Where we may differ is: > -whether concepts can ever be directly known or an object of satipatthana > -whether concepts cause any of the problems or *suffering* > -whether concepts can be accumulated, retrieved and so on > -whether realities and not concepts have sabhava (essence) ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: I suspect these differences are pure terminological/definitional. ---------------------------------------------------- > .......... > Apologies for any mis-understanding on my part. I think these are key > issues and very compex ones. I’ll be very happy to discuss any of the > differences further or to hear from anyone else. > > Sarah > =========== > > ============================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 11997 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: answering questions op 19-03-2002 11:41 schreef egberdina op hhofman@d...: > Dear Christine, > > There are no right answers to the questions you were being asked. The > answers you gave were the answers you gave. No need to control the > outcome. Words are like seeds, drifitng in the wind, some land here, > some land there. You can sow, but you cannot make it rain :-) Dear Herman, I appreciate your answer to Christine, very wise. I have the same doubts when answering difficult questions, but it is exactly as you say. I should keep this in mind, it is good for me. Appreciative, Nina. 11998 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] "unpleasant words" Dear Num, I appreciate very much your clear exposition about the criteria for pleasant and unpleasant objects, and also your post on concepts and paramattha dhammas, I am sure it helps many people, including me. A tricky subject from another post: when we think of someone else's feeling or citta, I do not think these objects change into concepts, at least not immediately, but afterwards, when we build up stories, difficult to tell at which moment. But, as an object of mindfulness it is said: know the feeling or the citta (not a concept) of the other person as feeling, as citta. Thank you for your posts, anumodana, Nina. op 18-03-2002 23:47 schreef srnsk@a... op srnsk@a...: > > The following is what I got from reading abhidhammatthasangaha. In general to > know what is ittaramana (pleasant object) or anittharamana (unpleasant > object) can be approximated by the two definitions: the reality, which is a > result of kusaladhamma, is an ittharamana, the reality, which is a result of > akusaladhamma, is an anittharamana. Anyway this is not definite. For > example a strong smell of a dead deer is an ittharamana for the vulture but > not for the human. In this case the dead dear is called parikappa-ittharamana > for a vulture. Or like an anchovy, some people really like it and some cannot > even stand the taste and the smell of an anchovy. > > In atthakatha there is a list of 5 criteria as a guideline to define what is > ittharamana and what is anittharamana. > 1.as to vipaka citta > 2.as to a norm in general > 3.as to dvara > 4.as to aramana > 5.as to time (kala) > > 1.As to vipaka citta. If the vipaka citta is a kusala vipaka, that aramana is > an ittharamana. If the vipaka citta is akusala vipaka, that aramana is an > anittharamana. The problem with this criterion is, who can know which vipaka > moment is kusala or akusala vipaka? Probably only the Budhha and his great > disciples can know this. You mentioned javana process, which is not a vipaka > moment. Javana can be associated or disassociated with vipaka. For example, > an arahant no longer has kusala or akusala but still can experience akusala > vipaka. Or in sullathasutta, although one has akusla (painful) kayavinnana, > it does not mean that the akusala-javana is always the case to follow. > > 2.As to a norm in general: this one depends on a norm of general population > according to their background. Blood is sweet for the mosquito or fermented > food is attractive to the fly. Most people think sweetness is pleasant and > bitterness is unpleasant. > > 3.As to dvara. Pepper is nice to look at because it's colorful but capsaicin > can burn your tongue or your skin. So by eye-base, it's an ittharamana. By > kaya-base, it's an anittharamana. The javana in manodvara that follows the > eye-base, in this case has an object as ittharamana, the javana of mano-dvara > that follows the kaya-base has an object as anittharamana. > > 4.As to aramana. For example some flowers look very pretty but their smell > can be really bad. > > 5.As to time (kala). Water in general a pleasant object e.g. when we are hot > or thirsty but during the flood, water becomes anittharamana. Bright light > during the working hour is pleasant but to leave a light on when we go to bed > can be very unpleasant. > > For me it's still not completely clear. The bottom line is it's hard to > really know by thinking or assuming. I may try to deduct by combination of > the above criterion but the most definite on is probably the first one, by > knowing nature of vipaka at that moment, which I think is a panna in > vipassana-nnana. > > That all I can come up with. Hope it is somewhat relevant to your questions. > May be other can add clearer and more concise definitions/criteria. > > Num > 11999 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Mar 20, 2002 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL and metaphorical language Dear Dan, you are very kind, I am not at all offended. Your posts are good reminders to consider. I also understand that it is very personal what style of writing appeals to a particular person and what not. That is why it is so good we have a forum and several people answer posts. Do continue posting. My husband Lodewijk said: warm regards and added that he read your post with great interest. One thing: dosa-mula-citta does not have to be akusala kamma. In that case we would commit countless akusala kammas in a minute. There are intensities of akusala citta and particular factors make akusala citta into kamma that can bring results. This goes too far now, it is explained in the Co. to Minor Readings. Another remark in general about vipaka: the pleasant or unpleasant object itself is not vipaka, but the term vipaka refers to the vipakacitta that experiences it, this is the mental result of kamma. A complicated subject for me, and once A. Sujin explained, a harsh sound produced by akusala citta that another person hears is an unpleasant object, experienced by the vipakacitta hearing-consciousness. Appreciative, Nina. Post Dan follows: op 19-03-2002 17:05 schreef zipdrive14850 op dhd5@c...: > Dear Robert, > It's nice to hear from you. Thanks for all your help in my struggles > with Nina's ADL. As you correctly noticed, the trouble is mostly a > clash of styles. What makes it difficult for a skeptical Dan is that > the metaphorical language is so strongly intertwined with her > sometimes precise, technical language that I feel I always must be on > guard so as not to be misled into mistaking the metaphorical for the > actual. > > > "The dosa may be so strong that one wants to kill the insects; then > there is akusala kamma" > [Yes, but the dosa-mula-citta itself is akusala kamma without having > to be 'so strong'.]