13400 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 2:04pm
Subject: Re: ritual

 
  "Ray Hendrickson"   wrote:

> The other evidence we have about speaking conventally when talking about
> self-control, etc comes from the Suttas themselves.  In the Connected
> Discourse, "A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya" by Bhikkhu Bodhi we
> read on page102 #64

> "No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned;
> For him all knots of conceit are consumed.
> Though the wise one has transcended the conceived,
> He still might say, 'I speak,'
> He might say too, 'They speak to me.'
> Skilful, knowing the world's parlance,
> He uses such terms as mere expressions."

> The Buddha says the same thing about himself in a Sutta from MN, but I
> forget which number, but I am sure others here will know the passage.  So as
> well as the evidence you supplied, there is also this evidence from the
> Canon that the Buddha does use such terms as a "mere expressions."

Thanks, Ray.
My question is:  Why would the Buddha use conventional speech in such a positive
manner.  In your quote above, he is saying that one may casually use 'I' or 'you'
as a mere convention in order to communicate content, such as in the sentence,
'Are you hungry?'  That's my sense of it.  This is different.  Here, he is making
a positive command, saying:  'You should try as hard as you can to exercise
self-control.'  That is not merely using conventional speech, that is promoting
it, if that's what it in fact is. 

If you agree that this is a much more forceful use of such conventions, we have to
ask what the purpose is in saying this?  If we have 'no control' and we are really
to 'let go' and merely study Suttas and discern realities, why on earth would the
Buddha literally exhort people to try as hard as possible to control themselves? 
My only conclusion can be that whether 'self' is a convention or not, he wants
people to make an effort at exercising control.  This seems quite different than
the message he could have given if 'no control' were in fact the doctrine.  He
could have said, as many on this list seem to:  'Give up the effort to control
yourselvew, because in fact there is no self to control, and no way for selfless
kandhas to control them.  Everything arises from a cause, and the most you can do
is try to discern the truth of the way reality functions.'  This would be a very
effective message if this is in fact what the Buddha meant to say, but at least
for these listeners, that is apparently *not* what he wanted them to do.

Best,
Robert Ep.





 
13401 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 2:10pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Dear Howard,
Although I agree that this is an example of the Buddha choosing not to befuddle a
confused seeker's mind, respectfully I don't think that the story would have made
it into the canon except that it represents both the average person's mind as
well, and most important issues of how to deal with annihilationism and
eternalism, the discussion of which is launched on the platform of Vajjragotta's
story.

I think the Buddha's silence represented more than his response to Vajjragotta
himself, but also a strong statement on the misapprehensions of making a direct
statement to holders of either extreme philosophy which can only be understood in
the light of their respective wrong views and assumptions.  In this light, it does
not make a definitive statement about the nature of 'self' or 'not-self' but makes
clear that our common images, not only of 'self', but also of 'not-self', are
deluded.

Which is why Buddha was often silent when confronted with various standpoints to
which people, such as ourselves, were attached.

Best,
Robert Ep.

=================================

--- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Victor -
> 
> In a message dated 5/19/02 11:18:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Victor writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Howard,
> > 
> > For the statement "there is no self"
> > see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> > 
> > 
> ===========================
>        Yes. This well known sutta is a great example of the Buddha not 
> replying to a person out of kindness and knowledge, knowing that the state of 
> that person's mind is such that any answer will be misunderstood.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 


 
13402 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 2:12pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 
  --- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 5/19/02 3:45:58 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Robert Ep writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > --- Howard wrote:
> > > Hi, Jon -
> > 
> >     Do you 
> > > > see a necessary
> > > > contradiction in these 2 attributes (conditionality vs. own essence)?
> > > > 
> > > -------------------------------------------------------
> > > Howard:
> > >        The problem I have here is with the adjectival phrase "of their 
> > own" 
> > > in the sentence "The fact that these phenomena are conditioned and last 
> > for 
> > > only a brief moment doesn't mean that they lack characteristics of their 
> > own 
> > > capable of being discerned by consciousness accompanied by panna (termed 
> > > 'individual essence')." Everything about these phenomena, including their 
> > 
> > > very existence, arises in total dependence on conditions, all of which 
> > are 
> > > equally empty of own-being. What arises in total dependence on other 
> > > conditions does not have own-being, and inasmuch as these other 
> > conditions 
> > > are equally without own-being, the emptiness is thoroughgoing.
> > > ----------------------------------------------------------
> > >
> > Dear Howard,
> > I would really like to pay a little more attention this important point of 
> > yours. 
> > Do the terms paramatha dhamma, own-being and dhammas having their own 
> > independent
> > characteristics not imply a substantial quality these fleeting appearances? 
> >  Is
> > there not an implication of substantiality, and is it not inherent in the 
> > terms
> > and the feeling that is created around them?
> > 
> > I keep seeing these terms as a kind of hidden life-raft within the 
> > philosophy of
> > Abhidhamma, and it is as much their implied feeling as it is their explicit
> > definition.  When you say 'the emptiness is thoroughgoing' it makes me 
> > heave a
> > sigh of relief, because the sense of own-being and independent 
> > characteristics
> > seems laden with the burden of substantiality.  It just carries that 
> > flavor.  One
> > can explain it differently, but why do those ideas exist? 
> > 
> > What is the sense of own-being if not a sense of substantiality?  What 
> > other
> > purpose does it serve?  It seems to implicitly undercut emptiness and 
> > anatta.  If
> > something has own-being, it has entity.  And if it has entity, it does not 
> > partake
> > of anatta.   Own-being seems to me to be nothing other than another way of 
> > saying
> > 'entity' or 'being'.  It even has the word 'being' in it, and 'own', which 
> > means
> > that it belongs to one, ie, the entity in question.  Together with 
> > Buddhaghosa
> > saying that the paramatha dhammas are the 'final irreduceible entities of
> > experience', it really makes me feel that there is a hidden substantiality 
> > and
> > entity at play in these words.  How can something have an 'individual 
> > essence' and
> > not be identified as an entity?
> > 
> > Otherwise, why not just say that these experiences are insubstantial and
> > momentary, which would be in the direction of anatta and anicca?
> > 
> > Can you have something that is solid and empty at the same time?
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> =============================
>        I agree that terminology is *very* important. How we think is strongly 
> influenced by the descriptive terms used. I will not second-guess the 
> motivation of using sabhava-like terminology in some Theravadin writings - 
> there may be no substantialist motivation at all, and the intention may be, 
> as Robert K points out, nothing more than the ascription of characteristics 
> to elements of experience. However, I do think that the pragmatics of such 
> language use is harmful, controversial, and misleading.

Dear Howard,
Thanks for your reply.

best,
Robert Ep.




 
13403 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 2:23pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  Dear Howard,
Thanks for your reply, which is both intelligent and personal.  What I would say,
along your lines, is that I have no belief in a self 'as such' at this point, a
personal self, anything that we would call self in the conventional sense.  But I
differ in seeing 'only' fleeting phenomena rolling by.  To me, there is both the
continuous changes of content that mark human experience, and also a constant: 
consciousness, which has an ever-changing content but itself is everpresent. 
Consciousness has proved to be impersonal as well:  it does not constitute a self,
and the sense of self which you speak of is also merely an arising sensation
within consciousness, but the sense of always being mindful, conscious, aware, of
something is always there.  This leads this consciousness to conclude that the
property of awareness is the underlying reality within which all phenomena occur,
and this is the sticking point between many Buddhists of various orientiations. 
Is awareness merely a mechanical property of causation, which arises with causes
and subsides at death?  Or at least at the death of an arahant?  Or is it
impersonal, beyond the ordinary consciousness we experience in the world of human
objects, and does it have a life beyond the self?  At times in the past you have
agreed with me that there seems to be something like an impersonal awareness that
is not annihilated at death. Now you seem to have grown beyond that, and that is
fine.  I have not, and it is still an issue for me.  It is not an issue because I
am worried about what will happen at death.  I am concerned about the focus of
present practice.  Is it correct to discern the 'sense', not of self, but of
'being aware' as merely another mechanical arising, or is it a constant to be
realized as one's actual basis for the experience of the kandhas and this life?  I
tend to think the latter, and by viewing all arisings as merely mechanical that
perhaps something essential is lost in the practice of realization.

These are my thoughts and as someone who I know has progressed at least to the
point of letting go of concepts of self, I am wondering what you think about this
these days.

Best,
Robert Ep.

====================


--- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Rob and Victor -
> 
>        We use conventional expressions all the time that have meaning, but 
> not literal meaning. If we say that our alarm clock turns itself on at the 
> preset time or that a VCR turns itself off after recording, we are not 
> assuming a "self" in these things. It is clear what we DO mean, and it is not 
> a philosophical assertion.
>        Whether or not there is something in, about, identical with, 
> associated with, or underlying the khandhas which is properly called a "self" 
> may be asserted or denied. However, so far no one seems to encounter such 
> when looking for it. It not being found, a pragmatic approach takes it to be 
> at least irrelevant, and, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. Moreover, 
> the Buddha *did* teach that with stream entry a *belief* in 'self' is gone, 
> and that with arahatta even any odor of 'self' is gone. Inasmuch as these are 
> states of liberation and enlightenment, it certainly suggests to me that 
> while *beliefs* in 'self' and in 'no-self' are just that - beliefs, the 
> *fact* of the matter is that there is no self. 
>        At this point, I have no belief in a self at all. All I find is 
> impersonal, empty phenomena "rolling on". Included among these phenomena is 
> the frequently arising "sense" of self, but that is all it seems to be, this 
> "sense" - one more impersonal condition arising and ceasing from time to time 
> as part of the ongoing flux of conditioned experience.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> 
> In a message dated 5/19/02 3:07:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Robert Ep writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > --- yuzhonghao  wrote:
> > > TG,
> > > 
> > > For the statement "there is no self",
> > > see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> > > 
> > > For the statement "there is no control", I would like to share this 
> > > verse with you:
> > > 
> > > 159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
> > > others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
> > > self-control.
> > 
> > Dear Victor,
> > Here we have a clear description of the Buddha advocating self-control.  
> > Now, I
> > wonder if those who believe there is 'no control' because there is no 
> > 'self' will
> > explaint that this is merely conventional speech and does not refer to 
> > either a
> > 'self' or an actual imperative to 'exercise control' over oneself?
> > 
> > One can always say that something the Buddha said was not actually what he 
> > meant
> > because it is merely conventional speech, while when the Buddha says 
> > something
> > that is in accord with what one regards as the path, one will say that the 
> > Buddha
> > meant it literally.  
> > 
> > It is a slippery slope, because it means that we are making distinctions 
> > between
> > different suttas, or even different statements in the same sutta, based on 
> > our
> > prior beliefs.
> > 
> > It is an equally slippery slope to maintain the opposite, that the Buddha 
> > was
> > being literal when he says that we should maintain self-control, but 
> > metaphoric or
> > conventional when he says something else that we disagree with.  To make 
> > these
> > kinds of distinctions at all is fraught with danger.
> > 
> > So what is the correct view?  We do not want to wind up like some 
> > interpreters of
> > the Bible who conclude based on taking it literally [according to their
> > interpretation of what is literal] that the earth is only 5,000 years old, 
> > in the
> > face of all scientific evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, we do 
> > not want
> > to wind up in the position of those who insist that the only experiences 
> > that are
> > believeable are those which can be scientifically tested.
> > 
> > It seems to me that in general, we should take the Buddha literally, unless 
> > we
> > have some evidence to the contrary.   What is the evidence that 'one should
> > practice self-control' is merely conventional, and not a true imperative?  
> > Well,
> > since Buddha states clearly that none of the five khandas can be considered 
> > to
> > have the property of 'self', there are two possibilities:  what he 
> > considers
> > 'self' is beyond the five kandhas, or:  he is asking practitioners to 
> > attempt to
> > control certain arising phenomena, in the understanding that such attempt 
> > will
> > have certain results which will be beneficial to their progress.  
> > 
> > I think it may satisfy both camps if we say that he is addressing the 
> > conventional
> > self and asking his listeners to attempt to exercise control over akusala
> > conditions, even though such control may not be possible, in the 
> > understanding
> > that this will have certain effects, though they are not caused directly by 
> > the
> > practitioner.  
> > 
> > This is very similar to other Buddhist practices.  If one practices 
> > meditation,
> > the worst form of such practice is to struggle directly with the mind and 
> > attempt
> > to control it, which leads to tension and frustration.  One follows certain
> > practices, trusting that eventually they will yield the fruit.  The 
> > practice is
> > voluntary, but the results are involuntary.  If one practices discernment 
> > in daily
> > life, it is the same thing:  one pays attention to the attempt to discern 
> > namas
> > and rupas, knowing that most of the time he or she will fail, but 
> > eventually the
> > attempt to do so will yield fruit.  There is intention, but not control. It
> > explains why the sutta is useful, without falling into the fallacy of an 
> > atta
> > which can take action.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.



 
13404 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 2:25pm
Subject: Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 
  Okay Howard.
Hope I don't sound too disrespectful.  I have a tendency to fight hard in this
particular debate, and so I apologize if that leads me to step on anyone's toes.

Best,
Robert Ep.

====================

--- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 5/19/02 2:55:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Robert Ep writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Dear Howard,
> > Re. your nice breakdown of the sutra below: Interesting, that the noble 
> > eightfold
> > path is clearly announced as a path of practice, and not merely a 
> > description of
> > what occurs under the right conditions, wouldn't you agree?
> > 
> -----------------------------------------------------
>        I don't want to come on too strong, Rob. The sutta speaks for itself - 
> I'm just putting it out there.
> ----------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > I would like to hear what Jon has to say about this:  is it descriptive or
> > prescriptive?
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> ==========================
> With metta,
> Howard



 
13405 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 5:35pm
Subject: Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Howard

Many thanks for the interesting sutta below which I look forward to
discussing with you.

Before I do, however, we need to clarify something on the translation,
which concerns the particular passage you have highlighted.

I refer to the passage in the ATI translation that reads:
> "And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of 
> reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve,
right 
> speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness,
> right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the
development 
> of the frames of reference." 

In the Bhikkhu Bodhi translation (CDB, Wisdom), this appears as:
"And what is the way leading to the development of the establishment of
mindfulness?  It is the Noble Eightfold Path; that is, Right View … Right
Concentration.  This is called the way leading to the development of the
establishment of mindfulness."

The rendering in the CDB version is fairly standard stuff.  I am wondering
where the words "path of practice" in the ATI translation come from.  Do
you have any thoughts on this?  Can anybody help us with the Pali here?

Jon

--- Howard wrote: > Hi, Jon (and all) -

>        I found a not-too-long sutta which I think is interesting in a
> couple 
> ways. The sutta is the following:
> 
> ***********************
> 
> Samyutta Nikaya XLVII.40
> Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta
> Analysis of the Frames of Reference
> 
> Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.
> For free distribution only.
>  
> "I will teach you the frames of reference, their development, and the
> path of 
> practice leading to their development. Listen & pay close attention. I
> will 
> speak. 
> 
> "Now, what are the frames of reference? There is the case where a monk 
> remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful
> -- 
> putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. He remains 
> focused on feelings in & of themselves... mind in & of itself... mental 
> qualities in & of themselves -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting
> aside 
> greed & distress with reference to the world. "This is called the frames
> of 
> reference.
> 
>  "And what is the development of the frames of reference? There is the
> case 
> where a monk remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with
> regard to 
> the body, remains focused on the phenomenon of passing away with regard
> to 
> the body, remains focused on the phenomenon of origination & passing
> away 
> with regard to the body -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside
> greed & 
> distress with reference to the world. "He remains focused on the
> phenomenon 
> of origination with regard to feelings, remains focused on the
> phenomenon of 
> passing away with regard to feelings, remains focused on the phenomenon
> of 
> origination & passing away with regard to feelings -- ardent, alert, & 
> mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world.
> "He 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the
> mind, 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the
> mind, 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with
> regard 
> to the mind -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed &
> distress 
> with reference to the world. "He remains focused on the phenomenon of 
> origination with regard to mental qualities, remains focused on the 
> phenomenon of passing away with regard to mental qualities, remains
> focused 
> on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to mental 
> qualities -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress
> with 
> reference to the world. "This is called the development of the frames of
> 
> reference.
>  
> "And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of 
> reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve,
> right 
> speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness,
> 
> right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the
> development 
> of the frames of reference." Revised: Mon 10 September 2001 <A
> HREF="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn47-040.html">
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn47-040.html</A>
> *******************************

…
>        Most interesting to me is the final section which defines "the
> path of 
> practice to the development of the frames of reference," as specifically
> the 
> noble eightfold path. The straightforward reading of this takes
> satipatthana 
> more as something which "comes later", penultimate to liberation, rather
> than 
> as a technique to be practiced "all along". It would seem, on this
> reading, 
> that the entire eight-factored path is the path of practice culminating
> in 
> satipatthana (and then in awakening and liberation).
> 
> With metta,
> Howard



 
13406 From: Sukinder   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 8:39am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: 'no control', kamma of the fourth kind, MN117

 
  Hi Rob,

Nice to hear from you.

.........  I agree with a lot of what you say.

Happy to hear that.

I think one of the main areas where we may disagree, as I find a similar
disagreement with Jon, is whether or not certain practices can be assumed to
eventually lead to kusala, sati, panna, and all the other positive
qualities.

I think the quality of citta is the important thing, not the activity
itself. Giving
importance to 'activity' will I feel lead to some form of silabbataparamasa
or the
other. Kusala is encouraged and accumulation of parami does support the
development of panna, but this must be natural. By natural I mean, without
the
interference of an idea, that certain activities would condition kusala and
that
would in turn engender the development of panna. Even kusala cannot be
forced and it has already fallen away by the time we think about doing
something.

And I definitely do not believe that practices of other religions, such as
yoga,
can lead to sati and panna. Kusala was and is recognized by all other
religions
and I do believe that some level of kusala can be developed by performing
activities such as yoga and tai chi, but not sati and panna. The kusala they
all encourage is with some sense and form of self or the other. They
have no idea of anatta, or even anicca. Their conception of impermanence
is basically conceptual, not having perceived the rise and fall of
individual
dhammas. Conceptual understanding of impermanence cannot lead to
detachment from what buddhists know to be the momentary arising of
phenonmenon, which is 'now', let alone detachment from the sense of self,
which is constantly being reinforced through tanha, ditthi and mana.

The Buddha was equally perfect in wisdom the first moment he attained
enlightenment till the moment before he attained parinibbana. The wisdom
of the arahants all combined do not equal to a small part of the Buddhas.
And I do not believe any person outside the buddhist tradition in human
history, will have the wisdom close to a sotapanna.
Wisdom cannot be added and improved upon by sucessive generations.
A system of practice like yoga which has been worked upon and changed
through time can only result in getting people cling to the superficial
aspect of it.
My conclusion thus is, such practices not only do not help in buddhist
practise, but if seen instead as being a support, can be extremely
detrimental to development of panna.

Satipatthana is the *only* way. With this in mind, it is counter productive
to investigate and try out any other teachings. Panna being the aim of
Buddha's teachings, why give preference to development of other kinds
of kusala rather than understanding what is appearing at this moment?

Robert:
Another point is whether putting forth intentions implies that there is a
self,
and that the only way to acknowledge anatta is by admitting that nothing can
be
done to either speed or slow the path.  One has to kind of sneak in Sutta
study
and discernment in a passive, natural way, so that the notion of self won't
get in
and ruin it.  [Hope you don't mind me being a little facetious to highlight
the
point.]

Sukin:
Yes the sense of self is all pervading. Almost every moment of being awake
there is a sense of self via ditthi, tanha or mana. Especially when we are
not aware no? The sneaking in to study and paying attention to the teachings
can be done or at least have many moments where lobha is ruling no?;-)
I think this should alert us to how much the sense of self would then
overshadow activities we do intentionally to overccome the sense of self.

Robert:
I personally think [for whatever that's worth -- not much, I hear Jon
saying...my
God, I've internalized him!] that sitting with attention to the breath or to
the
present moment will eventually yield increased discernment, and lead to sati
and
panna.  I add that of course if one does this in an unskillful way it may
not lead
to any such results, but the practice itself, done with some reasonable
understanding and instruction, tends to lead in the right direction.  I
think that
most Abhidhammists will tend to disagree with this, and say that we cannot
possibly predict the arising of kusala based on any given practice.

I also believe that intention can be put forth by cittas and that this
cumulative
intention will eventually tend to yield positive fruit.  And I think some
take
this to imply that there must be a self being posited that will both put
this
effort forth and yield the fruit of that intention.  I contend that this is
not
necessarily so, and that intention can be put forth, just as we put forth
this or
that cause through the production of consciousness.  We have a moment of
anger and
the intention arises to either hold it back and take a deep breath or to
yell and
scream.  There is a moment of decision there as well.  There may also be a
moment
where we say, 'okay, let's not act on this anger in future' and eventually
this
may have an effect in that direction.  Can we choose to have an intention
and then
have it?  I don't know.  But I do think the putting forth of intention can
yield
an eventual result that arises from that intention.  My own life seems to
give
evidence for this.

Sukin:
Rob, turn your attention to the frame of your monitor, now to other parts of
your
computer, next scan your room, if there is sound, sound. Do you see the
diversity
and range of sense impressions, can you appreciate that it all involves a
complexity
of conditions (one of which being my prompting you to)? Sitting down to
observe
your breath, does this involve any more favourable set of conditions( for
the
development of panna) than standing and staring out into the open? Do you
know
exactly what is going on at any given moment and can you give a correct
interpretation of your experience to you meditation teacher? Can your
meditation teacher know what are the conditions any given moment?

I think it very important to distinguish between concept and reality, or
else we are
likely to end up getting caught in some form of practise, not recognizing
our
projections.

Sorry I have to go out somewhere. I feel I have not addressed your precise
points.
Had some other points in mind after I read your post earlier today, but
forgot what
they were. But will wait for your reply to see if anything else could be
said.

Best wishes,

Sukin.

 
 
13407 From: onco111   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 7:23pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K]

 
  Robert,
> Understanding (panna) knows the object in the way stated, and it 
> brings about by endeavouring, the manifestation of the path." This  
> perhaps ties up with your excellent series on silabataparamasa; as 
> you indicated this is actually an aspect of wrong view, it is not 
> the action per se that is the clinging to rule and ritual but the 
> wrong view that feels one is somehow controlling and directing the 
> various khandas. In the quote from the visuddhimagga we see that 
> citta(without panna) can know the characteristic of dhammas, it can 
> perceive subtle feelings  colours, sounds, hardness, heat - but if 
> panna is not present nothing is gained, one may be developing 
> silabataparamasa.

Interesting perception, Robert. As you say, central to the effort is 
knowing not just the difference between sati and samadhi but also the 
difference between sati with panya and sati without panya, and 
knowing not just in a theoretical sense, but knowing as the dhammas 
arise and pass away. Silabbataparamasa is not necessarily akusala, 
but neither is it liberating. 

Dan

 
13408 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 7:28pm
Subject: Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Howard

I've now had a chance to look at this sutta, and I see the point you are
raising about the final section.  Here the Noble Eightfold Path is
described as "the path [of practice] to the development of the frames of
reference" or, in the Bh. Bodhi translation, as "the way leading to the
development of the establishment of mindfulness".

I admit I am puzzled by this and have no thoughts on it as yet.  I am only
familiar with the Noble Eightfold Path being described as the path leading
to nibbana.  This is something entirely new to me.

As you know, I rely heavily on the commentaries for my interpretation of
the suttas, but unfortunately there is no English translation of the
Saaratthappakaasini or its tika.  I don't know if our Thai members (e.g.
Jaran, Kom or Num, or others) would be able to throw any light on this
point from the Thai translation which as I understand it includes the
commentary also.

I've noted your comments on the 'straightforward' meaning, Howard, but I
prefer not to speculate at this stage.

Very interesting, and thanks for bringing it up.  Any comments from others
most welcome.

Jon


--- Howard wrote: > Hi, Jon (and all) -
>        I found a not-too-long sutta which I think is interesting in a
> couple 
> ways. The sutta is the following:
> 
> ***********************
> 
> Samyutta Nikaya XLVII.40
> Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta
> Analysis of the Frames of Reference
> 
> Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.
> For free distribution only.
>  
> "I will teach you the frames of reference, their development, and the
> path of 
> practice leading to their development. Listen & pay close attention. I
> will 
> speak. 
> 
> "Now, what are the frames of reference? There is the case where a monk 
> remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful
> -- 
> putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. He remains 
> focused on feelings in & of themselves... mind in & of itself... mental 
> qualities in & of themselves -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting
> aside 
> greed & distress with reference to the world. "This is called the frames
> of 
> reference.
> 
>  "And what is the development of the frames of reference? There is the
> case 
> where a monk remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with
> regard to 
> the body, remains focused on the phenomenon of passing away with regard
> to 
> the body, remains focused on the phenomenon of origination & passing
> away 
> with regard to the body -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside
> greed & 
> distress with reference to the world. "He remains focused on the
> phenomenon 
> of origination with regard to feelings, remains focused on the
> phenomenon of 
> passing away with regard to feelings, remains focused on the phenomenon
> of 
> origination & passing away with regard to feelings -- ardent, alert, & 
> mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world.
> "He 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the
> mind, 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the
> mind, 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with
> regard 
> to the mind -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed &
> distress 
> with reference to the world. "He remains focused on the phenomenon of 
> origination with regard to mental qualities, remains focused on the 
> phenomenon of passing away with regard to mental qualities, remains
> focused 
> on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to mental 
> qualities -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress
> with 
> reference to the world. "This is called the development of the frames of
> 
> reference.
>  
> "And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of 
> reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve,
> right 
> speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness,
> 
> right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the
> development 
> of the frames of reference." Revised: Mon 10 September 2001 <A
> HREF="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn47-040.html">
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn47-040.html</A>
> *******************************

…
>        Most interesting to me is the final section which defines "the
> path of 
> practice to the development of the frames of reference," as specifically
> the 
> noble eightfold path. The straightforward reading of this takes
> satipatthana 
> more as something which "comes later", penultimate to liberation, rather
> than 
> as a technique to be practiced "all along". It would seem, on this
> reading, 
> that the entire eight-factored path is the path of practice culminating
> in 
> satipatthana (and then in awakening and liberation).
> 
> With metta,
> Howard


 
13409 From: Jim Anderson   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 7:42pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Jon,

The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii pa.tipadaa". It seems
to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of "pa.tipadaa"
(the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way leading to). It is also worth
noting that the Pali text takes satipa.t.thaana to be in the singular
(satipa.t.thaana.m) which B. Bodhi translates as "the establishment of
mindfulness" while Thanissaro Bhikkhu has "the frames of reference"
(plural).

Best wishes,
Jim Anderson

> Howard
>
> Many thanks for the interesting sutta below which I look forward to
> discussing with you.
>
> Before I do, however, we need to clarify something on the translation,
> which concerns the particular passage you have highlighted.
>
> I refer to the passage in the ATI translation that reads:
> > "And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of
> > reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve,
> right
> > speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness,
> > right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the
> development
> > of the frames of reference."
>
> In the Bhikkhu Bodhi translation (CDB, Wisdom), this appears as:
> "And what is the way leading to the development of the establishment of
> mindfulness?  It is the Noble Eightfold Path; that is, Right View . Right
> Concentration.  This is called the way leading to the development of the
> establishment of mindfulness."
>
> The rendering in the CDB version is fairly standard stuff.  I am wondering
> where the words "path of practice" in the ATI translation come from.  Do
> you have any thoughts on this?  Can anybody help us with the Pali here?
>
> Jon




 
13410 From: Sarah and Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 8:42pm
Subject: Reminder to trim posts....

 
  Dear All,

Just a reminder to trim those parts of previous posts which are not
necessary for replies. Also when possible, please put your reply at the
beginning rather than at the very end of a long message.

These points assist those reading in digest form, those who print out
messages or those reading in haste.

Thanks,

Jon & Sarah (who also forget at times)
===============================


 
13411 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 9:17pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Jim

Many thanks for coming in here, Jim.

 --- Jim Anderson  wrote: > Jon,
> 
> The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii pa.tipadaa". It
> seems
> to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of
> "pa.tipadaa"
> (the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way leading to). It is also

It would seem that the reference to 'practice' is the translator's own
gloss.

> It is also worth
> noting that the Pali text takes satipa.t.thaana to be in the singular
> (satipa.t.thaana.m) which B. Bodhi translates as "the establishment of
> mindfulness" while Thanissaro Bhikkhu has "the frames of reference"
> (plural).

On this point, Bh. Bodhi notes that the preferred sense would be "the
establishing of mindfulness"

> Best wishes,
> Jim Anderson

I won't ask you to look at the other question that arises with this sutta,
which I mentioned in my subsequent post, and which I think arises
independently of the translation points, as that would be too much of an
imposition (especially as you are away from your home base).  But any
thoughts you may have on it would be most welcome.

Jon


 
13412 From: Howard 
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 7:01pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Hi, Rob -

       The following is the initial portion of the article on anatta from 
Nyanatiloka's dictionary:


> anattá: 'not-self', non-ego, egolessness, impersonality, is the last of the 
> three characteristics of existence (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) The anattá doctrine 
> teaches that neither within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, 
> nor outside of them, can be found anything that in the ultimate sense could 
> be regarded as a self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding 
> substance. This is the central doctrine of Buddhism, without understanding 
> which a real knowledge of Buddhism is altogether impossible. It is the only 
> really specific Buddhist doctrine, with which the entire Structure of the 
> Buddhist teaching stands or falls. All the remaining Buddhist doctrines 
> may, more or less, be found in other philosophic systems and religions, but 
> the anattá-doctrine has been clearly and unreservedly taught only by the 
> Buddha, wherefore the Buddha is known as the anattá-vádi, or 'Teacher of 
> Impersonality'. Whosoever has not penetrated this impersonality of all 
> existence, and does not comprehend that in reality there exists only this 
> continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and mental 
> phenomena, and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without this 
> process, he will not be able to understand Buddhism, i.e. the teaching of 
> the 4 Noble Truths (sacca, q.v.), in the right light. He will think that it 
> is his ego, his personality, that experiences suffering, his personality 
> that performs good and evil actions and will be reborn according to these 
> actions, his personality that will enter into Nibbána, his personality that 
> walks on the Eightfold Path. Thus it is said in Vis.M. XVI:
> >> 
>> > 
> > 
> >> "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
> The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
> Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it;
> The path is, but no traveler on it is seen."
> 

       With regard to the sentence "The anattá doctrine teaches that neither 
within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of them, can 
be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a 
self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding substance.," I'd 
like to emphasize the words "nor outside of them." While I do not have a 
ready reference, I do seem to recall in some sutta the Buddha saying that 
there is no self outside of the khandhas. (And, of course, there *is* the 
sutta entitled The All, in which the Buddha describes the five khandhas as 
being all there is.) Now, of course, there is also nibbana, which is not any 
khandha at all. But the thing is, nibbana is without condition - it is the 
very absence of conditions. Now, can the discernment of absence, a 
thoroughgoing and utterly complete absence of all possible conditions be a 
self? I think not, for a "self", in addition to being unchanging, is also 
*personal*. But a thoroughgoing and utterly complete absence of all possible 
conditions has nothing by which it can be construed as personal.
       Consider, moreover the quoted material:

"Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it;
The path is, but no traveler on it is seen."

       The last two lines of this, as well, point to the impersonality of 
nibbana. So, I would say that there is no self to be found, not in the 
khandhas nor outside of them. I also do think that our strong desire that 
there BE a self outside the khandhas is a kind of last-ditch grasping at the 
anchor of self. That has to be let go of as well - or so it seems to me.

With metta,
Howard



In a message dated 5/20/02 1:55:42 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> 
> Hi TG.
> Well I still think it's interesting that the Buddha never says, even to 
> these
> disciples who presumably would *not* become bewildered if he were to say 
> it:
> "There is no Self".  Why does he repeat over and over again that all things 
> within
> the five kandhas - the entire content of *this* life - are 'not self', but 
> refuses
> to ever say that 'there is not a self of any kind'?
> 
> If the reason is in fact that to make such a statement would be adhering to
> annihilationism, one must ask:  What is wrong with the view that the Buddha 
> has
> here said that he wants to avoid?  Why does the Buddha *not* want to 
> promote the
> view that death, to quote the Sutta itself, 'is the annihilation of
> consciousness'.  Certainly there been quite a few discussions on this list 
> in
> which the Buddha's words in other Suttas have been interpeted to mean 
> precisely
> that:  that consciousness is totally annihilated at the death of an Arahant 
> who
> has realized Nibbana.  So is the only view the Buddha wishes to avoid the 
> view
> that the ordinary person has his consciousness annihilated at death?
> 
> It seems to me that the Buddha is saying here that the annihilationists are 
> wrong.
> The eternatlists are wrong too, but we can talk about that after looking at 
> the
> annihilationists a little more closely.  One would hope that if the Buddha 
> were
> merely saying the unenlightened person does *not* have their consciousness
> annihilated at death - because of course the tendencies of the kandhas' 
> karma
> still unresolved will cause him to be reborn - but that the enlightened 
> person's
> consciousness, having no more such tendencies - *is* annihilated at death
> [Parinibbana], he would say so and make this explicit.  If such a 
> distinction
> exists anywhere in the canon, I would appreciate being pointed to it.  This 
> is not
> my sense of what the Buddha is saying.  It seems apparent that he is saying 
> that
> the annihilationists are deluded and that consciousness is *not* 
> annihilated at
> death.  But if the Buddha were to assert that there is no self, this is the
> conclusion that the annihilationists would draw, and he would be leading 
> them into
> deeper delusion.
> 
> The eternalists on the other hand say that there *is* a self, and if Buddha 
> were
> to assert that there *is* a self, he would be leading the eternalists to 
> the
> conclusion that there is an immortal soul which survives death and 
> continues
> beyond the body.  I think it is fair to say that the Buddha does not agree 
> with
> this view and does not want to promote it.  
> 
> There are two possibilities that this allows: One is that there is a self 
> that is
> beyond the kandhas, a very unpopular view in the Theravadin community, but 
> one
> never explicitly ruled out by the Buddha.  I know he has clearly said that 
> there
> is no 'consciousness' that survives death, and that there is no 'eternal
> consciousness' that constitutes a kind of selfless self, but these are all 
> still
> within the limits of the kandhas as we know them in this life.  In other 
> words,
> there is no self that we as human beings can imagine.  Still, the Buddha 
> never
> says:  'There is no self of any kind', and I don't think the implication is 
> that
> he will only not assert this because he doesn't want to confuse the
> annihilationists.  Again, in his conversations with Ananda and other 
> advanced
> Arahants, there is no reason why he could not say:  'Just between us, by 
> the way,
> there is no self of any kind, but please don't tell the annihilationists as 
> they
> will confuse the issue.'  Even if this was the case, saying that 'there is 
> no
> self' does not explain why he refuses to say that consciousness is 
> extinguished at
> death, which he clearly announces here as a wrong view that the 
> annihilationists
> hold.  It seems clear to me that he is saying that the annihilationists 
> view is
> wrong, otherwise, why not support it?  Why not just say:  'yes, 
> consciousness *is*
> extinguished at death'.  But he does not want the annihilationists to think 
> this,
> because it is clearly a wrong view.
> 
> The other possibility is that there is no self of any kind, but that 
> something
> beyhond consciousness and the kandhas survives in a form that is beyond 
> anything
> we can know or imagine.  This seems to be implied by the Buddha's refusal 
> to rule
> out *some* kind of self, or *some* kind of consciousness surviving beyond 
> death. 
> Otherwise, why not just let the eternalists and the annihilationists know 
> the
> truth:  that there is no self, and that there is no consciousness beyond 
> death? 
> In what way would it confuse them or lead them into wrong views if in fact 
> these
> two direct statements were true?  It seems obvious to me that Buddha 
> refrains from
> saying this because to make these blunt statements would be promoting wrong 
> view,
> and that it is not correct to say that there is no self of any kind, and it 
> is not
> correct to say that consciousness is extinguished at death.  These are the 
> exact
> views that he is saying are wrong.
> 
> Now, the two important verses which you say that Victor left out make the
> following points:
> 
> 1/  In the first one Buddha states bluntly that 'all phenomena are 
> not-self'  That
> is that all *phenomena*, everything we experience in this life, are 
> 'not-self'. 
> Again this does not say 'there is no self'.  It says phenomena do not 
> contain a
> self or constitute a self.  So we must not look to phenomena to find a 
> 'self'. 
> The right view of anatta is always stated this way, isn't it?  That when 
> regarding
> phenomena we are not to cling to them and identify with them as 'self'.  
> Isn't
> that right?  Nowhere does the Buddha say: 'Look at yourself and be clear 
> that
> there is no self of any kind that is your self'.  He never rules out the
> possibility, never, of some kind of self beyond phenomena.  Now, I am not 
> saying
> that there is a self, but what I do want to point out is that Buddha's 
> purpose in
> the doctrine of anatta does not seem to be to convince us that there is no 
> self of
> any kind.  Rather it seems to be to direct us to look at all the things of 
> this
> life as 'not-self', 'impermanent' and 'unable to grant satisfaction' and 
> thus not
> worthy of clinging to.  When we stop clinging to all of these 'not-self'
> phenomena, we become free to travel the Noble Eightfold Path to liberation. 
>  And
> this seems to be Buddha's intent.  
> 
> I think this is why Victor keeps pointing out the form in which the Buddha
> addresses the subject of anatta, because many of us draw the conclusion, 
> perhaps
> erroneously, that Buddha is preaching a kind of delayed annihilationism.  
> If we
> say that 'there is no self and no property of self that exists beyond 
> death, and
> only the kandhas' tendencies keep consciousness from dying out', then we 
> aim for a
> kind of annihilationism that is delayed until Parinibbana, but is still 
> directly
> in line with the view of the annihilationists none-the-less, that 
> 'consciousness
> is extinguished at death', the view that the Buddha here explicitly 
> rejects.  how
> can we adopt a view that is explicitly rejected by the Buddha, and say that 
> it is
> Buddhist doctrine?
> 
> 2/ In the second verse that you have added to the post, Buddha makes it 
> clear that
> the self one thinks one has is not real, and is not annihilated by the 
> doctrine of
> anatta:
> 
> > "And if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self 
> -- 
> > were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would 
> become 
> > even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'" 
> 
> The most that we can draw from this is that our *idea* of self is totally 
> wrong. 
> Vacchagotta is bewildered - he has the wrong idea of self.  If told there 
> is no
> self, he would think, well, 'I know I *do* have a self', and he has a fixed 
> idea
> of what that self is, so if he were to accept the Buddha's assurance that 
> there is
> 'no' self, he would become more bewildered and think the self he knows he 
> has has
> been challenged, annihilated, by the Buddha's teaching.  This is how many 
> of us
> take the doctrine of anatta.  We try to see that we have no self, and it is 
> like a
> self struggling to annihilate itself.  Instead of letting go of our wrong 
> views
> about self, which Buddha says have to be completely let go - he says to let 
> go of
> every last view we have, because every conceptual view is inherently wrong, 
> an
> overlay on the truth - we think we really *do* have a self, and that we 
> have to
> somehow destroy it in order to realize the goal of Buddhism.  This is like
> fighting with a shadow, because our idea of what our self is is conceptual 
> and
> based on mental and emotional attachments to ideas and objects.
> 
> So Buddha is definitely saying that our *idea* of self is wrong, but he 
> nowhere
> states either positively or negatively that is no self of any kind, just 
> that we
> don't know and that we don't get it.  
> 
> In fact, isn't the point of what Buddha is saying here that 'everything we 
> think
> we know is wrong', and that he doesn't want to feed any of our tendencies 
> to
> falsely conceptualize about self and not-self?  If we accept that as the 
> premise,
> then we will focus on our own views of self, and let them go.  My 
> experience in
> the moment is that I am conscious of phenomena.  I know this consciousness 
> is
> present, and that it has one or another object.  That is my present 
> reality. 
> There is a sense of self, which I do not what to make of, and cannot until
> enlightenment.  I should neither accept nor reject this sense of self, but 
> focus
> on letting go of false concepts that may arise about this sense of self, 
> while
> trying to discern truly the functions of mind and the nature of arising 
> objects to
> gain insight and wisdom, gradually refraining from creating new kammic 
> tendencies,
> and letting go of attachments.  
> 
> But I think that Victor's basic view that the Buddha is telling us what to 
> let go
> of, since it is 'anatta', that is:  phenomena, is correct.  And to think 
> that
> Buddha has made any statement as to whether there is in fact some kind of 
> self or
> not, or that consciousness is completely extinguished in all forms at 
> death, is
> wrong.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         

 
13413 From: Howard 
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 7:40pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 5/20/02 2:23:47 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> Thanks for your reply, which is both intelligent and personal.  What I 
> would say,
> along your lines, is that I have no belief in a self 'as such' at this 
> point, a
> personal self, anything that we would call self in the conventional sense.  
> But I
> differ in seeing 'only' fleeting phenomena rolling by.  To me, there is 
> both the
> continuous changes of content that mark human experience, and also a 
> constant: 
> consciousness, which has an ever-changing content but itself is 
> everpresent. 
> Consciousness has proved to be impersonal as well:  it does not constitute 
> a self,
> and the sense of self which you speak of is also merely an arising 
> sensation
> within consciousness, but the sense of always being mindful, conscious, 
> aware, of
> something is always there.  This leads this consciousness to conclude that 
> the
> property of awareness is the underlying reality within which all phenomena 
> occur,
> and this is the sticking point between many Buddhists of various 
> orientiations. 
> 
-----------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       There is, of course, vi~n~nana. It is inseparable from its objects. 
They arise together and are interdependent. Vi~n~nana is a separative 
awareness - separative in partaking of subject-object duality, and separative 
in the sense of separating out objects from the field of possibilities based 
on interest and inclinations. Vi~n~nana is conditioned, and it deals in 
conditions. Nibbana, on the other hand, is unconditioned, has no relation to 
conditions, but deals in absence, and is utterly impersonal. So, where is 
there a self? If one wishes to say that nibbana is of the genus "awareness", 
I would not disagree, but such awareness is so radically "other", that for us 
to just say that it is a mode of awareness and think we have supplied some 
real content in saying so, is, I believe, to be mistaken.
------------------------------------------------------------

> Is awareness merely a mechanical property of causation, which arises with 
> causes
> and subsides at death?  Or at least at the death of an arahant?  Or is it
> impersonal, beyond the ordinary consciousness we experience in the world of 
> human
> objects, and does it have a life beyond the self?  At times in the past you 
> have
> agreed with me that there seems to be something like an impersonal 
> awareness that
> is not annihilated at death. Now you seem to have grown beyond that, and 
> that is
> fine.
> 
-----------------------------------------------------
Howard: 
       No, I haven't "grown" beyond anything. Perhaps I've refined my 
understanding a bit. No more.
-----------------------------------------------------

   I have not, and it is still an issue for me.  It is not an issue because I> 
> 
> am worried about what will happen at death.  I am concerned about the focus 
> of
> present practice.  Is it correct to discern the 'sense', not of self, but 
> of
> 'being aware' as merely another mechanical arising, or is it a constant to 
> be
> realized as one's actual basis for the experience of the kandhas and this 
> life?  I
> tend to think the latter, and by viewing all arisings as merely mechanical 
> that
> perhaps something essential is lost in the practice of realization.
> 
> These are my thoughts and as someone who I know has progressed at least to 
> the
> point of letting go of concepts of self, I am wondering what you think 
> about this
> these days.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
==============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13414 From: Howard 
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 7:42pm
Subject: Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 
  Hi, Rob -

In a message dated 5/20/02 2:26:04 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> Okay Howard.
> Hope I don't sound too disrespectful.  I have a tendency to fight hard in 
> this
> particular debate, and so I apologize if that leads me to step on anyone's 
> toes.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
========================
You are always respectful, and exhuberance is only to be admired! :-)

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13415 From: Howard 
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 7:53pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/20/02 7:28:49 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
<> writes:


> Howard
> 
> I've now had a chance to look at this sutta, and I see the point you are
> raising about the final section.  Here the Noble Eightfold Path is
> described as "the path [of practice] to the development of the frames of
> reference" or, in the Bh. Bodhi translation, as "the way leading to the
> development of the establishment of mindfulness".
> 
> I admit I am puzzled by this and have no thoughts on it as yet.  I am only
> familiar with the Noble Eightfold Path being described as the path leading
> to nibbana.  This is something entirely new to me.
> 
> As you know, I rely heavily on the commentaries for my interpretation of
> the suttas, but unfortunately there is no English translation of the
> Saaratthappakaasini or its tika.  I don't know if our Thai members (e.g.
> Jaran, Kom or Num, or others) would be able to throw any light on this
> point from the Thai translation which as I understand it includes the
> commentary also.
> 
> I've noted your comments on the 'straightforward' meaning, Howard, but I
> prefer not to speculate at this stage.
> 
> Very interesting, and thanks for bringing it up.  Any comments from others
> most welcome.
> 
> Jon
> 
> 
==========================
       It may very well turn out that there is a way of understanding this 
sutta which accords with your perspective. Whatever the case may be, I'd just 
like to say that I really admire your intellectual honesty and your 
willingness to face whatever the facts may be! Most people cling strongly to 
long-held views, and your openness to other possibilities is really 
impressive!

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13416 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 2:50am
Subject: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Howard and all,

"Thus, monks, any body whatsoever that is past, future, or present; 
internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or 
near: every body is to be seen as it actually is with right 
discernment as: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not 
what I am.' 

"Any feeling whatsoever... 

"Any perception whatsoever... 

"Any fabrications whatsoever... 

"Any consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; 
internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or 
near: every consciousness is to be seen as it actually is with right 
discernment as: 'This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not 
what I am.' 

"Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows 
disenchanted with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted 
with perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with 
consciousness. Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through 
dispassion, he is fully released. With full release, there is the 
knowledge, 'Fully released.' He discerns that 'Birth is depleted, the 
holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this 
world.'" 

See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html

Regards,
Victor

---  <> wrote:
> Hi, Rob -
> 
>        The following is the initial portion of the article on 
anatta from 
> Nyanatiloka's dictionary:
> 
> 
> > anattá: 'not-self', non-ego, egolessness, impersonality, is the 
last of the 
> > three characteristics of existence (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) The anattá 
doctrine 
> > teaches that neither within the bodily and mental phenomena of 
existence, 
> > nor outside of them, can be found anything that in the ultimate 
sense could 
> > be regarded as a self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other 
abiding 
> > substance. This is the central doctrine of Buddhism, without 
understanding 
> > which a real knowledge of Buddhism is altogether impossible. It 
is the only 
> > really specific Buddhist doctrine, with which the entire 
Structure of the 
> > Buddhist teaching stands or falls. All the remaining Buddhist 
doctrines 
> > may, more or less, be found in other philosophic systems and 
religions, but 
> > the anattá-doctrine has been clearly and unreservedly taught only 
by the 
> > Buddha, wherefore the Buddha is known as the anattá-vádi, 
or 'Teacher of 
> > Impersonality'. Whosoever has not penetrated this impersonality 
of all 
> > existence, and does not comprehend that in reality there exists 
only this 
> > continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily 
and mental 
> > phenomena, and that there is no separate ego-entity within or 
without this 
> > process, he will not be able to understand Buddhism, i.e. the 
teaching of 
> > the 4 Noble Truths (sacca, q.v.), in the right light. He will 
think that it 
> > is his ego, his personality, that experiences suffering, his 
personality 
> > that performs good and evil actions and will be reborn according 
to these 
> > actions, his personality that will enter into Nibbána, his 
personality that 
> > walks on the Eightfold Path. Thus it is said in Vis.M. XVI:
> > >> 
> >> > 
> > > 
> > >> "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
> > The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
> > Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it;
> > The path is, but no traveler on it is seen."
> > 
> 
>        With regard to the sentence "The anattá doctrine teaches 
that neither 
> within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of 
them, can 
> be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a 
> self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding 
substance.," I'd 
> like to emphasize the words "nor outside of them." While I do not 
have a 
> ready reference, I do seem to recall in some sutta the Buddha 
saying that 
> there is no self outside of the khandhas. (And, of course, there 
*is* the 
> sutta entitled The All, in which the Buddha describes the five 
khandhas as 
> being all there is.) Now, of course, there is also nibbana, which 
is not any 
> khandha at all. But the thing is, nibbana is without condition - it 
is the 
> very absence of conditions. Now, can the discernment of absence, a 
> thoroughgoing and utterly complete absence of all possible 
conditions be a 
> self? I think not, for a "self", in addition to being unchanging, 
is also 
> *personal*. But a thoroughgoing and utterly complete absence of all 
possible 
> conditions has nothing by which it can be construed as personal.
>        Consider, moreover the quoted material:
> 
> "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
> The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
> Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it;
> The path is, but no traveler on it is seen."
> 
>        The last two lines of this, as well, point to the 
impersonality of 
> nibbana. So, I would say that there is no self to be found, not in 
the 
> khandhas nor outside of them. I also do think that our strong 
desire that 
> there BE a self outside the khandhas is a kind of last-ditch 
grasping at the 
> anchor of self. That has to be let go of as well - or so it seems 
to me.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> 
> 
> In a message dated 5/20/02 1:55:42 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> <> writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Hi TG.
> > Well I still think it's interesting that the Buddha never says, 
even to 
> > these
> > disciples who presumably would *not* become bewildered if he were 
to say 
> > it:
> > "There is no Self".  Why does he repeat over and over again that 
all things 
> > within
> > the five kandhas - the entire content of *this* life - are 'not 
self', but 
> > refuses
> > to ever say that 'there is not a self of any kind'?
> > 
> > If the reason is in fact that to make such a statement would be 
adhering to
> > annihilationism, one must ask:  What is wrong with the view that 
the Buddha 
> > has
> > here said that he wants to avoid?  Why does the Buddha *not* want 
to 
> > promote the
> > view that death, to quote the Sutta itself, 'is the annihilation 
of
> > consciousness'.  Certainly there been quite a few discussions on 
this list 
> > in
> > which the Buddha's words in other Suttas have been interpeted to 
mean 
> > precisely
> > that:  that consciousness is totally annihilated at the death of 
an Arahant 
> > who
> > has realized Nibbana.  So is the only view the Buddha wishes to 
avoid the 
> > view
> > that the ordinary person has his consciousness annihilated at 
death?
> > 
> > It seems to me that the Buddha is saying here that the 
annihilationists are 
> > wrong.
> > The eternatlists are wrong too, but we can talk about that after 
looking at 
> > the
> > annihilationists a little more closely.  One would hope that if 
the Buddha 
> > were
> > merely saying the unenlightened person does *not* have their 
consciousness
> > annihilated at death - because of course the tendencies of the 
kandhas' 
> > karma
> > still unresolved will cause him to be reborn - but that the 
enlightened 
> > person's
> > consciousness, having no more such tendencies - *is* annihilated 
at death
> > [Parinibbana], he would say so and make this explicit.  If such a 
> > distinction
> > exists anywhere in the canon, I would appreciate being pointed to 
it.  This 
> > is not
> > my sense of what the Buddha is saying.  It seems apparent that he 
is saying 
> > that
> > the annihilationists are deluded and that consciousness is *not* 
> > annihilated at
> > death.  But if the Buddha were to assert that there is no self, 
this is the
> > conclusion that the annihilationists would draw, and he would be 
leading 
> > them into
> > deeper delusion.
> > 
> > The eternalists on the other hand say that there *is* a self, and 
if Buddha 
> > were
> > to assert that there *is* a self, he would be leading the 
eternalists to 
> > the
> > conclusion that there is an immortal soul which survives death 
and 
> > continues
> > beyond the body.  I think it is fair to say that the Buddha does 
not agree 
> > with
> > this view and does not want to promote it.  
> > 
> > There are two possibilities that this allows: One is that there 
is a self 
> > that is
> > beyond the kandhas, a very unpopular view in the Theravadin 
community, but 
> > one
> > never explicitly ruled out by the Buddha.  I know he has clearly 
said that 
> > there
> > is no 'consciousness' that survives death, and that there is 
no 'eternal
> > consciousness' that constitutes a kind of selfless self, but 
these are all 
> > still
> > within the limits of the kandhas as we know them in this life.  
In other 
> > words,
> > there is no self that we as human beings can imagine.  Still, the 
Buddha 
> > never
> > says:  'There is no self of any kind', and I don't think the 
implication is 
> > that
> > he will only not assert this because he doesn't want to confuse 
the
> > annihilationists.  Again, in his conversations with Ananda and 
other 
> > advanced
> > Arahants, there is no reason why he could not say:  'Just between 
us, by 
> > the way,
> > there is no self of any kind, but please don't tell the 
annihilationists as 
> > they
> > will confuse the issue.'  Even if this was the case, saying 
that 'there is 
> > no
> > self' does not explain why he refuses to say that consciousness 
is 
> > extinguished at
> > death, which he clearly announces here as a wrong view that the 
> > annihilationists
> > hold.  It seems clear to me that he is saying that the 
annihilationists 
> > view is
> > wrong, otherwise, why not support it?  Why not just say:  'yes, 
> > consciousness *is*
> > extinguished at death'.  But he does not want the 
annihilationists to think 
> > this,
> > because it is clearly a wrong view.
> > 
> > The other possibility is that there is no self of any kind, but 
that 
> > something
> > beyhond consciousness and the kandhas survives in a form that is 
beyond 
> > anything
> > we can know or imagine.  This seems to be implied by the Buddha's 
refusal 
> > to rule
> > out *some* kind of self, or *some* kind of consciousness 
surviving beyond 
> > death. 
> > Otherwise, why not just let the eternalists and the 
annihilationists know 
> > the
> > truth:  that there is no self, and that there is no consciousness 
beyond 
> > death? 
> > In what way would it confuse them or lead them into wrong views 
if in fact 
> > these
> > two direct statements were true?  It seems obvious to me that 
Buddha 
> > refrains from
> > saying this because to make these blunt statements would be 
promoting wrong 
> > view,
> > and that it is not correct to say that there is no self of any 
kind, and it 
> > is not
> > correct to say that consciousness is extinguished at death.  
These are the 
> > exact
> > views that he is saying are wrong.
> > 
> > Now, the two important verses which you say that Victor left out 
make the
> > following points:
> > 
> > 1/  In the first one Buddha states bluntly that 'all phenomena 
are 
> > not-self'  That
> > is that all *phenomena*, everything we experience in this life, 
are 
> > 'not-self'. 
> > Again this does not say 'there is no self'.  It says phenomena do 
not 
> > contain a
> > self or constitute a self.  So we must not look to phenomena to 
find a 
> > 'self'. 
> > The right view of anatta is always stated this way, isn't it?  
That when 
> > regarding
> > phenomena we are not to cling to them and identify with them 
as 'self'.  
> > Isn't
> > that right?  Nowhere does the Buddha say: 'Look at yourself and 
be clear 
> > that
> > there is no self of any kind that is your self'.  He never rules 
out the
> > possibility, never, of some kind of self beyond phenomena.  Now, 
I am not 
> > saying
> > that there is a self, but what I do want to point out is that 
Buddha's 
> > purpose in
> > the doctrine of anatta does not seem to be to convince us that 
there is no 
> > self of
> > any kind.  Rather it seems to be to direct us to look at all the 
things of 
> > this
> > life as 'not-self', 'impermanent' and 'unable to grant 
satisfaction' and 
> > thus not
> > worthy of clinging to.  When we stop clinging to all of 
these 'not-self'
> > phenomena, we become free to travel the Noble Eightfold Path to 
liberation. 
> >  And
> > this seems to be Buddha's intent.  
> > 
> > I think this is why Victor keeps pointing out the form in which 
the Buddha
> > addresses the subject of anatta, because many of us draw the 
conclusion, 
> > perhaps
> > erroneously, that Buddha is preaching a kind of delayed 
annihilationism.  
> > If we
> > say that 'there is no self and no property of self that exists 
beyond 
> > death, and
> > only the kandhas' tendencies keep consciousness from dying out', 
then we 
> > aim for a
> > kind of annihilationism that is delayed until Parinibbana, but is 
still 
> > directly
> > in line with the view of the annihilationists none-the-less, that 
> > 'consciousness
> > is extinguished at death', the view that the Buddha here 
explicitly 
> > rejects.  how
> > can we adopt a view that is explicitly rejected by the Buddha, 
and say that 
> > it is
> > Buddhist doctrine?
> > 
> > 2/ In the second verse that you have added to the post, Buddha 
makes it 
> > clear that
> > the self one thinks one has is not real, and is not annihilated 
by the 
> > doctrine of
> > anatta:
> > 
> > > "And if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there 
is no self 
> > -- 
> > > were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered 
Vacchagotta would 
> > become 
> > > even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not 
exist?'" 
> > 
> > The most that we can draw from this is that our *idea* of self is 
totally 
> > wrong. 
> > Vacchagotta is bewildered - he has the wrong idea of self.  If 
told there 
> > is no
> > self, he would think, well, 'I know I *do* have a self', and he 
has a fixed 
> > idea
> > of what that self is, so if he were to accept the Buddha's 
assurance that 
> > there is
> > 'no' self, he would become more bewildered and think the self he 
knows he 
> > has has
> > been challenged, annihilated, by the Buddha's teaching.  This is 
how many 
> > of us
> > take the doctrine of anatta.  We try to see that we have no self, 
and it is 
> > like a
> > self struggling to annihilate itself.  Instead of letting go of 
our wrong 
> > views
> > about self, which Buddha says have to be completely let go - he 
says to let 
> > go of
> > every last view we have, because every conceptual view is 
inherently wrong, 
> > an
> > overlay on the truth - we think we really *do* have a self, and 
that we 
> > have to
> > somehow destroy it in order to realize the goal of Buddhism.  
This is like
> > fighting with a shadow, because our idea of what our self is is 
conceptual 
> > and
> > based on mental and emotional attachments to ideas and objects.
> > 
> > So Buddha is definitely saying that our *idea* of self is wrong, 
but he 
> > nowhere
> > states either positively or negatively that is no self of any 
kind, just 
> > that we
> > don't know and that we don't get it.  
> > 
> > In fact, isn't the point of what Buddha is saying here 
that 'everything we 
> > think
> > we know is wrong', and that he doesn't want to feed any of our 
tendencies 
> > to
> > falsely conceptualize about self and not-self?  If we accept that 
as the 
> > premise,
> > then we will focus on our own views of self, and let them go.  My 
> > experience in
> > the moment is that I am conscious of phenomena.  I know this 
consciousness 
> > is
> > present, and that it has one or another object.  That is my 
present 
> > reality. 
> > There is a sense of self, which I do not what to make of, and 
cannot until
> > enlightenment.  I should neither accept nor reject this sense of 
self, but 
> > focus
> > on letting go of false concepts that may arise about this sense 
of self, 
> > while
> > trying to discern truly the functions of mind and the nature of 
arising 
> > objects to
> > gain insight and wisdom, gradually refraining from creating new 
kammic 
> > tendencies,
> > and letting go of attachments.  
> > 
> > But I think that Victor's basic view that the Buddha is telling 
us what to 
> > let go
> > of, since it is 'anatta', that is:  phenomena, is correct.  And 
to think 
> > that
> > Buddha has made any statement as to whether there is in fact some 
kind of 
> > self or
> > not, or that consciousness is completely extinguished in all 
forms at 
> > death, is
> > wrong.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 

 
13419 From: <> 
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 7:35am
Subject: ADL ch. 9 (1)

 
  http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 9 (1)

THE AHETUKA CITTAS WHICH ARE UNKNOWN IN DAILY LIFE 

There are eighteen types of ahetuka citta, or cittas arising without
hetu (root). Fifteen types of ahetuka citta are vipaka. As we have seen,
ten of these fifteen cittas are dvi-panca vinnanas. They are: 

two seeing-consciousness 
two hearing-consciousness 
two smelling-consciousness 
two tasting-consciousness 
two body-consciousness 

Seeing-consciousness is the result of kamma. When it is the result of an
ill deed, seeing-consciousness is akusala vipakacitta which experiences
an unpleasant object; when it is the result of a good deed, it is kusala
vipakacitta which experiences a pleasant object. The function of seeing
consciousness is to experience visible object. 

Kamma which produces seeing-consciousness does not only produce the
vipakacitta which is seeing-consciousness, it also produces two other
kinds of vipakacitta, which succeed seeing-consciousness.
Seeing-consciousness is succeeded by vipakacitta which receives the
object. This citta is called sampaticchana-citta
(receiving-consciousness). Visible object which is experienced by
seeing-consciousness does not fall away when seeing-consciousness falls
away because it is rupa; rupa does not fall away as rapidly as nama.
When an object is experienced through one of the six doors, there is not
merely one citta experiencing that object, but there is a series of
cittas succeeding one another, which share the same object. 

If the seeing-consciousness is akusala vipaka, the sampaticchana-citta
(receiving-consciousness) is also akusala vipaka; if the
seeing-consciousness is kusala vipaka, the sampaticchana-citta is also
kusala vipaka. Thus there are two types of sampaticchana-citta: one is
akusala vipaka and one is kusala vipaka. 
Sampaticchana-citta is ahetuka vipaka; there are no akusala hetus
(unwholesome roots) or sobhana hetus (beautiful roots) arising with this
type of citta. Sampaticchana-citta succeeds seeing-consciousness;
seeing- consciousness is a condition for the arising of
sampaticchana-citta. Likewise, when there is a process of cittas
experiencing sound, sampaticchana-citta succeeds hearing-consciousness.
It is the same with regard to nose, tongue, and body. 

Sampaticchana-citta always arises with upekkha (indifferent feeling), no
matter whether the sampaticchana- citta is akusala vipaka or kusala
vipaka. 

After the sampaticchana-citta has arisen and fallen away, the process of
cittas is not yet over. The sampaticchana-citta is succeeded by another
ahetuka vipakacitta which is still the result of kamma. This type of
citta is called santirana-citta (investigating-consciousness). 
Santirana-citta investigates or considers the object which was
'received' by the sampaticchana-citta. Santirana-citta succeeds
sampaticchana-citta through five sense-doors; sampaticchana-citta is a
condition for the arising of santirana-citta. When seeing has arisen,
sampaticchana-citta succeeds the seeing-consciousness, and
santirana-citta succeeds the sampaticchana-citta in the process of
cittas which experience visible object through eye-door. It is the same
with the santirana- citta which arises in the process of cittas
experiencing an object through ear-door, nose-door, tongue-door,
body-door. It succeeds the sampaticchana-citta. We cannot choose whether
santirana-citta should arise or not; cittas arise because of conditions,
they are beyond control. 

Santirana-citta is also an ahetuka vipakacitta. When the object is
unpleasant (anittharammana), the santirana- citta is akusala vipaka and
it is accompanied by upekkha (indifferent feeling). As regards
santirana-citta which is kusala vipaka, there are two kinds. When the
object is pleasant (ittharammana), but not extraordinarily pleasant,
santirana-citta is accompanied by upekkha. When the object is
extraordinarily pleasant (atittharammana), the santirana-citta is
accompanied by somanassa. Thus, there are three kinds of santirana-citta
in all. It depends on conditions which kind of santirana-citta arises. 

Thus, there are fifteen (15) types of ahetuka citta which are vipaka.
Summarizing them, they are: 

10 cittas which are dvi-panca-vinnana (five pairs) 
1 sampaticchana-citta (receiving-consciousness) which is akusala vipaka 
1 sampaticchana-citta which is kusala vipaka 
1 santirana-citta (investigating-consciousness) which is akusala vipaka,
accompanied by upekkha 
1 santirana-citta which is kusala vipaka, accompanied by upekkha 
1 santirana-citta which is kusala vipaka, accompanied by somanassa

 
13420 From: Num 
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 6:30am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Hi Howard, Jon, Jim and all (Sarah, Nina and Larry at the end);


<< The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii pa.tipadaa". It seems
to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of "pa.tipadaa"
(the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way leading to). >>


Num: I looked up the Thai sutta and the atthakatha. 
<<Satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii>> translated as <<development of 
satipatthana-4.>> The word "pa.tipadaa" is left untranslated in Thai.  The 
word "bhavana" means to develop and "gamini" means leading to.

I have just got a Thai tipitaka and atthakatha CDrom from Kom. There is no 
specific commentary to this particular sutta (vibhanga-sutta).


<< "And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of 
reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve, right 
speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, 
right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the development 
of the frames of reference." >>

<< Most interesting to me is the final section which defines "the path of 
practice to the development of the frames of reference," as specifically the 
noble eightfold path. The straightforward reading of this takes satipatthana 
more as something which "comes later", penultimate to liberation, rather than 
as a technique to be practiced "all along". It would seem, on this reading, 
that the entire eight-factored path is the path of practice culminating in 
satipatthana (and then in awakening and liberation). >>


Num: This reminds me of 37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma (factors pertaining to 
enlightenment). There are seven main groups in bodhipakkhiyadhamma. 
4-Satipatthana is mentioned first and eight-factored path is mentioned last. 
Jon, you mentioned before that there were 14 core dhammas in 
37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma. Sati is one of the core dhammas in 
bodhipakkhiyadhamma (factors pertaining to enlightenment). 

In bodhipakkhiyadhamma, sati-cetasika, as a factor pertaining to 
enlightenment, was mentioned under different terms: 4-satipatthana, 
satindriya, satipala, satisambojjhango, and sammasati. Satipatthana is 
sammasati in the eight-factored path. 

My understanding is all factors in 37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma (14 core dhammas) 
or in eight-factored path are simultaneously attained only during the moment 
of lokuttara-citta (there are some exceptions (piti- and vitaka-cetasika) for 
someone who attains enlightenment with jhana; ref: nnanakatha, PSM and 
magga-vibhanga, Vibhanga).  Satipatthana in other kusala-cittas 
(lokiya-kusala) performs its function of leading to the path, by being 
mindful of whatever reality appearing and temporary eliminating akulsala but 
with weaker power. Not until the moment of lokuttara-citta, sati 
(satipatthana) at that moment with all factors pertaining to enlightenment 
will simultaneously and synchronously perform their functions by completely 
eradicate akusala according to the level of magga-citta. So in the moment of 
eight-factored path, there is the most fulfilling and enriching satipatthana. 

Each magga-citta occurs only one time for each person in sammasara. The 
arammana of lokuttara-citta is nibbana. Magga-citta and its accompanied 
cetasikas share the same arammana, nibbana.
     

Best wishes.

Num

PS. Sarah, thanks for updating my profile. I will keep sneaking in as time 
permits. Sorry, I have no special power:-(  I still live a life of a 
layperson, who enjoys working and having fun at the same time :-) BTW, I have 
not finished reading PSM yet. Nina and Larry and for those who are interested 
in PSM: I cannot make a commitment at this point. If the time is not too 
unkind, I am more than willing to share what I will learn from PSM session, 
although my understanding will be very limited.

 
13421 From: Num 
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 6:33am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Hi Howard, Jon, Jim and all (Sarah, Nina and Larry at the end);


<< The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii pa.tipadaa". It seems
to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of "pa.tipadaa"
(the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way leading to). >>


Num: I looked up the Thai sutta and the atthakatha. 
<<Satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii>> translated as <<development of 
satipatthana-4.>> The word "pa.tipadaa" is left untranslated in Thai.  The 
word "bhavana" means to develop and "gamini" means leading to.

I have just got a Thai tipitaka and atthakatha CDrom from Kom. There is no 
specific commentary to this particular sutta (vibhanga-sutta).


<< "And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of 
reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve, right 
speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, 
right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the development 
of the frames of reference." >>

<< Most interesting to me is the final section which defines "the path of 
practice to the development of the frames of reference," as specifically the 
noble eightfold path. The straightforward reading of this takes satipatthana 
more as something which "comes later", penultimate to liberation, rather than 
as a technique to be practiced "all along". It would seem, on this reading, 
that the entire eight-factored path is the path of practice culminating in 
satipatthana (and then in awakening and liberation). >>


Num: This reminds me of 37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma (factors pertaining to 
enlightenment). There are seven main groups in bodhipakkhiyadhamma. 
4-Satipatthana is mentioned first and eight-factored path is mentioned last. 
Jon, you mentioned before that there were 14 core dhammas in 
37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma. Sati is one of the core dhammas in 
bodhipakkhiyadhamma (factors pertaining to enlightenment). 

In bodhipakkhiyadhamma, sati-cetasika, as a factor pertaining to 
enlightenment, was mentioned under different terms: 4-satipatthana, 
satindriya, satipala, satisambojjhango, and sammasati. Satipatthana is 
sammasati in the eight-factored path. 

My understanding is all factors in 37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma (14 core dhammas) 
or in eight-factored path are simultaneously attained only during the moment 
of lokuttara-citta (there are some exceptions (piti- and vitaka-cetasika) for 
someone who attains enlightenment with jhana; ref: nnanakatha, PSM and 
magga-vibhanga, Vibhanga).  Satipatthana in other kusala-cittas 
(lokiya-kusala) performs its function of leading to the path, by being 
mindful of whatever reality appearing and temporary eliminating akulsala but 
with weaker power. Not until the moment of lokuttara-citta, sati 
(satipatthana) at that moment with all factors pertaining to enlightenment 
will simultaneously and synchronously perform their functions by completely 
eradicate akusala according to the level of magga-citta. So in the moment of 
eight-factored path, there is the most fulfilling and enriching satipatthana. 

Each magga-citta occurs only one time for each person in sammasara. The 
arammana of lokuttara-citta is nibbana. Magga-citta and its accompanied 
cetasikas share the same arammana, nibbana.
     

Best wishes.

Num

PS. Sarah, thanks for updating my profile. I will keep sneaking in as time 
permits. Sorry, I have no special power:-(  I still live a life of a 
layperson, who enjoys working and having fun at the same time :-) BTW, I have 
not finished reading PSM yet. Nina and Larry and for those who are interested 
in PSM: I cannot make a commitment at this point. If the time is not too 
unkind, I am more than willing to share what I will learn from PSM session, 
although my understanding will be very limited.

 
13422 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 1:09pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Dear Jim, Num, Jon, Howard,

I don’t suppose the Pali grammar would allow a switch in cases  to:

“What does the development of satipatthana lead to? The Noble 8fold Path
etc”
<lit: development of satipatthana is the way leading to what?>

Just a thought.

Sarah (v.rusty on Pali noun tenses and not sure where to check easily)
======

--- Jim Anderson  wrote: > Jon,
> 
> The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii pa.tipadaa". It
> seems
> to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of
> "pa.tipadaa"
> (the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way leading to). It is also
> worth
> noting that the Pali text takes satipa.t.thaana to be in the singular
> (satipa.t.thaana.m) which B. Bodhi translates as "the establishment of
> mindfulness" while Thanissaro Bhikkhu has "the frames of reference"
> (plural).
..........



 
13423 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 1:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi Rob Ep,

--- Robert Epstein  wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> Hi!  Haven't spoken to you in a while.  How are you?

You’re certainly maiking up for lost time;-) Just trying to catch up on
work, home and dhamma fronts, so I’m not too sorry that most your posts
are addressed to Howard and Jon;-)

Still, I’m very glad to try to respond to this one which includes some
useful questions:

> I am having trouble with the idea that concepts are not part of the five
> kandhas,
> as I thought that everything that arises in mental and
> perceptual-physical
> experience was included in the five kandhas, in other words, everything
> in this
> life other than the experiencing of Nibbana.
.....

This is correct. “Everything that arises in mental and perceptual physical
experience”, i.e all namas and rupas that arise and fall away are included
in the 5 khandhas. “Everything in this life” which is real with
characteristics which can be known “other than the experiencing of
Nibbana” is included.
.....

> How do concepts get exemption?  
.....
They don’t qualify as namas or rupas or as paramattha dhammas.
.....

 > I am also wondering what the exact delineation of the concept is.  If a
> thought
> about a concept is a paramatha dhamma, but a concept is not, where does
> the
> concept occur in the thought, as what part of the thought?
.....
The thinking (you call thought) which thinks about the concepts (or
experiences the concepts) has particular characteristics. The concepts
never form part of it.They are conceptualized or imagined by it.
.....
 > Let me propose an example:  
> 
> "I saw a tree yesterday."
> 
> I is a concept.  
> saw is a concept.
> tree is a concept
> yesterday is a concept.
> 
> Is that not so?  Where is the reality of this thought?  Is the whole
> thing a
> concept, a collection of concepts?  Or is it a string of concepts, but
> the thought
> itself which holds them all together is not a concept?  
.....
The conceiving--or the experiencing by the nama-- which thinks or
experiences is real. The string of concepts, is just as you say, a string
of concepts. The idea of something holding them together is another
concept. No thing or whole thing in truth, just cittas, accompanied by
sanna, moha, ditthi and all the other mental factors which help create the
illusion of the concepts existing.
.....
So if I discern:
> "I am thinking 'I saw a tree yesterday'", the discerning thought "I am
> thinking..." etc. is a paramatha dhamma, but it's object, the concept "I
> saw a
> tree yesterday" is a concept and is not a paramatha dhamma?
.....
If I understand you, this is almost correct. At the moment of discerning
(being aware?) of the nama, thinking, there is no idea of the concept. In
other words, one moment there may be thinking (paramattha dhamma) of
concept and another moment there may be awareness (paramattha dhamma) of
thinking (paramattha dhamma --or p.d. from now on--).In other words, only
the 5khandhas are ever ‘discerned’.(*I’m a little wary of the use of
discern because I know that people use it in different ways on this list -
ask your pal, Howard;-))
.....
 
> In the sentence:  "You are smiling right now", which I could be
> perceiving at this
> very moment, 
> You is a concept,
> Are is a concept,
> Smiling is a concept,
> Right now is a concept,
> no?
.....
yes
..... 
> Where is the thought that is an actuality, and are these in fact all
> concepts?
> Is the thought as a whole a concept?
.....
As discussed, the cittas and cetasikas which ‘think’ are real....the story
in part or whole is made up of concepts and doesn’t *exist*.
.....
 > Here is another thought:  "I am sad right now."
> The experience of sadness is a paramatha dhamma, but when I think "I am
> sad", in
> the thought, sadness is a concept, because the thought does not actually
> contain
> the experience.  It takes place in another moment and refers to the
> sadness
> second-hand.  So where is the actual thought that is an actuality, if
> all the
> contained concepts are not real?  
.....
Same answer as for the happy thoughts;-) Sadness (dosa) as you say is
p.d., any awareness or understanding of it are p.d, but the story is a
story. although the thinking of it, probably accompanied by yet more dosa
are p.d. So it’s easy to see how the dosa continues as the thinking
conceives more stories about it;-(.
.....
 > The only thoughts I can think of that would qualify for paramatha
dhamma
> status,
> would be reflective thoughts that take a thought as an object.  These
> can be
> referrred to in the present moment, because their objects are in
> language and
> therefore not second-hand.  So if I say "I want to consider the thought
> "I am sad"
> ", the "I am sad" is a concept, but the statement "I want to
> consider..." etc., is
> a thought which has a concept as an object, and is therefore a paramatha
> dhamma. 
> Is this correct?  Perhaps you can help me sort this out.
.....
It doesn’t sound quite right. At the moment of thinking or saying “I want
to consider..” again there are p.d thinking (regardless of whether spoken
out) about concepts. In other words, if it’s not a citta, cetasika or
rupa, then it’s a concept which is not included in ‘the All’ which should
be or can be directly known.

Hope this helps. Many thanks for the good questions.

Sarah
=====


 
13424 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 2:40pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: 'no control', kamma of the fourth kind, MN117

 
  Dear Sukin,
Well I really enjoyed your message.  I like how vigorous it is.  You seem to both
have a very strong point of view which is somewhat opposed to mine and also to be
in a very spontaneous frame of mind, which has a nice freshness to it.

Now that I've reviewed your post like a good cup of coffee or a glass of wine, I
should look to what you have actually said.  But I will add that in this vigorous
opposition I feel some kind of positive dialectic is there, and I look forward to
some more exchanges.

Okay, comments below.

--- Sukinder  wrote:
> Hi Rob,
> 
> Nice to hear from you.
> 
> .........  I agree with a lot of what you say.
> 
> Happy to hear that.
> 
> I think one of the main areas where we may disagree, as I find a similar
> disagreement with Jon, is whether or not certain practices can be assumed to
> eventually lead to kusala, sati, panna, and all the other positive
> qualities.
> 
> I think the quality of citta is the important thing, not the activity
> itself. Giving
> importance to 'activity' will I feel lead to some form of silabbataparamasa
> or the
> other. 

Unfortunately do not know this term.  But I am impressed by how long it is.  If
you can translate I would appreciate it.

  Kusala is encouraged and accumulation of parami does support the
> development of panna, but this must be natural. By natural I mean, without
> the
> interference of an idea, that certain activities would condition kusala and
> that
> would in turn engender the development of panna. 

Okay, this goes back to one of my points, which perhaps you could address:  I feel
that the idea of developing kusala 'naturally' is itself an intention imposed on
the 'naturalness' of the arising moments, and I would be interested to see how you
can get a 'natural' development out of such a situation.  It is very similar to
the physicist who desperately wants to see what an electron looks like when he is
not around and how it behaves when he's not watching, but the only way he can
observe this is to use an electron microscope, and the use of the electron
microscope changes the behavior of the electrons he is observing.  So he can never
see what actually takes place but only the result with his effect factored in. 
How can he account for his own effect on the phenomenon and thus get a 'pure' take
on what the real behavior of electrons is?  How can we possibly factor in the
effect our intention to follow the Buddhist path has on the 'natural occurrence'
of moments and thus really observe the actual moments as they arise without some
sort of overlayingn intention?  I don't think it is possible at all, therefore I
conclude that trying to achieve some sort of 'naturalness' that is not affected by
intentions and intentional activities and efforts is barking up the wrong tree. 
Instead we should follow our true intention and acknowledge it, which is of
course, to reach enlightenment by following the dharma.  Once acknowleding this
extremely *unnatural* intention which permanently and irreparably tears apart the
natural unconsciousness that is the keynote of ordinary life, we can set about
answering the important questions as to how to most effectively follow the path. 
If there were only one answer to this question, and if the answer was as clear and
simple as some sometimes think it is, life would be simple, the dharma would be
simple, and the certain march to Nibbana would be simple.  But it is extremely
stressful, marked by decisions to be made, false starts and layers of delusion,
even for those who follow the dhamma as closely as they know how.

To start with, there is more than one approach to Buddhism, and each of the
schools thinks that the others are deluded.   This has always been the case with
every religion, no matter what its goals, aims or teachings, and the conflicts
within Buddhism, while not the same, are analogous.   So the Theravadan school
says that the Mahayana school is fabricated.  The Mahayana school says that the
Theravadan school is the lesser vehicle for those of ordinary capacities.  The
Vajrayana-Tibetan school says that both the other schools in their ordinary
practices are limited.  Meanwhile the Buddha is in the background calmly stating
that all conceptual views are erroneous and that we shouldn't create debates
between different schools of thought as this unsettles the mind.  Yet the debates
go on, because we are in samsara.  

So then we focus on Theravada itself, and we have the direct teachings in the
Tipitaka.  Even here we have conflicts:  different translations, different
teachers, different emphases, different interpretations, different commentaries. 
Abhidhamma states that it is the Abhidhammic commentaries that make true sense out
of the otherwise not-so-clear Suttas.  Other approaches to Theravada state that
Abhidhamma is an intellectual approach and that simple meditation on the nature of
the moments is more fruitful than trying to break the moments down into
categories, and that we should focus instead on the jhanas and the development of
vipassana through sitting meditation for very long periods of time.  Abhidhamma
replies that the Buddha never stated that meditation was to be the main approach
to sati and panna, and that discernment is more natural in everyday life.  etc.
etc.

So I do not see anything naturally occurring about any of this.  What I see is a
struggle to find the path and different authoritative answers as to how to follow
the path for persons of different inclinations and temperaments.  This also makes
sense in the light of the Budhha's teachings, because he certainly preached
different objects of attention for different groups in different stages of
progress.  Some he pointed to the ethical path, some to sitting meditation, some
to discernment, some to study of intellectual distinctions about the nature of
reality.  

If we attempt to discern the workings of consciousness and the kandhas in the
moment, as we all agree that in one way or another we must and should, then I
think this should include investigating the assumptions and views that we have
about the path when they arise in consciousness.  The concept 'Abhidhamma', the
concept 'Theravada', the concept 'Buddha' should all be seen as ideas and not as
realities.  Then perhaps we can focus on the nature of the mind and perception
[namas and rupas].  

But to conclude this point, I disagree that we must somehow contrive to invent a
naturalness to our methodology that simply doesn't exist.  Instead, I think we
should use whatever methods are in line with the Buddha's teachings in so far as
we understand it and use them vigorously according to what works.  How can we tell
what works and what doesn't to make progress on the path?  Buddha describes the
kind of qualities that arise as one lets go of clingings and defilements and moves
into higher stages of mental and perceptual purity along the path.  He speaks of a
refined sense of pleasure in the higher mental states, of a refined kind of
emotion that develops, of a sort of peacefulness that pervades the mind, of
eventual transcendence of thought and desire at even higher levels of release, and
other qualities that are gradually attained if we are on the correct path.  In my
opinion, one can use these sorts of things as a barometer of progress.  If the
Buddha talks about feelings and realizations that mark progress on the path, we
can look to these things.  If we cannot use something in our personal experience
to mark our progress, I think we must be forever deluded, because no outside
source whether sutta or teacher can give us the final word on whether our
experience has been elevated in the proper direction.  So we have to develop some
sort of real observation of what is happening in our consciousness, even if it is
very slow.

Now I have anger arising at different times, and frustration and this and that
negative state.  I also have various other things that seem to be akusala.  But I
can also see areas that are definitely less fearful and clinging, less angry and
less rigid in view than there were in my consciousness say a year ago.  I am not
as afraid of death as I used to be, there is less concern for the loss of my
personal self.  I have less of a sense that there *is* a personal self.  I am more
inclined to see moments arising and a sense of awareness being present, but have
had experiences of clearly not being able to see a self in the center of these
operations.  There have been some strong moments of clearly seeing the anattaness
of certain things in the moment, struck by the changing nature of experience, etc.
 All of this to me shows a general trend towards progress on the path.  

While Jon is right that one can be fooled about kusala and akusala and other
feelings or senses of progress, and that one has to have a refined consciousness
to make these distinctions correctly, I still think that there is also some
objectivity to doing a general or gradual assessment of progress.  How often does
anger arise?  is there a feeling of suppression or a sense that a large tendency
towards anger and frustration has gone away, been rooted out?  Shouldn't we keep
track of such things as part of our discernment and have a sense of whether we are
going in the right direction?  I think so.  Otherwise we are always taking an
outside source as the measure, and we will never reach the independence necessary
to be able to discern with surety.

  Even kusala cannot be
> forced and it has already fallen away by the time we think about doing
> something.

I think this is different than the general practices we do as a matter of
lifestyle
to make progress.  If one becomes a monk, he doesn't have to think at every
moment:  I'm intending to make progress by being a monk.  He has already made the
decision which he thinks will be helpful to his path and he just continues to do
it unless it proves to be incorrect.  Isn't there some intention in that decision?
 Sure there is.

> And I definitely do not believe that practices of other religions, such as
> yoga,
> can lead to sati and panna. 

Well, I understand your point of view, but I don't think you can really know that,
can you?  How would you know whether it does or not?

  Kusala was and is recognized by all other
> religions
> and I do believe that some level of kusala can be developed by performing
> activities such as yoga and tai chi, but not sati and panna. 

This seems to be an assumption on your part unless you have some other knowledge
that this is the case.

  The kusala they
> all encourage is with some sense and form of self or the other. 

With respect, this is not only true of most religious practices, but also of most
Buddhist practices.  We are attached to form of self even if we have the concept
of anatta.  And I think it is sort of like saying 'well I'm sure there is no life
on any other planet' because we are centered in our own experience, but it is very
possible that adepts in other religions have also reached wisdom, since wisdom is
not just a quality of the Buddha, but of human potential which the Buddha came to
point out and point the path to.  So we disagree on this point so far.  That is
not to say that any path as a path is as effective as Buddhism.  I don't believe
that anyone was as systematic and thorough and insightful as Buddha on the way to
liberation.  But that doesn't mean there are no Arahants or great sages who have
realized emptiness of form and anattaness of human being in any other religion.  I
would look to Ramana Maharshi and Nisargardatta in Advaita Vedanta, whom I believe
thoroughly realized anatta through and through.  It is so indicated in both their
lives and their conversations.  

  They
> have no idea of anatta, or even anicca. 

I would disagree.  While anatta is the clear realization of the Buddha, others
have come to see anatta in their own terms.  I think it is a realization waiting
to be discovered, not an invention of the Buddha.

  Their conception of impermanence
> is basically conceptual, not having perceived the rise and fall of
> individual
> dhammas. 

I don't think this is true in the case of great sages of Hinduism.  Hinduism in
general is fettered with the concept of Atman which the average person takes to be
an 'inner self', but in the great sages the term 'Atman' is dissolved into
emptiness of form and self, and the statement is made by someone like Dattatreyas
in the Avadhut Gita that there is no self, no form, no clinging, etc.  He made
this point very clearly.  Some of these great sages founded schools which broke
apart the conceptual frame of Hinduism in a similar way to that done by Buddha
when he radicalized the Brahmanism of his day.  This is not to take away from
Buddha' overriding greatness, but just to point out that these discoveries are
potentially universal and in some cases are realized within other forms of
practice and terminologies.

  Conceptual understanding of impermanence cannot lead to
> detachment from what buddhists know to be the momentary arising of
> phenonmenon, which is 'now', 

Wouldn't that be lovely if the average Buddhist knew this?  Certainly the
impermanence of the momentary arising of phenomenon is a standard meditation
feature of meditation-based Hinduism, which it has promoted quite effectively. 
The Buddha did not originate the non-conceptual realization of impermanence.  It
is a standard in Hindu meditation.

   let alone detachment from the sense of self,

also a goal of Hindu meditation.  Hinduism is a little different in that it tries
to promote detachment from the conventional self but replaces it with a higher
self, so it usually does not reach the level of true anatta.  But in the highest
versions, atman dissolves into no-self.  This should be recognized because in some
circles it does take place.

For instance, Nisargardatta states that the self is not an entity but is just a
conceptual object of consciousness.

> which is constantly being reinforced through tanha, ditthi and mana.

Sorry, I don't know these terms off the top of my head.

> The Buddha was equally perfect in wisdom the first moment he attained
> enlightenment till the moment before he attained parinibbana. The wisdom
> of the arahants all combined do not equal to a small part of the Buddhas.

I don't say you are wrong, but I would challenge whether you actually know this to
be the case.  What's the evidence for this?

> And I do not believe any person outside the buddhist tradition in human
> history, will have the wisdom close to a sotapanna.

Well, how well have you studied the high teachings of other traditions?  I find
that the higher adepts of other traditions go quite far in the direction of
realization of anatta, anicca and dukkha.  I see this realization as more
universal than you do, although pretty rare in all traditions, but universally
potential.  One has to sift through the terminology of each tradition to
understand what is being said, but if you read properly I believe that there are
'selfless' and highly enlightened beings in other traditions.  I don't think the
Buddha wanted us to make him into a God who was the sole source of understanding. 
I think he wanted us to look to the universal human qualities and potentials that
are there to be tapped.  Buddhism in my opinion should not be turned into an
exclusive club, but should be used as a window into the true nature of human
existence and potential.

> Wisdom cannot be added and improved upon by sucessive generations.

Another disagreement.  This is to set the Buddha's words in stone, rather than to
reinvigorate them with our understanding in each generation.  That which is set in
stone becomes remote and static in my opinion.  It must be put into practice in
each of us by making it our own.

> A system of practice like yoga which has been worked upon and changed
> through time can only result in getting people cling to the superficial
> aspect of it.

I disagree strongly.  The essential understanding of yoga has been very solid for
10 or 15,000 years.  It has not changed with the wind, but like Buddhism, each
generation has adapted their use of it to be able to practice within their
understanding and circumstances.  This does not change the nature of yoga.

> My conclusion thus is, such practices not only do not help in buddhist
> practise, but if seen instead as being a support, can be extremely
> detrimental to development of panna.

I think this is just an opinion here, Sukin, which, as far as I know, is not based
upon your own practice, but just an idea you have that nothing but Buddhism can be
useful.

> Satipatthana is the *only* way. 

Well, that is like me saying 'meditation is the only way.'  Buddha has pointed out
a number of different practices to develop insight and wisdom, so the 'only'
qualifier doesn't seem to do this justice.  Satipatthana is the only result
perhaps, but the methods are there to promote and practice mindfulness and letting
go in various ways.  There is not only one way to Satipatthana or Buddha wouldn't
have had to speak about all the areas of life and so many different factors to be
developed.

  With this in mind, it is counter productive
> to investigate and try out any other teachings. 

I wouldn't advise running around trying things out.  What I am talking about is a
little more serious than that.

  Panna being the aim of
> Buddha's teachings, why give preference to development of other kinds
> of kusala rather than understanding what is appearing at this moment?

yes, the question is what will aid the understandingn of what is appearing at this
moment.  You can neither prove nor disprove that focussing upon and opening up the
body will or will not help the understanding of what appears in the moment.  My
sense from my own years of practice is that with the right attention to the
moment, yoga can get rid of a lot of static and junk that gets in the way of
paying attention to the moment and cultivating discernment.  I think that's what
it was designed for.  One can of course look at jangled nerves and racing thoughts
and try to discern the realities that they represent, but it is most difficult to
do so.  It is sometimes useful to be able to clear the decks and look more clearly
at the basic arising of namas and rupas without such akusala static in the way.  I
see this as an obvious asset, *as long* as one does not become attached either to
the practice or its results.

> Robert:
> Another point is whether putting forth intentions implies that there is a
> self,
> and that the only way to acknowledge anatta is by admitting that nothing can
> be
> done to either speed or slow the path.  One has to kind of sneak in Sutta
> study
> and discernment in a passive, natural way, so that the notion of self won't
> get in
> and ruin it.  [Hope you don't mind me being a little facetious to highlight
> the
> point.]
> 
> Sukin:
> Yes the sense of self is all pervading. Almost every moment of being awake
> there is a sense of self via ditthi, tanha or mana. Especially when we are
> not aware no? The sneaking in to study and paying attention to the teachings
> can be done or at least have many moments where lobha is ruling no?;-)
> I think this should alert us to how much the sense of self would then
> overshadow activities we do intentionally to overccome the sense of self.

All of our activities are intentional, even the ones we don't acknowledge as such,
because they are the 'right' ones in our minds.  If we discern the arising nature
of a nama or rupa within the frame of Abhidhamma teaching that is an intentional
practice.  There is nothing natural about it.  It is a guided activity within a
conceptual framework.  To not acknowledge this is very dangerous as it tends to
make one think that their own conditioned view is the 'natural' one.  Very
dangerous indeed.  One should disclose one's view to oneself as to what is
natural, what is correct, what is proper and take that into account when
discerning the nature of the moment.  Otherwise one is just discerning one's own
chosen philosophy in the guise of naturalness.   It takes amazing honesty and
attention to release one's own view and be in the presence of the naked moment. 
Having a view that one way is right and the other is wrong does not aid this
endeavor, in fact it prejudices it and makes it even more difficult to see what is
really happening when *all* views are seen as merely views and the moment itself
is allowed to deliver its true nature directly to consciousness without concepts
in the way.

> Robert:
> I personally think [for whatever that's worth -- not much, I hear Jon
> saying...my
> God, I've internalized him!] that sitting with attention to the breath or to
> the
> present moment will eventually yield increased discernment, and lead to sati
> and
> panna.  I add that of course if one does this in an unskillful way it may
> not lead
> to any such results, but the practice itself, done with some reasonable
> understanding and instruction, tends to lead in the right direction.  I
> think that
> most Abhidhammists will tend to disagree with this, and say that we cannot
> possibly predict the arising of kusala based on any given practice.
> 
> I also believe that intention can be put forth by cittas and that this
> cumulative
> intention will eventually tend to yield positive fruit.  And I think some
> take
> this to imply that there must be a self being posited that will both put
> this
> effort forth and yield the fruit of that intention.  I contend that this is
> not
> necessarily so, and that intention can be put forth, just as we put forth
> this or
> that cause through the production of consciousness.  We have a moment of
> anger and
> the intention arises to either hold it back and take a deep breath or to
> yell and
> scream.  There is a moment of decision there as well.  There may also be a
> moment
> where we say, 'okay, let's not act on this anger in future' and eventually
> this
> may have an effect in that direction.  Can we choose to have an intention
> and then
> have it?  I don't know.  But I do think the putting forth of intention can
> yield
> an eventual result that arises from that intention.  My own life seems to
> give
> evidence for this.
> 
> Sukin:
> Rob, turn your attention to the frame of your monitor, now to other parts of
> your
> computer, next scan your room, if there is sound, sound. Do you see the
> diversity
> and range of sense impressions, can you appreciate that it all involves a
> complexity
> of conditions (one of which being my prompting you to)? 

That's one way of looking at it.   A less complex way of looking at it would be to
say that it is all 'merely taking place'.  Unless one observes a complex set of
conditions causing sense impressions to arise, I would simply say they are taking
place and allow myself to experience them with mindfulness.  To see them as
complex is a concept, one drawn from philosophy.    Who says that all that we
observe makes any given thing happen.  Do we really know that?  When we observe a
process and can see the pattern that led to it that is great.  Then we really see
the chain of causes.  But we shouldn't assume that all the 'stuff' we pick up is
somehow related in a causal chain.  Let's distinguish direct understanding from
concept on this.

  Sitting down to
> observe
> your breath, does this involve any more favourable set of conditions( for
> the
> development of panna) than standing and staring out into the open? 

Well, I do know that focussing on an object causes more focussed attention.  A
simple fact.  Is that a good thing?  I think that generally it is.  Before coming
to this list I thought that was pretty much agreed upon.  Focussing and
cultivating mindfulness in both meditation free of distractions and in everyday
life is the one-two punch that gradually knocks out ignorance.  But here there is
a great prejudice against meditative practice, it seems.  Jon gave a decent
explanation in that he says that we will not have the dharma in future lives, so
we should study it now, and we can work on the jhanas in future lifetimes.   But I
still feel that there is a great prejudice here, based on philosophy, not
experience.  To take the Buddha's many words on meditation and discard them as
secondary or even harmful seems to me a great disservice to a most important part
of the path.  I don't understand it and don't think it contributes anything to an
otherwise noble school of Buddhism.  It seems to me in a way to be a shying away
*from* direct experience, because in meditation, in my experience, direct
experience of the nature of realities is highlighted and heightened.  I don't
believe the argument that somehow this is unnatural.  Buddhism is simply filled
with expedient means, and meditation is high on the list on those given by the
Buddha.  Frankly, I think it's a grave error to think one must or should stick to
naturally discerning everyday realities while shying away from a real practice in
which mindfulness is highlighted, and by which the work with everyday realities
would be greatly enhanced.  

  Do you
> know
> exactly what is going on at any given moment and can you give a correct
> interpretation of your experience to you meditation teacher? 

Not necessary.  First of all, I don't have a meditation teacher at present, and
second, telling a meditation teacher what I experience is not the foremost use of
a meditation teacher or of meditation.  

  Can your
> meditation teacher know what are the conditions any given moment?

Can anyone else?  Yes or no, depending on whether they do or not.  Why be
particularly prejudiced against a great meditation teacher?  You would not speak
against the salutary effects of seeking the advice and teaching of an Abhidhammic
'spiritual friend'.  But you assume that there is something wrong with the
discernment and capability of a teacher who focusses on meditation.  I say: 
what's the difference between these two?  Because I really don't see any
distinction.  They are both teaching about ways of applying the Dhamma, both
legitimate ways of doing so.   But because of philosophical predispositions you
can only accept the usefulness of one and not the other.  I see this as a form of
prejudice.  Have you examined it, and found that it is really true?  Or is it an
idea you have developed from your affiliation with a school of thought?  These are
hard questions, but I think very good ones for us all to look at, whatever our
orientation.

> I think it very important to distinguish between concept and reality, or
> else we are
> likely to end up getting caught in some form of practise, not recognizing
> our
> projections.

Likewise with *all* philosophies and forms of practices, including the ones you
may think are exempt from this criticism.

> Sorry I have to go out somewhere. I feel I have not addressed your precise
> points.
> Had some other points in mind after I read your post earlier today, but
> forgot what
> they were. But will wait for your reply to see if anything else could be
> said.

Well, I'm sure your response to my ruminations above will be very interesting. 
And I am looking forward to hearing back from you when you have a chance to digest
them.

Best,
Robert Ep.




 
13425 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 2:46pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  --- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 5/20/02 7:28:49 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Jon writes:
> 
> 
> > Howard
> > 
> > I've now had a chance to look at this sutta, and I see the point you are
> > raising about the final section.  Here the Noble Eightfold Path is
> > described as "the path [of practice] to the development of the frames of
> > reference" or, in the Bh. Bodhi translation, as "the way leading to the
> > development of the establishment of mindfulness".
> > 
> > I admit I am puzzled by this and have no thoughts on it as yet.  I am only
> > familiar with the Noble Eightfold Path being described as the path leading
> > to nibbana.  This is something entirely new to me.
> > 
> > As you know, I rely heavily on the commentaries for my interpretation of
> > the suttas, but unfortunately there is no English translation of the
> > Saaratthappakaasini or its tika.  I don't know if our Thai members (e.g.
> > Jaran, Kom or Num, or others) would be able to throw any light on this
> > point from the Thai translation which as I understand it includes the
> > commentary also.
> > 
> > I've noted your comments on the 'straightforward' meaning, Howard, but I
> > prefer not to speculate at this stage.
> > 
> > Very interesting, and thanks for bringing it up.  Any comments from others
> > most welcome.
> > 
> > Jon
> > 
> > 
> ==========================
>        It may very well turn out that there is a way of understanding this 
> sutta which accords with your perspective. Whatever the case may be, I'd just 
> like to say that I really admire your intellectual honesty and your 
> willingness to face whatever the facts may be! Most people cling strongly to 
> long-held views, and your openness to other possibilities is really 
> impressive!

agreed.

robert ep




 
13426 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 2:54pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  --- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 5/20/02 2:23:47 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Robert Ep writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Dear Howard,
> > Thanks for your reply, which is both intelligent and personal.  What I 
> > would say,
> > along your lines, is that I have no belief in a self 'as such' at this 
> > point, a
> > personal self, anything that we would call self in the conventional sense.  
> > But I
> > differ in seeing 'only' fleeting phenomena rolling by.  To me, there is 
> > both the
> > continuous changes of content that mark human experience, and also a 
> > constant: 
> > consciousness, which has an ever-changing content but itself is 
> > everpresent. 
> > Consciousness has proved to be impersonal as well:  it does not constitute 
> > a self,
> > and the sense of self which you speak of is also merely an arising 
> > sensation
> > within consciousness, but the sense of always being mindful, conscious, 
> > aware, of
> > something is always there.  This leads this consciousness to conclude that 
> > the
> > property of awareness is the underlying reality within which all phenomena 
> > occur,
> > and this is the sticking point between many Buddhists of various 
> > orientiations. 
> > 
> -----------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        There is, of course, vi~n~nana. It is inseparable from its objects. 
> They arise together and are interdependent. Vi~n~nana is a separative 
> awareness - separative in partaking of subject-object duality, and separative 
> in the sense of separating out objects from the field of possibilities based 
> on interest and inclinations. Vi~n~nana is conditioned, and it deals in 
> conditions. Nibbana, on the other hand, is unconditioned, has no relation to 
> conditions, but deals in absence, and is utterly impersonal. So, where is 
> there a self? 

Certainly not a personal one, or an identity as we would think of it, if at all.

  If one wishes to say that nibbana is of the genus "awareness", 
> I would not disagree, 

well that is a big step for many, and I would agree with that.  that to me is one
of the main steppingstones away from annihilationism.

  but such awareness is so radically "other", that for us 
> to just say that it is a mode of awareness and think we have supplied some 
> real content in saying so, is, I believe, to be mistaken.

I agree.  I am willing to accept the total otherness of such nibbanic-awareness,
and think that this may be why the Buddha refused to assert or refute such an
identification.  His understanding of nibbanic awareness was such that it would
only be turned into an object of mind if it was communicated in the teachings.  As
such, he would choose the most expedient explanations for leading people there,
rather than cause an intellectual obstacle by explaining what was beyond
explanation.

I am happy to leave it as 'wholly other', as long as it opens a chink of light, a
doorway to the possibility that the essential quality of being, having become
transformed and utterly impersonal and beyond form, may not be utterly
extinguished in enlightenment.  While this may frighten some in thinking that it
implies another doorway for self to creep back in, I would say it must indeed be
wholly beyond such form, and thus does not.

> ------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> > Is awareness merely a mechanical property of causation, which arises with 
> > causes
> > and subsides at death?  Or at least at the death of an arahant?  Or is it
> > impersonal, beyond the ordinary consciousness we experience in the world of 
> > human
> > objects, and does it have a life beyond the self?  At times in the past you 
> > have
> > agreed with me that there seems to be something like an impersonal 
> > awareness that
> > is not annihilated at death. Now you seem to have grown beyond that, and 
> > that is
> > fine.
> > 
> -----------------------------------------------------
> Howard: 
>        No, I haven't "grown" beyond anything. Perhaps I've refined my 
> understanding a bit. No more.
> -----------------------------------------------------

Okay.  well, if you have anything to say about how that particular idea may have
become more refined or changed, I would be interested.  It's an important area for
me, and I respect your thought on it.

Best,
Robert Ep.



 
13427 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 2:58pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  --- Howard wrote:

> "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
> The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
> Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it;
> The path is, but no traveler on it is seen."
> 
>        The last two lines of this, as well, point to the impersonality of 
> nibbana. So, I would say that there is no self to be found, not in the 
> khandhas nor outside of them. I also do think that our strong desire that 
> there BE a self outside the khandhas is a kind of last-ditch grasping at the 
> anchor of self. That has to be let go of as well - or so it seems to me.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

Hi Howard.
I understand your point, and I would simply ask:  Is there a way to propose
letting go of the last vestige of personal or substantial self, without falling
into annihilationism?

And to me that necessitates something still existing, even though it is neither
self nor form.

Best,
Robert Ep.



 
13428 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 4:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Iddhi

 
  Dear Rob Ep,

I fully agree with you that the practice of samadhi/jhana pre-dates
Buddhism and is not unique to it. I certainly have no doubt about the
practices so prevalent in the texts.

Without wishing to sound disrespectful in anyway, I do however question
whether TM levitation or any form of Astanga yoga taught today, for
example, have any element of jhana involved. 

As discussed, when referring to the psychic powers in the texts, these can
only be developed -- as Wynn pointed --  by those who had accomplished all
rupa and arupa jhanas plus additional preparations. We are talking about
what (for me) are incomprehensibly high levels of refined purity and
wholesome states. We are not just talking about very highly developed
concentration.

If there is no clear understanding  whilst doing yoga, TM , or any other 
practice of the difference between kusala and akusala moments, I don’t
believe there can be any chance of even reaching base camp in the
development of samatha.

So that’s why I made my original comment;-)

Sarah
=====  

 
  --- Robert Epstein  wrote: > 

W:> > > How do you explain the levitation perform by the yogis of TM
> > > (Transcendental
> > > Meditation)

S:> > I don’t try;-) Let me know what you think!
> 
R:> Perhaps they have learned something akin to the jhanas.  While the
Noble
> Eightfold
> Path and the discernment of anatta may be unique to Buddhism, the
> development of
> deep meditation states and psychic powers is not.
> 
> Hindu practice of samadhi/jhana is about 10 - 15,000 years old, and very
> effective.  There is no doubt that the yogins of old, as exemplified by
> Patanjali's yoga suttas, were masters of many of these states.  The word
> jhana is
> the Pali for the Sanskrit dhyana, which is the core of the practice of
> the
> Ashtanga [eight-limbed] path of yoga, leading to ultimate Samadhi
> states.  Dhyana,
> while important for Theravadan Buddhism in its Pali form as jhana,
> became the
> basis for the most important Mahayana sects as well:  dhyana practice
> was
> transmitted from India to China by Bodhidharma, where they came to
> pronounce it
> 'Ch'an'.  Ch'an Buddhism was brought from China to Japan, where the
> Japanese
> pronounced it....you guessed it:  Zen.  Jhana = Dhyana = Ch'an = Zen. 
> Those sects
> which took their version of the name 'jhana or dhyana' as the name of
> their sect,
> emphasized sitting meditation and direct realization of nibbana/nirvana.
..........


 
13429 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 5:36pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K]

 
  --- 
Dear Dan, 
Actually you took the point to a whole 'nother level. I was pointing 
out that there can be "knowing" without either sati or insight - but 
you are right that there can also be knowing with sati but without 
panna. That is why panna (wisdom) is the base of the development of 
satipatthana. Some people think they have to make the "mind" still so 
that they can watch nama and rupa, not realising that the mind is a 
concept and that namas and rupas are arising and passing away all the 
time they are trying to arrange this still 'mind', that the nama 
that 'knows' has passed away before they even had time to think of it.
We can become intent on trying to do this or that because of clinging 
to self view and its corollary, wrong practice, silabataparamasa.
 Most of us don't think we have to make seeing happen, or hearing or 
hardness but many won't accept that all dhammas are similary 
conditioned and arise without any self doing anything. The 
understanding of this - which develops as the different dhammas are 
investigated - is very relaxing and if it reaches sufficient level 
will come with strong samadhi, for a brief time; but it is a samadhi 
that is not the same as trying to concentrate on an object.
  All ways of kusala can support the development of insight, but they 
won't if they are clung to or mistaken as the path.
best wishes
robert


 "onco111"  wrote:
> Robert,
> > Understanding (panna) knows the object in the way stated, and it 
> > brings about by endeavouring, the manifestation of the path." 
This  
> > perhaps ties up with your excellent series on silabataparamasa; 
as 
> > you indicated this is actually an aspect of wrong view, it is not 
> > the action per se that is the clinging to rule and ritual but the 
> > wrong view that feels one is somehow controlling and directing 
the 
> > various khandas. In the quote from the visuddhimagga we see that 
> > citta(without panna) can know the characteristic of dhammas, it 
can 
> > perceive subtle feelings  colours, sounds, hardness, heat - but 
if 
> > panna is not present nothing is gained, one may be developing 
> > silabataparamasa.
> 
> Interesting perception, Robert. As you say, central to the effort 
is 
> knowing not just the difference between sati and samadhi but also 
the 
> difference between sati with panya and sati without panya, and 
> knowing not just in a theoretical sense, but knowing as the dhammas 
> arise and pass away. Silabbataparamasa is not necessarily akusala, 
> but neither is it liberating. 
> 
> Dan

 
13430 From: Howard 
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 4:12pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Hi, Sarah -



> Dear Jim, Num, Jon, Howard,
> 
> I don’t suppose the Pali grammar would allow a switch in cases  to:
> 
> “What does the development of satipatthana lead to? The Noble 8fold Path
> etc�
> 
==========================
       Heh, heh, heh! ;-)) [More seriously: Well, of course, who knows? It 
might be so.]

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13431 From: Howard 
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 4:26pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi, Sarah and Robert -



> 
> Hi Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein  wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > Hi!  Haven't spoken to you in a while.  How are you?
> 
> You’re certainly maiking up for lost time;-) Just trying to catch up on
> work, home and dhamma fronts, so I’m not too sorry that most your posts
> are addressed to Howard and Jon;-)
> 
> Still, I’m very glad to try to respond to this one which includes some
> useful questions:
> 
> > I am having trouble with the idea that concepts are not part of the five
> > kandhas,
> > as I thought that everything that arises in mental and
> > perceptual-physical
> > experience was included in the five kandhas, in other words, everything
> > in this
> > life other than the experiencing of Nibbana.
> .....
> 
> This is correct. “Everything that arises in mental and perceptual physical
> experience�, i.e all namas and rupas that arise and fall away are included
> in the 5 khandhas. “Everything in this life� which is real with
> characteristics which can be known “other than the experiencing of
> Nibbana� is included.
> .....
> 
> > How do concepts get exemption?  
> .....
> They don’t qualify as namas or rupas or as paramattha dhammas.
> .....
> 
> > I am also wondering what the exact delineation of the concept is.  If a
> > thought
> > about a concept is a paramatha dhamma, but a concept is not, where does
> > the
> > concept occur in the thought, as what part of the thought?
> .....
> The thinking (you call thought) which thinks about the concepts (or
> experiences the concepts) has particular characteristics. The concepts
> never form part of it.They are conceptualized or imagined by it.
> .....
> > Let me propose an example:  
> > 
> > "I saw a tree yesterday."
> > 
> > I is a concept.  
> > saw is a concept.
> > tree is a concept
> > yesterday is a concept.
> > 
> > Is that not so?  Where is the reality of this thought?  Is the whole
> > thing a
> > concept, a collection of concepts?  Or is it a string of concepts, but
> > the thought
> > itself which holds them all together is not a concept?  
> .....
> The conceiving--or the experiencing by the nama-- which thinks or
> experiences is real. The string of concepts, is just as you say, a string
> of concepts. The idea of something holding them together is another
> concept. No thing or whole thing in truth, just cittas, accompanied by
> sanna, moha, ditthi and all the other mental factors which help create the
> illusion of the concepts existing.
> .....
> So if I discern:
> > "I am thinking 'I saw a tree yesterday'", the discerning thought "I am
> > thinking..." etc. is a paramatha dhamma, but it's object, the concept "I
> > saw a
> > tree yesterday" is a concept and is not a paramatha dhamma?
> .....
> If I understand you, this is almost correct. At the moment of discerning
> (being aware?) of the nama, thinking, there is no idea of the concept. In
> other words, one moment there may be thinking (paramattha dhamma) of
> concept and another moment there may be awareness (paramattha dhamma) of
> thinking (paramattha dhamma --or p.d. from now on--).In other words, only
> the 5khandhas are ever ‘discerned’.(*I’m a little wary of the use of
> discern because I know that people use it in different ways on this list -
> ask your pal, Howard;-))
> .....
> 
> > In the sentence:  "You are smiling right now", which I could be
> > perceiving at this
> > very moment, 
> > You is a concept,
> > Are is a concept,
> > Smiling is a concept,
> > Right now is a concept,
> > no?
> .....
> yes
> ..... 
> > Where is the thought that is an actuality, and are these in fact all
> > concepts?
> > Is the thought as a whole a concept?
> .....
> As discussed, the cittas and cetasikas which ‘think’ are real....the story
> in part or whole is made up of concepts and doesn’t *exist*.
> .....
> > Here is another thought:  "I am sad right now."
> > The experience of sadness is a paramatha dhamma, but when I think "I am
> > sad", in
> > the thought, sadness is a concept, because the thought does not actually
> > contain
> > the experience.  It takes place in another moment and refers to the
> > sadness
> > second-hand.  So where is the actual thought that is an actuality, if
> > all the
> > contained concepts are not real?  
> .....
> Same answer as for the happy thoughts;-) Sadness (dosa) as you say is
> p.d., any awareness or understanding of it are p.d, but the story is a
> story. although the thinking of it, probably accompanied by yet more dosa
> are p.d. So it’s easy to see how the dosa continues as the thinking
> conceives more stories about it;-(.
> .....
> > The only thoughts I can think of that would qualify for paramatha
> dhamma
> > status,
> > would be reflective thoughts that take a thought as an object.  These
> > can be
> > referrred to in the present moment, because their objects are in
> > language and
> > therefore not second-hand.  So if I say "I want to consider the thought
> > "I am sad"
> > ", the "I am sad" is a concept, but the statement "I want to
> > consider..." etc., is
> > a thought which has a concept as an object, and is therefore a paramatha
> > dhamma. 
> > Is this correct?  Perhaps you can help me sort this out.
> .....
> It doesn’t sound quite right. At the moment of thinking or saying “I want
> to consider..� again there are p.d thinking (regardless of whether spoken
> out) about concepts. In other words, if it’s not a citta, cetasika or
> rupa, then it’s a concept which is not included in ‘the All’ which should
> be or can be directly known.
> 
> Hope this helps. Many thanks for the good questions.
> 
> Sarah
> 
===============================
       Robert, you and I understand concepts to be thoughts/ideas, and not 
their alleged referents (which, in terms of direct experience, sometimes 
exist, but most often don't.) I believe that the firm of Sarah, Jon & 
Associates, Ltd (Does that have a good ring to it, Sarah? ;-)) systematically 
conflate the two, or, if not that, then, at least, when using the term 
'concept', have the alleged referents in mind whereas we have the ideas in 
mind. Thus, as I see it, there are two groups of people here, one group 
talking about A, the other talking about B, with A and B different, but we 
are all acting as though we mean the same thing. Such conversations can be 
amazingly coherent despite the fact that they shouldn't be at all! ;-))

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13432 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 8:29pm
Subject: Re: Lunch with Azita was Re: [dsg] SE QLD

 
  Dear Chris (& Azita).

Yes, I really enjoyed the account too and having visited (20+yrs ago)
makes it even more colourful;-)

I’m glad you all had such fun and delighted Sarah F will be joining us in
Noosa too. Perhaps we’ll be able to persuade her at least to have a ‘dip’
by way of a break from dhamma discussions. 

> Pacing ourselves carefully, with pots of tea, spreading luncheon 
> courses out, and more pots of tea, we managed to occupy the table for 
> about three and a half hours.   Discussions ranged over Jons' post to 
> me that morning (Is Kamma unstoppable?),  Kamma in general, bodily 
> pleasant feeling and mental unpleasant feeling - kusala kamma and 
> accumulations of dosa, seeing and visible object and nama and rupa in 
> general.  We also talked about meeting more Aussie's who are studying 
> Dhamma and Abhidhamma and ways to increase our circle of 'admirable 
> friends' before, oh so reluctantly, making our farewells.  

I’m impressed.

> Oh, one thing I forgot to mention.  We may have to 'do something' 
> about Azita and her computer knowledge.  Her Dhamma knowledge is 
> great, but I.T.  comprehension is very sad.... :-)  Did you know she....


Sounds like a great sharing of talents, skills and knowledge.

>  Sorry Azita - one thing I learned from the honoured list moderators 
> is that you musn't trust Anyone when you are content and relaxed over 
> shared meals and Dhamma discussions.  Remind me to tell you of my BKK 
> experiences with 'them', preferably before July. :) :) :)

Hey, Azita, I think you should reciprocate and give your version too.

Thanks Chris (and also for the links -of course you researched well as
usual;-))......

Sarah
=====



 
13433 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 8:41pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  --- 
Dear jon and Howard ,
I am probably a little dense but could someone tell me what the 
confusion or debateable point is in this sutta. 
Anyway some points (I my be completely missing what is being 
discussed):
From the atthasalini, (see below)we know that sometimes the suttas 
use the eighfold path as a general term meaning both mundane and 
nibbanic - even though only the actual moments of attaining nibbana 
actually have all eightfactors. Like the Paticcasamuppada - it can 
be seen over lifetimes or over a moment - satipatthana and the 
eightfold path is deep, a moment of satipatthana is a moment of the 
eightfold (fivefold) path . When we consider what is being taught 
here we see that right view and all the other factors (as part of 
sankhara khandha) must be present for there to be satipatthana; the 
development of satipatthana is deep and long, cirakala bhavana(long 
time development) before it can be established. 
As Dan and me discussed ealier, there can be knowing of dhammas and 
this can seem to be satipatthana but it depends on whether insight 
is present as to whether is is the real mccoy: it needs the factor 
of samma-ditthi. We see how profound is satipatthana.

Atthasalini page 204:
"For althogh the pAth is eightfold, yet, in the wordly
consciousness the tthree abstinces are not obtained at one and
the same instant. hence it is said to be fivefold only. BUT it
may be objected, there is this scripture;'The path by which one
came is a phrase for the eightfold ariyan path'(samyutta 1v
195)In this sutta the path of insight preceeding the
transcendental path is eightfold. now since the mundane path as
implied by the term 'path by which they came'is eightfold,
should it not be eightfold here also?'
Nay, it should not be. the suttanta teaching is carried out by
expounding. In this way he said, for instance, 'verily his
bodily acts, vocal acts and life were quite pure'(majhhimma 111
289). BUT this abhidhamma teaching is bare teaching without
exposition. in the worldly consciousness the three abstinces are
not obtained at one and the same instant and therefore the Path
is fivefold"ENDQUOTE.
best
robert


> 
> > Howard
> > 
> > I've now had a chance to look at this sutta, and I see the point 
you are
> > raising about the final section.  Here the Noble Eightfold Path 
is
> > described as "the path [of practice] to the development of the 
frames of
> > reference" or, in the Bh. Bodhi translation, as "the way leading 
to the
> > development of the establishment of mindfulness".
> > 
> > I admit I am puzzled by this and have no thoughts on it as yet.  
I am only
> > familiar with the Noble Eightfold Path being described as the 
path leading
> > to nibbana.  This is something entirely new to me.
> > 
> > As you know, I rely heavily on the commentaries for my 
interpretation of
> > the suttas, but unfortunately there is no English translation of 
the
> > Saaratthappakaasini or its tika.  I don't know if our Thai 
members (e.g.
> > Jaran, Kom or Num, or others) would be able to throw any light 
on this
> > point from the Thai translation which as I understand it 
includes the
> > commentary also.
> > 
> > I've noted your comments on the 'straightforward' meaning, 
Howard, but I
> > prefer not to speculate at this stage.
> > 
> > Very interesting, and thanks for bringing it up.  Any comments 
from others
> > most welcome.
> > 
> > Jon
> > 
> > 
> ==========================
>        It may very well turn out that there is a way of 
understanding this 
> sutta which accords with your perspective. Whatever the case may 
be, I'd just 
> like to say that I really admire your intellectual honesty and 
your 
> willingness to face whatever the facts may be! Most people cling 
strongly to 
> long-held views, and your openness to other possibilities is 
really 
> impressive!
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

 
13434 From: Howard 
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 4:45pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 5/21/02 3:51:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> 
> Hi Howard.
> I understand your point, and I would simply ask:  Is there a way to propose
> letting go of the last vestige of personal or substantial self, without 
> falling
> into annihilationism?
> 
----------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       I would say that there is. There is, in fact, no self at all right 
now. Any discerning right now is a conditioned, samsaric discerning, and it 
is no self. There is no self to be found, and, thus, no self to be 
annihilated. There are just conditions and the knowing of conditions, with 
that knowing being yet one more condition, and with the advent of nibbana, 
there is just the absence of conditions, and there is no *separate* knowing 
of that absence, for that would be a condition, and thus what there *would* 
be is beyond all categories, beyond description. (Even to use the word 'be' 
is to be in error. To say *anything* is to be in error. Only silence would be 
without error. This whole post is in error!)
--------------------------------------------------------

> 
> And to me that necessitates something still existing, even though it is 
> neither
> self nor form.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
=============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13435 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 8:56pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  --- Howard wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 5/20/02 7:28:49 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Jon writes:
> 
> 
> > Howard
> > 
> > I've now had a chance to look at this sutta, and I see the point you
> are
> > raising about the final section.  Here the Noble Eightfold Path is
> > described as "the path [of practice] to the development of the frames
> of
> > reference" or, in the Bh. Bodhi translation, as "the way leading to
> the
> > development of the establishment of mindfulness".
> > 
> > I admit I am puzzled by this and have no thoughts on it as yet.  I am
> only
> > familiar with the Noble Eightfold Path being described as the path
> leading
> > to nibbana.  This is something entirely new to me.
> > 
> > As you know, I rely heavily on the commentaries for my interpretation
> of
> > the suttas, but unfortunately there is no English translation of the
> > Saaratthappakaasini or its tika.  I don't know if our Thai members
> (e.g.
> > Jaran, Kom or Num, or others) would be able to throw any light on this
> > point from the Thai translation which as I understand it includes the
> > commentary also.
> > 
> > I've noted your comments on the 'straightforward' meaning, Howard, but
> I
> > prefer not to speculate at this stage.
> > 
> > Very interesting, and thanks for bringing it up.  Any comments from
> others
> > most welcome.
> > 
> > Jon
> > 
> > 
> ==========================
>        It may very well turn out that there is a way of understanding
> this 
> sutta which accords with your perspective. Whatever the case may be, I'd
> just 
> like to say that I really admire your intellectual honesty and your 
> willingness to face whatever the facts may be! Most people cling
> strongly to 
> long-held views, and your openness to other possibilities is really 
> impressive!
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

Thanks Howard (and later, Rob Ep), very kind of you to say so.  If the
truth be known, however, there's no shortage of strong clinging to
long-held views here -- but sometimes cunningly disguised as intellectual
honesty and openness to other possibilities!!.

Seriously, though, I do believe that ignoring or trying to explain away
contrary evidence is counter-productive, since it may hold the key to some
further understanding.  And it is always useful to remember that progress
along the path is measured as much by the wrong view that is exposed as it
is by the insight that is 'gained'.

Unfortunately, not much has turned up so far on this point.  But it's
certainly one I'll bring up with the 'experts' when I next get the chance.

Jon


 
13436 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 9:02pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita

 
  Dear Larry,

I meant to butt in on your post below a few days ago. 

It’s true that “akusala roots are at the heart of all self grasping” as
you say. However I don’t think we can say that “akusala roots are what is
most commonly taken for self”. All phenomena are taken for self as we read
about over and over in the suttas; i,e. the 5 khandhas of grasping. Even
concepts are mistakenly taken for being real and for being self. In order
to understand dhammas as anatta, therefore, there has to be the
development of awareness of all kinds of namas and rupas such as seeing,
hearing, thinking, visible objects, likes, dislikes and so on.

Likewise, vipaka (say, seeing or hearing), never becomes ‘the attribute of
the akusala citta” (if I understand you), but akusala cittas and cetasikas
succeeding the vipaka may cling, be averse, be ignorant or have wrong view
of that vipaka.
Understanding vipaka as rootless certainly helps distinguish it from these
other states and it’s true, as perhaps you’re suggesting, that all these
paramattha dhammas have to be understood as having different
characteristics and functions  and are not self. The theory such as
knowing the difference between ahetuka and sahetuka cittas can in this way
(as I think you’re saying) be a supporting condition for right view and
awareness to develop.

Instead of saying “the feeling is lobha, dosa or moha”, I’d suggest there
are different feelings (pleasant, unpleasant, neutral vedana) accompanying
these other mental factors. Like you suggest, they are namas and
experience the object along with the citta. Yes, the object doesn’t have
feelings (whether it’s a nama, rupa or concept) and untangling the tangle,
knowing the different realities is the way to see self as just an
illusion.

I’m not sure if I’ve butted in or helped, but I’m appreciating the ADL
extracts and your comments, though some of your ‘ADL corner’ seem a little
quiet. Lucy’s weeklong breaks seem like a long time here. Still, she’s
probably reading Rob Ep’s mail through the nite and trying to catch up -
maybe we should recommend a course in speed-reading as an essential skill
here;-)

Sarah (another member of the 'untaught manyfolk')
=====
Hi Christine, interesting article. I am far
from understanding how kamma
> works, but I think anatta can be partially glimpsed just by finding
> rootless cittas. It seems obvious that akusala roots are at the heart of
> all self grasping. That is to say, akusala roots are what is most
> commonly taken as 'self'. And this 'self' appropriates vipaka as soon as
> it arises, so the vipaka becomes the attribute of the akusala citta.
> Seeing vipaka for what it is (rootless) is to see that it is not self.
> Somehow this translates into seeing that the sahetuka citta is also not
> self. It's sort of infectious.
> 
> The main thing is to identify the object of one's feelings. See that the
> object is itself without feeling. See that the feeling is lobha, dosa,
> or moha. Voila! What was self is no longer self. Abhidhamma for the
> untaught manyfolk :-)



 
13437 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 9:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Num

Many thanks for going to the trouble of tracking down this sutta in your
Tipitaka set and on CD-ROM.  I must say I'm surprised there's nothing on
the point that Howard has raised.

--- Num wrote: > 
> Hi Howard, Jon, Jim and all (Sarah, Nina and Larry at the end);
> 
> 
> << The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii pa.tipadaa". It
> seems
> to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of
> "pa.tipadaa"
> (the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way leading to). >>
> 
> 
> Num: I looked up the Thai sutta and the atthakatha. 
> <<Satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii>> translated as <<development of 
> satipatthana-4.>> The word "pa.tipadaa" is left untranslated in Thai. 

I find it interesting that this word should have been left untranslated
(but I can't think what significance this might have ;-) ).

> The  word "bhavana" means to develop and "gamini" means leading to.
> 
> I have just got a Thai tipitaka and atthakatha CDrom from Kom. There is
> no specific commentary to this particular sutta (vibhanga-sutta).
> 
> 
> << "And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of
> 
> reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve,
> right 
> speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness,
> right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the
> development of the frames of reference." >>
> 
> << Most interesting to me is the final section which defines "the path
> of 
> practice to the development of the frames of reference," as specifically
> the 
> noble eightfold path. The straightforward reading of this takes
> satipatthana 
> more as something which "comes later", penultimate to liberation, rather
> than 
> as a technique to be practiced "all along". It would seem, on this
> reading, 
> that the entire eight-factored path is the path of practice culminating
> in 
> satipatthana (and then in awakening and liberation). >>

I believe your summary that follows is correct, at least as far as I
recall from my reading of the Visuddhimagga .  Thanks very much for the
reminder.  (But I don’t think it helps solve the problem raised by Howard,
does it?).

Jon

> Num: This reminds me of 37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma (factors pertaining to 
> enlightenment). There are seven main groups in bodhipakkhiyadhamma. 
> 4-Satipatthana is mentioned first and eight-factored path is mentioned
> last. 
> Jon, you mentioned before that there were 14 core dhammas in 
> 37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma. Sati is one of the core dhammas in 
> bodhipakkhiyadhamma (factors pertaining to enlightenment). 
> 
> In bodhipakkhiyadhamma, sati-cetasika, as a factor pertaining to 
> enlightenment, was mentioned under different terms: 4-satipatthana, 
> satindriya, satipala, satisambojjhango, and sammasati. Satipatthana is 
> sammasati in the eight-factored path. 
> 
> My understanding is all factors in 37-bodhipakkhiyadhamma (14 core
> dhammas) 
> or in eight-factored path are simultaneously attained only during the
> moment 
> of lokuttara-citta (there are some exceptions (piti- and
> vitaka-cetasika) for 
> someone who attains enlightenment with jhana; ref: nnanakatha, PSM and 
> magga-vibhanga, Vibhanga).  Satipatthana in other kusala-cittas 
> (lokiya-kusala) performs its function of leading to the path, by being 
> mindful of whatever reality appearing and temporary eliminating akulsala
> but with weaker power. Not until the moment of lokuttara-citta, sati 
> (satipatthana) at that moment with all factors pertaining to
> enlightenment 
> will simultaneously and synchronously perform their functions by
> completely 
> eradicate akusala according to the level of magga-citta. So in the
> moment of 
> eight-factored path, there is the most fulfilling and enriching
> satipatthana. 
> 
> Each magga-citta occurs only one time for each person in sammasara. The 
> arammana of lokuttara-citta is nibbana. Magga-citta and its accompanied 
> cetasikas share the same arammana, nibbana.
>      
> 
> Best wishes.
> 
> Num


 
13438 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 9:28pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 
  Christine

--- christine_forsyth  wrote: > Hi Jon,
> 
> You are quite right about the difficulty in coming to terms with this 
> aspect of dhamma.  It is interesting that it is not a case of hearing 
> and 'not' understanding....because  I do, at least intellectually.  
> Sometimes I feel as if there are two me's - a reasonable, rational 
> one who drags a kicking and resisting one along. :-) 
> Thanks for the common sense advice.

Well, the 'kicking and resisting one' is also very zany and entertaining,
and it helps keep a good balance here!

Even we reasonable and rational types can resist accepting things we have
heard and 'know' to be true.  This is because the problem is not really
the personality trait but the accumulated wrong view that is not going to
be dispelled so easily.

This is why one needs constant and continued exposure to right view, via
the 'good friend(s)'.  Wrong view is so deeply ingrained.  We need to have
patience with our kilesa, realising that it is not going to change
overnight (or perhaps even in the foreseeable future).

Jon

> metta,
> Christine
> ---  Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> > Christine, DaiWen
> > 
> > Christine, your post to Sarah raises aspects of dhamma that some 
> people have
> > difficulty coming to terms with.  And it reminded me of a recent 
> post of DaiWen's
> > that I had meant to comment on.
> > 
> > Christine said:
> > > Non-action, like action, is an intentional choice.  And if I 
> don't 
> > > act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one action instead 
> of 
> > > another, the results of that action or non-action are my kama-
> vipaka 
> > > eventually? 
> > > Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in need of 
> protection, 
> > > speaking out about injustices, social action?
> > 
> > I agree that non-action can be as much an intentional choice as 
> action.  But as I
> > understand the teachings, the merits of any (non-) action are 
> determined solely by
> > the quality of the accompanying mental state, and not to any extent 
> by the
> > conventional outcome.
> > 
> > So is sympathetic action more likely to be kusala than non-action?  
> I think each
> > person can only answer this by reference to their own experience.  
> What may come
> > easily and naturally to one might be contrary to the nature of 
> another.  And for a
> > given person, much will depend on the kind of situation involved, 
> anyway.
> > 
> > There is no inherent merit in one course rather than the other, 
> since so much
> > depends on individual accumulations.  In the end we all do what we 
> are inclined to,
> > with what little kusala we can muster.
> > 
> > Jon

 
13439 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 9:36pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi Howard,

 --- Howard wrote: > Hi, Sarah and Robert -

>        Robert, you and I understand concepts to be thoughts/ideas, and
> not 
> their alleged referents (which, in terms of direct experience, sometimes
> 
> exist, but most often don't.) I believe that the firm of Sarah, Jon & 
> Associates, Ltd (Does that have a good ring to it, Sarah? ;-))
> systematically 
> conflate the two, or, if not that, then, at least, when using the term 
> 'concept', have the alleged referents in mind whereas we have the ideas
> in 
> mind. 
.....
I’d rather suggest that the firm be called ‘pannatti’ as referred to in
the texts we are discussing --and clearly elaborated in the lists that
Goglerr and others have posted of all the various kinds of pannatti--and
encompassing as you point out, all ideas, including what you refer to as
‘their alleged referents’, if these are not the paramattha dhammas
themselves. If I found Sarah, Jon & Asociates, Ltd (hmm, not sure about
the ring) were not sticking strictly to precise definitions in these
texts, especially those in the Abhidhamma where they are given in greatest
detail, I’d certainly like to have any differences pointed out. I
certainly have no interest in formulating any new theory and from my
understanding see no need.
.....
>Thus, as I see it, there are two groups of people here, one group 
> talking about A, the other talking about B, with A and B different, but
> we 
> are all acting as though we mean the same thing. Such conversations can
> be 
> amazingly coherent despite the fact that they shouldn't be at all! ;-))
.....
<smile> I think that if one group says A is right based on experience and
study of the Tipitaka and the other says the same about B, then it’s
helpful to look at the Tipitaka with the aid of ancient commentaries and
different Pali translations if necessary, to see if, with a little
teamwork, a happy resolution can be found.You’ve made mention once or
twice I think of the ‘orthodox Theravada position’. I certainly take the
orthodox position to include the Abhidhamma in the Tipitaka.(If the
commentaries and Abhidhamma are excluded from review and the Suttas are
interpreted in different ways which seem to accord with experience, then I
agree that it’s going to be a difficult discussion;-))

It may take a lifetime or few, or differences may remain, but considering,
checking and understanding a little more about the various mental states
and other ‘actualities’ (just borrowed from B.Bodhi for a change) in the
process can be very helpful. As Goglerr and I concluded, if differences or
‘gaps’ remain, that’s fine too.

Who knows, maybe Rob Ep will agree with S,J & Assocs this time;-))

Sarah
=====



 
13440 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 9:47pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Hi Howard,

Just to show the other 'many folk' that sometimes we're really in sync,
may I say that I think this post of yours is very helpful and wise indeed.
I particularly appreciate your conclusion at the very end about the
'last-ditch grasping at the anchor of self' so well-expressed.

With appreciation,
Sarah
======


 --- Howard wrote: > Hi, Rob -
> 
>        The following is the initial portion of the article on anatta
> from 
> Nyanatiloka's dictionary:
> 
> 
> > anattá: 'not-self', non-ego, egolessness, impersonality, is the last
> of the 
> > three characteristics of existence (ti-lakkhana, q.v.) The anattá
> doctrine 
> > teaches that neither within the bodily and mental phenomena of
> existence, 
> > nor outside of them, can be found anything that in the ultimate sense
> could 
> > be regarded as a self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other
> abiding 
> > substance. This is the central doctrine of Buddhism, without
> understanding 
> > which a real knowledge of Buddhism is altogether impossible. It is the
> only 
> > really specific Buddhist doctrine, with which the entire Structure of
> the 
> > Buddhist teaching stands or falls. All the remaining Buddhist
> doctrines 
> > may, more or less, be found in other philosophic systems and
> religions, but 
> > the anattá-doctrine has been clearly and unreservedly taught only by
> the 
> > Buddha, wherefore the Buddha is known as the anattá-vádi, or 'Teacher
> of 
> > Impersonality'. Whosoever has not penetrated this impersonality of all
> 
> > existence, and does not comprehend that in reality there exists only
> this 
> > continually self-consuming process of arising and passing bodily and
> mental 
> > phenomena, and that there is no separate ego-entity within or without
> this 
> > process, he will not be able to understand Buddhism, i.e. the teaching
> of 
> > the 4 Noble Truths (sacca, q.v.), in the right light. He will think
> that it 
> > is his ego, his personality, that experiences suffering, his
> personality 
> > that performs good and evil actions and will be reborn according to
> these 
> > actions, his personality that will enter into Nibbána, his personality
> that 
> > walks on the Eightfold Path. Thus it is said in Vis.M. XVI:
> > >> 
> >> > 
> > > 
> > >> "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
> > The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
> > Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it;
> > The path is, but no traveler on it is seen."
> > 
> 
>        With regard to the sentence "The anattá doctrine teaches that
> neither 
> within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence, nor outside of
> them, can 
> be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a 
> self-existing real ego-entity, soul or any other abiding substance.,"
> I'd 
> like to emphasize the words "nor outside of them." While I do not have a
> 
> ready reference, I do seem to recall in some sutta the Buddha saying
> that 
> there is no self outside of the khandhas. (And, of course, there *is*
> the 
> sutta entitled The All, in which the Buddha describes the five khandhas
> as 
> being all there is.) Now, of course, there is also nibbana, which is not
> any 
> khandha at all. But the thing is, nibbana is without condition - it is
> the 
> very absence of conditions. Now, can the discernment of absence, a 
> thoroughgoing and utterly complete absence of all possible conditions be
> a 
> self? I think not, for a "self", in addition to being unchanging, is
> also 
> *personal*. But a thoroughgoing and utterly complete absence of all
> possible 
> conditions has nothing by which it can be construed as personal.
>        Consider, moreover the quoted material:
> 
> "Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
> The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there;
> Nibbána is, but not the man that enters it;
> The path is, but no traveler on it is seen."
> 
>        The last two lines of this, as well, point to the impersonality
> of 
> nibbana. So, I would say that there is no self to be found, not in the 
> khandhas nor outside of them. I also do think that our strong desire
> that 
> there BE a self outside the khandhas is a kind of last-ditch grasping at
> the 
> anchor of self. That has to be let go of as well - or so it seems to me.



 
13441 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 9:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Rob K

Thanks for the comments, Rob.  Very much to the point as usual.

--- "robertkirkpatrick.rm"  wrote: > ---

> Dear jon and Howard ,
> I am probably a little dense but could someone tell me what the 
> confusion or debateable point is in this sutta. 

The point is I think that, while the sutta can be easily explained by
taking the Noble Eightfold Path in its mundane version, it is difficult to
read it with the Noble Eightfold Path as referring to magga citta.  Does
this make sense to you? 

On the other hand, perhaps your quote from the Atthasilini below could be
read as meaning that the reference here is simply to the mundane path?

Jon

> Anyway some points (I my be completely missing what is being 
> discussed):
> From the atthasalini, (see below)we know that sometimes the suttas 
> use the eighfold path as a general term meaning both mundane and 
> nibbanic - even though only the actual moments of attaining nibbana 
> actually have all eightfactors. Like the Paticcasamuppada - it can 
> be seen over lifetimes or over a moment - satipatthana and the 
> eightfold path is deep, a moment of satipatthana is a moment of the 
> eightfold (fivefold) path . When we consider what is being taught 
> here we see that right view and all the other factors (as part of 
> sankhara khandha) must be present for there to be satipatthana; the 
> development of satipatthana is deep and long, cirakala bhavana(long 
> time development) before it can be established. 
> As Dan and me discussed ealier, there can be knowing of dhammas and 
> this can seem to be satipatthana but it depends on whether insight 
> is present as to whether is is the real mccoy: it needs the factor 
> of samma-ditthi. We see how profound is satipatthana.
> 
> Atthasalini page 204:
> "For althogh the pAth is eightfold, yet, in the wordly
> consciousness the tthree abstinces are not obtained at one and
> the same instant. hence it is said to be fivefold only. BUT it
> may be objected, there is this scripture;'The path by which one
> came is a phrase for the eightfold ariyan path'(samyutta 1v
> 195)In this sutta the path of insight preceeding the
> transcendental path is eightfold. now since the mundane path as
> implied by the term 'path by which they came'is eightfold,
> should it not be eightfold here also?'
> Nay, it should not be. the suttanta teaching is carried out by
> expounding. In this way he said, for instance, 'verily his
> bodily acts, vocal acts and life were quite pure'(majhhimma 111
> 289). BUT this abhidhamma teaching is bare teaching without
> exposition. in the worldly consciousness the three abstinces are
> not obtained at one and the same instant and therefore the Path
> is fivefold"ENDQUOTE.
> best
> robert



 
13442 From: Howard 
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 6:44pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi, Sarah -

> 
> Hi Howard,
> 
> --- Howard wrote: > Hi, Sarah and Robert -
> 
> >        Robert, you and I understand concepts to be thoughts/ideas, and
> > not 
> > their alleged referents (which, in terms of direct experience, sometimes
> > 
> > exist, but most often don't.) I believe that the firm of Sarah, Jon & 
> > Associates, Ltd (Does that have a good ring to it, Sarah? ;-))
> > systematically 
> > conflate the two, or, if not that, then, at least, when using the term 
> > 'concept', have the alleged referents in mind whereas we have the ideas
> > in 
> > mind. 
> .....
> I’d rather suggest that the firm be called ‘pannatti’ as referred to in
> the texts we are discussing --and clearly elaborated in the lists that
> Goglerr and others have posted of all the various kinds of pannatti--and
> encompassing as you point out, all ideas, including what you refer to as
> ‘their alleged referents’, if these are not the paramattha dhammas
> themselves. If I found Sarah, Jon & Asociates, Ltd (hmm, not sure about
> the ring) were not sticking strictly to precise definitions in these
> texts, especially those in the Abhidhamma where they are given in greatest
> detail, I’d certainly like to have any differences pointed out. I
> certainly have no interest in formulating any new theory and from my
> understanding see no need.
> .....
> >Thus, as I see it, there are two groups of people here, one group 
> > talking about A, the other talking about B, with A and B different, but
> > we 
> > are all acting as though we mean the same thing. Such conversations can
> > be 
> > amazingly coherent despite the fact that they shouldn't be at all! ;-))
> .....
> <smile> I think that if one group says A is right based on experience and
> study of the Tipitaka and the other says the same about B, then it’s
> helpful to look at the Tipitaka with the aid of ancient commentaries and
> different Pali translations if necessary, to see if, with a little
> teamwork, a happy resolution can be found.You’ve made mention once or
> twice I think of the ‘orthodox Theravada position’. I certainly take the
> orthodox position to include the Abhidhamma in the Tipitaka.(If the
> commentaries and Abhidhamma are excluded from review and the Suttas are
> interpreted in different ways which seem to accord with experience, then I
> agree that it’s going to be a difficult discussion;-))
> 
> It may take a lifetime or few, or differences may remain, but considering,
> checking and understanding a little more about the various mental states
> and other ‘actualities’ (just borrowed from B.Bodhi for a change) in the
> process can be very helpful. As Goglerr and I concluded, if differences or
> ‘gaps’ remain, that’s fine too.
> 
> Who knows, maybe Rob Ep will agree with S,J & Assocs this time;-))
> 
> Sarah
> =====
> 
============================
       My point is merely that I don't think our differences are differences 
in content, but only in terminology. Perhaps the translation of 'pa~n~natti' 
as 'concept' is not the best translation. If 'pa~n~natti' denotes an alleged 
concept-reference such as the tree on my back lawn that I am (conventionally) 
looking at right now, then the translation of it as 'concept' is misleading 
to those many people who think of concepts as mere ideas. The relatively 
concrete"tree on my back lawn", is, itself, a mental construct composed of 
very recent memories (mainly visual) with the idea of tree (the concept per 
se) superimposed. But it is not the same as the concept of 'tree on my back 
lawn', because there is more "immediacy" to it, due to its having been 
constructed from just-experienced conditions. At least that is how I 
understand it. In no case do I understand it to be some external "thing". 
Perhaps a translation of 'pa~n~natti' as 'percept' might come closer - I 
would find that very clear. But, in any case, the "reality" is an internal 
one, with any alleged external "tree" being nonexistent, or, at least, in 
principle unknowable.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13443 From: watercolorca   
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 11:02pm
Subject: A self ouside the khandas/simultaneity

 
  Hi everyone-I'm doing Pali lesson daily and attempting to keep up.

If you read to the end-anyone have any thoughts on "five khanadas 
simutaneously come to be realized"....thanks,J.

H: "...our strong desire that there BE a self outside the khandas..."

Nyanatiloka: "the khandas are the five groups of clinging in which the 
Buddha has summed up all the physical and mental phenomena of 
existence, and which appear to ignorant man as his Ego or personality.

What is called individual existence is in reality nothing but a mere 
process of those mental and physical phenomenon, a process that from 
time immemorial has been going on, and that also after death will 
still continue for unthinkably long periods of time.

Some writers on Buddhism who have not understood that the five khandas 
are just classificatory groupings, have conceived of them as compact 
entities (heaps, bundles) while the Groups never exist as such; i.e.  
they never occur in a simultaneous totality of all their constituents.  
Also all these single constituents of a Group which are present in any 
body-mind process are of an evanescent nature, and so also their 
varying combinations.  Feeling, perception and mental formations are 
only different aspects and functions of a single unity of 
consciousness. They are to consciousness what redness, softeness, 
sweeteness, etc. are to an apple and have as little separate existence 
as those qualities."

"Whatever, O Brother, there exists of feeling, of perception and of 
mental formations, these things are associated, not dissociated, and 
it is impossible to separate one from the other and show their 
difference. For whatever one feels, one perceives; and whatever one 
perceives, of this one is consciousness."  (M.43)

And of all of this - "this does not belong to me, this I am not, this 
is not my Ego." (S.XXI.5)

While the doctrine of anatta proceeds analytically, by splitting 
existence up into ultimate constituent parts, into mere empty, 
unsubstantial phenomena or elements; the doctrine of Depedendent 
Origination proceeds synthetically, by showing that all phenomena are 
in some way, conditionally related with each other.

Satipatthana (D.22 and M.10) Awareness of mindfullness...the monk 
dwells in contemplation of the body, feelings, mind and mind-objects.  
These contemplations are in reality not to be taken as merely separate 
exerises but as things inseparably associated with each other.  
Thereby the Satipatthana Sutta forms an illustration of the way in 
which these four contemplations relating ****to the five khandas 
simultanenously come to be realized, ****and finally lead to the 
Insight into the Impersonality of all existence.  Mindfulness is meant 
to encompass the whole personality and starts with the body as primary 
and regular subject of meditation."

There are many ways of analysis of "body" leading to insight into 
anatta in all Buddhist traditions. 

"One thing, O Monks, developed and repeatedly practiced, leads to the 
attainment of wisdom. It is the contemplation on the body." (A.I and 
Vis VI.2)

"...the links of the eightfold "Path" not only do not arise one after 
the other, this should not be interpreted to mean that one advances 
step by step in sequence of ennumeration until one finally may reach 
the destination of Nibbana.  If this were true, one would have 
realizied first of all Right View and penetration to the truth even 
before one could hope to proceed to Right Thought and Right Action 
etc. But the links in part arise simultaneously as inseparably 
associated mental factors in one and the same state of consciousness. 
At least four links are bound up with karmically wholesome 
consciousness but Right View is not necessarily present in every 
wholesome state of consciousness."

"All khandas/phenomena are compared respectively, to a lump of froth, 
a bubble, a mirage, a coreless plantain stem, a conjuring trick, a 
m

 
13444 From: Num 
Date: Tue May 21, 2002 8:03pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Dear Jon:

Jim: <<  The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii pa.tipadaa". It 
seems to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of 
"pa.tipadaa" (the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way leading to). >>
Num <<I looked up the Thai sutta and the atthakatha. <<
Satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii>> translated as <<development of 
satipatthana-4.>> The word "pa.tipadaa" is left untranslated in Thai. >>
Jon: << I find it interesting that this word should have been left 
untranslated
(but I can't think what significance this might have ;-) ). >>


I meant in Thai tipitaka, the word patipada is used without being translated 
in to simpler Thai word. I think Jim can give more thorough meaning of the 
word. Pati- has a board meaning. I think here it means "toward" and pada 
means " the way". Another word 'patipatti'; pati here means "together or all 
over" and patti means "attaining or reaching". Patipatti, which usually 
translated into practice, can also mean reaching altogether, knowing all --> 
knowing nama and rupa.

<< This is called the path of practice to the development of the frames of 
reference>>
 <<I believe your summary that follows is correct, at least as far as I 
recall from my reading of the Visuddhimagga .  Thanks very much for the 
reminder.  (But I don't think it helps solve the problem raised by Howard, 
does it?).>>


Hmm, to me, I think the sutta speaks itself that satipatthana in a magga 
level (in 8-factored path) is the way that one needs to attain to reach 
lokuttaracitta/nibbana (conventional speaking). If it is not the satipatthana 
in 8-factored path level, sammasati/satipatthana/sati is still in a worldly 
level.  So, again conventional speaking, nibbana cannot be attained without 
attaining satipatthana in 8-factorted path level.  When I read it, I do not 
feel that the sutta tells us that the 8-factored path is a preceding factor 
to obtain first and then later practice satipatthana. I do not get the sense 
of chronology or practicing step here. Am I missing something? 


Num

 
13445 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 2:43am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi Sarah,

Just a suggestion that you might find useful:

No matter what concept means to you, ask yourself these question: how 
does a concept come to be?  What are its conditions?

Regards,
Victor


> >        Robert, you and I understand concepts to be 
thoughts/ideas, and
> > not 
> > their alleged referents (which, in terms of direct experience, 
sometimes
> > 
> > exist, but most often don't.) I believe that the firm of Sarah, 
Jon & 
> > Associates, Ltd (Does that have a good ring to it, Sarah? ;-))
> > systematically 
> > conflate the two, or, if not that, then, at least, when using the 
term 
> > 'concept', have the alleged referents in mind whereas we have the 
ideas
> > in 
> > mind. 
> .....
> I'd rather suggest that the firm be called `pannatti' as referred 
to in
> the texts we are discussing --and clearly elaborated in the lists 
that
> Goglerr and others have posted of all the various kinds of pannatti-
-and
> encompassing as you point out, all ideas, including what you refer 
to as
> `their alleged referents', if these are not the paramattha dhammas
> themselves. If I found Sarah, Jon & Asociates, Ltd (hmm, not sure 
about
> the ring) were not sticking strictly to precise definitions in these
> texts, especially those in the Abhidhamma where they are given in 
greatest
> detail, I'd certainly like to have any differences pointed out. I
> certainly have no interest in formulating any new theory and from my
> understanding see no need.
> .....
> >Thus, as I see it, there are two groups of people here, one group 
> > talking about A, the other talking about B, with A and B 
different, but
> > we 
> > are all acting as though we mean the same thing. Such 
conversations can
> > be 
> > amazingly coherent despite the fact that they shouldn't be at 
all! ;-))
> .....
> <smile> I think that if one group says A is right based on 
experience and
> study of the Tipitaka and the other says the same about B, then it's
> helpful to look at the Tipitaka with the aid of ancient 
commentaries and
> different Pali translations if necessary, to see if, with a little
> teamwork, a happy resolution can be found.You've made mention once 
or
> twice I think of the `orthodox Theravada position'. I certainly 
take the
> orthodox position to include the Abhidhamma in the Tipitaka.(If the
> commentaries and Abhidhamma are excluded from review and the Suttas 
are
> interpreted in different ways which seem to accord with experience, 
then I
> agree that it's going to be a difficult discussion;-))
> 
> It may take a lifetime or few, or differences may remain, but 
considering,
> checking and understanding a little more about the various mental 
states
> and other `actualities' (just borrowed from B.Bodhi for a change) 
in the
> process can be very helpful. As Goglerr and I concluded, if 
differences or
> `gaps' remain, that's fine too.
> 
> Who knows, maybe Rob Ep will agree with S,J & Assocs this time;-))
> 
> Sarah
> =====

 
13446 From: Sukin   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 3:05am
Subject: Re: 'no control', Reply to Rob E.

 
  Hi Rob,
Whew!! Finally finished reading your looong post.
Sorry about yesterday, wasn't a good day for me.
I always like reading your thoughts even if I don't fully agree,

you consider from many angles.

Hope you don't mind me not quoting you in the full, since its such
a long post I'm replying to. Also I changing the name of the subject.

> importance to 'activity' will I feel lead to some form of
silabbataparamasa
> or the other.

Robert:
Unfortunately do not know this term.  But I am impressed by how long it is.
If you can translate I would appreciate it.

Sukin:
Silabbataparamasa is "wrong practise", meaning anything we do with the view
that doing such things will lead to understanding.

Robert:
I feel that the idea of developing kusala 'naturally' is itself an intention
imposed on the 'naturalness' of the arising moments, and I would be interested to see
how you can get a 'natural' development out of such a situation.

Sukin:
Vipaka arises all through life and we cannot know, less predict when which
kamma will bear fruit as sense impressions through which doorway. Our

accumulated kilesas will condition the subsequent moments and
we will be accumulating more akusala. Sometimes however kusala can arise
because conditions for it has arisen. Whether sati and panna will arise at
any moment is beyond anyones control, so there is no *trying* to be natural.
There will be understanding or there will not, as simple as that. Surely intention
is there, but there is no seeking out already fallen states or unarisen ones.
Nor trying to 'be' more attentive.

Robert:
How can we possibly factor in the.........activities and efforts is barking
up the wrong tree.

Sukin:
Surely every individual factor comprising a moment of citta, including the
arammana influences the type and quality of the citta. A citta conditioned

by sati and panna and other beautiful cetasikas will be quite different from 

a citta conditioned by lobha and a desire to 'catch' and know the moment. 

The former will accomplish its function to understand, the latter will defeat

its own purpose.

Robert:
Instead we should follow our true intention ........ most effectively follow the path.

Sukin:
Do you think, once you have found the path best suited to you, your sincere
intentions to follow that path will carry you through? So is it only the
question of finding your path and following it to the end?

Robert:
If there were only one answer to this question, ....... false starts and
layers of delusion, even for those who follow the dhamma as closely 

as they know how.

Sukin:
I agree, trying out different methods must be quite stressful, but I don't
think the difficulty of the path is due to these diversions. The difficulty

is in our deeply conditioned, faulty way of viewing reality, made harder 

by our continual accumulation of ignorance.

Robert:
To start with, there is more than one approach to Buddhism,

Sukin:
Buddhism as we know it, not as the Buddha taught. Or do you think that the
Mahayana teachings are the actual word of the Buddha?

Robert:
 The Mahayana school says that theTheravadan school is the lesser vehicle
for those of ordinary capacities.  The Vajrayana-Tibetan school says that both the
other schools in their ordinary practices are limited.

Sukin:
This might interest you Rob, I have become pro Theravada less than two years
ago. Before that I read some Mahayana and a little bit about what Vajrayana was,
I never questioned their assertions about them being progressively superior to
Theravada. I believed their arguments. Interestingly at one point a couple of months ago,
I was reminded about vajrayana, about how they teach about seeing no difference
between Nirvana and Samsara, and that their aim is to view any and every event
without choice and as equally enlightening. I compared this to K. Sujin's attitude
towards the teachings and I saw that she encourages the same thing without having to
go through all the hassles that the other practice puts forward as a
pre-condition. And I dare say, more simply and affectively.

Robert:
Meanwhile the Buddha......Yet the debates go on, because we are in samsara.

Sukin:
Yes, debating is pointless I think.

Robert:
The concept 'Abhidhamma', .........of the mind and perception [namas and
rupas].

Sukin:
I agree.

Robert:
In my opinion, one can use these sorts of things as a barometer of progress.
If the Buddha talks about feelings and realizations that mark progress on the path,
we can look to these things.

Sukin:
Personally I don't find it useful to measure my or anyone else's progress,
not knowing how to do it without giving importance to 'self' ;-).

Robert:
If we cannot use something .......So we have to develop some sort of real
observation of what is happening in our consciousness, even if it is very slow.

Sukin:
I think it isn't necessary, just keep on studying and applying the teachings
in an unforced manner.

Robert:
There have been some strong moments of clearly seeing .....me shows a
general trend towards progress on the path.

Sukin:
Good, but is it worth clinging to?:-)


Robert:
Shouldn't we keep track of .....taking an outside source as the measure, and
we will never  reach the independence necessary to be able to discern with
surety.

Sukin:
I think only when we have discerned the rise and fall of nama and rupa,
knowing clearly the distinction between the two, as a sotapanna has, 

can we really know for sure that what the Buddha taught is all true and 

only then will we really be independent and no more need outside confirmation.

Robert:
I think this is different than the general practices ...... Isn't there some
intention in that decision? Sure there is.

Sukin:
Intention is in every citta, it arises and falls with it and it takes on the
quality of the citta, being with or without sati and panna.

   >And I definitely do not believe that practices of other religions, such as
> yoga, can lead to sati and panna.
Robert:
Well, I understand your point of view, but I don't think you can really know
that, can you?  How would you know whether it does or not



>      Kusala was and is recognized by all other religions
> and I do believe that some level of kusala can be developed by performing
> activities such as yoga and tai chi, but not sati and panna.
Robert:
This seems to be an assumption on your part unless you have some other
knowledge that this is the case.


Sukin:

I use sati here for sati of the level of satipatthana, which means having a reality

as object. I do not think other practices can lead to actually percieving elementary

realities. It is an assumption and will remain so until I actually tread the path to

its fruition, meanwhile it is based on rational thinking and faith in the Buddha's

teachings.



> The kusala they
> all encourage is with some sense and form of self or the other.


Robert:
With respect, this is not only true ...... Ramana Maharshi and Nisargardatta 

in Advaita Vedanta, whom I believe thoroughly realized anatta through and 

through.  It is so indicated in both their lives and their conversations.



Sukin:

It is hard for me at this point to give a reasonable( I have to think more )

argument to support my claim. But hope you don't mind my pointing out

that Nisargardatta either was a chain smoker or sold cigarettes as a

living. Do you think that an enlightened person could do that? 

Would you choose to? A sotapanna could never do such. Besides

people like the two you mentioned above, did believe in a great

'SELF' a 'THAT' no?

> They have no idea of anatta, or even anicca.


Robert:
I would disagree.  While anatta is the clear realization of the Buddha, others
have come to see anatta in their own terms.  I think it is a realization
waiting to be discovered, not an invention of the Buddha.



Sukin:

Nobody has ever said that the Buddha invented anything, he didn't even invent

buddhism;-). Anatta can be discovered, but by Buddhas only and i doubt there 

has been a Paceka Buddha even, in this past 2500 years. 

Robert:

I don't think this is true in the case of great sages of Hinduism......cases 

are realized within other forms of practice and terminologies.



Sukin:

Hope you don't mind that I do not want to make any comments here.

Robert:
The Buddha did not originate the non-conceptual realization of impermanence.
It is a standard in Hindu meditation.



Sukin:

Are you sure that they know that consciousness is an element, rising momentarily

conditioning the next moment on and on? If not how can they see rise and fall of 

individual cittas? It would surprise me greatly if you brought out some proof.

Robert:

For instance, Nisargardatta states that the self is not an entity but is
just a conceptual object of consciousness.



Sukin:

Yes perhaps( never read him) but wasn't he in this case trying to point out that the

small individual 'self' is non existent, only to show that the 'real' self was the "SELF"? 

> The Buddha was equally perfect in wisdom the first moment he attained
> enlightenment till the moment before he attained parinibbana. The wisdom
> of the arahants all combined do not equal to a small part of the Buddhas.


Robert:
I don't say you are wrong, but I would challenge whether you actually know
this to be the case.  What's the evidence for this?



Sukin:

Just that to be a Perfectly Enlightened Buddha means that all the qualities have

been developed and accumulated to 100%.

> Wisdom cannot be added and improved upon by sucessive generations.


Robert:
Another disagreement.  This is to set the Buddha's words in stone, rather
than to reinvigorate them with our understanding in each generation.  That which is
set in stone becomes remote and static in my opinion.  It must be put into practice
in each of us by making it our own.



Sukin:

I think every buddhist knows that his religion is a practical religion not just a set

of doctrines. By my statement above I meant that the original teacher's insights

can only be taken as a guide, but can never be re examined and corrected and

improved upon by its followers. Later generations can only adulterate the teachings.

> A system of practice like yoga which has been worked upon and changed
> through time can only result in getting people cling to the superficial
> aspect of it.


Robert:
I disagree strongly.  ......  This does not change the nature of yoga.



Sukin:

Sorry I made the wrong assumption, I based my conclusion on the variety

of yoga books available in the market.

> My conclusion thus is, such practices not only do not help in buddhist
> practise, but if seen instead as being a support, can be extremely
> detrimental to development of panna.


Robert:
I think this is just an opinion here, ....... Buddhism can be useful.

> Satipatthana is the *only* way.


Robert:
Well, that is like me saying 'meditation is the only way.'  .......and so many 

different factors to be developed.



Sukin:

Satipatthana means to be mindful of 'realities'. It can happen under whatever

circumstance, even when one is meditating, only that it would be harder

to come by if one thinks that one has to do certain activities (like meditation)

in order that it will arise. It is the only 'way' to enlightenment but not in the

sense that it is a programme or something. From this point of view, it can be

reached from as many number of directions as there are beings practising it. 

Robert:

All of our activities are intentional, .......of Abhidhamma teaching that is an
intentional practice.  There is nothing natural about it.  It is a guided activity
within a conceptual framework.  



Sukin:

True



Robert

To not acknowledge this is very dangerous as it tends.....amazing honesty
and attention to release one's own view and be in the presence of the naked
moment.



Sukin:

Yes, and knowing that at the moment it arises frees us from this tendency. But
what about moments of seeing, hearing etc., do we doubt those moments?
Aren't these moments real? even if our sati and panna is not sharp enough to
perceive them as just elements. We can in any case know the individual
characteristics that are apparent eventhough clouded by the 'I' experiencing it.

Robert:
Having a view that one way is right and the other is wrong does not aid this
endeavor, in fact it prejudices it and makes it even more difficult to see
what is really happening when *all* views are seen as merely views and the moment
itself is allowed to deliver its true nature directly to consciousness without
concepts in the way.



Sukin:

But even views arise and fall don't they? Its not like it is going to be there all the time, no?

Otherwise we will have to get rid of all akusala before we can develop panna.


Robert:
That's one way of looking at it.   A less complex way of looking at it would
be to say that it is all 'merely taking place'.  .... one drawn from philosophy.    

Sukin:
I was drawing you attention to the complexity and hence impossibility of 
pinpointing any particular activity as being a direct cause for sati and panna
to arise.

Robert:
Well, I do know that focussing on an object causes more focussed attention.
A simple fact.  Is that a good thing?  

Sukin:
I think its better than watching TV and playing video games as I do.;-)

Robert:
Jon gave a decent ..... Frankly, I think it's a grave error to think one 
must or should stick to naturally discerning everyday realities while shying 
away from a real practice in which mindfulness is highlighted, and by 
which the work with everyday realities would be greatly enhanced.

Sukin:
I would say that if practising Jhana was something you did as a daily thing
before hearing about buddhism, then I would advise you to take tips and
advice from the Tipitaka as to how to best do it. But if you have heard about
jhana only after encountering buddhism and have the idea that jhana 
somehow can be used as a tool for developing sati, then I think you are wrong.

Robert:
Can anyone else?  Yes or no, depending on whether they do or not.  Why be
particularly prejudiced against a great meditation teacher?  ........ They are both 
teaching about ways of applying the Dhamma, both legitimate ways of doing so.   
But because of philosophical predispositions you can only accept the usefulness 
of one and not the other.  I see this as a form of prejudice. 

Sukin:
One is telling you about the way things are in general. About how development 
takes place, the right and wrong paths etc., leaving the rest for conditions to arise
when you may be able to recognize them. The other proposes a pattern of 
behavior and agenda to follow and there are inevitably expectations connected
to this.

Robert: 
Have you examined it, and found that it is really true?  Or is
it an idea you have developed from your affiliation with a school of thought?

Sukin:
Thanks, I often think of this. I can never be perfectly sure, but nothing else is
more appealing and makes more sense to me.

Dead tired.
Better rush to sleep now.
I am not checking it so I expect some mistakes in this letter.

best wishes,
Sukin.





 
13447 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 1:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi again, Sarah -

       I'd like to add a couple more thoughts on this "percept" business. The 
percept of "the glass I'm drinking from" SEEMS to be some "thing in the 
world". The concept of 'glass' (the notion of a cylindrical holder for 
beverages) does not so seem - it is just an idea. The concept of 'glass' 
arises and ceases, as I think of it and when I no longer think of it. It is 
impermanent. The glass I'm drinking from, however, the supposedly existing 
"thing in the world", though it seems impermanent is only conventionally so, 
and is not in reality impermanent, nor is it permanent, nor is it anything at 
all, precisely because THERE IS NO glass I'm drinking from except 
conventionally. There is just the percept, the internal mental construct 
which erroneously *seems* to be a thing "out there". (The percept, itself, 
the actual internal construct, is impermanent - it does not remain.)
       I think that what I'm saying here, while probably not identical with 
your take on pa~n~natti, may be very close to it. What do you think, Sarah?

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 5/21/02 10:50:36 AM Eastern Daylight Time, Howard 
writes:


>    My point is merely that I don't think our differences are differences 
> in content, but only in terminology. Perhaps the translation of 
> 'pa~n~natti' 
> as 'concept' is not the best translation. If 'pa~n~natti' denotes an 
> alleged 
> concept-reference such as the tree on my back lawn that I am 
> (conventionally) 
> looking at right now, then the translation of it as 'concept' is misleading 
> 
> to those many people who think of concepts as mere ideas. The relatively 
> concrete"tree on my back lawn", is, itself, a mental construct composed of 
> very recent memories (mainly visual) with the idea of tree (the concept per 
> 
> se) superimposed. But it is not the same as the concept of 'tree on my back 
> 
> lawn', because there is more "immediacy" to it, due to its having been 
> constructed from just-experienced conditions. At least that is how I 
> understand it. In no case do I understand it to be some external "thing". 
> Perhaps a translation of 'pa~n~natti' as 'percept' might come closer - I 
> would find that very clear. But, in any case, the "reality" is an internal 
> one, with any alleged external "tree" being nonexistent, or, at least, in 
> principle unknowable.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13448 From: <> 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 7:15am
Subject: ADL ch. 9 (2)

 
  http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 9 (2)

Seven types of the ahetuka vipakacittas are akusala vipaka and eight
types are kusala vipaka, since there are two types of santirana-citta
which are kusala vipaka. 
As we have seen, there are altogether eighteen ahetuka cittas. Of these
eighteen ahetuka cittas fifteen are vipakacittas and three are
kiriyacittas. Kiriyacittas are different from akusala cittas and kusala
cittas and from vipakacittas. Akusala cittas and kusala cittas are
cittas which are cause; they can motivate ill deeds and good deeds which
are capable of producing their appropriate results. Vipaka-cittas are
cittas which are the result of akusala kamma and kusala kamma.
Kiriyacittas are cittas which are neither cause nor result. 

One type of ahetuka kiriyacitta is the
'five-door-adverting-consciousness', in Pali: panca-dvaravajjana-citta.
('Panca' is five, 'dvara' is door, 'avajjana' is adverting or turning
towards.';) When an object impinges on one of the five senses, there has
to be a citta which adverts or turns towards the object through that
sense-door. When visible object impinges on the eye-sense, there has to
be the adverting-consciousness which adverts towards visible object
through the eye-door, or cakkhu-dvaravajjana-citta (eye-door-adverting-
consciousness), before there can be seeing-consciousness
(cakkhu-vinnana). When sound impinges on the ear-sense, the
ear-door-adverting-consciousness (sota-dvaravajjana-citta) has to advert
to the sound through the ear-door before there can be
hearing-consciousness (sota-vinnana). The panca-dvaravajjana-citta
merely turns towards the object which impinges on one of the five
sense-doors. But it does not see or hear. The panca-dvaravajjana-citta
is an ahetuka kiriyacitta, it arises without hetu (root); there is not
yet like or dislike. The panca-dvaravajjana-citta is succeeded by one of
the dvi-panca-vinnanas (five pairs), which is vipakacitta. 

Each citta which arises in the process of cittas experiencing an object
has its own function. 

The cittas which experience an object through one of the senses do not
know anything else but that object. When one, for example, is reading,
the citta which sees experiences only visible object and it does not
know the meaning of the letters. After the eye-door process has been
completed visible object is experienced through the mind-door and then
there can be other mind-door processes of cittas which know the meaning
of what has been written and which think about it. Thus, there are
processes of cittas which experience an object through one of the senses
and processes of cittas which experience an object through the
mind-door. 

Another type of ahetuka kiriyacitta is the mano-dvaravajjana-citta
(mind-door-adverting-consciousness), which arises both in the sense-door
process and in the mind-door process but performs two different
functions according as it arises in each of those two kinds of
processes. When an object contacts one of the sense-doors, the
panca-dvaravajjana-citta (five-door-adverting-consciousness) turns
towards the object, one of the dvi-panca-vinananas experiences it,
sampaticchana-citta receives the object and santirana-citta investigates
it. The santirana-citta is succeeded by an ahetuka kiriyacitta which
experiences the object through that sense-door and 'determines'
(votthapana) the object. It is actually the same type of citta as the
mano- dvara vajjana-citta, (mind-door-adverting-consciousness, the first
citta of the mind-door process), but when it arises in the sense-door
process it can be called votthapana-citta, since it performs the
function of determining the object in the sense-door process. The
votthapana-citta, after it has determined the object, is, on the case of
non-arahats, followed by akusala cittas or by kusala cittas. It depends
on one's accumulations of akusala and kusala whether the votthapana
citta will be succeeded by akusala cittas or by kusala cittas.

 
13449 From: <> 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 7:53am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita

 
  Hi Sarah,

Just a couple of questions in response to your reply. 

You wrote, "I don't think we can say that "akusala roots are what is
most commonly taken for self"." What do you consider to be the basic
manifestation of the particular sense of 'me' right now?

You also wrote, "Likewise, vipaka (say, seeing or hearing), never
becomes 'the attribute of the akusala citta" (if I understand you), but
akusala cittas and cetasikas succeeding the vipaka may cling, be averse,
be ignorant or have wrong view of that vipaka."

Do you regard your shirt as an attribute of who you are ('who you are'
being an akusala citta according to me)? Isn't your shirt a vipaka?
 
Finally you wrote, "Instead of saying "the feeling is lobha, dosa or
moha", I'd suggest there are different feelings (pleasant, unpleasant,
neutral vedana) accompanying these other mental factors." What are
lobha, dosa, and moha _in experience_ if not feelings?

hope this leaves you hope-less, Larry

 
13450 From: TG 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 4:35am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
  Hi Robert Ep.

I think you misunderstand what is meant by "no control."  No control does not 
mean there is no volition, or effort to strive for better states.  What it 
means is that there are only conditions interacting with each other and there 
is no Self that is "in control."

The idea of "control" presupposes the idea of "self."  It is a subtle way of 
grasping after Self IMO.  

If there is control as you say...what is it that is controling?

TG




In a message dated 5/19/2002 11:04:34 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> "Ray Hendrickson"   wrote:
> 
> > The other evidence we have about speaking conventally when talking about
> > self-control, etc comes from the Suttas themselves.  In the Connected
> > Discourse, "A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya" by Bhikkhu Bodhi we
> > read on page102 #64
> 
> > "No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned;
> > For him all knots of conceit are consumed.
> > Though the wise one has transcended the conceived,
> > He still might say, 'I speak,'
> > He might say too, 'They speak to me.'
> > Skilful, knowing the world's parlance,
> > He uses such terms as mere expressions."
> 
> > The Buddha says the same thing about himself in a Sutta from MN, but I
> > forget which number, but I am sure others here will know the passage.  So 
> as
> > well as the evidence you supplied, there is also this evidence from the
> > Canon that the Buddha does use such terms as a "mere expressions."
> 
> Thanks, Ray.
> My question is:  Why would the Buddha use conventional speech in such a 
> positive
> manner.  In your quote above, he is saying that one may casually use 'I' or 
> 'you'
> as a mere convention in order to communicate content, such as in the 
> sentence,
> 'Are you hungry?'  That's my sense of it.  This is different.  Here, he is 
> making
> a positive command, saying:  'You should try as hard as you can to exercise
> self-control.'  That is not merely using conventional speech, that is 
> promoting
> it, if that's what it in fact is. 
> 
> If you agree that this is a much more forceful use of such conventions, we 
> have to
> ask what the purpose is in saying this?  If we have 'no control' and we are 
> really
> to 'let go' and merely study Suttas and discern realities, why on earth 
> would the
> Buddha literally exhort people to try as hard as possible to control 
> themselves? 
> My only conclusion can be that whether 'self' is a convention or not, he 
> wants
> people to make an effort at exercising control.  This seems quite different 
> than
> the message he could have given if 'no control' were in fact the doctrine.  
> He
> could have said, as many on this list seem to:  'Give up the effort to 
> control
> yourselvew, because in fact there is no self to control, and no way for 
> selfless
> kandhas to control them.  Everything arises from a cause, and the most you 
> can do
> is try to discern the truth of the way reality functions.'  This would be a 
> very
> effective message if this is in fact what the Buddha meant to say, but at 
> least
> for these listeners, that is apparently *not* what he wanted them to do.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 





 
13451 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 8:41am
Subject: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
> Hi Robert Ep.
> 
> I think you misunderstand what is meant by "no control."  No 
control does not 
> mean there is no volition, or effort to strive for better states.  
What it 
> means is that there are only conditions interacting with each other 
and there 
> is no Self that is "in control."
> 
> The idea of "control" presupposes the idea of "self."  It is a 
subtle way of 
> grasping after Self IMO.  
> 
> If there is control as you say...what is it that is controling?
> 
> TG

TG,

159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
self-control. 

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html

Regards,
Victor

 
13452 From: <> 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 8:46am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 9 (2)

 
  Dear group,

I'm not sure if it is really worthwhile asking these questions since we
can't observe citta process, but, neverheless, I was wondering:

When do cetasika manifest in citta process?

What is the object of mind door adverting consciousness? It can't be
another citta because then there would be two cittas at the same time.
It can't be a rupa because it would have to be cognized through one of
the 5 doors. How do we cognize rupa,  concept, and memory through the
mind door? What is the nature of the object?

How is a cetasika cognized? as a qualifier of another citta?

In seeing process what is going on in receiving, investigating, and
determining? Does memory play a part here?

Anyone else have a question about this stuff?

Larry

 
13453 From: TG 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 4:50am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
  Hi Victor

I'll ask you the same question.  If there is "control" who or what is doing 
the controling?

TG




In a message dated 5/21/2002 5:41:32 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
Victor writes:


> 159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
> others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
> self-control. 
> 
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 



 
13454 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 4:52am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 9 (2)

 
  Hi, Larry -

       I have no answers for you. I just want to say "Good questions!" 

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 5/21/02 8:47:15 PM Eastern Daylight Time, <> 
writes:


> Dear group,
> 
> I'm not sure if it is really worthwhile asking these questions since we
> can't observe citta process, but, neverheless, I was wondering:
> 
> When do cetasika manifest in citta process?
> 
> What is the object of mind door adverting consciousness? It can't be
> another citta because then there would be two cittas at the same time.
> It can't be a rupa because it would have to be cognized through one of
> the 5 doors. How do we cognize rupa,  concept, and memory through the
> mind door? What is the nature of the object?
> 
> How is a cetasika cognized? as a qualifier of another citta?
> 
> In seeing process what is going on in receiving, investigating, and
> determining? Does memory play a part here?
> 
> Anyone else have a question about this stuff?
> 
> Larry 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13455 From: <> 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 9:00am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
  Hi TG,

If we translate 'control' into 'cause' then kusala and akusala cittas
are causes or controllers of kamma.

Larry
-------------
TG wrote:Hi Victor 
I'll ask you the same question. If there is "control" who or what is
doing the controling? 
TG

 
13456 From: Kom Tukovinit   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 1:53pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Dear Jon & All,

No new information.  Just more opinion ;-).

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Num [mailto:Num]
>
> Dear Jon:
>
> Jim: <<  The Pali phrase is
> "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii pa.tipadaa". It
> seems to me that "the path of practice" is either
> a translation of
> "pa.tipadaa" (the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa"
> (the way leading to). >>
> Num <<I looked up the Thai sutta and the atthakatha. <<
> Satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii>> translated as
> <<development of
> satipatthana-4.>> The word "pa.tipadaa" is left
> untranslated in Thai. >>
> Jon: << I find it interesting that this word
> should have been left
> untranslated
> (but I can't think what significance this might
> have ;-) ). >>
>
>
> I meant in Thai tipitaka, the word patipada is
> used without being translated
> in to simpler Thai word. I think Jim can give
> more thorough meaning of the
> word. Pati- has a board meaning. I think here it
> means "toward" and pada
> means " the way". Another word 'patipatti'; pati
> here means "together or all
> over" and patti means "attaining or reaching".
> Patipatti, which usually
> translated into practice, can also mean reaching
> altogether, knowing all -->
> knowing nama and rupa.
>
> << This is called the path of practice to the
> development of the frames of
> reference>>
>  <<I believe your summary that follows is
> correct, at least as far as I
> recall from my reading of the Visuddhimagga .
> Thanks very much for the
> reminder.  (But I don't think it helps solve the
> problem raised by Howard,
> does it?).>>
>
>
> Hmm, to me, I think the sutta speaks itself that
> satipatthana in a magga
> level (in 8-factored path) is the way that one
> needs to attain to reach
> lokuttaracitta/nibbana (conventional speaking).
> If it is not the satipatthana
> in 8-factored path level,
> sammasati/satipatthana/sati is still in a worldly
> level.  So, again conventional speaking, nibbana
> cannot be attained without
> attaining satipatthana in 8-factorted path level.
>  When I read it, I do not
> feel that the sutta tells us that the 8-factored
> path is a preceding factor
> to obtain first and then later practice
> satipatthana. I do not get the sense
> of chronology or practicing step here. Am I
> missing something?
>
>

Patipada is left translated in more than a few contexts in
the Thai-translated Tipitakas.  For example,
Majhimma-pa.tipadaa (the middle way), Samma-pa.tipadaa (the
right way), and Dukkha-Niroda-gamani-Patipadda (the way
leading to the cessation, or magga).  I guess Patipadda is
translated as either the way or the practice.

If one insists on doctrines (right or wrong!), one can say,
Satipatthana is both 5-fold and 8-fold magga, and magga is
both 5-fold and 8-fold.  Therefore, satipatthana can be used
interchangeably with magga.

kom

 
13457 From: Kom Tukovinit   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 2:30pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 
  Dear Christine and Jon,

Sorry to butt in, but this is too entertaining to resist...

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jonothan Abbott [mailto:Jon]
> > Sometimes I feel as if there are two me's - a
> reasonable, rational
> > one who drags a kicking and resisting one along. :-)
> > Thanks for the common sense advice.
>
> Well, the 'kicking and resisting one' is also
> very zany and entertaining,
> and it helps keep a good balance here!
>

Just while I am entertaining my zany friends, I need to
remind myself, the entertaining friends would only lead to
bad plane of existence, miserable plane of existence, and
hell, or at the very least many more continued rounds of
existence.  The more rational friends will lead me (if it's
not the entertaining friends who dress up as the rational
friends) to good plane of existence, happy plane of
existence, and heaven, and if we are persistent, eventually
the release.   Hmm....   Good friends should really be
appreciated...

kom

 
13458 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 3:37pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
  Dear larry,
looking at it this way,
one could say that our real 'self'
is each arising and falling kusala or akusala citta
which causes both the content and consequences of each moment.

of course it is not a 'self' in the sense of an entity,
instead it is a flowing and changing reality, a process.

robert

======

--- <> wrote:
> Hi TG,
> 
> If we translate 'control' into 'cause' then kusala and akusala cittas
> are causes or controllers of kamma.
> 
> Larry
> -------------
> TG wrote:Hi Victor 
> I'll ask you the same question. If there is "control" who or what is
> doing the controling? 
> TG
> 



 
13459 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 3:51pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
  --- TG wrote:
> Hi Robert Ep.
> 
> I think you misunderstand what is meant by "no control."  No control does not 
> mean there is no volition, or effort to strive for better states.  What it 
> means is that there are only conditions interacting with each other and there 
> is no Self that is "in control."
> 
> The idea of "control" presupposes the idea of "self."  It is a subtle way of 
> grasping after Self IMO.  
> 
> If there is control as you say...what is it that is controling?
> 
> TG

I don't know that I have the answer to that.  My point is that the Buddha clearly
says that one should practice control of self, and he does so quite positively. 
The point is what does the Buddha mean by this, not whether I know what is
controlling or not.  What do you think the Buddha meant when he said we should
strive hard to control our selves?  He obviously meant something.  

My own sense is that control can be exercised without theree being a self to
control or to do the controlling.  I think it is limiting to assume that the
Buddha is either speaking conventionally or else speaking to a 'self'.  The third
alternative is that he is speaking to consciousness and putting causes into
effect.  That is a kind of control that is not dependent on a self, but does
affect the resultant consciousness.

Robert Ep.

===========

> 
> 
> 
> In a message dated 5/19/2002 11:04:34 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
> Robert Ep writes:
> 
> 
> > "Ray Hendrickson"   wrote:
> > 
> > > The other evidence we have about speaking conventally when talking about
> > > self-control, etc comes from the Suttas themselves.  In the Connected
> > > Discourse, "A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya" by Bhikkhu Bodhi we
> > > read on page102 #64
> > 
> > > "No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned;
> > > For him all knots of conceit are consumed.
> > > Though the wise one has transcended the conceived,
> > > He still might say, 'I speak,'
> > > He might say too, 'They speak to me.'
> > > Skilful, knowing the world's parlance,
> > > He uses such terms as mere expressions."
> > 
> > > The Buddha says the same thing about himself in a Sutta from MN, but I
> > > forget which number, but I am sure others here will know the passage.  So 
> > as
> > > well as the evidence you supplied, there is also this evidence from the
> > > Canon that the Buddha does use such terms as a "mere expressions."
> > 
> > Thanks, Ray.
> > My question is:  Why would the Buddha use conventional speech in such a 
> > positive
> > manner.  In your quote above, he is saying that one may casually use 'I' or 
> > 'you'
> > as a mere convention in order to communicate content, such as in the 
> > sentence,
> > 'Are you hungry?'  That's my sense of it.  This is different.  Here, he is 
> > making
> > a positive command, saying:  'You should try as hard as you can to exercise
> > self-control.'  That is not merely using conventional speech, that is 
> > promoting
> > it, if that's what it in fact is. 
> > 
> > If you agree that this is a much more forceful use of such conventions, we 
> > have to
> > ask what the purpose is in saying this?  If we have 'no control' and we are 
> > really
> > to 'let go' and merely study Suttas and discern realities, why on earth 
> > would the
> > Buddha literally exhort people to try as hard as possible to control 
> > themselves? 
> > My only conclusion can be that whether 'self' is a convention or not, he 
> > wants
> > people to make an effort at exercising control.  This seems quite different 
> > than
> > the message he could have given if 'no control' were in fact the doctrine.  
> > He
> > could have said, as many on this list seem to:  'Give up the effort to 
> > control
> > yourselvew, because in fact there is no self to control, and no way for 
> > selfless
> > kandhas to control them.  Everything arises from a cause, and the most you 
> > can do
> > is try to discern the truth of the way reality functions.'  This would be a 
> > very
> > effective message if this is in fact what the Buddha meant to say, but at 
> > least
> > for these listeners, that is apparently *not* what he wanted them to do.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.



 
13460 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 4:05pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
  Hi Larry,

I don't see 'control' meaning the same as 'cause'. 
The dictionary meaning of Control is:"Power or authority to check or 
restrain; restraining or regulating influence; power to direct or 
determine; a relation of constraint of one entity (thing or person or 
group) by another."  
The dictionary meaning of Cause is: "events that provide the 
generative force that is the origin of something."

Cause happens from multiple conditions.  But I feel Control is an 
entirely different thing.  I could 'cause' a fire to be started on a 
windy day in the paddock, but I cannot 'control' what happens after 
that.

metta,
Christine

> Hi TG,
> 
> If we translate 'control' into 'cause' then kusala and akusala 
cittas
> are causes or controllers of kamma.
> 
> Larry
> -------------
> TG wrote:Hi Victor 
> I'll ask you the same question. If there is "control" who or what is
> doing the controling? 
> TG

 
13461 From: Sarah   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 4:41pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A self ouside the khandas/simultaneity

 
  Dear J,

 --- watercolorca  wrote: > Hi everyone-I'm doing Pali
lesson daily and attempting to keep up.
> 
> If you read to the end-anyone have any thoughts on "five khanadas 
> simutaneously come to be realized"....thanks,J.

Welcome to DSG and thanks for your message. We mostly have to learn a
little Pali and attempt to keep up. Glad, you're not only keeping up, but
checking the detail with a fine eye as shown by the good question. 

This is the passage that your qu relates to (from Nyantiloka dictionary, I
presume, though I can’t find it on a quick look):

> Satipatthana (D.22 and M.10) Awareness of mindfullness...the monk 
> dwells in contemplation of the body, feelings, mind and mind-objects.  
> These contemplations are in reality not to be taken as merely separate 
> exerises but as things inseparably associated with each other.  
> Thereby the Satipatthana Sutta forms an illustration of the way in 
> which these four contemplations relating ****to the five khandas 
> simultanenously come to be realized, ****and finally lead to the 
> Insight into the Impersonality of all existence.  
*****
I understand the confusion and how this phrase can be misleading. As I’m
sure you’re suggesting, awareness (satipatthana) can only ever take one
reality as object at a time. In other words, there can’t be awareness of
say, hardness and feeling, or seeing and hearing, at the same time, even
though the different phenomena are ‘inseparably associated’ by conditions.

However, I think we can say that as awareness develops of particular
characteristics of realities, these are known to apply to other realities
which are not the objects of awareness. To clarify, we can either refer to
particular characteristics (visesa lakkhana) such as lobha (attachment),
dosa (aversion), vedana (feeling) and so on or we can refer to common
characteristics (sammana lakkhana)of all conditioned realities, i.e the
ti-lakkhana of anicca, dukkha and anatta. 

As realities are understood as namas and rupas only (not self), or one of
these characteristics becomes apparent, we could perhaps say the 5
khandhas ‘simultaneously’ come to be realized at moments of vipassana
~nana, for example. I’m not sure if this is what N. had in mind.

On a side note, nibbana only has visesa lakkhana and not sammana lakkhana.
Also if we refer to a reality having sabhava, it is the same as saying it
has lakkhana. Similarly we can say, I think,  the aim of understanding is
to know realities as anatta, as lakkhana or as nama/rupa.
.....
To continue the quote you (Howard?) gave just a little further while we
are being particular:
.....
>Mindfulness is meant 
> to encompass the whole personality and starts with the body as primary 
> and regular subject of meditation."
> 
> There are many ways of analysis of "body" leading to insight into 
> anatta in all Buddhist traditions. 
.....
Hmm, this is definitely not what I believe the Satipatthana Sutta to be
saying. As we often discuss here (and Rob K and Sukin are discussing in
other threads), as soon as their is an idea of ‘order’ or ‘rule’ or object
as ‘primary’ or first, then it suggests an idea of selection, control
which defeats the purpose of the previous quotes on anatta.
.....
 > "One thing, O Monks, developed and repeatedly practiced, leads to the 
> attainment of wisdom. It is the contemplation on the body." (A.I and 
> Vis VI.2)
.....
I just try to look up this quote in context, but there is a problem with
the references given.Vis V1,2 is a reference to the asubha (foulness of
corpses) but doesn’t have this quote.
 .....
I think the following quote is very helpful and accords with the point
about the 8FP which Jon, Num and others have been making (i.e not steps,
but simultaneous arising of mental states at path moments):
.....
> "...the links of the eightfold "Path" not only do not arise one after 
> the other, this should not be interpreted to mean that one advances 
> step by step in sequence of ennumeration until one finally may reach 
> the destination of Nibbana.  If this were true, one would have 
> realizied first of all Right View and penetration to the truth even 
> before one could hope to proceed to Right Thought and Right Action 
> etc. But the links in part arise simultaneously as inseparably 
> associated mental factors in one and the same state of consciousness. 
> At least four links are bound up with karmically wholesome 
> consciousness but Right View is not necessarily present in every 
> wholesome state of consciousness."
.....
 > "All khandas/phenomena are compared respectively, to a lump of froth, 
> a bubble, a mirage, a coreless plantain stem, a conjuring trick, a 
> m
.....
As it’s quite easy to misunderstand this commonly recited quote, sometimes
with suggestions that there are no characteristics and no realities at
all, as in a dream (when only pannatti-concepts) are experienced, I’d like
to sign off, but re-quote the commentary notes to SN, Phena Sutta again.
It is apparent that it is the ti-lakkhana that are again being stressed.

J, thanks for your astute question (not really answered) and look forward
to more. If you can provide another initial at least (other details if and
when you feel inclined, of course), it’ll prevent me getting you confused
or becoming  ‘over familiar’ because J is what I call Jonothan (known in
cyberspace as Jon) in real life;-)

Sarah
=====

From the  Phena Sutta (A Lump of Foam) Spk notes translated by B.Bodhi:
***** 
note 190: “Spk: a bubble (bubbu.la) is feeble and cannot be grasped, for
it
breaks up as soon as it is seized;  so too feeling is feeble and cannot be
grasped as permanent and stable.  As a bubble arises and ceases in a drop
of
water and does not last long, so too with feeling:  100,000 ‘ko.tis’ of
feelings arise and cease in the time of a fingersnap (one ko.ti = 10
million). 
As a bubble arises in dependence on conditions, so feeling arises in
dependence
on a sense base, an object, the defilements, and contact.”

“Spk: Perception is like a mirage (marikaa) in the sense that it is
insubstantial, for one cannot grasp a mirage to drink or bathe or fill a
pitcher.  As a mirage deceives the multitude, so does perception, which
entices
people with th idea that the colourful object is beautiful, pleasurable,
and
permanent.”
*****
Sarah:Does this mean feelings, perceptions and other paramatha dhammas
(realities)
don’t have lakhana (characteristics) or sabhava (nature) or that they
don’t
exist momentarily in their different ‘activities’? No.
*****
“Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many
sheaths,
each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional
formations is
an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own characteristic.”

“Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (maayaa) in the sense that
it is
insubstantial and cannot be grasped.  Consciousness is even more transient
and
fleeting than a magical illusion.  For it gives the impression that a
person
comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is
different
in each of these activities.  Consciousness deceives the multitude like a
magical illusion.” 
*****
<end earlier post>
======================================================



 
13462 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 5:17pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: 'no control', Reply to Rob E.

 
  --- Sukin  wrote:
> Hi Rob,
> Whew!! Finally finished reading your looong post.
> Sorry about yesterday, wasn't a good day for me.
> I always like reading your thoughts even if I don't fully agree,

thanks

> you consider from many angles.
> 
> Hope you don't mind me not quoting you in the full, since its such
> a long post I'm replying to. Also I changing the name of the subject.
> 
> > importance to 'activity' will I feel lead to some form of
> silabbataparamasa
> > or the other.
> 
> Robert:
> Unfortunately do not know this term.  But I am impressed by how long it is.
> If you can translate I would appreciate it.
> 
> Sukin:
> Silabbataparamasa is "wrong practise", meaning anything we do with the view
> that doing such things will lead to understanding.

Sutta study for instance?  Or is this exempt from being 'wrong practice'?

> Robert:
> I feel that the idea of developing kusala 'naturally' is itself an intention
> imposed on the 'naturalness' of the arising moments, and I would be interested
> to see
> how you can get a 'natural' development out of such a situation.
> 
> Sukin:
> Vipaka arises all through life and we cannot know, less predict when which
> kamma will bear fruit as sense impressions through which doorway. Our
> 
> accumulated kilesas will condition the subsequent moments and
> we will be accumulating more akusala. Sometimes however kusala can arise
> because conditions for it has arisen. Whether sati and panna will arise at
> any moment is beyond anyones control, so there is no *trying* to be natural.

control and intention are not the same thing.  intentions create results, whether
immediately or later, if they are actual intentions.  since every cause has an
effect, this shuld be true, shoudn't it?  one confuses 'control' with 'results'. 
certainly intentions and practices yield *results* that are in keeping with those
intentions or practices.  this is in keeping with the law of cause and effect, the
law of kamma.  

if in fact it is totally unpredictable which activities will produce kusala or
akusala results, then we would be living in a seemingly random, chaotic universe. 
Buddha's teaching is that it is not random, but direct.  Yes, conditions combine
in complex ways, but i think it is an error to say that everything is so complex
that we have no idea what is going on.  I think we can be logical creatures, as
Buddha advises, and pay attention to the results of actions, and act accordingly. 
To think that we have to remain in an attitude of infantile hope that one day the
dhamma will shine on us and bring us to the next step if we just avoid purposeful
action and behave 'naturally' seems very mistaken to me.  My understanding is that
Buddha said we must achieve liberation *through our own efforts*, not through
waiting for an outside force, and that we must clear up our own doubts through
following the Dhamma and observing the results until we become *skilled*.  A
passive attitude and a belief in random cause and effect, albeit resulting from
past kamma in some amazingly complex way, will not, in my opinion, help our
progress.

What it does do is put us in a passive position, one which is similar to the
followers of many teachings, who disempower themselves and empower their teachers,
the gurus or experts.  This is not what buddha intended.  The idea that there is
no 'self' can be used incorrectly to disempower the aspirant for enlightenment. 
Buddha meant to empower us, not take away our power by saying we have no control. 
The relief from having a self is a *freedom*, not a handicap. 

> There will be understanding or there will not, as simple as that. Surely
> intention
> is there, but there is no seeking out already fallen states or unarisen ones.
> Nor trying to 'be' more attentive.

Well I disagree.  The theory of cittas has its own set of escape hatches, such as
the innumerable cetasikas which can cross-hatch each other in such a way as to
cause a number of complex effects, and the fact that the accumulations of the
cittas are passed on from one to the next.  In other words, if an intention arises
in one citta, it may be passed to the next one and so on and so forth.  This means
the opposite of what you have said here:  the cittas do not merely arise and fall,
they develop factors and accumulate them, and pass them down.  So you *can*
develop and build intentions and have systematic results.  If this were not the
case, I don't believe that Buddhism would be a workable approach.  It can't be
random, and it can't be totally passive or one may as well study supermarket
coupons or the phone book.  If studying the Suttas and taking good spiritual
advice from trusted teachers of dhamma have slow but systematic results, then why
should meditation and other intentional activities have similarly positive
results?  I still don't get the distinction.

I know I'm being pretty tough here, but I want to get to the real bones of the
issue and see if we can draw some solid conclusions at some point.

> Robert:
> How can we possibly factor in the.........activities and efforts is barking
> up the wrong tree.
> 
> Sukin:
> Surely every individual factor comprising a moment of citta, including the
> arammana influences the type and quality of the citta. A citta conditioned
> 
> by sati and panna and other beautiful cetasikas will be quite different from 
> 
> a citta conditioned by lobha and a desire to 'catch' and know the moment. 
> 
> The former will accomplish its function to understand, the latter will defeat
> 
> its own purpose.

Well we can certainly learn and develop the right attitude towards discernment and
learn to recognize those attitudes and approaches that are defeating of our
purpose.  This is a matter of intelligence, practice and assessment, not
coincidence.

> Robert:
> Instead we should follow our true intention ........ most effectively follow the
> path.
> 
> Sukin:
> Do you think, once you have found the path best suited to you, your sincere
> intentions to follow that path will carry you through? So is it only the
> question of finding your path and following it to the end?

I don't understand the intention of your question, if it is not to say that this
is not true.  What is missing from finding the true path and following it?  The
question is of what the path consists, but other than that, yes, that is what is
to be done.  it is not 'my path' though, it is my understanding of the teachings
and how to apply them in order to do what Buddha teaches.

> Robert:
> If there were only one answer to this question, ....... false starts and
> layers of delusion, even for those who follow the dhamma as closely 
> 
> as they know how.
> 
> Sukin:
> I agree, trying out different methods must be quite stressful, but I don't
> think the difficulty of the path is due to these diversions. The difficulty
> 
> is in our deeply conditioned, faulty way of viewing reality, made harder 
> 
> by our continual accumulation of ignorance.
> 
> Robert:
> To start with, there is more than one approach to Buddhism,
> 
> Sukin:
> Buddhism as we know it, not as the Buddha taught. Or do you think that the
> Mahayana teachings are the actual word of the Buddha?

I am not a scholar and I don't know what the proofs are for historical validity of
any teachings.  What i do know is that there is wisdom in both Theravada and
Mahayana.  I don't have any doubt of that.

> Robert:
>  The Mahayana school says that the Theravadan school is the lesser vehicle
> for those of ordinary capacities.  The Vajrayana-Tibetan school says that both
> the
> other schools in their ordinary practices are limited.
> 
> Sukin:
> This might interest you Rob, I have become pro Theravada less than two years
> ago. Before that I read some Mahayana and a little bit about what Vajrayana was,
> I never questioned their assertions about them being progressively superior to
> Theravada. I believed their arguments. Interestingly at one point a couple of
> months ago,
> I was reminded about vajrayana, about how they teach about seeing no difference
> between Nirvana and Samsara, and that their aim is to view any and every event
> without choice and as equally enlightening. I compared this to K. Sujin's
> attitude
> towards the teachings and I saw that she encourages the same thing without
> having to
> go through all the hassles that the other practice puts forward as a
> pre-condition. And I dare say, more simply and affectively.

Well that is not to say that one is ultimately more effective than the other.  We
don't really know that, but we do know that there is wisdom in Buddhist teachings.

> Robert:
> Meanwhile the Buddha......Yet the debates go on, because we are in samsara.
> 
> Sukin:
> Yes, debating is pointless I think.
> 
> Robert:
> The concept 'Abhidhamma', .........of the mind and perception [namas and
> rupas].
> 
> Sukin:
> I agree.
> 
> Robert:
> In my opinion, one can use these sorts of things as a barometer of progress.
> If the Buddha talks about feelings and realizations that mark progress on the
> path,
> we can look to these things.
> 
> Sukin:
> Personally I don't find it useful to measure my or anyone else's progress,
> not knowing how to do it without giving importance to 'self' ;-).

Well there is a path and there is a goal.  If not, what is the point?  If one is
training to do something, one has some way of assessing whether they are heading
in the right direction, doing the right process.  One can't walk around in circles
and be satisfied, so we have to have something to see if we are heading in the
right direction, no?

> Robert:
> If we cannot use something .......So we have to develop some sort of real
> observation of what is happening in our consciousness, even if it is very slow.
> 
> Sukin:
> I think it isn't necessary, just keep on studying and applying the teachings
> in an unforced manner.

well, that's okay.  that's one way of following the teachings, I would say. 
Certainly strain and force will not be helpful.

> Robert:
> There have been some strong moments of clearly seeing .....me shows a
> general trend towards progress on the path.
> 
> Sukin:
> Good, but is it worth clinging to?:-)

You added that.  Who said anything about clinging?  i'm talking about whether one
is heading in the right direction.  Anyone, from scientist to artist, would check
their results.  you assume there is clinging there.

> 
> Robert:
> Shouldn't we keep track of .....taking an outside source as the measure, and
> we will never  reach the independence necessary to be able to discern with
> surety.
> 
> Sukin:
> I think only when we have discerned the rise and fall of nama and rupa,
> knowing clearly the distinction between the two, as a sotapanna has, 
> 
> can we really know for sure that what the Buddha taught is all true and 
> 
> only then will we really be independent and no more need outside confirmation.

but we have to develop that capacity and we have to work in a way that will get us
there.  it won't happen by accident.

> Robert:
> I think this is different than the general practices ...... Isn't there some
> intention in that decision? Sure there is.
> 
> Sukin:
> Intention is in every citta, it arises and falls with it and it takes on the
> quality of the citta, being with or without sati and panna.

yes, but it also accumulates and is passed on.

>    >And I definitely do not believe that practices of other religions, such as
> > yoga, can lead to sati and panna.
> Robert:
> Well, I understand your point of view, but I don't think you can really know
> that, can you?  How would you know whether it does or not
> 
> 
> 
> >      Kusala was and is recognized by all other religions
> > and I do believe that some level of kusala can be developed by performing
> > activities such as yoga and tai chi, but not sati and panna.
> Robert:
> This seems to be an assumption on your part unless you have some other
> knowledge that this is the case.
> 
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> I use sati here for sati of the level of satipatthana, which means having a
> reality
> 
> as object. I do not think other practices can lead to actually percieving
> elementary
> 
> realities. It is an assumption and will remain so until I actually tread the
> path to
> 
> its fruition, meanwhile it is based on rational thinking and faith in the
> Buddha's
> 
> teachings.

in other words, it is a belief system based on Buddha's teachings.  not that
there's anything wrong with that.

> > The kusala they
> > all encourage is with some sense and form of self or the other.
> 
> 
> Robert:
> With respect, this is not only true ...... Ramana Maharshi and Nisargardatta 
> 
> in Advaita Vedanta, whom I believe thoroughly realized anatta through and 
> 
> through.  It is so indicated in both their lives and their conversations.
> 
> 
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> It is hard for me at this point to give a reasonable( I have to think more )
> argument to support my claim. But hope you don't mind my pointing out
> that Nisargardatta either was a chain smoker or sold cigarettes as a
> living. Do you think that an enlightened person could do that? 

I think it's a mistake to draw assumptions in that way.  Nisargardatta saw the
emptiness of all phenomena and saw no reason to change his behavior.  He just kept
doing what he had always done.  i have heard many arguments saying that one should
not worry about 'fixing' this reality, but instead discern its true nature, and
that is what he emphasized.

> Would you choose to? A sotapanna could never do such. Besides
> people like the two you mentioned above, did believe in a great
> 'SELF' a 'THAT' no?

no, they used the terminology of their culure, but it is clear by their words that
they did not consider the SELF to be a thing, an entity, a field of being, or a
separate or universal identity.  they said that individual entities did not exist
as such.

> > They have no idea of anatta, or even anicca.
> 
> 
> Robert:
> I would disagree.  While anatta is the clear realization of the Buddha, others
> have come to see anatta in their own terms.  I think it is a realization
> waiting to be discovered, not an invention of the Buddha.
> 
> 
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> Nobody has ever said that the Buddha invented anything, he didn't even invent
> buddhism;-). Anatta can be discovered, but by Buddhas only and i doubt there 
> has been a Paceka Buddha even, in this past 2500 years. 

matter of opinion.

> Robert:
> 
> I don't think this is true in the case of great sages of Hinduism......cases 
> are realized within other forms of practice and terminologies.

> Sukin:
> 
> Hope you don't mind that I do not want to make any comments here.

that's up to you.  

> Robert:
> The Buddha did not originate the non-conceptual realization of impermanence.
> It is a standard in Hindu meditation.

> Sukin:
> 
> Are you sure that they know that consciousness is an element, rising momentarily
> conditioning the next moment on and on? 

there is certainly a great moment-to-moment literature as to the continuous
arising and changing of consciousness.  as to the individual citta theory, that is
a property of abhidhamma and not necessarily of Theravada in general.

  If not how can they see rise and fall of
> individual cittas? It would surprise me greatly if you brought out some proof.

to be able to see the specific content of each moment is a property of advanced
meditation as well as Buddhist philosophy.  as for 'individual cittas', we will
both have to wait to see if they really arise and fall as single elements in a
string of beads, or whether they break down to non-units in a continuous changing
thread.  so far the idea that there are specific bounded cittas that have clear
boundaries seems quite substantialist to me and is controversial within Buddhism
at large.  I don't take it as a requirement for being 'Buddhist'.

> Robert:
> 
> For instance, Nisargardatta states that the self is not an entity but is
> just a conceptual object of consciousness.
> 
> 
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> Yes perhaps( never read him) but wasn't he in this case trying to point out that
> the small individual 'self' is non existent, only to show that the 'real' self
was
> the "SELF"? 
>
Actually he used a more specific language than that, which referred to something
much less entity-like than the SELF, although he employed that terminology also. 
his more specific terminology was phenomenon and noumena, which is closer to the
Buddha's teaching.  

> > The Buddha was equally perfect in wisdom the first moment he attained
> > enlightenment till the moment before he attained parinibbana. The wisdom
> > of the arahants all combined do not equal to a small part of the Buddhas.
> 
> 
> Robert:
> I don't say you are wrong, but I would challenge whether you actually know
> this to be the case.  What's the evidence for this?
> 
> 
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> Just that to be a Perfectly Enlightened Buddha means that all the qualities have
> been developed and accumulated to 100%.

well I don't believe in 100% within samsara, this is a form of perfectionism to
me.  moments are neither perfect nor imperfect, they are what they are.  the
Buddha is one who has no delusions, but you really can't measure other qualities
by percent.   Does the buddha say he is a perfect being?  Just curious.
> 
> > Wisdom cannot be added and improved upon by sucessive generations.
> 
> 
> Robert:
> Another disagreement.  This is to set the Buddha's words in stone, rather
> than to reinvigorate them with our understanding in each generation.  That which
> is
> set in stone becomes remote and static in my opinion.  It must be put into
> practice
> in each of us by making it our own.
> 
> 
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> I think every buddhist knows that his religion is a practical religion not just
> a set
> of doctrines. By my statement above I meant that the original teacher's insights
> can only be taken as a guide, but can never be re examined and corrected and
> improved upon by its followers. Later generations can only adulterate the
> teachings.

I disagree.  Each generation does add something to understanding.  The original
teachings are of the highest order, but that doesn't mean there's nothing for us
to do to create a continuing tradition.

> > A system of practice like yoga which has been worked upon and changed
> > through time can only result in getting people cling to the superficial
> > aspect of it.
> 
> 
> Robert:
> I disagree strongly.  ......  This does not change the nature of yoga.
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> Sorry I made the wrong assumption, I based my conclusion on the variety
> of yoga books available in the market.
> 
> > My conclusion thus is, such practices not only do not help in buddhist
> > practise, but if seen instead as being a support, can be extremely
> > detrimental to development of panna.
> 
> 
> Robert:
> I think this is just an opinion here, ....... Buddhism can be useful.
> 
> > Satipatthana is the *only* way.
> 
> 
> Robert:
> Well, that is like me saying 'meditation is the only way.'  .......and so many 
> different factors to be developed.
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> Satipatthana means to be mindful of 'realities'. It can happen under whatever
> circumstance, even when one is meditating, 

I like that.  'even when one is meditating'.  do you see that there is some
prejudice here against the traditional activities of Buddhism?  You do realize
that most Buddhists believe in meditation as the Buddha's preferred method?  and
make it their main practice?  

  only that it would be harder
> to come by if one thinks that one has to do certain activities (like meditation)
> in order that it will arise. 

AGain, or if they think they will get some benefit out of reading suttas and
commentarires.  please tell me the difference between believing in one or the
other.

  It is the only 'way' to enlightenment but not in
> the sense that it is a programme or something. From this point of view, it can
be
> reached from as many number of directions as there are beings practising it. 
> 
> Robert:
> 
> All of our activities are intentional, .......of Abhidhamma teaching that is an
> intentional practice.  There is nothing natural about it.  It is a guided
> activity
> within a conceptual framework.  
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> True
> 
> Robert
> 
> To not acknowledge this is very dangerous as it tends.....amazing honesty
> and attention to release one's own view and be in the presence of the naked
> moment.
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> Yes, and knowing that at the moment it arises frees us from this tendency. 

In meditation too.  But meditation has the advantage of literally focussing the
awareness, and one can still account for the intention and let go of clinging
while still doing a practice.

  But
> what about moments of seeing, hearing etc., do we doubt those moments?
> Aren't these moments real? even if our sati and panna is not sharp enough to
> perceive them as just elements. We can in any case know the individual
> characteristics that are apparent even though clouded by the 'I' experiencing
it.

Meditation has a similar purpose, to simply see the nature of the mind as it
appears in the moment through arising thoughts, sensations, breath, arising
phenomena.  it is the same thing, only concentrated.

> Robert:
> Having a view that one way is right and the other is wrong does not aid this
> endeavor, in fact it prejudices it and makes it even more difficult to see
> what is really happening when *all* views are seen as merely views and the
> moment
> itself is allowed to deliver its true nature directly to consciousness without
> concepts in the way.
> 
> Sukin:
> 
> But even views arise and fall don't they? Its not like it is going to be there
> all the time, no?
> 
> Otherwise we will have to get rid of all akusala before we can develop panna.

yes, but we work like demons to keep our views in place. and we keep
reconstituting them and accumulating them in many moments.  so they stick around
even though they rise and fall again and again.  so maybe we should let go rather
than hold on to our views when they do arise.

> Robert:
> That's one way of looking at it.   A less complex way of looking at it would
> be to say that it is all 'merely taking place'.  .... one drawn from philosophy.
>    
> 
> Sukin:
> I was drawing you attention to the complexity and hence impossibility of 
> pinpointing any particular activity as being a direct cause for sati and panna
> to arise.

I see that as a way of dismissing practices that have been proven to be helpful
and effective over many centuries.  I don't think it's the most helpful view, to
see things as so complex that it is random cause and effect to us, but then to
step back in say but on the other hand we should study suttas and read the
commentaries.  that is contradictory.  we certainly think *those* activities will
yield results, despite the complexity of causes.  

> Robert:
> Well, I do know that focussing on an object causes more focussed attention.
> A simple fact.  Is that a good thing?  
> 
> Sukin:
> I think its better than watching TV and playing video games as I do.;-)
> 
> Robert:
> Jon gave a decent ..... Frankly, I think it's a grave error to think one 
> must or should stick to naturally discerning everyday realities while shying 
> away from a real practice in which mindfulness is highlighted, and by 
> which the work with everyday realities would be greatly enhanced.
> 
> Sukin:
> I would say that if practising Jhana was something you did as a daily thing
> before hearing about buddhism, then I would advise you to take tips and
> advice from the Tipitaka as to how to best do it. But if you have heard about
> jhana only after encountering buddhism and have the idea that jhana 
> somehow can be used as a tool for developing sati, then I think you are wrong.

everything that supports discernment and the develpment of understanding is
helpful.  I don't have a superstition about when or how i had to hear about it. 
anything that is clung to and controlled is non-helpful.  so in meditation one
must let go of controlling results, and one must do so in sutta study as well.  I
still don't see the difference.

> Robert:
> Can anyone else?  Yes or no, depending on whether they do or not.  Why be
> particularly prejudiced against a great meditation teacher?  ........ They are
> both 
> teaching about ways of applying the Dhamma, both legitimate ways of doing so.   
> But because of philosophical predispositions you can only accept the usefulness 
> of one and not the other.  I see this as a form of prejudice. 
> 
> Sukin:
> One is telling you about the way things are in general. About how development 
> takes place, the right and wrong paths etc., leaving the rest for conditions to
> arise
> when you may be able to recognize them. The other proposes a pattern of 
> behavior and agenda to follow and there are inevitably expectations connected
> to this.

well this is a good explanation. thanks for that.  on the other hand, I don't
believe that one follows the dhamma 'in general' and without expectations.  i
think all practices are in the same boat.

> Robert: 
> Have you examined it, and found that it is really true?  Or is
> it an idea you have developed from your affiliation with a school of thought?
> 
> Sukin:
> Thanks, I often think of this. I can never be perfectly sure, but nothing else
> is
> more appealing and makes more sense to me.

ah, so it is a matter of faith, predilection and instinct.  we are in the same
boat, just different crafts.

> Dead tired.
> Better rush to sleep now.
> I am not checking it so I expect some mistakes in this letter.
> 
> best wishes,
> Sukin.

i expect mine, which is written even later, is full of problems.  but I appreciate
the dialogue.

best,
robert



 
13463 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 5:18pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 
  Yes Kom, I totally agree ... that's why I - the reasonable, rational 
one - joined this wonderful group.  Though now I'm worried about what 
clothes you are all wearing..... :)  Never thought of 'counterfeit' 
admirable friends before. :)  No, can't be such a thing, can there?
 
metta,
Christine  

---  Kom Tukovinit  wrote:
> Dear Christine and Jon,
> 
> Sorry to butt in, but this is too entertaining to resist...
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jonothan Abbott 
> > > Sometimes I feel as if there are two me's - a
> > reasonable, rational
> > > one who drags a kicking and resisting one along. :-)
> > > Thanks for the common sense advice.
> >
> > Well, the 'kicking and resisting one' is also
> > very zany and entertaining,
> > and it helps keep a good balance here!
> >
> 
> Just while I am entertaining my zany friends, I need to
> remind myself, the entertaining friends would only lead to
> bad plane of existence, miserable plane of existence, and
> hell, or at the very least many more continued rounds of
> existence.  The more rational friends will lead me (if it's
> not the entertaining friends who dress up as the rational
> friends) to good plane of existence, happy plane of
> existence, and heaven, and if we are persistent, eventually
> the release.   Hmm....   Good friends should really be
> appreciated...
> 
> kom

 
13464 From: Sarah   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 5:19pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita

 
  Hi Larry,

Excuse me, just this once (well, no promises) interspersing my comments
amongst yours as I'm short of time:
.....
 --- <> wrote: > Hi Sarah,
> 
> Just a couple of questions in response to your reply. 
> 
> You wrote, "I don't think we can say that "akusala roots are what is
> most commonly taken for self"." What do you consider to be the basic
> manifestation of the particular sense of 'me' right now?
.....
Anything (concept or reality) taken to be ‘me’, ‘my’, ‘mine’ or a ‘thing’
right now at moments of (micha) ditthi in particular. If you ask what
objects are ‘most commonly taken for self’, surely they are the seeing,
visible object, hearing, sound and so on.
..... 
> You also wrote, "Likewise, vipaka (say, seeing or hearing), never
> becomes 'the attribute of the akusala citta" (if I understand you), but
> akusala cittas and cetasikas succeeding the vipaka may cling, be averse,
> be ignorant or have wrong view of that vipaka."
> 
> Do you regard your shirt as an attribute of who you are ('who you are'
> being an akusala citta according to me)? Isn't your shirt a vipaka?
.....
A shirt is a concept. It doesn’t exist. Vipaka refers to specific
realities. Am I misunderstanding you?
.....  
> Finally you wrote, "Instead of saying "the feeling is lobha, dosa or
> moha", I'd suggest there are different feelings (pleasant, unpleasant,
> neutral vedana) accompanying these other mental factors." What are
> lobha, dosa, and moha _in experience_ if not feelings?
.....
As we’re discussing a book on Abhidhamma, I think it’s helpful to be more
specific. We know there are 5 khandhas. Feelings (vedana) have their own
khandha (ch2), just as sanna (memory) does. Lobha, dosa and moha are
another 3 of the 52 cetasikas which are all included (less vedana and
sanna) in sankhara khandha. They are also the 3 unwholesome roots of all
akusala cittas. It’s confusing if we refer to them as feelings, even
though they are always accompanied by feelings. For example, lobha may be
accompanied by pleasant feeling or by indifferent feeling. Kusala cittas
may also be accompanied by pleasant feeling or indifferent feeling, so we
can see that we cannot tell the mental state just from the feeling.
.....
> hope this leaves you hope-less, Larry
.....
Ah yes, but I question whether this leaves you question-less;-)
I'd planned to look at your more recent questions too, but have to dash,
so hopefully someone else like Kom will.

Sarah
=====



 
13465 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 1:55pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A self ouside the khandas/simultaneity

 
  Hi, Sarah -

       No, not me.

With metta,
Howard


> To continue the quote you (Howard?) gave just a little further while we
> are being particular:
> .....
> >Mindfulness is meant 
> > to encompass the whole personality and starts with the body as primary 
> > and regular subject of meditation."
> > 
> > There are many ways of analysis of "body" leading to insight into 
> > anatta in all Buddhist traditions. 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13466 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 2:41pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: 'no control', Reply to Rob E.

 
  Hi, Robert (and Sukin) -

In a message dated 5/22/02 5:18:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> there is certainly a great moment-to-moment literature as to the continuous
> arising and changing of consciousness.  as to the individual citta theory, 
> that is
> a property of abhidhamma and not necessarily of Theravada in general.
> 
>   If not how can they see rise and fall of
> > individual cittas? It would surprise me greatly if you brought out some 
> proof.
> 
> to be able to see the specific content of each moment is a property of 
> advanced
> meditation as well as Buddhist philosophy.  as for 'individual cittas', we 
> will
> both have to wait to see if they really arise and fall as single elements 
> in a
> string of beads, or whether they break down to non-units in a continuous 
> changing
> thread.  so far the idea that there are specific bounded cittas that have 
> clear
> boundaries seems quite substantialist to me and is controversial within 
> Buddhism
> at large.  I don't take it as a requirement for being 'Buddhist'.
> 
> 
==========================
       Rob, there are *so* many points you raise in this long post, in 
addition to what I quote above, that I agree with. One major one is an 
addressing of an apparent tendency towards randomness, pointing it out and 
criticizing it. I concur that the recognition of "no control" due to 
"impersonality" can improperly lead to a sense of helplessness and 
randomness, and it is important for this pitfall to be pointed out.
       Also, I concur with your assessment, as expressed in what I quote 
above, of the string-of-beads interpretation of the dhamma theory not being a 
requirement for being 'Buddhist'. When it is said that conditioned dhammas 
are impermanent, this does not require discreteness and sharp boundaries. 
There may be no more to be said than simply statements of the sort "There was 
the experience of redness, but now there is not"; that is, impermanence 
merely means that conditions don't remain. On the other hand, since the 
Abhidhamma doesn't countenance any gaps between mindstates, perhaps the 
distinction between continuity and discreteness is a false distinction, with 
the reality being a middle-way one between these extremes. But we do have to 
be careful in not imposing our commonsense notions of boundaries on the 
details of experience. The boundaries between cittas, marked by either a 
change in arammana or the removal or addition of cetasikas, would best not be 
taken to be "realities", else we run into all the paradoxes of Zeno and 
Nagarjuna. At the alleged point at which a cetasika ceases, is it in effect, 
or not in effect, or both, or neither?! A whole mess of trouble is created in 
reifying boundaries. I think we need to stick with the more empirical view of 
"This was, and now it is not".

With metta,
Howard

With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13467 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 7:52pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Howard

--- Howard wrote: 
> Hi, Sarah and Robert -
…
>   Robert, you and I understand concepts to be thoughts/ideas, and not
> their alleged referents (which, in terms of direct experience, sometimes
> exist, but most often don't.) I believe that the firm of Sarah, Jon & 
> Associates, Ltd (Does that have a good ring to it, Sarah? ;-))
> systematically 
> conflate the two, or, if not that, then, at least, when using the term 
> 'concept', have the alleged referents in mind whereas we have the ideas
in
> mind. Thus, as I see it, there are two groups of people here, one group 
> talking about A, the other talking about B, with A and B different, but
we 
> are all acting as though we mean the same thing. Such conversations can
> be amazingly coherent despite the fact that they shouldn't be at all!
;-))
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

I thought this was a very useful attempt to summarise and isolate the
differences between us on this issue.

However, on what you've said here, there is no difference that I can see. 
I too understand concepts to be thoughts/ideas and not their alleged
referents.  When I use the term 'concept' I have only ideas in mind.

Any idea of an actual 'object' is just that, an idea.

Now, where does that leave us, I wonder!

Jon

PS  I speak of course for myself and not for the senior partner of the
firm ;-))



 
13468 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 8:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Howard

Again, I find myself in agreement with you here, on the substance of your
post (that is, putting aside your comments about the appropriateness of
the designation 'concept').

--- Howard wrote: 
> Hi, Sarah -
…
>        My point is merely that I don't think our differences are
> differences 
> in content, but only in terminology. Perhaps the translation of
> 'pa~n~natti' 
> as 'concept' is not the best translation. If 'pa~n~natti' denotes an
> alleged 
> concept-reference such as the tree on my back lawn that I am
> (conventionally) 
> looking at right now, then the translation of it as 'concept' is
> misleading 
> to those many people who think of concepts as mere ideas. The relatively
> concrete"tree on my back lawn", is, itself, a mental construct composed
of
> very recent memories (mainly visual) with the idea of tree (the concept
per
> se) superimposed. But it is not the same as the concept of 'tree on my
> back 
> lawn', because there is more "immediacy" to it, due to its having been 
> constructed from just-experienced conditions. At least that is how I 
> understand it. In no case do I understand it to be some external
> "thing". 
> Perhaps a translation of 'pa~n~natti' as 'percept' might come closer - I
> would find that very clear. But, in any case, the "reality" is an
> internal 
> one, with any alleged external "tree" being nonexistent, or, at least,
> in principle unknowable.

Yes, there is no alleged external "tree".  There are only ever namas and
rupas arising and falling away, and only those that arise with or are the
object of a present mind-moment have any 'reality'.  Anything else at that
moment can only be a concept (mental construct).

I also agree with you that pannatti does not denote 'an alleged
concept-reference' (as you put it).

Jon

That makes it twice in one day ;-)).


 
13469 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 4:30pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/22/02 7:53:58 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Jon writes:


> 
> Howard
> 
> --- Howard wrote: 
> > Hi, Sarah and Robert -
> …
> >   Robert, you and I understand concepts to be thoughts/ideas, and not
> > their alleged referents (which, in terms of direct experience, sometimes
> > exist, but most often don't.) I believe that the firm of Sarah, Jon & 
> > Associates, Ltd (Does that have a good ring to it, Sarah? ;-))
> > systematically 
> > conflate the two, or, if not that, then, at least, when using the term 
> > 'concept', have the alleged referents in mind whereas we have the ideas
> in
> > mind. Thus, as I see it, there are two groups of people here, one group 
> > talking about A, the other talking about B, with A and B different, but
> we 
> > are all acting as though we mean the same thing. Such conversations can
> > be amazingly coherent despite the fact that they shouldn't be at all!
> ;-))
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard
> 
> I thought this was a very useful attempt to summarise and isolate the
> differences between us on this issue.
---------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Thank you.
---------------------------------------------

> 
> However, on what you've said here, there is no difference that I can see. 
> I too understand concepts to be thoughts/ideas and not their alleged
> referents.  When I use the term 'concept' I have only ideas in mind.
> 
> Any idea of an actual 'object' is just that, an idea.
> 
> Now, where does that leave us, I wonder!
> 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       It leaves me mildly surprised, and it seems to leave us in complete 
agreement!
-----------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Jon
> 
> PS  I speak of course for myself and not for the senior partner of the
> firm ;-))
> 
> 
============================
       ;-))

With metta,
Howard       

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13470 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 8:33pm
Subject: Re: anicca

 
  Jon and all,

Is a mental construct permanent or impermanent?
Is it satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
Is it to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This 
is not mine.  This I am not.  This is not my self."?

Regards,
Victor

> 
> Yes, there is no alleged external "tree".  There are only ever 
namas and
> rupas arising and falling away, and only those that arise with or 
are the
> object of a present mind-moment have any 'reality'.  Anything else 
at that
> moment can only be a concept (mental construct).
> 
> I also agree with you that pannatti does not denote 'an alleged
> concept-reference' (as you put it).
> 
> Jon
> 
> That makes it twice in one day ;-)).

 
13471 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 4:36pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/22/02 8:17:05 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Jon writes:


> 
> Howard
> 
> Again, I find myself in agreement with you here, on the substance of your
> post (that is, putting aside your comments about the appropriateness of
> the designation 'concept').
> 
> --- Howard wrote: 
> > Hi, Sarah -
> …
> >        My point is merely that I don't think our differences are
> > differences 
> > in content, but only in terminology. Perhaps the translation of
> > 'pa~n~natti' 
> > as 'concept' is not the best translation. If 'pa~n~natti' denotes an
> > alleged 
> > concept-reference such as the tree on my back lawn that I am
> > (conventionally) 
> > looking at right now, then the translation of it as 'concept' is
> > misleading 
> > to those many people who think of concepts as mere ideas. The relatively
> > concrete"tree on my back lawn", is, itself, a mental construct composed
> of
> > very recent memories (mainly visual) with the idea of tree (the concept
> per
> > se) superimposed. But it is not the same as the concept of 'tree on my
> > back 
> > lawn', because there is more "immediacy" to it, due to its having been 
> > constructed from just-experienced conditions. At least that is how I 
> > understand it. In no case do I understand it to be some external
> > "thing". 
> > Perhaps a translation of 'pa~n~natti' as 'percept' might come closer - I
> > would find that very clear. But, in any case, the "reality" is an
> > internal 
> > one, with any alleged external "tree" being nonexistent, or, at least,
> > in principle unknowable.
> 
> Yes, there is no alleged external "tree".  There are only ever namas and
> rupas arising and falling away, and only those that arise with or are the
> object of a present mind-moment have any 'reality'.  Anything else at that
> moment can only be a concept (mental construct).
> 
> I also agree with you that pannatti does not denote 'an alleged
> concept-reference' (as you put it).
> 
> Jon
> 
> That makes it twice in one day ;-)).
> 
> 
=========================
Yes, indeed it does! And it "makes my day"! :-)

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13472 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 8:42pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
  TG,

Read the verse again

159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
self-control. 

See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html

Regards,
Victor


> Hi Victor
> 
> I'll ask you the same question.  If there is "control" who or what 
is doing 
> the controling?
> 
> TG
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In a message dated 5/21/2002 5:41:32 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
> Victor writes:
> 
> 
> > 159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would 
train 
> > others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, 
is 
> > self-control. 
> > 
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
>  
13473 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 8:49pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Howard

--- Howard wrote: 
> Hi, Robert -
…
>        We are in basic agreement on this Robert, but, actually, I think
> that 
> Abidhamma is as well. As I understand it, the Buddhist perspective, and
> most 
> explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a phenomenalist one which doesn't
> countenance objects existing independently of experience. 

Here I have to enter a possible disagreement, but one that I hope may also
turn out to be more a matter of terminology than of substance ;-).

> There is no hardness other than the experience of hardness,
> at least none that can be actually known. 

I see a difference between the 2 assertions in your preceding statement,
namely that--
(a) There is no hardness other than the hardness being experienced.
(b) There is no hardness that can be actually known other than the
hardness being experienced

The statement at (b) is clearly so, in terms of the teachings (to my
understanding).

The statement at (a) needs to be qualified, I think.  Hardness like any
other reality arises because of conditions.  In the case of the hardness
that we take as being part of an inanimate object (like a table, tree or
building), those conditions do not include the fact of their being the
object of someone's citta.  In other words, the hardness does not arise
dependent on there being someone there to experience it.

But speaking from the point of view of an individual, the statement at (a)
is correct, because there is no hardness in the world of the present
moment other than the hardness being experienced by the citta of that
moment.

>        But there is more to not being a self-existing entity or object
> with 
> "own being" than just not being a mind-independent "external object".

Just a reminder that I for one have never asserted dhammas to be
'self-existing entities' or 'objects with own-being' (nor has anyone else
on this list to my knowledge -- are you not tilting at windmills here,
Howard?! ;-) ).  And I certainly agree that there is no such thing as a
'mind-independent "external object"'

> Even 
> "internal phenomena" including such experiential phenomena as sights,
> sounds, 
> sensed odors and touches, thoughts, emotions, mind images etc, all
> direct 
> elements of experience, fail to be self-existing entities, being mere 
> dependent arisings, mere fleeting things-in-relation, each being nothing
> more 
> than its characteristics, and each arising in dependence on other
> similarly 
> empty, fleeting conditions.

No argument from me here either.  I wonder what it is we've been in
disagreement about all this while ;-)).

Jon



 
13474 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 9:00pm
Subject: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Howard and all,

I suggest examining how the Buddha used the word "self" as recorded 
in the discourses and comparing it with how one would use the 
word "self."

Regarding the statement "There is, in fact, no self at all right now" 
see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html

Regards,
Victor


> Howard:
>        I would say that there is. There is, in fact, no self at all 
right 
> now. Any discerning right now is a conditioned, samsaric 
discerning, and it 
> is no self. There is no self to be found, and, thus, no self to be 
> annihilated. There are just conditions and the knowing of 
conditions, with 
> that knowing being yet one more condition, and with the advent of 
nibbana, 
> there is just the absence of conditions, and there is no *separate* 
knowing 
> of that absence, for that would be a condition, and thus what there 
*would* 
> be is beyond all categories, beyond description. (Even to use the 
word 'be' 
> is to be in error. To say *anything* is to be in error. Only 
silence would be 
> without error. This whole post is in error!)
> --------------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > And to me that necessitates something still existing, even though 
it is 
> > neither
> > self nor form.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> =============================
> With metta,
> Howard

 
13475 From: Joyce Short   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 8:59pm
Subject: Control/Questions of King Milinda/Non-occurrence

 
  Hi Sarah,

Thanks for your kind response...(re: khandas/simultaneity).  I'm banging
away here doing review so be sure to shout when you see I've got something
wrong.  A question at the bottom of this if anyone has any thoughts (?)
Many thanks.

>>Mindfulness is meant
>> to encompass the whole personality and starts with the body as primary
>> and regular subject of meditation."

That is from Nyanatiloka.  And in practice we begin with the body in the
body,  (kayanupassana) although the four frames are not practiced one by one
as separate exercises.  See pgae 166-167 in Dictionary.
>>
>> There are many ways of analysis of "body" leading to insight into
>> anatta in all Buddhist traditions.
> .....
> Hmm, this is definitely not what I believe the Satipatthana Sutta to be
> saying. As we often discuss here (and Rob K and Sukin are discussing in
> other threads), as soon as their is an idea of ‘order’ or ‘rule’ or object
> as ‘primary’ or first, then it suggests an idea of selection, control
> which defeats the purpose of the previous quotes on anatta.

Yes, I was reflecting on the "control" thread. The flow of Paticcasamuppada
is conditioned by Ignorance (lack of mindfulness). "Through Ignorance are
conditioned the sankharas, i.e. the rebirth-producing volitions (cetana) or
"karma-formations"...."Through the karma-formations is conditioned
consciousness (in the present life) etc.  Pg 128....

So it would seem that the "control" aspect is mindfulness? A series of
events can be identified as "me" and "mine" (I) or there can be
dis-identified observing of a stream of events.  This is mastered by seeing
in the stream of events impersonality, impermanence and suffering. In the
context of anatta one avoids the suffering implicit in questions of "self"
("controller" and "other" things to be controlled) by using an alternative
strategy of dividing up experience: the Four Noble Truths of suffering, it's
cause, it's cessation and the path to it's cessation. So we recognize things
just as they are in the moment as they are directly experienced and then
perform the appropriate duty...

"Depending on the mind base there arises a series of mental activities such
as thinking, imagining, depending on the body. One notes these in each case
as they arise.  With improved concentration the mind remains fixed on the
object to which it is directed.  On every occasion of noting, one notices a
dual set of object (materiality) and mental state (mentality) which makes
note of the object, rising together. Here one sees impermanence, suffering
(the body is a collection of sufferings)

Then at every time of noting it is found that elements of materiality and
mentality occur according to their respective nature and conditioning and
not according to one's wishes. One therefore realizes that they are 'not
governable' they are not a person or living entity.  Insight into non-self.

Mind occurs singly, moment to moment in succession.  Those who do not know
this believe that one mind exists in the course of life or existence. They
do not know that new minds are arising at every moment. They think that the
seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thinking of the past and
present belong to one and the same mind, and that three or four acts of
seeing, hearing, knowing occur simultaneously.  These are wrong views...

Re:  "CONTROL"  -Those who do restrain the mind are sure to be released from
Mara's bonds'.  It is said that the mind should be contemplated (via
mindfulness/awareness) at each moment of its occurrence.  The mind can thus
be controlled by means of contemplation. On his successful controlling of
mind, the yogi will win freedom from Mara, the King of Death.  It is
important to note mind at each moment of its occurrence.  And as soon as it
is noted, the mind passes away".  From Mahasi Sayadaw - Satipatthana
Vipassana

"In the Questions of King Milinda it is said: His consciousness, while
carrying on the practice of bringing to mind (i.e. noticing), passes beyond
the continuous occurrence of phenomena and alights upon non-occurrence. One
who, having practiced in the correct manner, has alighted upon
non-occurrence, O king, is said to have realized Nibbana."

This from stages of insight Mahasi Sayadaw.  Any thoughts on
"non-occurrence"?

Metta,
Joyce

 
13476 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 5:09pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: anicca

 
  Hi, Victor -

In a message dated 5/22/02 8:34:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Victor writes:


> Jon and all,
> 
> Is a mental construct permanent or impermanent?
> 
-----------------------------------------------
Howard:
       It's impermanent, Victor. No one here is questioning that so far as I 
know.
----------------------------------------------

> Is it satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
> ----------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Unsatisfactory, Victor. 
----------------------------------------------

> Is it to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This 
> is not mine.  This I am not.  This is not my self."?
> 
------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Yep, that too. ;-)
------------------------------------------------

> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
==========================
       Victor, I doubt that anyone on this list thinks that any conditioned 
dhammas are anything other than impermanent and unsatisfactory, or that any 
dhammas are self/personal. When Sarah, for example, says that pa~n~natti are 
unchanging, I believe that is merely because pa~n~natti, understood as 
*referents* of mental constructs (concepts and percepts), are actually 
nonexistent and hence incapable of having *any* characteristics. A mental 
construct, itself, however - the mental phenomenon, is impermanent, ceasing 
whenever discernment of it ceases.
        Is your point in asking the rhetorical questions in your post to 
encourage us all to always directly notice the tilakkhana whenever we observe 
any dhamma, and to remind ourselves of them whenever we think of any dhamma? 
If that is so, then, because there is a difference between mere belief and 
direct seeing, such encouragement is a great idea!

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13477 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 5:26pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/22/02 8:50:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Jon writes:


> 
> Howard
> 
> --- Howard wrote: 
> > Hi, Robert -
> …
> >        We are in basic agreement on this Robert, but, actually, I think
> > that 
> > Abidhamma is as well. As I understand it, the Buddhist perspective, and
> > most 
> > explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a phenomenalist one which doesn't
> > countenance objects existing independently of experience. 
> 
> Here I have to enter a possible disagreement, but one that I hope may also
> turn out to be more a matter of terminology than of substance ;-).
> 
> > There is no hardness other than the experience of hardness,
> > at least none that can be actually known. 
> 
> I see a difference between the 2 assertions in your preceding statement,
> namely that--
> (a) There is no hardness other than the hardness being experienced.
> (b) There is no hardness that can be actually known other than the
> hardness being experienced
> 
---------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       There *is* a difference. Position (b) is the general phenomenalist 
one. Position (a) is the radical phenomenalist one which represents an 
admixture of phenomenalism with pragmatism - what is in principle unknowable 
is "as good as" nonexistent.
----------------------------------------------------

> 
> The statement at (b) is clearly so, in terms of the teachings (to my
> understanding).
> 
> The statement at (a) needs to be qualified, I think.  Hardness like any
> other reality arises because of conditions.  In the case of the hardness
> that we take as being part of an inanimate object (like a table, tree or
> building), those conditions do not include the fact of their being the
> object of someone's citta.  In other words, the hardness does not arise
> dependent on there being someone there to experience it.

-------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Ahh, but "the hardness that we take as being part of an inanimate 
object (like a table, tree or building)" is concept-only. There being no 
tables, trees, and buildings, there is no hardness possessed by them. It's 
actually the other way around: The occurrences of hardness directly 
experienced in mindstreams are compounded, along with other conditions, into 
concepts and percepts of such "things" as tables, trees, and buildings.
--------------------------------------------------------

> 
> But speaking from the point of view of an individual, the statement at (a)
> is correct, because there is no hardness in the world of the present
> moment other than the hardness being experienced by the citta of that
> moment.
> 
> >        But there is more to not being a self-existing entity or object
> > with 
> > "own being" than just not being a mind-independent "external object".
> 
> Just a reminder that I for one have never asserted dhammas to be
> 'self-existing entities' or 'objects with own-being' (nor has anyone else
> on this list to my knowledge -- are you not tilting at windmills here,
> Howard?! ;-) ).  And I certainly agree that there is no such thing as a
> 'mind-independent "external object"'
> 
> > Even 
> > "internal phenomena" including such experiential phenomena as sights,
> > sounds, 
> > sensed odors and touches, thoughts, emotions, mind images etc, all
> > direct 
> > elements of experience, fail to be self-existing entities, being mere 
> > dependent arisings, mere fleeting things-in-relation, each being nothing
> > more 
> > than its characteristics, and each arising in dependence on other
> > similarly 
> > empty, fleeting conditions.
> 
> No argument from me here either.  I wonder what it is we've been in
> disagreement about all this while ;-)).
> 
-----------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       It beats me, Jon!! ;-)) I think it may all heve been a combination of 
terminological differences and differences in emphasis.
----------------------------------------------------

> 
> Jon
> 
> 
===========================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13478 From: Sarah   
Date: Wed May 22, 2002 9:57pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi, Victor,

Glad to see you 'keeping an eye' on us all;-)

 --- yuzhonghao  wrote: > Hi Sarah,
> 
> Just a suggestion that you might find useful:
> 
> No matter what concept means to you, ask yourself these question: how 
> does a concept come to be?  What are its conditions?
.....
Following a tip from TG, may I ask you for your suggestions of responses
to these questions, preferably having defined concept first?

I promise to be asking myself at the same time and to share any
conclusions after I hear yours;-)

Sarah
=====



 
13479 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 0:53am
Subject: [dsg] Re: anicca

 
  Howard,

It is good that you see mental construct as such, and each and every 
aggregate is to be seen as such. 

"Seeing thus, the well-instructed disciple of the noble ones grows 
disenchanted with the body, disenchanted with feeling, disenchanted 
with perception, disenchanted with fabrications, disenchanted with 
consciousness. Disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate. Through 
dispassion, he is fully released. With full release, there is the 
knowledge, 'Fully released.' He discerns that 'Birth is depleted, the 
holy life fulfilled, the task done. There is nothing further for this 
world.'" 

See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-059.html

Regard,
Victor

> Hi, Victor -
> 
> In a message dated 5/22/02 8:34:13 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Victor writes:
> 
> 
> > Jon and all,
> > 
> > Is a mental construct permanent or impermanent?
> > 
> -----------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        It's impermanent, Victor. No one here is questioning that so 
far as I 
> know.
> ----------------------------------------------
> 
> > Is it satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
> > ----------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        Unsatisfactory, Victor. 
> ----------------------------------------------
> 
> > Is it to be seen as it actually is with right discernment 
thus: "This 
> > is not mine.  This I am not.  This is not my self."?
> > 
> ------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        Yep, that too. ;-)
> ------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> > 
> ==========================
>        Victor, I doubt that anyone on this list thinks that any 
conditioned 
> dhammas are anything other than impermanent and unsatisfactory, or 
that any 
> dhammas are self/personal. When Sarah, for example, says that 
pa~n~natti are 
> unchanging, I believe that is merely because pa~n~natti, understood 
as 
> *referents* of mental constructs (concepts and percepts), are 
actually 
> nonexistent and hence incapable of having *any* characteristics. A 
mental 
> construct, itself, however - the mental phenomenon, is impermanent, 
ceasing 
> whenever discernment of it ceases.
>         Is your point in asking the rhetorical questions in your 
post to 
> encourage us all to always directly notice the tilakkhana whenever 
we observe 
> any dhamma, and to remind ourselves of them whenever we think of 
any dhamma? 
> If that is so, then, because there is a difference between mere 
belief and 
> direct seeing, such encouragement is a great idea!
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

 
13480 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 5:36am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Sarah,

For the definition of the word "concept", check a dictionary.  An 
online resource can be found at http://www.webster.com/

Also see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-002.html

Regards,
Victor


---  Sarah  wrote:
> Hi, Victor,
> 
> Glad to see you 'keeping an eye' on us all;-)
> 
>  --- yuzhonghao  wrote: > Hi Sarah,
> > 
> > Just a suggestion that you might find useful:
> > 
> > No matter what concept means to you, ask yourself these question: 
how 
> > does a concept come to be?  What are its conditions?
> .....
> Following a tip from TG, may I ask you for your suggestions of 
responses
> to these questions, preferably having defined concept first?
> 
> I promise to be asking myself at the same time and to share any
> conclusions after I hear yours;-)
> 
> Sarah
> =====

 
13481 From: Num 
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 1:41am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 9 (2)

 
  Hi Larry and ADL group:

Larry: Long time no see! How are you doing?

I just looked up our ADL schedule. Wow, you really keep up with it. Big 
admiration from me, OK.  Now, I have already shipped my ADL book back, so I 
have to read ADL from your post.  

<< I'm not sure if it is really worthwhile asking these questions since we 
can't observe citta process, but, neverheless, I was wondering: >>
N: You always come up with good and difficult questions :-P. I try to share 
some input, which is pretty much a book-knowledge. I believe that theory is 
helpful esp. with practicing (mean being mindful of whatever reality here and 
now). I try to keep it short and (somewhat) simple, OK.

<< When do cetasika manifest in citta process? >>
N: Simultaneously (sahajata-dhamma).

<< What is the object of mind door adverting consciousness? It can't be 
another citta because then there would be two cittas at the same time. It 
can't be a rupa because it would have to be cognized through one of the 5 
doors. How do we cognize rupa, concept, and memory through the mind door? 
What is the nature of the object? >>

N: Let me put in both mind-door-adverting-consciousness 
(mano-dvaravajjana-citta, MDAC) and five-door-adverting-consciousness 
(panca-dvaravajjana-citta, PDAC). Both are first citta in its own process 
(vithi). Both are kiriya-jati in nature. One of the differences between the 
two is MDAC is accompanied by viriya-cetasika while PDAC does not. It's said 
that b/c PDAC is passive in taking in arammana while MDAC is seeking its 
arammana! MDAC sometimes receives arammana sequentially after 
sense-door-process, sometimes does not e.g. when having citta or cetasika as 
its arammana.

-Panca-dvaravajjana-citta can have only paramattha-arammana (pancarammana: 
color, sound, smell, taste and 3 tangible objects) as its arammana. The 
arammana of PDAC has to be in the present moment only (paccupanna-arammana).

-Mano-dvaravajjana-citta can have both pancarammana (as above) and 
dhammarammana (all cittas, all cetasikas, 5 sense rupas (sense door), 16 fine 
rupas, nibbana, and pannatti) as its arammana. So all kinds of arammana can 
be an object of MDAC.  

Arammana of MDAC can be past, present, future and even time independent 
(pannatti and nibbana).  The arammana that MDAC receives right after PDAC is 
just completely fallen away, so it's still called continuous-present object 
(paccupan-santati).  

Arammana of MDAC can be lokiya or lokuttara.  Another way to say this is 
arammana of MDAC can be: 1) Kamarammana (kamacittas & cetasikas, all rupas), 
2) Mahakatarammana (jhana cittas and cetasikas), 3) Pannatti-arammana, and 4) 
Lokuttararammana (8 lokuttara cittas, their accompanied cetasikas and 
nibbbana).  The present citta cannot have itself as its arammana but can have 
the past cittas or cetasikas, which have fallen away, as its arammana.

<< How is a cetasika cognized? as a qualifier of another citta? >>
N: The same arammana as citta, but with each of its own function. "How" is 
always hard to answer ;-(.   Cetasika is namadhamma. Namadhamma's nature is 
cognizing arammana.

<< In seeing process what is going on in receiving, investigating, and 
determining? Does memory play a part here? >>
N: I think so, by marking each citta's arammana. For seeing process, the same 
ruparammana is their object.


Best wishes.

Num

 
13482 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 6:22am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi sarah,
I'll jump in if that's okay.  

A concept to me is the same as an idea.  Would you generally agree?  An idea or
concept is a product of thought, rather than something that appears in the world,
so I would say it rises and falls with the rising and falling of the thought that
is 'about' it.  If I have a concept 'cat' and I think to myself: "My cat is very
pretty", that thought is full of concepts.  In fact there is very little in it
that is not a concept.  One thing that is not a concept is the experience of
thinking the thought itself, but everything *in* the thought is concept.  "My" is
a concept; "cat" is a concept; "Is" is a concept; "very" is a concept, based on
comparison; and "pretty" is a concept, a conceptual evaluation.  If I think of the
image of a telephone, I see an image that doesn't actually exist in life.  The
experience of thinking of the telephone is actual.  I am *actually* seeing the
image in the moment.  But the image itself is a concept, since no 'telephone'
exists in actual experience.  The image of the telephone is also a memory, not an
actual experience in the moment.  The experience of remembering is an actual
experience, but the object of memory, the telephone, is a concept.

So to me, the experience of thinking of a concept is actual.  the concept itself
really is a concept.  The image of the telephone is there, the sentence "My cat is
very pretty" is really said to myself, so the experience of these things being
thought must be a nama.  But the things within the thought, the content, is purely
concept.

My last thought on this is maybe a little more controvesial, I'm not sure:

It thus makes sense to call these images or sentences or whatever they are
'conceptual objects'.  They are not real in the world, but they are actually
created as concepts in a moment of thinking, as a part of a thought only.  The
word 'cat' will never represent a reality, it only exists in the world of invented
meanings.  It is no more real than 'hobgoblin'.  Yet both concepts are created as
'ideas' by language and exist as 'ideas'.  To say they do not really arise as
objects is true.  To say that a thought takes them as its object is also true.

Do you agree with this?  Does it make sense?  Am I missing something?

Best,
Robert ep.

======

--- Sarah  wrote:
> Hi, Victor,
> 
> Glad to see you 'keeping an eye' on us all;-)
> 
>  --- yuzhonghao  wrote: > Hi Sarah,
> > 
> > Just a suggestion that you might find useful:
> > 
> > No matter what concept means to you, ask yourself these question: how 
> > does a concept come to be?  What are its conditions?
> .....
> Following a tip from TG, may I ask you for your suggestions of responses
> to these questions, preferably having defined concept first?
> 
> I promise to be asking myself at the same time and to share any
> conclusions after I hear yours;-)
> 
> Sarah
> =====



 
13483 From: <> 
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 7:31am
Subject: ADL ch. 9 (3)

 
  http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 9 (3)

After the cittas of the sense-door process have fallen away the object
can be experienced through the mind-door. The mano-dvaravajjana-citta is
the first citta of the mind-door process which experiences that object
which has fallen away already. In the sense-door process the panca-dvara
vajjana-citta adverts to the object which has not fallen away yet. For
example, it adverts to visible object or sound which is still impinging
on the appropriate sense-door. The mano-dvaravajjana-citta which arises
in the mind-door process however, can experience an object which has
fallen away already. After the mano-dvaravajjana-citta has adverted to
the object it is succeeded by either kusala cittas or akusala cittas (in
the case of non-arahats), which experience that same object. The
mano-dvaravajjana-citta itself is neither akusala citta nor kusala
citta; it is kiriyacitta. 

Although the votthapana-citta in the sense-door process and the
mano-dvaravajjana-citta in the mind-door process are the same type of
citta, an ahetuka kiriyacitta, their functions are different. In the
sense-door process this citta performs the function of votthapana
(determining the object) and in the mind-door process it performs the
function of avajjana (adverting). Thus, whenever we deal with the
mano-dvaravajjana-citta we have to know what function it is performing. 

When sound impinges on the earsense it can be experienced by cittas
arising in the ear-door process and after that it is experienced by
cittas arising in a mind-door process. Processes of cittas which
experience an object through one of the five senses and through the
mind-door succeed one another time and again. 

How can there be akusala cittas or kusala cittas in the process of
cittas which experience an object through one of the sense-doors, when
one does not even know yet what it is that is experienced? There can be
akusala cittas or kusala cittas before one knows what it is. One can
compare this situation with the case of a child who likes a brightly
coloured object such as a balloon before it knows that the object is a
balloon. We can have like or dislike of an object before we know what it
is. 

Another ahetuka kiriyacitta is the hasituppada-citta
(smile-producing-consciousness). Only arahats have this kind of citta.
Laughing and smiling can be motivated by different kinds of cittas. When
people who are 
not arahats smile, it is usually motivated by lobha or by kusala citta.
Arahats do not have any defilements; they do not have akusala cittas.
Neither do they have kusala cittas; they do not accumulate any more
kamma. Instead of kusala cittas they have kiriyacittas, accompanied by
sobhana (beautiful) roots, sobhana kiriyacittas. Arahats do not laugh
aloud, because they have no accumulations for laughing; they only smile.
When they smile the smiling may be motivated by sobhana kiriyacitta or
by the ahetuka kiriyacitta which is called hasituppada-citta. 

Thus, of the eighteen ahetuka cittas, fifteen are vipakacittas and three
are kiriyacittas. The ahetuka kiriyacittas are: 

1. Panca-dvaravajjana-citta (five-door-adverting consciousness) 

2. Mano-dvaravajjana-citta (mind-door-adverting- consciousness), which
performs the function of adverting to the object through the mind-door
when it arises in the mind-door process and which performs the function
of votthapana (determining the object) when it arises in the sense-door
process 

3. Hasituppada-citta (smile-producing-consciousness) 

Those who are not arahats can have only seventeen of the eighteen
ahetuka cittas. These seventeen types of ahetuka citta arise in our
daily life. When an object impinges on one of the five senses,
panca-dvaravajjana- citta (five-door-adverting consciousness) turns
towards the object through that sense-door. This citta is followed by
panca-vinnana which experiences the object, by sampaticchana-citta which
receives it, by santirana-citta which investigates it and by
votthapana-citta which determines the object and then by akusala cittas
or kusala cittas. When the cittas of the sense-door process have fallen
away the object is experienced through the mind-door. The
mano-dvaravajjana-citta adverts to the object through the mind-door and
is then followed by akusala cittas or kusala cittas. There is 'unwise
attention' (ayoniso manasikara) to the object which is experienced if
akusala cittas arise, and there is 'wise attention' (yoniso manasikara)
to the object if kusala cittas arise. For example, when we see insects
there may be dosa-mula-cittas (cittas rooted in aversion). Thus, there
is ayoniso manasikara (unwise attention). The dosa may be so strong that
one wants to kill the insects; then there is akusala kamma. If one
realizes that killing is akusala and one abstains from killing, there
are kusala cittas and thus there is yoniso manasikara (wise attention).
If one studies Dhamma and develops vipassana (insight) it is a condition
for yoniso manasikara. When we are mindful of the nama or rupa which
appears through one of the six doors, there is yoniso manasikara at that
moment.

 
 
13484 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 10:20am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  --- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 5/22/02 8:50:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Jon writes:
> 
> > Howard
> > 
> > --- Howard wrote: 
> > > Hi, Robert -
> > â€|
> > >        We are in basic agreement on this Robert, but, actually, I think
> > > that 
> > > Abidhamma is as well. As I understand it, the Buddhist perspective, and
> > > most explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a phenomenalist one which doesn't
> > > countenance objects existing independently of experience. 
> > 
> > Here I have to enter a possible disagreement, but one that I hope may also
> > turn out to be more a matter of terminology than of substance ;-).
> > 
> > > There is no hardness other than the experience of hardness,
> > > at least none that can be actually known. 
> > 
> > I see a difference between the 2 assertions in your preceding statement,
> > namely that--
> > (a) There is no hardness other than the hardness being experienced.
> > (b) There is no hardness that can be actually known other than the
> > hardness being experienced
> > 
> ---------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        There *is* a difference. Position (b) is the general phenomenalist 
> one. Position (a) is the radical phenomenalist one which represents an 
> admixture of phenomenalism with pragmatism - what is in principle unknowable 
> is "as good as" nonexistent.
> ----------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > The statement at (b) is clearly so, in terms of the teachings (to my
> > understanding).
> > 
> > The statement at (a) needs to be qualified, I think.  Hardness like any
> > other reality arises because of conditions.  In the case of the hardness
> > that we take as being part of an inanimate object (like a table, tree or
> > building), those conditions do not include the fact of their being the
> > object of someone's citta.  In other words, the hardness does not arise
> > dependent on there being someone there to experience it.
> 
> -------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        Ahh, but "the hardness that we take as being part of an inanimate 
> object (like a table, tree or building)" is concept-only. There being no 
> tables, trees, and buildings, there is no hardness possessed by them. 

Dear Howard,
I wonder if it's really correct to say that there are "no tables, trees an
buildings'.  Just as Buddha was unwilling to say bluntly that 'there is no self',
I doubt he would assert the nonexistence of tables either.  Rather, I think he
might say that the idea that we experience a 'table' when we experience 'hardness'
is a concept.  And we can never know 'table' since the concept 'table' is a
collection of experiences that each add up to only one or another direct quality. 
None of these ever adds up to 'table' in actual experience, only as a deductive
conclusion.  Experientially speaking, and in the service of knowing the reality of
the present moment, 'table' does not exist except as a concept.  But this does not
mean that 'table' as some sort of cosmic reality outside of experience either does
or doesn't exist.  It just means what Jon said when he cited version (b) and said
that version (a) that no other object existed except for the one experienced was
much more radical, perhaps more radical than necessary.  

So is there a table somewhere out in the world beyond the senses of humans?  Not
as far as we experience directly.  Still, our deductive reasoning by which we
'conceptualize' table and deal with the 'table' that we coordinate between our
momentary experiences and concepts works pretty well to allow us to eat, drink and
be merry, or whatever else we do on the 'table'.  

So it may be that there *is* something resembling a 'table', but that we just
can't experience it directly all at once, and thus shouldn't confuse concept with
reality.  

What happens if we neither confirm nor deny the existence of 'table' as an object
out there, but really strive to distinguish between what we actually experience
and what we *think* [conceptualize] that we experience?  I think it makes for much
more clear and skillful action, and more importantly, allows us to begin to
discern the actuality of the mind and senses which leads us towards the necessary
sati and panna needed for awakening.

And in the meantime I think it's also skillful to be mindful of how we use
concepts in order to 'navigate' in samsara.  It's not as if the need to use a fork
goes away because one develops a bit of discernment.  So how do we use concepts in
the moment to coordinate the idea of 'fork' with the getting of the food to the
mouth?  Pretty interesting.  

Perhaps an arahant can navigate eating a meal using only the immediate sensations
of hardness/coolness/roughness/sourness/under-the-tongueness/swallowing/etc.,
without forming a concept of 'food' or 'fork', which would explain the Buddhist
meditation on food in which it takes five minutes to take and swallow one bite.  

Anyway, I wonder what you think about this?  Distinguishing between concept and
nama/rupa is important, but concepts also seem necessary. 

Best,
Robert



 
13485 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 10:21am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  --- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 5/22/02 8:50:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Jon writes:
> 
> > Howard
> > 
> > --- Howard wrote: 
> > > Hi, Robert -
> > â€|
> > >        We are in basic agreement on this Robert, but, actually, I think
> > > that 
> > > Abidhamma is as well. As I understand it, the Buddhist perspective, and
> > > most explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a phenomenalist one which doesn't
> > > countenance objects existing independently of experience. 
> > 
> > Here I have to enter a possible disagreement, but one that I hope may also
> > turn out to be more a matter of terminology than of substance ;-).
> > 
> > > There is no hardness other than the experience of hardness,
> > > at least none that can be actually known. 
> > 
> > I see a difference between the 2 assertions in your preceding statement,
> > namely that--
> > (a) There is no hardness other than the hardness being experienced.
> > (b) There is no hardness that can be actually known other than the
> > hardness being experienced
> > 
> ---------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        There *is* a difference. Position (b) is the general phenomenalist 
> one. Position (a) is the radical phenomenalist one which represents an 
> admixture of phenomenalism with pragmatism - what is in principle unknowable 
> is "as good as" nonexistent.
> ----------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > The statement at (b) is clearly so, in terms of the teachings (to my
> > understanding).
> > 
> > The statement at (a) needs to be qualified, I think.  Hardness like any
> > other reality arises because of conditions.  In the case of the hardness
> > that we take as being part of an inanimate object (like a table, tree or
> > building), those conditions do not include the fact of their being the
> > object of someone's citta.  In other words, the hardness does not arise
> > dependent on there being someone there to experience it.
> 
> -------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        Ahh, but "the hardness that we take as being part of an inanimate 
> object (like a table, tree or building)" is concept-only. There being no 
> tables, trees, and buildings, there is no hardness possessed by them. 

Dear Howard,
I wonder if it's really correct to say that there are "no tables, trees an
buildings'.  Just as Buddha was unwilling to say bluntly that 'there is no self',
I doubt he would assert the nonexistence of tables either.  Rather, I think he
might say that the idea that we experience a 'table' when we experience 'hardness'
is a concept.  And we can never know 'table' since the concept 'table' is a
collection of experiences that each add up to only one or another direct quality. 
None of these ever adds up to 'table' in actual experience, only as a deductive
conclusion.  Experientially speaking, and in the service of knowing the reality of
the present moment, 'table' does not exist except as a concept.  But this does not
mean that 'table' as some sort of cosmic reality outside of experience either does
or doesn't exist.  It just means what Jon said when he cited version (b) and said
that version (a) that no other object existed except for the one experienced was
much more radical, perhaps more radical than necessary.  

So is there a table somewhere out in the world beyond the senses of humans?  Not
as far as we experience directly.  Still, our deductive reasoning by which we
'conceptualize' table and deal with the 'table' that we coordinate between our
momentary experiences and concepts works pretty well to allow us to eat, drink and
be merry, or whatever else we do on the 'table'.  

So it may be that there *is* something resembling a 'table', but that we just
can't experience it directly all at once, and thus shouldn't confuse concept with
reality.  

What happens if we neither confirm nor deny the existence of 'table' as an object
out there, but really strive to distinguish between what we actually experience
and what we *think* [conceptualize] that we experience?  I think it makes for much
more clear and skillful action, and more importantly, allows us to begin to
discern the actuality of the mind and senses which leads us towards the necessary
sati and panna needed for awakening.

And in the meantime I think it's also skillful to be mindful of how we use
concepts in order to 'navigate' in samsara.  It's not as if the need to use a fork
goes away because one develops a bit of discernment.  So how do we use concepts in
the moment to coordinate the idea of 'fork' with the getting of the food to the
mouth?  Pretty interesting.  

Perhaps an arahant can navigate eating a meal using only the immediate sensations
of hardness/coolness/roughness/sourness/under-the-tongueness/swallowing/etc.,
without forming a concept of 'food' or 'fork', which would explain the Buddhist
meditation on food in which it takes five minutes to take and swallow one bite.  

Anyway, I wonder what you think about this?  Distinguishing between concept and
nama/rupa is important, but concepts also seem necessary. 

Best,
Robert


 
13486 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 11:47am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi Rob Ep,

 --- Robert Epstein  wrote: > Hi sarah,
> I'll jump in if that's okay. 

Anytime. No formalities her. What you say below sounds 'spot on' to me
too, including the 'controversial' part;-)) So much agreement these days.
You'd better keep it to refer to when you forget what you agreed to;-).

.....and so, the ti-lakkhana of anicca, dukkha and anatta refer to the
paramattha dhammas included in the 5khandhas that *exist*, are conditioned
and can be known -- in other words what the Teachings are explaining in
all 3 parts of the Tipitaka. That is why when we talk about  impermanence
(anicca), for example, it is referring to the characteristic of seeing,
visible object or thinking, but not to 'my pretty cat' or any other
concept.

Many thanks, for your carefully considered post. 

Appreciate (as Num would say;-))

Sarah
=======

 
> A concept to me is the same as an idea.  Would you generally agree?  An
> idea or
> concept is a product of thought, rather than something that appears in
> the world,
> so I would say it rises and falls with the rising and falling of the
> thought that
> is 'about' it.  If I have a concept 'cat' and I think to myself: "My cat
> is very
> pretty", that thought is full of concepts.  In fact there is very little
> in it
> that is not a concept.  One thing that is not a concept is the
> experience of
> thinking the thought itself, but everything *in* the thought is concept.
>  "My" is
> a concept; "cat" is a concept; "Is" is a concept; "very" is a concept,
> based on
> comparison; and "pretty" is a concept, a conceptual evaluation.  If I
> think of the
> image of a telephone, I see an image that doesn't actually exist in
> life.  The
> experience of thinking of the telephone is actual.  I am *actually*
> seeing the
> image in the moment.  But the image itself is a concept, since no
> 'telephone'
> exists in actual experience.  The image of the telephone is also a
> memory, not an
> actual experience in the moment.  The experience of remembering is an
> actual
> experience, but the object of memory, the telephone, is a concept.
> 
> So to me, the experience of thinking of a concept is actual.  the
> concept itself
> really is a concept.  The image of the telephone is there, the sentence
> "My cat is
> very pretty" is really said to myself, so the experience of these things
> being
> thought must be a nama.  But the things within the thought, the content,
> is purely
> concept.
> 
> My last thought on this is maybe a little more controvesial, I'm not
> sure:
> 
> It thus makes sense to call these images or sentences or whatever they
> are
> 'conceptual objects'.  They are not real in the world, but they are
> actually
> created as concepts in a moment of thinking, as a part of a thought
> only.  The
> word 'cat' will never represent a reality, it only exists in the world
> of invented
> meanings.  It is no more real than 'hobgoblin'.  Yet both concepts are
> created as
> 'ideas' by language and exist as 'ideas'.  To say they do not really
> arise as
> objects is true.  To say that a thought takes them as its object is also
> true.
> 
> Do you agree with this?  Does it make sense?  Am I missing something?



 
13487 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 0:02pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Victor,

 --- yuzhonghao  wrote: > Sarah,
> 
> For the definition of the word "concept", check a dictionary.  An 
> online resource can be found at http://www.webster.com/

Thankyou. When I use 'concept', I am referring to pa~n~natti as elaborated
in several posts under concepts at:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts

I believe these details of what is included in pannatti in Buddhist texts
to be far broader and more explicit than the definition of concepts in the
dictionary.
 
> Also see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-002.html

Is paticca samuppada (as discussed in this link) talking about concepts or
realities? What is the significance?

Sarah
======


 
13488 From: manji   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 0:32pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Perhaps the difference between concepts and reality falls in with sanna.
When sanna marks, it marks objects of the mind door or the sense doors.
When sanna recollects, the recollection is concept.

This recollection/concept seems to arise so fast that there is an
incomplete experience of the object which is the proximate cause of the
recollection. This seems to present quite a bit of trouble in the fact
that there can be taking this concept for reality, where then this
concept becomes a full object of the mind door. This process (taking
concepts for reality) obstructs concentration and in depth penetration
of objects, however...

With concentration comes sanna again, except this time it is marking. So
the clever monks sits thinking concepts are taken care of, but all the
while the there is marking, marking. This marking, through
concentration, becomes so powerful that the recollection then may arise
seeming to be just as real as reality. This process can serve as a
testament to why it is so easy to take concepts for reality, or for that
matter, self. This process is evident in daily life all the way through
all the Jhanas... and then some.

This stood out from /Cetasikas/, pg.39: 
======================================= 
We read in the Middle Length Sayings (I, no. l8, Discourse of the Honey
Ball) about the origin of perceptions and obsessions and their ending.
Mahå-
Kaccana gave to the monks an explanation about what the Buddha had said
in brief: 
	
Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of eye and visual
object; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement (phassa);
feelings are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one
perceives; what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons about
obsesses one; what obsesses one is the origin of the number of
perceptions and obsessions which assail a man in regard to visual object
cognisable by the eye, past, future, present…
=======================================

and this:

The footnote of /Cetasikas/, pg 35:

1 The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 3-5) explains the difference between saññå,
citta and paññå by way of a simile. Saññå is like the mere perception of
a coin by a child who does not know its value. Citta is like the
villager who knows its value. Paññå is like the money-changer who
penetrates its true characteristics.

.........................

this sanna,
this marking and recollection,
this is dukkha...

and this dukkha? Is it a mere recollection from the conditioning of
teaching? Or is there real dukkha? Oh yes friend, this sanna, there is
dukkha. There is cause... 

time to go,
bye bye...

Buddham saranam gacchami,
Dhammam saranam gacchami,
Sangham saranam gacchami.

-manji-

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Robert Epstein 
> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 10:22 PM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.


 
13489 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 0:55pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Thanks, Sarah.

one or two comments below:

--- Sarah  wrote:
> Hi Rob Ep,
> 
>  --- Robert Epstein  wrote: > Hi sarah,
> > I'll jump in if that's okay. 
> 
> Anytime. No formalities her. What you say below sounds 'spot on' to me
> too, including the 'controversial' part;-)) So much agreement these days.
> You'd better keep it to refer to when you forget what you agreed to;-).

ha ha, that's very true!

> .....and so, the ti-lakkhana of anicca, dukkha and anatta refer to the
> paramattha dhammas included in the 5khandhas that *exist*, are conditioned
> and can be known -- in other words what the Teachings are explaining in
> all 3 parts of the Tipitaka. That is why when we talk about  impermanence
> (anicca), for example, it is referring to the characteristic of seeing,
> visible object or thinking, but not to 'my pretty cat' or any other
> concept.

is that because that which isn't actual can not be either permanent or
impermanent?

> Many thanks, for your carefully considered post. 

: ) 

> Appreciate (as Num would say;-))
> 
> Sarah
> =======

: )

robert


 
13490 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 1:06pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Control/Questions of King Milinda/Non-occurrence

 
  HI Joyce,

LOL, that was a fun reappearance after a very long holiday here;-) I had
worked out you were from Canada, English native speaker, well-read in the
texts and following the posts carefully. Thanks for not keeping us in
suspense any longer.
.....
 --- Joyce Short  wrote: > Hi Sarah,
> 
> Thanks for your kind response...(re: khandas/simultaneity).  I'm banging
> away here doing review so be sure to shout when you see I've got
> something
> wrong.  
.....
Likewise.... and we’re all free to interpret texts as we like (Victor,
that’s VERY conventional language;-)). Thanks for the dict page refs too.
.....
> >>Mindfulness is meant
> >> to encompass the whole personality and starts with the body as
> primary
> >> and regular subject of meditation."
> 
> That is from Nyanatiloka.  And in practice we begin with the body in the
> body,  (kayanupassana) although the four frames are not practiced one by
> one
> as separate exercises.  See pgae 166-167 in Dictionary.
.....
Oh, the pages are different in the copy of the Dict (new one which
replaced the old moth-eaten one) in front of me.

I understand that kayanupassana is taught as the first foundation of
mindfulness in the Satipatthana Sutta.  I don’t however understand there
to be (or can be) any rule about order of objects for sati to be aware of.
However, don’t we tend so very easily to take “body’ for self. Don’t we
have the idea of seeing and hearing people and things all day long? 

From the comm. and sub comm to the Satipatthana Sutta, we read:
*****
>>In this body,... there is seen no body, man, woman or anything else.
Beings engender wrong belief, in many ways,.... Therefore the men of old
said: 

What he sees that is not (properly) seen;
What is seen, that he does not (properly) see;
Not seeing (properly) he is shackled clean;
And he, the shackled fool, cannot get free. 

What he sees = What man or woman he sees. Why, is there no seeing of man
or a woman with the eye? There is. "I see a woman," "I see a man." --
these statements refer to what he sees by way of ordinary perception. That
perception, owing to wrong comprehension, does not get at the sense-basis
[rupayatana] in the highest sense, philosophically, through the falsely
determined condition of material form [viparita gahavasena miccha
parikappita rupatta]. 

Or the meaning is: the absence of perception which is called the seeing of
primary and derived materiality, beginning with things such as the hair of
the head, owing to non-cognizability of the collective nature of an object
like a man or woman by eye-consciousness [kesadibhutupadaya
samuhasankhatam ditthi na hoti acakkhuviññana viññeyyatta]. 

What is seen that he does not properly see = He does not see, according to
reality by the eye of wisdom, the sense-basis which exists, the collection
of primary and derived materiality beginning with hair of the head and the
like [yam rupayatanam kesadibhutupadaya samuhasankhatam dittham tam
pañña-cakkhuna bhutato na passati]. 

Not seeing properly he is shackled = Not seeing this body as it actually
is, with the eye of wisdom, he thinks: "This is mine, this am I, this is
my self," and is bound with the fetter of defilement [imam attabhavam
yathabhutam paññacakkhuna apassanto etam mama esohamasmi eso me attati
kilesa bandhanena bajjhati].>>
<end quote>
*****
It seems to me that when there is an idea of selection or order, it
suggests an idea of self that can select or order or at least a desire for
a particular object. So, in summary, while I really like and appreciate
most of what Nyantiloka has written and the dictionary is a wonderful
resource as we all find, some comments such as those which suggest ‘we
begin with the body in the body’ are misleading to me. I’ve just found on
p196 something similar. 
..... 
> Yes, I was reflecting on the "control" thread. The flow of
> Paticcasamuppada
> is conditioned by Ignorance (lack of mindfulness). "Through Ignorance
> are
> conditioned the sankharas, i.e. the rebirth-producing volitions (cetana)
> or
> "karma-formations"...."Through the karma-formations is conditioned
> consciousness (in the present life) etc.  Pg 128....
> 
> So it would seem that the "control" aspect is mindfulness? 
.....
You’ve introduced all the ‘sensitive’ topics into your post, Joyce, which
makes me a little hesitant to respond in case I give any offence,
unknowingly;-(

However, as you ask, I’d say that the ‘“control” aspect’ is an illusion.
In the ‘flow’ above, we see the conditioned nature of realities which are
anatta. While there is ignorance, they are not known as they really are.
.....
>A series of
> events can be identified as "me" and "mine" (I) or there can be
> dis-identified observing of a stream of events.  This is mastered by
> seeing
> in the stream of events impersonality, impermanence and suffering. In
> the
> context of anatta one avoids the suffering implicit in questions of
> "self"
> ("controller" and "other" things to be controlled) by using an
> alternative
> strategy of dividing up experience: the Four Noble Truths of suffering,
> it's
> cause, it's cessation and the path to it's cessation. So we recognize
> things
> just as they are in the moment as they are directly experienced and then
> perform the appropriate duty...
.....
Thankyou for these comments and the Mahasi quote which followed (snipped
just for now). Let me suggest only that it is the duty of sati to be
aware, panna to know and so on. There is no strategy as such that is
necessary or duty to be performed by anything or anyone other than the
various mental factors, which will perform these duties accordingly by
conditions. In order for the very highly developed wisdom which
understands the 4NT to begin to develop, it’s helpful to know more about
all the various mental and physical phenomena which can be directly
understood at any time, in any order, if there are the appropriate
conditions.

I remember from before that you have studied and considered carefully,
Joyce, so I don’t wish to persuade or sound dogmatic, but am happy to
discuss further.
.....
> 
> "In the Questions of King Milinda it is said: His consciousness, while
> carrying on the practice of bringing to mind (i.e. noticing), passes
> beyond
> the continuous occurrence of phenomena and alights upon non-occurrence.
> One
> who, having practiced in the correct manner, has alighted upon
> non-occurrence, O king, is said to have realized Nibbana."
> 
> This from stages of insight Mahasi Sayadaw.  Any thoughts on
> "non-occurrence"?
.....
 It sounds (without reading the full passage) like it is saying that by
understanding conditioned phenomena, the wisdom (i.e. lokuttara cittas)
realize the unconditioned reality, i.e. nibbana. 

Just my guess,

Thanks for some excellent points and I hope I haven’t trodden on too many
toes....Pls know that any questioning of what I or anyone else says will
always be appreciated by many others.

Sarah
======



 
13491 From: Howard 
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 9:09am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 5/22/02 10:23:00 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> 
> --- Howard wrote:
> > Hi, Jon -
> > 
> > In a message dated 5/22/02 8:50:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> > Jon writes:
> > 
> > > Howard
> > > 
> > > --- Howard wrote: 
> > > > Hi, Robert -
> > > â€|
> > > >        We are in basic agreement on this Robert, but, actually, I 
> think
> > > > that 
> > > > Abidhamma is as well. As I understand it, the Buddhist perspective, 
> and
> > > > most explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a phenomenalist one which 
> doesn't
> > > > countenance objects existing independently of experience. 
> > > 
> > > Here I have to enter a possible disagreement, but one that I hope may 
> also
> > > turn out to be more a matter of terminology than of substance ;-).
> > > 
> > > > There is no hardness other than the experience of hardness,
> > > > at least none that can be actually known. 
> > > 
> > > I see a difference between the 2 assertions in your preceding 
> statement,
> > > namely that--
> > > (a) There is no hardness other than the hardness being experienced.
> > > (b) There is no hardness that can be actually known other than the
> > > hardness being experienced
> > > 
> > ---------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> >        There *is* a difference. Position (b) is the general phenomenalist 
> 
> > one. Position (a) is the radical phenomenalist one which represents an 
> > admixture of phenomenalism with pragmatism - what is in principle 
> unknowable 
> > is "as good as" nonexistent.
> > ----------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > > 
> > > The statement at (b) is clearly so, in terms of the teachings (to my
> > > understanding).
> > > 
> > > The statement at (a) needs to be qualified, I think.  Hardness like any
> > > other reality arises because of conditions.  In the case of the 
> hardness
> > > that we take as being part of an inanimate object (like a table, tree 
> or
> > > building), those conditions do not include the fact of their being the
> > > object of someone's citta.  In other words, the hardness does not arise
> > > dependent on there being someone there to experience it.
> > 
> > -------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> >        Ahh, but "the hardness that we take as being part of an inanimate 
> > object (like a table, tree or building)" is concept-only. There being no 
> > tables, trees, and buildings, there is no hardness possessed by them. 
> 
> Dear Howard,
> I wonder if it's really correct to say that there are "no tables, trees an
> buildings'.
> 
---------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       From my perspective, it is conventionally false but ultimately (and 
pragmatically) true. That's my perspective - perspective (a), but I'm not 
suggesting it be anyone else's.
----------------------------------------------------
   Just as Buddha was unwilling to say bluntly that 'there is no self',> 
> I doubt he would assert the nonexistence of tables either.  Rather, I think 
> he
> might say that the idea that we experience a 'table' when we experience 
> 'hardness'
> is a concept.  And we can never know 'table' since the concept 'table' is a
> collection of experiences that each add up to only one or another direct 
> quality. 
> None of these ever adds up to 'table' in actual experience, only as a 
> deductive
> conclusion.  Experientially speaking, and in the service of knowing the 
> reality of
> the present moment, 'table' does not exist except as a concept.  But this 
> does not
> mean that 'table' as some sort of cosmic reality outside of experience 
> either does
> or doesn't exist.  It just means what Jon said when he cited version (b) 
> and said
> that version (a) that no other object existed except for the one 
> experienced was
> much more radical, perhaps more radical than necessary.  
> 
--------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Conventionally there are tables, and there is a keyboard that I am 
typing on, and a chair I am sitting on. What is more, I am perceiving all 
these things "out there". That's conventional truth, and it enables me to 
function quite nicely in this world, this intersubjective realm of 
experience, which is MIND MADE. But when I look carefully - very carefully, I 
actually only experience what the Abhidhammikas call paramattha dhammas, and 
these are all "in here", not "out there" - and, of course, impermanent, 
unsatisfactory, impersonal, and insubstantial.
-------------------------------------------------------

> 
> So is there a table somewhere out in the world beyond the senses of humans? 
> 
> 
--------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       I don't think so. I'm actually not even sure what that would mean. 
---------------------------------------------------------
  Not> 
> as far as we experience directly.  Still, our deductive reasoning by which 
> we
> 'conceptualize' table and deal with the 'table' that we coordinate between 
> our
> momentary experiences and concepts works pretty well to allow us to eat, 
> drink and
> be merry, or whatever else we do on the 'table'.  
> 
-----------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       No disagreement. The patterns of relations among actually experienced 
conditions are such that our minds are able to create this world of apparent 
things, and navigate within it.
-----------------------------------------------------

> 
> So it may be that there *is* something resembling a 'table', but that we 
> just
> can't experience it directly all at once, and thus shouldn't confuse 
> concept with
> reality.
> 
------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Well, the only thing I know for sure about that is that there is, in 
principle, no way of knowing such a thing "out there" which is responsible 
for our experience of table, for all we ever experience is the very content 
of experience, itself.
-----------------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> What happens if we neither confirm nor deny the existence of 'table' as an 
> object
> out there, but really strive to distinguish between what we actually 
> experience
> and what we *think* [conceptualize] that we experience?
> 
----------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       What happens if we neither confirm nor deny the existence of a self? I 
think that is Victor's position. But the pragmatist position is that whatever 
is not known, and is in principle unknowable is effectively nonexistent.
---------------------------------------------------
   I think it makes for much> 
> more clear and skillful action, and more importantly, allows us to begin to
> discern the actuality of the mind and senses which leads us towards the 
> necessary
> sati and panna needed for awakening.

----------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Okay. Whatever an individual finds helpful is that person's business. 
I don't want to even begin to attempt to foist my position on you or anyone. 
It makes sense to me. That's all. Could I be all wrong? Sure!!
----------------------------------------------------

> 
> And in the meantime I think it's also skillful to be mindful of how we use
> concepts in order to 'navigate' in samsara.  It's not as if the need to use 
> a fork
> goes away because one develops a bit of discernment.  So how do we use 
> concepts in
> the moment to coordinate the idea of 'fork' with the getting of the food to 
> the
> mouth?  Pretty interesting.  
> 
> Perhaps an arahant can navigate eating a meal using only the immediate 
> sensations
> of 
> hardness/coolness/roughness/sourness/under-the-tongueness/swallowing/etc.,
> without forming a concept of 'food' or 'fork', which would explain the 
> Buddhist
> meditation on food in which it takes five minutes to take and swallow one 
> bite.  
> 
> Anyway, I wonder what you think about this?  Distinguishing between concept 
> and
> nama/rupa is important, but concepts also seem necessary. 

------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       The world we live in is a world of concepts, and concepts are needed 
to function in it. I expect this is even so for a Buddha. I just don't think 
a Buddha (or arahant) is taken in by those concepts.
-------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Best,
> Robert
> 
> 
============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13492 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 1:35pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi Rob Ep,

> > You'd better keep it to refer to when you forget what you agreed
> to;-).
> 
> ha ha, that's very true!

;-)<snip>

> is that because that which isn't actual can not be either permanent or
> impermanent?
.....
Right. We don’t need a Buddha to teach us about stories and
concepts...there is no lack of expertise here. the Teachings are concerned
(as the radical phenomenologists would say too, eh Howard) with what can
be directly known and experienced. We can think and think for ever, but
never come up with the truth.
.....
Sarah
=====

P.S. (silly and frivolous-be warned)
Rob, I'm also thinking that if you're still struggling to finish your book
on acting and 'live' role-plays, we could maybe help out with a little
cross-dressing (as Chris & Kom were discussing this I think), drag out a
few of the more zany members (I mean sensible and rational is all very
well, but it doesn’t sell books), have Erik instructing us on a few debate
strategies with all the gesticulations and posturing, have As change
places with Bs, you and Nina reading posts backwards and upside down,
Frank attaining jhanas in his vigorous astanga series, Wynn and friends
attempting miracles.....Oh and you and Sukin falling asleep as you write
booklets to each other at 3am.....Num speaking Pali ..hmm, talk about
concepts and proliferations. Of course, dialogue is no prob...you’re
spoilt for choice in the archives here;-)
..... 




 
13493 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 8:57pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K]

 
  Hi Dan,

Thanks for taking another comment of mine in such good humour. One little
question here:

onco111  wrote: > Robert,

> Interesting perception, Robert. As you say, central to the effort is 
> knowing not just the difference between sati and samadhi but also the 
> difference between sati with panya and sati without panya, and 
> knowing not just in a theoretical sense, but knowing as the dhammas 
> arise and pass away. Silabbataparamasa is not necessarily akusala, 
> but neither is it liberating.
.....
Can you give me an example of silabbataparamasa which 'is not necessarily
akusala' ? Surely wrong view and attachment are always involved.

Thanks,

Sarah
======

Sarah
======






 
13494 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 9:10pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  --- 
Some  useful observations,  Manji. thanks
robert
 "manji"  wrote:
> Perhaps the difference between concepts and reality falls in with 
sanna.
> When sanna marks, it marks objects of the mind door or the sense 
doors.
> When sanna recollects, the recollection is concept.
> 
> This recollection/concept seems to arise so fast that there is an
> incomplete experience of the object which is the proximate cause 
of the
> recollection. This seems to present quite a bit of trouble in the 
fact
> that there can be taking this concept for reality, where then this
> concept becomes a full object of the mind door. This process 
(taking
> concepts for reality) obstructs concentration and in depth 
penetration
> of objects, however...
> 
> With concentration comes sanna again, except this time it is 
marking. So
> the clever monks sits thinking concepts are taken care of, but all 
the
> while the there is marking, marking. This marking, through
> concentration, becomes so powerful that the recollection then may 
arise
> seeming to be just as real as reality. This process can serve as a
> testament to why it is so easy to take concepts for reality, or 
for that
> matter, self. This process is evident in daily life all the way 
through
> all the Jhanas... and then some.
> 
> This stood out from /Cetasikas/, pg.39: 
> ======================================= 
> We read in the Middle Length Sayings (I, no. l8, Discourse of the 
Honey
> Ball) about the origin of perceptions and obsessions and their 
ending.
> Mahå-
> Kaccana gave to the monks an explanation about what the Buddha had 
said
> in brief: 
> 	
> Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of eye and 
visual
> object; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement (phassa);
> feelings are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one
> perceives; what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons 
about
> obsesses one; what obsesses one is the origin of the number of
> perceptions and obsessions which assail a man in regard to visual 
object
> cognisable by the eye, past, future, present…
> =======================================
> 
> and this:
> 
> The footnote of /Cetasikas/, pg 35:
> 
> 1 The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 3-5) explains the difference between 
saññå,
> citta and paññå by way of a simile. Saññå is like the mere 
perception of
> a coin by a child who does not know its value. Citta is like the
> villager who knows its value. Paññå is like the money-changer who
> penetrates its true characteristics.
> 
> .........................
> 
> this sanna,
> this marking and recollection,
> this is dukkha...
> 
> and this dukkha? Is it a mere recollection from the conditioning of
> teaching? Or is there real dukkha? Oh yes friend, this sanna, 
there is
> dukkha. There is cause... 
> 
> time to go,
> bye bye...
> 
> Buddham saranam gacchami,
> Dhammam saranam gacchami,
> Sangham saranam gacchami.
> 
> -manji-
> 
> >

 
13495 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 9:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi Howard,

 --- Howard wrote: 
>        My point is merely that I don't think our differences are
> differences 
> in content, but only in terminology. Perhaps the translation of
> 'pa~n~natti' 
> as 'concept' is not the best translation. If 'pa~n~natti' denotes an
> alleged 
> concept-reference such as the tree on my back lawn that I am
> (conventionally) 
> looking at right now, then the translation of it as 'concept' is
> misleading 
> to those many people who think of concepts as mere ideas. The relatively
> 
> concrete"tree on my back lawn", is, itself, a mental construct composed
> of 
> very recent memories (mainly visual) with the idea of tree (the concept
> per 
> se) superimposed. But it is not the same as the concept of 'tree on my
> back 
> lawn', because there is more "immediacy" to it, due to its having been 
> constructed from just-experienced conditions. At least that is how I 
> understand it. In no case do I understand it to be some external
> "thing". 
> Perhaps a translation of 'pa~n~natti' as 'percept' might come closer - I
> 
> would find that very clear. 
.....
Maybe we can translate pannatti as concepts and percepts as I note you've
done elsewhere, or better still, just refer to pannatti.
.....

>But, in any case, the "reality" is an
> internal 
> one, with any alleged external "tree" being nonexistent, or, at least,
> in 
> principle unknowable.
.....
OK. When we look out of the window and seeing sees its visible object (or
for Dan, there is the seeing of visible object;-)), I'm not sure whether
it helps to refer to this reality as internal, but I understand and agree
with your point. (Visible object is classified as an external ayatana).

Howard, if you ever make a copy of your own simple Pali-English or
English-pali glossary, I'd like a copy to help me understand the way
others like yourself use terms. It might also be helpful for others coming
from a similar background to yourself, too (though there many not be so
many from a Mahayana/radical phenomenology/Peter Harvey/Goenka/DSG one)
hmm..

Sarah
=====

Sarah
=====


 
13496 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 9:36pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi again Howard!

I forget if I'm agreeing or not with my partner, but both the percepts and
the concepts you refer to below (as I understand) are included under the
broad pannatti umbrella. Remember pannatti cover ideas of what is real,
not real, of concrete or abstract and much more. so I think you are
elaborating some of the different kinds of pannatti in effect. 

It's true as you say, that as the thinking of these pannatti arises and
ceases, so in effect do the concepts thought about. But, as you stress, in
reality, only the thinking and other paramattha dhammas are impermanent,
because pannatti are pannatti and by definition, not real. When you
mention the percepts at the end, I have an idea you are not distinguishing
between the citta which thinks and the pannatti as object, which is why
you refer to it as impermanent.

that's my best take....(apologies for any misunderstanding)

Sarah
=====
 --- Howard wrote: > Hi again, Sarah -
> 
>        I'd like to add a couple more thoughts on this "percept"
> business. The 
> percept of "the glass I'm drinking from" SEEMS to be some "thing in the 
> world". The concept of 'glass' (the notion of a cylindrical holder for 
> beverages) does not so seem - it is just an idea. The concept of 'glass'
> 
> arises and ceases, as I think of it and when I no longer think of it. It
> is 
> impermanent. The glass I'm drinking from, however, the supposedly
> existing 
> "thing in the world", though it seems impermanent is only conventionally
> so, 
> and is not in reality impermanent, nor is it permanent, nor is it
> anything at 
> all, precisely because THERE IS NO glass I'm drinking from except 
> conventionally. There is just the percept, the internal mental construct
> 
> which erroneously *seems* to be a thing "out there". (The percept,
> itself, 
> the actual internal construct, is impermanent - it does not remain.)
>        I think that what I'm saying here, while probably not identical
> with 
> your take on pa~n~natti, may be very close to it. What do you think,
> Sarah?



 
13497 From: <> 
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 10:37pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: ritual (control?)

 
  Hi Christine,

I will concede there is a bit of a leap from 'cause' to 'control.' I
just thought it might be useful to look at this question from a slightly
different perspective. The Buddha says _both_ we can and cannot control
our consciousness. Looking for a controller is a good way to glimpse
no-self. Understanding that good thoughts lead to good consequences is a
good way to run our lives.

Larry

 
13498 From: <> 
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 10:56pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita

 
  Hi Sarah, you wrote:
If you ask what objects are 'most commonly taken for self', surely they
are the seeing, visible object, hearing, sound and so on.

L: I think you misunderstand me. I wasn't asking about an object but
rather the sense of self itself that arises before anything is
identified *with.* I would contend that this is a feeling. By 'feeling'
I don't mean pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral but rather the feeling of
like, dislike, and confusion. If this wrecks havoc in your well ordered
mind we could call these cetasikas, but I was attempting to convey
something in the language of the 'untaught manyfolk.'

Anyway, my main contention is that neither dukkha nor 'self' is an
identity problem. Both are a problem of lobha, dosa, and moha.

best regards, Larry

 
 
13499 From: Howard 
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 7:25pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi, Sarah -


> 
> Hi Howard,
> 
> --- Howard wrote: 
> >        My point is merely that I don't think our differences are
> > differences 
> > in content, but only in terminology. Perhaps the translation of
> > 'pa~n~natti' 
> > as 'concept' is not the best translation. If 'pa~n~natti' denotes an
> > alleged 
> > concept-reference such as the tree on my back lawn that I am
> > (conventionally) 
> > looking at right now, then the translation of it as 'concept' is
> > misleading 
> > to those many people who think of concepts as mere ideas. The relatively
> > 
> > concrete"tree on my back lawn", is, itself, a mental construct composed
> > of 
> > very recent memories (mainly visual) with the idea of tree (the concept
> > per 
> > se) superimposed. But it is not the same as the concept of 'tree on my
> > back 
> > lawn', because there is more "immediacy" to it, due to its having been 
> > constructed from just-experienced conditions. At least that is how I 
> > understand it. In no case do I understand it to be some external
> > "thing". 
> > Perhaps a translation of 'pa~n~natti' as 'percept' might come closer - I
> > 
> > would find that very clear. 
> .....
> Maybe we can translate pannatti as concepts and percepts as I note you've
> done elsewhere, or better still, just refer to pannatti.
> 
----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       This sounds good to me. I see the concepts as mentally constructed 
templates and the percepts as mental constructs involving fresh memories of 
paramattha dhammas overlayed by concepts. So they are different, but, yes, it 
is clear that the term 'pa~n~natti' subsumes both of these.
---------------------------------------------------------

> .....
> 
> >But, in any case, the "reality" is an
> > internal 
> > one, with any alleged external "tree" being nonexistent, or, at least,
> > in 
> > principle unknowable.
> .....
> OK. When we look out of the window and seeing sees its visible object (or
> for Dan, there is the seeing of visible object;-)), I'm not sure whether
> it helps to refer to this reality as internal, but I understand and agree
> with your point. (Visible object is classified as an external ayatana).
> 
---------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Yes, I understand that usage. Visual consciousness "internal" and 
visual object "external", but I take these as describing the experiential 
*sense* of these, the "feel" of them, rather than any literal outside and 
inside.
---------------------------------------------------

> 
> Howard, if you ever make a copy of your own simple Pali-English or
> English-pali glossary, I'd like a copy to help me understand the way
> others like yourself use terms. It might also be helpful for others coming
> from a similar background to yourself, too (though there many not be so
> many from a Mahayana/radical phenomenology/Peter Harvey/Goenka/DSG one)
> hmm..
-------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       You certainly have a good handle on the package of lakkhana which 
constitutes "Howard"!! ;-))
-------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Sarah
> =====
> 
> Sarah
> =====
> 
===========================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13500 From: Howard 
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 7:38pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 5/23/02 9:38:07 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Sarah writes:


> 
> Hi again Howard!
> 
> I forget if I'm agreeing or not with my partner, but both the percepts and
> the concepts you refer to below (as I understand) are included under the
> broad pannatti umbrella. Remember pannatti cover ideas of what is real,
> not real, of concrete or abstract and much more. so I think you are
> elaborating some of the different kinds of pannatti in effect. 
> 
-----------------------------------------------
Howard:
       I agree.
----------------------------------------------

> 
> It's true as you say, that as the thinking of these pannatti arises and
> ceases, so in effect do the concepts thought about. But, as you stress, in
> reality, only the thinking and other paramattha dhammas are impermanent,
> because pannatti are pannatti and by definition, not real.
> 
-------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       The concept of 'tree' is a thought. It can arise and cease as a mind 
object. It is impermanent.
---------------------------------------------------
  When you> 
> mention the percepts at the end, I have an idea you are not distinguishing
> between the citta which thinks and the pannatti as object, which is why
> you refer to it as impermanent.
> 
--------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       I don't think so. A percept and the knowing of the percept arise 
together and interdependently, as is always the case with vi~n~nana and its 
object. At the moment (already gone! ;-)), I see the word 'word'. Of course, 
there is no thing which is the word 'word' that I see - there is just the 
percept, the mental construct built from actual direct experiences overlayed 
by the concept of the word 'word'.
--------------------------------------------------

> 
> that's my best take....(apologies for any misunderstanding)
> 
> Sarah
> =====
=============================
With metta,
Howard

P.S. But, hey, you know? What's in a name??? (That has a good ring to it, 
hmm? ;-))


> --- Howard wrote: > Hi again, Sarah -
> > 
> >        I'd like to add a couple more thoughts on this "percept"
> > business. The 
> > percept of "the glass I'm drinking from" SEEMS to be some "thing in the 
> > world". The concept of 'glass' (the notion of a cylindrical holder for 
> > beverages) does not so seem - it is just an idea. The concept of 'glass'
> > 
> > arises and ceases, as I think of it and when I no longer think of it. It
> > is 
> > impermanent. The glass I'm drinking from, however, the supposedly
> > existing 
> > "thing in the world", though it seems impermanent is only conventionally
> > so, 
> > and is not in reality impermanent, nor is it permanent, nor is it
> > anything at 
> > all, precisely because THERE IS NO glass I'm drinking from except 
> > conventionally. There is just the percept, the internal mental construct
> > 
> > which erroneously *seems* to be a thing "out there". (The percept,
> > itself, 
> > the actual internal construct, is impermanent - it does not remain.)
> >        I think that what I'm saying here, while probably not identical
> > with 
> > your take on pa~n~natti, may be very close to it. What do you think,
> > Sarah?
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13501 From: <> 
Date: Thu May 23, 2002 11:45pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 9 (2)

 
  Hi Num, good to hear from you and thanks for the answers. I only
realized later that 'universal cetasikas' meant arising with every
citta. So contact, feeling, perception, volition, one-pointedness, life
faculty, and attention all arise with adverting consciousness, sense
consciousness, receiving, investigting, and determining consciousnesses
and also mind door adverting consciousness. 

I take it that lobha, dosa, moha, alobha, adosa, amoha may or may not
arise in 5 door process. Would they arise with every citta in 5 door
process?

I still don't understand mind object. What is a 'past citta'? Is it a
citta or something else?

Is a pannatti aramanna a citta or something else?

Is  memory a citta or something else?

I think a lot of this confusion could be cleared up if we had a clear
understanding of memory. Saying sanna marks its object for memory is not
saying enough. We need more understanding of memory and more
understanding of sanna. I am very surprised that in a system that
depends so heavily on memory so little is known about this function.

I've been toying with the idea that sati is memory and satipatthana is
very near memory (upatthana means standing near). This may account for
the sense of presence and objectivity. One consciousness cognizing
another consciousness that is so near it seems current but really isn't
('presence' in this case would be a memory). The main problem with this
theory is that sati isn't a universal cetasika but sanna is. Maybe sanna
and sati work together.

Anyway, I hope you are enjoying your vacation.  Relaxing, doing nothing,
just watching the sun shine and the grass grow.

Larry

 
13502 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 0:51am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Sarah,

Whatever concept means to you, I suggest seeing its condition and 
cause.

Regards,
Victor


---  Sarah  wrote:
> Victor,
> 
>  --- yuzhonghao  wrote: > Sarah,
> > 
> > For the definition of the word "concept", check a dictionary.  An 
> > online resource can be found at http://www.webster.com/
> 
> Thankyou. When I use 'concept', I am referring to pa~n~natti as 
elaborated
> in several posts under concepts at:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts
> 
> I believe these details of what is included in pannatti in Buddhist 
texts
> to be far broader and more explicit than the definition of concepts 
in the
> dictionary.
>  
> > Also see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-
002.html
> 
> Is paticca samuppada (as discussed in this link) talking about 
concepts or
> realities? What is the significance?
> 
> Sarah
> ======

 
13503 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 0:51am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Sarah,

Whatever concept means to you, I suggest seeing its condition and 
cause.

Regards,
Victor


---  Sarah  wrote:
> Victor,
> 
>  --- yuzhonghao  wrote: > Sarah,
> > 
> > For the definition of the word "concept", check a dictionary.  An 
> > online resource can be found at http://www.webster.com/
> 
> Thankyou. When I use 'concept', I am referring to pa~n~natti as 
elaborated
> in several posts under concepts at:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts
> 
> I believe these details of what is included in pannatti in Buddhist 
texts
> to be far broader and more explicit than the definition of concepts 
in the
> dictionary.
>  
> > Also see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-
002.html
> 
> Is paticca samuppada (as discussed in this link) talking about 
concepts or
> realities? What is the significance?
> 
> Sarah
> ======

 
13504 From: onco111   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 4:03am
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K]

 
  Excellent, Sarah! You caught me averaging. I do so appreciate your 
sharp observations.

I meant that if someone wants to give alms to win merit or to put 
flowers on an alter to please God or to stand up in front of friends 
and family to publicly pledge to be faithful to and stick together 
with another in marriage or to take five precepts in a ceremony, it's 
not a bad thing. Of course, during any of these rituals, there are 
bound to be akusala and kusala moments arising and passing away. The 
balance very often tilts toward the kusala, even if there happen to 
be many moments of silabbataparamasa mixed in. But I think you are 
right to note that at the moments of silabbataparamasa, surely 
attachment and wrong view arise -- not to condemn the partaking in 
the ritual, though, just pointing out how wrong view may arise.

Dan

---  Sarah  wrote:
> Hi Dan,
> 
> Thanks for taking another comment of mine in such good humour. One 
little
> question here:
> 
> onco111  wrote: > Robert,
> 
> > Interesting perception, Robert. As you say, central to the effort 
is 
> > knowing not just the difference between sati and samadhi but also 
the 
> > difference between sati with panya and sati without panya, and 
> > knowing not just in a theoretical sense, but knowing as the 
dhammas 
> > arise and pass away. Silabbataparamasa is not necessarily 
akusala, 
> > but neither is it liberating.
> .....
> Can you give me an example of silabbataparamasa which 'is not 
necessarily
> akusala' ? Surely wrong view and attachment are always involved.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Sarah
> ======

 
13505 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 4:49am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Sarah,
Can you please explain how concepts are not impermanent because not real?  I don't
get the connection.  if something is unreal but it is thought of, what is not
impermanent about that?  It seems to me that the opposite of impermanent is
permanent.  Are you saying that that which is unreal must be permanent?  i can't
see what that could possibly mean, since something that is not real, rather than
being permanent, doesn't even exist in the first place.  It only exists when
thought of, since it has no other existence, and thus would still be quite
impermanent as far as I can see.

Best,
Robert Ep.

======

--- Sarah  wrote:
> Hi again Howard!
> 
> I forget if I'm agreeing or not with my partner, but both the percepts and
> the concepts you refer to below (as I understand) are included under the
> broad pannatti umbrella. Remember pannatti cover ideas of what is real,
> not real, of concrete or abstract and much more. so I think you are
> elaborating some of the different kinds of pannatti in effect. 
> 
> It's true as you say, that as the thinking of these pannatti arises and
> ceases, so in effect do the concepts thought about. But, as you stress, in
> reality, only the thinking and other paramattha dhammas are impermanent,
> because pannatti are pannatti and by definition, not real. When you
> mention the percepts at the end, I have an idea you are not distinguishing
> between the citta which thinks and the pannatti as object, which is why
> you refer to it as impermanent.
> 
> that's my best take....(apologies for any misunderstanding)
> 
> Sarah
> =====
>  --- Howard wrote: > Hi again, Sarah -
> > 
> >        I'd like to add a couple more thoughts on this "percept"
> > business. The 
> > percept of "the glass I'm drinking from" SEEMS to be some "thing in the 
> > world". The concept of 'glass' (the notion of a cylindrical holder for 
> > beverages) does not so seem - it is just an idea. The concept of 'glass'
> > 
> > arises and ceases, as I think of it and when I no longer think of it. It
> > is 
> > impermanent. The glass I'm drinking from, however, the supposedly
> > existing 
> > "thing in the world", though it seems impermanent is only conventionally
> > so, 
> > and is not in reality impermanent, nor is it permanent, nor is it
> > anything at 
> > all, precisely because THERE IS NO glass I'm drinking from except 
> > conventionally. There is just the percept, the internal mental construct
> > 
> > which erroneously *seems* to be a thing "out there". (The percept,
> > itself, 
> > the actual internal construct, is impermanent - it does not remain.)
> >        I think that what I'm saying here, while probably not identical
> > with 
> > your take on pa~n~natti, may be very close to it. What do you think,
> > Sarah?
> 
> 



 
13506 From: Num 
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 1:32am
Subject: Phenapinda sutta

 
  Hi Sarah:

I read your quote from a commentary below. Well, this will turn out to be 
akusala can condition kusala and vice versa ;-) The thing that caught my 
attention from the sutta was the plantain. When I was in the Caribbean, I had 
a lot of plantain and breadfruit with meal. I like it a lot. Esp. when it was 
charcoal-broiled, it smelled and tasted so good. I then checked the sutta 
further from accesstoinsight, the translation was a little bit different. I 
like a simile of sankara-khandha (fabrications or aggregate of volitional 
formations in your quote) with a banana tree a lot. In Thailand I enjoyed 
working in my garden on my own. Every time I cut the banana from its tree, I 
cut its truck in to small pieces and put it back to the banana trees as an 
organic fertilizer. I heard about this simile before ( but never read the 
whole sutta), so every I cut a banana tree it reminded me of the simile. (A 
banana and a plantain look the same, to me).

Yesterday, I had a tennis lesson very early morning then went in to work and 
went running in a park in the evening. The weather was really nice yesterday. 
I was kind of tired (I am getting old !!) After a dinner and a shower, I did 
my usual sitting meditation. B/c I was so tired, I fell asleep couple times 
during the meditation. So I decided to jump into bed early. 11 pm is very 
early for me. I got up around 4 am. (5 hours of sleep is normal for me).  So 
I decided to look up the Phena sutta and its commentary from my CD-rom. In 
Thai it called Phenapinda (a lump of foam)-sutta. Nothing about koti was 
mentioned. In Thai attakatha, both Burmese and Sinhala Pali were referred to.

This came to my thought. B/c of my memory and my clinging to the smell and 
taste of a broiled plantain, I was turned on by your quote to read the sutta 
further. B/c of the tiredness and dina-midda during my meditation, I went to 
bed early and then got up early enough to look up the sutta further on my 
Thai CD-rom. B/c of my sensual enjoyment in gardening, the simile of a banana 
tree is really caught my attention :-)

OK, let talk about the sutta.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-095.html

Here are some parts from the sutta:

*****************************

Form (rupa) is like a glob of foam;
feeling (vedana), a bubble;
perception (sanna), a mirage;
fabrications (sankara), a banana tree;
consciousness (vinnana), a magic trick . . . . 

. . That's the way it goes:it's a magic trick, an idiot's babbling. It's said 
to be a murderer. No substance here is found . . . 

. . Thus a monk, persistence aroused (sati), should view the aggregates by 
day & by night, mindful, alert; should discard all fetters; should make 
himself his own refuge; should live as if his head were on fire -- in hopes 
of the state with no falling away (nibbana).

*********************************

<<SNP>> <Sarah>
Commentary from the Phena Sutta (A Lump of Foam) Spk notes translated by 
B.Bodhi:
***** 
note 190: "Spk: a bubble (bubbu.la) is feeble and cannot be grasped, for it 
breaks up as soon as it is seized;  so too feeling is feeble and cannot be 
grasped as permanent and stable.  As a bubble arises and ceases in a drop of 
water and does not last long, so too with feeling:  100,000 'ko.tis' of 
feelings arise and cease in the time of a fingersnap (one ko.ti = 10 
million). As a bubble arises in dependence on conditions, so feeling arises 
in dependence on a sense base, an object, the defilements, and contact."

"Spk: Perception is like a mirage (marikaa) in the sense that it is 
insubstantial, for one cannot grasp a mirage to drink or bathe or fill a 
pitcher.  As a mirage deceives the multitude, so does perception, which 
entices people with th idea that the colourful object is beautiful, 
pleasurable, and permanent."

 "Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many 
sheaths, each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional 
formations is an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own 
characteristic."

"Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (maayaa) in the sense that it 
is insubstantial and cannot be grasped.  Consciousness is even more transient 
and fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a 
person comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is 
different in each of these activities.  Consciousness deceives the multitude 
like a magical illusion." 

<<SNP>>
***********************************

When I first read the sutta, I told myself it was very beautifully said. At 
the end of the sutta, as I quoted "Form is like a glob of foam; feeling, a 
bubble; perception, a mirage; fabrications, a banana tree; consciousness, a 
magic trick".  I asked myself: why a rupa is compared to the foam in Konka 
river, vedana with the bubble, sanna with the mirage, other 
cetasikas(sakarakhanda) with the banana tree, and vinnana with the magic 
trick?

Your quote explains it very well. You did not put in the simile of rupa and 
the foam. 

It said Rupa (form) is liked a foam b/c of its lakkhana: 
annicca/dukkha/anatta. The foam formed up, stayed as foam for a while then 
broken or flew away to the sea. The atthakatha said that b/c the foam is 
flowing away, so it's wise to see this as: "This is not mine. This I am not. 
This is not my self". (We see this pretty frequent, Thanks Victor for always 
reminding us).

Vedana (feeling) was compared with a bubble of a rain in the water. A 
raindrop is like an arammana, the water in a pond is like a sensebase, the 
wave of the water is kilesa and the wind is like phassa. Without the wind and 
the rain, there is no wavy water.

Sanna (perception) is well explained.

Sankara (fabrications or aggregate of volitional formations).  I like the 
simile if the banana/plantain tree a lot. The tree consists of multiple 
layers or sheaths. Each layer is different with its own shade of color but 
forms up together as a banana tree. Each cetasika has its own lakkhana but 
forms up together and almost impossible to discern. We usually take the 
formation as "this is me, this is mine and this is myself".  Yes, when I peel 
the trunk, there is no heartwood in a banana tree.

Vinnana (consciousness) is really like magic.

Khandha is like an executer. No matter how beautiful the formation is. It 
will be self-executed. I also like the sentence from the last part of the 
sutta, "should make himself his own refuge; should live as if his head were 
on fire".

To me this sutta is full with hidden treasures. 

Thanks and anumodhana.

Num

 
13507 From: <> 
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 7:02am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Hi Robert, if I may stick my conceptual nose in here. I think the idea
behind this 'concept' broohaha is that concepts are principles, and as
such they are timeless, neither permanent nor impermanent. Principles
can be mentally manipulated as in mathematics but you can't really
observe 1+1=2. So in that sense principles are not real (observable),
but they may still be true as with 'impermanence' for example (a true
concept).  IMO this concept concept gets muddled if we say no names have
real referents. In that case the names of paramattha dhammas would be
meaningless. Also, IMO, this concept of concepts gets even further
muddled if we say all combinations of paramattha dhammas are unreal. If,
by 'dhamma', we mean 'functionality', and if, in combining
functionalities we create new functionalities, then we create new
dhammas and new realities. These new functionalities are no less real
than basic functionalities (paramattha dhammas) but they aren't 'basic'.
[I modified this last idea from something RML Gethin said in "The
Buddhist Path To Awakening"]

Well, I hope this settles this issue once and for all.

best wishes, Larry

 
13508 From: <> 
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 8:15am
Subject: ADL ch. 9 (4)

 
  http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 9 (4)

When there are two people in the same situation, one person may have
ayoniso manasikara and the other may have yoniso manasikara. This
depends on their accumulations. We read in the 'Kindred Sayings' (lV,
Salayatanavagga, Kindred Sayings on Sense, Fourth Fifty, Ch.V, par. 202,
Lustful) about the monk who, 
after he has experienced an object through one of the six doors, has
ayoniso manasikara, and about the monk who has yoniso manasikara. We
read that Maha-Moggallana said to the monks: 

Friends, I will teach you the way of lusting and also of not lusting.... 

And how, friends, is one lustful? 

Herein, friends, a monk, seeing object with the eye, feels attachment
for objects that charm, feels aversion from objects that displease,
abides without mindfulness of the body, and his thoughts are mean. He
realizes not, in its true nature, that emancipation of heart, that
emancipation of wisdom, wherein those evil, unprofitable states that
have arisen cease without remainder. 

This monk, friends, is called 'lustful after objects cognizable by the
eye, nose, tongue... objects cognizable by the mind'; When a monk so
abides, friends, if Mara comes upon him by way of the eye, Mara gets an
opportunity. If Mara comes upon him....by way of the mind, Mara gets
access, gets opportunity.... 

So dwelling, friends, objects overcome a monk, a monk overcomes not
objects. Sounds overcome a monk, a monk overcomes not sounds. Scents,
savours, tangibles and mind-states overcome a monk, a monk overcomes not
sounds, scents, savours, tangibles and mind-states. This monk, friends,
is called 'conquered by objects, sounds, scents, savours, tangibles and 
mind-states, not conquerer of them.' Evil, unprofitable states,
passion-fraught, leading to rebirth overcome him, states unhappy, whose
fruit is pain, whose future is rebirth, decay and death. Thus, friends,
one is lustful. 

And how, friends, is one free from lust? 

Herein, friends, a monk, seeing an object with the eye, is not attached
to objects that charm, nor averse from objects that displease.... 

Tasting a savour with the tongue...with mind cognizing a mind-state, he
is not attached to mind-states that charm, nor is he averse from
mind-states that displease, but dwells with mindfulness of the body, his
thought is boundless. So that he realizes in its true nature that 
emancipation of heart, that emancipation of wisdom, wherein those evil,
unprofitable states that have arisen come to cease without remainder. 

This monk, friends, is called 'not lustful after objects cognizable by
the eye... not lustful after mind-states cognizable by mind.' Thus
dwelling, friends, if Mara comes upon him by way of the eye, of the
tongue,... of the mind, Mara gets no access, gets no opportunity.... 

Moreover, friends, so dwelling a monk conquers objects, objects do not
conquer him. He conquers sounds, scents, savours, tangibles,
mind-states. They do not conquer him. Such a monk, friends, is called,
'conquerer of objects, sounds, scents, savours, tangibles and
mind-states,'; He is conquerer, not conquered. He conquers those evil,
unprofitable states, passion-fraught, inciting to lust, leading to
rebirth, states unhappy, whose fruit is pain, rebirth, decay and death.
Thus, friends, is one free from lust. 
 
Questions 
1. What is kiriyacitta? 
2. When we smile, is it always motivated by lobha? 
3. Can akusala cittas and kusala cittas  arise in a sense-door process?

 
13509 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 9:05am
Subject: ritual(Dan)

 
  A letter from Dan --- 
..., "onco111"  wrote:
Dear D,

D: Do you agree that we should spend our time with kinds in 
happiness, or will what ever bad mood will do?

--> Dan: We'd all like to be free from dosa all the time, but 
sometimes bad moods do arise. Is it better to understand them as 
they 
arise? Or to try to create pleasant sensations to cover up the bad 
mood? We can always think "happy, happy, happy," or "I want 
pleasure, 
always to have pleasant sensations, never any dosa," but this is not 
reality, and it is not the way out of sansara. Both lobha and dosa 
arise from the same source: craving and ignorance. These things are 
so clear in children. But adults are lot like children: Always 
wanting to free from dosa but not seeing the danger in lobha.

DD: Dan if you know another process in plain English that fits with 
your use of the word "satipatthana" please provide.  

--> Dan: No. I know no English word that fits well with my use of 
the 
word "satipatthana." And you are right to note that no 'method' is 
specified. Satipatthana cannot be forced or controlled or willed to 
arise. It arises for brief moments when conditions are ripe. Those 
conditions include listening to the true Dhamma and wise attention 
(yoniso manasikara).
 
D: I think we can come to some understanding about 
silabbataparamasa. 
If there is a direct cause/ effect relationship that can be seen 
then 
that is wisdom, when there is no relationship between the action and 
hope for results, then that is ignorance and can be called 
silabbataparamasa. 

--> Dan: Wonderful sentence,  If you mean 'action' as an 
activity or practice, then you have it exactly backwards. If you 
mean 'action' as 'volition', then you have it exactly right. 
Silabbataparamasa is mistaking practice/ritual/method for 'action' 
and (wrongly) seeing a direct cause/effect relationship between that 
kind of 'action' and arising of wisdom. 

D: Example, Feeding a famous monk on his birthday so that a heavenly 
life or some merit will come in some future life. Another example. 
Sitting in meditation retreat waiting for the bell to ring, 
thinking, 
I'll meditate after lunch.

--> Dan: Wonderful examples! In the act of feeding a famous monk on 
his birthday, consciousness arises and passes away innumerable 
times. 
At some moments there may arise a greedy and deluded 
consciousness: "I want to store up my merit!" At some moments there 
may arise pure motives of generosity: "May he live comfortably and 
with good health and good cheer." Also, in some cases there may be 
no 
moments of generosity. In other cases there may be no moments of 
greed and delusion. The merit is not so much in the action qua 
practice/ritual/method but in the action qua volition. Although 
giving is powerful and good, there still may be a proliferation of 
greedy and deluded moments before and after the 'giving' action. 
This 
can happen if there is the wrong view: "I will feed a famous monk on 
his birthday so that I can gain a heavenly life in the future." The 
volition of giving is good, but wrong view is not eliminated so long 
as that equation of "gain merit by giving to famous monk" is viewed 
as a method for generating gain.

The same goes for the meditation retreat sitting. At some moments 
there may arise a greedy and deluded consciousness: "I want to 
attain 
such-and-such a state because of the merit/pleasantness/wisdom I 
will 
gain." At some moments there may arise pure thoughts: "Whatever 
arises is bound to pass away. No need to cling to such ephemeral, 
impersonal, changing phenomena as self." In some cases there may be 
no moments of pure thoughts. In other cases there may be no moments 
of greed and delusion. The merit is not so much in the action qua 
practice/ritual/method but in the action qua volition from moment to 
moment. Although jhana is powerful and good, there still may be a 
proliferation of greedy and deluded moments before and after the 
jhana. This can happen if there is the wrong view: "I will practice 
samatha so that I can be happy, happy, happy. It's even better than 
sex!" By all means, practice samatha, practice jhana. But how can 
wrong view be eliminated when samatha is viewed as a ritual for 
gaining merit?

D: Sitting in meditation doing the practice (training) properly is 
not an empty ritual.  Riding the mind of hindrances in a moment by 
moment activity is not empty ritual. Ritual need not be empty, it 
depends on the state of mind. 

--> Dan: Agreed. Ritual need not be empty. But silabbataparamasa 
refers to the 'non-empty' rituals as well as the empty ones.

D: responding to "justify as righteous because it involves so much 
effort and concentration"  This seems to discount concentration, but 
as you well know right concentration is a factor of the path, so 
when 
you say "righteous" it seems that you are using it as a dirty word.  
If we belittle concentration, then we can more easily reject it from 
the daily practice.

--> Dan: "Righteous" is a function of "rightness", not of effort or 
concentration. Effort and concentration can easily be wrong effort 
and wrong concentration. It would be a huge mistake to belittle 
concentration, but the distinction between 'right concentration' 
and 'wrong concentration' must also be emphasized. The type of jhana 
that people so often refer to is a form of right concentration, as 
the Buddha made clear by so many references to it (the other kind is 
the jhana is with seeing characteristics as object rather than 
object 
as object, i.e. supramundane jhana). But what is the view of jhana 
during the non-jhana times? If it is viewed as something to be taken 
up immediately, without delay, a number of problems are raised. 
First, there is then little effort to understand reality as it is at 
this moment as opposed to reality as you'd like it to be. Second, 
there is too easily a cultivation of lobha -- "Oh, I wish I were 
somewhere else! Oh, how I need that cushion and that quiet room. Oh, 
if only those hindrances weren't there! Then, I'd really be happy!" 
Third, there is cultivation of self view, of the view that there is 
one who directs and controls the arising of kusala states.  



Thanks.

Dan
--- End forwarded message ---

 
13510 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 9:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  ---   Robert Epstein  
wrote:
Sarah,
Can you please explain how concepts are not impermanent because not 
real?  I don't
get the connection.  if something is unreal but it is thought of, 
what is not
impermanent about that?  It seems to me that the opposite of 
impermanent is
permanent.  Are you saying that that which is unreal must be 
permanent?  i can't
see what that could possibly mean, since something that is not real, 
rather than
being permanent, doesn't even exist in the first place.  It only 
exists when
thought of, since it has no other existence, and thus would still be 
quite
impermanent as far as I can see.

Best,
Robert Ep.
Dear Rob.E.
This might explain:
The Dhamma Theory
Philosophical Cornerstone of the ABHIDHAMMA
Y. Karunadasa The Wheel Publication No. 412/413 (Buddhist 
Publication society)
Karunadasa:
"""because pannattis are without corresponding objective reality, the
commentaries call them asabhava-dhammas -- things without a real 
nature --
to distinguish them from the real elements of existence.Since 
sabhava, the
intrinsic nature of a dhamma, is itself the dhamma, from the point 
of view
of this definition what is qualified as asabhava amounts to an 
abhava, a
non-existent in the final sense. It is in recognition of this fact 
that
the three salient characteristics of empirical reality -- origination
(uppada), subsistence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga) -- are not 
applied
to them. For these three characteristics can be predicated only of 
those
things which answer to the Abhidhammic definition of empirical 
reality.
Again, unlike the real existents, pannattis are not brought about by
conditions (paccayatthitika). For this same reason, they are also 
defined
as "not positively produced" (aparinipphanna). Positive production
(parinipphannata) is true only of those things which have their own
individual nature (avenika-sabhava). Only a dhamma that has an own-
nature,
with a beginning and an end in time, produced by conditions, and 
marked by
the three salient characteristics of conditioned existence, is 
positively
produced.

Further, pannattis differ from dhammas in that only the latter are
delimited by rise and fall; only of the dhammas and not of the 
pannattis
can it be said, "They come into being having not been (ahutva 
sambhonti);
and, after having been, they cease (hutva pativenti)." Pannattis 
have no
own-nature to be manifested in the three instants of arising, 
presence,
and dissolution. Since they have no existence marked by these three
phases, such temporal distinctions as past, present, and future do 
not
apply to them. Consequently they have no reference to time 
(kalavimutta).
For this self-same reason, they have no place in the traditional 
analysis
of empirical existence into the five khandhas, for what is included 
in the
khandhas should have the characteristics of empirical reality and be
subject to temporal divisions.121 Another noteworthy characteristic 
of
pannattis is that they cannot be described either as conditioned
(sankhata) or as unconditioned (asankhata), for they do not possess 
their
own-nature (sabhava) to be so described. Since the two categories of 
the
conditioned and the unconditioned comprise all realities, the 
description
of pannattis as exempt from these two categories is another way of
underscoring their unreality."">>
best wishes
robert

 
13511 From: Kom Tukovinit   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 9:23am
Subject: RE: [dsg] anicca

 
  Dear Roberts K,

This is a very nice explanation.  Do you by any chance know why Pannatti may
be explained as anatta (although not as impermanence or dukha)?

kom



> -----Original Message-----
> From: robertkirkpatrick.rm > Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 6:12 PM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca
>
>
> ---   Robert Epstein 
> wrote:
> Sarah,
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> Dear Rob.E.
> This might explain:
> The Dhamma Theory
> Philosophical Cornerstone of the ABHIDHAMMA
> Y. Karunadasa The Wheel Publication No. 412/413 (Buddhist
> Publication society)
> Karunadasa:
> """because pannattis are without corresponding objective reality, the
> commentaries call them asabhava-dhammas -- things without a real
> nature --
> to distinguish them from the real elements of existence.Since
> sabhava, the
> intrinsic nature of a dhamma, is itself the dhamma, from the point
> of view
> of this definition what is qualified as asabhava amounts to an
> abhava, a
> non-existent in the final sense. It is in recognition of this fact
> that
> the three salient characteristics of empirical reality -- origination
> (uppada), subsistence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga) -- are not
> applied
> to them. For these three characteristics can be predicated only of
> those
> things which answer to the Abhidhammic definition of empirical
> reality.
> Again, unlike the real existents, pannattis are not brought about by
> conditions (paccayatthitika). For this same reason, they are also
> defined
> as "not positively produced" (aparinipphanna). Positive production
> (parinipphannata) is true only of those things which have their own
> individual nature (avenika-sabhava). Only a dhamma that has an own-
> nature,
> with a beginning and an end in time, produced by conditions, and
> marked by
> the three salient characteristics of conditioned existence, is
> positively
> produced.
>
> Further, pannattis differ from dhammas in that only the latter are
> delimited by rise and fall; only of the dhammas and not of the
> pannattis
> can it be said, "They come into being having not been (ahutva
> sambhonti);
> and, after having been, they cease (hutva pativenti)." Pannattis
> have no
> own-nature to be manifested in the three instants of arising,
> presence,
> and dissolution. Since they have no existence marked by these three
> phases, such temporal distinctions as past, present, and future do
> not
> apply to them. Consequently they have no reference to time
> (kalavimutta).
> For this self-same reason, they have no place in the traditional
> analysis
> of empirical existence into the five khandhas, for what is included
> in the
> khandhas should have the characteristics of empirical reality and be
> subject to temporal divisions.121 Another noteworthy characteristic
> of
> pannattis is that they cannot be described either as conditioned
> (sankhata) or as unconditioned (asankhata), for they do not possess
> their
> own-nature (sabhava) to be so described. Since the two categories of
> the
> conditioned and the unconditioned comprise all realities, the
> description
> of pannattis as exempt from these two categories is another way of
> underscoring their unreality."">>
> best wishes
> robert
>

 
13512 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 9:43am
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Dear Kom,
Not really, Kom. 
best wishes
robert
 "Kom Tukovinit"  wrote:
> Dear Roberts K,
> 
> This is a very nice explanation.  Do you by any chance know why 
Pannatti may
> be explained as anatta (although not as impermanence or dukha)?
> 
> kom
> 
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: robertkirkpatrick.rm 
> > Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2002 6:12 PM
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca
> >
> >
> > ---   Robert Epstein 
> > wrote:
> > Sarah,
> >
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > Dear Rob.E.
> > This might explain:
> > The Dhamma Theory
> > Philosophical Cornerstone of the ABHIDHAMMA
> > Y. Karunadasa The Wheel Publication No. 412/413 (Buddhist
> > Publication society)
> > Karunadasa:
> > """because pannattis are without corresponding objective 
reality, the
> > commentaries call them asabhava-dhammas -- things without a real
> > nature --
> > to distinguish them from the real elements of existence.Since
> > sabhava, the
> > intrinsic nature of a dhamma, is itself the dhamma, from the 
point
> > of view
> > of this definition what is qualified as asabhava amounts to an
> > abhava, a
> > non-existent in the final sense. It is in recognition of this 
fact
> > that
> > the three salient characteristics of empirical reality -- 
origination
> > (uppada), subsistence (thiti), and dissolution (bhanga) -- are 
not
> > applied
> > to them. For these three characteristics can be predicated only 
of
> > those
> > things which answer to the Abhidhammic definition of empirical
> > reality.
> > Again, unlike the real existents, pannattis are not brought 
about by
> > conditions (paccayatthitika). For this same reason, they are also
> > defined
> > as "not positively produced" (aparinipphanna). Positive 
production
> > (parinipphannata) is true only of those things which have their 
own
> > individual nature (avenika-sabhava). Only a dhamma that has an 
own-
> > nature,
> > with a beginning and an end in time, produced by conditions, and
> > marked by
> > the three salient characteristics of conditioned existence, is
> > positively
> > produced.
> >
> > Further, pannattis differ from dhammas in that only the latter 
are
> > delimited by rise and fall; only of the dhammas and not of the
> > pannattis
> > can it be said, "They come into being having not been (ahutva
> > sambhonti);
> > and, after having been, they cease (hutva pativenti)." Pannattis
> > have no
> > own-nature to be manifested in the three instants of arising,
> > presence,
> > and dissolution. Since they have no existence marked by these 
three
> > phases, such temporal distinctions as past, present, and future 
do
> > not
> > apply to them. Consequently they have no reference to time
> > (kalavimutta).
> > For this self-same reason, they have no place in the traditional
> > analysis
> > of empirical existence into the five khandhas, for what is 
included
> > in the
> > khandhas should have the characteristics of empirical reality 
and be
> > subject to temporal divisions.121 Another noteworthy 
characteristic
> > of
> > pannattis is that they cannot be described either as conditioned
> > (sankhata) or as unconditioned (asankhata), for they do not 
possess
> > their
> > own-nature (sabhava) to be so described. Since the two 
categories of
> > the
> > conditioned and the unconditioned comprise all realities, the
> > description
> > of pannattis as exempt from these two categories is another way 
of
> > underscoring their unreality."">>
> > best wishes
> > robert

 
13513 From: abbott_hk   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 1:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Dear Kom & Rob K,

Yes, it's a wonderful quote, thanks Rob - far more helpful than 
my clumsy attempts.

Actually, I raised yr question with K.Sujin, Kom and I understand 
we can we refer to pannatti as anatta in the sense that there is 
no self or atta anywhere and so we can say there is no 'atta' in 
what is real or imaginary. Of course, calling pannatti anatta in 
this way is not the same as understanding the characteristic of 
anatta of conditioned realities with panna.

One or two other points may come to mind (what I mentioned 
about lakkhana and sabhava to Joyce was one). 

Sarah
======


---  "Kom Tukovinit"  
wrote:
> Dear Roberts K,
> 
> This is a very nice explanation.  Do you by any chance know 
why Pannatti may
> be explained as anatta (although not as impermanence or 
dukha)?
> 
> kom

 
 
13514 From: Sukinder   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 8:35am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: 'no control', Reply to Rob E.(Booklet)

 
  Hi Rob,
After many obstacles I am now managing to respond. Starting with taking
my wife to immigration to extend her visa, paying a heavy fine for
overstaying
and then coming to work late. Decided to write from home later that night,
but younger son would not sleep until almost midnight, meanwhile other son
starts to cough, decided not to leave room in case he needs attention.
Planned to write in morning, but "yahoo 'my groups' " wasn't responding.
Left home to come to workplace to use computer here, remembered on
the way that this is friday, day to have lunch at mother's place. As usual
she stuffs me and I feel discomfort for the rest of the day.
But just remembered that all this is just concept and story, even the idea
that stomach is full, is just thinking, uncomfortable feeling does not have
to be connected to the story about mother stuffing me. And the feeling
does not necessarily have to originate from my belly. So now having done
a bit of breaking down of conventional reality in terms of it being just
that,
I am feeling better now. Still stuck with sakkaya ditthi however. Oh well!

Rob, let me say at the outset, that I like reading your views very much,
however having very little experience of dhamma myself, I find that my
own response often tend towards self- justification rather
than -clarification.
So I hope you don't mind me leaving out parts of your post to which my
response would be clearly akusala. Also being a junior within a group
of junior seekers of dhamma, my response should not be taken to
represent any one else's, less so the Abhidhamma or Therevada position.
I would be more comfortable had I had the knowledge and capability
to quote the tipitaka to support my understandings. The teachings
would at least put me more or less on track, otherwise the tendency
is toward interpreting in terms of personal inclination.

Now I go the the post:

> Sukin:
> Silabbataparamasa is "wrong practise", meaning anything we do with the
view
> that doing such things will lead to understanding.

R:
Sutta study for instance?  Or is this exempt from being 'wrong practice'?

S:
The aim of study, is intellectual knowledge. Whether there will be
understanding
of what is read or heard depend on conditions. There can be study with no
understanding, just accumulating lots of words. According to what I've
heard,
the tipitaka is full of descriptions about all the different realities, the
right path
and the wrong path. Don't you think it advisable to read about all these
realities
which inevitably arises through the course of our lives and find out what
will lead to
what, before deciding that a particular activity is condusive to
understanding?

R:
control and intention are not the same thing.  intentions create results,
whether
immediately or later, if they are actual intentions.  since every cause has
an
effect, this shuld be true, shoudn't it?  one confuses 'control' with
'results'.
certainly intentions and practices yield *results* that are in keeping with
those
intentions or practices.  this is in keeping with the law of cause and
effect, the
law of kamma.

S:
I get what you are saying about intention, and this is why I commentated
last time
about finding one's path and following it with all sincerity, whether just
this would
guarantee understanding.
At this point I'd like to add, that when people following the Buddha's path
say such
things as they wan't to attain 'final liberation' or that they want 'out of
samsara',
they don't realy mean it. Why, because if they consider how much attachment
they still had, they will have to admit that they still cling strongly to
the senses.
So if our intentions our not pure, the result will not be so.
And where best to know what our real inclinations are toward than in normal
every day circumstance? For eg., a person can be driven to tears hearing
some
dhamma, at that moment he may wish to become a monk, would it be advisable
for him to do so?

R:
if in fact it is totally unpredictable which activities will
produce.........albeit
resulting from past kamma in some amazingly complex way, will not, in
my opinion, help our progress.

What it does do is put us ..............we have no control.
The relief from having a self is a *freedom*, not a handicap.

S:
I agree that such descriptions can lead to the idea of passivity. But here
we are
talking about understanding as the aim, and I believe that panna is the
opposite
of passivity and allowing circumstace to thrust us here and there. Avija in
fact
is what gets us 'blown by the wind of circumstance', panna 'rides with the
wind'
of reality and goes against the tide of convention.
Understanding any situation is the goal. In the conventional world, we do
and
are bound by duty to do things with expectation of results, but what the
outcome
will be there is no being confused or surprised or carried away if there is
understanding that it was not "us" who brought about that result, just a
complex set of conditions.

S:
> There will be understanding or there will not, as simple as that. Surely
> intention is there, but there is no seeking out already fallen states or
unarisen ones.
> Nor trying to 'be' more attentive.

R:
Well I disagree.  The theory of cittas has its own set of escape hatches,
such as
the innumerable cetasikas which can cross-hatch each other in such a way as
to
cause a number of complex effects, and the fact that the accumulations of
the
cittas are passed on from one to the next.  In other words, if an intention
arises
in one citta, it may be passed to the next one and so on and so forth.

S:
It will pass on how strongly and what other object may condition the
proceeding
cittas and whether it will be kusala or akusala is hard to predict.

R:
This means the opposite of what you have said here:  the cittas do not
merely
arise and fall, they develop factors and accumulate them, and pass them
down.
So you *can*develop and build intentions........................ then why
should meditation and other intentional activities have similarly positive
results?  I still don't get the distinction.

S:
The law of cause and effect is precise but there being different intensities
and
innumerable causes it is impossible to isolate one condition and base the
result on that.

R:
I know I'm being pretty tough here, but I want to get to the real bones of
the
issue and see if we can draw some solid conclusions at some point.

S:
Not to worry, I am enjoying it and am very greatful.

R:
Well we can certainly learn and develop the right attitude towards
discernment and
learn to recognize those attitudes and approaches that are defeating of our
purpose.  This is a matter of intelligence, practice and assessment, not
coincidence.

S:
Agreed that this does happen, but can we be sure that it will? We do know on
the
other hand, that kusala or akusala conditions more of the same in terms of
accumulated tendencies, why not then we assess, based on the teachings to
see
what is right and what is not from the very beginning, which is now?
The avija associated with the activity (a concept) ie., sitting cross
legged, closing
one's eyes etc., will condition more of the same on and on. Yes the act of
studying
sutta, whether sitting or standing or walking or lying down can also be
accumulated
the same way, therefore it is very important to have an excellent teacher
like
K. Sujin and a group like DSG :-) to remind us about detachment and to show
the
significance of going beyond mere theory to actual application in daily
life. Panna
even a little leads to some level of detachment and tendency away from
silabbataparamasa.

> Sukin:
> Buddhism as we know it, not as the Buddha taught. Or do you think that the
> Mahayana teachings are the actual word of the Buddha?

R:
I am not a scholar and I don't know what the proofs are for historical
validity of
any teachings.  What i do know is that there is wisdom in both Theravada and
Mahayana.  I don't have any doubt of that.

S:
One does learn from any situation in life, but that depends on whether we
learn
to understand from the position of our own experience of reality or we learn
to imitate based on other's understandings. When I read a Mahayana text now,
it seems more to direct toward a "doing" kind of thing, which goes against
how
I view the world now. This is not to deny some very good reminders in there
especially with regard to parami. But this is clearly just my point of view.

R:
Well that is not to say that one is ultimately more effective than the
other.  We
don't really know that, but we do know that there is wisdom in Buddhist
teachings.

S:
Sorry I wasn't clear. What I meant was that it was more effective in terms
of the
number of people approaching it, with or without prior knowledge can gain to
a large or lesser extent.

> Sukin:
> Personally I don't find it useful to measure my or anyone else's progress,
> not knowing how to do it without giving importance to 'self' ;-).

R:
Well there is a path and there is a goal.  If not, what is the point?  If
one is
training to do something, one has some way of assessing whether they are
heading
in the right direction, doing the right process.  One can't walk around in
circles
and be satisfied, so we have to have something to see if we are heading in
the
right direction, no?

S:
Surely there is always a danger of going astray, and it would be a shame
indeed
to have come in contact with the teachings and still go wrong. But this is a
conventional way of seeing things, doing something, gauging it and testing
ground.
But can one really know what activity is going to lead to what. There is a
path and
there is a goal, but that goal is the understanding of the present moment.
Perhaps
with greater and greater precision, but is there any need to worry whether
the
precision is increasing or not? We still have to come back to the moment
don't we?

On the other hand, if one measures ones progress in terms of tendency for
kusala,
I feel that even if we are studying dhamma, if the aim is development of
panna, it is
possible that strong akusala arises from time to time which may have not
been so
before we studied dhamma. But this should not be evidence that there is no
progress.
The aim is panna and so instead of trying to control our behavior as before,
there
may be conditions for the otherwises hidden kilesas, manifest themselves in
terms
of akusala actions.
But I do agree that in the long run it must be less, otherwise we are doing
something
wrong.


> Sukin:
> Good, but is it worth clinging to?:-)

R:
You added that.

S:
Sorry!

R:
Anyone, from scientist to artist, would check
their results.  you assume there is clinging there.

S:
Yes, I think so, maybe subtle but surely there must be.


> can we really know for sure that what the Buddha taught is all true and
> only then will we really be independent and no more need outside
confirmation.

R:
but we have to develop that capacity and we have to work in a way that will
get us
there.  it won't happen by accident.

S:
Again, nothing is accidental, attempting to keep track or not will not
change what
the result will be from studying and applying the teachings. Measuring
progress
will condition an attempt to do something in relation to the result. *What
will
be that something to do?!*

> Sukin:
> Intention is in every citta, it arises and falls with it and it takes on
the
> quality of the citta, being with or without sati and panna.

R:
yes, but it also accumulates and is passed on.

S:
If it is akusala, then akusala accumulates. Besides lobha can come in
anytime, even after kusala moment.

R:
I think it's a mistake to draw assumptions in that way.  Nisargardatta saw
the
emptiness of all phenomena and saw no reason to change his behavior.  He
just kept
doing what he had always done.  i have heard many arguments saying that one
should
not worry about 'fixing' this reality, but instead discern its true nature,
and
that is what he emphasized.

S:
I made the comment with some reluctance, he is in any case a much superior
person to myself. But smoking cannot be any thing but a manifestation of
kilesa.
You are supposed to keep the five precepts perfectly once you become a
sotapanna.

R:
to be able to see the specific content of each moment is a property of
advanced
meditation as well as Buddhist philosophy.  as for 'individual cittas', we
will
both have to wait to see if they really arise and fall as single elements in
a
string of beads, or whether they break down to non-units in a continuous
changing
thread.  so far the idea that there are specific bounded cittas that have
clear
boundaries seems quite substantialist to me and is controversial within
Buddhism
at large.  I don't take it as a requirement for being 'Buddhist'.

S:
Yet out of bhavanga where there is no experience of anything, arises a sense
door adverting citta which conditions the sense consciousness. After that
there
may be sati of the level of satipatthana to be mindful of a reality 'just
arisen'.
This may be theory only, but based on someone else's experience, it is said
that at the moment of satipatthana, there is only the object of the citta,
no
observer observing anything, just that reality, "no self" anywhere, split
second,
and back to normal way of seeing things, ie., with subject / object duality.
This makes sense to me.

The boudary clear or subsumed by the conditions conditioning it is not an
issue. Undoubtedly there arises a visesa lakkhana to show the individuality
and uniqueness of that arising

But I don't take the knowledge of deatils to be a requirement for becoming
a buddhist either ;-).

R:
well I don't believe in 100% within samsara, this is a form of perfectionism
to
me.  moments are neither perfect nor imperfect, they are what they are.  the
Buddha is one who has no delusions, but you really can't measure other
qualities
by percent.   Does the buddha say he is a perfect being?  Just curious.

S:
100% means he had perfectly accomplished the paramis that were a
precondition
for becoming a samma sambuddha. Never mind about the exact figure, whether
it was 99.99%, or 95%, the point is he did not need any further development
nor
could there be. He accomplished everything that was needed to accomplish.

R:
I disagree.  Each generation does add something to understanding.  The
original
teachings are of the highest order, but that doesn't mean there's nothing
for us
to do to create a continuing tradition.

S:
NO.
If the teachings were something 'thought out', then I agree that you can
review and
improve on it. But the wisdom of the Buddha was not a result of "thinking
about"
reality. The insight he gained had no relation to the culture and history of
his time.
All the Buddhas past and future will necessarily have the same
understanding.
Anyone else is just a factor in the opposite direction, ie., polluting the
original
insight.

> Sukin:
> Yes, and knowing that at the moment it arises frees us from this tendency.

R:
In meditation too.  But meditation has the advantage of literally focussing
the
awareness, and one can still account for the intention and let go of
clinging
while still doing a practice.

S:
If this is your experience I'm happy for you.


> what about moments of seeing, hearing etc., do we doubt those moments?
> Aren't these moments real? even if our sati and panna is not sharp enough
to
> perceive them as just elements. We can in any case know the individual
> characteristics that are apparent even though clouded by the 'I'
experiencing
it.

R:
Meditation has a similar purpose, to simply see the nature of the mind as it
appears in the moment through arising thoughts, sensations, breath, arising
phenomena.  it is the same thing, only concentrated.

S:
Allow me to say something here. We have accumulated avijja of realities
through
all doorways. In order to understand seeing consciousness, it must arise
first.
If we don't know realities through all doorways we will continue to have
doubts
about it. It is not a matter of closing eyes and noting 'thinking',
'hearing' and
expect one day to develop understanding of eye-consciousness and visible
objects. There must be no picking and choosing. This is why understanding
must be natural, in daily life. If avijja arises much in relation to seeing
for
instance, then ignoring it would make it harder to understand.
The idea of meditation itself is a problem for me, if someone suggest what
is called "post meditation" ie., the idea of carrying mindfulness over to
daily
activities. This seems absurd to me.

R:
yes, but we work like demons to keep our views in place. and we keep
reconstituting them and accumulating them in many moments.  so they stick
around
even though they rise and fall again and again.  so maybe we should let go
rather
than hold on to our views when they do arise.

S:
If views are seen as just views and not reality, they would automatically
have less appeal. The problem is we have so much attachment to views, that
even right theoretical view can be clung to. But that is not the object of
studying the teachings, it must be done with detachment.

R:
I see that as a way of dismissing practices that have been proven to be
helpful
and effective over many centuries.  I don't think it's the most helpful
view, to
see things as so complex that it is random cause and effect to us, but then
to
step back in say but on the other hand we should study suttas and read the
commentaries.  that is contradictory.  we certainly think *those* activities
will
yield results, despite the complexity of causes.

S:
Study and know that it is only theory.
Study more theory and know that it is different from direct experience.
When there is direct experience, know what is direct experience, the
theory will have less appeal. But direct experience will happen only
when the conditions are right.
So you study more to understand 'Theoretically'. It is not to study theory
in order to have direct experience, it is just to understand theory and
that it is not the experience itself.

Whew! Never worked so hard all my life. Hope I have at least accumulated
some parami or the other ;-).

Hopefully you Rob, will be able to make our mails shorter, I didn't know how
to.
Sorry everyone else.

Best wishes,
Sukin.

 
13515 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 6:48pm
Subject: Present moment/ illusory future

 
  Dear All,

Buddhism emphasises that the past is an idealised fantasy, the future 
illusory, and that reality can only be found in the present moment.

In order to live in the present moment, Buddhism encourages us to 
be "mindful" or fully conscious of what we are doing.  Not only are 
we then living wholly in the present, but we are set free from living 
in vain regret for the past, or dreaming about the future.
 
Just a brief diversion to 'dream about the illusory future' for a 
moment.....
.... Looking at visible object, colours, feeling hardness, hearing 
rustling sound - thinking  Qantas ticket to Bangkok. 
Hard  to live in the present moment when there are only 16 days 
before leaving Brisbane and hoping to end up in Bangkok, before 
joining everyone else going to Sri Lanka.    But who can tell ... 
life is an unpredictable adventure....and, just in case the snakes 
had slipped from our minds....
"According to Sri Lanka National Museum's Manuscript Series (Vol. 
VIII) and the Sinhala Palm Leaf Manuscripts Medical Vol. IV 
(Treatment  for  snake bites), there are five kinds of venomous 
snakes in Sri Lanka. They are the Mapila (Cat-snake), the Karawala 
(Krait), the Naya (Cobra), the  Tit-polonga (Russell's viper) and the 
Kunakatuwa (Humped-nose viper)." 

Does (anyone apart from me) think it is a little worrying that the 
Treatment for snake bites is kept on Palm Leaf Manuscripts? :-)

metta,
Christine

 
13516 From: Sarah   
Date: Fri May 24, 2002 8:51pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita

 
  Hi Larry,

Yes, I think I did misunderstand you (as I suspected at the time),
probably because it was in an ADL study context.

You mention a ‘sense of self that arises before anything is identified
*with*.’ You suggest this is a ‘feeling of like, dislike and confusion’.
Let me assure you while we’re ont the topic of ‘untaught manyfolk’, that
there is nothing ‘well-ordered’ about my mind. I just came home from my
Tai Chi class in which I was most embarrassed, having forgotten everything
I learnt last week after the disruption of the long weekend away. Still,
as Sukin has just reminded us with so many helpful daily life details,
there can be sati at these times of conventional forgetting and awareness
of the embarrassment (dosa, mana, clinging to self and so on).

I think the feeling of ‘sense of self’ you refer to is thinking (about
concepts, of course) and not necessarily in words or long thoughts at all.
It can creep in so quickly and as you suggest, is accompanied by like,
dislike or moha. There may be ditthi (wrong view) too, or it may just be
attachment to self. Only sati and panna can know precisely. 

When I referred to objects such as seeing, visible object and so on, I was
suggesting that without these realities in the sense door processes, there
would be no thinking, likes or dislikes. Therefore, there has to be the
development of understanding of realities appearing or experiencing
through six doorways.

As Manji just quoted so helpfully (thanks Manji for all your excellent
quotes):
======================================= 
We read in the Middle Length Sayings (I, no. l8, Discourse of the Honey
Ball) about the origin of perceptions and obsessions and their ending.
Mahå-
Kaccana gave to the monks an explanation about what the Buddha had said
in brief: 
	
Visual consciousness, your reverences, arises because of eye and visual
object; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement (phassa);
feelings are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one
perceives; what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons about
obsesses one; what obsesses one is the origin of the number of
perceptions and obsessions which assail a man in regard to visual object
cognisable by the eye, past, future, present…
=======================================

Larry, I fully agree with you that all the problems in life come down to
the akusala roots and in particular to moha (ignorance) and ditthi (wrong
view).

Thanks for your patience with my misguided comments before. I also really
appreciate that you are studying abhidhamma IN DAILY LIFE. However
detailed it is, the test of its value is only in the understanding of
phenomena appearing now. It doesn’t matter if we don’t master or remember
all the details.

Talking of which, I’ve now long forgotten the embarrassment of the Tai Chi
class, thanks;-)

Sarah
=====


 
13517 From: Num 
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 1:05am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 9 (2)

 
  Hi Larry,

Let me bring this up. As it mentioned in Milindapanha, Ven. Nagasena said to 
the King Milinda that to discern citta and it accompanied cetasikas is very 
difficult, like to compartmentalize the ingredients of a soup when you taste 
the soup or to analyze the sea water in the ocean to see which part of the 
water comes from what river.

The following is from the post K.Sukin wrote to Rob E. I think both quotes 
complement each other pretty well. K.Sukin is a very wise man.

***********************
<<If views are seen as just views and not reality, they would automatically 
have less appeal. The problem is we have so much attachment to views, that 
even right theoretical view can be clung to. But that is not the object of 
studying the teachings, it must be done with detachment.>>

<<Study and know that it is only theory. Study more theory and know that it 
is different from direct experience. When there is direct experience, know 
what is direct experience, the theory will have less appeal. But direct 
experience will happen only when the conditions are right. So you study more 
to understand 'Theoretically'. It is not to study theory in order to have 
direct experience, it is just to understand theory and that it is not the 
experience itself.>>
*******************

<<I take it that lobha, dosa, moha, alobha, adosa, amoha may or may not arise 
in 5 door process. Would they arise with every citta in 5 door process?>>

N: In a non-arahant person, one or more of the six root-cetasikas co-arise 
with cittas in javana sub-process of both PDAC and MDAC. All other cittas in 
the process are ahetuka.

In an arahant, two or more of the sobana roots (alobha, adosa and/or panna) 
co-arise with cittas in javana sub-process of both PDAC and MDAC (It's called 
sobana roots b/c an arahant no longer has kusala citta, all citta in javana 
sub-process become kiriya citta).  The smiling process of an arahant can be 
rooted (mahakiriya-somanassa) or rootless (hasitupada vithi). 

The bhavanga-citta remains the same, as the patisandhi-citta, through out 
life. In human plane, it can be with kusala-ahetuka vipaka or kusala-hetuka 
vipaka citta (with or without panna).


<<I still don't understand mind object. What is a 'past citta'? Is it a citta 
or something else?>>

N: "Past citta" is citta that has already fallen away. An object of MDAC can 
be namadhamma (e.g. citta, cetasika). We talk about something really fast 
here. In daily life sometimes we have past or recent past vedana, rupa, 
cetasika, or citta as an object of the current citta.  I think sanna also 
plays a role here. 

From Satipatthana-sutta: The Contemplation of Consciousness,

<<"And how, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating consciousness in 
consciousness? 
"Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust, as with 
lust; the consciousness without lust, as without lust; the consciousness with 
hate, as with hate; the consciousness without hate, as without hate; the 
consciousness with ignorance, as with ignorance; the consciousness without 
ignorance, as without ignorance; the shrunken state of consciousness, as the 
shrunken state; the distracted state of consciousness, as the distracted 
state; the state of consciousness become great, as the state become great; 
the state of consciousness not become great, as the state not become great; 
the state of consciousness with some other mental state superior to it, as 
the state with something mentally higher; the state of consciousness with no 
other mental state superior to it, as the state with nothing mentally higher; 
the quieted state of consciousness, as the quieted state; the state of 
consciousness not quieted, as the state not quieted; the freed state of 
consciousness as freed; and the unfreed state of consciousness, as unfreed. >>



<<Is a pannatti aramanna a citta or something else?>>
N: Pannatti can be arammana of citta.

<<Is  memory a citta or something else?>>
N: No, sanna cetasika is sanna-khandha. It's a cetasika.

<<I think a lot of this confusion could be cleared up if we had a clear 
understanding of memory. Saying sanna marks its object for memory is not 
saying enough. We need more understanding of memory and more understanding of 
sanna. I am very surprised that in a system that depends so heavily on memory 
so little is known about this function.>>

N: May I refer you to the useful posts on dsg: Sanna (memory, perception) 
5880, 8384, 10098, 10141, 10378, 11085, 11923. 

<<I've been toying with the idea that sati is memory and satipatthana is very 
near memory (upatthana means standing near). This may account for the sense 
of presence and objectivity. One consciousness cognizing another 
consciousness that is so near it seems current but really isn't ('presence' 
in this case would be a memory). The main problem with this theory is that 
sati isn't a universal cetasika but sanna is. Maybe sanna and sati work 
together.>>

N: Sati is a conditioned reality. Sanna is a proximate cause of sati. Sati 
has a manifestation of attending its arammana. Sanna is one of the 5-khandha. 
There are a lot of schools/views about nature of sanna by various schools of 
thought during the Bhuddha time as mentioned in 62 wrong views in 
Brahmajala-sutta. I think sanna is very crucial.

<<Anyway, I hope you are enjoying your vacation.  Relaxing, doing nothing, 
just watching the sun shine and the grass grow.>>

N: Thanks. My vacation will start 3 weeks from now.


Best wishes and happy Memorial Day weekend.


Num

 
13518 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 6:26am
Subject: Much ado over nothing? re Useful Posts

 
  Dear Sarah, Jon, and All,

I often study the Useful Posts to learn and reflect on the Dhamma, 
and have found them an invaluable resource. They have been a primary 
learning tool for me, second only to current discussions on List. But 
I have felt uncomfortable and reluctant to study them lately, ever 
since seeing the "eXTReMe Tracking" Logo at the bottom of the index 
page, which was apparently installed on 28 March.  Did I miss the 
post broaching this subject with the members ? 
http://extremetracking.com/open;geo?login=dsgup
I realise that collecting and collating statistics is (sometimes) 
useful. My personal opinion is that  my reading habits, when I am on-
line, and how often I visit a site are my own private business.  I 
believe individual identity is not one of the statistics being kept 
(from a look at the Summary) but I think we all know who comes from 
the Domain of 'au', whose server is iprimus.com.au and who has had 17 
contacts or 77.27% of the total.
Could we be told a little more about the Tracker, why it is there, 
and what it is hoped to achieve?  Does it matter  whether it is known 
that a thousand people a year (or just ten) visit the Useful Posts?
I acknowledge that I may be being oversensitive on this issue.  I 
have recently been involved in robust debate over the ethics of 
cameras in staff toilets and locker areas, and a tracking system for 
when individual cars enter and leave the Staff Car park at the 
hospital. (I was on the 'no' side of the debate, as you may have 
guessed :)) - had a win on the staff toilets/lockers, and a loss on 
the carpark tracker.)

Anyway, Just my thoughts,
metta,
Christine

 
13519 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 8:33am
Subject: Re: Much ado over nothing? re Useful Posts

 
  --- 
Dear Chris. and all,
I guess before the debate on this begins I should mention that on my 
site www.abhidhamma.org I installed a tracker way back that gives me 
all sorts of statistics on how many visits, what country even IP. My 
ones  a hidden one as I originally installed a non-hidden one like 
the one you mention that sarah and jon have apparently installed but 
I didn't like the look of it on the page.
What are my reasons for this? Mainly vanity as I wanted to see how 
many people were visiting the site and how diverse they were. the 
count buttons (different from trackers)give no info but with the 
trackers you can see who is a new visitor as against and old, what 
country etc. and so get a better idea. I actually haven't looked at 
the stats  for months as the novelty soon wears off but if anyone is 
interested here is a the stats on country of origin for a couple of 
months (I just went to the site and got it):
Countries Number of visits 
US Commercial 384  
Network 375  
Australia 107  
Japan 94  
US Educational 66  
Netherlands 50  
Singapore 49  
Thailand 49  
United Kingdom 48  
Canada 46  
Malaysia 24  
Italy 19  
Belgium 16  
Switzerland 14  
United States 13  
Spain 12  
Germany 9  
New Zealand 8  
Austria 7  
Sweden 6  
Poland 6  
Czech Republic 5  
France 5  
US Government 5  
Non-Profit Org 5  
Croatia (Hrvatska) 5  
Un. Arab Emirates 5  
Israel 4  
US Military 4  
Hong Kong 3  
Indonesia 3  
Taiwan 3  
Brazil 3  
Brunei Darussalam 3  
Uruguay 2  
South Africa 2  
Romania 2  
Chile 2  
Argentina 2  
Greece 2  
Korea (South) 2  
Finland 2  
Hungary 1  
Slovak Republic 1  
Denmark 1  
Mexico 1  
Norway 1  
Iceland 1  
India 1  
Macedonia 1  
Ecuador 1  
Nepal 1  
best wishes
robert
 "christine_forsyth"  wrote:
> Dear Sarah, Jon, and All,
> 
> I often study the Useful Posts to learn and reflect on the Dhamma, 
> and have found them an invaluable resource. They have been a 
primary 
> learning tool for me, second only to current discussions on List. 
But 
> I have felt uncomfortable and reluctant to study them lately, ever 
> since seeing the "eXTReMe Tracking" Logo at the bottom of the 
index 
> page, which was apparently installed on 28 March.  Did I miss the 
> post broaching this subject with the members ? 
> http://extremetracking.com/open;geo?login=dsgup
> I realise that collecting and collating statistics is (sometimes) 
> useful. My personal opinion is that  my reading habits, when I am 
on-
> line, and how often I visit a site are my own private business.  I 
> believe individual identity is not one of the statistics being 
kept 
> (from a look at the Summary) but I think we all know who comes 
from 
> the Domain of 'au', whose server is iprimus.com.au and who has had 
17 
> contacts or 77.27% of the total.
> Could we be told a little more about the Tracker, why it is there, 
> and what it is hoped to achieve?  Does it matter  whether it is 
known 
> that a thousand people a year (or just ten) visit the Useful Posts?
> I acknowledge that I may be being oversensitive on this issue.  I 
> have recently been involved in robust debate over the ethics of 
> cameras in staff toilets and locker areas, and a tracking system 
for 
> when individual cars enter and leave the Staff Car park at the 
> hospital. (I was on the 'no' side of the debate, as you may have 
> guessed :)) - had a win on the staff toilets/lockers, and a loss 
on 
> the carpark tracker.)
> 
> Anyway, Just my thoughts,
> metta,
> Christine

 
13520 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 9:51am
Subject: Re: Much ado over nothing? re Useful Posts

 
  Dear Robert, and All,

 I agree that this is a widespread practice. Though I can't quite see 
what benefits would obtain to a buddhist list knowing where 
their 'customers' are coming from.  The 'product' can hardly be 
changed to suit what people are looking for nowadays. :) And I don't 
think anybody has an advertising budget....

My understanding of the situation on dsg, is that it is not a case of 
monitoring from where one-off or repeat hits by the general world 
population are originating.  Perhaps I am wrong, but I thought the 
Useful Posts were only open to this comparatively small family of 
members.  I wonder what would be the reason (other than curiosity) to 
observe 'who' is looking at 'what', and at 'which times'  they are 
doing it?  My major unsettledness probably comes as a projection onto 
dsg of concern at a growing intrusion of observational/monitoring 
devices in  life-in-general.

 It makes me smile, Robert, to hear you admit to vanity .... and it 
is hard to keep any heat in the discussion after such a 
confession.:)    

metta,
Christine

---  "robertkirkpatrick.rm" 
 wrote:
> --- 
> Dear Chris. and all,
> I guess before the debate on this begins I should mention that on 
my 
> site www.abhidhamma.org I installed a tracker way back that gives 
me 
> all sorts of statistics on how many visits, what country even IP. 
My 
> ones  a hidden one as I originally installed a non-hidden one like 
> the one you mention that sarah and jon have apparently installed 
but 
> I didn't like the look of it on the page.
> What are my reasons for this? Mainly vanity as I wanted to see how 
> many people were visiting the site and how diverse they were. the 
> count buttons (different from trackers)give no info but with the 
> trackers you can see who is a new visitor as against and old, what 
> country etc. and so get a better idea. I actually haven't looked at 
> the stats  for months as the novelty soon wears off but if anyone 
is 
> interested here is a the stats on country of origin for a couple of 
> months (I just went to the site and got it):
> Countries Number of visits 
> US Commercial 384  
> Network 375  
> Australia 107  
> Japan 94  
> US Educational 66  
> Netherlands 50  
> Singapore 49  
> Thailand 49  
> United Kingdom 48  
> Canada 46  
> Malaysia 24  
> Italy 19  
> Belgium 16  
> Switzerland 14  
> United States 13  
> Spain 12  
> Germany 9  
> New Zealand 8  
> Austria 7  
> Sweden 6  
> Poland 6  
> Czech Republic 5  
> France 5  
> US Government 5  
> Non-Profit Org 5  
> Croatia (Hrvatska) 5  
> Un. Arab Emirates 5  
> Israel 4  
> US Military 4  
> Hong Kong 3  
> Indonesia 3  
> Taiwan 3  
> Brazil 3  
> Brunei Darussalam 3  
> Uruguay 2  
> South Africa 2  
> Romania 2  
> Chile 2  
> Argentina 2  
> Greece 2  
> Korea (South) 2  
> Finland 2  
> Hungary 1  
> Slovak Republic 1  
> Denmark 1  
> Mexico 1  
> Norway 1  
> Iceland 1  
> India 1  
> Macedonia 1  
> Ecuador 1  
> Nepal 1  
> best wishes
> robert
>  "christine_forsyth"  wrote:
> > Dear Sarah, Jon, and All,
> > 
> > I often study the Useful Posts to learn and reflect on the 
Dhamma, 
> > and have found them an invaluable resource. They have been a 
> primary 
> > learning tool for me, second only to current discussions on List. 
> But 
> > I have felt uncomfortable and reluctant to study them lately, 
ever 
> > since seeing the "eXTReMe Tracking" Logo at the bottom of the 
> index 
> > page, which was apparently installed on 28 March.  Did I miss the 
> > post broaching this subject with the members ? 
> > http://extremetracking.com/open;geo?login=dsgup
> > I realise that collecting and collating statistics is (sometimes) 
> > useful. My personal opinion is that  my reading habits, when I am 
> on-
> > line, and how often I visit a site are my own private business.  
I 
> > believe individual identity is not one of the statistics being 
> kept 
> > (from a look at the Summary) but I think we all know who comes 
> from 
> > the Domain of 'au', whose server is iprimus.com.au and who has 
had 
> 17 
> > contacts or 77.27% of the total.
> > Could we be told a little more about the Tracker, why it is 
there, 
> > and what it is hoped to achieve?  Does it matter  whether it is 
> known 
> > that a thousand people a year (or just ten) visit the Useful 
Posts?
> > I acknowledge that I may be being oversensitive on this issue.  I 
> > have recently been involved in robust debate over the ethics of 
> > cameras in staff toilets and locker areas, and a tracking system 
> for 
> > when individual cars enter and leave the Staff Car park at the 
> > hospital. (I was on the 'no' side of the debate, as you may have 
> > guessed :)) - had a win on the staff toilets/lockers, and a loss 
> on 
> > the carpark tracker.)
> > 
> > Anyway, Just my thoughts,
> > metta,
> > Christine

 
13521 From: <> 
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 10:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 9 (2)

 
  Thanks Num, for your clarifications and suggestions. I'm going to look
though my books for more on sanna this weekend. If I find anything new
I'll post it. One thought that has occured to me is that we have a list
of different rupa, a list of different vedana, a list of different
sankhara, and a list of different citta, but no list (that I know of) of
different sanna. That's interesting. 

Larry

 
13522 From: <> 
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 10:35am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita

 
  Hi Sarah, even I don't understand what I'm saying. Ego is such a
difficult thing to identify. You could call it attachment, but when
viewed in satippatthana it is just attachment. It's like light looking
for dark.

Larry

 
13523 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 10:47am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Much ado over nothing? re Useful Posts

 
  Christine

The Tracker button was put there by Kom who helps a lot behind the scenes
and has certain (limited) moderator privileges for that purpose.  Kom was
interested to know the number of visitors to the Useful Posts site and, as
far as I know, that is the only information that the function gives.

Sarah and I are definitely not concerned about the identity of visitors to
that page (or any other part of the list), and we will ask Kom to remove
the button if in fact it gives information other than just the number of
visitors.  We realise that privacy is a sensitive issue for some members.

As this issue is off-topic, we would ask that any further correspondence
on this subject be off-list.  We can assure you we will respond
sympathetically to any such issues raised by members.  We do not wish
anything to detract from the dhamma discussion on the list.

Thanks for raising the point, and for your co-operation.

Jon & Sarah


 --- christine_forsyth  wrote: > Dear Sarah, Jon,
and All,
> 
> I often study the Useful Posts to learn and reflect on the Dhamma, 
> and have found them an invaluable resource. They have been a primary 
> learning tool for me, second only to current discussions on List. But 
> I have felt uncomfortable and reluctant to study them lately, ever 
> since seeing the "eXTReMe Tracking" Logo at the bottom of the index 
> page, which was apparently installed on 28 March.  Did I miss the 
> post broaching this subject with the members ? 
> http://extremetracking.com/open;geo?login=dsgup
> I realise that collecting and collating statistics is (sometimes) 
> useful. My personal opinion is that  my reading habits, when I am on-
> line, and how often I visit a site are my own private business.  I 
> believe individual identity is not one of the statistics being kept 
> (from a look at the Summary) but I think we all know who comes from 
> the Domain of 'au', whose server is iprimus.com.au and who has had 17 
> contacts or 77.27% of the total.
> Could we be told a little more about the Tracker, why it is there, 
> and what it is hoped to achieve?  Does it matter  whether it is known 
> that a thousand people a year (or just ten) visit the Useful Posts?
> I acknowledge that I may be being oversensitive on this issue.  I 
> have recently been involved in robust debate over the ethics of 
> cameras in staff toilets and locker areas, and a tracking system for 
> when individual cars enter and leave the Staff Car park at the 
> hospital. (I was on the 'no' side of the debate, as you may have 
> guessed :)) - had a win on the staff toilets/lockers, and a loss on 
> the carpark tracker.)
> 
> Anyway, Just my thoughts,
> metta,
> Christine
> 


 
13524 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 11:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Num

 --- Num wrote: 
> Dear Jon:
> 
> Jim: <<  The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii
> pa.tipadaa". It 
> seems to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of 
> "pa.tipadaa" (the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way leading to).
> >>
> Num <<I looked up the Thai sutta and the atthakatha. <<
> Satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii>> translated as <<development of 
> satipatthana-4.>> The word "pa.tipadaa" is left untranslated in Thai. >>
> Jon: << I find it interesting that this word should have been left 
> untranslated
> (but I can't think what significance this might have ;-) ). >>
> 
> 
> I meant in Thai tipitaka, the word patipada is used without being
> translated 
> in to simpler Thai word. I think Jim can give more thorough meaning of
> the 
> word. Pati- has a board meaning. I think here it means "toward" and pada
> 
> means " the way". Another word 'patipatti'; pati here means "together or
> all 
> over" and patti means "attaining or reaching". Patipatti, which usually 
> translated into practice, can also mean reaching altogether, knowing all
> --> 
> knowing nama and rupa.

On 'patipada'
Thanks for clarifying the 'untranslated' point;  my apologies for not
seeing the obvious meaning in your comment.
Perhaps the most frequently-met use of this term is in the description of
the 4th NOble Truth as 'dukkha nirodha gamini patipada' which to my
recollection is invariably translated as something like 'path leading to
the extinction of suffering' (never as 'practice').

On 'patipatti'
I believe this term is translated into Thai as 'tyyng ch'po'.  Does this
give the same sense as you have indicated above?
Some may find it helpful, as I do, to think of patipatti in the context of
the 3 levels of understanding, namely--
pariyatti (theoretical understanding)
patipatti (application of the theory)
pativedhi (realisation).
Any moment of satipatthana would qualify as 'patipatti' under this 3-fold
grouping.

Jon



 
13525 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 11:24am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Kom

 --- Kom Tukovinit  wrote: 
> Dear Jon & All,
... 
> Patipada is left translated in more than a few contexts in
> the Thai-translated Tipitakas.  For example,
> Majhimma-pa.tipadaa (the middle way), Samma-pa.tipadaa (the
> right way), and Dukkha-Niroda-gamani-Patipadda (the way
> leading to the cessation, or magga).  I guess Patipadda is
> translated as either the way or the practice.
> 
> If one insists on doctrines (right or wrong!), one can say,
> Satipatthana is both 5-fold and 8-fold magga, and magga is
> both 5-fold and 8-fold.  Therefore, satipatthana can be used
> interchangeably with magga.

Thanks for your comments.

I agree with the connection you make between satipatthana and magga.  As I
understand it, the commentaries explain that a moment of satipatthana is a
moment of mundane path-consciousness.

Nevertheless, I tend to think that when the Buddha used the term 'Noble
Eightfold Path' in addressing listeners who were ripe for enlightenment he
was referring exclusively to supramundane consciousness.

Jon


 
13526 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 11:28am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 
  Kom

 --- Kom Tukovinit  wrote: > Dear Christine and Jon,
> 
> Sorry to butt in, but this is too entertaining to resist...
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jonothan Abbott [mailto:Jon]
> > > Sometimes I feel as if there are two me's - a
> > reasonable, rational
> > > one who drags a kicking and resisting one along. :-)
> > > Thanks for the common sense advice.
> >
> > Well, the 'kicking and resisting one' is also
> > very zany and entertaining,
> > and it helps keep a good balance here!
> >
> 
> Just while I am entertaining my zany friends, I need to
> remind myself, the entertaining friends would only lead to
> bad plane of existence, miserable plane of existence, and
> hell, or at the very least many more continued rounds of
> existence.  The more rational friends will lead me (if it's
> not the entertaining friends who dress up as the rational
> friends) to good plane of existence, happy plane of
> existence, and heaven, and if we are persistent, eventually
> the release.   Hmm....   Good friends should really be
> appreciated...

I agree with what you say about the value of good friends.  However, we
should be careful not to 'typecast' too readily.  Zany types can have a
genuine interest in the teachings and in supporting another's interest in
the teachings.  And there are plenty of rational types with serious wrong
view!!

Jon


 
13527 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 11:44am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: anicca

 
  Victor

 --- yuzhonghao  wrote: 
> Jon and all,
> 
> Is a mental construct permanent or impermanent?
> Is it satisfactory or unsatisfactory?
> Is it to be seen as it actually is with right discernment thus: "This 
> is not mine.  This I am not.  This is not my self."?

Interesting questions.  Consider this:  do we take mental constructs as
being permanent and satisfactory in the same way that we take the visible
object, sound or consciousness as being permanent and satisfactory?  I
think not.

To my understanding of the texts, the 'direct knowledge' that the Buddha
spoke of was addressed to the experiencing of the dhammas that constitute
the 5 khandhas (which, again to my understanding, do not include purely
mental constructs).

I think the reason for this emphasis could be that taking mental
constructs for being self or satisfactory is not a problem that needs to
be specifically addressed, whereas taking say lobha or visible object for
self or satisfactory is a problem that needs to be directly addressed.

Jon 


 
13528 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 11:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Howard

--- Howard wrote: 
> Hi, Robert (and Nina) -
> 
>        The position you take here, Rob, seems to go a bit beyond mine. 
> Something which is like a "star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash
> of 
> lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream"
> has a 
> mirage-like quality, but it is not absolutely nothing. Dhammas exist,
> but in 
> a middle-way, dependent, and not self-supporting manner (despite the
> root mean
> ing of 'dhamma'). The question is exactly what does one mean by a
> "reality". 
> I do NOT see hardness as having to be hardness of "something". There are
> just 
> the characteristics and functionalities, but no "things" that possess
> them, 
> except conventionally (that is: only in a manner of speaking). The 

Again, I agree with you here, particularly where you say that hardness is
not the hardness *of something* but is just hardness.  The 'thing' that we
take as possessing the hardness is just another concept/conventional
reality.

> The characteristics are real in the sense of being elements of 
> experience, but are unreal in the sense of not being self-existent.
> This is my take on the matter. 

I will 'pass' on the second part of this assertion, since the idea of
'self-existence' is not one I am familiar with (unless it means the same
as 'conditioned').

>   My fear is that the constant reference to "realities" tends
> towards a substantialist perspective.

Well this is altogether another issue.  But I think we shouldn't let a
matter of terminology cloud the real issue (namely, what is meant by
realities as that term is found in the texts, and what is the significance
of realities in the teachings).

As it happens I don’t share your concern, and I'm content to go along with
the Theras who seemed to know an awful lot more about these things than
anyone today does.  I can see a case for "realties" used to distinguish
phenomena from "concepts", even though the phenomena in question are
ultimately insubstantial.

Jon

 
13529 From: Howard 
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 7:52am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/24/02 11:46:39 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Jon writes:


>  I can see a case for "realties" used to distinguish
> phenomena from "concepts", even though the phenomena in question are
> ultimately insubstantial.
> 
===========================
That's not "bad", Jon. It doesn't make me uncomfortable! ;-))

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         

 
13530 From: Kom Tukovinit   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 1:49pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 
  Dear Jon,

I am sorry to have sounded somewhat stereotypical of people.
I didn't mean to be.  I meant to point out that we should
appreciate the value of kusala, and beware of the faults of
akusala.  The zany friend, and the logical (maybe
serious? --- nah... the peaceful) friends are metaphorical
of akusala and kusala (as Christine was talking about two
different kinds of friends within herself.)  The akusala is
very entertaining to me, but there also are many faults with
it.

There are also many akusala that cross-dress as kusala.
Lobha (micha-sati) can dress up as Sati (samma-sati).  We
need to be thorough while studying the dhammas, and it is
important to clearly differentiate our good friends
(kusala), and our not-so-good, but very entertaining friends
(akusala).

I wouldn't label Christine as not-so-good friend, despite
how entertaining she is ;-).  Being attached to her because
how entertaining she is, now that has many faults...

kom

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jonothan Abbott [mailto:Jon]
> Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 8:29 PM
> Subject: RE: [dsg] Deciding how best to act
>
>

> > Just while I am entertaining my zany friends, I need to
> > remind myself, the entertaining friends would
> only lead to
> > bad plane of existence, miserable plane of
> existence, and
> > hell, or at the very least many more continued rounds of
> > existence.  The more rational friends will lead
> me (if it's
> > not the entertaining friends who dress up as
> the rational
> > friends) to good plane of existence, happy plane of
> > existence, and heaven, and if we are
> persistent, eventually
> > the release.   Hmm....   Good friends should really be
> > appreciated...
>
> I agree with what you say about the value of good
> friends.  However, we
> should be careful not to 'typecast' too readily.
> Zany types can have a
> genuine interest in the teachings and in
> supporting another's interest in
> the teachings.  And there are plenty of rational
> types with serious wrong
> view!!

 
13531 From: Kom Tukovinit   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 2:04pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Dear Jon,

More opinion, obviously...  ;-)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jonothan Abbott [mailto:Jon]
>
> I agree with the connection you make between
> satipatthana and magga.  As I
> understand it, the commentaries explain that a
> moment of satipatthana is a
> moment of mundane path-consciousness.

This may be unrelated.  I was discussing with Num today
about this particular point.  One thing we agreed with each
other is that Satipatthana is counted as 4 of the 37
Bodhi-pacaya-dhamma (???).  Satipatthana 4 must first be
developed before all the sammpayutta-dhamma can be called
Sammapathan 4, Iddhibat 4, ..., Magga 8.  At the point of
magga, all 37 factors become perfected (at the appropriate
level).  By this definition, I understand Satipatthana to be
part of magga.

>
> Nevertheless, I tend to think that when the
> Buddha used the term 'Noble
> Eightfold Path' in addressing listeners who were
> ripe for enlightenment he
> was referring exclusively to supramundane consciousness.
>

I don't have such confidence yet.  Somehow when the word
magga is used, sometimes (I think) it is interpreted in the
commentaries as being both mundane and supra-mundane.  And I
also understand that we all have to start somewhere besides
at the perfection, and even then it is still called the
path, just a very dangerous (for falling wayside, being
fooled by akusala and micha-dithi) one...

kom

 
13532 From: jonoabb   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 5:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 
  Victor

---  "yuzhonghao"  wrote:
> Jon,
> 
> Regarding "learning by understanding and applying", what about it?
> 
> Regards,
> Victor

To my reading of the teachings, an understanding at a theoretical 
level about the different dhammas and their 
properties/characteristics (pariyatti) is a necessary prerequisite 
for seeing dhammas as they truly are (patipatti).

This is why the Buddha gave such importance to listening to the 
dhamma and associating with the wise/good friend, not only at the 
beginning level but throughout the development of the path right up 
to arahantship.

I see this approach as truly emulating those who listened to the 
Buddha's teaching during his lifetime.  We should keep in mind that 
those listeners included not only monks who had a developed practice 
of samatha, but also monks with no such accumulations and lay-people 
leading `ordinary' lives.  As you will know from your reading of the 
suttas (which I can see is very extensive) some of the householders 
attained enlightenment on hearing the Buddha's teaching, while some 
(such as Anathapindika) were followers who were already sotapanna but 
continued to attend frequently and ask questions.

What those varied listeners had in common was not their status or 
lifestyle but their developed understanding (direct knowledge) of the 
presently arising phenomena, based on a correct conceptual 
understanding of the Buddha's teaching.

So by `understanding and applying' I mean `pariyatti' and `patipatti'.

Jon


> >  --- yuzhonghao  wrote: 
> > > the unnamed monk the Buddha mentioned in the discourse is a 
model 
> > > that I would emulate.  And this is how I learn how to establish 
> > > mindfulness from reading the Satipatthana Sutta: following the 
> > > examples in the discourse and emulate them.  It is a process 
> > > of "learning by doing" and takes repetitive practice.

 
13533 From: Sarah   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 8:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K]

 
  Hi Dan,

 --- onco111  wrote: > Excellent, Sarah! 

My goodness, is this the same Dan that started the 1.1. Discouraging
series this time last year that had me quaking and shaking, wondering when
the dreaded 1.2 would come, I ask??
.....
>You caught me averaging.
.....
Is that averaging between kusala and akusala or between right and wrong
ritual??
..... 
>I do so appreciate your 
> sharp observations.
.....
Likewise...just a little teamwork and I always welcome your comments too,
in spite of the shakes;-) 
.....
 > I meant that if someone wants to give alms to win merit or to put 
> flowers on an alter to please God or to stand up in front of friends 
> and family to publicly pledge to be faithful to and stick together 
> with another in marriage or to take five precepts in a ceremony, it's 
> not a bad thing. Of course, during any of these rituals, there are 
> bound to be akusala and kusala moments arising and passing away. The 
> balance very often tilts toward the kusala, even if there happen to 
> be many moments of silabbataparamasa mixed in. But I think you are 
> right to note that at the moments of silabbataparamasa, surely 
> attachment and wrong view arise -- not to condemn the partaking in 
> the ritual, though, just pointing out how wrong view may arise.
.....
Yes, all agreed, though I wouldn't like to say in general in which way the
balance tilts. Like you suggest, exactly the same functions and processes
can be followed with right view or wrong view. Whenever there is the idea
that any of the rituals will lead of themselves to the development of
satipatthana or nibbana, there are moments of silabbataparamasa, as I
understand. This is why we can never tell from outer appearances what the
understanding is at these times.

Hi to Lisa too,

Sarah
=====



 
13534 From: onco111   
Date: Sat May 25, 2002 10:52pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K]

 
  Sarah: My goodness, is this the same Dan that started the 1.1. 
Discouraging series this time last year that had me quaking and 
shaking, wondering when the dreaded 1.2 would come, I ask??

--> Dan: Thanks for the reminder! I'll get working on it. See you 
soon!

 
13535 From: Num 
Date: Sun May 26, 2002 1:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 9 (2)

 
  Dear Larry and ADL group.

<< 
 N: In a non-arahant person, one or more of the six root-cetasikas co-arise 
with cittas in javana sub-process of both PDAC and MDAC. All other cittas in 
the process are ahetuka.
 >>

Opppp, I have to edit my statement. Kom just reminded me that the tadalambana 
citta, which have a function of knowing the arammana in continuation from the 
javana-citta, can be 8 maha-vipaka citta (kamavacara-sahetuka-vipaka citta) 
or 3 of the santirana citta (ahetuka).

Thanks Kom. 

Enchante'  ;-)


Num

 
13536 From: jonoabb   
Date: Sun May 26, 2002 5:05pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Num, Kom & others

A further thought on this, or perhaps I am only just 'getting' what 
you have been saying.  

In the sutta we are discussing, the reference to the development 
of mindfulness could be meant as a reference to magga 
citta/nibbana.

If that's the interpretation, then giving the Noble Eightfold Path as 
the way leading to this would 'fit'.

But this is only speculation.  I would like to see how similar 
references elsewhere are explained in the commentaries.

Jon

> Dear Jon:
> 
> Jim: <<  The Pali phrase is "satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii 
pa.tipadaa". It 
> seems to me that "the path of practice" is either a translation of 
> "pa.tipadaa" (the way) or "-gaaminii pa.tipadaa" (the way 
leading to). >>
> Num <<I looked up the Thai sutta and the atthakatha. <<
> Satipa.t.thaanabhaavanaagaaminii>> translated as 
<<development of 
> satipatthana-4.>> The word "pa.tipadaa" is left untranslated in 
Thai. >>
> Jon: << I find it interesting that this word should have been left 
> untranslated
> (but I can't think what significance this might have ;-) ). >>
> 
> 
> I meant in Thai tipitaka, the word patipada is used without 
being translated 
> in to simpler Thai word. I think Jim can give more thorough 
meaning of the 
> word. Pati- has a board meaning. I think here it means 
"toward" and pada 
> means " the way". Another word 'patipatti'; pati here means 
"together or all 
> over" and patti means "attaining or reaching". Patipatti, which 
usually 
> translated into practice, can also mean reaching altogether, 
knowing all --> 
> knowing nama and rupa.
> 
> << This is called the path of practice to the development of the 
frames of 
> reference>>
>  <<I believe your summary that follows is correct, at least as far 
as I 
> recall from my reading of the Visuddhimagga .  Thanks very 
much for the 
> reminder.  (But I don't think it helps solve the problem raised by 
Howard, 
> does it?).>>
> 
> 
> Hmm, to me, I think the sutta speaks itself that satipatthana in 
a magga 
> level (in 8-factored path) is the way that one needs to attain to 
reach 
> lokuttaracitta/nibbana (conventional speaking). If it is not the 
satipatthana 
> in 8-factored path level, sammasati/satipatthana/sati is still in 
a worldly 
> level.  So, again conventional speaking, nibbana cannot be 
attained without 
> attaining satipatthana in 8-factorted path level.  When I read it, I 
do not 
> feel that the sutta tells us that the 8-factored path is a 
preceding factor 
> to obtain first and then later practice satipatthana. I do not get 
the sense 
> of chronology or practicing step here. Am I missing 
something? 
> 
> 
> Num

 
13537 From: Nina van Gorkom   
Date: Sun May 26, 2002 9:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Path of Discrimination, to Num

 
  op 21-05-2002 04:30 schreef Num op Num
>Hi Num, nice to hear from you, you made me laugh, because I could predict what
you would answer about helping with PSM (Path of Discrimination).
What I had in mind: it is helpful if you just make a few notes of the
sessions and also share with us what you discussed privately with your aunt
about this subject. It should not be a heavy task, what do you think? I can
look up my Thai co too. Jim has everything in Pali, but he does not have his
library now. As far as I know this book, in English, is not on line, but we
could just indicate the subject and give a short outline of it. I think it
is not such a good idea to try to finish the whole book, it is not something
one can absorb by reading it all. But I like to know, what are they reading
now in Bgk? Maybe just a para or two, I am sure the pace is going to be very
slow, as Howard suggested.
I liked your post about the plaintain tree.
Appreciative, Nina.

Num:  PS. Sarah, thanks for updating my profile. I will keep sneaking in as
time 
> permits. Sorry, I have no special power:-(  I still live a life of a
> layperson, who enjoys working and having fun at the same time :-) BTW, I have
> not finished reading PSM yet. Nina and Larry and for those who are interested
> in PSM: I cannot make a commitment at this point. If the time is not too
> unkind, I am more than willing to share what I will learn from PSM session,
> although my understanding will be very limited.
>

 
13538 From: Nina van Gorkom   
Date: Sun May 26, 2002 9:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg]what is real?

 
Dear Rob Ep, 
I am just catching up with my mail, and meanwhile so many good things have
been said by others that I do not know what to add. I try to follow some of
your questions. 

R:  my problem with calling the momentary manifestations of
> the
> khandas 'realities' is greater than that, because my question is:  Are these
> momentary manifestations actually 'real'?  What is their status?  Is it
> correct to
> think of them as 'real'?  Howard in his signature and others at other times
> have
> quoted Buddha saying that we should regard this life as an illusion, a
> fleeting
> dream, not substantial, but a kind of trick of the mind.  Do we call the
> events
> that arise in a dream 'realities'?  It seems contradictory to me.
N: The khandhas are momentary, but they are real. Sarah pointed out that
seeing life as foam, etc. should not be misunderstood, otherwise we would
conclude that our whole life is nonsense, that accumulation and development
of understanding and all good qualities were not possible. Seeing is very
real, but it vanishes immediately. But we do not yet realize impermanence,
and we take realities, as I wrote before, into a whole, for self, as a
person. The Buddha said: do not cling to I or mine, what we take for self
are nama and rupa which do not last. If we believe that they last and are
self we live with illusions.
You have doubts about what is reality and what is not.  You do not doubt
that there was birth, and to be more precise: the moment of
rebirth-consciousness, and that there will be death, to be more precise:
dying-consciousness. In between is what we call life: seeing, hearing,
attachment, anger. Everybody has anger, you do not doubt that there is
anger, do you? It is one of the five khandhas, the khandha of formations or
activities. You can experience that anger is different from attachment, you
do not doubt about this, do you? Verify this for yourself. You can
experience that seeing is different from hearing, that they have different
objects and arise at different sensebases. You can verify this to yourself.
You also asked about hardness: where and on what basis does hardness occur?
When it impinges on the bodysense which can be all over the body where there
is sensitivity. That is for a short moment the bodybase, but it falls away.
It is real, prove it to yourself. Panna and all good qualities can be
developed and thus accumulated, this is not an illusion. So, we should not
say that our whole life is an illusion.

R: If the 
> purpose
> of the path is to awaken from the dream of samsara, the illusion that we are
> separate individuated beings with internal entities, and that what we perceive
> is
> filtered through the operations of the mind, I would agree that it is a highly
> important thing to be able to distinguish between what we are really
> experiencing
> in the moment, and to be able to tell whether it is a concept or a perceived
> reality.
N: Yes, that is most important. I find what Rob K quoted from Karunadasa
about pannatti being unproduced and not arisen by conditions most helpful. I
also find very helpful what Sukin said about studying with detachment, study
of the present moment, leading to direct experience. And then what Howard
said I like very much, about the clinging to the self:

 <So, I would say that there is no self to be found, not in the
khandhas nor outside of them. I also do think that our strong desire that
there BE a self outside the khandhas is a kind of last-ditch grasping at the
anchor of self. That has to be let go of as well - or so it seems to me.>

N: When one develops understanding of nama and rupa little by little it will
also become clearer what is reality, what is not reality. But not
immediately, can we be patient enough?

R: But to stop there and to say that the experience of 'hardness',
'sadness', or
> other momentary experiences are 'real', and that they are the final reality,
> seems
> to me to rob us of the understanding that these too are *unreal*, that they
> are
> momentary manifestations of perception or thought, dependent on human
> consciousness for their appearance.  There seems to be an empiricist idea in
> calling dhammas 'realities', that things exist in the world apart from human
> apprehension.  The fact that we perceive 'hardness' or 'sadness' does not mean
> that they are real, it only proves that these things occur in the mind,
> without
> which we perceive nothing.
N: Does hardness occur in the mind? A citta experiences hardness just for a
moment (sorry, Dan). It falls away and hardness falls away. Nama and rupa
are entirely different and cannot be mixed. How could there be solidity
arising in the mind?
There was another matter brought up by Howard: is only the colour that is
experienced real? But what about the colour at the back, or the sounds in
the wood not heard by you when you are not there. There are many rupas
arising and falling away, but if there are not the right conditions they are
not experienced. For the experience of visible object there have to be
visible object that impinges on the eyesense so that seeing can arise that
experiences it. 

R:  I believe Buddha asked us to suspend any judgment about whether there is
a 
> 'real
> world' outside of us or not,
N: the Buddha was the knower of the worlds in many ways: he knew the other
planes of existence, and all world systems. Planes of existence: these are
words that designate the conditions for different kinds of results, pleasant
and unpleasant. These results are realities.The Buddha knew all. They are
real, but we cannot fathom them. See, what is reality is not necessarily
experienced by us. 

R: Are the kandhas actual structures that exist in a real world?  I
> think
> that to draw the conclusion that they are is to say that we live in an
> objective
> universe which is actual and substantial.  And this would then be a
> substantialist
> view which leads to real object and entity.
> It is hard for me to imagine the sensation of 'hardness' being real, without
> it
> somehow implying a 'real object' that is hard.  'Hardness' cannot float about
> or
> exist by itself, there is no 'hardness' that stands on its own and makes an
> impression on a person.
N: Hardness does not float about by itself, quite right. The four great
Elements of solidity, cohesion, heat and motion always arise together and
support one another. Visible object appears now, it does not float by
itself, it is supported by the four great elements and other rupas, it
arises and falls away in a group, kalapa, of rupas. But when visible object
is experienced, the other elements in that group, like solidity are not
experienced. Prove it. You can prove all this for yourself. When a harsh
sound hurts the ear, it is painful; it is hardness that is experienced at
one moment, and sound at another moment. These objects cannot be experienced
at the same time. 

R: Hardness is a quality of something that is hard.  <snip>   If we say the
'hardness' is 'real', rather than merely
> an
> experience of the perceiving organ, then we assert by implication that the
> 'wood'
> is also real, and that that which is made of wood is also real, even though we
> admit that we cannot perceive it all at once, but only one rupa at a time.
N: The wood is not real, it is a conglomeration of different realities, and
we think of the idea of wood, because of sanna. We remember what wood is
because of previous experiences.

R:  So that leaves me with the question, are objects real according to
Buddha?  Do 
> we
> live in an empirically objective universe, apprehended imperfectly by us as
> perceiving subjects?  Can we ever assume that there is a world of 'realities'
> either within or beyond our own mental and perceptual functions, which are
> thoroughly caused by the interaction of the kandhas?
> 
> The objects and thoughts that we perceive through the cittas are in every case
> productions of mental processes, through mental or sensory doors.  To me it is
> very uncertain that anything that we apprehend in these ways can be called
> 'realities'.  I would prefer to think of them as 'manfestations', 'arisings',
> or
> 'creations of perceptual/mental processes'.  I just don't see how we can
> assume
> anything that is a 'reality' beyond the mind itself, from which all our
> experiences arise.
N: If we see citta as a creator of all we experience there still is a
(hidden) illusion of self, now disguised as a creator of what is
experienced. No owner, no creator is there.

R:  I think it makes a difference which way we look at this, as to what
there is 
> to
> awaken from.  <snip>

N: You touch on essential points and you really want to know what is real,
what are realities. I was not so happy with the translation of paramattha
dhammas as final entities, by Ven. Bodhi.  I have some trouble with
philosophical terms, so I asked my sister about them. Entity: in Greek:
Ousia (pronounce usia). Meaning, to be, being, and also, as I understood,
implying possession, what is mine. But I am not sure now whether I
understood this in the right way.  Aritoteles: substance is ousia. Latin:
substantia. We inherited a lot of ideas from Greek philosophy, even without
knowing this. Also the idea of subject and object (for Dan!). I found it
helpful to forget all about what I learnt (phenomenology, existentialism)
and try to find out what can be proven right now. Doubt arises, but also
that is real, is it not? Only the sotapanna has eradicated doubt. Thus, I
would rather use the word element, dhatu, instead of entity that, as you
said, suggests substantiality. Now, dhatu is from the same root as dhamma,
to bear; it bears its own characteristic. But dhamma has many different
meanings. Element indicates impersonality, not a person. However, we can, as
said before, use any translation of paramattha dhamma, so long as we
understand the meaning.
You also said, the mind is constant but the contents are changing. As
regards concepts being the object, I think the opposite is true: several
cittas in a process may think of a concept like wood. Cittas change, but
they have still the object of wood. So, I would rather not say: concepts
fall away together with the citta. In a general sense we can say that when
you stop thinking of a concept it is not there, but that is not the same as
the impermanence of citta that arises from conditions and then falls away.
And again, think of Karunadasa's article. When the object of citta is not a
concept it is a reality.

Control:in Pali: samvara. It can also be translated as guarding. As Victor
quoted: self control is difficult. O.K. to use this word, so long as we take
it in the right sense: sati is guarding the six doors, and then akusala does
not arise. 

You have many pertinent questions about what is reality, they are very good.
It cannot be clear all at once what is real, only in the course of the
development of insight, direct experience of realities or elements. As Sarah
quoted before from the "Dispeller of Delusion", Ch 2: <The characteristic of
no-self is unobvious, dark, unclear, difficult to penetrate, difficult to
illustrate, difficult to make known...The characteristic of no-self does not
appear, owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating the resolution into
the various elements owing to its being concealed by compactness...When
resolving of the compact is effected by resolution into the various
elements, the characteristic of no-self appears in accordance with its true
essential nature...>
It is panna that is already developed which can resolve the whole of a
person into various elements that do not last and are no-self. Do not be
surprised that there is still doubt of what is real. There is a way to learn
the truth, but this is not a fast way. Many conditions have to be fulfilled,
such as study, asking questions, investigation of what appears right now.
The development of all good qualities, the paramis, perfections.
Best wishes for your study, investigation of realities, proving the truth
for yourself,  
Nina.  




 
13539 From: Sarah   
Date: Sun May 26, 2002 10:10pm
Subject: Zany Snake Corner

 
  Dear Christine (& Lucy),

It may seem that we women make up at least 77.27% of the zany DSG members,
but hopefully that’s another illusion;-)
.....
--- christine_forsyth  wrote: 

> Hard  to live in the present moment when there are only 16 days 
> before leaving Brisbane and hoping to end up in Bangkok, before 
> joining everyone else going to Sri Lanka.    But who can tell ... 
> life is an unpredictable adventure....and, just in case the snakes 
> had slipped from our minds....
> "According to Sri Lanka National Museum's Manuscript Series (Vol. 
<snip>
.....
I’m quite sure that out of the 160+members of the group going to Sri Lanka
(5 coaches and long lobby waits....hmmm), you’ll be the only one to have
researched the museum by internet in advance, Chris. At least we all know
where the snake bite treatments are kept now, anyway;-)

Let me assure you, however that my students have insisted that snakes
haven’t slipped from my mind ever since I presented my offering which,
Lucy (hope you’re back by now - surely a week’s up?-), I’m glad to say was
much appreciated despite a loss of some colour and some disappointment
that it had been frozen and de-frosted (rather than professionally
preserved). It has led to plenty of discussions, essays and snake projects
and only one call from a parent wondering if it could be true that there
was a REAL snake in class. 

I also caught the second half of a fascinating TV program about the 10
most dangerous snakes in the world and how to grasp them correctly. I was
half-listening, half-writing a post and half doing a few other things, but
it certainly sounded as though approx. 99.9% of these snakes were not in
Sri Lanka but in Australia, and in particular in.... Queensland! (I’m also
almost as sure that there was a reference to a snake “gulping” its dinner
of a rat down......)

So what have I learnt? I’ve learnt to read the “Snake Simile” with greater
respect than ever. What is the purpose of studying the Teachings? We
discussed the monks in the Mulapariyaya sutta who were puffed up with
conceit from all they had studied. In the Snake Simile, how easily the
Teachings can be wrongly grasped and how they can lead to more mana
(conceit) and other harm if they are not studied with the right purpose:
*****
(From Snake Simile, transl by Nyanaponika, wheel 48/9):

“Suppose, monks, a man wants a snake, looks for a snake, goes in search of
a snake.  he then sees a large snake, and when he is grasping its body or
its tail, the snake turns back on him and bites his hand or arm or some
other limb of his.  And because of that he suffers death or deadly pain. 
And why?  Because of his wrong grasp of the snake.

Similarly, O monks, there are some foolish men who study the Teaching; 
having studied it, they do not wisely examine the purpose of those
teachings.  To those who do not wisely examine the purpose, these
teachings will not yield insight.  They study the Teaching only to use it
for criticizing or for refuting others in disputation.  they do not
experience the (true) purpose for which they (ought to ) study the
Teaching.  To them these teachings wrongly grasped, will bring harm and
suffering for a long time.  And why?  Because of their wrong grasp of the
teachings.”
*****
The man who grasps it correctly (on the TV and in the sutta), “holds it
down firmly” with a “forked stick” and then “catches it firmly by the
neck”. Similarly, those who rightly grasp the Teachings “study the
Teaching;  and having learned it, they examine wisely the purpose of those
teachings.  To those who wisely examine the purpose, these teachings will
yield insight.” We are also reminded that if we do not know the purpose of
what is said, we should question it, “or else (ask) those monks who are
wise”.
.....

Do we understand the ‘purpose’ of our studies or practice at this moment?
Are we learning to grasp the snake correctly or just learning to “refute
others in disputation”? I really appreciate the reminders about the
purpose and like Num’s super post about stories and kilesa leading to wise
reflection of the Phena Sutta, so some of our zany snake discussions have
led me to consider the Snake Sutta again and more about the true purpose
of study.

Sarah 

p.s There's bound to be thinking about the future and making plans as we
are now.....if there is awareness of thinking or any other reality at
these times, this shows an appreciation of the right purpose of our
studies as I understand.
===================



 
13540 From: Sarah   
Date: Sun May 26, 2002 10:47pm
Subject: Conqueror or Conquered

 
  Dear All,

I’d been feeling rather tired all day and was still lost in stories about
students, classes and domestic issues when I read the most recent extract
from ADL and was given the perfect reminders about wise and unwise
attention and being ‘overcome’ by what is appearing through the 6
doorways:
.....
“. We read in the 'Kindred Sayings' (lV,
Salayatanavagga, Kindred Sayings on Sense, Fourth Fifty, Ch.V, par. 202,
Lustful) about the monk who, 
after he has experienced an object through one of the six doors, has
ayoniso manasikara, and about the monk who has yoniso manasikara. We
read that Maha-Moggallana said to the monks: 

Friends, I will teach you the way of lusting and also of not lusting.... 

And how, friends, is one lustful? 

Herein, friends, a monk, seeing object with the eye, feels attachment
for objects that charm, feels aversion from objects that displease,
abides without mindfulness of the body, and his thoughts are mean. He
realizes not, in its true nature, that emancipation of heart, that
emancipation of wisdom, wherein those evil, unprofitable states that
have arisen cease without remainder. 

This monk, friends, is called 'lustful after objects cognizable by the
eye, nose, tongue... objects cognizable by the mind'; When a monk so
abides, friends, if Mara comes upon him by way of the eye, Mara gets an
opportunity. If Mara comes upon him....by way of the mind, Mara gets
access, gets opportunity.... 

So dwelling, friends, objects overcome a monk, a monk overcomes not
objects. Sounds overcome a monk, a monk overcomes not sounds. Scents,
savours, tangibles and mind-states overcome a monk, a monk overcomes not
sounds, scents, savours, tangibles and mind-states. This monk, friends,
is called 'conquered by objects, sounds, scents, savours, tangibles and 
mind-states, not conquerer of them.' Evil, unprofitable states,
passion-fraught, leading to rebirth overcome him, states unhappy, whose
fruit is pain, whose future is rebirth, decay and death. Thus, friends,
one is lustful. “ <end quote>
*****
We go on to read about the one who is ‘not lustful after objects...’, not
conquered by what appears throught the doorways:

“ Such a monk, friends, is called,
'conquerer of objects, sounds, scents, savours, tangibles and
mind-states,'; He is conquerer, not conquered. He conquers those evil,
unprofitable states, passion-fraught, inciting to lust, leading to
rebirth, states unhappy, whose fruit is pain, rebirth, decay and death.
Thus, friends, is one free from lust.” 
*****
All day we can be lost in concepts, conquered by objects, but at a brief
moment of sati, panna (wisdom) can  ‘conquer’ .

I also liked Dan’s comments about the wish to be free from dosa (aversion)
and not seeing the danger in lobha:

>> Dan: We'd all like to be free from dosa all the time, but 
sometimes bad moods do arise. Is it better to understand them as 
they 
arise? Or to try to create pleasant sensations to cover up the bad 
mood? We can always think "happy, happy, happy," or "I want 
pleasure, 
always to have pleasant sensations, never any dosa," but this is not 
reality, and it is not the way out of sansara. Both lobha and dosa 
arise from the same source: craving and ignorance. These things are 
so clear in children. But adults are lot like children: Always 
wanting to free from dosa but not seeing the danger in lobha.<<
*****

As Larry has been suggesting, when there is no awareness, there will
always be a ‘sense’ of self and the lobha, dosa and other realities are
bound to be taken for me, my, mine. Just being reminded of the *lust* for
what is experienced now and how these are only namas and rupas, no self or
substance to be found, can condition sati and panna to conquer ‘these
evil, unprofitable states”.

Sarah
======
 


 
13541 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Sun May 26, 2002 11:39pm
Subject: oh death

 
  Dear Group,
Heard a fine tape today; "Oh Death" by Ralph Stanley (74 years old).
Sung in a drawnout, haunting voice with no instrumental 
accompaniment.
Some of the Lyrics: 
Ohh, Death
Wooo-oh, Death
Won't you spare me over til another year.
Well what is this that I can't see
With ice cold hands takin' hold of me?

Well I am death, none can excel
I'll open the door to heaven or hell
I'll fix your feet til you can't walk
I'll lock your jaw til you can't talk
I'll close your eyes so you can't see
This very hour , come and go with me
Leave the body and leave it cold
To draw up the flesh off of the frame
Dirt and worm both have a claim

O, Death
O, Death
Won't you spare me over til another year
Oh, death how you're treatin' me
You've close my eyes so I can't see
Well you're hurtin' my body
You make me cold
Oh death please consider my age
Please don't take me at this stage

O, death
woooO, death
Won't you spare me over til another year
Won't you spare me over til another year
Wont you spare me over til another year

 
13542 From: Howard 
Date: Sun May 26, 2002 7:56pm
Subject: Re: [dsg]what is real?

 
  Hi, Nina -



> There was another matter brought up by Howard: is only the colour that is
> experienced real? But what about the colour at the back, or the sounds in
> the wood not heard by you when you are not there. There are many rupas
> arising and falling away, but if there are not the right conditions they 
> are
> not experienced. For the experience of visible object there have to be
> visible object that impinges on the eyesense so that seeing can arise that
> experiences it. 
> 
==========================
       You raise an important point here, Nina. As one answer, I would say 
that this is where conditionality and intersubjectivity enter in. 
       "The sounds in the wood not heard by you when you are not there" are 
only presumed, as is true for whatever is "currently transpiring" on the far 
side of the moon. But such a presumption, read in a certain way, is not 
without basis, for there is a lawfulness to events. A (subjunctive) 
conditionality along the lines of "Should such & such a sequence of 
conditions be observed, then certain other condtions would be observed", 
along with the recognition of multiple streams of experience interacting to 
form an "intersubjective reality", can serve as an alternative to the view of 
a self-existing "external reality".
       But leaving the question of robustness to the radical phenomenalist 
view asid for a while, I would like to address the use of the term 'reality' 
for paramattha dhammas. My only hesitancy in the use of the term is that it 
carries a connotation of substantial and independent existence. But there is, 
from my perspective, a sense in which paramattha dhammas have a reality that 
is lacking in concepts. That sense is that concepts "project outwards" to 
alleged "things" in an external world, whereas paramattha dhammas do not. 
When hardness is discerned, there is just the direct experience of hardness, 
something immediately (without mediation) and internally apprehensible, and 
it is not until the percept of, for example, a table arises that we seem to 
experience that hardness as a characteristic of an "external thing". In that 
sense, I actually *like* the term 'reality', though I would prefer, say, 
'actuality', which seems to me to less "loaded".

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13543 From: <> 
Date: Mon May 27, 2002 6:13am
Subject: mind-door process

 
  Greetings dsg, here is some info about mind-door process from "A
Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma"

ch. IV, guide to #12

The limited or sense-sphere mind-door process is itself twofold: (1)
that consequent to a five-door process (pancadvaranubandhaka), and (2)
the independent process (visumsiddha).

(1) Just as when a gong is struck once by a baton, the gong sends forth
a continuous stream of reverberations, so when one of the five sense
doors has been impinged upon once by a sense object, after the five door
process has ceased the past sense object comes into range at the mind
door and sets off many sequences of mind-door processes. Because these
cognitive processes come as the sequel to a five-door process, they are
known as 'consequent processes'. They are counted as fivefold by way of
the five sense-door processes which they follow.

Ledi Sayadaw explains that it is in these consequent processes that
distinct recognition of the object occurs; such recognition does not
occur in a bare five-door process itself. An eye-door process, for
example, is followed first by a conformational mind-door process
(tadanuvattika manodvaravithi), which reproduces in the mind door the
object just perceived in the sense-door process. Then comes a process
grasping the object as  whole (samudayagahika); then a process
recognizing the colour (vannasallakkhana); then a process grasping the
entity (vatthugahika); then a process recognizing the entity
(vatthusallakkhana); then a process grasping the name (namagahika); then
a process recognizing the name (namasallakkhana).

"The process grasping the object as a whole" is the mind-door process
perceiving as a whole the forms repeatedly perceived in individual
frames by the two preceding processes, the original sense-door process
and the conformational mind-door process. This process exercises a
synthesizing function, fusing the perception of distinct "shots" of the
object into the perception of a unity, as in the case of a whirling
fire-brand perceived as a circle of fire. It is only when this has
occurred that recognition of the colour is possible. When the
recognition of the colour occurs, one recognizes the colour, "I see
blue." When the recognition of the entity occurs, one recognizes the
entity or shape. When the recognition of the name occurrs, one
recognizes the name. Thus, Ledi Sayadaw asserts, it is only when a
recognitional process referring to one or another specific feature
occurs that one knows, "I see this or that specific feature."

(2) An 'independent mind-door process' occurs when any of the six
objects enters the range of cognition entirely on its own, not as a
consequence of an immediately preceding sense-door process. The question
may be raised how an object can enter the range of the mind door
independently of a proximate sensory impingement. Ledi Sayadaw cites
various sources: through what was directly perceived earlier, or by
inference from what was directly perceived; through what was learnt by
oral report, or by inference from what was learnt by oral report; on
accont of belief, opinion, reasoning, or reflective acceptance of a
view; by the power of kamma, psychic power, disturbance of the bodily
humours, the influence of a diety, comprehension, realization, etc. He
explains that if one has clearly experienced an object even once, at a
later time - even after a hundred years or in a future life - dependent
on that object a condition may be set for the vibravation of the
bhavanga. The mind that has been nurtured on such an input of prior
experiences is extremely susceptible to their influence. When it
encounters any sense object, that object may tigger off in a single
moment mental waves extending to many thousands of objects previously
perceived.

The mental continuum, constantly being excited by these causal
influences, is always seeking an opportunity to emerge from the bhavanga
and acquire a clear cognition of an object. Therefore the mental factor
of attention present in the bhavanga repeatedly causes the bhavanga to
vibrate, and it directs consciousness again and again to advert to
objects which have gained conditions to appear. Even though the bhavanga
citta has its own object, Ledi Sayadaw explains, it occurs in the mode
of inclining towards some other object. As a result of this perpetual
'buzz" of activity in the bhavanga, when an object acquires sufficient
prominence through other operative conditions, it draws the continuum of
consciousness out of the bhavanga, and then that object comes into the
range of cognition at the mind door.

<END QUOTE>

 
 
13544 From: Sarah   
Date: Mon May 27, 2002 2:26pm
Subject: Friends.....

 
  Dear Friends,

I have a little news to share:

1. Ranil (an occasional poster on DSG) has just got married. We look
forward to meeting him and his new bride when we visit Sri Lanka and wish
them joy and happiness. 

2. I spoke to Mike Nease by telephone a couple of days ago. He’s well,
pretty upbeat and very busy doing several jobs. He’s now in his own flat
and sends everyone his regards.

Sarah
======



 
13545 From: Sarah   
Date: Mon May 27, 2002 3:07pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 
  Dear Stigan, Kom & Nina,

>>Stigan:
Thank-you for your replies, they are very helpful.

As well as  forgiveness would abhayadaana also include "giving protection
to 
beings when they have become frightened on account of fire,water,lions
tigers 
and other wild beasts?" ie. In a bush fire where animals are being burnt,
the 
"saving" them from the fire.  Or when someone is being attacked by "wild 
animals" and you have the means to protect them?  Would these cases be 
concidered Abhayadaana?<<
*****
According to the Pali dict. in front of me, abhaya as we know means free
from fear or danger or fearless as in Dhp 258. I raised S’s question with
K.Sujin last weekend concerning abhayadana. I understand (but don’t have
textual references) that it means forgiveness, non-harm and is a kind of
dana with no object as we know. When there is abhyadana, there is
abhyapata (sp?) or non-hatred. There can be.non-harm whenever we are
friendly, abhava (sp?), ready to help, wishing for the welfare of others.
So, yes, there can be abhyadana in these examples above or at any time we
help or speak out, if it is without anger or any ill-will. K.Sujin gave
the example of  visiting the zoo with abhyadana.

>>Kom:When I hear K. Sujin on tape, I understood that this means
strictly forgiving.  However, looking at the description
now, it seems to be more than forgiving.  When we help other
people from dangers, be it through directly helping, or
counseling, it also seems like it is also abhaya dana.  The
gift of the dhamma is obviously the most elavated type of
abhaya dhamma.  We help other people in reaching the true
abhaya, nibbana.
*****
I don’t even understand that the people (or animals) have to be in danger.
When there is just the wishing of non-harm or wishing for their welfare
(as at the zoo), it can be abhayadana. (Actually, it seems very close to
metta to me.) I like your last example, but the very brief discussion was
interrupted before I had a chance to raise this aspect..... 

Sarah
======



 
13546 From: abhidhammika   
Date: Mon May 27, 2002 8:34pm
Subject: Kamma In Color: A New Modern Commentary

 
  Dear Dhamma Friends

How are you?

The following modern commentary on Vittaara Suttam on Four Groups of 
Actions has been written in response to the requests made by Joyce 
Short, Venerable Dhammarati, and Upasaka Howard.

This English language commentary is not to replace the standard Pali 
commentary on that Suttam. In fact, it has been based on the latter 
as if it were a modern English language subcommentary on it, which 
again is not to replace the standard Pali subcommentary either. 

I hope you also find this new commentary useful.

With kind regards,

Suan Lu Zaw

_________________________________________________________



A New Commentary On Vitth&#257;ra Suttam 

By Suan Lu Zaw

Our actions do not have colors in the ultimate sense. But, the Buddha 
included dark actions and white actions in this Suttam as if actions 
had colors. What the Buddha was doing here was using figurative 
speech to offer us vivid illustration of actions we are capable of 
doing and their outcomes.

In this new commentary on Vitthaara Suttam, I planned to offer the 
representative interpretation in line with the Buddha's use of 
selective examples in the original Suttam. In other words, my 
interpretation would be a narrowly focussed one with the function of 
pinpointing the most obvious phenomena. After all, the Suttanta 
approach is always partial and never intended to be comprehensive.

Vitthaara Suttam contains five paragraphs.

The Paragraph One is significant because the Buddha, here, confirmed 
the phenomenon of our actions having their results in the next life. 
This paragraph is the answer to those sceptics who have doubts about 
whether the Buddha actually taught Samsaara that is the serial 
rebirths. The Buddha unmistakably declared that he had personally 
realized them with extraordinary wisdom.

The Paragraph Two defined the meaning of dark action. Here, the 
Buddha limited the range of the meaning of the dark action to those 
actions carried out with anger. We need to remember this limitation 
placed on the meaning of the adjective "dark (kanha)". In this 
paragraph, the adjective "dark" covers only those actions with anger.

The next important thing to note is the strength of anger. We can 
know the strength of anger if we know its results. The Buddha 
described miserable hellish world as the destination to which the 
actions with this anger would lead. And he also described the 
resulting feeling as really miserable harh feeling (ekantadukkham). 
This means that, in order to get such hellish existence and feeling, 
the violent actions must have been carried out with full-strength 
anger.

This type of anger that leads to dark action referred to in Paragraph 
Twb is well documented in Abhidhamma Pitaka. Dhammasanganii, the 
First Book of Abhidhamma, describes the arising of the unhealthy 
mental event with displeasure and strong anger (akusala cittam 
uppannam hoti domanassasahagatam patighasampayuttam). 

The Paragraph Three defined the meaning of white action. Here, the 
Buddha described the white action as those actions carried out with 
dis-anger. As all healthy minds come with dis-anger according to 
Abhidhamma, we can know for sure that white action refers to those 
actions originated from healthy efficacious mental events 
(kusalacittaani). 

All we need to do here is to determine which healthy efficacious 
consciousness the Buddha was referring to in the Paragraph Three. As 
the Buddha had chosen the existence and feeling of Subhakinha Brahma 
gods as the outcome of the white action carried out with dis-anger, 
we know for sure that the healthy efficacious consciousness in the 
Paragraph Three is the Jhaana consciousness.

Now, as the final step, we need to find out which Jhaana 
consciousness is responsible for rebirth in the Subhakinha Brahma 
world. In this regard, Vibhanga, the second book of Abhidhamma, 
becomes handy. In Section 1026, Vibhanga, we found the following 
question and answer.

"Tatiyaam jhaanaam paniitaam bhaavetvaa kattha upapajjanti? 
Tatiyaam jhaanaam paniitaam bhaavetvaa subhakinhaanaam devaanaam 
sahabyataam upapajjanti." 

"Where are they reborn by having developed the superior Third Jhaana 
(tatiyam jhaanam paniitam)? They are reborn in the world of 
Subhakinha Brahmas by having developed the superior Third Jhaana."

Thus, we now know that the white action in the Paragraph Three refers 
to the development of the Third Jhaana consciousness at the superior 
level. 

Paragraph Four demands our careful reading. Particular attention 
should be paid to the dark action and the white action carried out in 
the conext of Paragraph Four. Is the dark action here the same as the 
dark action in Paragraph Two? And, is the white action in Paragraph 
Four similar to the white action in Paragraph Three?

The answers to those questions are No. How do we know that the 
actions are not the same although they have the same 
adjectives "dark" and "white"? We know that the actions are not the 
same because their results are different.

Let us take a closer look at the results of the actions in Paragraph 
Four. The white actions here lead to rebirths as human beings, as 
sensuous gods and as mansion-owning halfway beings. 

The Pali commentary on Vitthaara Suttam defined gods in Paragraph 
Four as sensuous gods. 

"Ekacce ca devaati ettha pana kaamaavacaradevaa datthabbaa. … Ekacce 
ca vinipaatikaati ettha vemaanikapetaa datthabbaa."

"And some gods here should be noted as sensuous gods… and some 
vinipaatikaa here should be noted as mansion-owning halfway beings".

As an obvious starting example, not all human beings are up to the 
practice of Jhaana, let alone attaining Jhaana consciousness. From 
this observation, we can know that white actions they had performed 
in their previous lives originated from healthy efficacious 
consciousnesses lower than Jhaana consciousness. These lower 
consciousnesses are none other than sensuous healthy efficacious 
consciousnesses (kaamaavacara kusalacittaani).

The Buddha also told us that they had also carried out dark actions 
alongside those sensuous white actions. As they were not reborn in 
hell as those who carried out dark actions in the context of 
Paragraph Two, we know for sure that the dark actions referred to in 
Paragraph Four are not as severe as those in Paragraph Two.

At this point, we need to point out that dark actions referred to in 
Paragraph Four may be originated from all forms of unhealthy 
efficacious consciousnesses in addition to those with anger. We can 
know this because the Buddha included mansion-owning halfway beings 
alongside human beings and sensuous gods. Mansion-owning halfway 
beings are called "vemaanikapetaa". As we have seen above, the 
term "vinipaatikaa" found in the Suttam was defined 
as "vemaanikapetaa" in the Pali commentary on this Suttam. Vemaanika 
(vimaana + ika) means those who have mansions (vimaana). Petas are 
those beings who carried out dark actions usually with greed or with 
anger out of greed in their previous lives. They are sometimes called 
hungry ghosts. 

I called petas halfway beings because they partly enjoy the good 
lives and partly suffer the miserable lives, and because they could 
transform into happy beings by having received sharing of merit 
dedicated to them by their living human relatives.

How about human beings having greed? We could ask ourselves if we are 
ever without greed. Most of the problems in our human societies are 
due to inequalities in possession and sharing of resources. We can 
safely say that those inequalities are the results of individual 
greed and collective greed. Therefore, human beings must have carried 
out dark actions with greed as well.

Actions referred to in Paragraph Five are exclusively Buddhist 
actions. Only when a Buddha appears in mankind, teachings on actions 
carried out specifically for depletion of actions and their results 
become available. 

What did the Buddha mean when he defined the un-dark and un-white 
actions as activation (cetanaa) to eradicate dark and white action 
having dark and white result? 

The Pali commentary on Samkkhitta Suttam in Section 232, on which 
Vitthaara Suttam is an elaboration, the un-dark and un-white action 
refers to the four stages of the path wisdom.

"Akanham asukkanti kammakkhayakaram catumaggañaanam
adhippetam."

"Un-dark and un-white action means the four stages of the path wisdom 
that do depletion of actions."

Thus, our examination of Vitthaara Suttam regarding four groups of 
actions is complete.

All we need to do now is to locate them in the Abhidhamma Pitaka. All 
of them can be found in Dhammasanganii, the very first book of 
Abhidhamma.
 
The reference for the consciousness responsible for dark action in 
Paragraph Two is Section 413. 

The reference for the consciousness responsible for white action in 
Paragraph Three is Section 163. 

The references for the consciousnesses responsible for dark and white 
action in Paragraph Four are Sections 365, 413, 421, 422 for dark 
actions and Sections 1 or 147 for white actions. Section 365 is only 
an example. So are Sections 1 or 147 only examples.

The references for the consciousnesses responsible for un-dark and un-
white action in Paragraph Five are Section 277 for the first path 
wisdom (pathamo maggo), 361 for the second path wisdom (dutiyo 
maggo), 362 for the third path wisdom (tatiyo maggo), and 363 for the 
fourtht path wisdom (catuttho maggo). 


Suan Lu Zaw


____________________________________________________________


PREVIOUSLY ON THIS LIST


Vitthaara Suttam, from which the following translation was made, can 
be found in Section 233, Kammavaggo, Catukkanipaata, Anguttaranikaayo 
on Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version 3 produced by Vipassana Research 
Institute. Those who use Roman edition should see page 230 in Volume 
2 of that edition.


VITTHAARA SUTTAM ON FOUR GROUPS OF KAMMA


Translated By Suan Lu Zaw

Monks, four actions have been declared by me by having personally 
realized them with extraordinary wisdom. What are the four? Monks, 
there is dark action having dark result. Monks, there is white action 
having white result. Monks, there is dark and white action having 
dark and white result. Minks, there is un-dark and un-white action 
having un-dark and un-white result, which takes place for depletion 
of actions.

Monks, what is dark action having dark result? Here, monks, some 
carry out physical action with anger, verbal action with anger, and 
mental action with anger. Having carried out physical action with 
anger, having carried out verbal action with anger, and having 
carried out mental action with anger, he is reborn in the harsh 
world. Being reborn in the harsh world, harsh contacts touch him. 
Being touched by harsh contacts, he experiences the really miserable 
harsh feelings like those beings in hell do. Monks, this is called 
dark action having dark result.

Monks, what is white action having white result? Here, monks, some 
carry out physical action with dis-anger, verbal action with dis-
anger, and mental action with dis-anger. Having carried out physical 
action with dis-anger, having carried out verbal action with dis-
anger, and having carried out mental action with dis-anger, he is 
reborn in the gentle world. Being reborn in the gentle world, gentle 
contacts touch him. Being touched by gentle contacts, he experiences 
the really pleasant gentle feelings like Subhakinha Brahma gods do. 
Monks, this is called white action having white result.

Monks, what is dark and white action having dark and white result? 
Here, monks, some carry out physical action with anger as well as 
with dis-anger, verbal action with anger as well as with dis-anger, 
and mental action with anger as well as with dis-anger. Having 
carried out physical action with anger as well as with dis-anger, 
having carried out verbal action with anger as well as with dis-
anger, and having carried out mental action with anger as well as 
with dis-anger, he is reborn in the harsh and gentle world. Being 
reborn in the harsh and gentle world, harsh as well as gentle 
contacts touch him. Being touched by harsh as well as gentle 
contacts, he experiences the mixed feelings of pleasure and misery 
like human beings, some sensuous gods and some mansion-owning halfway 
beings do. Monks, this is called dark and white action having dark 
and white result.

Monks, what is un-dark and un-white action having un-dark and un-
white result, which takes place for depletion of actions? Here, 
monks, such activation as to eradicate dark action having dark 
result, such activation as to eradicate white action having white 
result, and such activation as to eradicate dark and white action 
having dark and white result, this activation is called un-dark and 
un-white action having un-dark and un-white result, which takes place 
for depletion of actions. Monks, these four actions have been 
declared by me by having personally realized them with extraordinary 
wisdom. 


NOTES ON KEY TERMS	

The phrase "with anger" is a translation of the Pali 
compound "sabyaapajjam" which was defined as "sadosam" in the Pali 
commentary. Sadosam = sa + dosam.
Doso is defined as anger in Pali Text Society's Pali – English 
Dictionary, see page 332.

The phrase "with dis-anger" is a translation of the Pali 
word "abyaapajjam". The opposite of the Pali term "doso" is "adoso". 
Dis-anger is the literal translation of "adoso". Abyaapajjo is 
described as a synonym of adoso in Section 33, Dhammasanganii. Hence, 
I translated abyaapajjam as with dis-anger in order to contrast it 
with anger in Paragraph Two of the Vitthaara Suttam. 

In Section 397, Siilakkhandha Pali, Diighanikaayo, we find "bhikkhu 
averam abyaapajjam mettacittam bhaaveti. Without enmity, and with dis-
anger, the monk develops the loving mind". 

Thus, dis-anger is a technical term to convey love or loving kindness 
as one of its meanings. It does not refer to the mere absence of 
anger as when our minds are with greed.

Un-dark is a translation of the word "akanha, not dark". Here, un-
darkness does not refer to other colors such as whiteness. It means 
counteracting the very color of darkness. Un-dark means anti-dark. 

Thus, un-dark action would counteract the dark actions and their dark 
results. 

Un-white is a translation of the word "asukka, not white". Here, too, 
un-whiteness does not refer to darkness or other colors. It means 
counteracting the very color of whiteness. Un-white means anti-white. 

Thus, un-white action would counteract the white actions and their 
white results. 
.

To read the original Suttam in Pali, please follow the following link.

http://www.tipitaka.org/tipitaka/s0402m3/s0402m3-frm.html

And, please also visit the following link to download and install the 
Pali font on your computer so that the Pali letters appear on your 
screen correctly.

http://www.tipitaka.org/general/pali.html



With regards,

Suan Lu Zaw

http://www.bodhiology.org/

 
13547 From: Kom Tukovinit   
Date: Mon May 27, 2002 11:53pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 
  Dear Sarah,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sarah [mailto:Sarah]
> I don’t even understand that the people (or
> animals) have to be in danger.
> When there is just the wishing of non-harm or
> wishing for their welfare
> (as at the zoo), it can be abhayadana. (Actually,
> it seems very close to
> metta to me.) I like your last example, but the
> very brief discussion was
> interrupted before I had a chance to raise this
> aspect.....
>
> Sarah
> ======

Thanks for trying to get more details.  Very nice food for
thoughts.

kom

 
13548 From: <> 
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 0:14am
Subject: translation help

 
  Greetings dsg, can someone tell me which sutta is Anguttara iii,
413-414? I believe this would be book of threes, page 413-414 in PTS
(pali?) edition. There is an online anguttara but I can't tell which
sutta it is. 

I want to check the context of the following line:
"sanna always results in a concept [vohara, expression of worldly
usage]: whatever is conceptualized has previously been 'sannanized.' "

also you might tell me what you think of this as a translation for:

Katamo ca bhikkhave sannanam vipako? Voharavepakkaham bhikkhave sanna
vadami; yatha yatha nam sanjanati, tatha tatha voharati 'evam sanni
ahosin' ti

I'm takng it from "The Five Aggregates" by Mathieu Boisvert

thanks very much, Larry

 
13549 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 5:15am
Subject: Re: Friends.....

 
  Hi Sarah,

Lovely to hear the news about Ranil and his bride, and Mike who is 
greatly missed.  May  all be safe and protected, May  all be healthy 
and strong, may  all be happy of heart and  mind, May  all live with 
ease and well-being. 

metta,
Christine
---  Sarah  wrote:
> Dear Friends,
> 
> I have a little news to share:
> 
> 1. Ranil (an occasional poster on DSG) has just got married. We look
> forward to meeting him and his new bride when we visit Sri Lanka 
and wish
> them joy and happiness. 
> 
> 2. I spoke to Mike Nease by telephone a couple of days ago. He's 
well,
> pretty upbeat and very busy doing several jobs. He's now in his own 
flat
> and sends everyone his regards.
> 
> Sarah
> ======


 
13550 From: <> 
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 7:43am
Subject: ADL ch. 10 (1)

 
  http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 10 (1)

THE FIRST CITTA IN LIFE 

Time and again there are cittas arising which experience different
objects through the senses and through the mind-door. There are seeing
or hearing, there are cittas with attachment to what is seen or heard.
These cittas arise because of different conditions. We may wonder
whether they also have different functions. Seeing and the citta with
attachment to visible object do not arise at the same time, they are
different and they perform different functions. We will understand more
about cittas if we know in what order they arise and which function they
Perform. A citta cannot arise without performing a function. Each citta
has its own function, in Pali : Kicca. There are fourteen functions of
cittas in all. 

The citta arising at the first moment of life must also have a function.
What is birth, and what is it actually that is born? We speak about the
birth of a child, but in fact, there are only nama and rupa which are
born. The word 'birth' is a conventional term. We should consider what
birth really is. Nama and rupa arise and fall away at every moment and
thus there is birth and death of nama and rupa at every moment. In order
to understand what causes birth we should know what conditions the nama
and rupa which arise at the first moment of a new lifespan. 

What arises first at the beginning of our life, nama or rupa? At any
moment of our life there have to be both nama and rupa. In the planes of
existence where there are five khandhas (four namas and one rupa), nama
cannot arise without rupa; citta cannot arise without the body. What is
true for any moment of our life, is also true for the first moment of
our life. At the first moment of our life nama and rupa have to arise at
the same time. The citta which arises at that moment is called the
patisandhi-citta or rebirth-consciousness. Since no citta arises without
conditions, the patisandhi-citta must also have conditions. The
patisandhi-citta is the first citta of a new life and thus its cause can
only be in the past. One may have doubts about past lives, but how can
people be so different if there were not past lives? We can see that
people are born with different accumulations. Can we explain the
character of a child by looking at its parents? What we mean by
'character' is actually nama. Could parents transfer to another being
nama which falls away as soon as it has arisen? There must be other
factors which are the condition for a child's character. Cittas which
arise and fall away succeed one another and thus each citta conditions
the next one. The last citta of the previous life (dying-consciousness)
was succeeded by the first citta of this life. That is why tendencies
one had in the past can continue by way of accumulation from one citta
to the next one and from past lives to the present life. Since people
accumulated different tendencies in past lives they are born with
different tendencies and inclinations. 

We do not only see that people are born with different characters, we
also see that they are born in different surroundings; some people are
born in pleasant surroundings and some people are born in miserable
surroundings. In order to understand this we should not cling to
conventional terms such as 'person' or 
'surroundings'. If we think in terms of paramattha dhammas we will see
that being in pleasant or miserable surroundings is nothing else but the
receiving of pleasant or unpleasant objects through eyes, ears, nose,
tongue and body-sense. It is kusala vipaka or akusala vipaka. Vipaka
(result) does not arise without conditions; it is caused by good or bad
deeds, by kamma. Different people perform different kamma and each deed
brings its own result. The fact that people are born in different
surroundings must have a condition: it is conditioned by kamma performed
in a previous life. Kamma causes one to be born. The patisandhi-citta is
the result of kamma; it is vipaka. 

In this world we see different births of people and of animals. When we
compare the life of an animal with the life of a human being, we notice
that being born an animal is sorrowful; it is akusala vipaka. Being born
a human being is kusala vipaka, even if one is born poor or if one has
to experience many unpleasant 
things during one's life. The patisandhi-cittas of different people are
of many different degrees of kusala vipaka because the kusala kammas
which produced them were of different degrees.

 
13551 From: <> 
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 8:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 
  Hi Sarah, thinking of abhayadana in the sense of giving courage (or
fearlessness, the mere absense of fear), I am reminded of satipatthana.
I think there is abhaya in that when it is difficult.

Larry

 
13552 From: Jim Anderson   
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 9:52am
Subject: Re: [dsg] translation help

 
  Hi Larry,

> Greetings dsg, can someone tell me which sutta is Anguttara iii,
> 413-414? I believe this would be book of threes, page 413-414 in PTS
> (pali?) edition. There is an online anguttara but I can't tell which
> sutta it is.

The 'iii' refers to the volume no. only. I checked the CSCD disk and found
that the sutta corresponds to the Nibbedhikasutta in Book VI (chakkanipaato,
mahaavaggo). I don't have the PTS edition or translation with me but you
might try looking for one under AN VI.63.

> I want to check the context of the following line:
> "sanna always results in a concept [vohara, expression of worldly
> usage]: whatever is conceptualized has previously been 'sannanized.' "
>
> also you might tell me what you think of this as a translation for:

I don't think it's a very good translation. I hope you can find a better
one.

> Katamo ca bhikkhave sannanam vipako? Voharavepakkaham bhikkhave sanna
> vadami; yatha yatha nam sanjanati, tatha tatha voharati 'evam sanni
> ahosin' ti
>
> I'm takng it from "The Five Aggregates" by Mathieu Boisvert
>
> thanks very much, Larry

You're welcome, Jim



 
13553 From: <> 
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 10:32am
Subject: Re: [dsg] translation help

 
  Thanks Jim, I found it here:
http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/angu/an6-63.htm

Here's the section on sanna for anyone who might be interested (comments
at the end):

[3] "'Perception should be known. The cause by which perception comes
into play...The diversity in perception...The result of perception...The
cessation of perception...The path of practice for the cessation of
perception should be known.' Thus it has been said. In reference to what
was it said? 

"There are these six kinds of perception (mental labels): the perception
of form, the perception of sound, the perception of aroma, the
perception of flavor, the perception of tactile sensation, the
perception of ideas. 

"And what is the cause by which perception comes into play? Contact is
the cause by which perception comes into play. 

"And what is the diversity in perception? Perception with regard to
forms is one thing, perception with regard to sounds is another,
perception with regard to aromas is another, perception with regard to
flavors is another, perception with regard to tactile sensations is
another, perception with regard to ideas is another. This is called the
diversity in perception. 

"And what is the result of perception? Perception has expression as its
result, I tell you. However a person perceives something, that is how he
expresses it: 'I have this sort of perception.' This is called the
result of perception. 

"And what is the cessation of perception? From the cessation of contact
is the cessation of perception; and just this noble eightfold path --
right view, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood,
right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration -- is the way
leading to the cessation of perception. 

"Now when a noble disciple discerns perception in this way, the cause by
which perception comes into play in this way, the diversity of
perception in this way, the result of perception in this way, the
cessation of perception in this way, & the path of practice leading to
the cessation of perception in this way, then he discerns this
penetrative holy life as the cessation of perception. 

"'Perception should be known. The cause by which perception comes into
play...The diversity in perception...The result of perception...The
cessation of perception...The path of practice for the cessation of
perception should be known.' Thus it has been said, and in reference to
this was it said. <END QUOTE>

I think Boisvert translated the line, 

"Perception has expression as its result, I tell you. However a person
perceives something, that is how he expresses it" 

as, "sanna always results in a concept [vohara, expression of worldly
usage]: whatever is conceptualized has previously been 'sannanized.' "
 
from: Katamo ca bhikkhave sannanam vipako? Voharavepakkaham bhikkhave
sanna vadami; yatha yatha nam sanjanati, tatha tatha voharati 'evam
sanni ahosin' ti

This at least tells me sanna is productive in some way. I wonder if this
'expression' and 'mental label' is the 'mark' that sanna metaphorically
makes for memory. In Visuddhimagga sanna is linked with 'recognition'
but not exactly memory which is more the domain of sati.

Comments and clarifications anyone?

thanks, Larry

 
13554 From: <> 
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 10:51am
Subject: Re: [dsg] translation help

 
  "There are these six kinds of perception (mental labels): the perception
of form, the perception of sound, the perception of aroma, the
perception of flavor, the perception of tactile sensation, the
perception of ideas."

Hi all, I notice there seems to be a difference here between 'mental
label' and 'idea'. I wonder if that is the difference between the two
kinds of pannatti (name and meaning). I also wonder if sanna is the
'noting' in satipatthana. Also where does the 'meaning' aspect of
pannatti come from? 

thanks, Larry

 
13555 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 11:43am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Kamma In Color: A New Modern Commentary

 
  Suan

Thanks for this interesting commentary which I look forward to studying in
detail.

I appreciate the point you bring out well that the fourfold classification
of kamma in this sutta is given for the purpose of instruction and
explanation, and is not an 'absolute' one in terms of the paramattha
dhammas found in the abhidhamma.

Jon

 --- abhidhammika  wrote: > 
> 
> 
> Dear Dhamma Friends
> 
> How are you?
> 
> The following modern commentary on Vittaara Suttam on Four Groups of 
> Actions has been written in response to the requests made by Joyce 
> Short, Venerable Dhammarati, and Upasaka Howard.
> 
> This English language commentary is not to replace the standard Pali 
> commentary on that Suttam. In fact, it has been based on the latter 
> as if it were a modern English language subcommentary on it, which 
> again is not to replace the standard Pali subcommentary either. 
> 
> I hope you also find this new commentary useful.
> 
> With kind regards,
> 
> Suan Lu Zaw
> 
> _________________________________________________________
> 
> 
> 
> A New Commentary On Vitth&#257;ra Suttam 
> 
> By Suan Lu Zaw
> 
> Our actions do not have colors in the ultimate sense. But, the Buddha 
> included dark actions and white actions in this Suttam as if actions 
> had colors. What the Buddha was doing here was using figurative 
> speech to offer us vivid illustration of actions we are capable of 
> doing and their outcomes.
> 
> In this new commentary on Vitthaara Suttam, I planned to offer the 
> representative interpretation in line with the Buddha's use of 
> selective examples in the original Suttam. In other words, my 
> interpretation would be a narrowly focussed one with the function of 
> pinpointing the most obvious phenomena. After all, the Suttanta 
> approach is always partial and never intended to be comprehensive.
> 
> Vitthaara Suttam contains five paragraphs.
> 
> The Paragraph One is significant because the Buddha, here, confirmed 
> the phenomenon of our actions having their results in the next life. 
> This paragraph is the answer to those sceptics who have doubts about 
> whether the Buddha actually taught Samsaara that is the serial 
> rebirths. The Buddha unmistakably declared that he had personally 
> realized them with extraordinary wisdom.
> 
> The Paragraph Two defined the meaning of dark action. Here, the 
> Buddha limited the range of the meaning of the dark action to those 
> actions carried out with anger. We need to remember this limitation 
> placed on the meaning of the adjective "dark (kanha)". In this 
> paragraph, the adjective "dark" covers only those actions with anger.
> 
> The next important thing to note is the strength of anger. We can 
> know the strength of anger if we know its results. The Buddha 
> described miserable hellish world as the destination to which the 
> actions with this anger would lead. And he also described the 
> resulting feeling as really miserable harh feeling (ekantadukkham). 
> This means that, in order to get such hellish existence and feeling, 
> the violent actions must have been carried out with full-strength 
> anger.
> 
> This type of anger that leads to dark action referred to in Paragraph 
> Twb is well documented in Abhidhamma Pitaka. Dhammasanganii, the 
> First Book of Abhidhamma, describes the arising of the unhealthy 
> mental event with displeasure and strong anger (akusala cittam 
> uppannam hoti domanassasahagatam patighasampayuttam). 
> 
> The Paragraph Three defined the meaning of white action. Here, the 
> Buddha described the white action as those actions carried out with 
> dis-anger. As all healthy minds come with dis-anger according to 
> Abhidhamma, we can know for sure that white action refers to those 
> actions originated from healthy efficacious mental events 
> (kusalacittaani). 
> 
> All we need to do here is to determine which healthy efficacious 
> consciousness the Buddha was referring to in the Paragraph Three. As 
> the Buddha had chosen the existence and feeling of Subhakinha Brahma 
> gods as the outcome of the white action carried out with dis-anger, 
> we know for sure that the healthy efficacious consciousness in the 
> Paragraph Three is the Jhaana consciousness.
> 
> Now, as the final step, we need to find out which Jhaana 
> consciousness is responsible for rebirth in the Subhakinha Brahma 
> world. In this regard, Vibhanga, the second book of Abhidhamma, 
> becomes handy. In Section 1026, Vibhanga, we found the following 
> question and answer.
> 
> "Tatiyaam jhaanaam paniitaam bhaavetvaa kattha upapajjanti? 
> Tatiyaam jhaanaam paniitaam bhaavetvaa subhakinhaanaam devaanaam 
> sahabyataam upapajjanti." 
> 
> "Where are they reborn by having developed the superior Third Jhaana 
> (tatiyam jhaanam paniitam)? They are reborn in the world of 
> Subhakinha Brahmas by having developed the superior Third Jhaana."
> 
> Thus, we now know that the white action in the Paragraph Three refers 
> to the development of the Third Jhaana consciousness at the superior 
> level. 
> 
> Paragraph Four demands our careful reading. Particular attention 
> should be paid to the dark action and the white action carried out in 
> the conext of Paragraph Four. Is the dark action here the same as the 
> dark action in Paragraph Two? And, is the white action in Paragraph 
> Four similar to the white action in Paragraph Three?
> 
> The answers to those questions are No. How do we know that the 
> actions are not the same although they have the same 
> adjectives "dark" and "white"? We know that the actions are not the 
> same because their results are different.
> 
> Let us take a closer look at the results of the actions in Paragraph 
> Four. The white actions here lead to rebirths as human beings, as 
> sensuous gods and as mansion-owning halfway beings. 
> 
> The Pali commentary on Vitthaara Suttam defined gods in Paragraph 
> Four as sensuous gods. 
> 
> "Ekacce ca devaati ettha pana kaamaavacaradevaa datthabbaa. … Ekacce 
> ca vinipaatikaati ettha vemaanikapetaa datthabbaa."
> 
> "And some gods here should be noted as sensuous gods… and some 
> vinipaatikaa here should be noted as mansion-owning halfway beings".
> 
> As an obvious starting example, not all human beings are up to the 
> practice of Jhaana, let alone attaining Jhaana consciousness. From 
> this observation, we can know that white actions they had performed 
> in their previous lives originated from healthy efficacious 
> consciousnesses lower than Jhaana consciousness. These lower 
> consciousnesses are none other than sensuous healthy efficacious 
> consciousnesses (kaamaavacara kusalacittaani).
> 
> The Buddha also told us that they had also carried out dark actions 
> alongside those sensuous white actions. As they were not reborn in 
> hell as those who carried out dark actions in the context of 
> Paragraph Two, we know for sure that the dark actions referred to in 
> Paragraph Four are not as severe as those in Paragraph Two.
> 
> At this point, we need to point out that dark actions referred to in 
> Paragraph Four may be originated from all forms of unhealthy 
> efficacious consciousnesses in addition to those with anger. We can 
> know this because the Buddha included mansion-owning halfway beings 
> alongside human beings and sensuous gods. Mansion-owning halfway 
> beings are called "vemaanikapetaa". As we have seen above, the 
> term "vinipaatikaa" found in the Suttam was defined 
> as "vemaanikapetaa" in the Pali commentary on this Suttam. Vemaanika 
> (vimaana + ika) means those who have mansions (vimaana). Petas are 
> those beings who carried out dark actions usually with greed or with 
> anger out of greed in their previous lives. They are sometimes called 
> hungry ghosts. 
> 
> I called petas halfway beings because they partly enjoy the good 
> lives and partly suffer the miserable lives, and because they could 
> transform into happy beings by having received sharing of merit 
> dedicated to them by their living human relatives.
> 
> How about human beings having greed? We could ask ourselves if we are 
> ever without greed. Most of the problems in our human societies are 
> due to inequalities in possession and sharing of resources. We can 
> safely say that those inequalities are the results of individual 
> greed and collective greed. Therefore, human beings must have carried 
> out dark actions with greed as well.
> 
> Actions referred to in Paragraph Five are exclusively Buddhist 
> actions. Only when a Buddha appears in mankind, teachings on actions 
> carried out specifically for depletion of actions and their results 
> become available. 
> 
> What did the Buddha mean when he defined the un-dark and un-white 
> actions as activation (cetanaa) to eradicate dark and white action 
> having dark and white result? 
> 
> The Pali commentary on Samkkhitta Suttam in Section 232, on which 
> Vitthaara Suttam is an elaboration, the un-dark and un-white action 
> refers to the four stages of the path wisdom.
> 
> "Akanham asukkanti kammakkhayakaram catumaggañaanam
> adhippetam."
> 
> "Un-dark and un-white action means the four stages of the path wisdom 
> that do depletion of actions."
> 
> Thus, our examination of Vitthaara Suttam regarding four groups of 
> actions is complete.
> 
> All we need to do now is to locate them in the Abhidhamma Pitaka. All 
> of them can be found in Dhammasanganii, the very first book of 
> Abhidhamma.
>  
> The reference for the consciousness responsible for dark action in 
> Paragraph Two is Section 413. 
> 
> The reference for the consciousness responsible for white action in 
> Paragraph Three is Section 163. 
> 
> The references for the consciousnesses responsible for dark and white 
> action in Paragraph Four are Sections 365, 413, 421, 422 for dark 
> actions and Sections 1 or 147 for white actions. Section 365 is only 
> an example. So are Sections 1 or 147 only examples.
> 
> The references for the consciousnesses responsible for un-dark and un-
> white action in Paragraph Five are Section 277 for the first path 
> wisdom (pathamo maggo), 361 for the second path wisdom (dutiyo 
> maggo), 362 for the third path wisdom (tatiyo maggo), and 363 for the 
> fourtht path wisdom (catuttho maggo). 
> 
> 
> Suan Lu Zaw
> 
> 
> ____________________________________________________________
> 
> 
> PREVIOUSLY ON THIS LIST
> 
> 
> Vitthaara Suttam, from which the following translation was made, can 
> be found in Section 233, Kammavaggo, Catukkanipaata, Anguttaranikaayo 
> on Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version 3 produced by Vipassana Research 
> Institute. Those who use Roman edition should see page 230 in Volume 
> 2 of that edition.
> 
> 
> VITTHAARA SUTTAM ON FOUR GROUPS OF KAMMA
> 
> 
> Translated By Suan Lu Zaw
> 
> Monks, four actions have been declared by me by having personally 
> realized them with extraordinary wisdom. What are the four? Monks, 
> there is dark action having dark result. Monks, there is white action 
> having white result. Monks, there is dark and white action having 
> dark and white result. Minks, there is un-dark and un-white action 
> having un-dark and un-white result, which takes place for depletion 
> of actions.
> 
> Monks, what is dark action having dark result? Here, monks, some 
> carry out physical action with anger, verbal action with anger, and 
> mental action with anger. Having carried out physical action with 
> anger, having carried out verbal action with anger, and having 
> carried out mental action with anger, he is reborn in the harsh 
> world. Being reborn in the harsh world, harsh contacts touch him. 
> Being touched by harsh contacts, he experiences the really miserable 
> harsh feelings like those beings in hell do. Monks, this is called 
> dark action having dark result.
> 
> Monks, what is white action having white result? Here, monks, some 
> carry out physical action with dis-anger, verbal action with dis-
> anger, and mental action with dis-anger. Having carried out physical 
> action with dis-anger, having carried out verbal action with dis-
> anger, and having carried out mental action with dis-anger, he is 
> reborn in the gentle world. Being reborn in the gentle world, gentle 
> contacts touch him. Being touched by gentle contacts, he experiences 
> the really pleasant gentle feelings like Subhakinha Brahma gods do. 
> Monks, this is called white action having white result.
> 
> Monks, what is dark and white action having dark and white result? 
> Here, monks, some carry out physical action with anger as well as 
> with dis-anger, verbal action with anger as well as with dis-anger, 
> and mental action with anger as well as with dis-anger. Having 
> carried out physical action with anger as well as with dis-anger, 
> having carried out verbal action with anger as well as with dis-
> anger, and having carried out mental action with anger as well as 
> with dis-anger, he is reborn in the harsh and gentle world. Being 
> reborn in the harsh and gentle world, harsh as well as gentle 
> contacts touch him. Being touched by harsh as well as gentle 
> contacts, he experiences the mixed feelings of pleasure and misery 
> like human beings, some sensuous gods and some mansion-owning halfway 
> beings do. Monks, this is called dark and white action having dark 
> and white result.
> 
> Monks, what is un-dark and un-white action having un-dark and un-
> white result, which takes place for depletion of actions? Here, 
> monks, such activation as to eradicate dark action having dark 
> result, such activation as to eradicate white action having white 
> result, and such activation as to eradicate dark and white action 
> having dark and white result, this activation is called un-dark and 
> un-white action having un-dark and un-white result, which takes place 
> for depletion of actions. Monks, these four actions have been 
> declared by me by having personally realized them with extraordinary 
> wisdom. 
> 
> 
> NOTES ON KEY TERMS	
> 
> The phrase "with anger" is a translation of the Pali 
> compound "sabyaapajjam" which was defined as "sadosam" in the Pali 
> commentary. Sadosam = sa + dosam.
> Doso is defined as anger in Pali Text Society's Pali – English 
> Dictionary, see page 332.
> 
> The phrase "with dis-anger" is a translation of the Pali 
> word "abyaapajjam". The opposite of the Pali term "doso" is "adoso". 
> Dis-anger is the literal translation of "adoso". Abyaapajjo is 
> described as a synonym of adoso in Section 33, Dhammasanganii. Hence, 
> I translated abyaapajjam as with dis-anger in order to contrast it 
> with anger in Paragraph Two of the Vitthaara Suttam. 
> 
> In Section 397, Siilakkhandha Pali, Diighanikaayo, we find "bhikkhu 
> averam abyaapajjam mettacittam bhaaveti. Without enmity, and with dis-
> anger, the monk develops the loving mind". 
> 
> Thus, dis-anger is a technical term to convey love or loving kindness 
> as one of its meanings. It does not refer to the mere absence of 
> anger as when our minds are with greed.
> 
> Un-dark is a translation of the word "akanha, not dark". Here, un-
> darkness does not refer to other colors such as whiteness. It means 
> counteracting the very color of darkness. Un-dark means anti-dark. 
> 
> Thus, un-dark action would counteract the dark actions and their dark 
> results. 
> 
> Un-white is a translation of the word "asukka, not white". Here, too, 
> un-whiteness does not refer to darkness or other colors. It means 
> counteracting the very color of whiteness. Un-white means anti-white. 
> 
> Thus, un-white action would counteract the white actions and their 
> white results. 
> .
> 
> To read the original Suttam in Pali, please follow the following link.
> 
> http://www.tipitaka.org/tipitaka/s0402m3/s0402m3-frm.html
> 
> And, please also visit the following link to download and install the 
> Pali font on your computer so that the Pali letters appear on your 
> screen correctly.
> 
> http://www.tipitaka.org/general/pali.html
> 
> 
> 
> With regards,
> 
> Suan Lu Zaw
> 
> http://www.bodhiology.org/
>  
> 
> 
>  


 
13556 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 1:01pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: 'no control', Reply to Rob E.

 
  Thanks, Howard, for your response to my post.
I found your points here valuable.  The idea of discrete boundaries between
experienced moments does create a discontinuity of the flux of impermanence that
at least seems to be troubling.

I always thought the breakdown of phenomena was that they didn't break down to
anything, and the fact that you could not find the final unit of what anything
was, was in a sense, the proof of anatta.  Take it down to the lowest common
denominator, and there's nothing there.  Isn't this what appears to be in reality,
according to physics?  The smallest particles seem to keep opening up into another
level of even smaller particles and within that particle there is a universe of
event-relations taking place.

If there are final 'realities' which are the true 'entities' [to quote
Buddhaghosa] of experience, this seems to halt the journey to anatta by landing on
something that is substantial and truly defineable.  I suspect that this
establishes a comfort zone against the onslaught of complete anatta that is the
basic nature of reality.   

Best,
Robert Ep.

==================

--- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Robert (and Sukin) -
> 
> In a message dated 5/22/02 5:18:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Robert Ep writes:
> 
> 
> > there is certainly a great moment-to-moment literature as to the continuous
> > arising and changing of consciousness.  as to the individual citta theory, 
> > that is
> > a property of abhidhamma and not necessarily of Theravada in general.
> > 
> >   If not how can they see rise and fall of
> > > individual cittas? It would surprise me greatly if you brought out some 
> > proof.
> > 
> > to be able to see the specific content of each moment is a property of 
> > advanced
> > meditation as well as Buddhist philosophy.  as for 'individual cittas', we 
> > will
> > both have to wait to see if they really arise and fall as single elements 
> > in a
> > string of beads, or whether they break down to non-units in a continuous 
> > changing
> > thread.  so far the idea that there are specific bounded cittas that have 
> > clear
> > boundaries seems quite substantialist to me and is controversial within 
> > Buddhism
> > at large.  I don't take it as a requirement for being 'Buddhist'.
> > 
> > 
> ==========================
>        Rob, there are *so* many points you raise in this long post, in 
> addition to what I quote above, that I agree with. One major one is an 
> addressing of an apparent tendency towards randomness, pointing it out and 
> criticizing it. I concur that the recognition of "no control" due to 
> "impersonality" can improperly lead to a sense of helplessness and 
> randomness, and it is important for this pitfall to be pointed out.
>        Also, I concur with your assessment, as expressed in what I quote 
> above, of the string-of-beads interpretation of the dhamma theory not being a 
> requirement for being 'Buddhist'. When it is said that conditioned dhammas 
> are impermanent, this does not require discreteness and sharp boundaries. 
> There may be no more to be said than simply statements of the sort "There was 
> the experience of redness, but now there is not"; that is, impermanence 
> merely means that conditions don't remain. On the other hand, since the 
> Abhidhamma doesn't countenance any gaps between mindstates, perhaps the 
> distinction between continuity and discreteness is a false distinction, with 
> the reality being a middle-way one between these extremes. But we do have to 
> be careful in not imposing our commonsense notions of boundaries on the 
> details of experience. The boundaries between cittas, marked by either a 
> change in arammana or the removal or addition of cetasikas, would best not be 
> taken to be "realities", else we run into all the paradoxes of Zeno and 
> Nagarjuna. At the alleged point at which a cetasika ceases, is it in effect, 
> or not in effect, or both, or neither?! A whole mess of trouble is created in 
> reifying boundaries. I think we need to stick with the more empirical view of 
> "This was, and now it is not".
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> With metta,
> Howard



 
13557 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 1:17pm
Subject: Re: [dsg]what is real?

 
  Dear Nina,
Thank you for your message, which was very pertinent to the questions I have been
considering.  I found your discussions helpful and very clear and sensible.  I
want you to know I will be re-reading this post for a while and considering it
carefully.

Thank you for the time and effort, and your kind concern for my understanding!

Best,
Robert Ep.

==================

--- Nina van Gorkom  wrote:
> op 18-05-2002 20:01 schreef Robert Epstein op <>:
> Dear Rob Ep, 
> I am just catching up with my mail, and meanwhile so many good things have
> been said by others that I do not know what to add. I try to follow some of
> your questions. 
> 
> R:  my problem with calling the momentary manifestations of
> > the
> > khandas 'realities' is greater than that, because my question is:  Are these
> > momentary manifestations actually 'real'?  What is their status?  Is it
> > correct to
> > think of them as 'real'?  Howard in his signature and others at other times
> > have
> > quoted Buddha saying that we should regard this life as an illusion, a
> > fleeting
> > dream, not substantial, but a kind of trick of the mind.  Do we call the
> > events
> > that arise in a dream 'realities'?  It seems contradictory to me.
> N: The khandhas are momentary, but they are real. Sarah pointed out that
> seeing life as foam, etc. should not be misunderstood, otherwise we would
> conclude that our whole life is nonsense, that accumulation and development
> of understanding and all good qualities were not possible. Seeing is very
> real, but it vanishes immediately. But we do not yet realize impermanence,
> and we take realities, as I wrote before, into a whole, for self, as a
> person. The Buddha said: do not cling to I or mine, what we take for self
> are nama and rupa which do not last. If we believe that they last and are
> self we live with illusions.
> You have doubts about what is reality and what is not.  You do not doubt
> that there was birth, and to be more precise: the moment of
> rebirth-consciousness, and that there will be death, to be more precise:
> dying-consciousness. In between is what we call life: seeing, hearing,
> attachment, anger. Everybody has anger, you do not doubt that there is
> anger, do you? It is one of the five khandhas, the khandha of formations or
> activities. You can experience that anger is different from attachment, you
> do not doubt about this, do you? Verify this for yourself. You can
> experience that seeing is different from hearing, that they have different
> objects and arise at different sensebases. You can verify this to yourself.
> You also asked about hardness: where and on what basis does hardness occur?
> When it impinges on the bodysense which can be all over the body where there
> is sensitivity. That is for a short moment the bodybase, but it falls away.
> It is real, prove it to yourself. Panna and all good qualities can be
> developed and thus accumulated, this is not an illusion. So, we should not
> say that our whole life is an illusion.
> 
> R: If the 
> > purpose
> > of the path is to awaken from the dream of samsara, the illusion that we are
> > separate individuated beings with internal entities, and that what we perceive
> > is
> > filtered through the operations of the mind, I would agree that it is a highly
> > important thing to be able to distinguish between what we are really
> > experiencing
> > in the moment, and to be able to tell whether it is a concept or a perceived
> > reality.
> N: Yes, that is most important. I find what Rob K quoted from Karunadasa
> about pannatti being unproduced and not arisen by conditions most helpful. I
> also find very helpful what Sukin said about studying with detachment, study
> of the present moment, leading to direct experience. And then what Howard
> said I like very much, about the clinging to the self:
> 
>  <So, I would say that there is no self to be found, not in the
> khandhas nor outside of them. I also do think that our strong desire that
> there BE a self outside the khandhas is a kind of last-ditch grasping at the
> anchor of self. That has to be let go of as well - or so it seems to me.>
> 
> N: When one develops understanding of nama and rupa little by little it will
> also become clearer what is reality, what is not reality. But not
> immediately, can we be patient enough?
> 
> R: But to stop there and to say that the experience of 'hardness',
> 'sadness', or
> > other momentary experiences are 'real', and that they are the final reality,
> > seems
> > to me to rob us of the understanding that these too are *unreal*, that they
> > are
> > momentary manifestations of perception or thought, dependent on human
> > consciousness for their appearance.  There seems to be an empiricist idea in
> > calling dhammas 'realities', that things exist in the world apart from human
> > apprehension.  The fact that we perceive 'hardness' or 'sadness' does not mean
> > that they are real, it only proves that these things occur in the mind,
> > without
> > which we perceive nothing.
> N: Does hardness occur in the mind? A citta experiences hardness just for a
> moment (sorry, Dan). It falls away and hardness falls away. Nama and rupa
> are entirely different and cannot be mixed. How could there be solidity
> arising in the mind?
> There was another matter brought up by Howard: is only the colour that is
> experienced real? But what about the colour at the back, or the sounds in
> the wood not heard by you when you are not there. There are many rupas
> arising and falling away, but if there are not the right conditions they are
> not experienced. For the experience of visible object there have to be
> visible object that impinges on the eyesense so that seeing can arise that
> experiences it. 
> 
> R:  I believe Buddha asked us to suspend any judgment about whether there is
> a 
> > 'real
> > world' outside of us or not,
> N: the Buddha was the knower of the worlds in many ways: he knew the other
> planes of existence, and all world systems. Planes of existence: these are
> words that designate the conditions for different kinds of results, pleasant
> and unpleasant. These results are realities.The Buddha knew all. They are
> real, but we cannot fathom them. See, what is reality is not necessarily
> experienced by us. 
> 
> R: Are the kandhas actual structures that exist in a real world?  I
> > think
> > that to draw the conclusion that they are is to say that we live in an
> > objective
> > universe which is actual and substantial.  And this would then be a
> > substantialist
> > view which leads to real object and entity.
> > It is hard for me to imagine the sensation of 'hardness' being real, without
> > it
> > somehow implying a 'real object' that is hard.  'Hardness' cannot float about
> > or
> > exist by itself, there is no 'hardness' that stands on its own and makes an
> > impression on a person.
> N: Hardness does not float about by itself, quite right. The four great
> Elements of solidity, cohesion, heat and motion always arise together and
> support one another. Visible object appears now, it does not float by
> itself, it is supported by the four great elements and other rupas, it
> arises and falls away in a group, kalapa, of rupas. But when visible object
> is experienced, the other elements in that group, like solidity are not
> experienced. Prove it. You can prove all this for yourself. When a harsh
> sound hurts the ear, it is painful; it is hardness that is experienced at
> one moment, and sound at another moment. These objects cannot be experienced
> at the same time. 
> 
> R: Hardness is a quality of something that is hard.  <snip>   If we say the
> 'hardness' is 'real', rather than merely
> > an
> > experience of the perceiving organ, then we assert by implication that the
> > 'wood'
> > is also real, and that that which is made of wood is also real, even though we
> > admit that we cannot perceive it all at once, but only one rupa at a time.
> N: The wood is not real, it is a conglomeration of different realities, and
> we think of the idea of wood, because of sanna. We remember what wood is
> because of previous experiences.
> 
> R:  So that leaves me with the question, are objects real according to
> Buddha?  Do 
> > we
> > live in an empirically objective universe, apprehended imperfectly by us as
> > perceiving subjects?  Can we ever assume that there is a world of 'realities'
> > either within or beyond our own mental and perceptual functions, which are
> > thoroughly caused by the interaction of the kandhas?
> > 
> > The objects and thoughts that we perceive through the cittas are in every case
> > productions of mental processes, through mental or sensory doors.  To me it is
> > very uncertain that anything that we apprehend in these ways can be called
> > 'realities'.  I would prefer to think of them as 'manfestations', 'arisings',
> > or
> > 'creations of perceptual/mental processes'.  I just don't see how we can
> > assume
> > anything that is a 'reality' beyond the mind itself, from which all our
> > experiences arise.
> N: If we see citta as a creator of all we experience there still is a
> (hidden) illusion of self, now disguised as a creator of what is
> experienced. No owner, no creator is there.
> 
> R:  I think it makes a difference which way we look at this, as to what
> there is 
> > to
> > awaken from.  <snip>
> 
> N: You touch on essential points and you really want to know what is real,
> what are realities. I was not so happy with the translation of paramattha
> dhammas as final entities, by Ven. Bodhi.  I have some trouble with
> philosophical terms, so I asked my sister about them. Entity: in Greek:
> Ousia (pronounce usia). Meaning, to be, being, and also, as I understood,
> implying possession, what is mine. But I am not sure now whether I
> understood this in the right way.  Aritoteles: substance is ousia. Latin:
> substantia. We inherited a lot of ideas from Greek philosophy, even without
> knowing this. Also the idea of subject and object (for Dan!). I found it
> helpful to forget all about what I learnt (phenomenology, existentialism)
> and try to find out what can be proven right now. Doubt arises, but also
> that is real, is it not? Only the sotapanna has eradicated doubt. Thus, I
> would rather use the word element, dhatu, instead of entity that, as you
> said, suggests substantiality. Now, dhatu is from the same root as dhamma,
> to bear; it bears its own characteristic. But dhamma has many different
> meanings. Element indicates impersonality, not a person. However, we can, as
> said before, use any translation of paramattha dhamma, so long as we
> understand the meaning.
> You also said, the mind is constant but the contents are changing. As
> regards concepts being the object, I think the opposite is true: several
> cittas in a process may think of a concept like wood. Cittas change, but
> they have still the object of wood. So, I would rather not say: concepts
> fall away together with the citta. In a general sense we can say that when
> you stop thinking of a concept it is not there, but that is not the same as
> the impermanence of citta that arises from conditions and then falls away.
> And again, think of Karunadasa's article. When the object of citta is not a
> concept it is a reality.
> 
> Control:in Pali: samvara. It can also be translated as guarding. As Victor
> quoted: self control is difficult. O.K. to use this word, so long as we take
> it in the right sense: sati is guarding the six doors, and then akusala does
> not arise. 
> 
> You have many pertinent questions about what is reality, they are very good.
> It cannot be clear all at once what is real, only in the course of the
> development of insight, direct experience of realities or elements. As Sarah
> quoted before from the "Dispeller of Delusion", Ch 2: <The characteristic of
> no-self is unobvious, dark, unclear, difficult to penetrate, difficult to
> illustrate, difficult to make known...The characteristic of no-self does not
> appear, owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating the resolution into
> the various elements owing to its being concealed by compactness...When
> resolving of the compact is effected by resolution into the various
> elements, the characteristic of no-self appears in accordance with its true
> essential nature...>
> It is panna that is already developed which can resolve the whole of a
> person into various elements that do not last and are no-self. Do not be
> surprised that there is still doubt of what is real. There is a way to learn
> the truth, but this is not a fast way. Many conditions have to be fulfilled,
> such as study, asking questions, investigation of what appears right now.
> The development of all good qualities, the paramis, perfections.
> Best wishes for your study, investigation of realities, proving the truth
> for yourself,  
> Nina.  
>


 
13558 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 2:33pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] translation help

 
  Dear Larry,

Looks like you’re doing some useful research on sanna. We can talk about 6
kinds of sanna (as in the sutta) marking objects through 6 doorways or we
can talk about 4 kinds of sanna in the 4 jati (classes) of kusala,
akusala, vipaka and kiriya. I’m sure there are other ways too.

Thanks for the translation and notes you give. I’m also looking at
B.Bodhi’s translation and the PTS one (transl by Hare).

The PTS transl gives this one to add to your collection (at end of post*):

“And what I perceptions’ fruit?  I say, monks, perceptions are the result
of habit (vohaara-vepakka).  As one comes to know a thing, so one
expresses oneslef: “Thus I perceived.”  This monks, is called perceptions’
fruit.”

BB’s:
“And what, monks, is the outcome of perceptions?  perceptions, I say, have
communication by speech as their outcome.  As one perceives a thing, so
one expresses it, saying:  ‘So I have perceived it.’”
*****
A few comments to your comments below (but not on the translations):

1. Without sanna, there would be no conceptualising or expressions of
common usage.

2. Sanna ‘marks’ at every moment. Like all other mental factors, it
accumulates. Thus each kind of marking accumulates.This is the way it is
productive or ‘habit-forming’.

3. What we think of as memory consists of a series of markings with many
other ingredients and factors combined to condition the moments of
thinking.

4. What we refer to as ‘memory’ is a concept and the thinking and sanna
involved may be kusala or akusala. It is quite different from sati
(awareness) which only arises with kusala cittas and is aware of whatever
reality appears, even at times of conventional poor memory. 

5. You mention in your second post** ‘a difference between ‘mental label’
and ‘idea’. Mental labels (used in brackets in yr translation after
perception) are referring, maybe misleadingly, to the 6 kinds of sanna.
They don’t refer to any kind of pannatti (and the other translations just
refer to perception). On the other hand, ‘ideas’ refer to pannatti (all
kinds) I’m sure. Through the mind door, sanna accompanies the mind door
cittas to mark pannatti.

6. I believe that when ‘noting’ is used in some translations of the
Satipatthana Sutta, for example, it is translated from ‘sampajaano’. I
believe it is more accurate to translate sampaja~n~na as clearly
comprehending or understanding. In other words, it refers to right
understanding. so sati-sampajanna refers to the development of awareness
and rt understanding.

Just a few ideas. Num or others may add more.

Sarah
=====

* --- <> wrote: > 
> I think Boisvert translated the line, 
> 
> "Perception has expression as its result, I tell you. However a person
> perceives something, that is how he expresses it" 
> 
> as, "sanna always results in a concept [vohara, expression of worldly
> usage]: whatever is conceptualized has previously been 'sannanized.' "
>  
> from: Katamo ca bhikkhave sannanam vipako? Voharavepakkaham bhikkhave
> sanna vadami; yatha yatha nam sanjanati, tatha tatha voharati 'evam
> sanni ahosin' ti
> 
> This at least tells me sanna is productive in some way. I wonder if this
> 'expression' and 'mental label' is the 'mark' that sanna metaphorically
> makes for memory. In Visuddhimagga sanna is linked with 'recognition'
> but not exactly memory which is more the domain of sati.
> 
> Comments and clarifications anyone?

**>   --- <> wrote: > "There are these six kinds of
perception (mental labels): the perception
> of form, the perception of sound, the perception of aroma, the
> perception of flavor, the perception of tactile sensation, the
> perception of ideas."
> 
> Hi all, I notice there seems to be a difference here between 'mental
> label' and 'idea'. I wonder if that is the difference between the two
> kinds of pannatti (name and meaning). I also wonder if sanna is the
> 'noting' in satipatthana. Also where does the 'meaning' aspect of
> pannatti come from? 
====================================================


 
13559 From: Sarah   
Date: Tue May 28, 2002 3:57pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] mind-door process

 
  Hi Larry again (also Suan, Rob K, Nina, Howard & All),

 --- <> wrote: > Greetings dsg, here is some info about
mind-door process from "A
> Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma"
> 
> ch. IV, guide to #12

I found the notes you quoted and particularly the comments by Ledi Sayadaw
very interesting indeed. Thank you.

I looked in the chapter and there is no mention of texts that Ledi Sayadaw
bases his explanations on. I wonder if Suan, Nina, Rob K or anyone more
familiar with the abhidhamma texts and commentaries than myself has come
across all the details described -- as opposed to just the outlines of the
processes as explained in the CMA itself-- and if so if you could give me
any references.
.....
> 
> Ledi Sayadaw explains that it is in these consequent processes that
> distinct recognition of the object occurs; such recognition does not
> occur in a bare five-door process itself. An eye-door process, for
> example, is followed first by a conformational mind-door process
> (tadanuvattika manodvaravithi), which reproduces in the mind door the
> object just perceived in the sense-door process. Then comes a process
> grasping the object as  whole (samudayagahika); then a process
> recognizing the colour (vannasallakkhana); then a process grasping the
> entity (vatthugahika); then a process recognizing the entity
> (vatthusallakkhana); then a process grasping the name (namagahika); then
> a process recognizing the name (namasallakkhana).

***** 

Howard, you asked before about how or why one of the bhavanga citta acts
as mind-door and perhaps this quote from the same passage of Larry’s
explains a little more:
.....
> Even though the bhavanga
> citta has its own object, Ledi Sayadaw explains, it occurs in the mode
> of inclining towards some other object. As a result of this perpetual
> 'buzz" of activity in the bhavanga, when an object acquires sufficient
> prominence through other operative conditions, it draws the continuum of
> consciousness out of the bhavanga, and then that object comes into the
> range of cognition at the mind door.
*****

On another point, Howard, you’ve questioned once or twice I think, to how
a dhamma can exist even momentarily when the conditions that ‘produced’ it
have fallen away. (sorry, I haven’t got your posts handy). I think it’s
important to understand that there are not only the conditions that lead
to a subsequent dhamma appearing such as kamma, prenascence, repetition
and so on, but there are many conditions (most conditions in fact) which
are conditioning and having effect at the ‘existing’ time of the dhamma,
such as root (hetus as discussed in ADL corner), object, conascence
(effect of cetasikas for example), dependence and many other paccaya
(conditions). I think Rob K also made this point, so I may just be
repeating it. We can also say that the arising of a state conditions the
‘middle’ and then the falling away of that state (i.e the 3 stages).

Maybe after ADL, Larry should consider leading us through Nina’s intro to
Conditions. It might be helpful for many of us. (Although we also have PSM
and possibly CMA itself .....Hmm)

Sarah
=====



 
13560 From: Nina van Gorkom   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 1:01am
Subject: vitthaara sutta, to Suan

 
  Dear Suan, thank you very much for your clear and most helpful commentary to
the vitthaara sutta. Without this explanation I would not have understood
this sutta. I am glad Joice and Howard asked for your commentary, and I hope
you will write more of those also when unasked!
Kind regards from Nina.

 
13561 From: Num 
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 1:06am
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 
  Dear Kom, Nina, Sarah and all;

3 kinds of dana: amissadana, abhyadana, and dhammadana. I'd like to make some 
comment on abhyadana and I'd also like to get some comment rgd the jataka. 

Yes, It can mean giving protection. In Tipitaka, Veluvanna always referred to 
as a sanctuary for squirrels (keta-abhya-dana). I think King Asoka also 
donated part of his garden to become a wildlife sanctuary (from Asoka 
inscription, I remember reading this from a plaque in San Diego Zoo eight 
years ago. It's said that is the first record of Nature Reserve area in the 
history). I like Kom's idea about abhyadana, <<The gift of the dhamma is 
obviously the most elavated type of
abhaya dhamma.  We help other people in reaching the true abhaya, nibbana.>>

In Thailand, there were couple places post that this area in keta-abhya-dana: 
a fish sanctuary at a temple near the floating market in Samutsakorn, a bird 
sanctuary posted in some areas I went bird watching, and a wildlife sanctuary 
posted in some private farmlands or woods.

I looked up the atthakatha of cariya-pitaka real quick. Something bothered a 
bit for example giving out a slave, as a gift to other was included in 
amissadana!! 

This also reminded me of Jataka-Vessantara. Prince Vessantara gave all of his 
precious belongings e.g. jewelry and white elephant. After he has to leave 
the city b/c his people think he made a bad decision to give out an 
invaluable treasure of the empire (the white elephant) to the Brahmin.  While 
he was on the way out from the city with his wife and 2 children, a group of 
Brahmins asked him for his horses and chariot. He gave them out as well.  
Later on, another greedy Brahmin came to him and asked for his son and 
daughter (Charlee and Kanha) to be his young wife's slaves. He gave them out 
too. The detail in the tipitaka and atthakatha is kind of heartbreaking. The 
Brahmin physically abused the kids pretty badly. The kids tried to hide in a 
lotus pond; he asked them to come out. The kids ran back to their dad twice 
to ask for help but he let the Brahmin took them anyway. No need to mention 
about their mother's (Princess Madhri) reaction after she found out that her 
husband gave their kids away to be enslaved. The bhottisattava finally gave 
his wife to another Brahmin, which actually is an Indriya in disguised to 
help his wife being given to a bad man.

I asked myself, does the prince have a right to do this, to give away his 
son, his daughter, and his wife. It mentioned he was in great pain in doing 
this. Is that a really great dana? His son, his daughter and his wife were 
all in great pain from his giving. Couple people told me it's a great dana to 
give the thing you love the most. It said that the bhottisattava did that 
because he aimed for the greatest thing, sappan-yutta-nnana, to become a 
samma-sambudha and to help all beings who are swimming in the stream of 
endless samsara. I admired his deed (his kids and his wife always anumodana 
him in his donation even when they are in pain and were donated themselves).  
I still have a hard time taking that it's a great dana. 

Anyway, it's a happy ending story. The family was back together. He resumed 
his princehood and became a king. After that life, the bhottisattava was 
reborn in Dusita plane and finally reborn as prince Sitdhattha in his last 
life.

Another quote from the zoo, "A tree is giving a shade even to an axman who is 
cutting its trunk". (Lord Buddha)

Best wishes,

Num

 
13562 From: <> 
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 6:10am
Subject: ADL ch. 10 (2)

 
  http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 10 (2)

At the first moment of our life kamma produces the patisandhi-citta and
then rupa has to arise at the same time. One may wonder what the cause
is of the rupa arising at the first moment of life. We see that people
are born with different bodily features: some are strong, some are weak,
some are handicapped from birth. This must have a cause. It is kamma
which causes both nama and rupa to be born. 

Could the rupa which we call 'dead matter' and the rupa we call 'plant'
be produced by kamma? A plant is not 'born' because a plant cannot
perform good and bad deeds; it has no kamma that could cause its birth.
Temperature is the condition for the life of a plant. As regards human
beings, kamma produces rupa at the moment the patisandhi-citta arises.
There couldn't be life if kamma did not produce nama and rupa from the
first moment of life. Temperature too produces rupa; if there were not
the right temperature the new life could not develop. As soon as the
patisandhi-citta has fallen away, at the moment the next citta is
arising, citta too starts to produce rupa. Furthermore, nutrition
produces rupa so that the body can grow. Thus we see that there are
other factors besides kamma which are condition for rupa, namely: citta,
temperature and nutrition. 
Kamma produces rupa not only at the first moment of life but throughout
our lives. 

Kamma does not only produce the vipaka-cittas which experience pleasant
and unpleasant objects through the sense-doors; it also produces
throughout our lives the rupas which can function as the sense-door
through which these objects are received. Could someone for instance
create his own eye-sense? It could not be created by temperature, only
by kamma. Transplantation of the eye cannot be successful unless kamma
produces eye-sense in the body of the receiver. 

The mother's womb is not the only way of birth. We learn from the
teachings that there can be birth in four different ways: by way of the
womb, by way of eggs, by way of moisture and by way of spontaneous
birth. 

People would like to know when life starts in the mother's womb. Life
starts at the moment the patisandhi-citta arises together with the rupa
which is produced by kamma at the same time. A life-span ends when the
last citta, the dying-consciousness (cuti-citta), falls away. As long as
the cuti-citta has not fallen away there is still life. One cannot know
the moment the cuti-citta of someone else arises and falls away unless
one has cultivated the knowledge of the cittas of other people. A Buddha
or someone else who has cultivated this kind of knowledge could know the
exact moment of someone's death. 

We may wonder which kamma in our life will produce the patisandhi-citta
of the next life. Some people believe that by doing many good deeds in
this life they can be assured of a happy rebirth. But the kamma which
produces rebirth will not necessarily be from this life. We have in past
lives as well as in this life performed both akusala kamma and kusala
kamma and these kammas are of different degrees. Some kammas produce
results in the same life they have been performed, some produce a result
in the form of the rebirth-consciousness of a future life, or in the
course of a future life. We have performed deeds in past lives which
could produce rebirth but which have not yet come to fruition. We cannot
know which kamma will produce our next rebirth. 

If akusala kamma produces the rebirth of the next life there will be an
unhappy rebirth. In that case the cittas which will arise shortly before
the dying-consciousness (cuti-citta) will be akusala cittas and they
will experience an unpleasant object which is conditioned by kamma. The
patisandhi-citta of the next life which succeeds the cuti-citta
experiences that same unpleasant object. If kusala kamma produces the
rebirth there will be a happy rebirth. In that case kusala cittas will
arise shortly before the cuti-citta and they will experience a pleasant
object which is conditioned by kamma. The patisandhi-citta of the next
life experiences that same pleasant object.

 
13563 From: Lucy   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 7:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello again & something for Snake Corner

 
  Hello Sarah et al.

Yup, one week away was planned, the following 2 weeks away were to remind
me about this thing of "no control" : )

Anyway, I'm back and having to catch up with all the things I should have
been doing 2 weeks ago. Work and leisure both seriously behind schedule.
Including about 80 pages of translation from French that was due this
Friday. Fortunately, no longer needed by Friday - panic over until the new
deadline approaches : ) --- and that was only the "leisure" activity !

About those gorgeous, soft, cool critters, snakes, I'm sure your students
would have loved a live one much more than a dead one. Find a live one for
them, Sarah, they'll be grateful to you the rest of their lives. Anyone in
fear of snakes should make a point of touching one - they feel ever so
soft, and so cuddly when they wrap around your neck attracted by the heat -
makes one love them forever.

(actually, the same goes for spiders, especially the nice big hairy ones.
Silk pales in comparison with the silkiness of a hairy spider)

Below is something the Buddha said about snakes - he loved them too !!! And
I just drool over the closing verses ....

Lucy

*********************************************************
From "Buddhism in  Translations"
Henry Clarke Warren
Harvard University Press {1896}

http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/bits/bit-1.htm
http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/bits/bits064.htm

§ 64. LOVE FOR ANIMALS.

[SUBLIME STATE OF FRIENDLINESS.]

Translated from the Culla-Vagga (v.6.).

   Now at that time a certain priest had been killed by the bite of a
snake, and when they announced the matter to The Blessed One, he said:

   "Surely now, O priests, that priest never suffused the four royal
families of the snakes with his friendliness. For if, O priests, that
priest had suffused the four royal families of the snakes with his
friendliness, that priest, O priests, would not have been killed by the
bite of a snake. And what are the four royal families of the snakes? The
Virûpakkhas are a royal family of snakes; the Erâpathas are a royal family
of snakes; the Chabyâputtas are a royal family of snakes; the
Kanhâgotamakas are a royal family of snakes. Surely, now, O priests, that
priest did not suffuse the four royal families of the snakes with his
friendliness. For surely, O priests, if that priest had suffused the four
royal families of the snakes with his friendliness, that priest, O priests,
would not have been killed by the bite of a snake. I enjoin, O priests,
that ye suffuse these four royal families of the snakes with your
friendliness; and that ye sing a song of defence for your protection and
safeguard. After this manner, O priests, shall ye sing:

"Virûpakkhas, I love them all,
The Erâpathas, too, I love,
Chabyâputtas, I love them, too,
And all Kanhâgotamakas.

{p. 303} [CV.v.6
"'Creatures without feet have my love,
And likewise those that have two feet,
And those that have four feet I love,
And those, too, that have many feet.

"'May those without feet harm me not,
And those with two feet cause no hurt;
May those with four feet harm me not,
Nor those who many feet possess.

"'Let creatures all, all things that live,
All beings of whatever kind,
See nothing that will bode them ill!
May naught of evil come to them!

*********************************************************


----- Original Message -----
From: "Sarah" 
Sent: Sunday, May 26, 2002 3:10 PM
Subject: [dsg] Zany Snake Corner


> Dear Christine (& Lucy),
>
> It may seem that we women make up at least 77.27% of the zany DSG
members,
> but hopefully that's another illusion;-)
> .....
> --- christine_forsyth  wrote:
>
> > Hard  to live in the present moment when there are only 16 days
> > before leaving Brisbane and hoping to end up in Bangkok, before
> > joining everyone else going to Sri Lanka.    But who can tell ...
> > life is an unpredictable adventure....and, just in case the snakes
> > had slipped from our minds....
> > "According to Sri Lanka National Museum's Manuscript Series (Vol.
> <snip>
> .....
> I'm quite sure that out of the 160+members of the group going to Sri
Lanka
> (5 coaches and long lobby waits....hmmm), you'll be the only one to have
> researched the museum by internet in advance, Chris. At least we all know
> where the snake bite treatments are kept now, anyway;-)
>
> Let me assure you, however that my students have insisted that snakes
> haven't slipped from my mind ever since I presented my offering which,
> Lucy (hope you're back by now - surely a week's up?-), I'm glad to say
was
> much appreciated despite a loss of some colour and some disappointment
> that it had been frozen and de-frosted (rather than professionally
> preserved). It has led to plenty of discussions, essays and snake
projects
> and only one call from a parent wondering if it could be true that there
> was a REAL snake in class.
>
> I also caught the second half of a fascinating TV program about the 10
> most dangerous snakes in the world and how to grasp them correctly. I was
> half-listening, half-writing a post and half doing a few other things,
but
> it certainly sounded as though approx. 99.9% of these snakes were not in
> Sri Lanka but in Australia, and in particular in.... Queensland! (I'm
also
> almost as sure that there was a reference to a snake "gulping" its dinner
> of a rat down......)
>
> So what have I learnt? I've learnt to read the "Snake Simile" with
greater
> respect than ever. What is the purpose of studying the Teachings? We
> discussed the monks in the Mulapariyaya sutta who were puffed up with
> conceit from all they had studied. In the Snake Simile, how easily the
> Teachings can be wrongly grasped and how they can lead to more mana
> (conceit) and other harm if they are not studied with the right purpose:
> *****
> (From Snake Simile, transl by Nyanaponika, wheel 48/9):
>
> "Suppose, monks, a man wants a snake, looks for a snake, goes in search
of
> a snake.  he then sees a large snake, and when he is grasping its body or
> its tail, the snake turns back on him and bites his hand or arm or some
> other limb of his.  And because of that he suffers death or deadly pain.
> And why?  Because of his wrong grasp of the snake.
>
> Similarly, O monks, there are some foolish men who study the Teaching;
> having studied it, they do not wisely examine the purpose of those
> teachings.  To those who do not wisely examine the purpose, these
> teachings will not yield insight.  They study the Teaching only to use it
> for criticizing or for refuting others in disputation.  they do not
> experience the (true) purpose for which they (ought to ) study the
> Teaching.  To them these teachings wrongly grasped, will bring harm and
> suffering for a long time.  And why?  Because of their wrong grasp of the
> teachings."
> *****
> The man who grasps it correctly (on the TV and in the sutta), "holds it
> down firmly" with a "forked stick" and then "catches it firmly by the
> neck". Similarly, those who rightly grasp the Teachings "study the
> Teaching;  and having learned it, they examine wisely the purpose of
those
> teachings.  To those who wisely examine the purpose, these teachings will
> yield insight." We are also reminded that if we do not know the purpose
of
> what is said, we should question it, "or else (ask) those monks who are
> wise".
> .....
>
> Do we understand the 'purpose' of our studies or practice at this moment?
> Are we learning to grasp the snake correctly or just learning to "refute
> others in disputation"? I really appreciate the reminders about the
> purpose and like Num's super post about stories and kilesa leading to
wise
> reflection of the Phena Sutta, so some of our zany snake discussions have
> led me to consider the Snake Sutta again and more about the true purpose
> of study.
>
> Sarah
>
> p.s There's bound to be thinking about the future and making plans as we
> are now.....if there is awareness of thinking or any other reality at
> these times, this shows an appreciation of the right purpose of our
> studies as I understand.
> ===================
>
>
>
>

 
13564 From: <> 
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 7:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] translation help

 
  Hi Sarah, appreciate your comments. On further reflection I'm inclined
to think sanna is recognition but on a subtle and pervasive level, not
as distinct, perhaps, as the citta process of recognition Ledi Sayadaw
outlined. This brings to mind the question of how citta process and
cetasika functionality work together. Also I'm thinking perhaps the
'ideas' that sanna 'mentally labels' are mind objects rather than
concepts only. I still don't have a satisfactory understanding of mind
objects. When rupa is a mind object, for example, the actual mind object
is a vibration (of bhavanga or sense door???) that is left in the wake
of the dissolved (?) rupa.

As for sati, re-reading the description (below) I don't think sati
really is memory as a discrete function. In satipatthana, for me, I
remember to be present and/or remember the object if I am using one.
What I would like is to experience sanna and I think, perhaps, in
satipatthana sanna could be experienced as simple recognition. I'm still
a little puzzled about the nature of presence, its vividness, and why
this isn't experienced in akusala cittas which arise in the present.
(maybe this is 'strong perception'?)

Lots of food for thought. Lucky for us it's all empty or we would get
fat.

Larry
--------------
from Visuddhimagga:
ch. 14, par. 130
[referring to sanna] Its function is to make a sign as a condition for
perceiving again that 'this is the same', as carpenters, etc., do in the
case of timber, and so on. It is manifested as the action of
interpreting by means of the sign as apprehended, like the blind who
'see' an elephant (Ud.68-9). Its proximate cause is an objective field
in whatever way that appears, like the perception that arises in fawns
that see scarecrows as men.

ch. 14, par. 141
[referring to sati] By its means they remember (saranti), or it itself
remembers, or it is just mere remembering (sarana) thus it is
mindfulness (sati). It has the characteristic of not wobbling. Its
function is not to forget. It is manifested as guarding, or it is
manifested as the state of confronting an objective field. Its proximate
cause is strong perception, or its proximate cause is the Foundations of
Mindfulness concerned with the body, and so on. It should be regarded
,however, as like a pillar because it is firmly founded, or as like a
doorkeeper because it guards the eye-door, and so on.

 
13565 From: Sarah   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 3:26pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] translation help

 
  Hi Larry,

I like the way you study, consider carefully, look at other texts,
question and so on.....

You’re quite right about the 6th kind of sanna marking all dhammarammana
(mind objects) and not just concepts. These can be paramattha dhammas or
pannatti. Let me correct my point from yesterday:

5. You mention in your second post ‘a difference between ‘mental label’
and ‘idea’. Mental labels (used in brackets in yr translation after
perception) are referring, maybe misleadingly, to the 6 kinds of sanna.
They don’t refer to any kind of pannatti (and the other translations just
refer to perception). On the other hand, ‘ideas’ refer to dhammarammana*
(mind objects) including pannatti (all
kinds). Through the mind door, sanna accompanies the mind door
cittas to mark pannatti as well as paramattha dhammas.
......
*dhammaaramma.na can be divided into: a)pasada-rupas (sense-organs),
b)sukhuma rupas (subtle rupas), c) citta, d)cetasikas, e)nibbana,
f)pannatti.
*****

I think the discussions on this sutta -- and the one Suan just wrote his
translation of the commentary and his own sub-commentary for -- give a
good indication of the value of studying the Abhidhamma when reading
suttas (especially translations). Without the little study we have done,
it would be very easy to misunderstand the references to labels and ideas
and to have not realize any realities are involved perhaps. 

You ask about when rupa is a mind object whether it is a “vibration (of
bhavanga or sense door???) that is left in the wake of the dissolved (?)
rupa.”

If we’re talking about the rupas experienced hrough the sense doorways,
then yes, when they are experienced by the mind door process immediately
following the sense door process, they have just fallen away. Like an echo
or clear reflection, the *reality* is experienced. In later mind door
processes, these experiences condition the thinking of concepts. (I’m sure
this will be coming up soon in the ADL corner). The rupa (or echo of the
rupa) is not an echo (or vibration) of “bhavanga or sense door”.

You raised some other important points about sati and sanna and I
appreciated your quotes from Vism. I’ll leave these for another post.
Others may have helpful comments.

Sarah
=====



 
13566 From: Sarah   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 4:16pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 
  Hi Num,

I always enjoy your combination of helpful detail and daily life musings
very much.

  --- Num wrote: > Dear Kom, Nina, Sarah and all;
> 
> 3 kinds of dana: amissadana, abhyadana, and dhammadana. I'd like to make
> some 
> comment on abhyadana and I'd also like to get some comment rgd the
> jataka. 
.....
At the back of his translation of the The Brahmajala Sutta and Its
Commentaries, there is a ‘Treatise on the Paramis’, I believe translated
from the Cariyapitaka Atthakatha, which you referred to. We read:

“The perfection of giving is to be practiced by benefiting beings in many
ways -- by relinquishing one's happiness, belongings, body and life to
others, by dispelling their fear, and by instructing them in the Dhamma.

Herein, giving is threefold by way of the object to be given: the giving
of material things (amisadana), the giving of fearlessness (abhayadana),
and the giving of the Dhamma (dhammadana).”

There is a lot of detail. Under the section of external objects, we read :
“Asked for his own children, wife, slaves, workers, and servants, the
Great man does not give them while they are as yet unwilling to go,
afflicted with grief.  but when they are willing and joyful, then he gives
them.  But if he knows that those who ask for them are demonic beings -
ogres, demons, or goblins - or men of cruel disposition, then he does not
give them away. So too, he will not give his kingdom to those intent on
the harm, suffering and affliction of the world, but he would give it away
to righteous men who protect the world with Dhamma.”

*****
Hmm..I’ll re-read the Jataka again later. I think it’s hard for us to even
conceptualise the extraordinary wholesome states accompanying the
perfection of the paramis. We’re so used to thinking in terms of the
‘stories’ and the social rights and wrongs rather than in terms of the
purity of the mental states.
.....
Thank you for your examples of abhaya dana from King Asoka and San Diego
Zoo! (Funny, just after I mentioned visiting a zoo - K.Sujin’s example and
of course we have your photo at the zoo to remind us too;-)). 

I also have a quote on the same theme which neatly (I think) ties in with
the Sri Lanka corner and Mahavamsa studies, giving us something else to
look out for in Anuradhapura:
 *****
http://www.lacnet.org/suntimes/961006/let2.html

"Ordering by the beat of the drum that no animals should be killed within
a radius of seven gau from the city, he gave security to animals. He also
gave security to the fish in the twelve great tanks, and bestowing on (the
region's people) gold and cloth and whatever other kind of wealth they
wished, he commanded them not to catch birds and so gave security to
birds...."

This inscription, which is engraved in an upright stone slab at
Ruwanweliseya, Anuradhapura, is a transcript of a decree issued in the
late12th Century by King Kirthi Nissanka Malla of Polonnaruwa. It is
reflective of the high moral concern that the rulers and people of Sri
Lanka showed towards animal life in ancient times.

Likewise scattered through the pages of the Mahavamsa, are other records
of royal protection granted for the preservation and well being of all
forms of animals. It can well be said that the policy of compassion and
tolerance initiated by Emperor Asoka in India in 270 BC in the form of
state protection to animals, was followed in earnest by a long line of Sri
Lankan Kings. Buddhism played a major role in influencing the development
of this benevolent public attitude towards animals.” <end quote>

*****
At the end of the section on the parami of dana in the ‘Treatise on the
Paramis’, we read:

“In practising the perfection of giving the Great Being should apply the
perception of impermanence to life and possessions.  He should consider
them as shared in common with many, and should constantly and continuously
arouse great compassion towards beings.  Just as, when a house is blazing,
the owner removes all his property of essential value and himself as well
without leaving anything important behind, so does the Great man
invariably give, without discrimination and without concern.”
*****

Sarah
=====



 
13567 From: Sarah   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 4:32pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello again & something for Snake Corner

 
  Dear Lucy (& Christine),

 --- Lucy  wrote: > Hello Sarah et al.
> 
> Yup, one week away was planned, the following 2 weeks away were to
> remind
> me about this thing of "no control" : )
.....
Welcome back.....at least I know now why it seemed a long week;-) Thank
you for finding time for us and the snake corner in your ‘catch-up’.
.....
 > About those gorgeous, soft, cool critters, snakes, I'm sure your
> students
> would have loved a live one much more than a dead one. Find a live one
> for
> them, Sarah, they'll be grateful to you the rest of their lives.
.....

Well, Lucy, remember these are city students who have mostly never seen a
lamb and who can (the younger ones anyway) be quickly silenced into
submission by a thumb-nail sized plastic spider. Just a few of them were
brave enough to touch the small, dead snake for an instant. If I produced
a live one, I seriously doubt I’d have any students left:-) 
.....
 >Anyone
> in
> fear of snakes should make a point of touching one - they feel ever so
> soft, and so cuddly when they wrap around your neck attracted by the
> heat -
> makes one love them forever.
.....
Perhaps, we’ll all take your word for it at this point.....
.....

Meanwhile, I greatly appreciated your snake sutta offering and the
reminder of the power of metta. Hey, Chris, maybe we could sing along on
the bus in Sri Lanka (a little easier than having to look for that palm
leaf with the bite remedy in the museum after all).

I look forward to any more snake sutta offerings from anyone.

Sarah
======
P.S. Chris, have you identified these snakes yet with the museum or other
web links in Sri Lanka?
.............................................................................................................

> I enjoin, O priests,
> that ye suffuse these four royal families of the snakes with your
> friendliness; and that ye sing a song of defence for your protection and
> safeguard. After this manner, O priests, shall ye sing:
> 
> "Virûpakkhas, I love them all,
> The Erâpathas, too, I love,
> Chabyâputtas, I love them, too,
> And all Kanhâgotamakas.
> 
> {p. 303} [CV.v.6
> "'Creatures without feet have my love,
> And likewise those that have two feet,
> And those that have four feet I love,
> And those, too, that have many feet.
> 
> "'May those without feet harm me not,
> And those with two feet cause no hurt;
> May those with four feet harm me not,
> Nor those who many feet possess.
> 
> "'Let creatures all, all things that live,
> All beings of whatever kind,
> See nothing that will bode them ill!
> May naught of evil come to them!
> 
> *********************************************************



 
13568 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 6:12pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello again & something for Snake Corner

 
  Dear Sarah, Lucy and all,

This is absolutely the last word on snakes from me. :)  Lucy, Britain 
only has 1 poisonous native snake....an adder.
http://www.geocities.com/braguk/Photos/coiledadder.jpg But it has 
many legally and illegally imported pet snakes who could be 
poisonous.  So please don't hug one unless you know it really 
well. :) 
Sri Lanka has 7 (was 5)  poisonous native snakes.  
http://www.sundaytimes.lk/020421/plus/2.html   In 2000, there were 
48,000 reported snake bites and 194 known deaths. (Sarah, should we 
start singing NOW?) 
Australia has  less than 15 poisonous snakes capable of biting and 
seriously harming a person  (out of about 140 species). But because 
every hospital has antivenom, Australia only has two or three deaths 
a year, from fewer than 3,000 bites (larger area, less population 
density.)
 Four or five poisonous types have been seen on my place over the 
years, but rarely now. (the rough scaled snake, the red bellied black 
snake, the tiger snake, the death adder, the common brown snake, and 
a disputed sighting of an aggressive taipan - I sighted it and ran, 
everyone else disputed it and scoffed!) 
http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/anaes/snakebite.html
O.K.  Sarah,  I am prepared to admit that snakes do gulp their 
food.... but very, very slowly.  For all you *never* wanted to know 
about the eating habit of snakes, with photos, try 
http://www.szgdocent.org/cc/c-eat2.htm
I vaguely remember that the original disagreement was over whether 
you 'heard' a gulping *sound* while meditating in Sri Lanka......but, 
once again, to keep the peace on the bus (five or six days is a long 
time if companions are 'at daggers drawn' :)), I won't question the 
statement....just a slightly raised eyebrow, a quizical look, and a 
quiet 'Is that so?' ....

metta,
Christine

---  Sarah  wrote:
> Dear Lucy (& Christine),
> 
>  --- Lucy  wrote: > Hello Sarah et al.
> > 
> > Yup, one week away was planned, the following 2 weeks away were to
> > remind
> > me about this thing of "no control" : )
> .....
> Welcome back.....at least I know now why it seemed a long week;-) 
Thank
> you for finding time for us and the snake corner in your `catch-up'.
> .....
>  > About those gorgeous, soft, cool critters, snakes, I'm sure your
> > students
> > would have loved a live one much more than a dead one. Find a 
live one
> > for
> > them, Sarah, they'll be grateful to you the rest of their lives.
> .....
> 
> Well, Lucy, remember these are city students who have mostly never 
seen a
> lamb and who can (the younger ones anyway) be quickly silenced into
> submission by a thumb-nail sized plastic spider. Just a few of them 
were
> brave enough to touch the small, dead snake for an instant. If I 
produced
> a live one, I seriously doubt I'd have any students left:-) 
> .....
>  >Anyone
> > in
> > fear of snakes should make a point of touching one - they feel 
ever so
> > soft, and so cuddly when they wrap around your neck attracted by 
the
> > heat -
> > makes one love them forever.
> .....
> Perhaps, we'll all take your word for it at this point.....
> .....
> 
> Meanwhile, I greatly appreciated your snake sutta offering and the
> reminder of the power of metta. Hey, Chris, maybe we could sing 
along on
> the bus in Sri Lanka (a little easier than having to look for that 
palm
> leaf with the bite remedy in the museum after all).
> 
> I look forward to any more snake sutta offerings from anyone.
> 
> Sarah
> ======
> P.S. Chris, have you identified these snakes yet with the museum or 
other
> web links in Sri Lanka?
> ....................................................................
.........................................
> 
> > I enjoin, O priests,
> > that ye suffuse these four royal families of the snakes with your
> > friendliness; and that ye sing a song of defence for your 
protection and
> > safeguard. After this manner, O priests, shall ye sing:
> > 
> > "Virûpakkhas, I love them all,
> > The Erâpathas, too, I love,
> > Chabyâputtas, I love them, too,
> > And all Kanhâgotamakas.
> > 
> > {p. 303} [CV.v.6
> > "'Creatures without feet have my love,
> > And likewise those that have two feet,
> > And those that have four feet I love,
> > And those, too, that have many feet.
> > 
> > "'May those without feet harm me not,
> > And those with two feet cause no hurt;
> > May those with four feet harm me not,
> > Nor those who many feet possess.
> > 
> > "'Let creatures all, all things that live,
> > All beings of whatever kind,
> > See nothing that will bode them ill!
> > May naught of evil come to them!
> >

 
13569 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 6:27pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Howard

> Jon
> I see a difference between the 2 assertions in your preceding statement,
> namely that--
> (a) There is no hardness other than the hardness being experienced.
> (b) There is no hardness that can be actually known other than the
> hardness being experienced
…
> The statement at (a) needs to be qualified, I think.  Hardness like any
> other reality arises because of conditions.  In the case of the hardness
> that we take as being part of an inanimate object (like a table, tree or
> building), those conditions do not include the fact of their being the
> object of someone's citta.  In other words, the hardness does not arise
> dependent on there being someone there to experience it.

-------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Ahh, but "the hardness that we take as being part of an inanimate 
object (like a table, tree or building)" is concept-only. There being no 
tables, trees, and buildings, there is no hardness possessed by them. It's
actually the other way around: The occurrences of hardness directly
experienced in mindstreams are compounded, along with other conditions,
into concepts and percepts of such "things" as tables, trees, and
buildings.
--------------------------------------------------------

Jon:
Let me re-phrase my comment slightly.  I meant, the hardness that is
experienced at one moment and, before we know it, is taken as being part
of an inanimate object (like table, tree or building) is still the dhamma
of hardness at that initial moment of experience.

At such moments, there are 2 distinct and separate sets of conditions at
play.  There are both the factors that condition the arising of that
hardness in this world, and the factors that condition the experience of
that hardness by the citta of the individual.  The latter set of factors
could not pertain without the former, but the opposite in not the case.

The former set of conditioning factors have nothing to do with kamma or
indeed citta in any shape or form, and are not what is being described by
the paticcasamuppada;  only the latter are.  However, they are to be found
in the abhidhamma texts such as the Patthana.

I don’t know if this makes clearer what I am trying to say.

Jon




 
13570 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 6:29pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Howard

> 
> I see a difference between the 2 assertions in your preceding statement,
> namely that--
> (a) There is no hardness other than the hardness being experienced.
> (b) There is no hardness that can be actually known other than the
> hardness being experienced
> 
---------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       There *is* a difference. Position (b) is the general phenomenalist 
one. Position (a) is the radical phenomenalist one which represents an
admixture of phenomenalism with pragmatism - what is in principle
unknowable is "as good as" nonexistent.
----------------------------------------------------

Jon:
The problem I have here, Howard, is that I'm not sure if you're wanting to
discuss the abhidhammic position or the phenomenalist position!! 

By way of illustrating what I mean, I'd like to give another 2
propositions to compare, again taken or adapted from an earlier post--

(a)  The Buddhist perspective, and most explicitly so in Abhidhamma,
doesn't countenance objects existing independently of experience.
(b)  The Buddhist perspective, and most explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a
phenomenalist one which doesn't countenance objects existing independently
of experience.

I think you can appreciate the difference in the thrust of these 2
positions.  For a start, the answer to (b) is going to depend on a agreed
definition for, and similar depth of understanding of, the concept of
phenomenalism.  And then, when you've figured it out as best you can, has
one really advanced one's understanding of the abhidhammic perspective?

Not that I would wish to discourage comparative discussion, but simply to
point out its limitations.  I thought there might be a point here worth
bringing up for discussion.

Jon



 
13571 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 6:36pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Right Concentration - Rob Ep (II)

 
  Rob Ep

Hi, it's me again.  Thanks for the many replies sent over the past week or
2 to my earlier posts.  I am slightly overwhelmed by the sheer number and
size of them, ;-)), coming as they did all at once (there must have been 1
or 2 all-night sessions at around that time) but I can assure you I'll be
getting round to replying, and soon I hope.

--- Robert Epstein  wrote: > Hi Jon.
> Well, I never saw this post and I really enjoyed it.  Thanks for your
> kind
> explanation of the emphases in Abhidhamma.  As I have been giving the
Abhidhamma a
> rather hard time on paramatha dhammas lately, and probably causing some
akusala
> reactions to arise towards myself, I would like to say that I think your
> explanation for the emphasis on dry insight makes a lot of sense.  The
belief that
> there will be subsequent lifetimes when the dhamma will not be available
> also helps to explain the current emphasis on dhamma study.

I'm glad you found something in the post that helps put the abhidhamma in
a better perspective.

I'm not sure whether your remark about 'emphasis on dry insight' refers to
me or to the abhidhamma, but I wouldn't necessarily agree in either
context.  To my mind the Abhidhamma simply explains what is and what can
possibly be, and in what combinations, rather than indicating what should
be.  It explains that samatha and insight are distinct forms of kusala
each having its own cause and means of development, and leading to
different goals.  Samatha properly developed leads to jhana, and insight
properly developed leads to enlightenment.

For one who attains enlightenment having first attained jhana, the
enlightenment *may* (but not *will necessarily*) be based on the jhana,
but even so the enlightenment is the culmination of the development of
insight and not of the samatha.

I do not read the texts as suggesting that a person who attains
enlightenment having first attained samatha does so because of any
conscious decision on the matter, any more than a person chooses to be
born as a member of one sex or the other, yet you could say that in either
case that outcome nevertheless depends wholly and solely on choices made
by the person in his or her previous lives.

Likewise in my own studies, I see no 'emphasis on dry insight', but simply
an attempt to understand what is the essence of insight, as distinct from
samatha.  I believe that whatever one's inclinations to samatha, this
knowledge is indispensible and is available to us only during the
dispensation of a Buddha.

Jon



 
13572 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 6:39pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Right Concentration - Rob Ep (II)

 
  Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein  wrote: 
> I would also like to look into the Visudhimagga and see what is said
> about the jhanas.  
> 
> Hmmn....that means homework......

OK, it's a topic that interests me, too, so here's a suggestion.  If you
indicate what aspects of the jhanas you're interested in looking into,
I'll try to find some relevant passages in the Vism and post them to the
list.

No hurry, though.  Just when you're ready. ;-))

Jon



 
13573 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 6:41pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Howard

--- Howard wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 5/22/02 8:17:05 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Jon writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Howard
> > 
> > Again, I find myself in agreement with you here, on the substance of
> your
> > post
…
> > I also agree with you that pannatti does not denote 'an alleged
> > concept-reference' (as you put it).
> > 
> > Jon
> > 
> > That makes it twice in one day ;-)).
> > 
> > 
> =========================
> Yes, indeed it does! And it "makes my day"! :-)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

Same goes for me, Howard!  (Let's make the most of it while it lasts.  As
the subject header says ... )

Jon



 
13574 From: Sarah   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 7:07pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello again & something for Snake Corner

 
  OK Chris,

You're the snake expert. Lucy and I can’t hope to match this serious
research. I was probably peeping in between concentrating on my breath..so
no need for the ‘slightly raised eyebrow’ even......

Right, I’ll start practising in the bath:

> "Virûpakkhas, I love them all,
> The Erâpathas, too, I love,
> Chabyâputtas, I love them, too,
> And all Kanhâgotamakas.

Sarah

p.s. did your research tell you if these were included in the Sri Lankan 5
or 7 poisonous snakes? (You can tell me on the bus if you don’t want to
break your ‘last word’ on snakes.) 
======================================================


 
13575 From: Joyce Short   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 8:58pm
Subject: Fields of Perception/Concentration from the Insight Perspective

 
  "Concentration (samadhi) practice can induce trance by focusing attention on
a SINGLE object, such as the breath, sound or form objects. Gradually the
senses withdraw from internal and external distractions as consciousness
ascends to blissfull realms of form and formless states. The rare meditator
may even realize the "Sphere of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception" where
only the most subtle trace of consciousness may be detected.  At this
plateau, "emptiness" or "voidness" is realized as concentration gradually
recedes until "emptiness" (of the object) alone survives in awareness, just
as a moving object placed on the foreground gradually withdraws into the
back ground and disappears from sight.

From the persective of Vipassana meditation, the mind's non-static nature
does not permit focusing on a single object without fluctuation.
Consciousness rises-and-falls even in samadhi states. Its appearance of
continuity is due to the flux of one mind-moment of concentration
immediately being replaced by another, in continuous succession. Ultimately,
there are no pure, static states of samadhi.

Concentration temporarily subdues and suppresses sensuality, ill will,
worry, apathy, and sceptical doubt.  Within its own sphere, many purposes
are served by its development.  The meditator trainee, with the help of
concentration, can cultivate strong mental powers to effectively aid others.
There are dangers, however, in developing concentration to a high level
unless the meditator follows good training techniques under the guidance of
a qualified teacher.  Unless practice is vigorously and regularily
maintained, mental taints, when forceably suppressed, will often surge with
increased intensity.

It may occassionally occur that the Truth of Dissatisfaction is made clear
to a samadhi meditator if wisdom can reflect upon the impermanent and non
self nature of absorption states.  Usually, mental impurities tend to remain
quiescent in the minds of many samadhi meditators.  Yogic knowledge produces
Purification of Thought, but is somewhat different from the Purification of
Views (or Understanding) which is necessary for full completion of the
Insight Path leading to Wisdom of "things as they really are."

From: Insight Meditation
      Practical Steps To Ultimate Truth
        Achan Sobin S.Namto
    edited by Rev.Martha Dharmapali




 
13576 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 9:08pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 
  --- Kom Tukovinit  wrote: 
... 
> There are also many akusala that cross-dress as kusala.

'Cross-dress'.  I like it!  A neat alternative description for Gayan's
vangchaka dhammas also?

> I wouldn't label Christine as not-so-good friend, despite
> how entertaining she is ;-).  Being attached to her because
> how entertaining she is, now that has many faults...

Agreed.

Jon


 
13577 From: kelvin liew peng chuan   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 9:24pm
Subject: suttas only?

 
  Dear friends in Dhamma,

may all of you be well, happy & peaceful (n happy belated Wesak!) i learnt a 
lot from the various issues in here.

a few days ago, i ahd a chance to have a conversation with a monk & 
according to him, all Buddhist should only rely on the Suttas & Vinaya.

According to him, Abhidhamma as well as Visudhimagga were later works and 
there were many things not in accordance to the Suttas in both of these 
later works.

is it true?




 
13578 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 10:39pm
Subject: Re: suttas only?

 
  ---
Dear Kelvin,
Nice to see you again. I think this is something we hear fairly 
regularly in Dhamma circles these days.
In the end I think people have no choice but to follow what their 
accumulations dictate; because of these many of us here have an 
interest in Abhidhamma and find the Visuddhimagga useful, whereas 
others find them unpalateable. It is OK, very natural that different 
people should have different tastes. 
Can we prove the Abhidhamma is the word of the Buddha? I think not, 
and nor can your monk friend prove that the suttas are Buddhavacca.
However, it is worthwhile to investigate and so did you ask the monk 
what sections of the Abhidhamma and Visuddhimagga he believes are 
not in accordance with the suttas? I haven't found that to be the 
case myself.
kind regards
robert

  "kelvin liew peng chuan"  
wrote:
> 
> Dear friends in Dhamma,
> 
> may all of you be well, happy & peaceful (n happy belated Wesak!) 
i learnt a 
> lot from the various issues in here.
> 
> a few days ago, i ahd a chance to have a conversation with a monk 
& 
> according to him, all Buddhist should only rely on the Suttas & 
Vinaya.
> 
> According to him, Abhidhamma as well as Visudhimagga were later 
works and 
> there were many things not in accordance to the Suttas in both of 
these 
> later works.
> 
> is it true?
> 

 
13579 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 7:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/29/02 6:28:56 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Jon writes:


> -------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        Ahh, but "the hardness that we take as being part of an inanimate 
> object (like a table, tree or building)" is concept-only. There being no 
> tables, trees, and buildings, there is no hardness possessed by them. It's
> actually the other way around: The occurrences of hardness directly
> experienced in mindstreams are compounded, along with other conditions,
> into concepts and percepts of such "things" as tables, trees, and
> buildings.
> --------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Jon:
> Let me re-phrase my comment slightly.  I meant, the hardness that is
> experienced at one moment and, before we know it, is taken as being part
> of an inanimate object (like table, tree or building) is still the dhamma
> of hardness at that initial moment of experience.
> 
> At such moments, there are 2 distinct and separate sets of conditions at
> play.  There are both the factors that condition the arising of that
> hardness in this world, and the factors that condition the experience of
> that hardness by the citta of the individual.  The latter set of factors
> could not pertain without the former, but the opposite in not the case.
> 
> The former set of conditioning factors have nothing to do with kamma or
> indeed citta in any shape or form, and are not what is being described by
> the paticcasamuppada;  only the latter are.  However, they are to be found
> in the abhidhamma texts such as the Patthana.
> 
> I don’t know if this makes clearer what I am trying to say.
> 
> Jon
> 
===========================
       Mmm, I'm not sure. It seems to me that you are hypothesizing a 
"hardness in this world" that is one thing, existing in some way on its own, 
something more Platonic and fantastic than something as "innocent" as such 
pa~n~nattis as trees and tables. I do not believe in such a "disembodied" 
hardness. The "world" is actually nothing but this body-mind, this stream of 
psychophysical experiences.
       In this respect, one can consider the following:
**********************************************************

Samyutta Nikaya XII.44



Loka Sutta



The World

Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.
For free distribution only. 
Dwelling at Savatthi. There the Blessed One addressed the monks: "I will 
teach you the origination of the world & the ending of the world. Listen & 
pay close attention. I will speak." "As you say, lord," the monks responded 
to the Blessed One. The Blessed One said: "And what is the origination of the 
world? Dependent on the eye & forms there arises eye-consciousness. The 
meeting of the three is contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes 
feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as 
a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as 
a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition 
comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, 
lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. This is the 
origination of the world. "Dependent on the ear & sounds there arises 
ear-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact... Dependent on the 
nose & aromas there arises nose-consciousness. The meeting of the three is 
contact... Dependent on the tongue & flavors there arises 
tongue-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact... Dependent on the 
body & tactile sensations there arises body-consciousness. The meeting of the 
three is contact... Dependent on the intellect & mental qualities there 
arises intellect-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact. From 
contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite 
condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes 
clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes 
becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a 
requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, 
& despair come into play. This is the origination of the world. "And what is 
the ending of the world? Dependent on the eye & forms there arises 
eye-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact. From contact as a 
requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition 
comes craving. Now, from the remainderless cessation & fading away of that 
very craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From the cessation 
of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming. From the cessation of 
becoming comes the cessation of birth. From the cessation of birth, then 
aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair all cease. Such 
is the cessation of this entire mass of stress & suffering. This is the 
ending of the world. "Dependent on the ear & sounds there arises 
ear-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact... Dependent on the 
nose & aromas there arises nose-consciousness. The meeting of the three is 
contact... Dependent on the tongue & flavors there arises 
tongue-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact... Dependent on the 
body & tactile sensations there arises body-consciousness. The meeting of the 
three is contact... Dependent on the intellect & mental qualities there 
arises intellect-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact. From 
contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite 
condition comes craving. Now, from the remainderless cessation & fading away 
of that very craving comes the cessation of clinging/sustenance. From the 
cessation of clinging/sustenance comes the cessation of becoming. From the 
cessation of becoming comes the cessation of birth. From the cessation of 
birth, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair all 
cease. Such is the cessation of this entire mass of stress & suffering. This 
is the ending of the world." Revised: Mon 10 September 2001 <A HREF="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-044.html">
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-044.html</A>
***********************************************
       There are better examples than this that I'm having difficulty finding 
-examples of suttas which identify "the world" with namarupa, with 
mentality-materiality. One of these involves someone asking the Buddha about 
whether the world is finite, whether it comes to an end. The Buddha replied 
to the effect that nibbana is the end of the world.

With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13580 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 7:14pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/29/02 6:30:25 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Jon writes:


> 
> Jon:
> The problem I have here, Howard, is that I'm not sure if you're wanting to
> discuss the abhidhammic position or the phenomenalist position!! 
> 
> By way of illustrating what I mean, I'd like to give another 2
> propositions to compare, again taken or adapted from an earlier post--
> 
> (a)  The Buddhist perspective, and most explicitly so in Abhidhamma,
> doesn't countenance objects existing independently of experience.
> (b)  The Buddhist perspective, and most explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a
> phenomenalist one which doesn't countenance objects existing independently
> of experience.
> 
> I think you can appreciate the difference in the thrust of these 2
> positions.  For a start, the answer to (b) is going to depend on a agreed
> definition for, and similar depth of understanding of, the concept of
> phenomenalism.  And then, when you've figured it out as best you can, has
> one really advanced one's understanding of the abhidhammic perspective?
> 
> Not that I would wish to discourage comparative discussion, but simply to
> point out its limitations.  I thought there might be a point here worth
> bringing up for discussion.
> 
> Jon
> 
==============================
       I'm perfectly happy with (a), Jon. The fact that I see the position in 
(a) as a phenomnalist one is unimportant. It is what it is, an I am very 
happy with it! :-)

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13581 From: abhidhammika   
Date: Thu May 30, 2002 0:00am
Subject: Re: vitthaara sutta: To Jonothan Abbott And Nina van Gorkom

 
  Dear Nina, And Jonothan

How are you?

Thank you for your kind comments on Kamma In Color the English 
language Commentary on Vittaara Suttam.

As you might have been already aware of, there are people who 
misunderstand Abhidhamma Pitaka. They think Abhidhamma Pitaka is an 
unnecessary body of teachings lacking in important teachings found in 
Suttam Pitaka. For example, Venerable Dhamarati thought that Four 
Groups of Kamma found in Vitthaara Suttam could not be found in 
Abhidhamma, and accordingly, threw a challenge at me and Robert by 
asking to locate them in Abhidhamma Pitaka and show referrences.

My commentary has been written to remove such misunderstanding 
rampant among some Buddhist thinkers.

Nina also wrote:

"I hope you will write more of those also when unasked!"

Thank you, Nina, for this request. I will try my best to write more 
English language commentaries on Pali Suttas even though unasked.


Take care!

Suan    



--- Jonothan Abbott ---wrote:

Suan

Thanks for this interesting commentary which I look forward to 
studying in detail.

I appreciate the point you bring out well that the fourfold 
classification of kamma in this sutta is given for the purpose of 
instruction and explanation, and is not an 'absolute' one in terms of 
the paramattha dhammas found in the abhidhamma.

Jon



---  Nina van Gorkom  wrote:

Dear Suan, thank you very much for your clear and most helpful 
commentary to
the vitthaara sutta. Without this explanation I would not have 
understood
this sutta. I am glad Joice and Howard asked for your commentary, and 
I hope
you will write more of those also when unasked!
Kind regards from Nina.

 
13582 From: Nina van Gorkom   
Date: Thu May 30, 2002 1:00am
Subject: Re: [dsg]realities, actualities.

 
  op 26-05-2002 17:56 schreef Howard op Howard:

Dear Howard, thank you for your carefully thought out and well formulated
post. I could add a few points to your remarks.

H:  "The sounds in the wood not heard by you when you are not there" are
> only presumed, as is true for whatever is "currently transpiring" on the far
> side of the moon. But such a presumption, read in a certain way, is not
> without basis, for there is a lawfulness to events. A (subjunctive)
> conditionality along the lines of "Should such & such a sequence of
> conditions be observed, then certain other condtions would be observed",
> along with the recognition of multiple streams of experience interacting to
> form an "intersubjective reality", can serve as an alternative to the view of
> a self-existing "external reality".

N: The example of sounds in the wood may not be so convincing. What about
this: the khandhas of people are realities arising and falling away, no
matter they are experienced or not. You mention conditionality: when there
are conditions for the arising of phenomena they do arise, no matter they
are experienced or not. The four great elements are conditions for other
rupas arising together with them in a group; they arise and fall away, no
matter they are experienced or not. The Buddha taught so many phenomena
which are real but which we cannot experience now. But as I understand, this
is not a point for you. But you have hesitancy about the term reality:

H:  But leaving the question of robustness to the radical phenomenalist
> view asid for a while, I would like to address the use of the term 'reality'
> for paramattha dhammas. My only hesitancy in the use of the term is that it
> carries a connotation of substantial and independent existence. But there is,
> from my perspective, a sense in which paramattha dhammas have a reality that
> is lacking in concepts. That sense is that concepts "project outwards" to
> alleged "things" in an external world, whereas paramattha dhammas do not.
> When hardness is discerned, there is just the direct experience of hardness,
> something immediately (without mediation) and internally apprehensible, and
> it is not until the percept of, for example, a table arises that we seem to
> experience that hardness as a characteristic of an "external thing". In that
> sense, I actually *like* the term 'reality', though I would prefer, say,
> 'actuality', which seems to me to less "loaded".

N: I said to Rob Ep: prove it, verify it for yourself, but I should also
remind my self of this. In this connection I found a most interesting
definition of reality:

The Kathavatthu deals in the first chapter, no. 1, with the question  ²Is
the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate object?² The Sakavadin
(Theravada) and the Paravadin (those of other beliefs) debate about this.
The commentary gives a definition of ³In the sense of a real and ultimate
object²:
<here real means that which is not to be apprehended as not fact, like
magic, a mirage and the like; actual. ³Ultimate² means that which is not to
be accepted as hearsay; highest sense...>

I find this last part: <not to be accepted as hearsay> very clear and an
excellent reminder to verify whatever appears. Like pain: can we verify it,
is it real, not imagination? It is there just for a moment, but very real.
We do not doubt about it. Here I was thinking about Rob Ep who finds it
difficult to know what is real. But it is difficult for all of us.
Also here we have the term actual that you prefer, actuality.

One more thing: when there is the direct experience of hardness we do not
think of a table at all. Maybe we touch a table and at that moment the
characteristic of hardness can be experienced, and when we know there is a
table the hardness is not experienced at the same time, there is thinking of
the concept table. But maybe you mean to say the same when you speak about
the direct experience of hardness, as different from thinking of an external
thing, the table.
To come back to "not from hearsay", when direct understanding of nama and
rupa is developed there is no need to think of ultimate realities,
actualities or any term. We do not mind what term is used.
By the way, you said that you were going to write an article about the
Abhidhamma. This would also be interesting for dsg.
Best wishes from Nina.



 
13583 From: Nina van Gorkom   
Date: Thu May 30, 2002 1:00am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts, to Sarah, and offerings, to Lucy

 
  op 28-05-2002 09:57 schreef Sarah op Sarah:


> I looked in the chapter and there is no mention of texts that Ledi Sayadaw
> bases his explanations on.
> .....
>> 
>> Ledi Sayadaw explains that it is in these consequent processes that
>> distinct recognition of the object occurs; such recognition does not
>> occur in a bare five-door process itself. An eye-door process, for
>> example, is followed first by a conformational mind-door process
>> (tadanuvattika manodvaravithi), which reproduces in the mind door the
>> object just perceived in the sense-door process. Then comes a process
>> grasping the object as  whole (samudayagahika); then a process
>> recognizing the colour (vannasallakkhana); then a process grasping the
>> entity (vatthugahika); then a process recognizing the entity
>> (vatthusallakkhana); then a process grasping the name (namagahika); then
>> a process recognizing the name (namasallakkhana).

Dear Sarah, this is in the commentary to the Abhidhammata Sangaha, edited as
"Compendium of Philosophy" by PTS, p. 33. Also Num quoted this text before.
Here it is slightly different from Ledi Sayadaw, about the perception of a
rose. After anubandavaramatta, it has grasping the past, atitaggahana. Then
grasping as a whole, grasping the meaning, grasping the name. The only thing
is, we should not think that immediately in the next process comes grasping
the object as a whole and the next one recognizing the colour, etc.  We
cannot count the different processes, too fast. This commentary speaks about
processes alternating several hundred thousand times before the synthetic
process takes place.
> ***** 
Another matter: the giving of fearlessness and forgiving, Lodewijk found
this difficult while checking my translation of Ch 2. I mentioned the sutta
on maha-dana, abstaining from ill deeds as a kind of giving as you know. I
shall insert this sutta with an explanation (mentioning this in a footnote)
so as to make clear that dana includes many things, even abstaining from
vengefulness, being unforgiving. I find translating very difficult, since I
do not like to change too much when I translate. Some editing we find
unavoidable though.
On dana: in Sri Lanka you will do a lot of chanting (wonderful how people
know the Pali, did'nt we enjoy that) and this is also dana: the offering of
sound, as Kh Sujin explained. It depends on conditions whether we remember
this. Another point:when playing music (good for me and also for my musical
friend Herman), we can offer the sound to the Triple Gem, this was also
mentioned by Kh Sujin. Here I have some doubts, since I am immediately
attached. Again, it depends on conditions whether kusala citta arises.
Maybe, if there is an opportunity, Kh. Sujin can say something more. But,
there may not be time. Actually, I was thinking of Lucy (is she out in the
woods, offering things?), who mentioned offerings.
Best regards, Nina.

 
13584 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 10:17pm
Subject: Re: [dsg]realities, actualities.

 
  Hi, Nina -


> 
> op 26-05-2002 17:56 schreef Howard op Howard:
> 
> Dear Howard, thank you for your carefully thought out and well formulated
> post. I could add a few points to your remarks.
> 
> H:  "The sounds in the wood not heard by you when you are not there" are
> > only presumed, as is true for whatever is "currently transpiring" on the 
> far
> > side of the moon. But such a presumption, read in a certain way, is not
> > without basis, for there is a lawfulness to events. A (subjunctive)
> > conditionality along the lines of "Should such & such a sequence of
> > conditions be observed, then certain other condtions would be observed",
> > along with the recognition of multiple streams of experience interacting 
> to
> > form an "intersubjective reality", can serve as an alternative to the 
> view of
> > a self-existing "external reality".
> 
> N: The example of sounds in the wood may not be so convincing. What about
> this: the khandhas of people are realities arising and falling away, no
> matter they are experienced or not. You mention conditionality: when there
> are conditions for the arising of phenomena they do arise, no matter they
> are experienced or not. The four great elements are conditions for other
> rupas arising together with them in a group; they arise and fall away, no
> matter they are experienced or not. The Buddha taught so many phenomena
> which are real but which we cannot experience now. But as I understand, 
> this
> is not a point for you. But you have hesitancy about the term reality:
> 
> H:  But leaving the question of robustness to the radical phenomenalist
> > view asid for a while, I would like to address the use of the term 
> 'reality'
> > for paramattha dhammas. My only hesitancy in the use of the term is that 
> it
> > carries a connotation of substantial and independent existence. But there 
> is,
> > from my perspective, a sense in which paramattha dhammas have a reality 
> that
> > is lacking in concepts. That sense is that concepts "project outwards" to
> > alleged "things" in an external world, whereas paramattha dhammas do not.
> > When hardness is discerned, there is just the direct experience of 
> hardness,
> > something immediately (without mediation) and internally apprehensible, 
> and
> > it is not until the percept of, for example, a table arises that we seem 
> to
> > experience that hardness as a characteristic of an "external thing". In 
> that
> > sense, I actually *like* the term 'reality', though I would prefer, say,
> > 'actuality', which seems to me to less "loaded".
> 
> N: I said to Rob Ep: prove it, verify it for yourself, but I should also
> remind my self of this. In this connection I found a most interesting
> definition of reality:
> 
> The Kathavatthu deals in the first chapter, no. 1, with the question  ²Is
> the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate object?² The Sakavadin
> (Theravada) and the Paravadin (those of other beliefs) debate about this.
> The commentary gives a definition of ³In the sense of a real and ultimate
> object²:
> <here real means that which is not to be apprehended as not fact, like
> magic, a mirage and the like; actual. ³Ultimate² means that which is not to
> be accepted as hearsay; highest sense...>
> 
> I find this last part: <not to be accepted as hearsay> very clear and an
> excellent reminder to verify whatever appears. Like pain: can we verify it,
> is it real, not imagination? It is there just for a moment, but very real.
> We do not doubt about it.
> 
----------------------------------------------
Howard:
       I share your liking of this last part. It gives a good sense for 
'real'. The first part, however, is not to my liking. For example, see the 
mirage-like terminology used in the Sutta Nipata (in the Uragga Sutta?), and, 
elsewwher, especially see the Phena Sutta. All conditioned dhammas are like 
foam, mirages, dreams - are hollow, fleeting phantoms.
------------------------------------------------       
   Here I was thinking about Rob Ep who finds it> 
> 
> difficult to know what is real. But it is difficult for all of us.
> Also here we have the term actual that you prefer, actuality.
> 
> One more thing: when there is the direct experience of hardness we do not
> think of a table at all. Maybe we touch a table and at that moment the
> characteristic of hardness can be experienced, and when we know there is a
> table the hardness is not experienced at the same time, there is thinking 
> of
> the concept table. But maybe you mean to say the same when you speak about
> the direct experience of hardness, as different from thinking of an 
> external
> thing, the table.
---------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       Yes, indeed. I mean exactly the same.
---------------------------------------------------

> To come back to "not from hearsay", when direct understanding of nama and
> rupa is developed there is no need to think of ultimate realities,
> actualities or any term. We do not mind what term is used.
> 
------------------------------------------------
Howard: 
       Yes, I like that Sarah. When things are seen as they actually are, 
words are unnecessary.
------------------------------------------------

> By the way, you said that you were going to write an article about the
> Abhidhamma. This would also be interesting for dsg.
> 
-------------------------------------------------
Howard:
       No, that must have been someone else. I have no credentials whatever 
for writing such an article.
--------------------------------------------------

> Best wishes from Nina.
> 
> 
=========================
Thank you for writing to me, Nina.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13585 From: Howard 
Date: Wed May 29, 2002 10:24pm
Subject: Re: [dsg]realities, actualities.

 
  Hi, again, Nina -

In a message dated 5/29/02 2:20:25 PM Eastern Daylight Time, Howard 
writes:


> Howard: 
>        Yes, I like that Sarah. When things are seen as they actually are, 
> words are unnecessary.
> 
==========================
       Whoops! It would be good were I to maintain sufficient mindfulness to 
remember who I am conversing with! ;-)) Sorry, Nina.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13586 From: <> 
Date: Thu May 30, 2002 7:17am
Subject: ADL ch. 10 (3)

 
  http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 10 (3)

People want to know whether they can ensure a happy rebirth for
themselves by controlling the last cittas before the
dying-consciousness, by willing them to be kusala. Some people invite
monks to chant in order to help a dying person to have kusala cittas.
However, nobody can be sure that his rebirth will be a happy one, unless
he has attained one of the stages of enlightenment. One cannot have
power over one's cittas. Can we control our thoughts now, at this
moment? Since we cannot do this, how could we control our thoughts at
the time shortly before dying? There is no self which can decide about
one's rebirth in the next life. Even if one has done many good deeds,
there may be akusala kamma of a previous life which can produce an
unhappy rebirth in the next life. After the last akusala cittas or
kusala cittas in life have fallen away, the cuti-citta arises. The
cuti-citta is succeeded by the patisandhi-citta of the next life. When
the patisandhi-citta arises the new lifespan starts. As long as kamma
there will be future lives. 

Since the first citta of a lifespan performs the function of rebirth
there is only one patisandhi-citta in a life. There is no self which
transmigrates from one life to the next life; there are only nama and
rupa arising and falling away. The present life is different from the
past life but there is continuity in so far as the present life is
conditioned by the past. Since the patisandhi-citta succeeds the
cuti-citta of the previous life the accumulated tendencies of past lives
go on to the patisandhi-citta. Thus, inclinations one has in the present
life are conditioned by the past. 

One is glad to be born if one does not realize that birth is the result
of kamma and that one will go forth in the cycle of birth and death as
long as there is kamma. Not seeing the dangers of birth is ignorance. At
this moment we are in the human plane of existence but as long as we
have not attained any stage of enlightenment we cannot be sure that
there will not be rebirth in one of the woeful planes. We all have
performed both akusala kamma and kusala kamma in different lives. Who
knows which of those deeds will produce the patisandhi-citta of the next
life, even if we continue doing good deeds? Some people think that birth
in a heavenly plane is desirable, but they do not realize that life in a
heavenly plane does not last and after a lifespan in heaven is over an
ill deed previously performed could produce a patisandhi-citta in a
woeful plane. 

We read in the 'Discourse on Fools and the Wise' (Middle Length Sayings
Ill, 129) that the Buddha, when he was staying in the Jeta Grove, in
Anathapindika's monastery, spoke to the monks about the sufferings in
hell and about the anguishes of animal birth. The Buddha said: 

'In many a disquisition could I, monks, talk a talk about animal birth,
but it is not easy to describe in full, monks, so many are the anguishes
of animal birth. 

Monks, it is like a man who might throw a yoke with one hole into the
sea. An easterly wind might take it westwards, a westerly wind might
take it eastwards, a northerly wind might take it southwards, a
southerly wind might take it northwards. There might be a blind turtle
there who came to the surface once in a hundred years. What do you think
about this, monks? Could that blind turtle push his neck through that
one hole in the yoke?' 

'lf at all, revered sir, then only once in a very long while.' 

'Sooner or later, monks, could the blind turtle push his neck through
the one hole in the yoke; more difficult than that, do I say, monks, is
human status once again for the fool who has gone to the Downfall. What
is the cause of that? Monks, there is no dhamma-faring there, no
even-faring, no doing of what is skilled, no doing of what is good.
Monks, there is devouring of one another there and feeding on the weak.
Monks, if some time or other once in a very long while that fool came to
human status (again), he would be born into those families that are low:
a family of low caste or a family of hunters or a family of
bamboo-plaiters or a family of cartwrights or a family of
refuse-scavengers, in such a family as is needy, without enough to drink
or to eat, where a covering for the back is with difficulty obtained.
Moreover, he would 
be illfavoured, ugly, dwarfish, sickly, blind or deformed or lame or
paralysed; he would be unable to get food, drink, clothes, vehicles,
garlands, scents and perfumes, bed, dwelling and lights; he would fare
wrongly in body, wrongly in speech, wrongly in thought. Because he had
fared wrongly in body, speech and thought, at the breaking up of the
body after dying he would arise in the sorrowful ways, a bad bourn, the
Downfall, Niraya Hell.... 

... This, monks, is the fool's condition, completed in its entirety...';

 
13587 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Thu May 30, 2002 11:02am
Subject: Blue Mountains Insight Meditation Centre

 
  Dear All,

Australian and Asia-Pacific list members may find the following link 
of interest.  
http://www.meditation.asn.au/
The website of the Blue Mountains Insight Meditation Centre.   Their 
aim is to provide facilities for the teaching and practice of 
satipatthana vipassana or insight meditation in the tradition of the 
late venerable Mahasi Sayadaw of Burma. The Centre seeks its 
inspiration in the Buddhist Theravadan tradition and aims to develop 
an Australian style of Buddhism, with the hope that the centre will 
develop as a place of meditation, study and community.The Centre is 
in the small town of Medlow Bath in the Blue Mountains World Heritage 
National Park, two hours from Sydney by train or ninety minutes by 
car. The Centre provides a peaceful setting in which to learn the art 
of meditation. Courses are taught by the resident teacher, Patrick 
Kearney, and by visiting monks, nuns or lay teachers from Burma and 
other countries. Details of the current retreats and activities can 
be found on this site, together with downloads of talks and 
information about the life of the Centre and its community. 
 
metta,
Christine

 
13588 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 30, 2002 2:39pm
Subject: Sri Lanka - B.Bodhi

 
  Dear Betty, Christine, Nina & All,

I had written to B.Bodhi some weeks ago about our plans in Sri Lanka, but
he only saw my letter yesterday and I’d like to share a few details which
I don’t believe are confidential.

In brief, he has been out of Sri Lanka for nearly a year and spent 9mths
in Singapore trying various treatments (unsuccessfully) for his headache
condition. Last week he went to New York for further consultations in a
neurology department of a hospital there. There don’t seem to be any fixed
plans for return at this stage and he certainly won’t be in SL when we
visit.

<Of interest to Nina (and maybe Michael Newton & Azita), he mentioned that
Ven Guttasila has been staying at the Forest Hermitage during his ‘long
absence’. As he says, Ven Guttasila is ‘an exemplary monk’, whom Jonothan
knew  well (and supported) for many years in Thailand. Nina, you’ll
remember he accompanied us (along w/Phra Dhammadharo) on our trip to India
in 1980. Actually, we had some contact with him a couple of years ago when
he visited Hong Kong and hope to see him if he’s still in Kandy.>

Sarah
======

 
13589 From: Sarah   
Date: Thu May 30, 2002 7:02pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts, to Sarah, and offerings, to Lucy

 
  Dear Nina,

 --- Nina van Gorkom  wrote: 
> Dear Sarah, this is in the commentary to the Abhidhammata Sangaha,
> edited as
> "Compendium of Philosophy" by PTS, p. 33. Also Num quoted this text
> before.
> Here it is slightly different from Ledi Sayadaw, about the perception of
> a
> rose. After anubandavaramatta, it has grasping the past, atitaggahana.
> Then
> grasping as a whole, grasping the meaning, grasping the name. The only
> thing
> is, we should not think that immediately in the next process comes
> grasping
> the object as a whole and the next one recognizing the colour, etc.  We
> cannot count the different processes, too fast. This commentary speaks
> about
> processes alternating several hundred thousand times before the
> synthetic
> process takes place.
> > ***** 

Thank you for these comments which are helpful, especially the last
sentence! I'm also curious about which part of the Abhid itself, L.Sayadaw
drew these details from, but it isn’t important at all.
.....
> Another matter: the giving of fearlessness and forgiving, Lodewijk found
> this difficult while checking my translation of Ch 2. I mentioned the
> sutta
> on maha-dana, abstaining from ill deeds as a kind of giving as you know.
> I
> shall insert this sutta with an explanation (mentioning this in a
> footnote)
> so as to make clear that dana includes many things, even abstaining from
> vengefulness, being unforgiving. I find translating very difficult,
> since I
> do not like to change too much when I translate. Some editing we find
> unavoidable though.
.....
May I take this opportunity to say that I think your translations read
very well and the extra footnotes are helpful to avoid confusions.
.....
> On dana: in Sri Lanka you will do a lot of chanting (wonderful how
> people
> know the Pali, did'nt we enjoy that) and this is also dana: the offering
> of
> sound, as Kh Sujin explained. It depends on conditions whether we
> remember
> this. Another point:when playing music (good for me and also for my
> musical
> friend Herman), we can offer the sound to the Triple Gem, this was also
> mentioned by Kh Sujin. Here I have some doubts, since I am immediately
> attached. Again, it depends on conditions whether kusala citta arises.
.....

Let me add another couple of short quotes from the ‘Treatise on the
Paramis’ from the Cariyapitaka Atthakatha, transl by B.Bodhi:

“..He does not give a gift with harsh words or a frown, but with words of
endearment, congenial speech, and a smile on his face.”

On the gift of sounds (saddadaana):

“The gift of sounds should be understood by way of the sounds of drums,
etc.  It is certainly not possible to give a sound as one gives a cluster
of lotuses, tearing it out by its bulb and roots and placing it in the
hands.  But one gives a gift of sound by giving its base.  Thus he makes a
gift of sound by presenting a musical instrument, such as drums or tom
toms, to the Triple Gem;  or by giving medicine for the voice, such as oil
and molasses, to preachers of the Dhamma;  or by announcing a lecture on
the Dhamma, chanting the scriptures, giving a discourse on the dhamma,
holding a discussion, or expressing appreciation for the good deeds of
others.” <end quotes>
*****
I think as you mentioned before with the example of playing music for your
father and his dog, it can be with kindness and consideration and of
course there can be awareness at any time.  Like you say, there is bound
to be attachment most the time however, just as in any activity....still,
good to begin to know it! Like we read in this quote, there are so many
different ways that dana can be offered, even just under the ‘gift of
sounds’. As we are not offering sounds in these discussions, perhaps we
can consider them as the gift of visible forms (ruupadaana). 
.....
> Maybe, if there is an opportunity, Kh. Sujin can say something more.
> But,
> there may not be time. 
.....
I’ll try to raise it. I’m not sure what is meant by ‘giving its base’ at
this quick glance. I also find the expression ‘he makes a gift.....to the
Triple Gem’ to be somewhat strange. I’ll be glad to hear anything more
myself. I’ve just been teaching for a couple of hours and using my voice
quite a lot. It’s a good opportunity  for saddadana too and I like the
reminder about 'congenial speech' and a smile too.
.....
>Actually, I was thinking of Lucy (is she out in
> the
> woods, offering things?), who mentioned offerings.
.....
The various classifications of dana are quite interesting: besides the
3fold classification mentioned of amisadana (giving of material things),
abhayadana and dhammadana, there is also the 2fold classification of
internal and external. the external gifts can be further classified as
tenfold or sixfold when analysed by way of sense object (aaramman.nato)
which are visible forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles and non-sensory
objects.

This Treatise on the Paramis that I’m dipping into, starts on p.243 of
BB’s translation of the Brahmajala Sutta and commentaries, for those who
have it.

Sarah
=====



 
13590 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Fri May 31, 2002 6:33am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta

 
  Kom

--- Kom Tukovinit  wrote: > Dear Jon,
> 
> More opinion, obviously...  ;-)
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Jonothan Abbott [mailto:Jon]
> >
> > I agree with the connection you make between
> > satipatthana and magga.  As I
> > understand it, the commentaries explain that a
> > moment of satipatthana is a
> > moment of mundane path-consciousness.
> 
> This may be unrelated.  I was discussing with Num today
> about this particular point.  One thing we agreed with each
> other is that Satipatthana is counted as 4 of the 37
> Bodhi-pacaya-dhamma (???).  Satipatthana 4 must first be
> developed before all the sammpayutta-dhamma can be called
> Sammapathan 4, Iddhibat 4, ..., Magga 8.  At the point of
> magga, all 37 factors become perfected (at the appropriate
> level).  By this definition, I understand Satipatthana to be
> part of magga.

(This too may be unrelated.)  At the moment of magga citta, all 37 factors
are 'having effect', although in terms of paramattha dhammas they are only
14 in total.

I believe it says in the Vism that at moment of magga citta, the  sati is
regarded as an instance of all 4 foundations/establishment, whereas at
other (mundane path) moments the sati is of only of one foundation or
another.

Likewise with the 4 padhanas (perseverences, efforts), it says that at
moment of magga citta the viriya cetasika performs the 4-fold function of
the 4 padhanas, whereas at mundane path moments only 1 of the 4 functions
is performed, depending on the circumstances.  But I've also heard
differently, that at mundane path moment the 4 padhana functions are all
being performed.

BTW, counting as 37 factors, I believe sati counts for 8 (not 4), since it
comes within some of the other 6 sets of factors also.

> > Nevertheless, I tend to think that when the
> > Buddha used the term 'Noble
> > Eightfold Path' in addressing listeners who were
> > ripe for enlightenment he
> > was referring exclusively to supramundane consciousness.
> >
> 
> I don't have such confidence yet.  Somehow when the word
> magga is used, sometimes (I think) it is interpreted in the
> commentaries as being both mundane and supra-mundane.  And I
> also understand that we all have to start somewhere besides
> at the perfection, and even then it is still called the
> path, just a very dangerous (for falling wayside, being
> fooled by akusala and micha-dithi) one...

In the CMA (Abhidhammattha Sangaha), in one of the notes is mentions that
the Noble Eightfold Path in the context of the Four Noble Truths is
exclusively supramundane.  This implies that in other contexts it is not
necessarily so, and 1 example of this would be as one of the 7 sets
comprising the bodhi-pakkhiya dhamma.  These are factors that are
developed in developing the path towards enlightenment, and so must be
mundane factors or at least have a mundane aspect.

Jon



 
13591 From: <> 
Date: Fri May 31, 2002 7:42am
Subject: ADL ch. 10 (4)

 
  Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 10 (4)

The Buddha spoke about the dangers of birth in many different ways. He
said that birth is dukkha (sorrow) ; it is followed by old age, sickness
and death. He pointed out the foulness of the body and reminded people
that also at this very moment the body is dukkha, impermanent and
not-self. If we continue taking mind and body for self there will be no
end to the cycle of birth and death. 

We read in the 'Kindred Sayings' (II, Nidana-vagga, Ch. XV, par. 10, A
person) that the Buddha, when he was in Rajagaha on Vulture's Peak, said
to the monks: 

Incalculable is the beginning, monks, of this faring on. The earliest
point is not revealed of the running on, faring on of beings, cloaked in
ignorance, tied by craving... The bones of one single person, monks,
running on, faring on for an aeon would be a cairn, a pile, a heap as
great as Mount Vepulla, were there a collector of those bones and the
collection were not destroyed. 

How is this? Incalculable is the beginning, monks, of this faring on.
The earliest point is not revealed of the running on, faring on of
beings, cloaked in ignorance, tied by craving... 

Thus spoke the Exalted One. After the Wellfarer had said this, he spoke
further: 

The pile of bones of (all the bodies of) one man 
Who has alone one aeon lived, 
Were heaped a mountain high - - so said the mighty seer - - 
Yes, reckoned high as Vipula 
To north of Vulture's Peak, crag-fort of Magadha. 
When he with perfect insight sees 
The Ariyan Truths: - - what dukkha is and how it comes. 
And how it may be overpassed, 
The Ariyan Eightfold Path, the way all ill to abate - - 
Seven times at most reborn, a man 
Yet running on, through breaking every fetter down, 
Endmaker does become of dukkha. 

It is fortunate to be born in the human plane where one can cultivate
insight. 
When one has attained the first stage of enlightenment (the stage of the 
sotapanna), one has realized the Four Noble Truths. Then one will not be
reborn 
more than seven times and one can be sure that there will eventually be
an end to rebirth. 
 
Questions 
1. How many functions of citta are there in all? . 
2. The four jatis of citta are: akusala, kusaIa, vipaka and kiriya.
Which jati is the patisandhi-citta? 
3. Is birth as a human being always the result of kusaIa kamma? 
4. When does human life start? 
5. Why is birth sorrow (dukkha)?

 
13592 From: Sarah   
Date: Fri May 31, 2002 2:33pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 10 (3)

 
  Dear ADL corner,

When I read the following quote from Discourse on Fools and the Wise'
(Middle Length Sayings
Ill, 129) in ADL 10(3) this morning, it reminded me of a brief discussion
we had in Bangkok:
.....
We read in the 'Discourse on Fools and the Wise' (Middle Length Sayings
Ill, 129) Monks, if some time or other once in a very long while that fool
came to
human status (again), he would be born into those families that are low:
a family of low caste or a family of hunters or a family of
bamboo-plaiters or a family of cartwrights or a family of
refuse-scavengers, in such a family as is needy, without enough to drink
or to eat, where a covering for the back is with difficulty obtained.
Moreover, he would 
be illfavoured, ugly, dwarfish, sickly, blind or deformed or lame or
paralysed; he would be unable to get food, drink, clothes, vehicles,
garlands, scents and perfumes, bed, dwelling and lights; he would fare
wrongly in body, wrongly in speech, wrongly in thought. Because he had
fared wrongly in body, speech and thought, at the breaking up of the
body after dying he would arise in the sorrowful ways, a bad bourn, the
Downfall, Niraya Hell.... 

... This, monks, is the fool's condition, completed in its entirety...';
*****

Some of us were discussing the difficult living conditions in countries
like India. The dirt and poverty can seem overwhelming and how there can
easily be dosa (aversion) and mana (conceit) as well as occasionally more
noble virtues when we see or think about these states. K.Sujin reminded us
(as we read in this sutta) that we’ve all spent many, many lifetimes
living in dirt and poverty. We’ve all been living in ‘low caste’ families,
in need, and ugly or deformed and so on over and over and over again. I
find these reflections are a condition for a little more patience,
tolerance and compassion. Let it also be a reminder of the value in faring
rightly ‘in body, speech and thought...’ 

Sarah
===== 
 --- <> wrote: >
http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm
> 
> Abhidhamma In Daily Life
> Chapter 10 (3)



 
13593 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Fri May 31, 2002 4:49pm
Subject: Merit Making

 
  Dear All,

Often one hears negative remarks about those who do good deeds 
believing these will have some positive effect on what rebirth they 
obtain. Some refer to this as superstition, or as the laziness of 
those who don't want to put a strong effort into leaving samsara 
forever, and are content with aiming for a life in a better place or 
form.  Doing good for others when the main idea is to benefit oneself 
does seem a little hypocritical - would this be regarded as a 'good' 
intention?  I am not familiar with merit making and would like to 
hear more about it, as well as  knowing if there are any simple, 
straightforward articles or suttas on merit?

metta,
Christine

 
13594 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Fri May 31, 2002 7:34pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Howard

No argument from me about your reading of the Loka Sutta, or its
importance.

However, on my reading of the teachings both the following are to be
understood from the texts:
(a) Only the dhamma that is being presently experienced can be known
(b) Dhammas exist independently of experience

You are I think correct to say that someone who asserts the latter is
hypothesizing, since it is implicit in (a) that we cannot prove (b).  But
equally, to assert the opposite would also be to hypothesize, I suppose.

Jon

============================
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/29/02 6:28:56 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Jon writes:
…
> Jon:
> Let me re-phrase my comment slightly.  I meant, the hardness that is
> experienced at one moment and, before we know it, is taken as being part
> of an inanimate object (like table, tree or building) is still the
dhamma
> of hardness at that initial moment of experience.
> 
> At such moments, there are 2 distinct and separate sets of conditions at
> play.  There are both the factors that condition the arising of that
> hardness in this world, and the factors that condition the experience of
> that hardness by the citta of the individual.  The latter set of factors
> could not pertain without the former, but the opposite in not the case.
> 
> The former set of conditioning factors have nothing to do with kamma or
> indeed citta in any shape or form, and are not what is being described
by
> the paticcasamuppada;  only the latter are.  However, they are to be
found
> in the abhidhamma texts such as the Patthana.
> 
> I don’t know if this makes clearer what I am trying to say.
> 
> Jon
> 
===========================
       Mmm, I'm not sure. It seems to me that you are hypothesizing
a"hardness in this world" that is one thing, existing in some way on its
own, something more Platonic and fantastic than something as "innocent" as
such pa~n~nattis as trees and tables. I do not believe in such a
"disembodied" hardness. The "world" is actually nothing but this
body-mind, this stream of psychophysical experiences.


       In this respect, one can consider the following:
**********************************************************

Samyutta Nikaya XII.44

Loka Sutta

The World

Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.
For free distribution only. Dwelling at Savatthi. There the Blessed One
addressed the monks: "I will teach you the origination of the world & the
ending of the world. Listen & pay close attention. I will speak." "As you
say, lord," the monks responded to the Blessed One. The Blessed One said:
"And what is the origination of the world? Dependent on the eye & forms
there arises eye-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact. From
contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a
requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition
comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite
condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes
birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow,
lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. This is the
origination of the world. "
…
***********************************************
       There are better examples than this that I'm having difficulty
finding -examples of suttas which identify "the world" with namarupa, with
mentality-materiality. One of these involves someone asking the Buddha
about whether the world is finite, whether it comes to an end. The Buddha
replied to the effect that nibbana is the end of the world.

With metta,
Howard



 
13595 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Fri May 31, 2002 9:09pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Supportive spiritual practices

 
  Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein  wrote: > 
…
> > I'm sure I've asked this before, but I don't recall having had a
> response.  When
> > you
> > say you judge practices by their effects, does that mean effects in
> terms of the
> > dhamma and, if so, what effects found in the teachings would you be
> referring
> > to?
> 
> Well, the preliminary problem in answering that is that 'in terms of the
> dhamma'
> is subject to the individual's evaluation.  You can say that anything
> that creates
> kusala effects is in line with the dhamma, or you can say that only
> those things
> which are explicitly mentioned in the suttas are in line with the
> dhamma, or you
> could say that those things which lead us to the dhamma by hook or by
> crook are in
> line with the dhamma, because we all come to the dhamma by various
> combinations of
> conditions and actions.

To my way of thinking, a 'practice' should be judged by whether leads to
detachment, understanding and, ultimately, enlightenment.  Any practice
that may bring other shorter-term gains but does not lead to escape is in
fact going to prologue our time in samsara.

Of course, developing various kinds of kusala at any opportunity is not a
form of 'practice' and is always to be encouraged.

Jon



 
13596 From: Howard 
Date: Fri May 31, 2002 6:38pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/31/02 7:36:01 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Jon writes:


> 
> Howard
> 
> No argument from me about your reading of the Loka Sutta, or its
> importance.
> 
> However, on my reading of the teachings both the following are to be
> understood from the texts:
> (a) Only the dhamma that is being presently experienced can be known
> (b) Dhammas exist independently of experience
> 
> You are I think correct to say that someone who asserts the latter is
> hypothesizing, since it is implicit in (a) that we cannot prove (b).  But
> equally, to assert the opposite would also be to hypothesize, I suppose.
> 
> Jon
==================================
       Yes. Strictly speaking you are correct. The thing is, when pragmatism 
is joined to phenomenalism, as it often is, what is not only not known but is 
in principle unknowable is treated as (tantamount to) nonexistent. It is both 
pragmatically and noetically nonexistent. Often, the Buddha, instead of 
speaking in objective terms, saying that some alleged domething-or-other 
didn't exist, he would say things along the lines of "It isn't found", "There 
is no known beginning", "It isn't evident/seen" etc. His speaking was largely 
in an experiential and pragmatic vein.
=============================
       I'd like to add a brief addendum, Jon. You raised the point before, 
and I see it as valid, that attempting to characterize the Buddha's teaching 
as phenomenalist and pragmatic does not add anything to that teaching. I *do* 
see the Dhamma (as a philosophical view) as included in this genus of 
phenomenalism/pragmatism, and my seeing it that way clarifies matters for me. 
However, were I to be shown that this is not so, then it would be 
phenomenalism/pragmatism that I would give up (in a second) rather than the 
Dhamma. The Dhamma has played a role in my life that has been, for lack of a 
better, less Christian sounding, term, salvational. I have complete 
confidence in the Dhamma, the Buddha, and the Ariyasangha. I have no doubt 
that the Buddha truly taught the way to freedom and the end of suffering, and 
that his teaching of no-self-to-be-found-anywhere is an entirely *true* 
teaching.
=============================
With metta,
Howard

> 
> 
> 

> 
> ============================
> Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 5/29/02 6:28:56 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Jon writes:
> …
> > Jon:
> > Let me re-phrase my comment slightly.  I meant, the hardness that is
> > experienced at one moment and, before we know it, is taken as being part
> > of an inanimate object (like table, tree or building) is still the
> dhamma
> > of hardness at that initial moment of experience.
> > 
> > At such moments, there are 2 distinct and separate sets of conditions at
> > play.  There are both the factors that condition the arising of that
> > hardness in this world, and the factors that condition the experience of
> > that hardness by the citta of the individual.  The latter set of factors
> > could not pertain without the former, but the opposite in not the case.
> > 
> > The former set of conditioning factors have nothing to do with kamma or
> > indeed citta in any shape or form, and are not what is being described
> by
> > the paticcasamuppada;  only the latter are.  However, they are to be
> found
> > in the abhidhamma texts such as the Patthana.
> > 
> > I don’t know if this makes clearer what I am trying to say.
> > 
> > Jon
> > 
> ===========================
>        Mmm, I'm not sure. It seems to me that you are hypothesizing
> a"hardness in this world" that is one thing, existing in some way on its
> own, something more Platonic and fantastic than something as "innocent" as
> such pa~n~nattis as trees and tables. I do not believe in such a
> "disembodied" hardness. The "world" is actually nothing but this
> body-mind, this stream of psychophysical experiences.
> 
> 
>        In this respect, one can consider the following:
> **********************************************************
> 
> Samyutta Nikaya XII.44
> 
> Loka Sutta
> 
> The World
> 
> Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.
> For free distribution only. Dwelling at Savatthi. There the Blessed One
> addressed the monks: "I will teach you the origination of the world & the
> ending of the world. Listen & pay close attention. I will speak." "As you
> say, lord," the monks responded to the Blessed One. The Blessed One said:
> "And what is the origination of the world? Dependent on the eye & forms
> there arises eye-consciousness. The meeting of the three is contact. From
> contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a
> requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition
> comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite
> condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes
> birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow,
> lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. This is the
> origination of the world. "
> …
> ***********************************************
>        There are better examples than this that I'm having difficulty
> finding -examples of suttas which identify "the world" with namarupa, with
> mentality-materiality. One of these involves someone asking the Buddha
> about whether the world is finite, whether it comes to an end. The Buddha
> replied to the effect that nibbana is the end of the world.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13597 From: Nina van Gorkom   
Date: Sat Jun 1, 2002 1:25am
Subject: Re: [dsg] offerings

 
  op 30-05-2002 13:02 schreef Sarah op Sarah:

>> On dana: in Sri Lanka you will do a lot of chanting (wonderful how
>> people
>> know the Pali, did'nt we enjoy that) and this is also dana: the offering
>> of
>> sound, as Kh Sujin explained. It depends on conditions whether we
>> remember
>> this. Another point:when playing music (good for me and also for my
>> musical
>> friend Herman), we can offer the sound to the Triple Gem, this was also
>> mentioned by Kh Sujin. Here I have some doubts, since I am immediately
>> attached. Again, it depends on conditions whether kusala citta arises.
> .....
> 
On the gift of sounds (saddadaana):
> 
> “The gift of sounds should be understood by way of the sounds of drums,
> etc.   or by announcing a lecture on
> the Dhamma, chanting the scriptures, giving a discourse on the dhamma,
> holding a discussion, or expressing appreciation for the good deeds of
> others. <end quotes>
> *****
S:  I think as you mentioned before with the example of playing music for
your
> father and his dog, it can be with kindness and consideration and of
> course there can be awareness at any time.  Like you say, there is bound
> to be attachment most the time however, just as in any activity....still,
> good to begin to know it!

N: The dog, a husky, thanks the artists after we have finished, going to me
and Lodewijk. 

S: Like we read in this quote, there are so many
> different ways that dana can be offered, even just under the ‘gift of
> sounds’. As we are not offering sounds in these discussions, perhaps we
> can consider them as the gift of visible forms (ruupadaana).

N:  Thank you for this reminder, wonderful.

>> Maybe, if there is an opportunity, Kh. Sujin can say something more.
>> But,
>> there may not be time.
> .....
S:  I’ll try to raise it. I’m not sure what is meant by ‘giving its base’ at
> this quick glance.
N: the base, vatthu, would be the instrument, such as a drum given to a
temple. 

S:I also find the expression ‘he makes a gift.....to the
> Triple Gem’ to be somewhat strange. I’ll be glad to hear anything more
> myself. I’ve just been teaching for a couple of hours and using my voice
> quite a lot. It’s a good opportunity  for saddadana too and I like the
> reminder about 'congenial speech' and a smile too.

N: To the Triple Gem, yes, with respect to the Triple Gem and gratefulness,
because without the Triple Gem we would not be able to study Dhamma here and
discuss it on this forum. The best gift is mindfulness and the development
of right understanding now. This can accompany a gift of music, as you said.

Now your other letter:
op 30-05-2002 08:39 schreef Sarah op Sarah:

> <Of interest to Nina (and maybe Michael Newton & Azita), he mentioned that
> Ven Guttasila has been staying at the Forest Hermitage during his ‘long
> absence’. As he says, Ven Guttasila is ‘an exemplary monk’, whom Jonothan
> knew  well (and supported) for many years in Thailand. Nina, you’ll
> remember he accompanied us (along w/Phra Dhammadharo) on our trip to India
> in 1980. Actually, we had some contact with him a couple of years ago when
> he visited Hong Kong and hope to see him if he’s still in Kandy.>

Dear Sarah, I remember Ven Guttasila very well, and also our conversations
in the bus with him on samatha and vipassana. Great if you meet him and have
more discussions.
I wrote to Ven. Bodhi an ordinary letter, to Kandy.
Best wishes from Nina.

 
13598 From: Nina van Gorkom   
Date: Sat Jun 1, 2002 1:25am
Subject: Re: [dsg] to Howard

 
  op 29-05-2002 20:24 schreef Howard op Howard:

> Hi, again, Nina -
> 
> In a message dated 5/29/02 2:20:25 PM Eastern Daylight Time, Howard
> writes:
> 
>> Yes, I like that Sarah. When things are seen as they actually are,
>> words are unnecessary.
>> 
> ==========================
> Whoops! It would be good were I to maintain sufficient mindfulness to
> remember who I am conversing with! ;-)) Sorry, Nina.
> 
Nina:  :-)  :-)
But Sarah could have said it.
I like the loka sutta you quoted to Jon and I shall write more about it
later, I looked up the commentary to this sutta. I am also thinking about
the Katavatthu text, this is for later.
Best wishes from Nina.

 
13599 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Sat Jun 1, 2002 4:03am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  I have no doubt 
> that the Buddha truly taught the way to freedom and the end of 
suffering, and 
> that his teaching of no-self-to-be-found-anywhere is an entirely 
*true* 
> teaching.
> =============================
> With metta,
> Howard


Howard,

Where are you, Howard?  Can you find yourself?

Regards,
Victor