37600 From: ashkenn2k Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 11:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Howard Maybe I should explain in another way. The sutta said the convergence of the three there is contact. Is it possible to have seeing wihout contact arisen of seeing citta with visible objects. In Abhdihamma, all these are one moment. Do you think, these are different moments there? Is it possible that seeing consciouness arise first then visible objects then contacting to see it. Buddha said convergencing of the three comes contact and he not say that seeing citta comes first, then visible object then contact to have seeing. So to me the convergence of the three is one citta moment with contact. Then do you think it is possible that after this convergence there is contact? If it is after the convergence, how do seeing citta knows a visible object? There must be someway a citta must knows a visible object if we say that contact comes after the convergence. Ken O 37601 From: Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 8:40am Subject: Re: [dsg] Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Ken - In a message dated 10/17/04 3:02:57 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@y... writes: > > Hi Howard > > Maybe I should explain in another way. The sutta said the > convergence of the three there is contact. Is it possible to have > seeing wihout contact arisen of seeing citta with visible objects. > In Abhdihamma, all these are one moment. Do you think, these are > different moments there? Is it possible that seeing consciouness > arise first then visible objects then contacting to see it. Buddha > said convergencing of the three comes contact and he not say that > seeing citta comes first, then visible object then contact to have > seeing. So to me the convergence of the three is one citta moment > with contact. Then do you think it is possible that after this > convergence there is contact? If it is after the convergence, how do > seeing citta knows a visible object? There must be someway a citta > must knows a visible object if we say that contact comes after the > convergence. > > Ken O > ======================== We seem to agree that the single convergence event is what contact is. What we disagree on is what Abhidhamma says contact is. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37602 From: Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 4:04pm Subject: Vism.XIV,108 + Nina's addition "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga) Ch. XIV 108. But the 'mind-consciousness-element' is of two kinds, namely, shared by all and not shared by all. [457] Herein, (71) that 'shared by all' is the functional [mind-consciousness-element] accompanied by equanimity without root-cause. It has the characteristic of cognizing the six kinds of objects. Its function is to determine at the five doors and to advert at the mind door. It is manifested as the states [of determining and adverting] corresponding to those [last-mentioned two functions]. Its proximate cause is the departure either of the resultant mind-consciousness-element without root-cause (40)-(41) [in the first case], or of one among the kinds of life-continuum [in the second]. (72) That 'not shared by all' is the functional [mind-consciousness-element] accompanied by joy without root-cause. It has the characteristic of cognizing the six kinds of objects. Its function is to cause smiling41 in Arahants about things that are not sublime. It is manifested as the state corresponding to that [last-mentioned]. Its proximate cause is always the heart-basis. So the sense-sphere functional without root-cause is of three kinds. ---------------------- Note 41. 'With respect to such unsublime objects as the forms of skeletons or ghosts' (Pm. 476). See e.g. Vin.iii,104. ++++++++++++++++++ Nina wrote: addition to Vis. 108: N: We read in the Expositor (II, p. 386) about the smiling-consciousness of the arahat which arises in the processes of cittas experiencing objects through the six doors: We read that evenso the Tathaagata smiles at the thought of the arising of Silent Buddhas in the future. N: First the Buddha directs his attention to the past or the future with mahaa-kiriyacittas accompanied by wisdom, and after that he smiles with ahetuka kiriyacittas, which are hasituppaada cittas. **** Nina. 37603 From: Andrew Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 4:39pm Subject: Re: "kira" - "so they say" Dear Dighanakha Thanks for this information about "kira" and all your other well- considered answers. I would like to ask you a question about the following passage written by Sarah in her India2 post: --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: about the authenticity or otherwise of the > Milinda-panha. She [K Sujin] said it didn't matter at all whether it was Theravadan > or anything else or which part of the text a dialogue comes from. If it's > helpful, fine. If it's not helpful or if it just leads to thinking, doubt > or aversion, just leave it aside. The same with difficult parts of the > commentaries. We have so little undestanding so we should just leave > anything beyond our understanding, rather than just thinking and doubting. Andrew: If I were a scholar, of course, I would not adopt the above approach because it is important for scholars to *be* scholarly. However, from the point of view of a Dhamma practitioner, the above approach appeals to me because (1) it doesn't require me to be dishonest about my true state of understanding or (2) to ignore that some assertion is unscientific or even bizarre-sounding to me at the present point in time. If asked "do you believe in this assertion?" I can reply frankly in the negative and yet still maintain saddha in the teachings. This is openly acknowledging anomalies but not getting swept up in them. In your view, is this a wise usage of the weeding-hook? Can one swing with the weeding-hook so fiercely that one ends up clinging to views? Also, do you believe that saddha is important *before* knowing the teaching, as suggested in these quotes: "If saddha is born, then he approaches" [Horner, Middle Length Sayings, Vol II p 365]; "Had he no saddha he could not attain whatever is to be won by saddha" [MN II 94, MLS II 281]. I better shut up now as one question has already spawned into 3. (-: When you have a spare moment, I would appreciate hearing your views but don't feel obliged. Best wishes Andrew T 37604 From: dighanakha Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 10:33pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hello Ken. If I may butt in... > Hi Howard > > > Maybe if you dont mind, tell me what you are thinking with details > why you think it is so different because I could not understand your > point on the differences. In "Cetasikas" Nina summarizes the commentarial conception of phassa thus: [begin quote] "Contact, in Pali: phassa, is mentioned first among the universals. Phassa arises together with every citta; it "contacts" the object so that citta can experience it. When seeing experiences visible object, phassa which accompanies seeing-consciousness also experiences visible object but it performs its own function. At that moment phassa "contacts" visible object and conditions seeing-consciousness to see.... "... We read in the 'Discourse of the Honey-ball' (Middle Length Sayings I, no. 18) that Mahaa-Kaccaana explained to the monks concerning contact: " 'This situation occurs: that when there is eye, your reverences, when there is visible object, when there is visual consciousness, one will recognise the manifestation of sensory impingement (phassa)... ' " [end quote] If the above quote from the Madhupi.n.d.ika Sutta is not to be misunderstood, we need to go back a few paragraphs in the same Sutta to see *why* there is a manifestation of phassa at this time: "Friend, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; *the coming together of the three is contact*. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what he has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable by the eye." (MN 18) (cakkhu~ncaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi~n~naa.na.m, ti.n.na.m sa"ngati phasso, phassapaccayaa vedanaa, ya.m vedeti ta.m sa~njaanaati, ya.m sa~njaanaati ta.m vitakketi, ya.m vitakketi ta.m papa~nceti, ya.m papa~nceti tatonidaana.m purisa.m papa~ncasa~n~naasa"nkhaa samudaacaranti atiitaanaagatapaccuppannesu cakkhuvi~n~neyyesu ruupesu.) This is where Suttas' conception of phassa differs from that of (commentarial) Abhidhamma. In the Suttas' conception one can "point to the manifestation of phassa when there is a coming together of eye, forms and eye consciousness," precisely because phassa is nothing other than this 'coming together'. It is not some additional factor that accompanies the coming together. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37605 From: Andrew Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 10:38pm Subject: "kira" Dear Dighanakha and all In a spare moment, I looked up "kira" in the PTS online Pali-English dictionary. One result. It means "a parrot". Couldn't resist parroting this .... (-: Andrew T 37606 From: kenhowardau Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 11:50pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi Htoo, You said to Howard: ------------- > I do not know why some people deny formal meditation. > ------------- The Buddha did not teach formal meditation. He taught the cause of every dhamma that arises. Every step on the way to enlightenment is conditioned by right understanding of dhammas and their causes. How could there be right formal practice? There are only dhammas: any idea (pannatti) of a traveller on the way to enlightenment denies the doctrine of conditionality. So too does any idea of studying or sitting in order to control the process of enlightenment. You jokingly asked Sarah; " When you swam, did you control your limbs?" May I suggest that question was consistent with your belief in a mixture of pannatti and paramattha dhamma? Sarah's reply was: "No control by me of limbs whether in the pool or at the bo-tree - just namas and rupas conditioned to perform their various functions;-)." That answer is consistent with conditionality. Kind regards, Ken H --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "htootintnaing" wrote: > > Howard: > > Hi, Ken (and Htoo) - > > It IS vitally important to not confuse the two, but this avoidance of > confusion cannot be attained just by definitions and attempting > to "unpack" all sentences into forms closer to a paramatthic level. > ------------------------------------------------------------------- --- > Htoo: That is true. > ------------------------------------------------------------------- 37607 From: kenhowardau Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 0:18am Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi DN and Ken O Nina's explanation of phassa comes from the Abhidhamma, not from her reading of the Honey-ball Sutta. DN, you tell us that phassa is a concept - a coming together. I assume this is your personal reading of the Sutta. But concepts are the domain of scientists and other uninstructed worldlings: the Buddha taught ultimate reality (the loka). A 'coming together' is not an ultimate reality: it is a conventional description of an ultimate reality, phassa. Ken H > This is where Suttas' conception of phassa differs from that of > (commentarial) Abhidhamma. In the Suttas' conception one can > "point to the manifestation of phassa when there is a coming > together of eye, forms and eye consciousness," precisely because > phassa is nothing other than this 'coming together'. It is not > some additional factor that accompanies the coming together. > 37608 From: jwromeijn Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 2:17am Subject: Re: Joop - Best wishes Dear all Thanks for the wishes for my health. I've had a by-pass in my leg and we (the doctor and me) think it done well; only the wounds are painfull and I can still hardly walk (so can do much meditation and much reading internet) I was a little nervous before the operation and when I was reading in Goldstein book's "One Dharma" I thought: when I die I will have next quote he used in it from the Buddha in the advertisement in the journals: "Therefore, Ananda, be islands unto yourselves, refuges unto yourselves, seeking no external refuge; with the Dhamma as your island, the Dhamma as your refuge, seeking no other refuge." (From DN 16, Maha-Parinibbana Sutta, in a dutch translation) I realize dead gets enough new chances. With metta Joop 37609 From: htootintnaing Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 3:15am Subject: Re: Vism.XIV,108 + Nina's addition Dear Larry and Nina, Just a few words. Please see below. With Metta, Htoo Naing ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, LBIDD@w... wrote: > "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga) Ch. XIV > > 108. But the 'mind-consciousness-element' is of two kinds, ...snip...snip..without root-cause is of three kinds. > ---------------------- > Note 41. 'With respect to such unsublime objects as the forms of > skeletons or ghosts' (Pm. 476). See e.g. Vin.iii,104. ++++++++++++++++++ Nina wrote: addition to Vis. 108: N: We read in the Expositor (II, p. 386) about the smiling- consciousness of the arahat which arises in the processes of cittas experiencing objects ...snip...snip...conclusion of the practice of which this laughter- producing consciousness arises. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: I would not use laughter-producing consciousness. Laugh is related to lobha where smile may or may not be related to lobha. Other parts are OK, Larry and Nina. With Metta, Htoo Naing ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > We read that evenso the Tathaagata smiles at the thought of the arising > of Silent Buddhas in the future. > > N: First the Buddha directs his attention to the past or the future with > mahaa-kiriyacittas accompanied by wisdom, and after that he smiles with > ahetuka kiriyacittas, which are hasituppaada cittas. > **** > Nina. 37610 From: htootintnaing Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 3:57am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Ken H: Hi Htoo, You said to Howard: ------------- > I do not know why some people deny formal meditation. > ------------- The Buddha did not teach formal meditation. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: When the lent came bhikkhus asked kammatthanas from Bhagava. Bhagava would instructed them you should do such kammatthana and you the other bhikkhu should do such kammatthana. After obtaining instruction, bhikkhus were delighted and they went for the lent for the rainy season for three months. Meditation and formal meditation are basically meditation. Formal is just a word of modification. The Buddha did teach kammatthana. There had been a lot of suttas that include how to do meditation. Once a group of bhikkhus obtained kammatthanas and they went to a forest. But as they were more powerful than those who were living at trees, those tree-dwellers had to go away from their dwelling. So they all showed unsighted things, voices, noice, smell etc etc. These bhikkhus could not proceed their kammatthana practice and they went back to Bhagava and told the matter. Bhagava then preached loving kindness and they were sent again to the same forest. They could then practise kammatthana well. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Ken H: He taught the cause of every dhamma that arises. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: This is right. But did He not teach how to meditate? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Ken H: Every step on the way to enlightenment is conditioned by right understanding of dhammas and their causes. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: This is true but I think these words come from intellect that stored deep in the mind when these dhamma were studied. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Ken H How could there be right formal practice? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Without practice, no one can approach nibbana. Even The Buddha had to practise. All Paccekabuddhas had to practise. All arahats practised. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Ken H: There are only dhammas: any idea (pannatti) of a traveller on the way to enlightenment denies the doctrine of conditionality. So too does any idea of studying or sitting in order to control the process of enlightenment. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Dhamma cannot be controlled. Even The Buddha Himself could not control Dhamma. Once I read at a list that 'The Buddha could control rupa etc etc'. This was written by a well-known writer. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Ken H: You jokingly asked Sarah; " When you swam, did you control your limbs?" May I suggest that question was consistent with your belief in a mixture of pannatti and paramattha dhamma? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Sarah knew me well and she would know what I intended. Sukin was asked like that and I just gave her my regards. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Ken H: Sarah's reply was: "No control by me of limbs whether in the pool or at the bo-tree - just namas and rupas conditioned to perform their various functions;-)." That answer is consistent with conditionality. Kind regards, Ken H ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: I know Sarah and her wisdom. And I have already read her message among the busy messages here. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing 37611 From: Ken O Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 4:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi Ken Howard Buddha did teach meditation we can see that in Visud, but one must meet those conditions favourable then one able to practise meditations. In Visud, the criterias like suitable place etc are spelt for one to practise jhanas. Anyway in order to practise jhanas as spelt in the suttas, one must free from sensual pleasure - still a very tall order for me :)! Ken O 37612 From: htootintnaing Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 4:18am Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 093 ) Dear Dhamma Friends, We have discussed four akusala cetasikas. They are moha or ignorance, ahirika or shamelessness, anottappa or fearlessness, and uddhacca or restlessness. These four akusala cetasikas are called sabba akusala sadharana cetasikas. Because they always arise with any of akusala cittas. There are three cetasikas which can be called as lobha-led cetasikas. They are lobha or attachment, maana or conceit, and ditthi or wrong view. These three cetasikas have lobha as a base or root and they always have lobha as their accompanying cetasika or leading cetasika. Lobha is a cetasika or mental factor that have a strong and powerful attraction to arammanas or objects. It is like a magnet and it will attract arammana or object. Lobha is attachment. That is atachment to objects of different kinds. Lobha always co-exists with moha and there is no lobha that does not have moha as its accompanying cetasika. Because of moha, lobha will not see any right dhamma and instead, it will strongly attach to arammana or object. Lobha has a support from moha and this support is darkness. As long as darkness is there, lobha cannot see right things. ( And lobha will never see right things.) Lobha has many different names. There are many suttas that refer to lobha. Dhamma are preached so as the listeners can understand. There were a lot of similes regarding dhammas in different settings. Similes are actually not the exact nature of what have been compared with. But at least the dhamma compared can be understood to some extent. There are 8 lobha mula cittas and they can be read up in the earlier posts of this series. All these 8 lobha mula cittas have lobha as a cetasikas. No other cittas in 89 cittas apart from these 8 cittas have lobha as a cetasikas. And all these 8 lobha cittas serve as javana citta. This is the response to the current object or arammana which has recently seen by vipaka citta such as cakku/ sota/ ghana/ jivha/ kaya-vinnana citta and so on, which again was started with panca dvara avajjana citta which is a kiriya citta. Lobha is attachment. It advises the king citta to be greedy and attached to the object and not depart from that object. It is like 'drinking of salty water when thirsty in oceans'. So drinking salty water will never satietise the drinkers. And lobha will never satietise sattas. Lobha is referred to as the main culprit causing endless continuation of the samsara. Moha always involves in any akusala citta. Sometimes moha is so subtle that it is hardly recognised. Lobha always has the quality of greediness and attachment and this quality is evident. Lobha is the cetasika that appears as samudaya sacca of 4 Ariyas' Noble Truths. May you all be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome and they will be valuable. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts. 37613 From: Suravira Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 4:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Causality & Impermanance - transcript of TV program Dear Sarah, Thanks so much for taking the time to review the TV transcript and to reply to it. > feedback, you're probably more likely to get it;-)). Also I know many > friends here who would be interested to hear any of your comments or > report from your retreat w/Gunaratana, especially any points that touch on > our discussions. > [Suravira] Unfortunately, as a broker in charge of a real estate firm, my current fiduciary responsibilities to my clients are such that I am unable to take time off from work next week to attend the 10 day retreat. The best laid plans of mice and men often go astray. Fortunately, the benefits derived from the assigned research (in preparation of the advanced teachers retreat) are very rewarding in themselves (nonetheless not being able to attend the retreat and spend more time with Venerable Bhante G does sadden me). > time. Time is a concept, it's not a reality to be known. See Karunadasa's > article on Time (but not Space). [Suravira] I have tracked down Karunadasa's paper (Time and Space: The Abhidhamma Perspective), and have read it. It is a really good essay. I will get back to you on this paper. By appending the phrase "(but not Space)" are you implying that you concur with Karunadasa's presentation of Time, but not his presentation of Space? > ignorance, no. By a Buddha's omniscience, yes. See `Niyama' in `Useful > Posts'. [Suravira] I will try to locate Niyama's paper. Thanks once again. With metta, Suravira 37614 From: htootintnaing Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 4:31am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Dear Ken O, I confuse with 2 Ken. Now I see there are 2 Ken in the same discussuion. One is Ken O and another is Ken H. Ken O was once an active member at JourneyToNibbana and now apparently does not share his dhamma any more at JourneyToNibbana. There are many beginners at JourneyToNibbana. Ken H is not a member there. Regarding meditation, yes, The Buddha did teach meditation. There were many instruction. This is how to calm down the stray thoughts or how to calm down nivarana dhamma or how to attain samadhi or how to attain jhanas. I have read frequently that formal meditation or not and so on. There are many meditation centres and there are many people. Those who are intelligent and have studied The Buddha Dhamma at theoretical level would accuse of those who are sitting at meditation centres while they themselves never did meditation. Instead they would say, understanding is first. This may automatically mean that those who are sitting may not understand well like them and they are formally sitting with lobha that wants to remove the sufferings. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Ken O wrote: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Ken O: Hi Ken Howard Buddha did teach meditation we can see that in Visud, but one must meet those conditions favourable then one able to practise meditations. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: The Buddha did teach meditation. Ken O is right. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Ken O: In Visud, the criterias like suitable place etc are spelt for one to practise jhanas. Anyway in order to practise jhanas as spelt in the suttas, one must free from sensual pleasure - still a very tall order for me :)! Ken O ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Ken O, you are right. The idea that leads these people denying formal meditation is that some go to a forest and sit under a tree and try to develop dhamma such as sati and panna. They cannot be developed or abolished. Any learned Buddhist knows this. But disciples of The Buddha do the practise and they touch patipatti. Some say that priyatti should be finished up so that all dhamma can be understood at theoretical level. They would go practising after completion of pariyatti. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing 37615 From: Ken O Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 5:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Dighanakha and Howard k: It always my pleasure to dicuss sutta meanings and Abhidhamma meanings. I think without of both of you, there is no fun learning the dhamma. > In "Cetasikas" Nina summarizes the commentarial conception of > phassa thus: > > [begin quote] > > "Contact, in Pali: phassa, is mentioned first among the > universals. Phassa arises together with every citta; it > "contacts" the object so that citta can experience it. When > seeing experiences visible object, phassa which accompanies > seeing-consciousness also experiences visible object but it > performs its own function. At that moment phassa "contacts" > visible object and conditions seeing-consciousness to see.... > "... We read in the 'Discourse of the Honey-ball' (Middle Length > Sayings I, no. 18) that Mahaa-Kaccaana explained to the monks > concerning contact: > > " 'This situation occurs: that when there is eye, your > reverences, when there is visible object, when there is visual > consciousness, one will recognise the manifestation of sensory > impingement (phassa)... ' " > [end quote] k: On the question of convergence, below in the explanation why it is a convergence. The below passage said clearly about <>. Hence the unity of the sense bases, sensory object and sensory consciouness only happen with the manifestation of "touching". Therefore there is no incongruent meaning in this sutta and Abhidhamma The passage is extract for your reference. Using the book Expositor, under Part IV, chapter II << That which on that occassion is contact refers to that contact which on that occassion arises as a fact of touching. The word in simple form expresses the intrinsic nature of touch (meaning as express in ultimate reality - i.e. absence of a living entity - Anutika). Phusana is the act of touching. Samphusana increased by the prefix, is the way of touching [viz : to unite with the object]. Samphusitatttam is the state of so touching. And this is the construction: There is on the occassion contact by virtue of touching; there is the occassion that which is the act of touching; there is on that occassion that which is the act of touching to unite with; there is that which, on that occassion, is the state of touching to unite with. Or that which, on that occassion, is contact by virture of touching is, in other different ways, said to be the act of touching, the act of touching to unite with, and the state of touching to unite with. This contact there is on that occassion. And the same construction of the words in the expositions of feeling and the rest should be understood.>> > If the above quote from the Madhupi.n.d.ika Sutta is not to be > misunderstood, we need to go back a few paragraphs in the same > Sutta to see *why* there is a manifestation of phassa at this time: > > "Friend, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness > arises; *the coming together of the three is contact*. With > contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one > perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one > thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what he has > mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions > tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, > future, and present forms cognizable by the eye." (MN 18) > > This is where Suttas' conception of phassa differs from that of > (commentarial) Abhidhamma. In the Suttas' conception one can > "point to the manifestation of phassa when there is a coming > together of eye, forms and eye consciousness," precisely because > phassa is nothing other than this 'coming together'. It is not > some additional factor that accompanies the coming together. k: I have explain the mainfestation of contact in convergence or unity. Now I like to explain why it is a mental factor or a condition that accompanies the coming together. In fact if you look carefully on MN18, with contact as condition 8), hence it is already an indication of an additional factor that accompanies the coming together. How could it not be a condition or a factor if it helps to arise another conditions of feelings, preception etc. If you look again in the dependent origination, contact is a condition for feelings, cravings, therefore it is a an additional factor for the convergence or unity. Likewise if you see the Honey Ball Sutta again, <> - this clearly show it can be seen, understood and investigate, it is a sabhava, it has its particluar characteristic, it is indentifiable, and hence it is a condition or a mental factor. Please feel free to add more comments. An interesting topic. Other topic questions are always welcome. As I say to Howard before, it is matter of presentation, there is no difference. Ken O 37616 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 2:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Dighanakha (and Ken and Nina) - In a message dated 10/18/04 1:33:58 AM Eastern Daylight Time, dighanakha@y... writes: > > Hello Ken. > > If I may butt in... > > >Hi Howard > > > > > > Maybe if you dont mind, tell me what you are thinking with details > >why you think it is so different because I could not understand your > >point on the differences. > > In "Cetasikas" Nina summarizes the commentarial conception of > phassa thus: > > [begin quote] > > "Contact, in Pali: phassa, is mentioned first among the > universals. Phassa arises together with every citta; it > "contacts" the object so that citta can experience it. When > seeing experiences visible object, phassa which accompanies > seeing-consciousness also experiences visible object but it > performs its own function. At that moment phassa "contacts" > visible object and conditions seeing-consciousness to see.... > > "... We read in the 'Discourse of the Honey-ball' (Middle Length > Sayings I, no. 18) that Mahaa-Kaccaana explained to the monks > concerning contact: > > " 'This situation occurs: that when there is eye, your > reverences, when there is visible object, when there is visual > consciousness, one will recognise the manifestation of sensory > impingement (phassa)... ' " > > [end quote] > > If the above quote from the Madhupi.n.d.ika Sutta is not to be > misunderstood, we need to go back a few paragraphs in the same > Sutta to see *why* there is a manifestation of phassa at this time: > > "Friend, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness > arises; *the coming together of the three is contact*. With > contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one > perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one > thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what he has > mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions > tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, > future, and present forms cognizable by the eye." (MN 18) > > (cakkhu~ncaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati > cakkhuvi~n~naa.na.m, ti.n.na.m sa"ngati phasso, phassapaccayaa > vedanaa, ya.m vedeti ta.m sa~njaanaati, ya.m sa~njaanaati ta.m > vitakketi, ya.m vitakketi ta.m papa~nceti, ya.m papa~nceti > tatonidaana.m purisa.m papa~ncasa~n~naasa"nkhaa samudaacaranti > atiitaanaagatapaccuppannesu cakkhuvi~n~neyyesu ruupesu.) > > This is where Suttas' conception of phassa differs from that of > (commentarial) Abhidhamma. In the Suttas' conception one can > "point to the manifestation of phassa when there is a coming > together of eye, forms and eye consciousness," precisely because > phassa is nothing other than this 'coming together'. It is not > some additional factor that accompanies the coming together. > > Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker ======================= Thank you very much. You have pinpointed exactly what needed to be pinpointed! With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37617 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 3:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi, Ken (and Htoo) - In a message dated 10/18/04 2:51:51 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: > The Buddha did not teach formal meditation. ======================== ;-)) It seems that Ken O is not the only Ken here with an excellent sense of humor!! What you are doing here, it seems to me, Ken, is an instance of the following technique of argumentation: Given [let us accept this] that the Buddha understood language to be a system of conventional shorthand for communicating information about what is ultimately only apprehended directly, whenever the Buddha uses any speech that does not accord with ones own preference, claim that the Buddha was not teaching that unhappy doctrine ;-) because "there are only dhammas". When a Buddha teaches what virtually all Buddhists call "formal meditation", what he is doing is the same as he does in teaching anything: speaking to people as he must, using language that expresses a complex multitude of realities by means of a system of abbreviational shorthand, all the time understanding the realities that underlie what is being expresssed. Conventional truth, is truth-communicated as opposed to truth-directly-apprehended, but it is truth nonetheless. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37618 From: htootintnaing Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 7:09am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Ken H: Hi Htoo, You said to Howard: ------------- > I do not know why some people deny formal meditation. > ------------- The Buddha did not teach formal meditation. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Please see in Majjhima Nikaya 20. "When, indeed, bhikkhus, evil unskillful thoughts due to reflection on an adventitious object are eliminated, when they disappear, and the mind stands firm, settles down, becomes unified and concentrated just within (his subject of meditation), through his reflection on an object connected with skill, through his pondering on the disadvantages of unskillful thoughts, his endeavoring to be without attentiveness and reflection as regards those thoughts or through his restraining, subduing, and beating down of the evil mind by the good mind with clenched teeth and tongue pressing on the palate, that bhikkhu is called a master of the paths along which thoughts travel. The thought he wants to think, that, he thinks; the thought he does not want to think, that, he does not think. He has cut down craving, removed the fetter, rightly mastered pride, and made an end of suffering." This clearly states that 'beating down of evil mind by good mind with clenched teeth and tongue pressing on the palate..' These are actions that arise during meditation. With Metta, Htoo Naing ---------------------------------------------------------------------- He taught the cause of > every dhamma that arises. Every step on the way to enlightenment is > conditioned by right understanding of dhammas and their causes. > > How could there be right formal practice? There are only dhammas: > any idea (pannatti) of a traveller on the way to enlightenment > denies the doctrine of conditionality. So too does any idea of > studying or sitting in order to control the process of > enlightenment. > > You jokingly asked Sarah; " When you swam, did you control your > limbs?" May I suggest that question was consistent with your belief > in a mixture of pannatti and paramattha dhamma? > > Sarah's reply was: "No control by me of limbs whether in the pool > or at the bo-tree - just namas and rupas conditioned to perform > their various functions;-)." > > That answer is consistent with conditionality. > > Kind regards, > Ken H > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "htootintnaing" > wrote: > > > > Howard: > > > > Hi, Ken (and Htoo) - > > > > It IS vitally important to not confuse the two, but this avoidance > of > > confusion cannot be attained just by definitions and attempting > > to "unpack" all sentences into forms closer to a paramatthic > level. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ - > --- > > Htoo: That is true. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ - 37619 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 3:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Ken (and Dighanakha, and Ken O) - In a message dated 10/18/04 3:19:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: > Hi DN and Ken O > > Nina's explanation of phassa comes from the Abhidhamma, not from her > reading of the Honey-ball Sutta. DN, you tell us that phassa is a > concept - a coming together. I assume this is your personal reading > of the Sutta. But concepts are the domain of scientists and other > uninstructed worldlings: the Buddha taught ultimate reality (the > loka). A 'coming together' is not an ultimate reality: it is a > conventional description of an ultimate reality, phassa. > > Ken H > ========================= Ken, you are getting bogged down in view. There is no reason to consider "the coming together of the three," which BTW, is *exactly* what the Buddha defined contact to be (!), to be pa~n~natti. It can just as easily be considered a momentary experiential event, a "cetasika", if you will, and a reality. It is not something *composed* of sense object, sense door, and sense consciousness, which would be a complex and, hence, pa~n~natti. It is an experiential event, an event that is a convergence. It is important to think in terms of events, Ken, and not things. It is events that are "real", and not things. Consciousness is not a thing, it is an event. Hardness is not a thing, it is an event. Fleeting events, Ken, not momentary true existents. If dhammas are solidified into true existents, then the Dhamma is solidified into a block of ice. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37620 From: htootintnaing Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 7:28am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Howard: Hi, Ken (and Htoo) - In a message dated 10/18/04 2:51:51 AM Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: > The Buddha did not teach formal meditation. ======================== ;-)) It seems that Ken O is not the only Ken here with an excellent sense of humor!! What you are doing here, it seems to me, Ken, is an instance of the following technique of argumentation: Given [let us accept this] that the Buddha understood language to be a system of conventional shorthand for communicating information about what is ultimately only apprehended directly, whenever the Buddha uses any speech that does not accord with ones own preference, claim that the Buddha was not teaching that unhappy doctrine ;-) because "there are only dhammas". When a Buddha teaches what virtually all Buddhists call "formal meditation", what he is doing is the same as he does in teaching anything: speaking to people as he must, using language that expresses a complex multitude of realities by means of a system of abbreviational shorthand, all the time understanding the realities that underlie what is being expresssed. Conventional truth, is truth- communicated as opposed to truth-directly-apprehended, but it is truth nonetheless. With metta, Howard ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Dear Howard, this is a good argumentation. Logician logicises logicstically logic logies. :-) With Metta, Htoo Naing 37621 From: htootintnaing Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 7:33am Subject: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Howard: Hi, Ken (and Dighanakha, and Ken O) - > In a message dated 10/18/04 3:19:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > kenhowardau@y... writes: > > > Hi DN and Ken O Ken, you are getting bogged down in view. There is no reason to consider "the coming together of the three," which BTW, is *exactly* what the Buddha defined contact to be (!), to be pa~n~natti. It can just as easily be considered a momentary experiential event, a "cetasika", if you will, and a reality. It is not something *composed* of sense object, sense door, and sense consciousness, which would be a complex and, hence, pa~n~natti. It is an experiential event, an event that is a convergence. It is important to think in terms of events, Ken, and not things. It is events that are "real", and not things. Consciousness is not a thing, it is an event. Hardness is not a thing, it is an event. Fleeting events, Ken, not momentary true existents. If dhammas are solidified into true existents, then the Dhamma is solidified into a block of ice. With metta, Howard ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Dear Howard, sorry butting in. So there is nothing at all? There are only events and not a thing that exists. Nama are events. Rupas are events. Nibbana is eventless. And what about pannatti? With Metta, Htoo Naing 37622 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 4:49am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Htoo - In a message dated 10/18/04 10:35:29 AM Eastern Daylight Time, htootintnaing@y... writes: > Htoo: > > Dear Howard, sorry butting in. So there is nothing at all? There are > only events and not a thing that exists. ----------------------------------------- Howard: I don't consider events to be nothing at all. That would be a nihilistic position that I do not take. ----------------------------------------- > > Nama are events. Rupas are events. > --------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, as I see it. --------------------------------------- Nibbana is eventless. ------------------------------------ Howard: I don't know what nibbana is, Htoo. I suspect that it is the "one true reality", but that any description of it must fail. I have my ideas about it, but they are not really particularly important. The closest I can come to my take on nibbana is what I wrote a couple days ago to Herman: << I see them [paramattha dhammas] merely as fleeting and insubstantial (but distinguishable) aspects of an interconnected, ultimately indescribable experiential reality. The paramattha dhammas exist, but only as things-in-relation and as parts of an interconnected, dynamic network or whole. That whole - that reality, as it actually is, freed of the fragmenting effect of defilements, may well be what nibbana is; but as it appears when experience is in thrall to those poisons, it is what the Zen folks call "the ten thousand things" or "the dust of the world", and what we commonly call "samsara". >> ----------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- And what > > about pannatti? > ------------------------------------ Howard: That depends on what one means exactly by that. In one sense, pa~n~natti are nothing at all - nonexistent. In the sense of (elementary) "ideas" or "thoughts", they are events. In the sense of concepts that are not elementary, they are only conventional designations of complexes of elementary thoughts. This business of pa~n~natti is not trivial, and is not succinctly dealt with. --------------------------------- > > With Metta, > > Htoo Naing > ========================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37623 From: dighanakha Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 9:24am Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hello Ken H. K> Nina's explanation of phassa comes from the Abhidhamma, not K> from her reading of the Honey-ball Sutta. Yes, I know. And I implied as much in my post, when I drew a contrast between Nina's commentarial Abhidhammic exposition of phassa and how phassa is defined in the Suttas. In "Cetasikas" Nina quotes one passage from the Honey-ball which appears to be compatible with the Abhidhammic understanding of phassa. I quoted an earlier passage from the same Sutta to show that there appears to be a difference, as noted earlier in this thread by Howard. Not that Howard was the first to notice this: Buddhaghosa in the Atthasaalinii, and Upasena in the Saddhammappajotikaa, were both probably aware of the problem, for neither of them will allow the Suttas' definition of phassa (a definition repeated many times) to be what it appears to be. Both commentators state: "This [the manifestation of contact] is shown here and there by the Sutta phrase: 'the coming together of the three is contact.' And in this phrase the meaning is that it is contact because of the coming together of the three, *but it should NOT be understood that the mere coming together is itself contact*." Aya~nhi tattha tattha 'ti.n.na.m sa"ngati phasso'ti eva.m kaara.nasseva vasena paveditoti. Imassa ca suttapadassa ti.n.na.m sa"ngatiyaa phassoti ayamattho, na sa"ngatimattameva phasso. (Atthasaalinii, Commentary to Phassapa~ncamakaraasi. Saddhammappajjotikaa, Commentary to Guha.t.thakasuttaniddesa; Expositor I 144-5) In other words, Buddhaghosa and Upasena will not allow that the Buddha's definition of phassa is in fact a definition of phassa! To fit it into the commentarial framework they maintain that the Buddha's definition is merely a definition of one item in the fourfold Abhidhammic description of phassa. The problem with accepting this is that the fourfold description scheme (i.e. characteristic, proximate cause, function, & manifestation) is simply not in evidence in any text before Buddhaghosa's time, not even in the sort of texts where you'd expect to find it. Early hermeneutical treatises like the Nettipakara.na and Pe.takopadesa contain an exceptionally elaborate apparatus for defining terms, but no mention at all of the fourfold scheme: an incredible omission if their authors had known about it. Likewise in the two Niddesas, early commentaries on parts of the Suttanipaata. These also had their own defining apparatus, but again, no mention of the fourfold scheme that is so central to the Mahavihara's eisegesis. K> DN, you tell us that phassa is a concept - a coming K> together. My post made no mention of phassa being a concept. For me the concept vs reality distinction does not figure in the scheme of things. I think what you mean, Ken, is that you construed what I wrote to be about concepts, in accordance with your own commentary-based presuppositions. K> I assume this is your personal reading of the Sutta. Then I suggest you stop assuming and re-read the post. I trust you will see that I merely quoted the Madhupi.n.dika Sutta and offered no personal reading beyond what the Sutta states. K> But concepts are the domain of scientists and other K> uninstructed worldlings: Ken, there is nothing about a scientist that necessitates his being an uninstructed worldling. Since 'scientist' and 'aryan' are not mutually exclusive sets, there's no a priori reason why there shouldn't be an overlap between them. Moreover, your attempt to convey your antipathy to science in this way is, frankly, rather infantile. If the Buddha's Dhamma entailed contempt for science then Kumara Kassapa wouldn't have bothered teaching Prince Payasi (DN 23) -- a man with a thoroughly scientific approach to matters. K> the Buddha taught ultimate reality (the loka). A 'coming K> together' is not an ultimate reality: it is a conventional K> description of an ultimate reality, phassa. Conventional description, in my opinion, is the only game in town. Having said that, your commentator friends in fact take the 'coming together' (sangati) as an alternative expression for coincidence/meeting/congruence (sannipaata), which in the Abhidhammic fourfold description of contact is said to be its manifestation (paccupa.t.thaana). So being concerned with dhammas and their relations, I should have thought that this would be (in your terms) an ultimate description. At least when it's in the dialect of Magadha. :-) Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ The view of those ascetics and brahmins who are of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me' is close to non-attachment, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-cleaving, close to non-grasping. (Dighanakha Sutta) 37624 From: Ken O Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 10:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Dhiganaka Let me address your questions again > > Not that Howard was the first to notice this: Buddhaghosa in the > Atthasaalinii, and Upasena in the Saddhammappajotikaa, were both > probably aware of the problem, for neither of them will allow the > Suttas' definition of phassa (a definition repeated many times) > to be what it appears to be. Both commentators state: > > "This [the manifestation of contact] is shown here and there by > the Sutta phrase: 'the coming together of the three is contact.' > And in this phrase the meaning is that it is contact because of > the coming together of the three, *but it should NOT be > understood that the mere coming together is itself contact*." Using your above translation. There is nothing wrong with this passage. It is trying to explain that the mere coming together is itself not contact because contact is a condition. Only when these three manisfest together then contact will manifest. This is to distingish that contact is not just mere coming together, it saying that contact is a condition arise when the three comes together. Again using your translation "Friend, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; *the coming together of the three is contact*. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what he has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable by the eye." (MN 18) So again if you look closely at the asterisk sentence *the coming together of the three is contact* Then if you loook again the Sutta emphasis, With contact as condition..... so the coming together will condition the arisen of contact. If this is not the point, how does contact later becomes a condition for feeling. So there is no contradiction. Contact arise out of the coming together of the three but contact is not the three - is to illustrate that contact is a condition Ken O 37625 From: htootintnaing Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 11:40am Subject: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Howard: Hi, Htoo - Howard: That depends on what one means exactly by that. In one sense, pa~n~natti are nothing at all - nonexistent. In the sense of (elementary) "ideas" or "thoughts", they are events. In the sense of concepts that are not elementary, they are only conventional designations of complexes of elementary thoughts. This business of pa~n~natti is not trivial, and is not succinctly dealt with. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Dear Howard, yes this business of pannatti is not trivial. But it does not arise and does not pass away. I still remember 'Howard tree'. Actually they do not arise. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Nina, I am swimming from the upflow. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >With Metta, >Htoo Naing > > ========================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37626 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 8:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Htoo - In a message dated 10/18/04 2:43:48 PM Eastern Daylight Time, htootintnaing@y... writes: > Htoo: > > Dear Howard, yes this business of pannatti is not trivial. But it > does not arise and does not pass away. I still remember 'Howard > tree'. Actually they do not arise. > > ===================== Well, yes. "The tree in the garden" that I seem to perceive through my window at this very moment indeed does not arise, because there is no dhamma at all that IS that. But there *are* a host of actual phenomena, interrelated in a complex fashion, that do serve as the basis for that empty percept, making it what I call "well grounded". With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37627 From: Dan D. Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 3:57pm Subject: Holy cow! Missed a few days and a TON of posts. Will catch up shortly... Dan 37628 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 4:25pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Vism.XIV,108 + Nina's addition Hi Htoo, Good point about laughter not being the same as the arahant's smile. Another thing that might be a little misleading is the quote below from the Expositor. The arahant's smile producing consciousness is without roots so there is no understanding. It is just a reaction, like smiling when seeing an old friend. A more conventional way of seeing this is that the joy produces the smile. Can an arahant's functional root consciousness also produce a smile? Larry ----------------------- Expositor : Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 4:33pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi DN, ----------- KH: > > Nina's explanation of phassa comes from the Abhidhamma, not from her reading of the Honey-ball Sutta. > > > DN: > Yes, I know. And I implied as much in my post, when I drew a contrast between Nina's commentarial Abhidhammic exposition of phassa and how phassa is defined in the Suttas. > ---------------------- KH: Yes, I know you know. I was making a point. Nina aims to understand suttas in a way that is consistent, not just with a sutta on its own, but also with the rest of the Tipitaka and its ancient commentaries. That is the stated aim of DSG (see our home page). --------------------- DN: > In "Cetasikas" Nina quotes one passage from the Honey-ball which appears to be compatible with the Abhidhammic understanding of phassa. I quoted an earlier passage from the same Sutta to show that there appears to be a difference, as noted earlier in this thread by Howard. Not that Howard was the first to notice this: Buddhaghosa in the Atthasaalinii, and Upasena in the Saddhammappajotikaa, were both probably aware of the problem, for neither of them will allow the Suttas' definition of phassa (a definition repeated many times) to be what it appears to be. Both commentators state: "This [the manifestation of contact] is shown here and there by the Sutta phrase: 'the coming together of the three is contact.' And in this phrase the meaning is that it is contact because of the coming together of the three, *but it should NOT be understood that the mere coming together is itself contact*." > ------------------ KH: The ancient commentaries frequently point out the difference between paramattha dhammas and conventional ideas. The Buddha taught the former, everyone else taught (teaches) the latter. ----------------- DN: > In other words, Buddhaghosa and Upasena will not allow that the Buddha's definition of phassa is in fact a definition of phassa! > ------------------ KH: Of course they will! The sutta does not give a comprehensive description of phassa. The Abhidhamma and commentaries provide additional details that were always known to students of the Dhamma. ------------------ DN: > To fit it into the commentarial framework they maintain that the Buddha's definition is merely a definition of one item in the fourfold Abhidhammic description of phassa. The problem with accepting this is that the fourfold description scheme (i.e. characteristic, proximate cause, function, & manifestation) is simply not in evidence in any text before Buddhaghosa's time, not even in the sort of texts where you'd expect to find it. Early hermeneutical treatises like the Nettipakara.na and Pe.takopadesa contain an exceptionally elaborate apparatus for defining terms, but no mention at all of the fourfold scheme: an incredible omission if their authors had known about it. Likewise in the two Niddesas, early commentaries on parts of the Suttanipaata. These also had their own defining apparatus, but again, no mention of the fourfold scheme that is so central to the Mahavihara's eisegesis. > ------------- KH: If I understand you correctly, you are not pointing to any contradiction by Buddhaghosa of the Dhamma, but you think he may have elaborated on it. Buddhaghosa said he was translating the works of other, much earlier commentators (whose original documents have since been lost). Is there any possibility, after your investigations, that he was telling the truth? ----------------------- KH: > > DN, you tell us that phassa is a concept - a coming together. > > > DN: > My post made no mention of phassa being a concept. For me the concept vs reality distinction does not figure in the scheme of things. I think what you mean, Ken, is that you construed what I wrote to be about concepts, in accordance with your own commentary-based presuppositions. > --------------------- KH: Yes, that is what I meant. Anything that is not ultimately real is, by definition, a concept. Ultimate realities (dhammas) are not solid objects that move around in space and occasionally bump into each other. So, any "coming together of dhammas" must be either another dhamma (the cetasika, phassa) or a descriptive term of speech (concept). --------------------- KH: > > I assume this is your personal reading of the Sutta. > > > DN: > Then I suggest you stop assuming and re-read the post. I trust you will see that I merely quoted the Madhupi.n.dika Sutta and offered no personal reading beyond what the Sutta states. > ------------ KH: If only it were that simple! Every reader of every sutta has a different impression of what it "states." ------------- KH: > > But concepts are the domain of scientists and other uninstructed worldlings: > > > DN: > Ken, there is nothing about a scientist that necessitates his being an uninstructed worldling. Since 'scientist' and 'aryan' are not mutually exclusive sets, there's no a priori reason why there shouldn't be an overlap between them. Moreover, your attempt to convey your antipathy to science in this way is, frankly, rather infantile. > -------------------------- KH: My apologies. It is difficult (for me at least) to write in a way that covers all bases. I knew my words could have been misconstrued in the way you have done, but I took the chance. My point was that concepts (including the complex ones used by scientists) are understandable by people, not only within, but also without the Buddha's dispensation. ------------------------ KH: > > the Buddha taught ultimate reality (the loka). A 'coming together' is not an ultimate reality: it is a conventional description of an ultimate reality, phassa. > > > DN: > Conventional description, in my opinion, is the only game in town. > > ------------------- KH: What does a sutta's conventional description describe? According to your stated opinion, it must be a conventional description of a conventional description of a conventional description . . . . Sorry if I appear to be raving, but you postulate a world in which, ultimately, nothing exists! ------------- DN: > Having said that, your commentator friends in fact take the 'coming together' (sangati) as an alternative expression for coincidence/meeting/congruence (sannipaata), which in the Abhidhammic fourfold description of contact is said to be its manifestation (paccupa.t.thaana). So being concerned with dhammas and their relations, I should have thought that this would be (in your terms) an ultimate description. At least when it's in the dialect of Magadha. :-) -------------------------- KH: I have never considered the possibility of an "ultimate description;" only of a "description of ultimate reality." Your thread on the dialect of Magadha went over my head. :-) Kind regards, Ken H 37630 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 4:49pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Dighanakha: "This is where Suttas' conception of phassa differs from that of (commentarial) Abhidhamma. In the Suttas' conception one can "point to the manifestation of phassa when there is a coming together of eye, forms and eye consciousness," precisely because phassa is nothing other than this 'coming together'. It is not some additional factor that accompanies the coming together." Hi Dighanakha, I agree it is a little strange to think of contact as a cetasika. Perhaps one reason might be the perceived need to see contact as a paramattha dhamma. "Coming together" is a concept. One thing we should watch out for is misunderstanding cetasikas as mini selves, as Howard has alluded to. Contact is one of the few dhammas that is obviously anatta but actually they are all like that, dependently arisen. Larry 37631 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 1:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Larry (and Dighanakha, and Ken) - In a message dated 10/18/04 7:52:30 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Dighanakha, > > I agree it is a little strange to think of contact as a cetasika. > Perhaps one reason might be the perceived need to see contact as a > paramattha dhamma. "Coming together" is a concept. One thing we should > watch out for is misunderstanding cetasikas as mini selves, as Howard > has alluded to. Contact is one of the few dhammas that is obviously > anatta but actually they are all like that, dependently arisen. > > Larry > ======================= There is certainly a concept of "coming together", just as there are concepts of "hardness" and of "feeling", but this does not mean that any of these are not actual events. There certainly is an abstraction called "coming together", but an actual instance of the concurrence of eye-door activation, visual content, and visual consciousness is not a concept - it is an event, an experiential event, and no less (or more) of a real event than, for example, an itch. So, yes, "coming together" is a concept, but a coming together (i.e., a concurrence) of "the three" is not; it is an actual experiential event. But there is something which I find more important than this particular issue of what contact is. It is something I find very perplexing. It is seeing people who are very, very fastidious about what the Buddha has supposedly said when it appeals to them, and, especially when it occurs in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, but are not at all so fastidious about what the Buddha has definitely said in the Sutta Pitaka when that material is at odds with preferred Abhidhammic material. It seems to me that a perspective that treats Abhidhamma as more the word of the Buddha than the Sutta Pitaka is close to being an establishment of a new philosophy of "Abhidhammism", a philosophy or religion that is considered to be the "true" Dhamma, improving upon and even replacing the Dhamma. I see this as a very extreme view. [The opposite extreme is to see little value in Abhidhamma, and changing the tipitaka to the dvipitaka. BTW, I am guessing here at the Pali for "two baskets".] With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37632 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 8:53pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Howard, Are you arguing that contact is a cetasika, as real as an itch? Who are you referring to as "people who are very, very fastidious"? Larry ----------------------------- H: "There is certainly a concept of "coming together", just as there are concepts of "hardness" and of "feeling", but this does not mean that any of these are not actual events. There certainly is an abstraction called "coming together", but an actual instance of the concurrence of eye-door activation, visual content, and visual consciousness is not a concept - it is an event, an experiential event, and no less (or more) of a real event than, for example, an itch. So, yes, "coming together" is a concept, but a coming together (i.e., a concurrence) of "the three" is not; it is an actual experiential event. But there is something which I find more important than this particular issue of what contact is. It is something I find very perplexing. It is seeing people who are very, very fastidious about what the Buddha has supposedly said when it appeals to them, and, especially when it occurs in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, but are not at all so fastidious about what the Buddha has definitely said in the Sutta Pitaka when that material is at odds with preferred Abhidhammic material. It seems to me that a perspective that treats Abhidhamma as more the word of the Buddha than the Sutta Pitaka is close to being an establishment of a new philosophy of "Abhidhammism", a philosophy or religion that is considered to be the "true" Dhamma, improving upon and even replacing the Dhamma. I see this as a very extreme view. [The opposite extreme is to see little value in Abhidhamma, and changing the tipitaka to the dvipitaka. BTW, I am guessing here at the Pali for "two baskets".]" 37633 From: kenhowardau Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 10:28pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi Htoo, Thanks for your replies. I am not the only DSG member who "denies formal meditation" (to use your words), but I must speak for myself because, often, I confuse the facts. "Formal meditation" is a term used at DSG to refer to the idea (pannatti) of meditation. It is distinct from "actual meditation" (bhavana), which is a momentary, conditioned phenomenon that arises independently of any formal procedure (independently of sitting in a certain way, holding the hands in a certain way, concentrating on postures and activities, and so on). People of all sorts can practise formal meditation (can have an idea of practising meditation). They can be lustful, hateful and ignorant. Momentary meditation, however, is practised only by the wise (by kusala citta with panna). You said about Majjhima Nikaya 20: --------------- > This clearly states that 'beating down of evil mind by good mind with clenched teeth and tongue pressing on the palate.' These are actions that arise during meditation. > ------------- Yes, they happen when the citta is kusala, not akusala. Kusala citta and panna arise irrespective of pannatti (concepts of appropriate times, inappropriate times, secluded places, busy places, straight backs, slumped backs, peaceful demeanours, frenzied excitement). Having said that, I agree that wise people tend, on average, to live quiet, simple lives. You are the authority on jhana, so I can't tell you anything about it, but I gather practitioners prefer extremely secluded lifestyles - otherwise they can forget their object of meditation. I gather also that they sometimes clench their teeth when kusala citta is suppressing the hindrances. When I said, "The Buddha did not teach formal meditation," you replied with several sutta references, most of which were to jhana, I think. My understanding is: 1) Jhana meditation (even when the meditator is seated, straight-backed at the base of a tree) is not a formal practice: it is a conditioned phenomenon. 2) Other, simpler, calm-producing meditations (mindfulness of; the Buddha, metta, death, repulsiveness) are likewise, momentary, conditioned phenomena. 3) Insight meditation is a conditioned, momentary phenomenon that leads to enlightenment, but unlike 1 and 2, it is in no way connected with concepts. 4) Ariyans who attain jhana have higher powers than ariyans who attain by insight alone, but even so, jhana and other samatha- bhavana are not factors that cause (lead to) enlightenment. I am not telling you anything you don't already know. As you said to Ken O, ". . . . those who are sitting may not understand well . . . and they are formally sitting with lobha that wants to remove their suffering." So I wonder what you mean when you say the Buddha taught meditation. Do I have any control over whether I am wise or foolish? Or is the situation the same as for Sarah in the pool or at the Bo-tree - no control, "just namas and rupas conditioned to perform their various functions?" You also said to Ken O: ----------- > Ken O, you are right. The idea that leads these people denying formal meditation is that some go to a forest and sit under a tree and try to develop dhamma such as sati and panna. They cannot be developed or abolished. Any learned Buddhist knows this. But disciples of The Buddha do the practise and they touch patipatti. Some say that pariyatti should be finished up so that all dhamma can be understood at theoretical level. They would go practising after completion of pariyatti. > ---------- I am still not sure we understand each other. Patipatti is satipatthana (mundane insight into conditioned dhamma). It leads to more thorough penetration of the Dhamma (pativedha). Formal meditation does not lead to patipatti: Association with the wise, hearing the true Dhamma and wise consideration of the true Dhamma are the factors that lead to patipatti. I don't know of anyone here who believes we have to finish studying and then go practising. A lot of people spend a lot of time studying and discussing Dhamma with good friends (like yourself), but that is their lifestyle. Again, there is no control and it is useless to have any plans for bringing about satipatthana. There are only namas and rupas, conditioned to perform their various functions. Kind regards, Ken H 37634 From: Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 6:43pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Larry - In a message dated 10/18/04 11:55:23 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > Are you arguing that contact is a cetasika, as real as an itch? > -------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, as real as an itch. I see it as an experiential event that really occurs. Whether it is properly called a cetasika I'm not so sure, though. --------------------------------------------- Who are> > you referring to as "people who are very, very fastidious"? ---------------------------------------------- Howard: What I had in mind was people who have no doubts about every last detail of Abhidhamma and will go through what I see as mental gymnastics to justify their faith in Abhidhamma even over and above the suttas. You, it happens, are very flexible as I see it, and I don't think that "fastidious" fits at all. (It just happens that it was your post that I was replying to when I "blew my cool". Sorry, Larry.) Actually, I apologize to everyone for the way I said what I said. While it wasn't wrong of me to state my opinion, it was very wrong to have done it with an undercurrent if anger. I'm afraid I shot my mouth off before considering the offense I was likely to be giving. I regret to say that the activity of promoting Abhidhamma (whose direct origination by the Buddha is at least doubtful) as superior to the Dhamma as given in suttas (whose origins surely do lie with the Buddha) really upsets me, and I'm afraid I very much reacted badly based on that upset. This is a lesson for me of the harm there is in expressing anger in any form, even so called "righteous anger", which is really not righteous at all, because at least in part it is always an expression of ego. Again, I truly apologize for speech that was not right speech. --------------------------------------------------------------- > > Larry > ----------------------------- > H: "There is certainly a concept of "coming together", just as there are > concepts of "hardness" and of "feeling", but this does not mean that any > of these are not actual events. There certainly is an abstraction called > "coming together", but an actual instance of the concurrence of eye-door > activation, visual content, and visual consciousness is not a concept - > it is an event, an experiential event, and no less (or more) of a real > event than, for example, an itch. > So, yes, "coming together" is > a concept, but a coming together (i.e., a concurrence) of "the three" is > not; it is an actual experiential event. > But there is something which I > find more important than this particular issue of what contact is. It is > something I find very perplexing. It is seeing people who are very, very > fastidious about what the Buddha has supposedly said when it appeals to > them, and, especially when it occurs in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, but are > not at all so fastidious about what the Buddha has definitely said in > the Sutta Pitaka when that material is at odds with preferred > Abhidhammic material. It seems to me that a perspective that treats > Abhidhamma as more the word of the Buddha than the Sutta Pitaka is close > to being an establishment of a new philosophy of "Abhidhammism", a > philosophy or religion that is considered to be the "true" Dhamma, > improving upon and even replacing the Dhamma. I see this as a very > extreme view. [The opposite extreme is to see little value in > Abhidhamma, and changing the tipitaka to the dvipitaka. BTW, I am > guessing here at the Pali for "two baskets".]" > > ====================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37635 From: Dan D. Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 11:21pm Subject: Sarah: "One path" Dear Sarah, You quoted from the Parinibbana Sutta commentary (?) in an eloquent restatement of something we agreed on: > " 'There a [true] renunciate (samana) is not found': it is meant > that there a first ascetic, namely a stream-enterer, does not > exist....'Others' doctrines are devoid of true renunciates': > others' doctrines are vain, empty, devoid of the twelve > renunciates, namely the four who undertake insight meditation > (vipassanaa) for the sake of the four paths, the four > who are on the paths, the four who have fruition......'If they live > rightly': If a stream-enterer explains what he has attained to > another person, and makes him attain stream-entry, then he is said > to live rightly. The same thing applies to a once-returner and the > rest. If one is on the path of stream-entry.....If one practises > insight meditation for the sake of the path of stream- > entry.....lives rightly....". And you continue: > Only one path as I understand, but of course we should respect any > kusala, whatever the label or belief or religion. Right. Only one (right) path and we should respect any kusala. Agreed. And on dsg we discuss what that path is. Is it a path of thinking, conceptualizing, intellectualizing, cogitation, and theorizing? Or is it a path of understanding reality as it is? This is the question. Development of wisdom consists neither of sitting quietly in a corner with closed eyes and directing the attention to this or that object nor of speculating on reality, constructing theories about reality, and blindly developing a conceptual framework based on someone else's understanding and description of reality. Of course, it can be helpful to listen to others' descriptions of what reality looks like when it is understood directly, as it is. If we hear something that is verified by our experience and "strikes a chord", then the description can serve to help solidify our understanding. However, conceptual models about anything beyond our understanding we should just set aside rather than spin off into thinking, doubting, or blindly accepting. Metta, Dan 37636 From: Dan D. Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 11:24pm Subject: "The distinction of right view" [Ken O] Dear Ken O, You wrote: "The distinction of right view lies on the fact that panna arise on the citta. To my understanding, if panna arise seeing things as anatta, anicca then there is right view regardless whether it is suparmundane path or mundane path." Bingo! Right view is about pañña arising with the citta rather than about any conceptual model of reality. Does the conceptual model help consolidate an understanding? If it helps you now, use it. If it does not, don't worry about it. It makes all the difference in the world where your understanding is at the moment. You go on to write: "Sammadithi is about right view on anatta. Without a Buddha, there will no knowledge of Anatta." But how does this square with your comment that the distinction of right view lies on the fact that pañña arises with the citta? Can there not be pañña and sammaditthi of some other characteristic (such as anicca or dukkha or metta or kammassakata)? I agree that if there is view of self, the view is not sammaditthi, but is there no other characteristic of reality that can be the object of sammaditthi? Finally, you mention: "If I am not wrong, Buddha initially wish to teach the dhamma to his two teachers who he thinks that will quickly grasp the dhamma and become enlighted and unfortunately they passed away before Buddha became enlighted. ...but again without the knowlegde of anatta there will be no salvation." Buddha taught many disciples who were already fairly advanced in wisdom and samatha outside the dispensation. Many such disciples quickly attained stages of enlightenment and would not have been able to without the Buddha's help. I also agree that outside the dispensation, there is no enlightenment; however, that is quite different from saying that there can be NO sammaditthi at all outside the dispensation. Metta, Dan 37637 From: Dan D. Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 11:23pm Subject: "Conceptual right view" is 'uncontestable' [Howard] Dear Howard, I contest your uncontestable take on the Sammaditthi sutta as dealing with "conceptual right view" (and "supramundane right view") rather than "mundane right view" (and "supramundane right view"). For example, you take section 3 as uncontestably conceptual rather than direct: "When, friends, a noble disciple understands the unwholesome, the root of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the root of the wholesome, in that way he is one of right view, whose view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma, and has arrived at this true Dhamma." Isn't the disciple with 'perfect confidence in the Dhamma' and the one who 'has arrived at this true Dhamma' referring to the Noble disciples, sotapanna through arahant? Surely you can't mean that intellectual acceptance of a conceptual formulation of the unwholesome, etc. is what defines enlightenment. Do you mean that 'perfect confidence in the Dhamma' and arriving 'at this true Dhamma' refer to intellectual acceptance of Buddha's teachings rather than direct understanding at deep levels? I see that you also refer to paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 6 as uncontestably conceptual, but let's start with 3. Metta, Dan 37638 From: Dan D. Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 11:25pm Subject: "[weighty] experience of dhammas" [Ken H] Dear Ken H, You discuss an interesting line of thought that you have been toying with. To wit, you wrote: > KH: "I wonder if you are thinking the same way I was thinking recently. I argued that the experience of dhammas was much more influential (weighty) than the experience of concepts. For example, if I were to experience hatred for an individual (a longboarder, let's say) that would be just a conceptual explanation of what was really going on - strong dosa for sense objects and other dhammas. I have backed off on that theory. It got no support (just well-informed opposition), although one or two members did agree there could be strong emotions for paramattha dhammas. I'd be interested in your opinion." I'm not sure what you mean. Dhammas (including concepts) are experienced all the time. Did you mean that direct understanding of paramattha dhammas was more weighty than conceptualization? I don't think it makes sense to generalize about this because direct understanding can range from a very brief instant of rudimentary insight that is very quickly forgotten (or perhaps even barely noticed) to magga and phala of an emergent arahant. Metta, Dan 37639 From: Dan D. Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 11:26pm Subject: "Concepts always attended by ditthi?! " [Mike] Dear Mike, Your question: "Do you suggest that concepts are always attended by views..." No. Not at all. What I am saying is that sammaditthi is "Right Viewing" rather than "right opinion" or "right conceptual formulation". The phrase "conceptual right view" muddies this critical distinction and can readily serve to encourage ditthi in a way that is very much the parallel of how "conventional right effort" so commonly serves to encourage silabbataparamasa. You continue: "...and that, since right view only attends satipatthaana or path and fruition, that concepts are always attended by wrong view?" No. Not at all. Concepts are not always attended by wrong view. However, it is not the concept itself that defines the distinction between ditthi and sammaditthi; it is the nature of the experiencing citta. Is it with right view, clinging, or neither (ñanavippayutta)? Metta, Dan 37640 From: Dan D. Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 11:27pm Subject: Two sammaditthi's in MN 117 (not three) [Mike] Dear Mike, In MN 117, there are only two kinds of right view discussed, not three. The distinction between the two is mundane vs. supramundane. As you rightly point out, the "mundane" here refers to right view of the mundane path, i.e., mundane satipatthana. The notion of "conceptual right view" does not make an appearance either in the sutta or the commentary. The commentary states that "two kinds of right view are forerunners: the right view of insight, which investigates formations as impermanent, suffering, and non-self; and the right view of the path, which arises as a consequence of insight and effects the radical destruction of defilements." [MLDB, n. 1100] It goes on to specifically address the (possibly) conceptual- sounding "One understands wrong view as wrong view and right view as right view: this is one's right view [MLDB 117:4]" in the following way: "..this is the right view of insight which understands wrong view as an object by penetrating its characteristics of impermanence, etc., and which understands right view by exercising the function of comprehension and by clearing away confusion." [MLDB, n 1101] In the sutta, Buddha speaks of sammaditthi wihout any qualifier suggesting 'conceptual understanding.' The commentary strongly suggests that the mundane sammaditthi in this sutta is mundane satipatthana rather than adhering to some conceptual formulation and makes no suggestion about any 'conceptual right view' as pre-cursor to anything. It is curious that Bhikkhu Bodhi here inserts his own opinion that "the conceptual comprehension of the four truths falls under mundane right view..." [MLDB, n. 1102], but this does not appear to be supported by the sutta or commentary. You also write: "The likelihood of jumping to pa.tivedha via pa.tipatti without ever having heard and understood the Dhamma (pariyatti) is beyond remote I think." Not sure what you mean... If you mean that the likelihood of someone developing the deeply penetrating insight of "enlightenment" without having heard the Dhamma is beyond remote, I'd agree. If you mean that it is impossible to have any insight at all without having heard the Dhamma, I'd have to say "Nonsense!" -- to put it mildly. Metta, Dan 37641 From: Dan D. Date: Mon Oct 18, 2004 11:28pm Subject: "correct conceptual grasp" [Andrew] Dear Andrew, I like your comment: "... an incorrect conceptual grasp of the teaching excludes direct penetration. They simply can't co-exist." This is certainly true. When right view arises in moments of satipatthana (direct penetration), there is no grasping at any conceptual formulation at all. Ditthi and direct penetration cannot co-exist. It may sound a little like I'm playing word games here; but you are close to expressing the distinction between ditthi and sammaditthi, and I'm trying to amend your wording just a little bit to bring that distinction a little more into focus. You go on to say: "A correct conceptual grasp implies pañña..." You lost me here. What do you mean when you write "correct conceptual grasp"? In what sense is there a "grasp"? And how is it 'conceptual'? In what sense is it 'correct'? I think these questions are the crux of the whole thread. Metta, Dan 37642 From: kenhowardau Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 1:32am Subject: [dsg] Re: Conceptual Right View Hi Howard and Mike, Howard wrote: ------------------------ > I'm afraid I have some reservations with regard to an operation of > pa~n~na that can directly know the incorrectness of the thought 'there is > no > result from kamma'. That seems to make pa~n~na into a kind of magical > force that > can directly know what is not directly knowable. -------------------------- To digress a little: Namas in general do not know their objects, do they? Take vedana (feeling), for example: if there is lobha, vedana "tastes" its object (arammana) as pleasant (or indifferent). But if, instead of lobha, dosa had arisen, vedana would have tasted that same arammana as painful. So, it seems to me that vedana is responsive to the root of the citta, but it does not know the inherent qualities of its object. Some namas do know their objects, though, don't they? Citta, sati, sanna are possibilities that come to mind, and panna is a definite starter. There is a simile somewhere about panna being like a moneychanger who knows the inherent qualities of a coin: Certain other namas are like a child and a villager who have less intricate levels of coin-knowledge. So panna knows its object, and we can accumulate a level of panna that knows the characteristics of dhammas. I suspect that same level of panna can arise even when pannatti is being experienced. A simile would be a rocket scientist changing a light bulb. He wouldn't launch the light bulb into orbit, but he would have no trouble with the technology. In the same way, a vipassana practitioner would be wise and capable when tending to commonplace, household duties. ------------------- H: > Not all phenomena are > directly > knowable, only paramattha dhammas, it seems to me. -------------------- A correction, Howard, if I may: Only paramattha dhammas are referred to, in Abhidhamma parlance, as 'phenomena.' All other arammana are pannatti (illusions). Please continue :-) -------------------- > It seems to me that it > is > by observing sequences of events and the relations among those events that > it > is possible to realize that kamma has consequences, and that this > seeing/knowing comes about in a regular, well structured, certain but > inferential way. It > doesn't seem correct to me that such knowing is an instance of direct > insight-knowing, although it is supported by such. --------------------- Mike replied: ------------------------- > This (last bit) sounds right to me, too--saccanulomika- sammaadi.t.thi isn't the same thing as saccapa.tivedha-sammaadi.t.thi precisely because it can take concepts as objects, as I understand it. The Great Forty seems to me to make it clear that it is consistent with the Dhamma, though. Otherwise how could sammaadi.t.thi 'have fermentations, side with merit & result in acquisitions', and how would this differ from the sammaadidi.t.thi that "is without fermentations, transcendent, a factor of the path"? Or do you think I've mistaken the Buddha's words here? > -------------------------- I have learnt not to translate suttas on my own. I don't know if you are right or wrong, but I seem to remember someone explaining that sutta to me. I think the right view with fermentations is satipatthana (patipatti), whereas the right view without fermentations is supramundane right view (pativedha). The elaborate description of right view is an intellectual understanding (pariyatti). That's certainly an oversimplification, and possibly entirely wrong. :-) Ken H 37643 From: samuraitradr Date: Sun Oct 17, 2004 6:42pm Subject: Help with clarification of "control" Greetings, I've been reading one of Nina Van Gorkum's books, and I guess I need some clarification on something. To some degree, I understand that we have no control over mind and body. I can't stop the body from getting sick or old, etc. and I can't stop my mind from liking and disliking certain things. On the other hand, I CAN control the body. I can make it stand, walk, run, sit etc. I CAN make the mind concentrate on a project, etc. So, there seems to be two things going on here. An aspect of body and mind that is beyond control as well as an aspect that "I" can control. And perhaps that is why I have difficulty in letting go of of the self; because to me "I" still, to some degree have some control of what "my" body does and what "my" mind thinks. Any ideas? Thanks. 37644 From: Bhikkhu Samahita Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 0:03am Subject: Dangerous Delight ... !!! Friends: Delight => Craving => Need => Urge => Pain => Suffering: Punna, there are these: Forms recognizable by the eye, Sounds recognizable by the ear, Smells recognizable by the nose, Tastes recognizable by the tongue, Touches recognizable by the body, Mental States recognizable by the mind, which are attractive & liked, wished for, desired & provocative of lust & greed. If one welcomes them, enjoys them & thus remains clinging to them, Delight Arises...!!! With the arising of Delight, Punna I tell you, there is also the arising of Suffering.!!! However, if one do neither welcome, enjoy, nor cling to these sense objects, Delight Ceases! With the ceasing of Delight, Punna I tell you, there is also the ceasing of all Suffering.!!! Given this brief instruction by the Buddha, as a meditation device, Punna, the business man, dwelling alone, alert, aware & keen, in no long time became another one of the fully Awakened Arahats. Source: The Middle length Sayings of the Buddha. Majjhima Nikaya MN 145 [iii 267] http://www.pariyatti.com/book.phtml?prod_id=25072X http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/index.html Friendship is the Greatest ! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. http://groups.msn.com/DirectDhamma http://uk.geocities.com/bhikkhu_samahita http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Buddha-Direct http://www.smartgroups.com/groups/TrueDhamma Dhamma-Questions sent to my email are quite Welcome. 37645 From: kenhowardau Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 3:41am Subject: Re: Joop - Best wishes Joop, Welcome back to the land of the living! I gather you were lying in hospital composing your own obituary, and you decided to take pot luck on the Dhamma quote be used in it. What do you mean where you write: "I realize dead gets enough new chances?" Kind regards, Ken H --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "jwromeijn" wrote: > > Dear all > > Thanks for the wishes for my health. 37646 From: plnao Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 5:55am Subject: Contact swings both ways. (Was Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of) Hi Howard, and all H > But there is something which I find more important than this > particular issue of what contact is. It is something I find very perplexing. It is > seeing people who are very, very fastidious about what the Buddha has supposedly > said when it appeals to them, and, especially when it occurs in the Abhidhamma > Pitaka, but are not at all so fastidious about what the Buddha has definitely > said in the Sutta Pitaka when that material is at odds with preferred > Abhidhammic material. The important thing is the proliferation that happens after contact, I would say, not the contact itself. I am comfortable with either the Abhidhamma phassa-as-element, or the Honeyball "coming together." Either "version" of contact is not-self, and though I haven't examined the point nearly as closely as you gents I don't yet see how going with either version makes a difference in terms of the proliferation that follows. But I would be very grateful to be taught otherwise. Metta, Phil p.s in passing, thank you Htoo and Suan for your feedback on aloko (light) the other day. 37647 From: m. nease Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 6:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Two sammaditthi's in MN 117 (not three) [Mike] OK--thanks, Dan... mike ----- Original Message ----- From: "Dan D." To: Sent: Monday, October 18, 2004 11:27 PM Subject: [dsg] Two sammaditthi's in MN 117 (not three) [Mike] > > > Dear Mike, > > In MN 117, there are only two kinds of right view discussed, not > three. The distinction between the two is mundane vs. supramundane. > As you rightly point out, the "mundane" here refers to right view of > the mundane path, i.e., mundane satipatthana. The notion > of "conceptual right view" does not make an appearance either in the > sutta or the commentary. The commentary states that "two kinds of > right view are forerunners: the right view of insight, which > investigates formations as impermanent, suffering, and non-self; and > the right view of the path, which arises as a consequence of insight > and effects the radical destruction of defilements." [MLDB, n. 1100] > It goes on to specifically address the (possibly) conceptual- > sounding "One understands wrong view as wrong view and right view as > right view: this is one's right view [MLDB 117:4]" in the following > way: "..this is the right view of insight which understands wrong > view as an object by penetrating its characteristics of impermanence, > etc., and which understands right view by exercising the function of > comprehension and by clearing away confusion." [MLDB, n 1101] In the > sutta, Buddha speaks of sammaditthi wihout any qualifier > suggesting 'conceptual understanding.' The commentary strongly > suggests that the mundane sammaditthi in this sutta is mundane > satipatthana rather than adhering to some conceptual formulation and > makes no suggestion about any 'conceptual right view' as pre-cursor > to anything. It is curious that Bhikkhu Bodhi here inserts his own > opinion that "the conceptual comprehension of the four truths falls > under mundane right view..." [MLDB, n. 1102], but this does not > appear to be supported by the sutta or commentary. > > You also write: "The likelihood of jumping to pa.tivedha via > pa.tipatti without ever having heard and understood the Dhamma > (pariyatti) is beyond remote I think." > > Not sure what you mean... If you mean that the likelihood of someone > developing the deeply penetrating insight of "enlightenment" without > having heard the Dhamma is beyond remote, I'd agree. If you mean that > it is impossible to have any insight at all without having heard the > Dhamma, I'd have to say "Nonsense!" -- to put it mildly. > > Metta, > > Dan 37648 From: m. nease Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 6:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Conceptual Right View Hi Ken, > I have learnt not to translate suttas on my own. I don't know if you > are right or wrong, but I seem to remember someone explaining that > sutta to me. I think the right view with fermentations is > satipatthana (patipatti), whereas the right view without > fermentations is supramundane right view (pativedha). The elaborate > description of right view is an intellectual understanding > (pariyatti). That's certainly an oversimplification, and possibly > entirely wrong. :-) This is certainly what Dan's reply suggests too (by the way, Dan, I also noticed that odd interpolation of BB's)--you're probably both right. Apologies all around, also to Howard for broadcasting my misunderstanding. mike 37649 From: m. nease Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 6:08am Subject: Re: [dsg] Two sammaditthi's in MN 117 (not three) [Mike] p.s. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Dan D." To: Sent: Monday, October 18, 2004 11:27 PM Subject: [dsg] Two sammaditthi's in MN 117 (not three) [Mike] > If you mean that > it is impossible to have any insight at all without having heard the > Dhamma, I'd have to say "Nonsense!" -- to put it mildly. Thank you for putting it mildly--here we disagree categorically, though. 37650 From: abhidhammika Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 6:25am Subject: Are You Sure? (Was: Contact swings both ways. To Howard Dear Howard, Phil, Nina, Mike Nease, Robert K and all How are you? I missed Howard's original post on this issue. But, I can assure you that the teachings on contact (phasso) like those on feeling (vedanaa) are the same everywhere within the whole Tipi.taka and their standard Pali commentaries. The Buddha taught contact as an ultimate reality in Sutta Pi.taka. For example, contact (phasso in phassa paccayaa) in various Suttams on Dependent Origination is a paramattha dhamma. Of course, if Howard found something different on the issue of contact between the Pi.takas, please give me a reference. I will look into the matter. With kind regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "plnao" wrote: Hi Howard, and all H > But there is something which I find more important than this > particular issue of what contact is. It is something I find very perplexing. It is > seeing people who are very, very fastidious about what the Buddha has supposedly > said when it appeals to them, and, especially when it occurs in the Abhidhamma > Pitaka, but are not at all so fastidious about what the Buddha has definitely > said in the Sutta Pitaka when that material is at odds with preferred > Abhidhammic material. The important thing is the proliferation that happens after contact, I would say, not the contact itself. I am comfortable with either the Abhidhamma phassa-as-element, or the Honeyball "coming together." Either "version" of contact is not-self, and though I haven't examined the point nearly as closely as you gents I don't yet see how going with either version makes a difference in terms of the proliferation that follows. But I would be very grateful to be taught otherwise. Metta, Phil p.s in passing, thank you Htoo and Suan for your feedback on aloko (light) the other day. 37651 From: Ken O Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 7:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Conceptual Right View Hi Ken H and Mike We cannot say that right view with fermentations is satipatthana because supramundane right view is also satipatthana. Satipatthana includes Arahants not just for worldings. Ken O 37652 From: Ken O Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 8:25am Subject: Re: [dsg] "The distinction of right view" [Ken O] Hi Dan > Bingo! Right view is about pañña arising with the citta rather than > about any conceptual model of reality. Does the conceptual model > help consolidate an understanding? If it helps you now, use it. If > it does not, don't worry about it. It makes all the difference in > the world> where your understanding is at the moment. Yes we need a conceptual understanding of right view in order to develop understand into subtle level. I would say investigation of right view which is a function of right thought where our mind is applied to the right view. > You go on to write: "Sammadithi is about right view on anatta. > Without a Buddha, there will no knowledge of Anatta." > > But how does this square with your comment that the distinction of > right view lies on the fact that pañña arises with the citta? Can > there not be pañña and sammaditthi of some other characteristic > (such as anicca or dukkha or metta or kammassakata)? > Buddha taught many disciples who were already fairly advanced in > wisdom and samatha outside the dispensation. Many such disciples > quickly attained stages of enlightenment and would not have been > able to without the Buddha's help. I also agree that outside the > dispensation, there is no enlightenment; however, that is quite > different from saying that there can be NO sammaditthi at all > outside the dispensation. When Buddha talk about right view, it emcompasses anatta. Without the knowledge of Anatta, there will no knowledge of not-self which is the basis for right view. We have to see it in the position of Buddha dhamma. Whereas for others, I would say they have correct view on the knowledge or anicca and dukkha because they are visible but it is not right view because as is no knowledge of Anatta. But Sammadithi is in the arena of the Buddha, only with the arisen of Buddha, the knowlege of anatta is able to be taught to us. So it said that there is no sammadithhi at all outside the dispensation. Some people may develop the understanding of not-self but theirs is limited because they would not know the underlying three roots where it cause all our rebirths. Ken O 37653 From: Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 4:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] "Conceptual right view" is 'uncontestable' [Howard] Hi, Dan - I agree with you about item 3. :-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 10/19/04 2:25:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time, onco111@y... writes: > Dear Howard, > I contest your uncontestable take on the Sammaditthi sutta as dealing > with "conceptual right view" (and "supramundane right view") rather > than "mundane right view" (and "supramundane right view"). For > example, you take section 3 as uncontestably conceptual rather than > direct: "When, friends, a noble disciple understands the unwholesome, > the root of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the root of the > wholesome, in that way he is one of right view, whose view is > straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma, and has arrived > at this true Dhamma." Isn't the disciple with 'perfect confidence in > the Dhamma' and the one who 'has arrived at this true Dhamma' > referring to the Noble disciples, sotapanna through arahant? Surely > you can't mean that intellectual acceptance of a conceptual > formulation of the unwholesome, etc. is what defines enlightenment. > Do you mean that 'perfect confidence in the Dhamma' and arriving 'at > this true Dhamma' refer to intellectual acceptance of Buddha's > teachings rather than direct understanding at deep levels? > > I see that you also refer to paragraphs 1, 2, 4, and 6 as > uncontestably conceptual, but let's start with 3. > > Metta, > > Dan > /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37654 From: Ken O Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 8:32am Subject: Re: [dsg] Sarah: "One path" Hi Dan > Right. Only one (right) path and we should respect any kusala. > Agreed. And on dsg we discuss what that path is. Is it a path of > thinking, conceptualizing, intellectualizing, cogitation, and > theorizing? Or is it a path of understanding reality as it is? This > is the question. Development of wisdom consists neither of sitting > quietly in a corner with closed eyes and directing the attention to > this or that object nor of speculating on reality, constructing > theories about reality, and blindly developing a conceptual > framework based on someone else's understanding and description of reality. Development of the path must start somewhere. So in that sense we are all just having conceptual right view. I would said thinking is good for understanding right view because it helps one to discriminate, comtemplate and investigate the dhamma. We cannot say we dont think because thinking which is with acorrdance with right view is right thought. Buddha has always in the sutta exhort us to reflect on our thoughts, actions and speech and reflection is to me right thought. Ken O 37655 From: dighanakha Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 9:48am Subject: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hello Ken (and Htoo). Htoo>> This clearly states that 'beating down of evil mind by good Htoo>> mind with clenched teeth and tongue pressing on the palate.' Htoo>> These are actions that arise during meditation. K> Yes, they happen when the citta is kusala, not akusala. K> Kusala citta and panna arise irrespective of pannatti K> (concepts of appropriate times, inappropriate times, K> secluded places, busy places, straight backs, slumped backs, K> peaceful demeanours, frenzied excitement). Having said that, K> I agree that wise people tend, on average, to live quiet, K> simple lives. You are the authority on jhana, so I can't K> tell you anything about it, but I gather practitioners K> prefer extremely secluded lifestyles - otherwise they can K> forget their object of meditation. I gather also that they K> sometimes clench their teeth when kusala citta is K> suppressing the hindrances. I think the text is describing something rather more proactive than your paraphrase would suggest: "If, while he is giving attention to stilling the thought-formation of those thoughts, there still arise in him evil unwholesome thoughts connected with desire, with hate, and with delusion, then, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the roof of his mouth, he should beat down, constrain and crush mind with mind. When, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the roof of his mouth, he beats down, constrains, and crushes mind with mind, then any evil unwholesome thoughts connected with desire, with hate, and with delusion, are abandoned in him and subside. With the abandoning of them, his mind becomes steadied internally, quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated. "Just as a strong man might seize a weaker man by the head or shoulders and beat him down, constrain him, and crush him, so too, when, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the roof of his mouth, a bhikkhu beats down, constrains, and crushes mind with mind, then any evil unwholesome thoughts connected with desire, with hate, and with delusion, are abandoned in him and subside. With the abandoning of them, his mind becomes steadied internally, quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated." And the commentary is even MORE proactive. Some weeks ago someone posted a rather limp paraphrase of it that didn't do justice to it at all. Here is what Dr. Buddhaghosa actually says: "The phrase 'dantebhidantamaadhaaya' means that one should press the upper teeth down on the lower teeth. "The phrase 'balavaa puriso' ['as a strong man'] means that just as a strong man, a great man, having seized a weak man by the head, throat or limbs, might squeeze him, crush him, pin him down securely and make him squirm, make him suffer, make him tremble as if he were on the point of death, even so, a bhikkhu should be a wrestler who wrestles with unskillful thoughts [thinking] thus: "Just who are YOU compared with ME!" Gaining mastery over the unskillful thoughts by means of his great exertion he should undertake the great resolve: " 'Willingly, let only my skin, sinews, and bones remain, and let the flesh and blood dry up on my body, but my energy shall not be relaxed so long as I have not attained what can be attained by manly strength, manly energy, and manly persistence.' " Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ The view of those ascetics and brahmins who are of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me' is close to non-attachment, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-cleaving, close to non-grasping. (Dighanakha Sutta) 37657 From: m. nease Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 3:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Conceptual Right View Hi Ken, ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ken O" To: Sent: Tuesday, October 19, 2004 7:54 AM Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Conceptual Right View > Hi Ken H and Mike > > We cannot say that right view with fermentations is satipatthana > because supramundane right view is also satipatthana. Satipatthana > includes Arahants not just for worldings. > Hi Ken, Interesting! So, what is satipa.t.taana with fermentations (as in the Great Forty)? I did NOT know that the supramundane path factor sammaadi.t.thi is satipa.t.taana... Thanks, mike 37658 From: kenhowardau Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 3:25pm Subject: Re: Help with clarification of "control" Greetings . . . , Welcome to DSG. You wrote: ------------ > I've been reading one of Nina Van Gorkum's books, and I guess I need some clarification on something. To some degree, I understand that we have no control over mind and body. I can't stop the body from getting sick or old, etc. and I can't stop my mind from liking and disliking certain things. > ------------------------ I agree. To some extent, we uninstructed worldlings do know what the Buddha taught: There is no control over realities (nama and rupa). If there could be control over rupa, we could decree, "Let my body remain young and healthy!" And if there could be control over nama, we could decree, "Let my mind be pure and wise!" ----------------------- > On the other hand, I CAN control the body. I can make it stand, walk, run, sit etc. I CAN make the mind concentrate on a project, etc. > ---------------------- Right again! A little knowledge of the Buddha's teaching (ultimate reality) should not turn us into helpless morons: We don't need to flop on the ground muttering, "As a Buddhist I have no control over mind and body!" -------------------- > So, there seems to be two things going on here. An aspect of body and mind that is beyond control as well as an aspect that "I" can control. And perhaps that is why I have difficulty in letting go of of the self; because to me "I" still, to some degree have some control of what "my" body does and what "my" mind thinks. Any ideas? > ------------ The mental and physical phenomena that are real and that are beyond control will, inevitably (unavoidably, uncontrollably), arise and perform their functions. They will create concepts. They will create concepts (of control) that deny the Buddha's teaching and they will create other concepts that are more in accord with the teaching. It all depends on the conditions prevailing at the time. Hopefully, they will create concepts of a person who behaves sensibly and they will not create concepts of an idiot who flops on the floor babbling, "No control!" :-) It all depends on conditions. Some conditions go way back many lifetimes; others are from the more recent past; some are created here and now. A sound, intellectual understanding of the Dhamma is one condition for sensible, constructive behaviour, both ultimate and conventional. Kind regards, Ken H P.S. A name would be handy. You can give a made-up one if you are worried about security, but I have never heard of any problems with giving a real name. 37659 From: Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 4:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Howard, I don't know if contact is a real internal experience but we can certainly see contact happening "out there". At any rate, I think you and abhidhamma are in agreement. As to the superiority and location (sutta or abhidhamma) of the Buddha's teaching, I think that is a matter of faith and is best left to individuals and those whose business it is to cultivate faith. As far as learning goes, one learns where one can. There is no real hierarchy, even between concept and reality, imo. Larry Btw, it can also be a good intellectual exercise to try to bring discordant views in-line with one's own. You see this a lot in Mahayana attempts to resolve differences between sutta and sutra. 37660 From: Andrew Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 5:03pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Howard I think we all understand when one of us goes "gunning for bear" so don't feel too bad about it. (-: I just have one comment to make (or query to pose): --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > But there is something which I find more important than this > particular issue of what contact is. It is something I find very perplexing. It is > seeing people who are very, very fastidious about what the Buddha has supposedly > said when it appeals to them, and, especially when it occurs in the Abhidhamma > Pitaka, but are not at all so fastidious about what the Buddha has definitely > said in the Sutta Pitaka when that material is at odds with preferred > Abhidhammic material. It seems to me that a perspective that treats Abhidhamma as more > the word of the Buddha than the Sutta Pitaka is close to being an > establishment of a new philosophy of "Abhidhammism", a philosophy or religion that is > considered to be the "true" Dhamma, improving upon and even replacing the Dhamma. > I see this as a very extreme view. [The opposite extreme is to see little > value in Abhidhamma, and changing the tipitaka to the dvipitaka. BTW, I am > guessing here at the Pali for "two baskets".] Andrew: There is something that perplexes me too. I may be wrong (and please someone correct me if I am) but essentially the same people are responsible (or at least had a hand in or some influence upon) the transmitting of the Sutta pitaka as well as the Abhidhamma pitaka to us in its present form. So if the Abhidhamma pitaka is a corruption by corporate monks, can we have any confidence that the Sutta pitaka is the pristine and faithfully-preserved word of the Buddha? Would not those foolish monks have corrupted the wording of the Suttas as well? If so, doesn't that put the Abhidhamma "extremists" and the Sutta "extremists" in one and the same boat? I can hear my Viking ancestors telling me that thrashing about with a weeding-hook in a boat over deep water has a down-side. (-: Best wishes Andrew T 37661 From: Ken O Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 5:22pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Conceptual Right View Hi Mike Right view is of two types, mundane and supramundane as seen in the sutta Great Forty. Right view with fermentations (mundane) are those still not in stream entry stage, however developing the path to that stage. For those in the supramundane right view, they still practise satipatthana even they are Arahant, Because they are the living examples of satipatthana. They are consistent just a matter of looking right view as panna, then right view is part of satipatthana, is a path factor Ken O 37662 From: Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 1:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Larry - In a message dated 10/19/04 7:14:39 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Howard, > > I don't know if contact is a real internal experience but we can > certainly see contact happening "out there". At any rate, I think you > and abhidhamma are in agreement. > ------------------------------------------ Howard: With respect to the position that contact is an experiential reality, as opposed to being concept-only, I would say that, yes, there is agreement. (Or should I say "concurrence"? ;-) Where I see a difference between Abhidhamma and Sutta on this issue, is what the nature of that reality is. The Buddha described it in suttas as a convergence or concurrence, whereas the Abhidhamma describes it as some thing or operation that is associated with (or is a condition for, or manifests as) such a convergence. ----------------------------------------- As to the superiority and location> > (sutta or abhidhamma) of the Buddha's teaching, I think that is a > matter of faith and is best left to individuals and those whose business > it is to cultivate faith. As far as learning goes, one learns where one > can. There is no real hierarchy, even between concept and reality, imo. ------------------------------------ Howard: Now, that last sentence of yours is interesting. You really *are* a flexible guy, Larry! ;-) ----------------------------------- > > Larry > Btw, it can also be a good intellectual exercise to try to bring > discordant views in-line with one's own. You see this a lot in Mahayana > attempts to resolve differences between sutta and sutra. ------------------------------------------ Howard: I agree. I even try to do this with regard to aspects of different religions!! (For example, Buddhism and Judaism.) ====================== With metta, Howard P.S. Thank you for the kindness of your reply. /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37663 From: Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 1:54pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Andrew - In a message dated 10/19/04 8:05:07 PM Eastern Daylight Time, athel60@t... writes: > Hi Howard > > I think we all understand when one of us goes "gunning for bear" so > don't feel too bad about it. (-: > ------------------------------------- Howard: Thank you! :-) ----------------------------------- I just have one comment to make > > (or query to pose): > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > > >But there is something which I find more important than this > >particular issue of what contact is. It is something I find very > perplexing. It is > >seeing people who are very, very fastidious about what the Buddha > has supposedly > >said when it appeals to them, and, especially when it occurs in the > Abhidhamma > >Pitaka, but are not at all so fastidious about what the Buddha has > definitely > >said in the Sutta Pitaka when that material is at odds with > preferred > >Abhidhammic material. It seems to me that a perspective that treats > Abhidhamma as more > >the word of the Buddha than the Sutta Pitaka is close to being an > >establishment of a new philosophy of "Abhidhammism", a philosophy > or religion that is > >considered to be the "true" Dhamma, improving upon and even > replacing the Dhamma. > >I see this as a very extreme view. [The opposite extreme is to see > little > >value in Abhidhamma, and changing the tipitaka to the dvipitaka. > BTW, I am > >guessing here at the Pali for "two baskets".] > > Andrew: There is something that perplexes me too. I may be wrong > (and please someone correct me if I am) but essentially the same > people are responsible (or at least had a hand in or some influence > upon) the transmitting of the Sutta pitaka as well as the Abhidhamma > pitaka to us in its present form. So if the Abhidhamma pitaka is a > corruption by corporate monks, can we have any confidence that the > Sutta pitaka is the pristine and faithfully-preserved word of the > Buddha? > Would not those foolish monks have corrupted the wording of > > the Suttas as well? If so, doesn't that put the > Abhidhamma "extremists" and the Sutta "extremists" in one and the > same boat? ---------------------------------------------- Howard: I follow you, and it is a good point. However, let me say a couple things: 1) I would not describe the Abhidhamma as a corruption of corporate monks, whatever "corporate monks" might be! ;-), but an attempt at synopsizing and fleshing out details of the Buddhadhamma by scholar-monks in a context-independent form, and I also accept that materials from the Samyutta Nikaya and early presentations by Sariputta likely constituted important input to the process. I do believe that in the process, some things got changed, some lost, and considerable added both in terminology and in perspective, but for the most part it is a truly amazing piece of work. 2) Some corruption - especially in the form of cuts, pastes, and borrowings, occured with the suttas. But they were just being passed forward, whereas the Abhidhamma Pitaka was, so it seems, a new creation, with most of the early schools coming up with their own Abhidhamma, often quite different from each other, whereas the suttas compiled by the schools had more in common. This latter can be seen in comparing the Chinese Agamas, which are very close to the Theravadin suttas, but were inherited from other early Indian schools. ------------------------------------------------------ > > I can hear my Viking ancestors telling me that thrashing about with a > weeding-hook in a boat over deep water has a down-side. (-: > > Best wishes > Andrew T > > ======================= With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37664 From: ashkenn2k Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 6:27pm Subject: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi DN > "The phrase 'dantebhidantamaadhaaya' means that one should > press the upper teeth down on the lower teeth. > > "The phrase 'balavaa puriso' ['as a strong man'] means that just > as a strong man, a great man, having seized a weak man by the > head, throat or limbs, might squeeze him, crush him, pin him down > securely and make him squirm, make him suffer, make him tremble > as if he were on the point of death, even so, a bhikkhu should be a > wrestler who wrestles with unskillful thoughts [thinking] thus: > "Just who are YOU compared with ME!" Gaining mastery over the > unskillful thoughts by means of his great exertion he should > undertake the great resolve: > > " 'Willingly, let only my skin, sinews, and bones remain, and let > the flesh and blood dry up on my body, but my energy shall not be > relaxed so long as I have not attained what can be attained by > manly strength, manly energy, and manly persistence.' " k: Is that all about the commentary or could you please give me the full translation of the commentary on that paragraph. From the initial reading if that is the commentary by Buddhaghosa, there is nothing wrong in it, it is just describing the a strong man. k: You have not get back to me about my explanation of contact of my earlier two emails. One thing about the methodology of Abhidhamma is that it describes what is and what is not, to make it clear to reader. Sometimes it goes in great detail for eg in some Abhidhamma text, there is couplets, triplet etc. All for the sake of making it concise and clear. Ken O 37665 From: kenhowardau Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 6:43pm Subject: Re: Conceptual Right View + Temporary absence Hi Ken O and all, Thanks for the messages you have addressed to me over the past few days, Ken. I have commented on them indirectly, but I also wanted to reply directly. I'm a bit rushed now, however, as I have to go to Brisbane to look after my sick parents. So, no internet access for a couple of days at least. You wrote: ----------------------- > We cannot say that right view with fermentations is satipatthana because supramundane right view is also satipatthana. > ---------------------- I think satipatthana refers to right view of conditioned dhammas. Admittedly, the one unconditioned dhamma, Nibbana, is a mental object and so belongs in the fourth Foundation of Mindfulness, and that does complicates things. :-) But I think right view of Nibbana is supramundane and therefore called, vipassana. Vipassana refers to all insight, mundane and supramundane, but satipatthana is mundane insight (into conditioned dhammas) only. ---------------------- KO: > Satipatthana includes Arahants not just for worldings. > ----------------------- Oh yes, that is another complication: When an arahant practices mundane insight, we would hardly say there are fermentations. I hope you have it sorted out by the time I get back. :-) Ken H 37666 From: Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 7:18pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Howard: "With respect to the position that contact is an experiential reality, as opposed to being concept-only, I would say that, yes, there is agreement. (Or should I say "concurrence"? ;-) Where I see a difference between Abhidhamma and Sutta on this issue, is what the nature of that reality is. The Buddha described it in suttas as a convergence or concurrence, whereas the Abhidhamma describes it as some thing or operation that is associated with (or is a condition for, or manifests as) such a convergence." Hi Howard, Abhidhamma describes contact as touching or impingement while sutta seems to describe it simply as an event or concurrence. In a sense it is the closest thing there is to real grasping. Larry 37667 From: nori Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 7:25pm Subject: Primitive Buddhism Hi Dhamma Friends, It seems that the Sutta-Nipata is very old compared to most of the Pali Canon which is post monastery era. "...for we see here a picture not of life in monasteries, but of the life of hermits in its first stage." I have posted part of the introduction of the English translation published by Oxford Books. http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/sbe10/index.htm --- INTRODUCTION TO THE SUTTA-NIPÂTA. THE Collection of Discourses, Sutta-Nipâta, which I have here translated[1], is very remarkable, as there can be no doubt that it contains some remnants of Primitive Buddhism. I consider the greater part of the Mahâvagga, and nearly the whole of the Atthakavagga as very old. I have arrived at this conclusion from two reasons, first from the language, and secondly from the contents. 1. We not only find here what we meet with in other Pâli poetry, the fuller Vedic forms of nouns and verbs in the plural, as avîtatamhâse, panditâse, dhammâse, sitâse, upatthitâse, pavâdiyâse, &c., and karâmase, asmase, sikkhissâmase; the shorter Vedic plurals and the instrumental singular of nouns, as vinikkhayâ, lakkhanâ for vinikkhayâni, lakkhanâni, mantâ, pariññâ, vinayâ, lâbhakamyâ for mantâya, &c.; Vedic infinitives, as vippahâtave, sampayâtave, unnametave; contracted (or sometimes old) forms, as santyâ, gakkâ, duggakkâ, sammukkâ, titthyâ, thiyo, parihîrati for santiyâ, gâtiyâ, sammutiyâ, titthiyâ, itthiyo, parihariyati, by the side of protracted forms, such as âtumânam; but also some unusual (sometimes old) forms and words, as apukkhasi, sagghasi[2] = sakkhissasi, sussam = sunissâmi (Sansk. sroshyâmi), pâva and pâvâ = vadati, pavekkhe = paveseyya, parikissati = parikilissati, vineyya, vikeyya, nikkheyya, pappuyya, = vinayitvâ, &c., datthu = disvâ (S. drishtvâ), atisitvâ = atikkamitvâ, anuvikka = anuviditvâ, paribbasâna = vasamâna, amhanâ (S. asmanâ) = pâsânena, vâkîbhi, katubbhi, rattamahâbhi, ise (vocative), suvâmi = sâmi, maga = miga, [1. Sir M. Coomâra Swâmy's translation of part of the book has been a great help to me. I hope shortly to publish the Pâli text. 2. C reads pagghasi.] p. xii tumo = so, parovara = parâvara, bhûnahu = bhûtihanaka, upaya, âmagandha, dhona, vyappatha, vyappathi, vevikkhâ, visenibhûta, visenikatvâ, patiseniyanti. Sometimes we meet also with difficult and irregular constructions, and very condensed expressions. All this proves, I think, that these parts of the book are much older than the Suttas in which the language is not only fluent, but of which some verses are even singularly melodious. 2. In the contents of the Suttanipâta we have, I think, an important contribution to the right understanding of Primitive Buddhism, for we see here a picture not of life in monasteries, but of the life of hermits in its first stage. We have before us not the systematizing of the later Buddhist church, but the first germs of a system, the fundamental ideas of which come out with sufficient clearness. From the Atthakavagga especially it is evident where Buddha takes his stand in opposition to Philosophy (ditthi = darsana). ... metta, nori 37668 From: dighanakha Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 8:42pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hello Andrew. A> There is something that perplexes me too. I may be wrong A> (and please someone correct me if I am) but essentially the A> same people are responsible (or at least had a hand in or A> some influence upon) the transmitting of the Sutta pitaka as A> well as the Abhidhamma pitaka to us in its present form. So A> if the Abhidhamma pitaka is a corruption by corporate monks, A> can we have any confidence that the Sutta pitaka is the A> pristine and faithfully-preserved word of the Buddha? Let me remark that as far as the Abhidhamma Pitaka goes, I don't myself view it as a "corruption by corporate monks", though such a description might well be applied to large chunks of the commentarial elaboration of it. What the corporate monks of the Mahavihara did was to concoct an after-the-fact account of the Abhidhamma Pitaka's origin, probably with the aim of lending weight to the text at a time when the mere fact of a text being useful for the goal of liberation was not enough for canonicity to be conferred upon it (in contrast with an earlier period in the Sasana's development when 'authorship' was a more fluid and pragmatically based affair, and the accolade "Buddha word" could be applied to any work by a Buddhist that achieved some measure of popularity (e.g. a Jataka story), or that was found to be useful dhammically (e.g. the Patisambhidamagga), or was good for fund-raising (e.g. the Petavatthu and Vimanavatthu). A> Would not those foolish monks have corrupted the wording A> of the Suttas as well? They might have, but the evidence suggests they didn't. The schools that preserved the first four Nikayas of the Sutta Pitaka and the Agamas (their Sanskrit and Chinese parallels) appear to have operated on the principle that these are texts you don't tamper with. For example, there is nothing in the doctrinal content of the first four Pali Nikayas to indicate that it was specifically the Tambapanniya school which had transmitted this collection. And in the Chinese Agamas there is very little to indicate that they were Sarvastivadin and Dharmagupta texts that were later preserved by Mahayanists. To quote a few modern scholars... Msgr. Etienne Lamotte: "However, with the exception of the Mahayanist interpolations in the Ekottara [the Chinese equivalent to the Pali Canon's Anguttara], which are easily discernible, the variations in question affect hardly anything save the method of expression or arrangement of the subjects. The doctrinal basis common to the agamas [preserved in Chinese and partially Sanskrit and Tibetan] is remarkably uniform. Preserved and transmitted by the schools, the sutras do not however constitute scholastic documents, but are the common heritage of all the sects." (History of Indian Buddhism p 156) Lance Cousins: "These divergences [between Nikayas and Agamas] are typically in matters of little importance -- such items as locations of suttas, the names of individual speakers or the precise order of occurrences of events. Only rarely are they founded on doctrinal or sectarian differences." (Pali Oral Literature, in "Buddhist Studies Ancient & Modern") Cousins again: "Although there are differences as to details and many variations of arrangement, the four Nikayas contain more or less the same fundamental ideas in all recensions. Such variation as exists is probably due to chance rather than sectarian differences. Indeed this is wholly to be expected in an oral literature. The texts contain much repetition of stock passages and formulaic patterns. This is a technique to ensure accurate preservation of oral traditions, but it is one that allows considerable variation of exact form. Such oral works, we know from studies elsewhere, are recited identically. Their content, however, is very traditional and conservative." (Handbook of Living Religions pp 288-9) David Kalupahana: "Doubts have been raised regarding the authenticity of the Pali Nikaya, especially because they were preserved by the Theravada sect of Buddhism and hence were taken to represent the ideas of that school. But a comparative study of the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas shows that the Pali Nikayas do not represent the Theravada standpoint. In fact, there is nothing in the Nikayas that can be called Theravada. The Nikayas and the Agamas agree so well with regard to the doctrines they embody...one can be very optimistic about the attempt to determine the nature of pre-Abhidharmic Buddhism. ... Therefore, one is fully justified in depending on the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas for the study of early or primitive Buddhism. (Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis pp xi-xiii) Finally Bruce Burrill, summarizing Thich Minh Chau's findings in his "Comparative Study of the Chinese Madhyama Agama and the Pali Majjhima Nikaya": "[Ven. Minh Chau] takes a very detailed look at these two bodies of texts. There are differences in the numbers of discourses that each has, but what he finds is essentially what Cousins points out. In some cases the one is clearer than the other in particular passages, but far more often there is a very marked correspondence to the point of identity between the two groups of texts -- a remarkable thing to consider given that the Chinese texts have been translated from the Magadhi into a prakrit then into Sanskrit and then into Chinese. So, the point is that what we find in the discourse collection of the Pali Canon is common property of all the Buddhist schools and was material that was settled quite early. No reason to believe that we are not seeing the Buddha's teachings in these texts. Sectarian differences within that grouping of texts are minimal. As has been said, the significant differences are found in the commentarial and exegetical literature." Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37669 From: Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 5:04pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Conceptual Right View + Temporary absence Dear Ken - In a message dated 10/19/04 9:44:58 PM Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: > I'm a bit rushed now, however, as I have to go to > Brisbane to look after my sick parents. ==================== I'm very sorry to hear that. I hope they do well. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37670 From: Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 5:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Larry - In a message dated 10/19/04 10:20:27 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi Howard, > > Abhidhamma describes contact as touching or impingement while sutta > seems to describe it simply as an event or concurrence. In a sense it is > the closest thing there is to real grasping. > > Larry > ==================== That wasn't the impression I got from what Nina has written. Quoting from Cetasikas, there is the following: __________________________ Contact, in Pali: phassa, is mentioned first among the Universal. Phassa arises together with every citta; it "contacts" the object so that citta can experience it. ----------------------------- Howard: This doesn't say that phassa is a coming together. It says that phassa is something that, accompanying a citta, contacts the object. ------------------------------ When seeing experiences visible object, phassa which accompanies seeing-consciousness also experiences visible object but it performs its own function. ---------------------------- Howard: Here phassa is described as something that accompanies consciousness, that is a thing that, itself, experiences, and that performs a function. ----------------------------- At that moment phassa "contacts" visible object and conditions seeing-consciousness to see. ------------------------- Howard: Again, phassa is not defined as a contacting but as some thing that contacts a sense object, and by so contacting, serves as a condition for experiencing. ------------------------- The Atthasalini (Expositor, Part IV, chapter I, 108) states about contact: Contact means "it touches" It has touching as its salient characteristic, impact as its function, "coinciding" (of the physical base, object and consciousness) as its manifestation, and the object which has entered the avenue (of awareness) as proximate cause . ------------------------------- Howard: Here the Atthasalani, not Nina, states, not that phassa is the coming together of the three, but that it is something that has "coinciding" (of the physical base, object and consciousness) as its *manifestation*. This is just not the same as what one finds in the suttas, imo. ====================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37671 From: dighanakha Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 11:38pm Subject: Teeth-clenching was: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hello Ken O (and Ken H). dig>> "The phrase 'dantebhidantamaadhaaya' means that one should dig>> press the upper teeth down on the lower teeth. dig>> dig>> "The phrase 'balavaa puriso' ['as a strong man'] means that dig>> just as a strong man, a great man, having seized a weak man dig>> by the head, throat or limbs, might squeeze him, crush him, dig>> pin him down securely and make him squirm, make him suffer, dig>> make him tremble as if he were on the point of death, even dig>> so, a bhikkhu should be a wrestler who wrestles with dig>> unskillful thoughts [thinking] thus: "Just who are YOU dig>> compared with ME!" Gaining mastery over the unskillful dig>> thoughts by means of his great exertion he should undertake dig>> the great resolve: dig>> dig>> " 'Willingly, let only my skin, sinews, and bones remain, dig>> and let the flesh and blood dry up on my body, but my energy dig>> shall not be relaxed so long as I have not attained what can dig>> be attained by manly strength, manly energy, and manly dig>> persistence.' " K> Is that all about the commentary or could you please give me K> the full translation of the commentary on that paragraph. The above translation is the whole of the commentarial gloss on the teeth-clenching passage, minus the one sentence that Nina has already covered in her paraphrase. Here's the missing sentence: 'Cetasaa cittan' ti kusalacittena akusalacitta.m abhinigga.nhitabba.m " 'Mind with mind' means the unskillful mind must be suppressed by the skillful one." K> From the initial reading if that is the commentary by K> Buddhaghosa, there is nothing wrong in it, it is just K> describing the a strong man. I too see nothing wrong in what the Commentary says. The problem was with Ken H's reading of the Sutta -- his failure to see it as an ovaada, an exhortation to purposive action. K> You have not get back to me about my explanation of contact K> of my earlier two emails. As I recall, neither of the two posts did much more than reiterate Buddhaghosa's view of phassa, without adding anything substantive to show that his description was consistent with that of the Suttas. But when I have time I'll take another look and see if I missed something. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37672 From: plnao Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 3:59am Subject: Re: [dsg] Are You Sure? (Was: Contact swings both ways. To Howard Hello Suan Thank you for writing. S: :> I missed Howard's original post on this issue. > > But, I can assure you that the teachings on contact (phasso) like > those on feeling (vedanaa) are the same everywhere within the whole > Tipi.taka and their standard Pali commentaries. > > The Buddha taught contact as an ultimate reality in Sutta Pi.taka. > > For example, contact (phasso in phassa paccayaa) in various Suttams > on Dependent Origination is a paramattha dhamma. > Of course, if Howard found something different on the issue of > contact between the Pi.takas, please give me a reference. I will > look into the matter. I think it was Dig Nutcracker who laid it out quite clearly, but it does appear that contact is described in a somewhat different way in some suttas when compared to the way it is in Abhidhamma. I had wondered about this in the past, and now as I look at my copy of the Honeyball Sutta ( MN18) I see I wrote a question mark in the margin along with "but isn't this different from the cognitive progress described in Abhidhamma?" The Honeyball has "dependent on eye & forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. WIth contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling." This sounds different to me than the way phassa is described in Abhidhamma (in "Cetasikas", for example) but frankly the slight difference, if there is one (I have probably misunderstood) doesn't concern me. The purpose of studying Dhamma is to get closer to understanding anatta, in my opinion. And I don't see how a slight discrepancy in the way phassa is described interferes with our ability to see phassa as not-self. The proliferation that follows is where we can gain insight that will help to eradicate defilements, it seems to this beginner. I guess my point is I don't quite understand why people feel obliged to persecute Abhidhamma or the commentaries based on discrepancies from the Suttanta. There are so many suttas that have very peculiar messages that don't seem to click with the Buddha's teaching of anatta. I think for instance of the sutta in AN that says that if a husband and wife live together in tune with Dhamma, they will be rewarded by living together in the next life. There are countless other examples. It seems to me that Abhidhamma is more consistently pure in its teaching of anatta than some suttas are. There seems to be reason to agree with what the "abhi" stands for. So I am not concerned by discrepancies. If a teaching is false, panna will know and it will not help to understand anatta. The truth will out. There is no need to play tug of war with Dhamma views, in my opinion. Panna will know if a teaching is false. I'm off topic here. Metta, Phil p.s I will now now add the passage I referred to from Dig the Nutcracker for your reference. Please follow up by joining the "thinking and thoughts" thread if you'd like, since those gents are much more willing and able to discuss this point than I am. Thanks again for writing! Dig the Nutcracker wrote: >>>If the above quote from the Madhupi.n.d.ika Sutta is not to be misunderstood, we need to go back a few paragraphs in the same Sutta to see *why* there is a manifestation of phassa at this time: "Friend, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; *the coming together of the three is contact*. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what he has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable by the eye." (MN 18) This is where Suttas' conception of phassa differs from that of (commentarial) Abhidhamma. In the Suttas' conception one can "point to the manifestation of phassa when there is a coming together of eye, forms and eye consciousness," precisely because phassa is nothing other than this 'coming together'. It is not some additional factor that accompanies the coming together. 37673 From: Ken O Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 5:00am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Conceptual Right View + Temporary absence Hi Ken H > ---------------------- > I think satipatthana refers to right view of conditioned dhammas. > Admittedly, the one unconditioned dhamma, Nibbana, is a mental > object and so belongs in the fourth Foundation of Mindfulness, and > that does complicates things. :-) But I think right view of Nibbana > is supramundane and therefore called, vipassana. Vipassana refers > to all insight, mundane and supramundane, but satipatthana is mundane insight (into conditioned dhammas) only. > Oh yes, that is another complication: When an arahant practices > mundane insight, we would hardly say there are fermentations. k: We must remember, satipatthana is a living emboidment of the Buddha. It is a way of living by the Buddha. Satipatthana method is to help worldings to reach enlightment. We must remember that satipatthana is not just address to worldings, it was address to noble disciples who have yet accomplish the path. It was also to show the worldlings that Buddha live in the world of satipatthana. Satipatthana includes the four noble truth which is both mundane and supramundane. Even great disciples of Buddha still live the way of satipatthana, but for them they have no fermentations. Ken O > > ---------------------- > KO: > Satipatthana includes Arahants not just for worldings. > > ----------------------- > 37674 From: Ken O Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 5:20am Subject: Re: [dsg] Teeth-clenching was: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi DN > As I recall, neither of the two posts did much more than > reiterate Buddhaghosa's view of phassa, without adding > anything substantive to show that his description was > consistent with that of the Suttas. But when I have time > I'll take another look and see if I missed something. I thought you are asking for the explanation on why Buddhaghosa's view of phassa and I give you the explanation of what it meant to say. And I give you the explanation of its meaning in consistency with the sutta. If you think it is not consistent after my explanation, please state the inconsistency. I am not a mind reader :) Ken O 37675 From: dighanakha Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 5:47am Subject: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Herman Hello Ken H. To Herman you wrote: K> Herman, there is no point in your saying, "Nonsense!" every K> time someone describes the Dhamma as found in the Theravada K> texts (see our home page). Please quote any part of those K> texts, that you do regard as genuine, and explain how it is K> not a teaching of ultimate reality. Below is a translation of the Kula Sutta from the Anguttara Nikaya (A ii 248). It is a teaching that I regard as genuine, but if it is a "teaching of ultimate reality", then my daughter's home economics teacher must be a Sammasambuddha. [begin quote] Whatsoever families, monks, after attaining greatness of wealth, fail to endure for long, all of them do so because of four reasons, or one or another of them. Which four? They do not look for things they have lost. They do not repair things that are old. They eat and drink to excess. They place in authority a man or a woman lacking virtue. Whatsoever families, monks, after attaining greatness of wealth, fail to endure for long, all of them do so because of these four reasons, or one or another of them. Whatsoever families, monks, after attaining greatness of wealth, endure for long, all of them do so because of four reasons, or one or another of them. Which four? They look for things they have lost. They repair things that are old. They eat and drink moderately. They place in authority a man or a woman possessed of virtue. Whatsoever families, monks, after attaining greatness of wealth, endure for long, all of them do so because of these four reasons, or one or another of them. [end quote] To avoid error when interpreting a Sutta, it is best to keep in mind those utterances of a most general character that the Buddha made regarding his teaching. These would include sayings such as: "As the great ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, so the Dhamma has but one taste, the taste of freedom." "I teach only dukkha and the ending of dukkha." "I teach Dhamma for the threefold benefit: benefit in the present, benefit in the future, and the highest benefit." And so on and so forth. There are many statements of this kind in the Suttas, but none that say, or even imply: "My teaching is all about ultimate and irreducible physical and psychical atoms." The above Sutta is simply concerned with di.t.thadhammikattha, 'benefit to be obtained in the present life'. It comprises four common-sense prudential maxims for householders who desire their families and family property to be stable and long-lasting. Nothing more. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37676 From: dighanakha Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 5:56am Subject: Re: Teeth-clenching Hello Ken O. K> If you think it is not consistent after my K> explanation, please state the inconsistency. Howard has described the inconsistency about as clearly as it can be described in message 37670. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37677 From: samuraitradr Date: Tue Oct 19, 2004 6:49pm Subject: Re: Help with clarification of "control" Ken, no problem with my name, Dave Kinney, of Windsor CT, USA. But still, there seems to be nama and rupa that CAN be controlled, and nama and rupa that can not. And maybe it's that aspect that we think, well, I can walk, drive, fly where I want I can say what I want, etc. etc. that keeps us believing that there MUST be a "self", "soul", whatever. To me, that's the hurdle I can't, as yet, jump. And then again, there is always the conundrum that, even when we start to observe what is going on, I think, OK, who is doing the observing? Get's to be an iterative process... Thanks for replying, Dave --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > Greetings . . . , > > Welcome to DSG. > > You wrote: > > ------------ > > I've been reading one of Nina Van Gorkum's books, and I guess I > need some clarification on something. To some degree, I understand > that we have no control over mind and body. I can't stop the body > from getting sick or old, etc. and I can't stop my mind from liking > and disliking certain things. > > ------------------------ > > I agree. To some extent, we uninstructed worldlings do know what the > Buddha taught: There is no control over realities (nama and rupa). > If there could be control over rupa, we could decree, "Let my body > remain young and healthy!" And if there could be control over nama, > we could decree, "Let my mind be pure and wise!" > > ----------------------- > > On the other hand, I CAN control the body. > I can make it stand, walk, run, sit etc. I CAN make the mind > concentrate on a project, etc. > > ---------------------- > > Right again! A little knowledge of the Buddha's teaching (ultimate > reality) should not turn us into helpless morons: We don't need to > flop on the ground muttering, "As a Buddhist I have no control over > mind and body!" > > -------------------- > > So, there seems to be two things going on here. An aspect of body > and mind that is beyond control as well as an aspect that "I" can > control. And perhaps that is why I have difficulty in letting go of > of the self; because to me "I" still, to some degree have some > control of what "my" body does and what "my" mind thinks. > > Any ideas? > > ------------ > > The mental and physical phenomena that are real and that are beyond > control will, inevitably (unavoidably, uncontrollably), arise and > perform their functions. They will create concepts. They will > create concepts (of control) that deny the Buddha's teaching and > they will create other concepts that are more in accord with the > teaching. It all depends on the conditions prevailing at the time. > > Hopefully, they will create concepts of a person who behaves > sensibly and they will not create concepts of an idiot who flops on > the floor babbling, "No control!" :-) > > It all depends on conditions. Some conditions go way back many > lifetimes; others are from the more recent past; some are created > here and now. A sound, intellectual understanding of the Dhamma is > one condition for sensible, constructive behaviour, both ultimate > and conventional. > > > Kind regards, > Ken H > > P.S. A name would be handy. You can give a made-up one if you are > worried about security, but I have never heard of any problems with > giving a real name. 37678 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 8:23am Subject: Brief India update Hello All We have just arrived at our hotel near Lumbini (in Nepal) after a 12 hour drive from Benares. Looking forward to a non-travelling day tomorrow! Sarah and I both have reports of happenings since the last post from Bodh Gaya, but I'm not able to use my USB key on the computers at this or our previous hotel due to the antiquity of the Windows OSs ;-)). Hoping to find a handy internet cafe tomorrow evening, time permitting (the days are very full). Nina and Lodewijk send their warm regards to everyone. Time to get my bag up to the room and get ready for tomorrow. Cheers Jon 37679 From: Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 4:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Are You Sure? (Was: Contact swings both ways. To Howard Hi, Phil - In a message dated 10/20/04 7:05:38 AM Eastern Daylight Time, plnao@j... writes: > I guess my point is I don't quite understand why people feel obliged to > persecute > Abhidhamma or the commentaries based on discrepancies from the Suttanta. ------------------------------------------- Howard: Just for the record, I, for one, feel no such obligation. The word 'persecute' is a tad strong, I think. ;-) I have no interest in persecuting, especially not that which I think has enormous value. But I do have an interest in evaluating, attempting to see what is the case and what is not. -------------------------------------------- > There are so many suttas > that have very peculiar messages that don't seem to click with the Buddha's > teaching of anatta. > I think for instance of the sutta in AN that says that if a husband and wife > live together in > tune with Dhamma, they will be rewarded by living together in the next life. > -------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't see why this is contrary to anatta any more than any other other conventional assertion. Do you assume this is false? I, myself, might wonder whether such a living connection would necessarily occur in the very next lives of the people involved, but I certainly do presume that kammic connections (chains? ;-) forged in one life are not quickly abandoned. (BTW, there is only one way to avoid conventional speech, and that is through utter silence.) ------------------------------------------- > There are > countless other examples. It seems > to me that Abhidhamma is more consistently pure in its teaching of anatta > than some > suttas are. There seems to be reason to agree with what the "abhi" stands > for. > ----------------------------------------- Howard: And what is that? One extreme, as I see it, is "superior" or "higher". The other extreme, which I disagree with, but which amuses me [my apologies] is Bhikkhu Buddhadasa's given meaning of "superfluous". ---------------------------------------- > So I am not concerned by discrepancies. If a teaching is false, panna will > know and it will not help to understand anatta. The truth will out. There is > no need > to play tug of war with Dhamma views, in my opinion. Panna will know if a > teaching is false. > --------------------------------------- Howard: Where is this pa~n~na? Where shall we find it, and how will we know it as distinct from mere preferred view? Whether pa~n~na is a special cognitive ability or is "merely" the natural, proper cognitive functioning that occurs when filters, obscurations, and defilements are pushed aside or, better, uprooted, what is the basis for knowing that it is in play? I think that reliance on an unexperienced answer-to-all-problems called "pa~n~na", much like reliance on an unexperienced creator god, leaves one open to being led merely by our tanha-driven preferences. I think that we must rely on careful investigation, looking to see for ourselves what is the way matters are, as suggested in the sutta to the Kalamas, and, in doing this, *whatever* perspective we may develop, it is very important to keep "So it SEEMS" at the front of the mind at all times. The three poisons are not easily removed, and knowing that we fall prey to them all the time is, perhaps, the beginning of wisdom. ---------------------------------------------- > I'm off topic here. ====================== I don't know. There are a lot of important topics. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37680 From: Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 4:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] Brief India update Hi, Jon - In a message dated 10/20/04 11:29:04 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonoabb@y... writes: > Hello All > > We have just arrived at our hotel near Lumbini (in Nepal) after a 12 hour > drive from Benares. Looking forward to a non-travelling day tomorrow! > Sarah and I both have reports of happenings since the last post from Bodh > Gaya, but I'm not able to use my USB key on the computers at this or our > previous hotel due to the antiquity of the Windows OSs ;-)). Hoping to > find a handy internet cafe tomorrow evening, time permitting (the days are > very full). > ------------------------------------------- Howard: Good to hear from you! :-) ------------------------------------------- > > Nina and Lodewijk send their warm regards to everyone. > ------------------------------------------ Howard: Please send them my best. I hope the rigors of the trip are quite tolerable for them both, and that all of you experience a wonderful, uplifting joy of devotion to the three jewels. ---------------------------------------- > > Time to get my bag up to the room and get ready for tomorrow. > > Cheers > Jon > ======================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37681 From: abhidhammika Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 9:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Are You Sure? (Was: Contact swings both ways. To Howard Dear Phil, Howard, Nina, Mike Nease, Robert K, Dighanakha and all How are you? The formula "Cakkhuñcaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññaa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso," is a very beautiful abhidhamma teaching presented by means of Suttantabhaajaniiya (Suttam style analysis). As such, it is merely another aspect of abhidhamma teaching, and so it is a waste of time for us to treat it as though something different from abhidhamma teaching on abhidhamma. Of course, Dighanakha is entitled to his own personal opinions as long as he qualified them as such. That is to say, Dighanakha would be very unwise, and arrogant even, to complain about Abhidhamma teachings and Standard Pali commentaries on the ground of their being different from his personal opinions and interpretations. Having said that, I will get back to you later to discuss that formaula further. Meanwhile, please read "Dutiyadvaya Suttam", in Section 93, Sa.laayatana Samyuttam, Samyuttanikaaya, and see how it supports Abhidhamma Style Analysis (Abhidhammabhaajaniiya) of contact (phasso). Verily, Abhidhamma is beautiful! With regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "plnao" wrote: Hello Suan Thank you for writing. S: :> I missed Howard's original post on this issue. > > But, I can assure you that the teachings on contact (phasso) like > those on feeling (vedanaa) are the same everywhere within the whole > Tipi.taka and their standard Pali commentaries. > > The Buddha taught contact as an ultimate reality in Sutta Pi.taka. > > For example, contact (phasso in phassa paccayaa) in various Suttams > on Dependent Origination is a paramattha dhamma. > Of course, if Howard found something different on the issue of > contact between the Pi.takas, please give me a reference. I will > look into the matter. I think it was Dig Nutcracker who laid it out quite clearly, but it does appear that contact is described in a somewhat different way in some suttas when compared to the way it is in Abhidhamma. I had wondered about this in the past, and now as I look at my copy of the Honeyball Sutta ( MN18) I see I wrote a question mark in the margin along with "but isn't this different from the cognitive progress described in Abhidhamma?" The Honeyball has "dependent on eye & forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. WIth contact as a requisite condition, there is feeling." This sounds different to me than the way phassa is described in Abhidhamma (in "Cetasikas", for example) but frankly the slight difference, if there is one (I have probably misunderstood) doesn't concern me. The purpose of studying Dhamma is to get closer to understanding anatta, in my opinion. And I don't see how a slight discrepancy in the way phassa is described interferes with our ability to see phassa as not-self. The proliferation that follows is where we can gain insight that will help to eradicate defilements, it seems to this beginner. I guess my point is I don't quite understand why people feel obliged to persecute Abhidhamma or the commentaries based on discrepancies from the Suttanta. There are so many suttas that have very peculiar messages that don't seem to click with the Buddha's teaching of anatta. I think for instance of the sutta in AN that says that if a husband and wife live together in tune with Dhamma, they will be rewarded by living together in the next life. There are countless other examples. It seems to me that Abhidhamma is more consistently pure in its teaching of anatta than some suttas are. There seems to be reason to agree with what the "abhi" stands for. So I am not concerned by discrepancies. If a teaching is false, panna will know and it will not help to understand anatta. The truth will out. There is no need to play tug of war with Dhamma views, in my opinion. Panna will know if a teaching is false. I'm off topic here. Metta, Phil p.s I will now now add the passage I referred to from Dig the Nutcracker for your reference. Please follow up by joining the "thinking and thoughts" thread if you'd like, since those gents are much more willing and able to discuss this point than I am. Thanks again for writing! Dig the Nutcracker wrote: >>>If the above quote from the Madhupi.n.d.ika Sutta is not to be misunderstood, we need to go back a few paragraphs in the same Sutta to see *why* there is a manifestation of phassa at this time: "Friend, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises; *the coming together of the three is contact*. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what he has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable by the eye." (MN 18) This is where Suttas' conception of phassa differs from that of (commentarial) Abhidhamma. In the Suttas' conception one can "point to the manifestation of phassa when there is a coming together of eye, forms and eye consciousness," precisely because phassa is nothing other than this 'coming together'. It is not some additional factor that accompanies the coming together. 37682 From: Ken O Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 10:01am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Howard and DN There is no disagreement with convergence of the bases, sense objects and sense cittas. So there is no need for me to explain it again. The issue is why a cetasika comes together with citta rather than after the convergence. I think one will have to see from the point of manifestation. Is contact able to be manifest itself before the convergence - No. Even though cetasikas can be an accompanying citta but it will not be manifested if there is no object for it to touch. Just like feelings who follow the citta will not be manifested if contact does not touch the object. So likewise a cetasikas would follow a citta, only will be manifested if the bases, sense objects and sense cittas converge and not before. Likewise in the four Great Elements, even though four of the come in a group, but only one will be manifested if the conditions are there for its manifestation. Please kindly comment Ken O 37683 From: htootintnaing Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 11:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Vism.XIV,108 + Nina's addition Larry: Hi Htoo, Good point about laughter not being the same as the arahant's smile. Another thing that might be a little misleading is the quote below from the Expositor. The arahant's smile producing consciousness is without roots so there is no understanding. It is just a reaction, like smiling when seeing an old friend. A more conventional way of seeing this is that the joy produces the smile. Can an arahant's functional root consciousness also produce a smile? Larry ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Of course. Hasituppada citta or smile-generating consciousness does not have sati and panna. It does not have mindfulness and wisdom. With Metta, Htoo Naing 37684 From: connieparker Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 0:45pm Subject: Re: the meaning of "papanca" Hi, Herman, On second thought, make it the heart-base rather than the mind that's the floodgate for papanca. peace, connie 37686 From: Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 10:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Help with clarification of "control" Hi Dave You can walk because there is an Earth, gravity, sun, plants (sustenance) etc. You can drive because of millions of "man hours" of technology, car manufactures, built roads, oil refineries, gas stations, etc. You can fly because of even more complex technologies, destinations, pilots, ground workers, ticket offices, runways, tower control, etc. You can say what you want because language was invented, and learned over many thousands of years. You can do these things because of your parents, and their parents, etc., etc. Without the Buddha, one couldn't study Buddhism. Without Christ, no Christianity. The point is, all of these things arise due to conditions. The only reason that "you" can do them, is because the conditional circumstances are currently supporting those abilities. If the conditions will allow it, an effort can be made. A human is on this planet because the conditions arose for that. Our bodies are sustained by conditions and our thoughts, ideas, plans, etc., are as well. An effort can be made to work within those conditions. But the belief in "control" is ultimately the belief in a "self" that is outside of conditions. TG In a message dated 10/20/2004 8:12:36 AM Pacific Standard Time, samuraitradr@y... writes: Ken, no problem with my name, Dave Kinney, of Windsor CT, USA. But still, there seems to be nama and rupa that CAN be controlled, and nama and rupa that can not. And maybe it's that aspect that we think, well, I can walk, drive, fly where I want I can say what I want, etc. etc. that keeps us believing that there MUST be a "self", "soul", whatever. To me, that's the hurdle I can't, as yet, jump. And then again, there is always the conundrum that, even when we start to observe what is going on, I think, OK, who is doing the observing? Get's to be an iterative process... Thanks for replying, Dave 37687 From: Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 4:21pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Howard, I think you and Nina are both misunderstanding contact. Vism.XIV,134: Herein, (i) it touches (phusati), thus it is 'contact' (phassa). This has the characteristic of touching. Its function is the act of impingement. It is manifested as concurrence. Its proximate cause is an objective field that has come into focus. L: I don't read this as a cetasika that touches things but as the "act of impingement". In other words, rupa touches sensitive matter and sensitive matter touches consciousness. It doesn't say so but it seems clear to me that sensitive matter translates rupa into nama. If the sensitive matter is healthy the translation is a good one but not a perfect one. The human eye cannot see the whole spectrum, ear cannot hear all sound frequencies, etc. Also it doesn't seem likely that chunks of hardness are rattling around in the bhavanga stream. The above also says contact manifests as concurrence. I believe this is how the Honeyball Sutta describes it. So there is that slight difference between sutta and abhidhamma: concurrence or impingement. Also, in describing contact as touch or impingement abhidhamma is using the language of the cognizing of tangible data. We could argue that this gives a materialistic bias to our understanding of experience. However, that might be a little nit-picky. Larry ---------------------- H: Hi, Larry - In a message dated 10/19/04 10:20:27 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: Hi Howard, Abhidhamma describes contact as touching or impingement while sutta seems to describe it simply as an event or concurrence. In a sense it is the closest thing there is to real grasping. Larry ==================== That wasn't the impression I got from what Nina has written. Quoting from Cetasikas, there is the following: __________________________ Contact, in Pali: phassa, is mentioned first among the Universal. Phassa arises together with every citta; it "contacts" the object so that citta can experience it. ----------------------------- Howard: This doesn't say that phassa is a coming together. It says that phassa is something that, accompanying a citta, contacts the object. ------------------------------ When seeing experiences visible object, phassa which accompanies seeing-consciousness also experiences visible object but it performs its own function. ---------------------------- Howard: Here phassa is described as something that accompanies consciousness, that is a thing that, itself, experiences, and that performs a function. ----------------------------- At that moment phassa "contacts" visible object and conditions seeing-consciousness to see. ------------------------- Howard: Again, phassa is not defined as a contacting but as some thing that contacts a sense object, and by so contacting, serves as a condition for experiencing. ------------------------- The Atthasalini (Expositor, Part IV, chapter I, 108) states about contact: Contact means "it touches" It has touching as its salient characteristic, impact as its function, "coinciding" (of the physical base, object and consciousness) as its manifestation, and the object which has entered the avenue (of awareness) as proximate cause . ------------------------------- Howard: Here the Atthasalani, not Nina, states, not that phassa is the coming together of the three, but that it is something that has "coinciding" (of the physical base, object and consciousness) as its *manifestation*. This is just not the same as what one finds in the suttas, imo. ====================== With metta, Howard 37688 From: Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 4:39pm Subject: Vism.XIV,109 "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga) Ch. XIV 109. III. ii. A. 2. That, however, 'with root cause' is of eight kinds (73)-(80), like the profitable (1)-(8), being classed according to joy and so on. While the profitable arises in trainers and ordinary men only, this arises in Arahants only. This is the difference here. So firstly, that of the sense sphere is of eleven kinds. III. ii. B., III. ii. C. That, however, of the 'fine-material sphere' (81)-(85), and that of the 'immaterial sphere' (86)-(89) are [respectively] of five kinds and of four kinds like the profitable. But they should be understood to differ from the profitable in that they arise only in Arahants. So functional consciousness in the three planes is of twenty kinds in all. 37689 From: Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 4:49pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Vism.XIV,109 Hi all, This paragraph is about an arahant's javana cittas that, unlke the smile producing consciousness, are "with roots", panna, alobha, adosa. They are exclusive to an arahant because they are functional, i.e., not kamma producing. Nina will have more to say on this later. If anyone else would care to comment, please do. Larry --------------------------- "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga) Ch. XIV 109. III. ii. A. 2. That, however, 'with root cause' is of eight kinds (73)-(80), like the profitable (1)-(8), being classed according to joy and so on. While the profitable arises in trainers and ordinary men only, this arises in Arahants only. This is the difference here. So firstly, that of the sense sphere is of eleven kinds. III. ii. B., III. ii. C. That, however, of the 'fine-material sphere' (81)-(85), and that of the 'immaterial sphere' (86)-(89) are [respectively] of five kinds and of four kinds like the profitable. But they should be understood to differ from the profitable in that they arise only in Arahants. So functional consciousness in the three planes is of twenty kinds in all. 37690 From: Andrew Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 5:02pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Dear DN and Howard I hope you don't mind if I succumb to the convenience of abbreviating your name even though, to me, DN *really* stands for "Dagens Nyheter" (a Swedish newspaper). (-: Thank you both for your comments and the quotations from a number of scholars. As I was largely introduced to Theravadan Buddhism by someone who considered that the whole Canon had been tampered with and "jazzed up" to make Buddhism more competitive with Brahmanism/Hinduism among the masses, I suspected that there were other Indologists who disagreed with those you have selected. A brief flap through my scant library has turned up that the German Indologist, H W Schumann, considered that the 2nd Council had tampered with the Canon (yes, including the suttas) to make a better case for the Buddha's omniscience. So, again, it seems that the scholars are at odds with one another (as to be expected). The end result is that, according to some Indologists, those who hold that the suttas are the faithfully-preserved word of the Buddha are not correct - which places those people in the same boat with the "extreme" Abhidhammists, as I originally stated. It all depends on which view you take. My attitude is: acknowledge whatever view you have but don't cling to it and don't encourage aversion to contrary views and certainly not to those who hold them. I *don't* find this easy advice to follow. I personally feel that my consideration of Abhidhamma has been incredibly helpful in getting me to focus on and gain some understanding of anatta and conditionality. I think I differ from Ken H by not being so dismissive of conventional reality (thanks DN for your post on help in the present, in this regard) but I can sense how a being with a complete direct understanding of anatta must have such a different outlook on things to we worldlings. Thanks again for your comments. Best wishes Andrew T --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "dighanakha" wrote: [snip] > A> Would not those foolish monks have corrupted the wording > A> of the Suttas as well? > > They might have, but the evidence suggests they didn't. > > The schools that preserved the first four Nikayas of the Sutta > Pitaka and the Agamas (their Sanskrit and Chinese parallels) > appear to have operated on the principle that these are texts you > don't tamper with. For example, there is nothing in the doctrinal > content of the first four Pali Nikayas to indicate that it was > specifically the Tambapanniya school which had transmitted this > collection. And in the Chinese Agamas there is very little to > indicate that they were Sarvastivadin and Dharmagupta texts that > were later preserved by Mahayanists. To quote a few modern > scholars... > > Msgr. Etienne Lamotte: > "However, with the exception of the Mahayanist interpolations in > the Ekottara [the Chinese equivalent to the Pali Canon's > Anguttara], which are easily discernible, the variations in > question affect hardly anything save the method of expression or > arrangement of the subjects. The doctrinal basis common to the > agamas [preserved in Chinese and partially Sanskrit and Tibetan] > is remarkably uniform. Preserved and transmitted by the schools, > the sutras do not however constitute scholastic documents, but > are the common heritage of all the sects." > (History of Indian Buddhism p 156) > > Lance Cousins: > "These divergences [between Nikayas and Agamas] are typically in > matters of little importance -- such items as locations of > suttas, the names of individual speakers or the precise order of > occurrences of events. Only rarely are they founded on doctrinal > or sectarian differences." > (Pali Oral Literature, in "Buddhist Studies Ancient & Modern") > > Cousins again: > "Although there are differences as to details and many variations > of arrangement, the four Nikayas contain more or less the same > fundamental ideas in all recensions. Such variation as exists is > probably due to chance rather than sectarian differences. Indeed > this is wholly to be expected in an oral literature. The texts > contain much repetition of stock passages and formulaic patterns. > This is a technique to ensure accurate preservation of oral > traditions, but it is one that allows considerable variation of > exact form. Such oral works, we know from studies elsewhere, are > recited identically. Their content, however, is very traditional > and conservative." > (Handbook of Living Religions pp 288-9) > > David Kalupahana: > "Doubts have been raised regarding the authenticity of the Pali > Nikaya, especially because they were preserved by the Theravada > sect of Buddhism and hence were taken to represent the ideas of > that school. But a comparative study of the Pali Nikayas and the > Chinese Agamas shows that the Pali Nikayas do not represent the > Theravada standpoint. In fact, there is nothing in the Nikayas > that can be called Theravada. The Nikayas and the Agamas agree so > well with regard to the doctrines they embody...one can be very > optimistic about the attempt to determine the nature of > pre-Abhidharmic Buddhism. ... Therefore, one is fully justified > in depending on the Pali Nikayas and the Chinese Agamas for the > study of early or primitive Buddhism. > (Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis pp xi-xiii) > > Finally Bruce Burrill, summarizing Thich Minh Chau's findings in > his "Comparative Study of the Chinese Madhyama Agama and the Pali > Majjhima Nikaya": > > "[Ven. Minh Chau] takes a very detailed look at these two bodies > of texts. There are differences in the numbers of discourses that > each has, but what he finds is essentially what Cousins points > out. In some cases the one is clearer than the other in > particular passages, but far more often there is a very marked > correspondence to the point of identity between the two groups of > texts -- a remarkable thing to consider given that the Chinese > texts have been translated from the Magadhi into a prakrit then > into Sanskrit and then into Chinese. So, the point is that what > we find in the discourse collection of the Pali Canon is common > property of all the Buddhist schools and was material that was > settled quite early. No reason to believe that we are not seeing > the Buddha's teachings in these texts. Sectarian differences > within that grouping of texts are minimal. As has been said, the > significant differences are found in the commentarial and > exegetical literature." 37691 From: nori Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 10:10pm Subject: Re: Brief India update Hi Jon and company, Pleasent journey. metta, nori --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Hello All > > We have just arrived at our hotel near Lumbini (in Nepal) after a 12 hour > drive from Benares. Looking forward to a non-travelling day tomorrow! > Sarah and I both have reports of happenings since the last post from Bodh > Gaya, but I'm not able to use my USB key on the computers at this or our > previous hotel due to the antiquity of the Windows OSs ;-)). Hoping to > find a handy internet cafe tomorrow evening, time permitting (the days are > very full). > > Nina and Lodewijk send their warm regards to everyone. > > Time to get my bag up to the room and get ready for tomorrow. > > Cheers > Jon 37692 From: dighanakha Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 10:46pm Subject: Contact (phassa) was: Re: Are You Sure? Hello Suan. S> Dear Phil, Howard, Nina, Mike Nease, Robert K, Dighanakha S> and all S> How are you? I'm fine, thank you. How are you? S> The formula "Cakkhu~ncaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati S> cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso," is a very S> beautiful abhidhamma teaching presented by means of S> Suttantabhaajaniiya (Suttam style analysis). S> As such, it is merely another aspect of abhidhamma teaching, S> and so it is a waste of time for us to treat it as though S> something different from abhidhamma teaching on abhidhamma. In the discussion so far, Howard and I have offered reasons as to why we think the treatment of phassa in the commentarial Abhidhamma (in particular the Atthasaalinii) is incompatible with that given in the Suttas (e.g. the Honeyball Sutta), that is, it appears the Atthasaalinii's treatment of phassa is not merely an expansion of the Suttas' conception, but a different conception entirely. If you believe us to be mistaken and would like to show us the error of our ways, you will need to do more than merely assert this to be the case and then tell us we are wasting our time by disagreeing. S> Of course, Dighanakha is entitled to his own personal S> opinions as long as he qualified them as such. Au contraire, since I don't reside in North Korea, Myanmar, or any other Orwellian police state, I am unconditionally entitled to my own opinions. Perhaps what you meant to say is that I am entitled to *express* these opinions on this list ... provided that I give due notice that they are mine. If so, then I would answer that this seems a needless affectation. I believe most of dsg's readers are smart enough to realize that expressed opinions are most likely to belong to the people who express them. One more point: when you name someone as one of the recipients of your posts, courtesy requires that he be addressed as 'you' not 'he'. S> Meanwhile, please read "Dutiyadvaya Suttam", in Section 93, S> Sa.laayatana Samyuttam, Samyuttanikaaya, and see how it S> supports Abhidhamma Style Analysis (Abhidhammabhaajaniiya) S> of contact (phasso). I have read it and don't see how it supports Buddhaghosa's conception of phassa any more than does the Madhupi.n.dika Sutta. Dutiyadvayasuttanta -- Second Discourse on Dyads (S. iv 67-9; Kindred Sayings IV 39-40; Connected Discourses II 1172-3) "Consciousness, bhikkhus, comes to be dependent on a dyad. How, bhikkhus, does consciousness come to be dependent on a dyad? Dependent on the eye and forms arises eye-consciousness. The eye is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise; forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Thus this dyad is wavering, unstable, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Eye-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness is likewise impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Eye-consciousness having arisen, bhikkhus, dependent upon a condition that is impermanent, how then could it be permanent? "Bhikkhus, that which is the coming together, the meeting, the concurrence of these three dhammas is called eye-contact. Eye-contact too is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause and condition for the arising of eye-contact is also impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Eye-contact having arisen, bhikkhus, dependent upon a condition that is impermanent, how then could it be permanent? Contacted bhikkhus, one feels, contacted one intends, contacted one perceives. Thus these dhammas too are wavering, unstable, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise." [repeat for ear, nose, tongue...etc.] The definition of phassa here is exactly the same as in the Madhupi.n.dika Sutta except that 'coming together' (sa"ngati) is supplemented with two other words, 'meeting' (sannipaata) and 'concurrence' (samavaaya), and the Sutta's focus is on impermanence rather than papa~nca. This does not seem to resolve any of the difficulties noted by Howard: [begin quote] Quoting from "Cetasikas", there is the following: "Contact, in Pali: phassa, is mentioned first among the Universal. Phassa arises together with every citta; it "contacts" the object so that citta can experience it." ------------------------- Howard: This doesn't say that phassa is a coming together. It says that phassa is something that, accompanying a citta, contacts the object. ------------------------- When seeing experiences visible object, phassa which accompanies seeing-consciousness also experiences visible object but it performs its own function. ------------------------- Howard: Here phassa is described as something that accompanies consciousness, that is a thing that, itself, experiences, and that performs a function. ------------------------- At that moment phassa "contacts" visible object and conditions seeing-consciousness to see. ------------------------- Howard: Again, phassa is not defined as a contacting but as some thing that contacts a sense object, and by so contacting, serves as a condition for experiencing. ------------------------- The Atthasalini (Expositor, Part IV, chapter I, 108) states about contact: Contact means "it touches" It has touching as its salient characteristic, impact as its function, "coinciding" (of the physical base, object and consciousness) as its manifestation, and the object which has entered the avenue (of awareness) as proximate cause . ------------------------- Howard: Here the Atthasalani, not Nina, states, not that phassa is the coming together of the three, but that it is something that has "coinciding" (of the physical base, object and consciousness) as its *manifestation*. This is just not the same as what one finds in the suttas, imo. [end quote] Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ The view of those ascetics and brahmins who are of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me' is close to non-attachment, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-cleaving, close to non-grasping. (Dighanakha Sutta) 37693 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Wed Oct 20, 2004 11:17pm Subject: India brief update Thurs (near Lumbini) Hello again Thursday lunchtime. Found a handy internet cafe but connection painfully slow and equipment even more outdated (no usb ports on the cpu), so again no chance of posting off anything composed on the laptop. Were fortunate to have Ajarn Sujin available for discussion this morning, so did that at the hotel. This afternoon we all go to pay respects at the place of the Buddha's birth. Sarah struggling with a bout of her broncial condition that kept her from any sleep last night, but otherwise in good spirits ;-)) Cheers Jon 37694 From: dighanakha Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 0:57am Subject: Re: Contact (phassa) was: Re: Are You Sure? Hello all. I wrote: dig> "Consciousness, bhikkhus, comes to be dependent on a dyad. dig> How, bhikkhus, does consciousness come to be dependent on a dig> dyad?" Later it occurred to me that the phrasing in my translation might wrongly suggest that consciousness BECOMES dependent on a dyad. These would be better translations of the phrase: "Bhikkhus, dependent on a dyad, consciousness comes to be." "Consciousness, bhikkhus, arises dependent on a dyad." "Consciousness, bhikkhus, comes to be, in dependence on a dyad." Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37695 From: plnao Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 3:56am Subject: Re: [dsg] Are You Sure? (Was: Contact swings both ways. To Howard) Hi Howard, and all Thanks for the reply, Howard. Please forgive me if I only get back to one point. > Howard: > Where is this pa~n~na? Where shall we find it, and how will we know it > as distinct from mere preferred view? Ph: I couldn't answer this, of course, without speculating. When I refer to panna, it is a fairly basic level and is absolutely based on examining one's own experience. So yes, it could certainly be preferred view. But I am prone to pay attention to simple teachings from K Sujin and/or Nina such as "when panna sees the benefits of kusala and the disadvantages of akusala, it will condition the arising of more kusala." Now, this is common sense, of course. When we realize that something is bad for us, based on our own experience, we will be less likely to do it again. By referring to panna, however, we stress that it is not we ourselves who are changing our behaviour, but that changes are arising due to conditions. I find Abhidhamma very liberating in that sense. It *doesn't* mean that we no longer have any control over things, as I'm sure you appreciate. We make wise choces and behave in an increasingly wholesome way, thanks to panna. As for the panna which is an ultimate reality and eradicates defilements at advanced stages of enlightenment, I only know about that in theory. It is good to know about it in theory so as to know that it will take time and that assuming we can pull enlightenment off in this lifetime as long as we bear down and practice hard is a mistake - a mistake that lead many achievment-oriented Westerners into getting bound up tighter into self, I suspect. But as for the panna which helps us see through gross defilements, I have experienced a lot. For example, this basic panna arose to guide me away from internet web sites such as "antiwar.com" which present the news so as to attack Bush in a way that takes pleasure in the failures of the Iraq war that have killed so many. Now, I had in the past decided often enough that these sites were unwholesome, and stopped for a few days, and started using them again, but last week I had very clear and fairly deep insight into the unwholesomeness in a way that was beyond mere thinking about it logically. It was panna arising to show me the benefits of kusala and the disadvantages of akusala. I can't really communicate this experience to you - as you know these subjective experiences are difficult to communicate with any real oomph. You'll have to take my word for it. I've stopped using the internet in that way. We'll see what happens. There are unwholesome conditions at work as well. But I feel quite confident, and grateful to the Abhidhamma approach which stresses that these wholesome changes are beyond my control in the sense of will power but are conditioned by Dhamma study and discussion and reflection that help to condition panna. H >Whether pa~n~na is a special cognitive > ability or is "merely" the natural, proper cognitive functioning that occurs > when filters, obscurations, and defilements are pushed aside or, better, > uprooted, what is the basis for knowing that it is in play? I think that reliance on > an unexperienced answer-to-all-problems called "pa~n~na", much like reliance > on an unexperienced creator god, leaves one open to being led merely by our > tanha-driven preferences. Ph: I admire your scrutiny in these matters, Howard. I'm a faith-driven kind of guy, so having people like you in my practice is very important for balance. Thanks for the rest of your feedback as well. I'll be printing it out as I do all replies for reconsideration later. (It's interesting to re-read posts several monhts later and see how one's understanding has progressed.) Please forgive me if I don't make any further replies in this thread, as my work week is starting again and I really am not able to keep up with you gents. Oh, very nice today when I was taking socks from my sock drawer and suddenly felt well-being towards Bush, whom I usually despise, and a sincere wish for peace and understanding and no more American casualities. That was metta arising beyond my control, when I least expected it. Conditioned by panna which had shown me clearly and deeply the unwholesomeness of the way I was using antiwar.com. The gross defilements are standing our more clearly, thanks to a basic level of panna. Tanha-driven preferences. Quite possibly. There is so much clinging involved in my Dhamma study now. Also faith that suggests wholesome forces are at work as well. And examined experience in the moment, experience that confirms this faith. Metta, Phil 37696 From: plnao Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 4:16am Subject: A red hat Hello everyone. I read a lot in K Sujin and Nina's teaching about the importance of seeing. "Is there seeing now?" K Sujin asks again and again. And of course there are many discussions here about the intricacies of seeing. "Of course there's seeing!" I thought at first. "I'm not a blind man!" Of course, I came to understand in theory that seeing visible object happens in a flash before other processes put the visual information together to form the concept of the person or thing we come to be so interested in, almost always to ou detriment. Understanding this in theory didn't help me at all to be able to "see visual object" "Damn! I'm no good at seeing visual object!" I thought. "Maybe I am a blind man after all!" Today, cycling down by the sea, I saw a man's red hat. And I really quite deeply understood in a flash how difficult it is to see visual object and colour before the mind leaps to perceive a red hat. Difficult to a degree that makes me almost want to say impossible in this lifetime." But never say never. And in the meantime, today's very humble but very clear insight into how quickly the mind leaps to form concepts encourages me, because it has brought me another small step closer towards knowing anatta. Very grateful to K Sujin and Nina for helping to make Abhidhamma understandable to beginners such as myself. Of course, the difficulty of seeing visual object is also laid out in the Suttanta. I think of the sutta about the monk who is able to *stop at seeing* Can't provide a reference at the moment - I trust you know the one I'm referring to. Metta, Phil 37697 From: dighanakha Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 6:08am Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hello Ken O. I have looked again at your two posts. I'm afraid I couldn't make any sense of the first one, and have only a couple of comments to make on the second. dig>> Not that Howard was the first to notice this: Buddhaghosa in dig>> the Atthasaalinii, and Upasena in the Saddhammappajotikaa, dig>> were both probably aware of the problem, for neither of them dig>> will allow the Suttas' definition of phassa (a definition dig>> repeated many times) to be what it appears to be. Both dig>> commentators state: dig>> "This [the manifestation of contact] is shown here and there dig>> by the Sutta phrase: 'the coming together of the three is dig>> contact.' And in this phrase the meaning is that it is dig>> contact because of the coming together of the three, *but it dig>> should NOT be understood that the mere coming together is dig>> itself contact*." K> Using your above translation. There is nothing wrong with K> this passage. It is trying to explain that the mere coming K> together is itself not contact because contact is a K> condition. Are you saying that an event (e.g. a coming together) cannot be a condition (paccaya)? If so, I can show you lots of examples from the Suttas where events are so described. K> Only when these three manisfest together then contact will K> manifest. This is to distingish that contact is not just K> mere coming together, it saying that contact is a condition K> arise when the three comes together. But the Sutta doesn't say that. It says the coming together IS contact. There is not even the slightest hint in the Suttas that contact is something other than this coming together. K> Again using your translation dig>> "Friend, dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness dig>> arises; *the coming together of the three is contact*. With dig>> contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that dig>> one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. dig>> What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With dig>> what he has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions dig>> and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with dig>> respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable by the dig>> eye." (MN 18) K> So again if you look closely at the asterisk sentence *the K> coming together of the three is contact* Then if you look K> again the Sutta emphasis, With contact as condition..... so K> the coming together will condition the arisen of contact. If K> this is not the point, how does contact later becomes a K> condition for feeling. By virtue of the fact that an event can serve as a paccaya. What do you see as problematic about this equation: "With contact as condition there arises feeling" = "With the coming together of eye, forms and eye consciousness as condition there arises feeling" ? I see no problem at all. K> So there is no contradiction. Contact arise out of the K> coming together of the three but contact is not the three - K> is to illustrate that contact is a condition Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37699 From: buddhatrue Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 1:32pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "dighanakha" wrote: > > Hello Ken O. > > I have looked again at your two posts. I'm afraid I couldn't > make any sense of the first one, and have only a couple of > comments to make on the second. Friend DN, I just wanted you to know that I very much enjoy your posts. We see eye to eye on several issues; you use proper documentation to back up your points; and you are very straightforward. Anyway, I just wanted to share an off-list e-mail that I had recently written to Rob M. It is related to the Honeyball Sutta: Hi Rob M, Gosh, you just have to get me started don't you?? ;-)) I have read your pamphlet on Rupa and I still don't agree with the basic premise of the philosophy. You see, even though the Honeyball discourse does state that "Dependent on eye and form, eye consciousness arises" I don't think that this statement is supposed to be understood as an ontological declaration. You write, "In the sensuous planes, all nama must be supported by rupa" but I think this presents only one side of the issue. I believe that rupa is also supported by nama. Take for example this Buddhist verse: As a water-vessel is variously perceived by beings: Nectar to celestials, is for a man plain drinking-water, While to the hungry ghost it seems a putrid ooze of pus and blood, Is for the water serpent-spirits and the fish a place to live in, While it is space to gods who dwell in the sphere of infinite space. So any object, live or dead, within the person or without -- Differently is seen by beings according to their fruits of kamma. Therefore, there is no "ultimate reality" to rupa or nama, they are both relative to kamma. I believe that the only ultimate reality is kamma and/or perception (As I have posted to DSG at times). Metta, James 37700 From: abhidhammika Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 4:57pm Subject: Enter The Abhidhammika! Dear Dighanakha, Howard, Nina, Robert K, Mike Nease, Ken O, Phil, Andrew T and all How are you? I am well, Dighanakha. You wrote: (you, not he, as requested by you ) "In the discussion so far, Howard and I have offered reasons as to why we think the treatment of phassa in the commentarial Abhidhamma (in particular the Atthasaalinii) is incompatible with that given in the Suttas (e.g. the Honeyball Sutta), that is, it appears the Atthasaalinii's treatment of phassa is not merely an expansion of the Suttas' conception, but a different conception entirely." I got the impression that Howard and you were unhappy about Aacariya Buddhagosa and other Theravada commentators treating phasso as a paramattha dhamma (as one of the ultimate realities) - by the strength of the formula "Cakkhu~ncaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso,". Was my impression correct? The way Aacariya Buddhaghosa understood phasso is in line with what Gotama the Buddha taught phasso in Dhammasa`nganii. For example, " 2. Katamo tasmim samaye phasso hoti? Yo tasmim samaye phasso phusanaa samphusanaa samphusitattam- ayam tasmim samaye phasso hoti." So Aacariya Buddhaghosa wasn't introducing any alien concept into the Buddha's authentic teachings. Dighanakha also wrote: "If you believe us to be mistaken and would like to show us the error of our ways, you will need to do more than merely assert this to be the case and then tell us we are wasting our time by disagreeing." I would not merely assert that you and Howard were mistaken, but I will note that you both seemed to be suffering from short- sightedness due to anti-Abhidhamma and anti-Commentary preconceptions and influences (wrong schooling and reading the wrong books by speculative academics such as David Kalupahana and the like? ) As you insisted that I will need to do more than merely assert your disagreement with Abhidhamma to be a mistake, I looked at the treatment of phasso in Atthasalini again. We read the following statement: "Tikasannipaatasa`nkhaatassa pana attano kaara.nassa vasena paveditattaa sannipaatapaccupa.t.thaano. Ayañhi tattha tattha "ti.n.nam sa`ngati phasso"ti evam kaara.nassa vasena paveditoti. Imassa ca suttapadassa ti.n.nam sa`ngatiyaa phassoti ayamattho; na sa`ngatimattameva phassoti." (Tikasannip±tasaªkh±tassa pana attano k±raºassa vasena paveditatt± sannip±tapaccupaµµh±no. Ayañhi tattha tattha "tiººam saªgati phasso"ti evam k±raºassa vasena paveditoti. Imassa ca suttapadassa tiººam saªgatiy± phassoti ayamattho; na saªgatimattameva phassoti. From CSCD) The above statement does take into account the Suttam folmula ""Cakkhu~nca, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso,". Aacariya Buddhaghosa clearly explained the word "sa`ngati" to be understood as "san`ngatiyaa". By the way, thank you for translating "Ditiyadvaya Samyuttam" for all of us. I will discuss that Suttam and your translation at a later date. I also read the corrections of the wordings in that translation you posted afterwards. I am glad to have a chance to discuss issues on Abhidhamma with a Pali scholar who effortlessly translates Pali texts. For now, please kindly look at again the Pali passage quoted from Atthasalinii, and I am sure you are comfortable with the Pali, if not with the meaning of it. Now I asked you the following questions. 1. Do you understand the quoted Pali statement from Atthasanili? (Of course, you understand it. Only double checking! You may, of course, assure us of your understanding by translating it.) 2. If so, do you agree with it? 3. If not, what are the reasons for your disagreement (apart from the apparent difference from the Suttam formula on phasso under discussion). I hope that I did not impose on you too much difficult questioning, but then again, you were challenging Abhidhamma Pitaka and Standard Pali Commentaries wittingly or unwittingly. As you read Pali, you need to take more responsibility when making statements that contradict Abhidhamma and Standard Pali Commentaries which have been being preserved and transmitted, with greatest reverence, by generations after generations of learned Theravada ascetics in various countries. As Howard does not read Pali, we cannot hold him accountable. He is free to go unless he0wanted to be charged with lesser offense!  With regards, Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "dighanakha" wrote: Hello Suan. S> Dear Phil, Howard, Nina, Mike Nease, Robert K, Dighanakha S> and all S> How are you? I'm fine, thank you. How are you? S> The formula "Cakkhu~ncaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati S> cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso," is a very S> beautiful abhidhamma teaching presented by means of S> Suttantabhaajaniiya (Suttam style analysis). S> As such, it is merely another aspect of abhidhamma teaching, S> and so it is a waste of time for us to treat it as though S> something different from abhidhamma teaching on abhidhamma. In the discussion so far, Howard and I have offered reasons as to why we think the treatment of phassa in the commentarial Abhidhamma (in particular the Atthasaalinii) is incompatible with that given in the Suttas (e.g. the Honeyball Sutta), that is, it appears the Atthasaalinii's treatment of phassa is not merely an expansion of the Suttas' conception, but a different conception entirely. If you believe us to be mistaken and would like to show us the error of our ways, you will need to do more than merely assert this to be the case and then tell us we are wasting our time by disagreeing. S> Of course, Dighanakha is entitled to his own personal S> opinions as long as he qualified them as such. Au contraire, since I don't reside in North Korea, Myanmar, or any other Orwellian police state, I am unconditionally entitled to my own opinions. Perhaps what you meant to say is that I am entitled to *express* these opinions on this list ... provided that I give due notice that they are mine. If so, then I would answer that this seems a needless affectation. I believe most of dsg's readers are smart enough to realize that expressed opinions are most likely to belong to the people who express them. One more point: when you name someone as one of the recipients of your posts, courtesy requires that he be addressed as 'you' not 'he'. S> Meanwhile, please read "Dutiyadvaya Suttam", in Section 93, S> Sa.laayatana Samyuttam, Samyuttanikaaya, and see how it S> supports Abhidhamma Style Analysis (Abhidhammabhaajaniiya) S> of contact (phasso). I have read it and don't see how it supports Buddhaghosa's conception of phassa any more than does the Madhupi.n.dika Sutta. Dutiyadvayasuttanta -- Second Discourse on Dyads (S. iv 67-9; Kindred Sayings IV 39-40; Connected Discourses II 1172-3) "Consciousness, bhikkhus, comes to be dependent on a dyad. How, bhikkhus, does consciousness come to be dependent on a dyad? Dependent on the eye and forms arises eye-consciousness. The eye is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise; forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Thus this dyad is wavering, unstable, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Eye-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness is likewise impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Eye-consciousness having arisen, bhikkhus, dependent upon a condition that is impermanent, how then could it be permanent? "Bhikkhus, that which is the coming together, the meeting, the concurrence of these three dhammas is called eye-contact. Eye-contact too is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause and condition for the arising of eye-contact is also impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. Eye-contact having arisen, bhikkhus, dependent upon a condition that is impermanent, how then could it be permanent? Contacted bhikkhus, one feels, contacted one intends, contacted one perceives. Thus these dhammas too are wavering, unstable, impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise." [repeat for ear, nose, tongue...etc.] The definition of phassa here is exactly the same as in the Madhupi.n.dika Sutta except that 'coming together' (sa"ngati) is supplemented with two other words, 'meeting' (sannipaata) and 'concurrence' (samavaaya), and the Sutta's focus is on impermanence rather than papa~nca. This does not seem to resolve any of the difficulties noted by Howard: [begin quote] Quoting from "Cetasikas", there is the following: "Contact, in Pali: phassa, is mentioned first among the Universal. Phassa arises together with every citta; it "contacts" the object so that citta can experience it." ------------------------- Howard: This doesn't say that phassa is a coming together. It says that phassa is something that, accompanying a citta, contacts the object. ------------------------- When seeing experiences visible object, phassa which accompanies seeing-consciousness also experiences visible object but it performs its own function. ------------------------- Howard: Here phassa is described as something that accompanies consciousness, that is a thing that, itself, experiences, and that performs a function. ------------------------- At that moment phassa "contacts" visible object and conditions seeing-consciousness to see. ------------------------- Howard: Again, phassa is not defined as a contacting but as some thing that contacts a sense object, and by so contacting, serves as a condition for experiencing. ------------------------- The Atthasalini (Expositor, Part IV, chapter I, 108) states about contact: Contact means "it touches" It has touching as its salient characteristic, impact as its function, "coinciding" (of the physical base, object and consciousness) as its manifestation, and the object which has entered the avenue (of awareness) as proximate cause . ------------------------- Howard: Here the Atthasalani, not Nina, states, not that phassa is the coming together of the three, but that it is something that has "coinciding" (of the physical base, object and consciousness) as its *manifestation*. This is just not the same as what one finds in the suttas, imo. [end quote] Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ The view of those ascetics and brahmins who are of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me' is close to non-attachment, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-cleaving, close to non-grasping. (Dighanakha Sutta) 37702 From: Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 2:15pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, James (and DN, and Rob) - In a message dated 10/21/04 4:47:11 PM Eastern Daylight Time, buddhatrue@y... writes: > Friend DN, > > I just wanted you to know that I very much enjoy your posts. We see > eye to eye on several issues; you use proper documentation to back > up your points; and you are very straightforward. Anyway, I just > wanted to share an off-list e-mail that I had recently written to > Rob M. It is related to the Honeyball Sutta: > > Hi Rob M, > > Gosh, you just have to get me started don't you?? ;-)) > I have read your pamphlet on Rupa and I still don't > agree with the basic premise of the philosophy. You > see, even though the Honeyball discourse does state > that "Dependent on eye and form, eye consciousness > arises" I don't think that this statement is supposed > to be understood as an ontological declaration. You > write, "In the sensuous planes, all nama must be > supported by rupa" but I think this presents only one > side of the issue. I believe that rupa is also > supported by nama. Take for example this Buddhist > verse: > > As a water-vessel is > variously perceived by beings: > > Nectar to celestials, > is for a man plain drinking-water, > > While to the hungry ghost it seems > a putrid ooze of pus and blood, > > Is for the water serpent-spirits > and the fish a place to live in, > > While it is space to gods who dwell > in the sphere of infinite space. > > So any object, live or dead, > within the person or without -- > > Differently is seen by beings > according to their fruits of kamma. > > Therefore, there is no "ultimate reality" to rupa or > nama, they are both relative to kamma. I believe that > the only ultimate reality is kamma and/or perception > (As I have posted to DSG at times). > > Metta, James > ======================= Two points, James: 1) Just for the record, and not that you implied otherwise, the quoted material on water perceived in various ways by various beings is, indeed, Buddhist, but isn't sutric, and isn't Theravadin. 2) That same material makes a valid point, in my opinion. The point as I see it is that differing accumulations result in distinguishable perceptions or experienced rupas, pleasant in some cases, unpleasant in others. The way I would explain the quoted material is that were a human to taste some water, and see various other beings "do the same", the human and all the other beings would not be experiencing the same rupa - they would be having differing experiences as conditioned by their individual make-ups. They probably wouldn't even think about what was going on in the same way - that is, they would impose differing conceptual stories. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37703 From: Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 2:36pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Enter The Abhidhammika! Hi, Suan (and Dighanakha) - In a message dated 10/21/04 8:03:41 PM Eastern Daylight Time, suanluzaw@b... writes: > > > Dear Dighanakha, Howard, Nina, Robert K, Mike Nease, Ken O, Phil, > Andrew T and all > > > I got the impression that Howard and you were unhappy about Aacariya > Buddhagosa and other Theravada commentators treating phasso as a > paramattha dhamma (as one of the ultimate realities) - by the > strength of the formula > > "Cakkhu~ncaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, > ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso,". > > Was my impression correct? > --------------------------------------------- Howard: I consider contact to be a real experiential event, that actually occurs, in dependence on causes and conditions of course. I have no problem with calling such an event a "cetasika". The debate pertains to exactly what its nature is from the perspective of sutta, abhidhamma, and commentary. I do not believe these perspectives coincide. ---------------------------------------------- > > The way Aacariya Buddhaghosa understood phasso is in line with what > Gotama the Buddha taught phasso in Dhammasa`nganii. > ---------------------------------------------- Howard: There is a presumption in that last statement, Suan, namely that the Dhammasa`nganii was taught by the Buddha. Do you think that is unquestionable, and *should* not be questioned? ----------------------------------------------- > > For example, > > " 2. Katamo tasmim samaye phasso hoti? Yo tasmim samaye phasso > phusanaa samphusanaa samphusitattamâ€" ayam tasmim samaye phasso > hoti." > > So Aacariya Buddhaghosa wasn't introducing any alien concept into > the Buddha's authentic teachings. > > Dighanakha also wrote: > > "If you believe us to be mistaken and would like to show us > the error of our ways, you will need to do more than merely > assert this to be the case and then tell us we are wasting > our time by disagreeing." > > I would not merely assert that you and Howard were mistaken, but I > will note that you both seemed to be suffering from short- > sightedness due to anti-Abhidhamma and anti-Commentary > preconceptions and influences (wrong schooling and reading the wrong > books by speculative academics such as David Kalupahana and the > like? ) ----------------------------------------------- Howard: Would that make me a member of a school called Anti-Abhidhammism, Suan? Are you making me into the Madeline Murray O'Hare of Theravada? ;-)) ------------------------------------------------- > > As Howard does not read Pali, we cannot hold him accountable. He is > free to go unless he wanted to be charged with lesser offense!  > -------------------------------------------------- Howard: After this post, except to respond to a possible reply you choose to make to it, I will, indeed, bow out. I'm no Buddhist scholar, and hardly know Pali from Swahili. --------------------------------------------------- > > With regards, > > Suan > ========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37704 From: buddhatrue Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 8:58pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Friend Howard, Howard: Just for the record, and not that you implied otherwise, the quoted material on water perceived in various ways by various beings is, indeed, Buddhist, but isn't sutric, and isn't Theravadin. James: Yeah, I know. Actually, I don't know the source as I came across the quote in an article from the Buddhist Publication Society. Do you know the source? I originally included it in an off-line e-mail and had no intention of posting it to DSG (I am trying to stay away from posting nowadays). But, since there is this wonderful thread on questioning the commentaries by Buddhaghosa (much to my satisfaction!), I wanted to break my silence and contribute a little something. Sorry to have broken the rules here. Howard: That same material makes a valid point, in my opinion… James: Glad that you agree! Metta, James 37705 From: Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 5:11pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Are You Sure? (Was: Contact swings both ways. To Howard) Hi, Phil - In a message dated 10/21/04 6:59:53 AM Eastern Daylight Time, plnao@j... writes: > Hi Howard, and all > > Thanks for the reply, Howard. Please forgive me if I only get back to one > point. > > ========================== Phil I just want to address one matter in your post. It pertains to politics ... and yet, it really doesn't. I just wanted to say that whatever your political inclinations may be, I am very impressed by, and very much admire, your approach that emphasizes the wholesome - that emphasizes the welfare of people. Because that's what really matters. There are honest differences that people can have when it comes down to details, to hierarchies of values, and to pragmatic issues, but when they are people of good will who genuinely value human beings and who have real compassion for them, they can easily agree to disagree without rancor on many matters of approach and evaluation, without hostility and even supportively. (I think, for example, of such people as John McCain, Russ Feingold, Joe Lieberman, and Joe Biden to mention a few.) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37706 From: Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 5:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, James - In a message dated 10/22/04 12:01:06 AM Eastern Daylight Time, buddhatrue@y... writes: > > Friend Howard, > > Howard: Just for the record, and not that you implied otherwise, the > quoted material on water perceived in various ways by various beings > is, indeed, Buddhist, but isn't sutric, and isn't Theravadin. > > James: Yeah, I know. Actually, I don't know the source as I came > across the quote in an article from the Buddhist Publication > Society. Do you know the source? > > ----------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't recall. Perhaps Shantideva? ----------------------------------------------- I originally included it in an > > off-line e-mail and had no intention of posting it to DSG (I am > trying to stay away from posting nowadays). But, since there is > this wonderful thread on questioning the commentaries by Buddhaghosa > (much to my satisfaction!), I wanted to break my silence and > contribute a little something. Sorry to have broken the rules here. > ----------------------------------------------- Howard: I think they allow occasional short quotations of heretical material here! ;-)) --------------------------------------------- > > Howard: That same material makes a valid point, in my opinion… > > James: Glad that you agree! > > Metta, James > > =========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37707 From: robmoult Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 10:32pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > The point as > I see it is that differing accumulations result in distinguishable > perceptions or experienced rupas, pleasant in some cases, unpleasant in others. The way > I would explain the quoted material is that were a human to taste some water, > and see various other beings "do the same", the human and all the other beings > would not be experiencing the same rupa - they would be having differing > experiences as conditioned by their individual make-ups. They probably wouldn't > even think about what was going on in the same way - that is, they would impose > differing conceptual stories. ===== Howard, do I take it from this that you reject the idea of "intrinsic nature" of rupas? Metta, Rob M :-) 37708 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 11:07pm Subject: India -- further brief update (from near Lumbini) Hello again All Yesterday (Thursday) afternoon we visited the place of the Buddha's birth at Lumbini, in present day Nepal. It was pleasing to see the beginning of the Heritage master plan being implemented by the UN. The whole area is being restored and preserved as a heritage site, with commercial premises and even temples being moved outside the park area. Quite a few changes since my last visit 3 years ago, and a world of difference from my first visit 25 years ago. Last night was my turn to feel unwell, running a fever, but fortunately both Sarah and I had a good night and are feeling much better today. This morning we had another session of discussion, with quite a few useful points (which Sarah, Nina and I will report on in due course). After an early lunch shortly we will be setting off for the 8+ hour drive to Savatthi, site of Jetavanna grove provided to the Buddha by Anathapindika, where the Buddha spent many years and delivered many of the discourses we have today. I see you are all keeping busy talking to each other. Keep up the good work! Jon 37709 From: plnao Date: Fri Oct 22, 2004 2:59am Subject: Re: [dsg] Are You Sure? (Was: Contact swings both ways. To Howard) Hi Howard , I am very impressed by, and very much admire, > your approach that emphasizes the wholesome - that emphasizes the welfare of > people. Because that's what really matters. > There are honest differences that people can have when it comes down > to details, to hierarchies of values, and to pragmatic issues, but when they > are people of good will who genuinely value human beings and who have real > compassion for them, they can easily agree to disagree without rancor on many > matters of approach and evaluation, without hostility and even supportively. Thanks for the kind words, Howard. "The welfare of people." Really, that's what Dhamma is all about, no matter what we think of phassa, or other fine points of Dhamma. Metta, Phil 37710 From: Date: Fri Oct 22, 2004 3:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Rob - In a message dated 10/22/04 1:32:37 AM Eastern Daylight Time, rob.moult@j... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > >The point as > >I see it is that differing accumulations result in distinguishable > >perceptions or experienced rupas, pleasant in some cases, > unpleasant in others. The way > >I would explain the quoted material is that were a human to taste > some water, > >and see various other beings "do the same", the human and all the > other beings > >would not be experiencing the same rupa - they would be having > differing > >experiences as conditioned by their individual make-ups. They > probably wouldn't > >even think about what was going on in the same way - that is, they > would impose > >differing conceptual stories. > > ===== > > Howard, do I take it from this that you reject the idea > of "intrinsic nature" of rupas? > > Metta, > Rob M :-) > ====================== No, Rob, exactly the opposite. You misinterpreted me. What I said was not that these beings were dealing with the same rupas and experiencing them differently, but rather that the rupas they were experiencing were different rupas. That water-taste that was tongue-door object for the human was *not* the rupa experienced by any of the others at the time that they were all supposedly experiencing "the same thing". Different rupas were involved. Don't forget, Rob, my approach is phenomenalist. The rupas that I am talking about are experiential phenomena, not alleged unexperienced, external entities. The water-taste experienced by the human had a specific nature and a specific associated vedana - it was exactly what it was during its brief appearance. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37711 From: htootintnaing Date: Fri Oct 22, 2004 3:36pm Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 094 ) Dear Dhamma Friends, We have discussed on moha who is the king of akusala dhamma. We also have discussed on ahirika and anottappa who are the right wing and the left wing generals of the king moha. We have talked about the secretary of the akusala uddhacca. These four dhammas are called sabba akusala sadharana cetasikas. Sadharana means 'always bearing'. These four dhammas arise with each and every of akusala dhamma and without any of these four dhammas, no akusala can arise. After that we have run on another class of akusala cetasikas. They are cetasikas whom are led by lobha cetasika. Whenever lobha-related akusala dhamma arises, lobha cetasika always arises. There are different types of lobha cittas and there are countless lobha cittas. But when they are considered on the ground of the basic character, then there are only 8 lobha cittas. All these 8 lobha cittas are led by lobha cetasika. Other lobha-related cetasikas are ditthi ( wrong view/ wrong impression/ wrong belief ) and maana ( conceit ). Each of these two cetasikas are also led by lobha cetasika. This means that whenever ditthi arises, lobha cetasika also has to arise. By the same token, whenever maana arises, lobha cetasika also has to arise. In the previous post, we have discussed about lobha cetasika to some extent. In this class of akusala cetasikas who are led by lobha cetasika, there left 2 more akusala cetasikas called ditthi and mana. Ditthi and mana will soon be discussed in the near future. May you all be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome and they will be valuable. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts. 37712 From: plnao Date: Fri Oct 22, 2004 3:52pm Subject: killing in a dream Hello all Last night I dreamed I was in the kitchen, and Naomi, my wife, and one of her friends asked me to take care of a insect that had gotten in. In reality it is usually a cockroach or an an or a spider, but in this case it was a bee. In "reality" I now almost invariably abstain from killing, but in the dream I took great delight in waiting for just the right moment to slam a big book down on the bee. Afterwards, I took delight in showing them how big the body was - it really was huge by now, just about as big as a small lobster, thanks to proliferation. A few interesting (maybe) points... - We know from a sutta that the temple monk who accidentally kills some ants (?) that he steps on when doing walking meditation(?) is free from bad kamma because there was no intent whatsoever. Some would say that there is no intent in a dream, that it is the sub-conscious at work, but it would seem that the very clear intent in the dream makes for bad kamma. Don't worry - I'm not asking you to try to absolve me of my sin! We know that it is pointless to try to conjecture on the workings of kamma. Just wanted to share what I think is an interesting point. - I was prompted to do the act. I think I have learned that an akusala citta is less powerful when it is prompted. Would that apply here? - I note that this morning there is hiri (shame) and ottappa (fear of wrongdoing), the states which are called "the Guardians of the world by the Buddha because they protect the world from falling into widespread immorality."(CAM) I think that is something good to come from my akusala dream. - I've noticed that the following day can be affected emotively by a dream. I start the day affected by it emotionally, and that effect quite often lingers during the day. I think a dream that really stands out can be a decisive object condition of some kind ( ? haven't worked out all the terms for conditions yet) that conditions many aspects of the following day. Could this be right? Metta, Phil 37713 From: htootintnaing Date: Fri Oct 22, 2004 6:41pm Subject: Re: killing in a dream Phil: Hello all Last night I dreamed I was in the kitchen, and Naomi, my wife, and one of her friends asked me to take care of a insect that had gotten in. In reality it is usually a cockroach or ..snip.. ..snip..snip..all snip.. I think a dream that really stands out can be a decisive object condition of some kind ( ? haven't worked out all the terms for conditions yet) that conditions many aspects of the following day. Could this be right? Metta, Phil ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Phil, Bhavanga cittas just see the past object in immediate past life. Dreaming is not bhavanga cittas. But during dreams, all 5 sense doors are nearly closed and only mano dvara is opened. In mano dvara vithi, after stoppage of bhavanga there arise 1. manodvara avajjana citta ( kiriya/ so no kamma ) 2. 7 javana cittas In dream people have 12 akusala cittas or 8 mahakusala cittas. As dreaming is not jhana or magga there will be cittas from 29 javana cittas. 29 javana cittas are a) 12 akusala cittas b) 8 mahakusala cittas c) 8 mahakiriya cittas d) 1 hasituppada citta c) and d) are cittas of arahats and these are not of dream mind. So there are akusala or kusala only. 3. 2 tadaarammana cittas These are 8 mahavipakas and 3 santirana cittas. As all 11 are vipaka cittas, there is no kamma. So in dreams, 12 akusala or 8 maha kusala have to arise. But these are not very strong so as to give rise to results as in cases of awake physical actions like bodily moment or verbal citation. With Metta, Htoo Naing 37714 From: robmoult Date: Fri Oct 22, 2004 8:03pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi Howard --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > > >The point as > > >I see it is that differing accumulations result in distinguishable > > >perceptions or experienced rupas, pleasant in some cases, > > unpleasant in others. The way > > >I would explain the quoted material is that were a human to taste > > some water, > > >and see various other beings "do the same", the human and all the > > other beings > > >would not be experiencing the same rupa - they would be having > > differing > > >experiences as conditioned by their individual make-ups. They > > probably wouldn't > > >even think about what was going on in the same way - that is, they > > would impose > > >differing conceptual stories. > > > > ===== > > > > Howard, do I take it from this that you reject the idea > > of "intrinsic nature" of rupas? > > > > Metta, > > Rob M :-) > > > ====================== > No, Rob, exactly the opposite. You misinterpreted me. What I said was > not that these beings were dealing with the same rupas and experiencing them > differently, but rather that the rupas they were experiencing were different > rupas. That water-taste that was tongue-door object for the human was *not* the > rupa experienced by any of the others at the time that they were all > supposedly experiencing "the same thing". Different rupas were involved. Don't forget, > Rob, my approach is phenomenalist. The rupas that I am talking about are > experiential phenomena, not alleged unexperienced, external entities. The > water-taste experienced by the human had a specific nature and a specific associated > vedana - it was exactly what it was during its brief appearance. We are 100% aligned except on a very minor semantics issue (phenomonology). Thanks for clarifying. Metta, Rob M :-) 37715 From: Antony Woods Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 3:39am Subject: Future Potential of Sense-objects Dear dsg Dhamma friends, Thankyou for opening this post. I think I have had a wrong view about sense-objects as experienced in vipassana practice. In the past I have noted seeing visible objects mechanically as if they were neutral, meaningless, momentary impressions breaking up leaving no lasting effect. Tonight I started perceiving the visual objects as having future potential for benefit. Examples are furniture, computer, this body etc etc. Even the mind and thoughts are not random, isolated phenomena but follow organic, kammic and other laws. There is momentum from past experiences and present choices. Even you reading this post are maybe not just a momentary acquaintance but maybe we will write group posts again and again in the future of dsg. Thanks for your attention / Antony. 37716 From: plnao Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 3:44am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: killing in a dream Hello Htoo Thank you for your detailed and clear feedback > So in dreams, 12 akusala or 8 maha kusala have to arise. But these > are not very strong so as to give rise to results as in cases of > awake physical actions like bodily moment or verbal citation. It's interesting though, that in my case at least, an action in a dream can - rarely- really reverberate the following day. That very reverberation suggests that the dream has some kind of conditioning power. After all, if I find that there is thinking about the dream, that means the thinking was conditioned by the dream, doesn't it? And there is unpleasant mental feeling as well. I'm also interested in the way the first thought that pops into our head as we wake in the morning can condition many thoughts during the rest of the day. For example, one morning several weeks ago as I woke up I thought immediately about the sutta of the man looking at the Ganges river, and watching the bubbles go by. (In Samyutta Nikaya, I think.) It is one of the suttas that most clearly calls for the Abhidhamma approach of seeing momentary mental states. Thinking of that sutta just as soon as I opened my eyes in the morning seemed to lead to a very good day with many Dhamma reflections arising. On the other hand, some days I wake to a thought that is very unwholesome. Who knows the way that thought affects/conditions the mental states that will arise later in that day or in days to come? I think those first thoughts that appear stand out as very strong conditioning objects in some way, but I am only guessing. (I need to learn a lot more about conditions.) I think it might have something to do with the expression "I got up on the wrong side of the bed." It could be that the flavour of the day to come is conditioned by that first thought, if and when it stands out clearly, the way they sometimes do. This is mere idle speculation. But it's interesting to me. Metta, Phil 37717 From: htootintnaing Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 6:08am Subject: [dsg] Re: killing in a dream Phil: Hello Htoo Thank you for your detailed and clear feedback > > So in dreams, 12 akusala or 8 maha kusala have to arise. But these > > are not very strong so as to give rise to results as in cases of > > awake physical actions like bodily moment or verbal citation. It's interesting though, that in my case at least, an action in a dream can - rarely-really reverberate the following day. That very reverberation suggests that the dream has some kind of conditioning power. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: I don't think so. The dream itself is a concept and sannakkhanda bring that concept. Actually, the power is in you. This sentence may be interpreted in many different way. Philosophically, this is right. Socially, this is also right. Morally, this again is right. From some other believers point of view, this is also right. The power is inside of you. Not in the dreams. For those who believe 'Buddha Nature', this is also right as 'Buddha Nature' is inside of you. ( I include this because there are Mahayanists here ). For those who believe kamma, this is also right. As at the point of waking up the dream has given you past kamma but this should not lead you to commiting new kamma. For not committing new ones, the power is inside of you. For those who love paramattha dhamma and Buddha Abhidhamma, this is also right. The power is inside of you. And not in the dream. Dream is a pannatti. When you remember it, it is because of cittas with sannas that bring that idea of the dream. Still the power is inside of you. Here, there is no you but the power is inside of you. You are the master of your kamma even though there have never been you there. So the dream should not at any moment lead you the whole day. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: After all, if I find that there is thinking about the dream, that means the thinking was conditioned by the dream, doesn't it? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: It has been far away to condition thinking as the dream has passed away when you wake up. But what conditions your thinking is that your thinking itself. This again is directed by yourself. Actually you are the master of the day and the master is not the dream. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: And there is unpleasant mental feeling as well. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: This is cognition of vedana which is a reality. If this is done properly, this is kusala citta and this will finally lead you to enlightenment. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: I'm also interested in the way the first thought that pops into our head as we wake in the morning can condition many thoughts during the rest of the day. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Interesting. But it is not the only condition for the whole day. If this is so, you have surrendered the mastery through out the day. Should this happen? No. I would not allow such matter. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: For example, one morning several weeks ago as I woke up I thought immediately about the sutta of the man looking at the Ganges river, and watching the bubbles go by. (In Samyutta Nikaya, I think.) It is one of the suttas that most clearly calls for the Abhidhamma approach of seeing momentary mental states. Thinking of that sutta just as soon as I opened my eyes in the morning seemed to lead to a very good day with many Dhamma reflections arising. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: This again is you who perform all the whole day activities and it is not the first thought or the dream. But the first thought or the dream may forerun. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: On the other hand, some days I wake to a thought that is very unwholesome. Who knows the way that thought affects/conditions the mental states that will arise later in that day or in days to come? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: People used to forsee or predict the future for example predict a day in the morning because of signs that they notice. Actually this should not follow. Signs themselves are nothing but sense impressions and as soon as these impressions are considered as signs, there have already arisen attached mind. Whether good past kamma or bad past kamma are just coming should not influence us. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: I think those first thoughts that appear stand out as very strong conditioning objects in some way, but I am only guessing. (I need to learn a lot more about conditions.) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: I do not think so. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: I think it might have something to do with the expression "I got up on the wrong side of the bed." ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Maybe. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: It could be that the flavour of the day to come is conditioned by that first thought, if and when it stands out clearly, the way they sometimes do. This is mere idle speculation. But it's interesting to me. Metta, Phil ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: You can be interested in it. But you should not. This will lead you to have less and less power. The power is in our hand. We are our master. We govern our kamma. Kamma does not govern us. We are the master of kamma. And kamma is not the master of us. But kamma just give as supportive conditions for us to master another kamma. When we can stop another kamma, then we are the absolute master of our kamma then. May you be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing 37718 From: htootintnaing Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 6:26am Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 095 ) Dear Dhamma Friends, In the akusalas that are governed by lobha cittas, lobha cetaiska is the king and he dictates all akusala related to lobha-related things like stealing in various forms, trying to satisfy needs of pleasure including sex and addictives, and telling lies with the base of attachment. There are 14 akusala cetasikas. We have discussed 4 moha-led cetasikas. There are 3 lobha-led cetasikas. They are lobha, ditthi and mana. Lobha cetasika is the king of all lobha cittas. This king lobha has chief queens. They are ditthi and mana. Whenever the king goes round the city, he takes one of his queen as his accompaniment. The king never sleeps with 2 queens in a single room. One queen is in a room and another queen is in another room. And he never takes both queens when he goes out for city-round. When a lobha citta arises, there always is lobha cetasika. But as the king lobha cetasika never take 2 queens at the same time, ditthi and mana never arise together. Instead they are mutually exclusive. If one follows the king lobha cetasika, another queen just stays in her room in the palace. So any lobha citta will have lobha cetasika. In these lobha cittas (please see in the earlier posts), there is an extra lobha-led cetasika. This may be one of 2 alternatives. They are ditthi and mana. So there may be lobha cetasika with ditthi cetasika or lobha citta may be with lobha cetasika with mana cetasika. May you all be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome and they will be valuable. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts. 37719 From: jwromeijn Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 6:57am Subject: Re: Rupa Hallo Rob Some weeks ago I've sent a reaction to your new pages on Rupa. (# 37234 of Oct 3) Perhaps you have not noticed it, I had a question in it, I qoute myself: "The differences between 'decay', 'impermance' (of a collection of rupas) and ''falling away' of an individual rupa is not clear. The time-scales of these three are different (decades of years, seconds (?) and billionths part of a second) but is that a real fundamental difference; are all three chraracteristics on a ultimate level?" I'm still interested in your answers to my message in general too. Metta Joop 37720 From: Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 2:59am Subject: Re: [dsg] Future Potential of Sense-objects Hi, Antony - In a message dated 10/23/04 6:40:16 AM Eastern Daylight Time, antony272b@h... writes: > Dear dsg Dhamma friends, > > Thankyou for opening this post. > > I think I have had a wrong view about sense-objects as experienced in > vipassana practice. > > In the past I have noted seeing visible objects mechanically as if they were > > neutral, meaningless, momentary impressions breaking up leaving no lasting > effect. > > Tonight I started perceiving the visual objects as having future potential > for benefit. Examples are furniture, computer, this body etc etc. > > Even the mind and thoughts are not random, isolated phenomena but follow > organic, kammic and other laws. There is momentum from past experiences and > present choices. > > Even you reading this post are maybe not just a momentary acquaintance but > maybe we will write group posts again and again in the future of dsg. > > Thanks for your attention / Antony. > > ========================= My inclination is to respond with "Yes, this is an important, even critical insight, but ... " You are quite correct that events have significance, that they occur lawfully, and that they relate backwards by a variety of relations to prior events, currently to related events, and forwards in varied ways to many events yet to occur. It is well said when you say "Even the mind and thoughts are not random, isolated phenomena but follow organic, kammic and other laws. There is momentum from past experiences and present choices," and it makes very good sense, as you say, to be "... perceiving the visual objects as having future potential for benefit." My only caveat, and this is minor, is that in the process of seeing matters this way, at the same time, we should continue to realize that conditions and events are, indeed, "momentary impressions breaking up," without substance, not remaining (and in-and-of-themselves never to recur) but leading onwards only to new, fresh, never-before-occurring phenomena, all fragile, insubstantial, fleeting, merely dependently occurring aspects of an ongoing flux. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37721 From: connieparker Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 4:33pm Subject: Re: Dhamma Thread ( 095 ) Hi, Htoo (and Herman), Thanks for king lobha and the two queens, Htoo. Just reading Dr. Mehm Tin Mon's Ultimate Science - THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHA ABHIDHAMMA and he writes: Lobha, together with its two great followers, i.e., di.t.thi (wrong view) and maana (conceit), is responsible for extending the life cycle or the round of rebirth that is known as sa.msaara. On account of this fact, lobha, di.t.thi and maana are collectively called 'papa~nca dhamma'. peace, connie 37722 From: m. nease Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 5:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Dhamma Thread ( 095 ) Dear Connie and Htoo, Many thanks Htoo for the Queens--interesting, Connie--I don't recall hearing of this connection between papa~nca, maana and di.t.thi before. All very useful I think--if one thinks that concepts can be useful (and of course I do). mike ----- Original Message ----- From: "connieparker" To: "dsg" Sent: Saturday, October 23, 2004 4:33 PM Subject: [dsg] Re: Dhamma Thread ( 095 ) > Hi, Htoo (and Herman), > Thanks for king lobha and the two queens, Htoo. > Just reading Dr. Mehm Tin Mon's Ultimate Science - THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHA > ABHIDHAMMA and he writes: Lobha, together with its two great followers, > i.e., di.t.thi (wrong view) and maana (conceit), is responsible for > extending the life cycle or the round of rebirth that is known as > sa.msaara. On account of this fact, lobha, di.t.thi and maana are > collectively called 'papa~nca dhamma'. > peace, > connie 37723 From: antony272b2 Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 6:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Future Potential of Sense-objects Dear Howard, Thanks for your thoughtful reply. The word "fragile" is a word I used this morning to describe my computer. Only one connection (e.g. the mouse socket - I asked my father for a new mouse) has to fail and I may need a new computer and my relationship with my father would be strained. He has a very wise expression: "LEEEVE THIIINGSSS ALOOONE!" Do you think that the resistance to the perception of things breaking up is the "deja vu" effect where we believe that we have experienced the arising objects before in a reliable state? My limited practice of Dependent Origination is to say: "This is contact (phassa)". This seems to give relief from discursive thought although thoughts are contact at the mind-door. Thanks again for your reply. with metta / Antony. 37724 From: Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 4:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Future Potential of Sense-objects Hi, Antony - In a message dated 10/23/04 9:30:44 PM Eastern Daylight Time, antony272b@h... writes: > Do you think that the resistance to the perception of things breaking > up is the "deja vu" effect where we believe that we have experienced > the arising objects before in a reliable state? > ======================= I think that the resistance to the perception of things breaking up is due to our desire for stability - for an anchor, and to our fear of shifting sands and the world's slipping out from under our feet as in an earthquake. The irony is that the sands *are* shifting, there *is* no firm footing, and the only real stability obtainable is obtained by letting go. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37725 From: kenhowardau Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 10:58pm Subject: Re: Teeth Clenching / Was The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi DN, I wrote: -------------- > > . . . . . I gather also that they sometimes clench their teeth when kusala citta is suppressing the hindrances. > > -------------- To which you replied: ----------- > I think the text is describing something rather more proactive than your paraphrase would suggest: > ----------- There are only conditioned dhammas in the world, so it stands to reason that there can't be anything more (or less) proactive than conditioned dhammas. In the remainder of your message you offer no thoughts on what the "something more" might be. Do you believe in an eternal soul? I ask that in all seriousness because I know some Buddhists do. The people behind AccessToInsight, for example, are dedicated to putting the self back into the Dhamma. They share your aversion to a teaching of ultimate reality because that teaching makes no allowance for a possible "something more." It teaches there are only dhammas and that all conditioned dhammas are anicca, dukkha and anatta while the one unconditioned dhamma is anatta. (No scope for a "something more.") In a subsequent post you write: ------------------- > There are many statements of this kind in the Suttas, but none that say, or even imply: "My teaching is all about ultimate and irreducible physical and psychical atoms." > ------------------- It's amazing that people can have such radically different views of the dhamma - ranging from "all about conditioned dhammas" to "nothing about conditioned dhammas." :-) --------------- > The above Sutta is simply concerned with di.t.thadhammikattha, 'benefit to be obtained in the present life'. It comprises four common-sense prudential maxims for householders who desire their families and family property to be stable and long-lasting. Nothing more. ----------------- Do you ever wonder why the Bodhisattva wandered samsara for countless aeons developing a simplistic, introductory lesson in home economics? What is the meaning of "they" "things" and "a man or a woman" in: "They look for things they have lost. They repair thin?s that are old. They eat and drink moderately. They place in authority a man or a woman possessed of virtue." Ken H 37726 From: nori Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 10:58pm Subject: Details on Vedana Hi Dhamma Friends, I think it is a common misunderstanding, as expressed by some in the past, that Vedana (feeling) is understood as being exclusively 'a mind born emotional feeling' and discludes bodily sensation via contact of body sense (organ). I think the error comes from an association made with nama and rupa, being thus: nama is associated with, exclusively, Vedana (feeling) which originates in the mind, and Rupa associated with "bodily sensation" via contact of body sense. But in the Maha-Satipathana Sutta it says explicitly: "And how does a monk remain focused on feelings (Vedana) in & of themselves?...When feeling a painful feeling of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a painful feeling of the flesh. When feeling a painful feeling not of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a painful feeling not of the flesh. When feeling a pleasant feeling of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a pleasant feeling of the flesh. When feeling a pleasant feeling not of the flesh, he discerns that he is feeling a pleasant feeling not of the flesh. ..." So it is clear from this that the term Vedana (feeling) encompasses both feelings/sensations of the flesh and not of the flesh. It encompasses both sensation born via contact of body sense organ, and feeling born from the mind. I can imagine some others, as I have, confuse the first frame of reference to be referring to bodily sensation and the second to feeling born of the mind. ...but the first frame of reference regarding (Kaya) body/aggregate is NOT referring to bodily sensation which is actually part of the second frame of reference. The first frame of reference is referring to Kaya/body/aggregate in the sense of what it is about, or having clear comprehension, awareness of it; its constitution, and its disposition ... its nature. with metta, nori 37727 From: dighanakha Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 11:32pm Subject: Re: Enter The Abhidhammika! Whereupon the Sautrantika grabbed him by the ears... Hello Suan. S> I got the impression that Howard and you were unhappy about S> Aacariya Buddhagosa and other Theravaada commentators S> treating phasso as a paramattha dhamma (as one of the S> ultimate realities) - by the strength of the formula S> S> "Cakkhu~ncaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati S> cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso,". S> S> Was my impression correct? No, I'm afraid not. The discussion was about whether the thing called contact in the Suttas is the same as the thing called contact in the Atthasaalinii. Or to be more precise, it was about whether the descriptions attached to the term 'contact' in these two texts are sufficiently close and compatible to count as descriptions of the same referent. At the end of my last post you will see that I included Howard's summary of where the Suttas and Atthasaalinii appear to differ. Neither of us has raised the question of phassa being or not being an ultimate reality. But now that you've brought the matter up, I suppose we could add "being an ultimate reality" to the list of attributes predicated of phassa in the Commentaries, but not mentioned by the Buddha in the Suttas. As to whether I'm unhappy about Buddhaghosa's description of phassa, I would have to say no. I believe he is wrong, but this doesn't cause me unhappiness. We are, after all, dealing with a man who believed the sun and moon are only 8 km apart, and who thought feral children would grow up speaking Pali, so we shouldn't be surprised or upset if he blunders when dealing with more subtle matters known only to Buddhas and noble disciples. A man with such a tenuous grasp of ordinary reality is unlikely to get it right about ultimate reality. S> The way Aacariya Buddhaghosa understood phasso is in line S> with what Gotama the Buddha taught phasso in S> Dhammasa`nganii. S> For example, S> "2. Katamo tasmim samaye phasso hoti? Yo tasmim samaye S> phasso phusanaa samphusanaa samphusitattam: ayam tasmim S> samaye phasso hoti." Translation: "What, on that occasion, is contact? Anything which on that occasion is contact, contacting, way of contacting, the state of contacting: this, on that occasion, is called contact." In future I should appreciate it if you would supply your own translations when you post Pali quotes. Although most of the dsg members seem to have a large vocabulary of Pali technical terms, I don't think there are many who can actually read the language. It would also be helpful if you would add some words of explanation, clarifying how you understand the passage and how you think it supports your point, rather than just assuming that this will be obvious to everyone. Regarding the quote from the Dhs. it seems to me that though it is different from the description in the Madhupi.n.dika and Dutiyadvaya Suttas, it does not unambiguously show contact to be something distinct from the coming together of the internal and external aayatanas and consciousness (as maintained by Buddhaghosa). I would be tentatively inclined to take it as a definition of the term rather than a description of its referent. But I look forward to further exegesis from you. dig>> If you believe us to be mistaken and would like to show us dig>> the error of our ways, you will need to do more than merely dig>> assert this to be the case and then tell us we are wasting dig>> our time by disagreeing. S> I would not merely assert that you and Howard were S> mistaken, But you did. All the same, I'm thankful that you undertake not to do it again. S> but I will note that you both seemed to be suffering from S> short-sightedness due to anti-Abhidhamma and anti-Commentary S> preconceptions and influences (wrong schooling and reading S> the wrong books by speculative academics such as David S> Kalupahana and the like?) Like the sort of short-sightedness that led SE Asia's foremost abhidhammikas to be still insisting on the truth of the flat earth Sineru cosmology well into the 20th century? In fact my view of the Commentaries is not a preconception, but a judgement I arrived at *after* studying them under the guidance of teachers trained in the Theravaada tradition. So it's a postconception, if there is such a word. As for Kalupahana, he hasn't been an important influence on me at all. On those points where I agree with him I had already formed my own judgement before I had read a single word by him. Staying on the subject of Kalupahana, I am intrigued to see him described as 'speculative'. Those buddhologists who criticize him and his mentor, Dr. Jayatilleke, usually allege that they go overboard in trying to make Buddhism seem more empirical and scientific than it really is, and downplay the role of saddhaa (cf. Jan Ergardt, "Faith & Knowledge in Early Buddhism"; Frank Hoffman, "Rationality & Mind in Early Buddhism"; and Rupert Gethin's book on the enlightenment factors). Nevertheless, Kalupahana is very careful to back up his arguments, point by point, by appeal to the texts, so it's strange to hear him being called 'speculative'. May I ask which of his books has led you to this conclusion? Perhaps you could also clarify what you mean by 'speculative' -- it's an adjective you seem to apply rather liberally to people you disagree with. S> As you insisted that I will need to do more than merely S> assert your disagreement with Abhidhamma to be a mistake, I S> looked at the treatment of phasso in Atthasalini again. I didn't insist that you do anything. I simply offered what Kantians would call a hypothetical imperative: "IF you wish to persuade me .... then you will need to ...." S> We read the following statement: S> "Tikasannipaatasa`nkhaatassa pana attano kaara.nassa vasena S> paveditattaa sannipaatapaccupa.t.thaano. Aya~nhi tattha S> tattha "ti.n.nam sa`ngati phasso"ti evam kaara.nassa vasena S> paveditoti. Imassa ca suttapadassa ti.n.nam sa`ngatiyaa phassoti S> ayamattho; na sa`ngatimattameva phassoti." S> The above statement does take into account the Suttam S> folmula ""Cakkhu~nca, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati S> cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso,". S> Aacariya Buddhaghosa clearly explained the word "sa`ngati" S> to be understood as "san`ngatiyaa". [For non-Pali readers: sangati means 'the coming together' and is in the nominative case, meaning that it's the subject of a sentence. Sangatiyaa is the causal ablative case of the same word and means 'due to the coming together'. So Dr. Buddhaghosa is saying that the "coming together of eye, forms and eye-consciousness" really means "BECAUSE OF the coming together..."] He didn't "clearly explain it". He simply asserted that 'sangati' means 'sangatiyaa'. The problem with this is that no Sutta contains the form 'sangatiyaa' in this context. Do you think the Buddha was incapable of saying 'sangatiyaa' if that was what he meant? Or to put it another way, why did the Buddha choose to say 'sangati' if that wasn't what he really meant? This definition of phassa is given 33 times in the Suttas and in none of them does the Buddha say 'sangatiyaa' or add any other words implying 'sangatiyaa'. [As an aside, there is a Sarvaastivaadin Aagama Sutra that DOES contain the form sa.mgate.h (the Sanskrit equivalent of sangatiyaa) in this context. The Sarvaastivaadins used this to support their own conception of phassa, which is substantially the same as that of the Mahaavihaara monks. The Sautraantikas rejected it because their Sutras -- like the Pali Suttas -- did not contain this form. But I suppose that wouldn't really help your case, would it? I mean we don't want to go slumming with them Sarvaastivaadins. ;-) Still, for anyone interested I will give the passage in my postscript] S> For now, please kindly look at again the Pali passage quoted S> from Atthasalinii, and I am sure you are comfortable with S> the Pali, if not with the meaning of it. S> Now I asked you the following questions. S> 1. Do you understand the quoted Pali statement from S> Atthasanili? Yes. In fact I posted a translation of it last week. S> You may, of course, assure us of your understanding by S> translating it. See message 37623. S> 2. If so, do you agree with it? S> 3. If not, what are the reasons for your disagreement (apart S> from the apparent difference from the Suttam formula on S> phasso under discussion). In message 37623 you will see I have already stated my disagreement and the reasons for it. Its discrepancy with the Sutta description is the major reason and that alone would be a sufficient cause to reject it (cf. the four great standards of the Mahaaparinibbaana Sutta). There are other reasons that lie outside the scope of dsg, since they would require introducing Sautraantika doctrines to the discussion. I would also note that the lateness of the Atthasalini's conception of phassa is evidenced by the fact that in the Kathavatthu's debates there is an implicit rejection of the view tena phassena ta.m phassa.m phusati (by that contact that contact contacts) in no fewer than three of the debates (see: Kvu. Part V: Pa.tuppanna~naa.nakathaa; Part XIII Samaapanno assaadetikathaa; and Part XVI Adhigayhamanasikaarakathaa). So it seems the Atthasaalinii's view of phassa as being in the nature of an agent rather than an event was not held by the Theravaadins at the time of the 3rd Council. S> I hope that I did not impose on you too much difficult S> questioning, but then again, you were challenging Abhidhamma S> Pitaka and Standard Pali Commentaries wittingly or S> unwittingly. S> As you read Pali, you need to take more responsibility when S> making statements that contradict Abhidhamma and Standard S> Pali Commentaries which have been being preserved and S> transmitted, with greatest reverence, by generations after S> generations of learned Theravaada ascetics in various S> countries. I suppose I could reply: "As you read Pali, you need to take more responsibility when making statements that contradict Suttas that were taught by the Buddha and preserved by arahants." But I won't. You would probably answer that the Abhidhamma and Commentaries were also taught by the Buddha and preserved by arahants. I would then deny this and we'd just end up going on a fruitless dance around the mulberry bush. I suggest a better course would be for you to trust that however misguided you think I am, I am nevertheless putting forward my understanding in good faith and not with the aim of harming the Saasanaa. I trust likewise that this is the case with you. Then, instead of appealing to the authority of tradition ("generations after generations"), hearsay or faith ("Buddhaghosa and the commentators were all arahants"), you should just stick to discussing what the texts are saying, relying on reason and evidence rather than argumenta ad hominem and ad antiquitatem. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ P.S. For anyone interested, I am appending a discussion of phassa from the Abhidharmakosabhasyam. This work is a commentary (bhaasyam) on a Sarvastivadin Abhidharma treatise (the Abhidharmakosa). Both the treatise and its commentary are by Vasubandhu who appears to favour the Sautraantika perspective (though unlike Buddhaghosa & Co., he does give a fair and sympathetic account of his opponents' views). As you will see, disagreement on the subject of phassa is nothing new. My notes are in square brackets. [To Sugeniuses: POTENTIAL HERESY COMING UP - DELETE THE POST NOW!] _____________________________ What is the nature of contact? The aacaaryas are not in agreement. The Sautraantikas say: "Contact is merely the coming together itself." They support this view citing the Sutra, "The coming together, the encounter, the meeting of these three dharmas is contact." The Sarvaastivaadins say: "Contact is a dharma associated with a citta, distinct from the coming together."* They support this view citing the Satsatka Sutra,** "The six internal bases [aayatanas, eye, ear etc.], the six external bases, the six consciousnesses, the six contacts, the six feelings, and the six cravings." The Sutra, they claim, knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal bases, external bases, and the consciousnesses; thus the contacts are separate dharmas, for the Sutra does not contain any repetition or double usages. [* cf Atthasaalinii 109. ** the Sanskrit version of the Chachakka Sutta MN 148] The Sautraantikas reply, explaining this Sutra thus: "If the Sutra did not contain any repetition, it would follow that feelings and cravings would exist apart from the dharmas-base (dharmaayatana) which is the sixth external base, the object of the mind-base (manaayatana), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and objects) refer to the organs and objects without any relation to the consciousnesses." A second Sautraantika reply, from Bhadanta Srilaabha: "Every eye and visible object is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing. Thus what is defined as contact in the Satsatka Sutra is the eye, a visible thing, and the consciousness which are cause and effect." But how do the Sarvaastivaadins, who maintain that contact is something distinct from the coming together of an eye, visible object and consciousness, explain the Sutra passage, "The coming together, the encounter, the meeting of these three dharmas is contact" ? They do not read the Sutra in this form*; or rather, they say that the expression is metaphorical**: when the Sutra says "the coming together" they claim that it really means "the result of the coming together." [* their version is: ya e.saa.m dharmaa.na.m sa.mgate.h sa.mnipaataat samavaayaat sa spar"sa.h. ** cf. discussion of Dhp. 194 at Path of Purification XVII 16] But this discussion is taking us too far afield. (Abhidharmakosabhasya III 30b-d) An abrupt and disappointing end. Luckily Vasubandhu was a bit of an erratic writer and so a few pages later he changes his mind and resumes the discussion. If the moderators don't mind I will post the rest of it in future postscripts. 37728 From: dighanakha Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 5:51am Subject: Re: Teeth Clenching Hello Ken H. K>>> I gather also that they sometimes clench their teeth when K>>> kusala citta is suppressing the hindrances. K> To which you replied: dig>> I think the text is describing something rather more dig>> proactive than your paraphrase would suggest: K> There are only conditioned dhammas in the world, so it K> stands to reason that there can't be anything more (or less) K> proactive than conditioned dhammas. K> In the remainder of your message you offer no thoughts on K> what the "something more" might be. In your original post you had interpreted an exhortation ("he SHOULD beat down, constrain and crush mind with mind") as if it were merely a narration or description of certain things that might happen. This is a misuse of language and does violence to the meaning and purpose of the passage. By "something more proactive" I meant that the Buddha in this passage is giving an instruction relating to mind development that a person should deliberately undertake. There is no suggestion that the bhikkhu just passively waits for teeth-clenching and "constraining mind by mind" to occur by itself. Now perhaps it would be possible to use some other mode of discourse to describe what is going on when the monk clenches his teeth and endeavours to constrain mind with mind, e.g. an explication in terms of paramattha dhammas. And such a description might, for all I know, be an accurate one. But to say that this is what the Buddha really *meant* is simply a falsehood. His discourse is advisory or homiletic and to convert it into a descriptive mode of discourse is to eviscerate it. K> Do you believe in an eternal soul? No, I don't. But your question hardly seems apropos of the Vitakkasanthaana Sutta. K> I ask that in all seriousness because I know some Buddhists K> do. I expect that there are, though I'm a little bemused by this sudden preoccupation with eternal souls. Were you perhaps wondering whether *you* might have one? K> The people behind AccessToInsight, for example, are K> dedicated to putting the self back into the Dhamma. If you mean the venerable Thanissaro, I can't agree with you. His take on anattaa is idiosyncratic and not how this doctrine was understood by any of the Indian aacaariyas, but nevertheless it's quite distinct from both the Vedantic interpretation of Mrs Rhys Davids (and numerous others) and the neo-Pudgalavaadin interpretation of George Grimm and A.P. Buddhadatta. I think Thanissaro might well be convicted on a charge of eel-wriggling, but not eternalism. His 'strategic interpretation' is in essence a dumbed down version of a thesis first proposed by the Austrian scholar Erich Frauwallner in the late 1950's. Frauwallner was famous for his skill in propounding eccentric theories plausibly enough for them to be taken seriously for a year or so, before he himself would disown them. His most famous and long-lasting one was the "Two Vasubandhus Theory" which was taken seriously for nearly two decades. As for the "Strategic Anatta Theory", this was shot down by buddhologists from all sides, disowned by Frauwallner himself within a year of it being published, and would have been all but forgotten were it not for Thanissaro. I suspect it may also be from Frauwallner that Thanissaro picked up his curious ideas on what Indians thought about extinguished fires. K> They share your aversion to a teaching of ultimate reality K> because that teaching makes no allowance for a possible K> "something more." It teaches there are only dhammas and that K> all conditioned dhammas are anicca, dukkha and anatta while K> the one unconditioned dhamma is anatta. (No scope for a K> "something more.") I am very unmystical and not at all a 'something more' enthusiast. But if you are trying to imply that the only possibilities are being a believer in physical and psychical atoms or being an eternalist, and that if I'm not the former then I must be the latter, then I'd say you are committing the fallacy of bifurcation, for there are plenty of other possibilities besides these two. One might, for example, accept that there are only dhammas, but not go along with how this or that Abhidharma tradition conceives dhammas. One might be a Puggalavaadin, with a dharmas theory AND a transmigrating 'person' who is held to be inscrutable but not eternal, and who is extinguished in parinirvana; one might be a Sautrantika and conceive of dharmas as thing-events rather than things; one might take the Dhamma as a 'leap philosophy' in which all such conceivings are to be eschewed. dig>> There are many statements of this kind in the Suttas, but dig>> none that say, or even imply: "My teaching is all about dig>> ultimate and irreducible physical and psychical atoms." K> It's amazing that people can have such radically different K> views of the dhamma - ranging from "all about conditioned K> dhammas" to "nothing about conditioned dhammas." I think it comes partly from a tendency to recklessly venture opinions without having studied the teaching very much, and partly from a tendency to speak one-sidedly (eka.msavaadii) and to fail to make necessary distinctions and qualifications. In my post I mentioned the distinction between the three kinds of benefit that the Buddha taught. Another one is the distinction between the 'Dhamma teaching specific to Buddhas' (buddhaana.m saamukka.msikaa dhammadesanaa) -- meaning the four noble truths -- and then everything else that a Buddha happens to teach, but which unawakened persons might also be able to teach. When one considers the range of teachings that lie within each of these two categories, one ought to see that both of the claims you have cited above rather exceed what can be supported in the Suttas. dig>> The above Sutta is simply concerned with dig>> di.t.thadhammikattha, 'benefit to be obtained in the present dig>> life'. It comprises four common-sense prudential maxims for dig>> householders who desire their families and family property dig>> to be stable and long-lasting. Nothing more. K> Do you ever wonder why the Bodhisattva wandered samsara for K> countless aeons developing a simplistic, introductory lesson K> in home economics? No, it isn't a subject I wonder about. Should I? K> What is the meaning of "they" "things" and "a man or a K> woman" in: K> "They look for things they have lost. K> They repair things that are old. K> They eat and drink moderately. K> They place in authority a man or a woman possessed of K> virtue." Really Ken, at your age you shouldn't expect other people to fill in ALL the gaps in your knowledge. Can't you think the answers out for yourself? Very well then, here goes:- "They" is a pronoun standing for two or more items or persons; in this case it refers to families whose conduct will conduce to their long-lastingness. "Things" could mean any items that a householder might conceivably mislay. So, in your case it might include your lunchbox, satchel, teddybear, tricycle, surfboard, toothbrush, plastic duck etc. etc.; or anything you own that might go astray: dogs, emus, ostriches, guinea pigs inflatable sheep etc. etc. "A man or a woman" means an adult male or female human. In this context it refers to those male or female humans who might be appointed to some position of stewardship or governorship. In your case it would mean your mother should not employ as a nanny some wanton wench who is likely to lead you astray. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37729 From: plnao Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 6:29am Subject: Concepts as condition beyond our control (was Re: [dsg] Re: killing in a dream) Hello Htoo and all Thank you for your feedback, Htoo. Ph: > It's interesting though, that in my case at least, an action in a > dream can - rarely-really reverberate the following day. That very > reverberation suggests that the dream has some kind of conditioning > power. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- : > Htoo> I don't think so. The dream itself is a concept and sannakkhanda > bring that concept. Ph: But cannot concepts also act as conditioning factors? I quote from Nina's "Conditions": "Not only realities but also concepts can be a natural decisive support-condition for phenomena. (snip) The concept of a person can then be a natural decisive support-condition for attachment or loving-kindness. (snip) We need to think of concepts in order to take care of ourselves or in order to understand the Dhmma, and thus, time and again in our daily life concepts condition different types of citta by way of natural decisive support-conditioning." (end quote) If a powerfully vivid concept arises in a dream, I would think it could condition cittas in the same way as if it were a concept fabricated in waking life. It would seem to me that this can be confirmed by experience. I mean, if I have a horrible dream, and feel aversion the next day, that dosa was conditioned by the dream, surely. Htoo> Actually, the power is in you. This sentence may be interpreted in > many different way. Philosophically, this is right. Socially, this is > also right. Morally, this again is right. From some other believers > point of view, this is also right. > > The power is inside of you. Not in the dreams. For those who > believe 'Buddha Nature', this is also right as 'Buddha Nature' is > inside of you. ( I include this because there are Mahayanists here ). > For those who believe kamma, this is also right. As at the point of > waking up the dream has given you past kamma but this should not lead > you to commiting new kamma. For not committing new ones, the power is > inside of you. Phil: I must say this puzzles me a bit, Htoo. There are conditions at work. There is the potential for right understanding in me that may gradually eradicate defilements, but the "power is in you" sounds like something I can grab hold on to at will, and I don't think that's right. It could be a matter of wording. The power is the potential to have right understanding of the dosa that arises because of the dream, to understand that the dosa is conditioned, and not-self, to see that and be detached from it. But the condition is still there at work, surely. I mean, if I feel aversion because of the dream, what else could it be except a condition at work? Again, I'm just beginning to learn about conditons. Htoo > Here, there is no you but the power is inside of you. You are the > master of your kamma even though there have never been you there. So > the dream should not at any moment lead you the whole day. Phil: Should not, ideally, if I have the right understanding to see the dosa for what it is. But that right understanding is not-self, not within my immediate control. Htoo> It has been far away to condition thinking as the dream has passed > away when you wake up. But what conditions your thinking is that your > thinking itself. This again is directed by yourself. Actually you are > the master of the day and the master is not the dream. Phil: Htoo! "Master of the day?!?" That sounds like a action movie title, not anatta! Have you been taking Dhamma steroids! (joke) > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Phil: > > And there is unpleasant mental feeling as well. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Htoo: > > This is cognition of vedana which is a reality. If this is done > properly, this is kusala citta and this will finally lead you to > enlightenment. Ph: Ah yes, as I learned from Nina, if there is dosa or lobha and I am mindful of it as anatta, the citta will then be kusala. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Phil: > > I'm also interested in the way the first thought that pops into our > head as we wake in the morning can condition many thoughts during the > rest of the day. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Htoo: > > Interesting. But it is not the only condition for the whole day. If > this is so, you have surrendered the mastery through out the day. > Should this happen? No. I would not allow such matter. Ph: I'm still interested in this. The way the thought stands out so clearly, sometimes, when we wake. But Htoo, how can you demand mastery when each lifetime is conditioned in an irreversible way by the patisandhi citta (spelling?) There is only so much we should expect to control. Yes, there is always the opportunity to have right understanding of realities, thus liberating us from creating fresh akusala kamma, but I think "surrendering the mastery" is part and parcel of the renunciation that is one of the Paramis. Of course it is all very subtle. We see that in the "crossing the flood" sutta. We don't press ahead too hard, but we don't stand still either. Thank you, Htoo. I teased you in a friendly way about "master of the day" but truly it is good to read stirring encouragement like that. I talk of having no control over things, but there *is* control arising, of course, thanks to wisdom we gain from the Buddha's teaching, and examination of our experience, and Dhamma discussion with good Dhamma friends. But it is control that we should be very wary of thinking we can exercise at will just because a friend tells us we can. It has to arise, or not arise, in a conditioned way, I think. Otherwise it can turn into a self-preservation exercise, especially for beginners like me. Metta, Phil 37730 From: dighanakha Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 7:42am Subject: Re: Teeth Clenching Hello Ken H. K>>> I gather also that they sometimes clench their teeth when K>>> kusala citta is suppressing the hindrances. K> To which you replied: dig>> I think the text is describing something rather more dig>> proactive than your paraphrase would suggest: K> There are only conditioned dhammas in the world, so it K> stands to reason that there can't be anything more (or less) K> proactive than conditioned dhammas. K> In the remainder of your message you offer no thoughts on K> what the "something more" might be. In your original post you had interpreted an exhortation ("he SHOULD beat down, constrain and crush mind with mind") as if it were merely a narration or description of certain things that might happen. This is an abuse of language and does violence to the meaning and purpose of the passage. By "something more proactive" I meant that the Buddha in this passage is giving an instruction relating to mind development that a bhikkhu should deliberately undertake. There is no suggestion that the bhikkhu just passively waits for "teeth-clenching" and "constraining mind by mind" to occur by itself. Now *maybe* it would be possible to use another mode of discourse in which one narrates what is going on when the bhikkhu clenches his teeth and endeavours to constrain mind with mind, e.g. an explication in terms of supposed paramattha dhammas. But even if this explication were an accurate one it would nonetheless be false to claim that this was what the Buddha *really meant* or that this would be an equivalent statement. No 'ought' statement can be the equivalent of an 'is' statement. The two are just not commensurate. The Buddha's mode of discourse in the Vitakkasanthana Sutta is advisory or homiletic and to convert this into a descriptive mode of discourse would be to eviscerate it. The full meaning and function of an utterance lies not only in its propositional content, but also in the outcome that the speaker anticipates his words will have. An utterance that is an incitant to a certain course of action is just not the same as a description of what will be going on if/when the listener undertakes that course of action. Am I making myself clear? K> Do you believe in an eternal soul? No, I don't. But your question hardly seems apropos of the Vitakkasanthaana Sutta. K> I ask that in all seriousness because I know some Buddhists K> do. I'll take your word for it, though frankly I'm a little puzzled by this sudden preoccupation with eternal souls. Were you perhaps wondering if *you* might have one? If so, wouldn't it be better to go and talk it over with your parish vicar? K> The people behind AccessToInsight, for example, are K> dedicated to putting the self back into the Dhamma. If you mean the venerable Thanissaro, I can't agree with you. His take on anattaa is idiosyncratic and not how this doctrine was understood by any of the Indian aacaariyas, but nevertheless it's quite distinct from both the Vedantic interpretation of Mrs Rhys Davids (and numerous others) and the neo-Pudgalavaadin interpretation of George Grimm and A.P. Buddhadatta. I think Thanissaro might well be convicted on a charge of eel-wriggling, but not eternalism. His 'strategic interpretation' is in essence a dumbed down version of a thesis first proposed by the Austrian scholar Erich Frauwallner in the late 1950's. Frauwallner was famous for his skill in propounding eccentric theories plausibly enough for them to be taken seriously for a year or so, before he himself would disown them. His most famous and long-lasting one was the "Two Vasubandhus Theory" which was taken seriously for nearly two decades. As for the "Strategic Anatta Theory", this was shot down by buddhologists from all sides, disowned by Frauwallner himself within a year of it being published, and would have been all but forgotten were it not for Thanissaro. I suspect it may also be from Frauwallner that Thanissaro picked up his curious ideas on what Indians thought about extinguished fires. K> They share your aversion to a teaching of ultimate reality K> because that teaching makes no allowance for a possible K> "something more." It teaches there are only dhammas and that K> all conditioned dhammas are anicca, dukkha and anatta while K> the one unconditioned dhamma is anatta. (No scope for a K> "something more.") I am very unmystical and not at all a 'something more' enthusiast. But if you are trying to imply that the only possibilities are being a believer in physical and psychical atoms or being an eternalist, and that if I'm not the former then I must be the latter, then I'd say you are committing the fallacy of bifurcation, for there are plenty of other possibilities besides these two. One might, for example, accept that there are only dhammas, but not go along with how this or that Abhidharma tradition conceives dhammas. One might be a Puggalavaadin, with a dharmas theory AND a transmigrating 'person' who is held to be inscrutable but not eternal, and who is extinguished in parinirvana; one might be a Sautrantika and conceive of dharmas as thing-events rather than things; one might take the Dhamma as a 'leap philosophy' in which all such conceivings are to be eschewed. dig>> There are many statements of this kind in the Suttas, but dig>> none that say, or even imply: "My teaching is all about dig>> ultimate and irreducible physical and psychical atoms." K> It's amazing that people can have such radically different K> views of the dhamma - ranging from "all about conditioned K> dhammas" to "nothing about conditioned dhammas." I think it comes partly from a tendency to recklessly venture opinions without having studied the teaching very much, and partly from a tendency to speak one-sidedly (eka.msavaadii) and to fail to make necessary distinctions and qualifications. In my post I mentioned the distinction between the three kinds of benefit that the Buddha taught. Another one is the distinction between the 'Dhamma teaching specific to Buddhas' (buddhaana.m saamukka.msikaa dhammadesanaa) -- meaning the four noble truths -- and then everything else that a Buddha happens to teach, but which unawakened persons might also be able to teach. When one considers the range of teachings that lie within each of these two categories, one ought to see that both of the claims you have cited above rather exceed what can be supported in the Suttas. dig>> The above Sutta is simply concerned with dig>> di.t.thadhammikattha, 'benefit to be obtained in the present dig>> life'. It comprises four common-sense prudential maxims for dig>> householders who desire their families and family property dig>> to be stable and long-lasting. Nothing more. K> Do you ever wonder why the Bodhisattva wandered samsara for K> countless aeons developing a simplistic, introductory lesson K> in home economics? No, it isn't a subject I wonder about. Should I? K> What is the meaning of "they" "things" and "a man or a K> woman" in: K> "They look for things they have lost. K> They repair things that are old. K> They eat and drink moderately. K> They place in authority a man or a woman possessed of K> virtue." Really Ken, at your age you shouldn't expect other people to fill in ALL the gaps in your knowledge. And these are simple words that you should already know by now. I suggest you try and get your mummy to buy you a picture dictionary in time for your twelfth birthday. Okay, here goes:- "They" is a pronoun standing for a plurality of items or persons. Like all pronouns it's an indexical term, which means that it takes its meaning from the context in which it is spoken. So, in this case it refers to families whose conduct will conduce to their long-lastingness. "Things" could mean any items that a householder might conceivably mislay. So, in your case it might include your lunchbox, satchel, teddybear, tricycle, surfboard, toothbrush, plastic duck etc. etc.; or anything you own that might go astray: dogs, rabbits, cats, guinea pigs, inflatable ostriches etc. etc. "A man or a woman" means an adult male or female human. In this context it refers to those male or female humans who might be appointed to some position of stewardship or governorship. In your case it would mean your mother should not employ as a nanny some wanton wench who is likely to lead you into bad habits. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37731 From: abhidhammika Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 7:46am Subject: Re: Enter The Abhidhammika! Whereupon the Sautrantika grabbed him by the ears... Dear Dighanakha, Howard, Nina, Robert k, Mike Nease, Chris, Andrew T, Phil and all How are you? Dighanakha, thank you for your considered reply to my challenge, and for providing materials on the issue from other sources as well. This post is to only acknowledge that I have read your reply. I won't be writing a rebuttal now. You still have time to reform, though. That is to say, you still have time to read carefully the Suttams under consideration and discover how they support Abhidhamma, Atthasalinii and other Standard Pali commentaries on the issue. When I write my critical arguments against your Sautrantika views on the issue and for upholding the views of Abhidhamma, Atthasalinii and Standard Pali commentaries, I will show how the Suttams support the latter. You wrote: "I suggest a better course would be for you to trust that however misguided you think I am, I am nevertheless putting forward my understanding in good faith and not with the aim of harming the Saasanaa. I trust likewise that this is the case with you. Then, instead of appealing to the authority of tradition ("generations after generations"), hearsay or faith ("Buddhaghosa and the commentators were all arahants"), you should just stick to discussing what the texts are saying, relying on reason and evidence rather than argumenta ad hominem and ad antiquitatem." I agree with what you wrote in the above paragraph. Our main objective in our discussion, even if in the form of debating, should be to find out the truth by relying on reason and evidence. I am glad to hear that you are putting forward your understanding in good faith as best you can. I can assure you that I have the same sentiments. So we will proceed from here with the mutual aim of upholding Buddha Saasana. With kind regards, Suan PS.. I have successfully experimented a discussion forum on the bodhiology website where Pali fonts can appear and there are no ads. When I have spare time, I will open the discussion forum where you can unleash your scholarship and academic prowess without constraints and conditions. When it is ready, I will let you and others know who might be interested in specialist issues in Pali Buddhism. Suan http://www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "dighanakha" wrote: Hello Suan. S> I got the impression that Howard and you were unhappy about S> Aacariya Buddhagosa and other Theravaada commentators S> treating phasso as a paramattha dhamma (as one of the S> ultimate realities) - by the strength of the formula S> S> "Cakkhu~ncaavuso, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati S> cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso,". S> S> Was my impression correct? No, I'm afraid not. The discussion was about whether the thing called contact in the Suttas is the same as the thing called contact in the Atthasaalinii. Or to be more precise, it was about whether the descriptions attached to the term 'contact' in these two texts are sufficiently close and compatible to count as descriptions of the same referent. At the end of my last post you will see that I included Howard's summary of where the Suttas and Atthasaalinii appear to differ. Neither of us has raised the question of phassa being or not being an ultimate reality. But now that you've brought the matter up, I suppose we could add "being an ultimate reality" to the list of attributes predicated of phassa in the Commentaries, but not mentioned by the Buddha in the Suttas. As to whether I'm unhappy about Buddhaghosa's description of phassa, I would have to say no. I believe he is wrong, but this doesn't cause me unhappiness. We are, after all, dealing with a man who believed the sun and moon are only 8 km apart, and who thought feral children would grow up speaking Pali, so we shouldn't be surprised or upset if he blunders when dealing with more subtle matters known only to Buddhas and noble disciples. A man with such a tenuous grasp of ordinary reality is unlikely to get it right about ultimate reality. S> The way Aacariya Buddhaghosa understood phasso is in line S> with what Gotama the Buddha taught phasso in S> Dhammasa`nganii. S> For example, S> "2. Katamo tasmim samaye phasso hoti? Yo tasmim samaye S> phasso phusanaa samphusanaa samphusitattam: ayam tasmim S> samaye phasso hoti." Translation: "What, on that occasion, is contact? Anything which on that occasion is contact, contacting, way of contacting, the state of contacting: this, on that occasion, is called contact." In future I should appreciate it if you would supply your own translations when you post Pali quotes. Although most of the dsg members seem to have a large vocabulary of Pali technical terms, I don't think there are many who can actually read the language. It would also be helpful if you would add some words of explanation, clarifying how you understand the passage and how you think it supports your point, rather than just assuming that this will be obvious to everyone. Regarding the quote from the Dhs. it seems to me that though it is different from the description in the Madhupi.n.dika and Dutiyadvaya Suttas, it does not unambiguously show contact to be something distinct from the coming together of the internal and external aayatanas and consciousness (as maintained by Buddhaghosa). I would be tentatively inclined to take it as a definition of the term rather than a description of its referent. But I look forward to further exegesis from you. dig>> If you believe us to be mistaken and would like to show us dig>> the error of our ways, you will need to do more than merely dig>> assert this to be the case and then tell us we are wasting dig>> our time by disagreeing. S> I would not merely assert that you and Howard were S> mistaken, But you did. All the same, I'm thankful that you undertake not to do it again. S> but I will note that you both seemed to be suffering from S> short-sightedness due to anti-Abhidhamma and anti-Commentary S> preconceptions and influences (wrong schooling and reading S> the wrong books by speculative academics such as David S> Kalupahana and the like?) Like the sort of short-sightedness that led SE Asia's foremost abhidhammikas to be still insisting on the truth of the flat earth Sineru cosmology well into the 20th century? In fact my view of the Commentaries is not a preconception, but a judgement I arrived at *after* studying them under the guidance of teachers trained in the Theravaada tradition. So it's a postconception, if there is such a word. As for Kalupahana, he hasn't been an important influence on me at all. On those points where I agree with him I had already formed my own judgement before I had read a single word by him. Staying on the subject of Kalupahana, I am intrigued to see him described as 'speculative'. Those buddhologists who criticize him and his mentor, Dr. Jayatilleke, usually allege that they go overboard in trying to make Buddhism seem more empirical and scientific than it really is, and downplay the role of saddhaa (cf. Jan Ergardt, "Faith & Knowledge in Early Buddhism"; Frank Hoffman, "Rationality & Mind in Early Buddhism"; and Rupert Gethin's book on the enlightenment factors). Nevertheless, Kalupahana is very careful to back up his arguments, point by point, by appeal to the texts, so it's strange to hear him being called 'speculative'. May I ask which of his books has led you to this conclusion? Perhaps you could also clarify what you mean by 'speculative' -- it's an adjective you seem to apply rather liberally to people you disagree with. S> As you insisted that I will need to do more than merely S> assert your disagreement with Abhidhamma to be a mistake, I S> looked at the treatment of phasso in Atthasalini again. I didn't insist that you do anything. I simply offered what Kantians would call a hypothetical imperative: "IF you wish to persuade me .... then you will need to ...." S> We read the following statement: S> "Tikasannipaatasa`nkhaatassa pana attano kaara.nassa vasena S> paveditattaa sannipaatapaccupa.t.thaano. Aya~nhi tattha S> tattha "ti.n.nam sa`ngati phasso"ti evam kaara.nassa vasena S> paveditoti. Imassa ca suttapadassa ti.n.nam sa`ngatiyaa phassoti S> ayamattho; na sa`ngatimattameva phassoti." S> The above statement does take into account the Suttam S> folmula ""Cakkhu~nca, pa.ticca ruupe ca uppajjati S> cakkhuvi~n~naa.nam, ti.n.nam sa'ngati phasso,". S> Aacariya Buddhaghosa clearly explained the word "sa`ngati" S> to be understood as "san`ngatiyaa". [For non-Pali readers: sangati means 'the coming together' and is in the nominative case, meaning that it's the subject of a sentence. Sangatiyaa is the causal ablative case of the same word and means 'due to the coming together'. So Dr. Buddhaghosa is saying that the "coming together of eye, forms and eye-consciousness" really means "BECAUSE OF the coming together..."] He didn't "clearly explain it". He simply asserted that 'sangati' means 'sangatiyaa'. The problem with this is that no Sutta contains the form 'sangatiyaa' in this context. Do you think the Buddha was incapable of saying 'sangatiyaa' if that was what he meant? Or to put it another way, why did the Buddha choose to say 'sangati' if that wasn't what he really meant? This definition of phassa is given 33 times in the Suttas and in none of them does the Buddha say 'sangatiyaa' or add any other words implying 'sangatiyaa'. [As an aside, there is a Sarvaastivaadin Aagama Sutra that DOES contain the form sa.mgate.h (the Sanskrit equivalent of sangatiyaa) in this context. The Sarvaastivaadins used this to support their own conception of phassa, which is substantially the same as that of the Mahaavihaara monks. The Sautraantikas rejected it because their Sutras -- like the Pali Suttas -- did not contain this form. But I suppose that wouldn't really help your case, would it? I mean we don't want to go slumming with them Sarvaastivaadins. ;-) Still, for anyone interested I will give the passage in my postscript] S> For now, please kindly look at again the Pali passage quoted S> from Atthasalinii, and I am sure you are comfortable with S> the Pali, if not with the meaning of it. S> Now I asked you the following questions. S> 1. Do you understand the quoted Pali statement from S> Atthasanili? Yes. In fact I posted a translation of it last week. S> You may, of course, assure us of your understanding by S> translating it. See message 37623. S> 2. If so, do you agree with it? S> 3. If not, what are the reasons for your disagreement (apart S> from the apparent difference from the Suttam formula on S> phasso under discussion). In message 37623 you will see I have already stated my disagreement and the reasons for it. Its discrepancy with the Sutta description is the major reason and that alone would be a sufficient cause to reject it (cf. the four great standards of the Mahaaparinibbaana Sutta). There are other reasons that lie outside the scope of dsg, since they would require introducing Sautraantika doctrines to the discussion. I would also note that the lateness of the Atthasalini's conception of phassa is evidenced by the fact that in the Kathavatthu's debates there is an implicit rejection of the view tena phassena ta.m phassa.m phusati (by that contact that contact contacts) in no fewer than three of the debates (see: Kvu. Part V: Pa.tuppanna~naa.nakathaa; Part XIII Samaapanno assaadetikathaa; and Part XVI Adhigayhamanasikaarakathaa). So it seems the Atthasaalinii's view of phassa as being in the nature of an agent rather than an event was not held by the Theravaadins at the time of the 3rd Council. S> I hope that I did not impose on you too much difficult S> questioning, but then again, you were challenging Abhidhamma S> Pitaka and Standard Pali Commentaries wittingly or S> unwittingly. S> As you read Pali, you need to take more responsibility when S> making statements that contradict Abhidhamma and Standard S> Pali Commentaries which have been being preserved and S> transmitted, with greatest reverence, by generations after S> generations of learned Theravaada ascetics in various S> countries. I suppose I could reply: "As you read Pali, you need to take more responsibility when making statements that contradict Suttas that were taught by the Buddha and preserved by arahants." But I won't. You would probably answer that the Abhidhamma and Commentaries were also taught by the Buddha and preserved by arahants. I would then deny this and we'd just end up going on a fruitless dance around the mulberry bush. I suggest a better course would be for you to trust that however misguided you think I am, I am nevertheless putting forward my understanding in good faith and not with the aim of harming the Saasanaa. I trust likewise that this is the case with you. Then, instead of appealing to the authority of tradition ("generations after generations"), hearsay or faith ("Buddhaghosa and the commentators were all arahants"), you should just stick to discussing what the texts are saying, relying on reason and evidence rather than argumenta ad hominem and ad antiquitatem. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ P.S. For anyone interested, I am appending a discussion of phassa from the Abhidharmakosabhasyam. This work is a commentary (bhaasyam) on a Sarvastivadin Abhidharma treatise (the Abhidharmakosa). Both the treatise and its commentary are by Vasubandhu who appears to favour the Sautraantika perspective (though unlike Buddhaghosa & Co., he does give a fair and sympathetic account of his opponents' views). As you will see, disagreement on the subject of phassa is nothing new. My notes are in square brackets. [To Sugeniuses: POTENTIAL HERESY COMING UP - DELETE THE POST NOW!] _____________________________ What is the nature of contact? The aacaaryas are not in agreement. The Sautraantikas say: "Contact is merely the coming together itself." They support this view citing the Sutra, "The coming together, the encounter, the meeting of these three dharmas is contact." The Sarvaastivaadins say: "Contact is a dharma associated with a citta, distinct from the coming together."* They support this view citing the Satsatka Sutra,** "The six internal bases [aayatanas, eye, ear etc.], the six external bases, the six consciousnesses, the six contacts, the six feelings, and the six cravings." The Sutra, they claim, knows of the six contacts, together with the six categories of internal bases, external bases, and the consciousnesses; thus the contacts are separate dharmas, for the Sutra does not contain any repetition or double usages. [* cf Atthasaalinii 109. ** the Sanskrit version of the Chachakka Sutta MN 148] The Sautraantikas reply, explaining this Sutra thus: "If the Sutra did not contain any repetition, it would follow that feelings and cravings would exist apart from the dharmas-base (dharmaayatana) which is the sixth external base, the object of the mind-base (manaayatana), since you can hold only that the first two categories (six organs and objects) refer to the organs and objects without any relation to the consciousnesses." A second Sautraantika reply, from Bhadanta Srilaabha: "Every eye and visible object is not the cause of a visual consciousness, as all visual consciousness is not the result of the eye and a visible thing. Thus what is defined as contact in the Satsatka Sutra is the eye, a visible thing, and the consciousness which are cause and effect." But how do the Sarvaastivaadins, who maintain that contact is something distinct from the coming together of an eye, visible object and consciousness, explain the Sutra passage, "The coming together, the encounter, the meeting of these three dharmas is contact" ? They do not read the Sutra in this form*; or rather, they say that the expression is metaphorical**: when the Sutra says "the coming together" they claim that it really means "the result of the coming together." [* their version is: ya e.saa.m dharmaa.na.m sa.mgate.h sa.mnipaataat samavaayaat sa spar"sa.h. ** cf. discussion of Dhp. 194 at Path of Purification XVII 16] But this discussion is taking us too far afield. (Abhidharmakosabhasya III 30b-d) An abrupt and disappointing end. Luckily Vasubandhu was a bit of an erratic writer and so a few pages later he changes his mind and resumes the discussion. If the moderators don't mind I will post the rest of it in future postscripts. 37732 From: Larry Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 8:52am Subject: Re: Details on Vedana --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "nori" wrote: > > Hi Dhamma Friends, > > I think it is a common misunderstanding, as expressed by some in the > past, that Vedana (feeling) is understood as being exclusively 'a > mind born emotional feeling' and excludes bodily sensation via > contact of body sense (organ). > snip Hi Nori, I was just thinking about feeling this morning. You bring up a good question: how do we feel? Specifically, what is bodily feeling and how can it be purely mental (nama)? I think the only way to find out is to look really carefully. I've been wrestling with a similar question. In abhidhamma tangible data is experienced with pleasant or unpleasant feeling while sound, flavor, odor, and light are experienced only with neutral feeling. How can this be? Flavor clearly is accompanied by a pleasant or unpleasant feeling. One thought that occurred is that possibly in the sensuous plane all sense door experience is intimately associated with the body door. A pleasant taste can be located in the body. Even a pleasant visual experience is "easy on the eyes". So perhaps we can say a flavor is tasted with neutral feeling but it is also experienced through the body door in the tongue area with pleasant or unpleasant feeling. However, a pleasant taste is unique to taste and different from pleasant touch. Now the question arises, is pleasant feeling ever really tangible? Does it have a texture? No. It's easy to say that but I think we have to look and see, particularly with regard to painful feeling. Btw, you might be interested in the Commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta at Access to Insight, translated by Soma Thera. Larry 37733 From: ashkenn2k Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 9:08am Subject: Teeth-clenching was: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi DN Sorry for the delay, family duties call for attention :). Lets talk about exhortataion of purposive actions. So does action spring out from the mind? Do you without panna, are in any chance for us to use such descriptive behaviour as said in the sutta. If panna does not conditon us to see the unwholesome of behaviour and initate the ability to clench our teeths, I dont think we are able to do it in the first instance. If panna is anatta, so how does purposely action come from :). There are always in the sutta description of purposely actions but we must first examine, the basis of conditions which arise without an agent. Then we would know whether is there a called for purposedly actions or such actions are conditioned from panna. Ken O 37734 From: Larry Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 9:19am Subject: Contact Hi all, I have a few thoughts to add to the great debate. First, I must say I know nothing about the Atthasalani so I am taking my abhidhamma views from the Visuddhimagga. It seems to me that the Honeyball Sutta doesn't say much about the nature of contact so for those who prefer a minimal pointer I suppose that is all one needs. Mn.18, par.17. "When there is the eye, a form, and eye-consciousness, it is possible to point out the manifestation of contact." The Visuddhimagga adds a little more detail but I think we can go beyond that. Vism.XIV,134: "Herein, (i) it touches (phusati), thus it is 'contact' (phassa). This has the characteristic of touching. Its function is the act of impingement. It is manifested as concurrence. Its proximate cause is an objective field that has come into focus." It seems to me that as a cetasika contact is something consciousness does. It is a verb and is practically synonymous with "cognize". To locate it as an object of satipatthana I think we have to look at "touch", "taste", "smell", "hear", "see", and "think". If we can see a difference between touch and hardness, taste and flavor, smell and odor, hear and sound, see and light, think and idea, then that is where we will find contact. Larry 37735 From: Ken O Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 9:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi DN Sorry for the late reply as I was held up by family duties :). > Are you saying that an event (e.g. a coming together) cannot > be a condition (paccaya)? If so, I can show you lots of examples > from the Suttas where events are so described. k: Coming together cannot not be a condition unless they interact with each other. A lof of people come together in this DSG email list, but few of us contact each other :). > By virtue of the fact that an event can serve as a paccaya. > What do you see as problematic about this equation: "With > contact as condition there arises feeling" = "With the > coming together of eye, forms and eye consciousness as > condition there arises feeling" ? > > I see no problem at all. k: There is a problem because we must remember contact is clearly stated in the dependent origination before feelings. We can debate logic but I think such logic should adhere to Buddhist terms, just like you like to debate on sutta terms ;) . So the mere coming together is not contact, only when contact is manifested by the mere coming together, then that is contact. This can be seen in MN18 (contact is after the mere coming together). The mere coming is just describing the meeting of the bases, sense mediums and sense consciouness. It is the percursor of contact and not contact itself. k: Yet again, I requote what Nina wrote <> Ken O 37736 From: Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 5:41am Subject: Re: [dsg] Teeth-clenching was: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi, Ken O (and DN, and Ken H) - In a message dated 10/24/04 12:08:40 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@y... writes: > Hi DN > > Sorry for the delay, family duties call for attention :). > > Lets talk about exhortataion of purposive actions. So does action > spring out from the mind? Do you without panna, are in any chance > for us to use such descriptive behaviour as said in the sutta. If > panna does not conditon us to see the unwholesome of behaviour and > initate the ability to clench our teeths, I dont think we are able > to do it in the first instance. If panna is anatta, so how does > purposely action come from :). > > There are always in the sutta description of purposely actions but > we must first examine, the basis of conditions which arise without > an agent. Then we would know whether is there a called for > purposedly actions or such actions are conditioned from panna. > > > Ken O ======================= Dear Ken and Ken ;-) Is cetana a cetasika-in-exile? Have you and some others banished it to the land of the not-to-be-mentioned? You remember cetana, don't you? The Buddha called it "kamma" at times! ;-) Look, guys, ordinary speech involves people willfully doing things, exerting effort, and even clenching their teeth. None of that is meaningless. It is just ordinary speech. (You know, like the Buddha used!) What makes it meaningful is that there are actual events underlying that level of speech, events that really occur and that are indirectly pointed to by such speech. If every time one speaks in an ordinary manner one has to stop to attempt to reformulate it in a closer to literal fashion, no communication will ever occur. BTW, Ken O, I don't get what you mean by your rhetorical question "If panna is anatta, so how does purposely action come from." Pa~n~na *is*, of course, anatta, and so is cetana, and so is everything else. What of it? Purposeful action is action motivated by intention and (usually) craving. That's what it is. When I speak of action or acting I don't presume an agent for such. I don't presume an actor. Do you? If not, then where is there a problem with the idea of purposeful action? With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37737 From: Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 5:54am Subject: Re: [dsg] Contact Hi, Larry - In a message dated 10/24/04 12:22:22 PM Eastern Daylight Time, LBIDD@w... writes: > Hi all, > > I have a few thoughts to add to the great debate. First, I must say I > know nothing about the Atthasalani so I am taking my abhidhamma views > from the Visuddhimagga. > > It seems to me that the Honeyball Sutta doesn't say much about the > nature of contact so for those who prefer a minimal pointer I suppose > that is all one needs. > > Mn.18, par.17. "When there is the eye, a form, and eye-consciousness, > it is possible to point out the manifestation of contact." > > =========================== On ATI, Thanissaro Bhikkhu renders this by the following, which involves 'delineation' instead of 'manifestation'. (And a version on a different web site uses the wording 'the notion of'.) __________________________ Now, when there is the eye, when there are forms, when there is eye-consciousness, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of contact.[1] When there is a delineation of contact, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of feeling. When there is a delineation of feeling, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of perception. When there is a delineation of perception, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of thinking. When there is a delineation of thinking, it is possible that one will delineate a delineation of being assailed by the perceptions & categories of complication. 1. The artificiality of this phrase -- "delineate a delineation" -- seems intentional. It underlines the artifice implicit in the process by which the mind, in singling out events, turns them into discrete things. ------------------------------------------------ /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37738 From: htootintnaing Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 0:21pm Subject: Re: Dhamma Thread ( 095 ) Dear Connie, Thanks for your reply to Dhamma Thread. You said these three dhamma are papanca dhamma. Yes, these three dhamma tanha, mana, and ditthi are papanca dhamma. You said they extend the round of birth and so on. I would choose the word 'expand'. Papanca dhamma are dhamma that expand the samsara. I do not know which word you prefer. Is there any difference between extend and expand? With Metta, Htoo Naing ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, connieparker wrote: > > Hi, Htoo (and Herman), > Thanks for king lobha and the two queens, Htoo. > Just reading Dr. Mehm Tin Mon's Ultimate Science - THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHA > ABHIDHAMMA and he writes: Lobha, together with its two great followers, > i.e., di.t.thi (wrong view) and maana (conceit), is responsible for > extending the life cycle or the round of rebirth that is known as > sa.msaara. On account of this fact, lobha, di.t.thi and maana are > collectively called 'papa~nca dhamma'. > peace, > connie 37739 From: htootintnaing Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 0:33pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Dhamma Thread ( 095 ) Dear Mike, Thanks for your reply to Dhamma Thread. Papanca dhamma are those dhamma that expand the samsara. I have replied to Connie that I prefer expand rather than extend. I think 'extend' has only one direction while 'expand' comprises from a point to all directions that is 360 degrees. These papanca dhamma are tanha, mana and ditthi. The second Noble Truth is the cause of suffering which is craving. And it is lobha cetasika which is also known as tanha. There are 5 khandhas. All conditioned dhammas are finally these 5 khandhas. All these 5 khandhas are suffering or dukkha. These 5 khandhas which are suffering have a cause and The Buddha preached as Samudaya Sacca and it is lobha cetasika or tanha. So tanha is the chief cause of 5 khandhas, which is the samsara. As long as tanha is there samsara is endless and it is said that tanha expand the samsara. So tanha is one of papanca dhamma. Whenever tanha arises, the tanha king takes one of his companion queens. As mana and ditthi are companions of tanha or lobha cetasika, these two queens are also papanca dhamma. So all these three dhamma namely tanha or lobha, mana, and ditthi are collectively known as papanca dhamma. That is they expand 'the samsara'. They create 'the five khandhas'. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "m. nease" wrote: > Dear Connie and Htoo, > > Many thanks Htoo for the Queens--interesting, Connie--I don't recall hearing > of this connection between papa~nca, maana and di.t.thi before. All very > useful I think--if one thinks that concepts can be useful (and of course I > do). > > mike 37740 From: htootintnaing Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 1:32pm Subject: Concepts as condition beyond our control (was Re: [dsg] Re: killing in a dream) Dear Phil, More discussion here. With Metta, Htoo Naing PS: I know 'master of the day' should be a tile for ?? :-) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: Hello Htoo and all Thank you for your feedback, Htoo. Ph: But cannot concepts also act as conditioning factors? I quote from Nina's "Conditions": "Not only realities but also concepts can be a natural decisive support-condition for phenomena. (snip) The concept of a person can then be a natural decisive support- condition for attachment or loving-kindness. (snip) We need to think of concepts in order to take care of ourselves or in order to understand the Dhmma, and thus, time and again in our daily life concepts condition different types of citta by way of natural decisive support-conditioning." (end quote) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: I agree Nina and your quote here. Patthana is complicated and complex dhamma. I have started writing on 'Patthana Dhamma' and it is still at 'arammana paccaya'. You can view it at http://www.geocities.com/htootintnaing/patthana1.html Citta, cetasika, rupa, nibbana, pannatti and their interconnection can be studied in patthana. Upanissaya paccaya is a condition that deals with many dhammas. But I would suggest you not to be led by your dreams. Dreams are your thought and you just felt during dreaming. In manodvara vithi there is no pancavinnana cittas. Manovinnana vithi starts with manodvaravajjana citta which is a kiriya citta. And if the dream is very clear then there are tadarammana cittas which are all vipaka cittas. If the dreams are not very clear then there may not be vipaka cittas and you may not remember them at all. It is vipakas which link javana cittas who create new and new kamma. Example in pancadvara vithi cittas pancadvaravajjana citta just arises because of conditions. This is followed by different vipaka cittas until arising of manodvaravajjana citta who is a kiriya citta determining what cittas should follow. So in pancadvara vithi there are 2 gates who screen the messages. The first is pancadvaravajjana citta and the 2nd is manodvaravajjana citta. Between these 2 gates are all vipaka cittas. They are pancavinnana citta, sampaticchana citta, santirana citta. After manodvaravajjana citta who works as a votthapana citta there follow 7 javana cittas. All these are kamma-generating as long as these javanas are not of arahats. So there is a link between vipaka and javana. There is a long block of vipaka ( bhavanga cittas ) before pancadvaravajjana citta. After javanas if there are 2 tadarammana, they follow javana and then a long block of vipaka follow again. Main link is between 3 vipakas and 7 javana cittas. in the middle is a kiriya citta. All foregoing conditions incoming cittas. In case of manodvara vithi, there are only 3 dhammas. They are manodvaravajjana which is abyakata dhamma of kiriya, 7 javana cittas which may be akusala or kusala dhamma in case of dreams. And if the dreams are clear 2 vipakas follow. The clarity is because of tadarammana and they are vipaka. Pannatti does not arise and does not falls away. But it does condition dhamma that follow it with upanissaya paccaya. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: If a powerfully vivid concept arises in a dream, I would think it could condition cittas in the same way as if it were a concept fabricated in waking life. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Vividness is because of arising of vipaka cittas ( tadarammana cittas ). But I would suggest you not let the dreams lead you. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: It would seem to me that this can be confirmed by experience. I mean, if I have a horrible dream, and feel aversion the next day, that dosa was conditioned by the dream, surely. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: I dream less and less. I do not know why. I think because I am almost always thinking dhamma. Whenever I dream, I just view them as they are and then I am at my present. I do not let them lead my day. Because I am the 'master of the day' :-). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: I must say this puzzles me a bit, Htoo. There are conditions at work. There is the potential for right understanding in me that may gradually eradicate defilements, but the "power is in you" sounds like something I can grab hold on to at will, and I don't think that's right. It could be a matter of wording. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Well! It might be. I know there is no control. When Sukin controls his car steering wheel and when Sarah controls her arms, hands, thighs, calves and feet, there is no one actually controlling. Because there is no Sukin, no Sarah, no car, no steering wheel, no arm, no hand, no thigh, no calf, and no foot at all. So does 'you' here. So, you may assume it as 'wording'. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: The power is the potential to have right understanding of the dosa that arises because of the dream, to understand that the dosa is conditioned, and not-self, to see that and be detached from it. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Exactly. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: But the condition is still there at work, surely. I mean, if I feel aversion because of the dream, what else could it be except a condition at work? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: This will depend on your practice of dhamma. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Phil: Again, I'm just beginning to learn about conditons. > Htoo > Here, there is no you but the power is inside of you. You are the > > master of your kamma even though there have never been you there. So > > the dream should not at any moment lead you the whole day. Phil: Should not, ideally, if I have the right understanding to see the dosa for what it is. But that right understanding is not-self, not within my immediate control. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Exactly right. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Htoo> It has been far away to condition thinking as the dream has passed > > away when you wake up. But what conditions your thinking is that your > > thinking itself. This again is directed by yourself. Actually you are > > the master of the day and the master is not the dream. Phil: Htoo! "Master of the day?!?" That sounds like a action movie title,not anatta! Have you been taking Dhamma steroids! (joke) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: I used to give many titles to different writings. 'Tracing the mind track' is another action movies coming soon. Intro have been started. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Htoo: > This is cognition of vedana which is a reality. If this is done > properly, this is kusala citta and this will finally lead you to > enlightenment. Ph: Ah yes, as I learned from Nina, if there is dosa or lobha and I am mindful of it as anatta, the citta will then be kusala. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Isn't that a good point?. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > Htoo: > Interesting. But it is not the only condition for the whole day. If > this is so, you have surrendered the mastery through out the day. > Should this happen? No. I would not allow such matter. Ph: I'm still interested in this. The way the thought stands out so clearly, sometimes, when we wake. But Htoo, how can you demand mastery when each lifetime is conditioned in an irreversible way by the patisandhi citta (spelling?) There is only so much we should expect to control. Yes, there is always the opportunity to have right understanding of realities, thus liberating us from creating fresh akusala kamma, but I think "surrendering the mastery" is part and parcel of the renunciation that is one of the Paramis. Of course it is all very subtle. We see that in the "crossing the flood" sutta. We don't press ahead too hard, but we don't stand still either. Thank you, Htoo. I teased you in a friendly way about "master of the day" but truly it is good to read stirring encouragement like that. I talk of having no control over things, but there *is* control arising, of course, thanks to wisdom we gain from the Buddha's teaching, and examination of our experience, and Dhamma discussion with good Dhamma friends. But it is control that we should be very wary of thinking we can exercise at will just because a friend tells us we can. It has to arise,or not arise, in a conditioned way, I think. Otherwise it can turn into a self-preservation exercise, especially for beginners like me. Metta, Phil ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Htoo: Dear Phil, there does exist control. I do not mean Atta. That control is conventional one. If there is no control, how can siila be practised? Control does exist. The Buddha encouraged to control strayed thought not to arise. The Buddha encourage people to control wanting to kill someone, to control wanting to steal things, to control wanting to have sex with other people's wives, to control wanting to self intoxication with alcohol or addictives. This is conventional control. As I said above, Sukin is controlling his car's steering wheel, Sarah is controlling her limbs while she is swimming. But all are anatta and there is in essence no control at all. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing 37741 From: htootintnaing Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 2:39pm Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 096 ) Dear Dhamma Friends, In the kingdom of lobha cittas, the king is lobha cetasika or tanha. This king has two queens. But he never appears on the throne with two queens as the throne has just a room for 2 people. When the king lobha takes the queen ditthi, queen mana has to stay back in her room in the palace. Ditthi is a cetasika. It advises the citta to see things in the wrong way and it also advises other cetasikas to do so in the same way as the leader citta would do. It is a wrong assumption. It is a wrong conclusion. Ditthi represents the wrong picture to the leader citta. And the leader of all mental faculties then assumes in the wrong way. Queen ditthi also advises the king lobha to assume in the wrong way. Again the king lobha also leads the queen ditthi in order to achieve what he wants. The characeter of lobha is wanting to take everything and will never surrender its will. While the king lobha advises the queen to be greedy, the queen ditthi supports the king lobha to view in the wrong way and they are actually mutually boostering their akusala effect. As long as the queen ditthi is there, the king lobha will look for what he wants and all he wants is all the wrong things because he has been advised by the queen ditthi to view in the wrong way. There are 5 khandhas. But these 5 khandhas are not seen as khandhas because the great akusala king moha covers with its darkness. With the aids of this great king's generals ahirika or shameless and anottappa or fearlessness and the secretary of that great king uddhacca, lobha the subsidized king dare do its job of wanting cravingly. This craving or tanha or the king lobha is lobha cetasika is it is always referred to as samudaya sacca or the 2nd truth of 4 ariyas' sacca or 4 Noble Truths. This lobha is the leader of papanca dhamma. Papanca dhamma are dhamma that expand the samsara. This means that lobha is creating kamma and this again causes arising of 5 upadanakkhandhas. This small king lobha creates kamma and 5 upadanakkhandhas because of his queen ditthi. The function of this queen ditthi is to suggest viewing in the wrong way. This post is for ditthi and this simile is like the king lobha when he sits with the queen ditthi on the throne in their palace. In lobha cittas, there are 8 lobha mula cittas. Ditthi gata sampayutta cittas are all associated with ditthi cetasika. There are 4 ditthi cittas. Or there are 4 lobha cittas with ditthi cetasikas. All these 4 ditthi gata sampayutta cittas are led by the great akusala king moha. Moha is darkness. It covers the light. The light of seeing dukkha as dukkha. As there is no light, dukkha is not seen. Moreover, ahirika and anottappa also support these 4 lobha cittas. Uddhacca also supports the group. Overall, all these 4 lobha cittas have a citta as the greatest king. This greatest king is regularly supported by great akusala king moha and in the akusala kingdom small king lobha supports the greatest king citta. While lobha is contributing to the greatest king citta, queen ditthi also contributes. Citta has distinctive character and so do other nama dhamma such as moha, ahirika, anottappa, uddhacca, lobha, and ditthi. 13 annasamana cetasikas that is 7 permanent ministers and 6 flexible ministers also join in and there are 19 cetasikas in 4 lobha cittas roughly. If lobha citta does not have somanassa there is no piti arise and there will be 18 cetasikas. Still this has to be modified. But at this stage, these matters will be left alone. When citta, and 19 distinctive and separate cetasikas are working, there is no person at all. They are anatta. They do not last long and they just last for a cittakkhana or they just last a khana or moment when a citta exists. They all are anicca or impermanent. They all are nothing but they are suffering and dukkha. May you all be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome and they will be valuable. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts. 37742 From: connieparker Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 4:19pm Subject: Re: Dhamma Thread ( 095 ) Dear Htoo and Mike, The way you explained it to Mike (I think 'extend' has only one direction while 'expand' comprises from a point to all directions that is 360 degrees) sounds right to me and I personally wouldn't have any problem saying either - that papanca extends or expands samsara. In the original quote, though, Dr. Tin Mon wrote that papanca "is responsible for extending the life cycle or the round of rebirth that is known as samsara". Somehow, 'expanding the life-cycle' doesn't sound quite right but does have a tempting "more panca-upadana-khanda is better/more fullfilling" flavour to it. 'Life-cycle' would be extended in duration or throughout ever more and more cycles. Still, our lifetimes also expand into other bhumis than just this rare and current human one. A little later, Dr. Tin Mon touches on another aspect of papanca: "...moha clouds the mind and blinds the eye not to see things as they really are. It makes one see things as nicca (permanent), sukha (pleasant), atta (self or person) and subha (beautiful). Because of this wrong vision, lobha clings or attaches to this ‘self or person’ and di.t.thi takes the wrong view that ‘self’ and ‘person’ really exist. The most basic and universal wrong view is the ‘personality-belief’ (sakkaaya-di.t.thi) or ‘ego-illusion’ (atta-di.t.thi). Sakkaaya-di.t.thi believes that this combination of mind and body is ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘person’, etc. Atta-di.t.thi believes in the existence of an ‘atta or soul’ or ‘ego’ or ‘life-entity’ in the body. ***From this sakkaaya-di.t.thi or atta-di.t.thi as well as from the ignorance due to moha there spring up thousands of wrong views.***" abhidhaultsci.pdf eBUDDHANET'S BOOK LIBRARY www.buddhanet.net peace, con-cept 37743 From: kenhowardau Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 4:35pm Subject: [dsg] Teeth-clenching was: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi Howard and Ken O, Firstly, Howard, thank you for your well wishes regarding my parents' health. Dad has gone into hospital for a few days, so I have returned home until they need me again. You mention cetana (champion it, even) as if Ken O and I have forgotten it exists. But no, we are both aware of cetana: it is an absolute reality that can be correctly described only by a Buddha. If that description has been heard and wisely considered, conditions will be in place for cetana to be directly understood. -------------- H: > When I speak of action or acting I don't presume an agent for such. I don't presume an actor. Do you? > ------------ In theory, no, but in practice, probably yes. When I desire to walk from here to the door, I probably have an idea of an enduring entity that will leave one place and arrive at the other. ------------- H: > If not, then where is there a problem with the idea of purposeful action? > --------------- Either way, there is no problem: ultimately, purposeful action is cetana, and that is how it is to be understood. For the purposes of satipatthana, there is no value in understanding action as the movements of a human frame through time and space. Kind regards, Ken H 37744 From: Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 0:40pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Teeth-clenching was: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi, Ken - In a message dated 10/24/04 7:38:12 PM Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: > Either way, there is no problem: ultimately, purposeful action is > cetana, and that is how it is to be understood. For the purposes of > satipatthana, there is no value in understanding action as the > movements of a human frame through time and space. > > ======================== Hey! We agree!!! ;-)) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37745 From: Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 4:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Enter The Abhidhammika! Whereupon the Sautrantika grabbed him by the ears... Hi Dighanakha, You wrote:"...Then, instead of appealing to the authority of tradition ("generations after generations"), hearsay or faith ("Buddhaghosa and the commentators were all arahants"), you should just stick to discussing what the texts are saying, relying on reason and evidence rather than argumenta ad hominem and ad antiquitatem." L: You could apply the same standard to the suttas. There are many things in the suttas that won't pass scientific scrutiny, conversations with devas for example. So what? This doesn't bother me in the least. As I see it, our task is to use what is written to help us understand experience. What is useful to a particular person is a matter of accumulations which, in turn, can be a matter of patience. Things gradually start to make sense. Additionally, I'm having trouble following your argument. Are you saying the standard sutta dependent arising formula is different from Buddhaghosa's commentaries therefore the commentaries are wrong? Or are you saying the commentaries are wrong because they don't accord with some other commentaries or don't accord with your experience or understanding? It seems to me that given the creative nature of conceptualization any two sentences about anything can agree or disagree with one another in one way or another. [Sorry, been thinking about Derrida lately :-))] Anyway, thanks for posting from the Abhidharmakosa Bhasyam. I'd like to see the rest if it's not too much trouble. One thing I've never understood is where Theravada (aka Buddhaghosa) fits into discussions of Sautrantika and Sarvastivada. Would it be possible to get a basic skeletal outline of important differences between Theravada and the other two? thanks, Larry 37746 From: Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 5:01pm Subject: Vism.XIV,110 "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga) Ch. XIV 110. So the 21 kinds of profitable, the 12 kinds of unprofitable, the 36 kinds of resultant, and the 20 kinds of functional, amount in all to 89 kinds of consciousness. And these occur in the fourteen modes of (a) rebirth-linking, (b) life-continuum, (c) adverting, (d) seeing, (e) hearing, (f) smelling, (g) tasting, (h) touching, (i) receiving, (j) investigating, (k) determining, (l) impulsion, (m) registration, and (n) death. 37747 From: Andrew Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 7:01pm Subject: Re: Enter The Abhidhammika! Whereupon the Sautrantika grabbed him by the ears... Dear DN Another fascinating post. Thank you. A question below: --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "dighanakha" wrote: [snip] Then, instead of appealing to the authority > of tradition ("generations after generations"), hearsay or > faith ("Buddhaghosa and the commentators were all > arahants"), you should just stick to discussing what the > texts are saying, relying on reason and evidence rather than > argumenta ad hominem and ad antiquitatem. You rule out *appealing to* faith, but Saddha isn't explicitly included in the above formula on the positive side and I'm wondering why not? If we are only to discuss texts, reason and evidence, how do we deal with the anger-eating yakkhas spoken of by the Buddha in the Suttas? We can't say "just have faith" because that offends against the formula. Do we just not discuss them at all? Surely that would be a case of selective blindness, though. What do you think? Best wishes Andrew T 37748 From: nori Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 7:46pm Subject: Re: Details on Vedana Hi Larry, I believe, all feeling, whether originating from the body senses or any other senses (and of course, feelings originating in the mind), all take place in the mind. The body cannot feel; the mind feels. I posted an article in the past, about people with amputated arms who still feel 'sensation' in their amputated arm as if it exists. And where do they feel this sensation ? ... on the arm. But its not there. And so, no sensation could be taking place in the arm, it takes place in the mind. --- And I think you are right, sensations are neutral, it is our reactions to the sensations that are painful, pleasent, or neither-... But our reaction to the sensations are conditioned by formations in the mind and body. with metta, nori --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Larry" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "nori" > wrote: > > > > Hi Dhamma Friends, > > > > I think it is a common misunderstanding, as expressed by some in > the > > past, that Vedana (feeling) is understood as being exclusively 'a > > mind born emotional feeling' and excludes bodily sensation via > > contact of body sense (organ). > > > snip > > Hi Nori, > > I was just thinking about feeling this morning. You bring up a good > question: how do we feel? Specifically, what is bodily feeling and > how can it be purely mental (nama)? I think the only way to find out > is to look really carefully. > > I've been wrestling with a similar question. In abhidhamma tangible > data is experienced with pleasant or unpleasant feeling while sound, > flavor, odor, and light are experienced only with neutral feeling. > How can this be? Flavor clearly is accompanied by a pleasant or > unpleasant feeling. One thought that occurred is that possibly in the > sensuous plane all sense door experience is intimately associated > with the body door. A pleasant taste can be located in the body. Even > a pleasant visual experience is "easy on the eyes". So perhaps we can > say a flavor is tasted with neutral feeling but it is also > experienced through the body door in the tongue area with pleasant or > unpleasant feeling. However, a pleasant taste is unique to taste and > different from pleasant touch. > > Now the question arises, is pleasant feeling ever really tangible? > Does it have a texture? No. It's easy to say that but I think we have > to look and see, particularly with regard to painful feeling. > > Btw, you might be interested in the Commentary to the Satipatthana > Sutta at Access to Insight, translated by Soma Thera. > > Larry 37749 From: Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 9:19pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Details on Vedana Nori: "I believe, all feeling, whether originating from the body senses or any other senses (and of course, feelings originating in the mind), all take place in the mind." Hi Nori, I agree but I think it is difficult to really see that. The example of the amputated arm that was still felt is a good one. The feeling _seemed_ to be in an arm that wasn't there. When I do something I don't want to do or avoid doing something I don't want to do there is often a painful bodily feeling involved and I unconsciously rationalize that performing this activity is painful to the body but in reality it isn't the least bit harmful to the body. Also I attach pleasant and unpleasant feelings to physical objects thereby giving them the appearance of having inherent value. Even when pleasant or unpleasant feeling is intimately associated with like or dislike, feeling is one thing and like or dislike is another. Feeling is a very interesting phenomenon. We should identify it often. Larry 37750 From: Ken O Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 10:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Details on Vedana Hi Nori and Larry As we know there are five types of feelings generally described in the suttas which inlcudes the bodily feelings. It is also clear in the suttas where each sensory rupas is felt by the respective sensory cittas. So what is felt in the body sensation only belongs to the body citta that arisen to cognise the bodily rupas. Hence technicaly speaking it is not right to say that bodily sensation is felt by the mind cittas. Larry brings up an interesting point. << Even when pleasant or unpleasant feeling is intimately associated with like or dislike, feeling is one thing and like or dislike is another. Feeling is a very interesting phenomenon. We should identify it often>> This experience has been discussed in the DART Sutta Ken O 37751 From: Ken O Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 10:34pm Subject: Ultimate Reality Hi All Just a thought that I would like to share. How do we differentiate ultimate reality and conventional reality. I feel the difference is whether we experience it. We can know to feel but we cannot know a concept like a table only through a mind construct. I think I like to say that there is no direct knowing of the object. Another question is that is citta really that fast? I was wondering if citta is not fast, how do we see light in a continuous stream without a breakage. It must be fast enough to take it as an object. Thats just my thoughts Ken O 37752 From: Ken O Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 10:59pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Teeth-clenching was: Re: The Sammaditthi Sutta: / Htoo Hi Howard Definitely cetana is around all the while :). I not saying something new. I am prostulating that the behaviour we have depends largely on the roots. How we react on a situation depends largely on the root that cause these behaviour. Just like our lobha mula cittas will conditioned the believe of a self, to me that is how we think that an I is doing something. Hence to get rid of the lobha mula citta does not embrace another I to get rid of it because that will only increase the tendency for an I to arise. I think it should be using panna to unroot the I root but panna does not appear when I appears as they are exlusive. In the same way, we have to realise whether such a purposely led action rooted in and whether a purposedly led action will condition panna to arise. Energy to strive for the wholesome have to be rise in conjuction with panna in order for it to be wholesome. But we think we should do something to get rid of an I with an initial rooted believe that is an I doing something, then the inital ground is already unwholesome. As we all know, see things directly, this means that is no I that prostulate an action, it just noticing, investigation or reflecting or mindfully as thing they really are. Events or objects arise on their own whether we are doing wholesome or unwholesome, it is beyond an agent. So can we used an agent to get rid of an agent since the arisen of the agent is already rooted in lobha mula citta. Basically to me actions arisen out of wholesome roots must be due to panna which is grown through considerations, reflection, listening, investigation and not out of an I action which is rooted in lobha mula cittas. Sometimes to me, it is diffcult to explain that purposedly led action could be rooted in lobha mula cittas. I think the Relay Chariot Sutta is the closest sutta I think prostulating such a behaviour. I think it is nowadays hard to believe that just by considering and listening and investigating, panna will grow. As usual, I would say the practise of satipatthana is every moment as we cannot escape from sense objects and not any kind of purposedly led action could be rooted in lobha mula. Again, to me the that is the danger in purposedly led action. However, it is still up to each individual underlying tendecies to do what they think is right because Buddhism is build upon our individual accumulations. Ken O 37753 From: dighanakha Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 11:03pm Subject: Re: Enter The Abhidhammika! Whereupon the Sautrantika grabbed him by the ears... Hello Andrew. dig>> Then, instead of appealing to the authority of tradition dig>> ("generations after generations"), hearsay or faith dig>> ("Buddhaghosa and the commentators were all arahants"), you dig>> should just stick to discussing what the texts are saying, dig>> relying on reason and evidence rather than argumenta ad dig>> hominem and ad antiquitatem. A> You rule out *appealing to* faith, but Saddha isn't A> explicitly included in the above formula on the positive A> side and I'm wondering why not? My statement was context-specific. It was only aimed at setting the parameters for a reasonable discussion of canonical and commentarial treatment of phassa, not at telling people the grounds on which they should personally arrive at a decision. If someone prompted by faith takes the line "If Buddhaghosa says sangati means sangatiyaa, then sangatiyaa it is!" then that's their business. But for a reasonable discussion between people of dissenting views, such a line of 'argument' must from the outset be ruled inadmissible. I wanted to make this clear at the beginning because it's tiresome to go to all the trouble of checking one's sources, translating relevant passages etc., only to have some drivelling faith-head countering with "But the Standard Commentaries were written by arahants!" as if this faith claim were some kind of trump card that settled everything. A> If we are only to discuss texts, reason and evidence, how do A> we deal with the anger-eating yakkhas spoken of by the A> Buddha in the Suttas? We can't say "just have faith" because A> that offends against the formula. Do we just not discuss A> them at all? Surely that would be a case of selective A> blindness, though. What do you think? I suppose if someone with a fervent faith in anger-eating yakkhas met someone who strongly disbelieved in them, it would be up to the two of them to determine what sort of parameters their debate should have. But this is a quite different kettle of fish to a discussion of the meaning of phassa in early and late Buddhist texts. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37754 From: dighanakha Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 11:57pm Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hello Ken O. dig>> Are you saying that an event (e.g. a coming together) cannot dig>> be a condition (paccaya)? If so, I can show you lots of dig>> examples from the Suttas where events are so described. K> Coming together cannot be a condition unless they K> interact with each other. Yes it can. Strangers on buses in England normally don't interract with each other, but their coming together is a condition for the bus to use more diesel fuel than it would if there had been no coming together. Not that such an analogy is required to prove the point: the very fact that the third factor is sensory-*consciousness* tells us that the three factors ARE interracting. The very fact that consciousness is there tells us that there is an *effectual* coming together that will produce vedanaa. dig>> What do you see as problematic about this equation: "With dig>> contact as condition there arises feeling" = "With the dig>> coming together of eye, forms and eye consciousness as dig>> condition there arises feeling" ? K> There is a problem because we must remember contact is K> clearly stated in the dependent origination before feelings. I know. I had said as much in the passage above. K> We can debate logic but I think such logic should adhere to K> Buddhist terms, just like you like to debate on sutta terms K> ;) . So the mere coming together is not contact, only when K> contact is manifested by the mere coming together, then that K> is contact. This can be seen in MN18 (contact is after the K> mere coming together). The mere coming is just describing K> the meeting of the bases, sense mediums and sense K> consciouness. It is the percursor of contact and not contact K> itself. Ken, MN18 (the Honeyball Sutta) does not say that. It is the Atthasaalinii that gives that explanation. The Sutta says: "Dependent on the eye and forms eye-consciousness arises. The coming together of the three IS contact." It does not say that these three are a precursor to contact. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37755 From: Ken O Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 2:06am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi DN Hi DN > Ken, MN18 (the Honeyball Sutta) does not say that. It is the > Atthasaalinii that gives that explanation. The Sutta says: > > "Dependent on the eye and forms eye-consciousness arises. > The coming together of the three IS contact." > > It does not say that these three are a precursor to contact. > If it does not say it is a percusor then why in the next statement it said, <> As I say, we should look at the logic of Buddhism dhamma. Yes it said that the coming together of the three IS contact but it emphasis with contact as condition in the next statement. Remember Abhidhamma say that contact can only be show or manifested by the coming together and not the coming together is contact and this is supported by your translation below. Abhidhamma method of saying that condition arise concurrently with contact but remember it does not say that it will manifested itself before the three coming together. This is only possible when the three came together, then contact will be known but the mere coming together is not contact - this to make clear that contact itself is an event that has arise from the coming together. <<"... We read in the 'Discourse of the Honey-ball' (Middle Length Sayings I, no. 18) that Mahaa-Kaccaana explained to the monks concerning contact: This situation occurs: that when there is eye, your reverences, when there is visible object, when there is visual consciousness, one will recognise the manifestation of sensory impingement (phassa)... ' ">> - this is a clear indication of an event when there is a visual citta, then phassa will be manifested. I do not discuss for the sake of winning any point of view, we will have to argue as I said based on dhamma logic. Contact is clearly an event after the coming together, as I said earlier if you see Dependent Origination. Ken o 37756 From: dighanakha Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 5:39am Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hello Ken O. dig>> Ken, MN18 (the Honeyball Sutta) does not say that. It is the dig>> Atthasaalinii that gives that explanation. The Sutta says: dig>> "Dependent on the eye and forms eye-consciousness arises. dig>> The coming together of the three IS contact." dig>> It does not say that these three are a precursor to contact. K> If it does not say it is a percusor then why in the next K> statement it said, < arise....>> What does that have to do with anything? The statement you refer to is talking about something different: about what phassa gives rise to, not about what phassa is, nor about what the 'coming together' is. A precursor precedes something. Contact is a precursor of feeling because feeling arises with contact as condition. Contact comes first, then comes feeling. If the Buddha had wanted to say that first there's the 'coming together', then contact arises, then he had plenty of ways of saying it. All he needed to do was add one syllable to 'sangati'. Why didn't he? I would say it's because that was *not* what he meant. It was the identity of phassa with the coming together that he was teaching. K> As I say, we should look at the logic of Buddhism dhamma. In fact in the next parts of your post you have not looked at "the logic of Buddhism dhamma" nor any other sort of logic, but have simply buttressed your claim with yet another Commentary-derived notion. This is hardly admissible in a discussion where the Commentaries' fidelity to the Suttas is the very thing in question. K> Yes it said that the coming together of the three IS contact K> but it emphasis with contact as condition in the next K> statement. Yes, in the NEXT statement. But the next statement is dealing with something different. K> Remember Abhidhamma say that contact can only be show or K> manifested by the coming together and not the coming K> together is contact and this is supported by your K> translation below. I know the Atthasalini says this, but do the Suttas support this commentarial notion? If so, where? (N.B. The manifestation passage in the Madhupindika Sutta does not constitute a denial of the identity of the 'coming together' with phassa, in contrast to what 'manifestation' means in the Atthasalini). K> Abhidhamma method of saying that condition arise K> concurrently with contact but remember it does not say that K> it will manifested itself before the three coming together. K> This is only possible when the three came together, then K> contact will be known but the mere coming together is not K> contact - this to make clear that contact itself is an event K> that has arise from the coming together. Here too for the umpteenth time you have merely reiterated how the Commentaries define phassa. But no matter how many times you do this, it won't bring you a jot closer to showing that this is what the Buddha of the Suttas meant by the term. K> <<"... We read in the 'Discourse of the Honey-ball' (Middle K> Length Sayings I, no. 18) that Mahaa-Kaccaana explained to K> the monks concerning contact: K> This situation occurs: that when there is eye, your K> reverences, when there is visible object, when there is K> visual consciousness, one will recognise the manifestation K> of sensory impingement (phassa)... ' ">> - this is a clear K> indication of an event when there is a visual citta, then K> phassa will be manifested. I'm not sure if I understand you. By "then" do you mean "afterwards" or "as a result" or both? If you mean "as a result" then do you mean a result that is simultaneous with the coming together? Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) P.S. To Larry (and anyone interested) I will continue with extracts from the Bhasyam. Today's passage is actually the very beginning of the discussion of sparsa (phassa), that immediately precedes the part I posted last time. It consists of the initial Sarvastivadin thesis from the Kosa itself, then Vasubandhu's commentary (writing as if he were a Sarvastivadin). No kick-ass Sautrantika stuff today. Kosa: There are six contacts. They arise from encounter.[*] Bhasyam: The first is the contact of the eye, and the sixth is the contact of mind (manas). They arise from the coming together of three things, an organ, its object, and a consciousness. One can see indeed that there can be a coming together of the five material organs, with their objects and their corresponding consciousnesses, for the three are simultaneous. But the mental organ or mind-element (manodhaatu) is destroyed when a mental consciousness (manovij~naana) arises; and the object (i.e. dharmas) of this consciousness can be future: so how can there be a coming together of the three? There is a coming together because the organ (manas) and the object (the dharmas) are the causal conditions of the mental consciousness; or rather because the organ, the object and the consciousness produce the same single effect, namely the contact. 37757 From: ashkenn2k Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 6:43am Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi DN Precisely that what Buddha trying to say, first the coming together then contact could be known or manifested. If not why did Maha Kaccana describe sense impingement in details << This situation occurs: that when there is eye, your reverences, when there is visible object, when there is visual consciousness, one will recognise the manifestation of sensory impingement (phassa)... ' ">> . When there is eye, visible objects and visual consciouness, one will recognise the manifestation of phassa. <> Here the coming together ryhmes with the above, when there is eye.... till visual citta. I dont see any digress because to me, linking them, <> Ken o 37758 From: Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 3:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi, Ken (and DN) - In a message dated 10/25/04 5:09:10 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@y... writes: > Hi DN > > >Ken, MN18 (the Honeyball Sutta) does not say that. It is the > >Atthasaalinii that gives that explanation. The Sutta says: > > > >"Dependent on the eye and forms eye-consciousness arises. > >The coming together of the three IS contact." > > > >It does not say that these three are a precursor to contact. > > > > If it does not say it is a percusor then why in the next statement it > said, <> > > As I say, we should look at the logic of Buddhism dhamma. Yes it > said that the coming together of the three IS contact but it emphasis > with contact as condition in the next statement. Remember Abhidhamma > say that contact can only be show or manifested by the coming > together and not the coming together is contact and this is supported > by your translation below. Abhidhamma method of saying that > condition arise concurrently with contact but remember it does not > say that it will manifested itself before the three coming together. > This is only possible when the three came together, then contact will > be known but the mere coming together is not contact - this to make > clear that contact itself is an event that has arise from the coming > together. > > <<"... We read in the 'Discourse of the Honey-ball' (Middle Length > Sayings I, no. 18) that Mahaa-Kaccaana explained to the monks > concerning contact: > > This situation occurs: that when there is eye, your > reverences, when there is visible object, when there is visual > consciousness, one will recognise the manifestation of sensory > impingement (phassa)... ' ">> - this is a clear indication of an > event when there is a visual citta, then phassa will be manifested. > I do not discuss for the sake of winning any point of view, we will > have to argue as I said based on dhamma logic. Contact is clearly an > event after the coming together, as I said earlier if you see > Dependent Origination. > > > Ken o > > ============================ Ken, I think you should look a bit more carefully at this matter. You are mixing "before" and "after", and you are mixing "cause" and "effect", and not discerning what conditions are causes for what effects. Sense object, sense door, and sense consciousness are, of course conditions for their coming together. It is said in the sutta that their coming together is exactly what contact is, and that, in turn, is a condition for the arising of feeling. Thus, what we have is as in the following diagram, where the arrows represent conditionality: sense object --------> sense door --------> contact ---------> Feeling sense consciousness --------> (Convergence) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37759 From: Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 3:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hi again, Ken - In a message dated 10/25/04 10:17:51 AM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@a... writes: > > sense object --------> > sense door --------> contact ---------> > Feeling > sense consciousness --------> > (Convergence) > > ========================= The arrows went awry in the course of mailing the post. The word 'Feeling' should be on the line above it, to the right of the arrow following 'contact', and the "sense consciousness" and "convergence" lines should corresponding be one line higher. Also, the first group of three arrows should be lined up, pointing towards 'contact', and the parenthesized word 'convergence' should be further right, directly under the word 'contact'. Sorry. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37760 From: jwromeijn Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 9:09am Subject: Historical origins dharma/dhamma-lists Hallo all A quote from 'On being mindless' by Paul Griffiths It's made in the chapter about the Vaibhasika, but can be seen as a general remark on the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma's. To me the elegance of the reasoning makes it likely that he is right. All the tenths of dhamm's are not a kind of revelation but the empirical result of introspection of (wise but perhaps not faultless) human beings. I only don't like his use of the term 'metaphysics' as a translation of 'Abhidharma; most times 'metaphysics' means a philosophy that assumes an ultimate truth that cannot be experienced with our empirical senses). Metta Joop "The relative weighting of the dharma-lists between the mental and the physical shows where the major interests of the architects of this metaphysical system lay and, I think, suggests something about the historical origins of the entire system. It is arguable, though by no means certain, that the abhidharmic taxonomic enterprise had its origins in the practice of certain types of introspective analytical meditation which where highly valued in the early Buddhist tradition and which essentially require the practioner to deconstruct the gestalt of everyday experience into its component parts and to learn to label and identify the separate and transient mental events from which Buddhist theory links the continuities of everyday experience are constructed. Once the importance of such meditational practices was assumed by the tradition, a corresponding significance was granted to the intellectual enterprise of developing a systematic metaphysic which was adequate to the task of classifying the mental events perceived by introspection. This historical explanation goes some way to explaining the greater interest of the systems in mental events than in the nature of the physical universe." 37761 From: ericlonline Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 1:45pm Subject: Re: Ultimate Reality Hey Ken O, > Just a thought that I would like to share. > > How do we differentiate ultimate reality and conventional reality. By conventional reality only. I > feel the difference is whether we experience it. We can know to feel > but we cannot know a concept like a table only through a mind > construct. I think I like to say that there is no direct knowing of > the object. What is an object? > Another question is that is citta really that fast? I was wondering > if citta is not fast, how do we see light in a continuous stream > without a breakage. It must be fast enough to take it as an object. Do you see a light stream or color? Do you hear a dog bark or sound? PEACE E 37762 From: nori Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 2:50pm Subject: The Buddha's "Meditative Technique" (Ven. Bhante Vimalaramsi) Hi Dhamma friends, I just wanted to share this dialog which was posted in another group which might be helpful to some here regrding specific meditation technique. --- From: "nori" Date: Sat Oct 23, 2004 12:41 pm Subject: Question for Bhante Vimalaramsi (re: detail on attention to breath) Hi Bhante, I would be greatful if you answered me this question. --- How do you watch your breath during sitting meditation ? Is the center of your attention upon the *sensations* of the breath at the region of the nose, or is it upon its *motion* (through the entirety of the senses) ? Thank you in advance. metta, nori --- From: Bhante Vimalaramsi Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 2:28 pm Subject: Re: [Triplegem] Re:The Buddha's "Meditative Technique" Dhamma Greetings Nori, I have written the Buddha's instructions (from this sutta) a few times on this group, but I will attempt again. Please note that I know how strong attachments about this can be, and if it is looked at through beginner's eyes it may be helpful. I will show where the sutta is written and where my comments are; Please note that I am commenting on the sutta and it is not my opinion but an attempt to show you what these instruction say and mean. In the Anapanasati sutta (#118 MN. starting at section #16 )it says: 16] "And how, bhikkhus, is mindfulness of breathing developed and cultivated, so that it is of great fruit and great benefit? 17] "Here a bhikkhu, gone to the forest, or to the root of a tree or an empty hut, sits down; having crossed his legs crosswise, with his body erect, and establishes mindfulness in front of him, ever mindful he breathes in, mindful he breathes out.. 18] "Breathing in long, he understands: 'I breathe in long'; or breathing out long, he understands, 'I breathe out long; Breathing in short, he understands, 'I breathe in short'; or breathing out short, he understands, 'I breathe out short'. ************ Comment: So far in these instructions have you run across the words nose, nostril tip, abdomen, or breath sensation at any of these places? No? WHY? Because the Anapanasati sutta, the Satipatthana Sutta, the Kayagatasati Sutta, or any other sutta instructions (Not my opinion) don't use these words, these ideas about the nose, nostril tip, abdomen and sensation that arises at these places are the opinion of the commentaries and sub-commentaries. The reason that I say this is because you don't see them mentioned at all in these suttas. So what do these instruction say and mean? It says he understands when he has taken a long or short breath. Please notice that it hasn't mentioned concentrating on the breath but he simply understands what the breath is doing in the present moment without mentioning a specific place to watch it. I personally (this is my opinion) take this to mean that the meditator also knows when they are breathing fast or slow, or when the breath is coarse or fine. But again it does not say to "Keep" one's focus only on the breath and deeply concentrate on it to the exclusion of everything else (not my opinion). Nor does it say that this is the only object of meditation to observe (again not my opinion). It just uses the word understands which to me says that the meditator knows what the breath is doing in the present moment but to not over-focus on it. ********* Sutta: Next it says: he trains thus: 'I shall breathe in experiencing the entire body; He trains thus: 'I shall breathe out experiencing the entire body" ******* Comment: Please notice that now instead of using the words he understands it has changed to He trains thus. So the first two lines of the meditation instruction say to understand or know what the breath is doing in a more general way and now the instructions are saying to use the breath in a more specific way, as a reminder to help the meditator to experience the entire body on the in and out breath. So now the breath is used not as a focus point but a reminder to notice and experience the entire body. In this way the breath although it is important is not the main focus of the meditation. The experiencing the entire body on the in breath and out breath is just as important as the breath itself. Again this is not my opinion, but is straight from the sutta. The breath is used in conjunction with other things. ******* Sutta: Next the sutta says: "He trains thus: 'I shall breathe in tranquilizing the bodily formation: He trains thus: 'I shall breathe out tranquilizing the bodily formation". ******* Comment: Now we get to the crux of the instructions given in this sutta. It says to tranquilize (relax) the bodily formation on the in and out breath (Not my opinion). In this way if these instructions are followed, the meditator will experience a different type of awareness than when they focus only on the breath itself. As a result, the insights into the way dependent origination works becomes a real observation (not a philosophy to be debated). One of the things that I have noticed is that these instructions say to tranquilize the bodily formation whether there is any noticeable tightness or not. Also, in America the bodily formation seems to mean to most people to be from the neck down. But the body includes the head, too. And this seems to me from direct observation to be a very important place to tranquilize (relax). When I first started going through the suttas and realized just how important following them closely was. I decided to take two weeks and do a self-retreat only following these instructions. I went so much deeper with better understanding in such a short time. And the meditation was so interesting that I actually spent 3 months in retreat. That is one of the advantages of being a monk, one can take the time to deeply explore dhamma without feeling they have to go do something else. Anyway, I saw directly the advantages of practicing the meditation in this way. Anytime mind becomes distracted (pulled away from the breath and relaxing) then the meditator looks at this distraction not as a problem to be forced away, but an opportunity to see how this process of Dependent Origination (D.O.) actually works. First the meditator notices that their mind is not on the breath and relaxing. Next, they see that mind is thinking thoughts(clinging), so they let go of the thoughts (by not paying attention to them any more), now they notice that when mind is pulled away from the breath and relaxing (feeling) there is a tightness or tension (craving) that accompanies that distraction, it is somewhere in the body and especially in the head. So the meditator relaxes that tension (relaxes the craving) and then they will feel an expansion or openness and then mind becomes very calm, alert and there are no thoughts (at that time). Next the meditator will notice that there is a tight mental fist wrapped around the feeling that arose with the distraction and they will then relax that tight mental fist (the tight mental fist is aversion and the wrong idea that these thoughts, opinions and concepts are ours personally). Next the meditator can, if they are attentive, notice that there is a subtle tightness in the head (craving) and they relax again. Now mind feels that expansion that was talked about earlier, their mind is very calm, alert, and peaceful. Next, and this is the twist that I have talked about in a previous post, is where I tell the meditator to smile ( again, the reason that I put this twist into the meditation is because when the meditator smiles their mind becomes even more open and they are able to bring this clear mind back to the meditation object, that is, the breath and relaxing on the in and out breath, very easily) then softly re direct their attention back to the breath and relaxing. And continue doing this until mind becomes distracted again. This is especially important to do this when a hindrance arises, because the hindrance is where our true attachments are and letting them go in a light way helps the meditator to see exactly "HOW" this process works (again, not my opinion). Investigation into one's experience when seen this way is practicing the enlightenment factor and this is a very important part of the practice. The more interested one is in HOW this process works, the deeper their understanding becomes and the clearer D.O. appears. If you want more information please go to our website at www.dhammasukha.org I have written a book called "The Anapanasati Sutta" A Practical Guide to Mindfulness of Breathing and Tranquil Wisdom Meditation. You can click on this and the entire book has been printed out by a few different people. You can down load it if you are really interested. I sincerely hope that this has been a help to you. Thank you for asking. Maha-Metta Always, Bhante Vimalaramsi 37763 From: kenhowardau Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 4:34pm Subject: Re: Help with clarification of "control" Hi Dave and TG, Dave wrote: -------------------------- > But still, there seems to be nama and rupa that CAN be controlled, and nama and rupa that can not. > -------------------------- KH: To solve the problem, you need to learn the difference between concept and reality. The so-called namas and rupas that seem to be controlled are concepts. The actual namas and rupas that are clearly not controlled are realities. ------------- D: > And maybe it's that aspect that we think,well, I can walk, drive, fly where I want I can say what I want, etc.etc. that keeps us believing that there MUST be a "self", "soul", whatever. > -------------- KH: 'I' 'walk' 'drive' 'fly' and 'spoken words' are all concepts. They are useful but not real. It is when we believe they are real that they (as you say) "keep us believing there must be a "self."" TG, I may have misunderstood your answer to Dave's post, in which case I apologise, but it seems that you believe concepts are real. You wrote: ----------- > You can walk because there is an Earth, gravity, sun, plants (sustenance) etc. You can drive because of millions of "man hours" of technology, The point is, all of these things arise due to conditions. > ----------- KH: Actually, concepts do not arise and fall. Only conditioned paramattha dhammas arise and fall. Back again to your post,Dave. You continued: ------------- > To me, that's the hurdle I can't, as yet, jump. > ------------- KH: Study the Abhidhamma with DSG (especially when the India travellers return). You will learn about ultimate realities, which are worthless, momentary, phenomena, and patently not you or I. They (not the concepts of 'walking' and 'flying' etc.,) are the realities discovered and described by the Buddha. Only they bear the characteristics; anicca, dukkha and anatta. --------------------------- D: > And then again, there is always the conundrum that, even when we start to observe what is going on, I think, OK, who is doing the observing? Get's to be an iterative process... > ---------------------------- KH: When there is a concept of an 'observer of realities' the "self or soul" you mentioned keeps coming back. So, forget about trying to observe realities: understanding is the key. Kind regards, Ken H 37764 From: Andrew Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 4:36pm Subject: Re: Enter The Abhidhammika! Whereupon the Sautrantika grabbed him by the ears... Dear DN Sorry if I took your words out of context. I didn't mean to misrepresent you. It's just that, at the moment, I am very interested in reflecting upon the place of saddha in Dhamma practice. In your post, you wrote: "some drivelling faith-head". As one Dhamma practitioner to another, do you have a sutta reference for this term or the use of this kind of language? (-: Like Howard, Pali is all Swahili to me so I'll butt out of the discussion here and leave you to it. But it remains a very interesting thread ... Best wishes Andrew T 37765 From: kenhowardau Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 7:18pm Subject: Re: Teeth Clenching Hi DN, ---------------------- DN: > In your original post you had interpreted an exhortation ("he SHOULD beat down, constrain and crush mind with mind") as if it were merely a narration or description of certain things that might happen. This is an abuse of language and does violence to the meaning and purpose of the passage. <. . .> By "something more proactive" I meant that the Buddha in this passage is giving an instruction relating to mind development that a bhikkhu should deliberately undertake. There is no suggestion that the bhikkhu just passively waits for "teeth-clenching" and "constraining mind by mind" to occur by itself. > ---------------------- You will be aware of a number of suttas in which the Buddha says the Middle Way is travelled (or the flood is crossed) 'not by striving and not by standing still.' There is no 'controlling entity' and there is no entity that is 'out of control.' There are only conditioned mental and physical phenomena. ------------------------------ DN: > Now *maybe* it would be possible to use another mode of discourse in which one narrates what is going on when the bhikkhu clenches his teeth and endeavours to constrain mind with mind, e.g. an explication in terms of supposed paramattha dhammas. But even if this explication were an accurate one it would nonetheless be false to claim that this was what the Buddha *really meant* or that this would be an equivalent statement. No 'ought' statement can be the equivalent of an 'is' statement. The two are just not commensurate. The Buddha's mode of discourse in the Vitakkasanthana Sutta is advisory or homiletic and to convert this into a descriptive mode of discourse would be to eviscerate it. <. . .> The full meaning and function of an utterance lies not only in its propositional content, but also in the outcome that the speaker anticipates his words will have. An utterance that is an incitant to a certain course of action is just not the same as a description of what will be going on if/when the listener undertakes that course of action. Am I making myself clear? > ------------------------------- I think I know what you mean, and I think you are missing the middle way. You reject the teaching of momentary, unsatisfactory impersonal nama and rupa (paramattha dhammas). To me, that suggests you can't possibly understand how the flood was crossed 'not by striving and not by standing still.' Thank you for your appraisal of Bhikkhu Thanissaro's teaching. I can't see why you think it is not eternalist, but that is not important. It is important that AccessToInsight readers be aware of what you write below: ---------------- DN > His take on anattaa is idiosyncratic and not how this doctrine was understood by any of the Indian aacaariyas, but nevertheless it's quite distinct from both the Vedantic interpretation of Mrs Rhys Davids (and numerous others) and the neo-Pudgalavaadin interpretation of George Grimm and A.P. Buddhadatta. I think Thanissaro might well be convicted on a charge of eel-wriggling, but not eternalism. His 'strategic interpretation' is in essence a dumbed down version of a thesis first proposed by the Austrian scholar Erich Frauwallner in the late 1950's. Frauwallner was famous for his skill in propounding eccentric theories plausibly enough for them to be taken seriously for a year or so, before he himself would disown them. His most famous and long-lasting one was the "Two Vasubandhus Theory" which was taken seriously for nearly two decades. As for the "Strategic Anatta Theory", this was shot down by buddhologists from all sides, disowned by Frauwallner himself within a year of it being published, and would have been all but forgotten were it not for Thanissaro. I suspect it may also be from Frauwallner that Thanissaro picked up his curious ideas on what Indians thought about extinguished fires. > ---------------- Yes, apparently the fire doesn't really go out - something 'continues on.' Sounds like eternalism to me! ---------- K> They [ATI] share your aversion to a teaching of ultimate reality K> because that teaching makes no allowance for a possible K> "something more." It teaches there are only dhammas and that K> all conditioned dhammas are anicca, dukkha and anatta while K> the one unconditioned dhamma is anatta. (No scope for a K> "something more.") DN: > I am very unmystical and not at all a 'something more' enthusiast. But if you are trying to imply that the only possibilities are being a believer in physical and psychical atoms or being an eternalist, then I must be the latter, then I'd say you are committing the fallacy of bifurcation, > --------- I thought you might secretly believe in a self, and so I asked you. Glad to know I was wrong! By the way, didn't the Buddha regard any view that is not the Middle Way as either eternalism or annihilationism? Is that "bifurcation?" ------------------------ DN: > and that if I'm not the former for there are plenty of other possibilities besides these two. One might, for example, accept that there are only dhammas, but not go along with how this or that Abhidharma tradition conceives dhammas. > ------------------------ There can be only one true Dhamma. If we have understood a wrong one, we are stuck with the two extremes. -------------- DN: > One might be a Puggalavaadin, with a dharmas theory AND a transmigrating 'person' who is held to be inscrutable but not eternal, and who is extinguished in parinirvana; > -------------- How is that different from annhilationism? ------------- DN: > one might be a Sautrantika and conceive of dharmas as thing- events rather than things; > ------------- Sounds like the wrong view: "the world does not really exist" (annihilationism?). ---------- DN: > one might take the Dhamma as a 'leap philosophy' in which all such conceivings are to be eschewed. > ---------- Sounds like Ven. Thanissaro's eternalist teaching; "anatta is just a strategy." ------------- DN: > In my post I mentioned the distinction between the three kinds of benefit that the Buddha taught. Another one is the distinction between the 'Dhamma teaching specific to Buddhas' (buddhaana.m saamukka.msikaa dhammadesanaa) -- meaning the four noble truths -- and then everything else that a Buddha happens to teach, but which unawakened persons might also be able to teach. When one considers the range of teachings that lie within each of these two categories, one ought to see that both of the claims you have cited above rather exceed what can be supported in the Suttas. > ------------- Is there anything in this latter (unawakened) category that could not be taught far better by unawakened experts? The Pali Canon contains descriptions of jhana, for example, but not the step-by- step instruction needed by a beginner. Also, the Kula Sutta's home economics lecture was pretty basic, don't you think? It certainly wouldn't get your daughter through her exams. -------------- dig>> The above Sutta is simply concerned with dig>> di.t.thadhammikattha, 'benefit to be obtained in the present dig>> life'. It comprises four common-sense prudential maxims for dig>> householders who desire their families and family property dig>> to be stable and long-lasting. Nothing more. K> Do you ever wonder why the Bodhisattva wandered samsara for K> countless aeons developing a simplistic, introductory lesson K> in home economics? DN: > No, it isn't a subject I wonder about. Should I? > -------------- Fair enough - silly question! But do you get my point? Home Economics is not the teaching of a Buddha. At a very superficial level, it might look as though the Kula Sutta teaches home economics, but that would be a terrible underrating of a Buddha's Dhamma. The Buddha taught satipatthana and every word of his teaching should be understood in terms of satipatthana. That is why I asked the following question: ------------- K> What is the meaning of "they" "things" and "a man or a K> woman" in: K> "They look for things they have lost. K> They repair things that are old. K> They eat and drink moderately. K> They place in authority a man or a woman possessed of K> virtue." -------------- I don't think that deserved the infantile response it received: -------------------- DN: > Really Ken, at your age you shouldn't expect other people to fill in ALL the gaps in your knowledge. And these are simple words that you should already know by now. I suggest you try and get your mummy to buy you a picture dictionary in time for your twelfth birthday. Okay, here goes:- "They" is a pronoun standing for a plurality of items or persons. Like all pronouns it's an indexical term, which --------------------- You know the texts far better than I do: the Buddha said he used conventional language without being "caught-up" by it. Whenever he spoke of a man or woman he was referring to the five khandhas (nama and rupa, paramattha dhammas). Kind regards, Ken H 37766 From: Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 4:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Help with clarification of "control" (Concepts as Realities) In a message dated 10/25/2004 4:37:31 PM Pacific Standard Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: KH: 'I' 'walk' 'drive' 'fly' and 'spoken words' are all concepts. They are useful but not real. It is when we believe they are real that they (as you say) "keep us believing there must be a "self."" TG, I may have misunderstood your answer to Dave's post, in which case I apologise, but it seems that you believe concepts are real. You wrote: Hi Ken H Yea, I think you did mis-understand my post. My post had nothing to do with topic of concepts. My post was in regards to the topic of "control." However, since you mention it, yes I do believe concepts are real. Concepts arise and cease due to conditions and are part of the Mental Formation and Consciousness aggregates. They are part of the Consciousness aggregate because they are supported and bound with Consciousness/awareness. As a Mental Formation they are classifiable as: -- Perception, Delusion, Wrong View, and perhaps in a subtle way Conceit. It should be clear, however, that the "referent" that the concept refers to is merely an imagination. That "referent" does not arise or cease at all. Even the so-called "ultimate realities" when classified through concepts are mere imagination. Even according to abhidhamma analysis... the rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death (consciousness) may take a concept as an object for consciousness and refer to that concept during one's entire life during the "process-freed life continuum" consciousness. Sounds like something that REALLY arsies and ceases due to conditions. Once again, the referent doesn't arise and cease, but the concept does. TG 37767 From: Bhikkhu Samahita Date: Thu Oct 21, 2004 11:34pm Subject: Unwavering Bliss ... Friends: Neither Pushed nor Pulled: Therefore, friend Channa, this instruction by the Blessed One should be given continuous attention: There is Wavering in one who is Dependent ! There is no wavering in one who is Independent ! When wavering is absent, there is Tranquillity.. When Stilled & Tranquil, there is no drifting.. When not drifting anywhere, there is no coming nor going.. When there is neither coming nor going, there is no passing away nor reappearing. When there is neither passing away nor reappearing, there is no here nor beyond nor in between ...! This -itself- is the very End of all Suffering ... Source: The Middle Length Sayings of the Buddha. Majjhima Nikaya 144 [iii 266] http://www.pariyatti.com/book.phtml?prod_id=25072X Friendship is the Greatest ! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. 37768 From: Bhikkhu Samahita Date: Fri Oct 22, 2004 9:54pm Subject: Refined Equanimity ... Friends: Supreme Ability at first Stance: Now, Ananda, what is the Supreme Noble Refinement of the Sense Abilities ? When one Sees a Form with the Eye; When one Hears a Sound with the Ear; When one Smells an Odour with the Nose; When one Tastes a Flavour with the Tongue; When one Touches a Tangible with the Body; When one Thinks an Idea with the Mind; there emerge in one, what is agreeable, what is disagreeable, and what is both agreeable & disagreeable... This one Understands thus: This agreeable, disagreeable, & both agreeable & disagreeable is a constructed, conditioned, transient, gross, dependently arisen, & disgusting noise... While that indeed is Peaceful, that is Sublime, that is Stilled & Stable Equanimity... Just as quickly as a man can shut his eyes, or stretch out his arm, even just as quickly, rapidly, & easily can such silenced & salient Equanimity be established !!! ----- Such Nobly trained Friend, Ananda, can freely choose between: May I experience whatever is repulsive, as only pleasant... May I experience whatever is attractive, as only repulsive... May I experience only Equanimity in both the attractive & the repulsive... ----- There are here these roots of trees, these empty huts. Meditate, Ananda, do not delay or else you will indeed regret it later! This is your instruction to you... ----- Therefore: Initiating & maintaining local meditation societies is of great merit !!! Source: The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. Majjhima Nikaya 152 [iii 300] http://www.pariyatti.com/book.phtml?prod_id=25072X http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/index.html Friendship is the Greatest ! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. http://groups.msn.com/DirectDhamma http://uk.geocities.com/bhikkhu_samahita http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Buddha-Direct http://www.smartgroups.com/groups/TrueDhamma Dhamma-Questions sent to my email are quite Welcome. 37769 From: Bhikkhu Samahita Date: Sun Oct 24, 2004 0:30am Subject: Final Fundamental Freedom ... !!! Friends: Complete Detachment by Relinquishing of all Clinging: Friends, you should Train yourself in this Way: I will not cling to neither the eye, the ear, the nose the tongue, the body, nor the mind... Thus will my consciousness depend neither on any awareness of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches nor any mental states... Thus will my consciousness depend neither on any visual contact, auditory contact, olfactory contact, gustatory contact, tactile contact, nor any mental contact... Thus will my consciousness neither depend on any feeling aroused from these visual, auditory, or ... mental contacts... Thus will my consciousness neither depend on any form, emotion, perception, mental construction, nor on any bare awareness itself... Thus will my consciousness depend neither on any solidity, fluidity, heat, motion, space nor on any sort of subtle mentality... Thus will my consciousness neither depend on any infinitude of space, any infinitude of consciousness, any sphere of nothingness, any sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception... Thus will my consciousness neither depend on anything at all in this world nor on anything at all in any other world beyond that. Thus will my consciousness be independent of what is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, encountered, searched and examined by the mind... This -only this- itself leads to the final fundamental freedom !!! Source: The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. Majjhima Nikaya MN 143 [iii 258-261] http://www.pariyatti.com/book.phtml?prod_id=25072X http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/index.html Friendship is the Greatest ! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. http://groups.msn.com/DirectDhamma http://uk.geocities.com/bhikkhu_samahita http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Buddha-Direct http://www.smartgroups.com/groups/TrueDhamma Dhamma-Questions sent to my email are quite Welcome. 37770 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon Oct 25, 2004 9:06pm Subject: India5 Dear Friends, India 3 & 4 to come when we can download - m'while v.unstable connection in Patna - first internet connection for several days after a few nts in Kushinara and Savatthi, really off the beaten tRACK. aZITA says to say the road from Kushinara to Patna yest (over 10hrs with just one short Indian wayside tea stop, real bumpty, dusty dirt roads etc) give her an idea of what the hell realms must be like . Nina sends lots of best wishes and to say she's thinking of everyone a lot and has many new ideas. Savatthi - large open green gardens at Jetavana with the ruins of the kutis of the Buddha and the great arahants remaining - Quite incredible. lots of monkeys and very beautifully kept compared to my last visit....lots of dh discussions when not on the road and for some on the road from behind masks, now a common sight in the group. Yest, leaving Kushinara, retracing the last steps of the Buddha before his parinibbana and stopping to visit the site on the hillside of Cunda's house where the Buddha was given the last controversial meal, well discussed on DSG. Lots of good cheer in the group - this morning they've gone out to Vaisali and the sites of the 2nd and 3rd councils while Jon and I are running round town trying to connect with you all. Way behind with reading - hope to catch up today and check all is in order;-). We think of our DSg friends a lot and many of our live discussions are centred round points and qus that come up on list. Must go bef I push my luck with the latest connection any more. Metta, Sarah (Jon & All) ==================== 37771 From: plnao Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 3:42am Subject: Re: Concepts as condition beyond our control (was Re: [dsg] Re: killing in a dream) Hello Htoo Thank you for your long post. I really sense that you have a lot of enthusiasm about helping people to understand Dhamma. As for dreams - don't worry, I don't let them control me. Actually, like you, I rarely dream anymore. Or should I say I rarely remember my dreams. I've wondered about why. I think it could be that even basic right understanding of the truth revealed through the Buddha's teaching has lessened some of the strife at work in my mind. I don't know. In any case, I am more interested about how one concept can condition the arising of many factors, whether it's a concept in a dream or waking. I think metta meditation the way it is usually practiced is a method of generating a concept in the hope of conditioning wholesomeness. I know my opinion goes against the grain of the way most Buddhist practice metta, but I do not believe it is good practice to intentionally think of metta, because metta should arise, or not arise, due to conditions. I've stopped thinking about metta when I have my contemplation of the Noble Truths in the morning, but I am aware of metta when it arises in my busy day, as I'm aware when irritation or joy or restlessness or any other mental factors arise beyond my control. Htoo>>> there does exist control. I do not mean Atta. That control is conventional one. If there is no control, how can siila be practised? Control does exist. The Buddha encouraged to control strayed thought not to arise. The Buddha encourage people to control wanting to kill someone, to control wanting to steal things, to control wanting to have sex with other people's wives, to control wanting to self intoxication with alcohol or addictives. This is conventional control. Phil>>> "The Buddha encouraged people to control wanting to kill someone" etc. When I read the suttas in which the Buddha encourages people to tame the mind, such as in the Dhammapada when we read about mind flipping and flopping around like a fish, I wonder if there are not many people who might be led astray by such teaching, or should I say such translation. How on earth can we control the mind that is flipping and flopping. Isn't it better to watch it, and see where it goes, and know that the wholesomeness of moments in which we know these mental formations as anatta, annica and dukkha will condition less akusala and more akusala. Isn't that enough? Why do we need to wrest control of the mind now. If we try to control the mind we are setting ourselves up for great dissatisfaction when we learn that we *can't* control the mind. It's like when we try to control our physical health by eating well and exercising, and come to count on physical health, and then have to go through great dissatisfaction when we are reminded that there is no way around sickness, old age, and death. Of course eating well and exercising is good, but not if we do so in the expectation that we will always be healthy. Studying the workings of the mind is good, and trying to patiently cultivate ,mental wholesomeness, but not in the expectation that we will ever be able to prevent unwholesome factors from arising beyond our control. We can decrease the likelihood of transgressions, but I don't think we can say that they will never happen because of mental will power. You know, Htoo, I am the kind of person who has always written a long list of New Year's resolutions every year. In fact, in recent years, this process has taken up about a week, re-reading my journal for the year, examining the experience recorded there, and then drawing up a list of resolutions about how to be a better, more peaceful and productive person. Of course, these resolutions have always failed, because there has always been a complete lack of right understanding of the way things work. There has always been self at the center of the enterprise, trying to build an ideal character in which to hold reign. Now, since coming across Abhidhamma through Nina's books, there are no more resolutions. There is simply examination - at a very crude level - of what is rising and falling away in moments. And a lot of repeated reading and reflection and discussion. I *do* sense that I am far less prone to commit transgressions than I ever have been before, even though I am no longer making resolutions. But I somehow can't call it control. Panna controls what is going on, in some way, yes. I can sense that. Howard questions the idea of "panna" being some kind of autonomous force or energy, like a god figure. (Sorry if I've incorrectly paraphrased you there, Howard.) As always, I see why he doth protest. Who am I, as a mere beginner in Dhamma, to talk about "panna" doing anything in my life. And yet, and yet.... So, for me, the conventional control, the will power, the reading about a precept and vowing to follow it has never worked. Now I sense the control is far subtler than that, but more deeply effective. It makes me feel very grateful to the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha. I'm not writing anything here that anyone hasn't read a thousand times before, of course. Thank you again, Htoo. Now I'm going to go and collect your Dhamma threads to study them and ask questions. Metta, Phil 37772 From: Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 2:14am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Help with clarification of "control" (Concepts as Realities) Hi, TG & Ken - I'll add some comments at various spots in the following: In a message dated 10/25/04 11:02:29 PM Eastern Daylight Time, TGrand458@a... writes: > > In a message dated 10/25/2004 4:37:31 PM Pacific Standard Time, > kenhowardau@y... writes: > KH: 'I' 'walk' 'drive' 'fly' and 'spoken words' are all concepts. > They are useful but not real. It is when we believe they are real > that they (as you say) "keep us believing there must be a "self."" > > TG, I may have misunderstood your answer to Dave's post, in which > case I apologise, but it seems that you believe concepts are real. > You wrote: > Hi Ken H > > Yea, I think you did mis-understand my post. My post had nothing to do with > > topic of concepts. My post was in regards to the topic of "control." > > However, since you mention it, yes I do believe concepts are real. Concepts > > arise and cease due to conditions and are part of the Mental Formation and > Consciousness aggregates. They are part of the Consciousness aggregate > because > they are supported and bound with Consciousness/awareness. As a Mental > Formation they are classifiable as: -- Perception, Delusion, Wrong View, and > perhaps > in a subtle way Conceit. > --------------------------------------------------- Howard: Here, you, TG, do exactly what I do, namely distinguish between concepts as ideas, as thoughts that are formational constructs produced by mental processing and then arising as mind-door objects (or content), as opposed to the conventional objects that are their intended referents. Those intended referents, even in the case of "paramatthic concepts", are merely mentally projected or imagined, and are not directly experienced (as opposed to the ideas, which *are*). --------------------------------------------------- > > It should be clear, however, that the "referent" that the concept refers to > is merely an imagination. That "referent" does not arise or cease at all. > Even the so-called "ultimate realities" when classified through concepts are > mere > imagination. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Here, TG, in a sense we agree, and in a sense we disagree. We agree in that, for example, the mentally considered extreme heat of a touched stove is the referent of a concept, and it is a nonexistent shadow that differs from actually felt burning heat. The actually felt burning heat is a body-door phenomenon, a paramattha dhamma, a direct experiential content, and not the referent of an idea, though intended to be. One more nuance that I would add about the ideas themselves, not their referents, that you and I both consider to lie within the category of sankhara: Most of the alleged concept-ideas that we think arise in the mind are themselves not paramattha dhammas, but are themselves conventional (mental) objects that are complexes of directly apprehended sankhata that the mind treats as if they were single ideas. My point here is hard to grasp, and I find that I keep on losing my grasp of it even as I write about it. What I'm saying here is that most of our seemingly unitary "thoughts" don't really exist, but are merely complexes or structured sequences of unitary thoughts. Thus, there are levels beyond levels of unreality to our world of concept. ------------------------------------------------------- > > Even according to abhidhamma analysis... the rebirth-linking, > life-continuum, > and death (consciousness) may take a concept as an object for consciousness > and refer to that concept during one's entire life during the "process-freed > > life continuum" consciousness. Sounds like something that REALLY arsies and > > ceases due to conditions. Once again, the referent doesn't arise and cease, > but > the concept does. > > TG > =========================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37773 From: dighanakha Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 6:16am Subject: Buddhaghosa on the names of dhammas was: Last minute thoughts to Dighanakha Hello Sarah (and all). I hope you are enjoying your pilgrimage. I will now begin replying to the posts you and Jon sent before departing, as I expect you will be back soon. S> Texts on Magadhan/Pali Ð Thx for the passage from the Vism. S> We discussed this and the Tiika before. It's not easy I S> agree, (see U.P. Ð Patisambhida). I've already given a brief S> summary of my understanding and look forward to further S> discussion on this. I'd be very interested to see any S> translation you give of those passages not already S> translated, esp Vibhanga Ðtiika, sutta commentaries etc. As S> I've said, I think in this case you're taking a very literal S> approach. I don't think so. Consider this: "In the naama-&-ruupa dyad, naama means name-creating (naamakara.na), shaping (namana), and causing to be shaped (naamana). Herein, four aggregates are naama with the meaning of 'name-creating'. "Though King Mahaasammata was named 'Mahaasammata' by the agreement (sammata) of the general population, or parents give their children names by announcing, "Let his name be 'Tissa', let his name be 'Phussa'!", or the name comes about by way of some quality, such as 'preacher of Dhamma' or 'memorizer of Vinaya', this is not the case with names [of dhammas] starting with 'vedanaa'. "The [naama-dhammas] starting with 'vedanaa' and [the elements] starting with 'great earth' arise *creating their own names* (attano naama.m karontaava uppajjanti). Their names just arise as they [the dhammas] arise. "Because at the arising of vedanaa, no one says, "Let your name be 'vedanaa'!" and there is no function of name-acquiring (na naama-gaha.na-kicca.m atthi). "As when earth has arisen, there is no function of name-acquiring: "Let your name be earth!" and likewise with the arising of a world system, Mt. Sineru, the moon, the sun, and the stars, there is no function of name-acquiring: "Let your name be 'world-system!' Let your name be 'star'!" The names just arise, as their spontaneously produced designations (opapaatika pa~n~natti) fall into place; so likewise with the arising of vedanaa, there is no function of name-acquiring: "Let your name be 'vedanaa'!" But the name 'vedanaa' just arises with the arising of vedanaa. Its spontaneously produced designation falls into place. "And the very same principle applies to [the other dhammas] starting with 'perception', sankhaaras etc.. [repeat the same for past vedanaa, future vedanaa, past sa~n~naa, future sa~n~naa ... etc.] (DhsA 1303, Suttantikadukanikkhepakathaa) "Dhammas arise creating their own names" ?? Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37774 From: m. nease Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 6:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate Reality Hi Ken, ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ken O" To: Sent: Sunday, October 24, 2004 10:34 PM Subject: [dsg] Ultimate Reality > > Hi All > > Just a thought that I would like to share. > > How do we differentiate ultimate reality and conventional reality. I > feel the difference is whether we experience it. We can know to feel > but we cannot know a concept like a table only through a mind > construct. I think I like to say that there is no direct knowing of > the object. Feeling, if you mean vedanaa, also arises with cittas that take concepts as objects, doesn't it? > Another question is that is citta really that fast? I was wondering > if citta is not fast, how do we see light in a continuous stream > without a breakage. It must be fast enough to take it as an object. Citta only must to arise and subside more rapidly than does the subsequent conceptualization in order to make the conceptualization seem unbroken, I think--somewhat like the individual frames of a movie or pixels of a cathode ray tube seeming to make an unbroken moving picutre. > Thats just my thoughts Just mine too--mostly borrowed, actually... mike 37775 From: jwromeijn Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 6:35am Subject: Re: India5 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > Dear Friends, > Hallo Sarah and other India pilgrims Nice to hear from you again. What interests me is how (perhaps later) are the results of your reflections on your tour ? Especially on the experiences in the multi-religious and more specific, the multi-buddhist culture in India. I mean: do you think now, more than living in a mono-Theravada culture that buddhist traditions can influence each other in a positive way? And do you think that more than till now Theravada and Mahayana buddhists can have fruitful discussions with each other? Metta Joop 37776 From: dighanakha Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 11:28am Subject: Re: Teeth Clenching Hello Ken H. dig>> By "something more proactive" I meant that the Buddha in dig>> this passage is giving an instruction relating to mind dig>> development that a bhikkhu should deliberately undertake. dig>> There is no suggestion that the bhikkhu just passively waits dig>> for "teeth-clenching" and "constraining mind by mind" to dig>> occur by itself. K> You will be aware of a number of suttas in which the Buddha K> says the Middle Way is travelled (or the flood is crossed) K> 'not by striving and not by standing still.' There is no K> 'controlling entity' and there is no entity that is 'out of K> control.' There are only conditioned mental and physical K> phenomena. There is actually only one Sutta that says this, the Oghatara.na (SN i 1). I don't interpret it as you do, and for that matter neither does the Samyutta Atthakathaa or Tiikaa. 'Striving' (paggaha, viriya) is an *essential* part of the middle way. What the Buddha says he avoided is 'over-straining' (aayuuhana.m), which the .Tiikaa equates with micchaa-vayaama, or wrong effort, like that of Sona who did walking meditation until his feet were worn to shreds. dig>> The full meaning and function of an utterance lies not only dig>> in its propositional content, but also in the outcome that dig>> the speaker anticipates his words will have. An utterance dig>> that is an incitant to a certain course of action is just dig>> not the same as a description of what will be going on dig>> if/when the listener undertakes that course of action. dig>> Am I making myself clear? K> I think I know what you mean, and I think you are missing K> the middle way. You reject the teaching of momentary, K> unsatisfactory impersonal nama and rupa (paramattha K> dhammas). In commenting on your interpretation of the teeth-clenching passage I saw no need to bring up momentary dhammas, either to affirm them or reject them. My view is that the existence or non-existence of such things has no bearing on the Buddha's instruction to a bhikkhu to clench his teeth and constrain mind with mind after all the previous methods have failed. It's simply an irrelevant consideration. It's as if a lumberjack is teaching someone how to saw a log in half and then you come along and tell him he can't possibly cut a log in half until he's been taught about the molecular changes that will take place in the log's hydro-carbons as it's being cut. K> By the way, didn't the Buddha regard any view that is not K> the Middle Way as either eternalism or annihilationism? It would be more accurate to say that he taught dependent arising as the middle way that avoids the extremes of "all exists" (sabba.m atthi) and "all does not exist" (sabba.m natthi), or between 'there-is-ness' (atthitaa) and 'there-is-not-ness' (natthitaa). The Commentaries later equated these terms with sassatavaada and ucchedavaada. K> Is that "bifurcation?" No. Bifurcation involves insisting on an either/or choice, when there are in fact more than two possibilities, or a possible both/and overlap between the two alteratives. The commonest form is when you give your opponent an absurd alternative to the view you want him to accept, try to convince him these are the only possibilities and then require him to choose between them. The bifurcation fallacy is what Robert K. and Sarah commit every time they invite us to choose between accepting the commentators' account of the origin of the Abhidhamma or else positing a huge monkish conspiracy to deceive people. dig>> One might, for example, accept that there are only dhammas, dig>> but not go along with how this or that Abhidharma tradition dig>> conceives dhammas. K> There can be only one true Dhamma. And 84,000 ways of formulating it. K> If we have understood a wrong one, we are stuck with the two K> extremes. If you read the Kaccaanagottasutta -- the only Sutta that deals with the teaching you are alluding to -- you will see that what lies between the two extremes is simply the dependent arising, "With ignorance as condition, sankhaaras; with sankhaaras as condition, consciousness ...etc." Accepting this as the middle way does not oblige one to embrace this Abhidharma tradition rather than that one, or indeed any one. dig>> One might be a Puggalavaadin, with a dharmas theory AND a dig>> transmigrating 'person' who is held to be inscrutable but dig>> not eternal, and who is extinguished in parinirvana; K> How is that different from annhilationism? Sorry, I should have written "a transmigrating 'person' who is held to be inscrutable but not eternal, but who is nonetheless *not* said to be extinguished in parinirvana." I suppose then your question would be, "How is that different from eternalism?" The Pudgalavaadin would reply by quoting the passage that rejects all four of the possibilities of what happens to an arahant after death and would then accuse you of annihilationism. The two of you would then have a jolly debate over what exactly this passage means. dig>> one might be a Sautrantika and conceive of dharmas as thing- dig>> events rather than things; K> Sounds like the wrong view: "the world does not really exist" K> (annihilationism?). Only for one committed to the view that a dhamma has to have a moment of stasis (thiti) in order to count as 'existing'. The Sautrantikas held that such a stasis would violate the teaching on impermanence. dig>> one might take the Dhamma as a 'leap philosophy' in which dig>> all such conceivings are to be eschewed. K> Sounds like Ven. Thanissaro's eternalist teaching; "anatta K> is just a strategy." Thanissaro's teaching is that anattaa is a strategy, not *just* a strategy. That is to say, he accepts that the teaching is also a statement about how things really are. But it's nothing like a 'leap' interpretation. The venerable is too much inclined to painting legs on snakes to make a good leaper. A 'leap' interpretation would rest on passages like the well-known instructions to Baahiya the Bark-clad, or those where the teaching is expressed in two or three word admonitions like "Pa.thavi.m maa ma~n~nii!" "Don't conceive earth!" dig>> In my post I mentioned the distinction between the three dig>> kinds of benefit that the Buddha taught. Another one is the dig>> distinction between the 'Dhamma teaching specific to dig>> Buddhas' (buddhaana.m saamukka.msikaa dhammadesanaa) -- dig>> meaning the four noble truths -- and then everything else dig>> that a Buddha happens to teach, but which unawakened persons dig>> might also be able to teach. When one considers the range of dig>> teachings that lie within each of these two categories, one dig>> ought to see that both of the claims you have cited above dig>> rather exceed what can be supported in the Suttas. K> Is there anything in this latter (unawakened) category that K> could not be taught far better by unawakened experts? I don't think one can really know how effective such teachings would have been for his listeners, as we only have them only in the compressed artificial form suited for an oral transmission. Still, if he had anything like the sort of powers that the Suttas attribute to him, then I imagine he would have acquitted himself pretty well. K> The Pali Canon contains descriptions of jhana, for example, K> but not the step-by- step instruction needed by a beginner. Here too there is obviously a difference between the teaching as the Buddha's listeners heard it and the form in which it was finally preserved. K>>> Do you ever wonder why the Bodhisattva wandered samsara for K>>> countless aeons developing a simplistic, introductory lesson K>>> in home economics? dig>> No, it isn't a subject I wonder about. Should I? K> Fair enough - silly question! But do you get my point? Home K> Economics is not the teaching of a Buddha. Do you mean you don't believe the Buddha taught the Kula Sutta? If you believe he did, then how can you deny that his teaching was *in part* aimed at promoting present-life welfare by giving guidance on everyday matters? K> At a very superficial level, "It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances." -- Oscar Wilde. :-) K> it might look as though the Kula Sutta teaches home K> economics, but that would be a terrible underrating of a K> Buddha's Dhamma. Rubbish. It's a testimony to his range and versatility as a teacher. K> The Buddha taught satipatthana and every word of his K> teaching should be understood in terms of satipatthana. Poppycock. Back up your claim with a citation from the Suttas. K> That is why I asked the following question: K>> What is the meaning of "they" "things" and "a man or a woman" in: K>> "They look for things they have lost. K>> They repair things that are old. K>> They eat and drink moderately. K>> They place in authority a man or a woman possessed of K>> virtue." Yes, I suspected that was why you asked the question, but you see, Ken, I take my Dhamma from the Suttas and that means I don't share your view that satipa.t.thaana is the whole of the Buddha's teaching, nor that satipa.t.thaana has anything to do with discerning psychical and physical atoms. K> I don't think that deserved the infantile response it K> received: Then you're probably taking your abhidhammic glass bead game much too seriously. Listen for a moment to Lance Cousins -- perhaps the wisest abhidhammika the west has yet produced: "The aim of this abhidhammic analysis is not really theoretical; it is related to insight meditation and offers a world-view based upon process in order to facilitate insight into change and no-self *so as to undermine mental rigidity*" dig>> "They" is a pronoun standing for a plurality of items or dig>> persons. K> You know the texts far better than I do: the Buddha said he K> used conventional language without being "caught-up" by it. K> Whenever he spoke of a man or woman he was referring to the K> five khandhas (nama and rupa, paramattha dhammas). Your first statement is correct. But he only said it once in one single Sutta, so it's not exactly the leitmotif of his teaching. And to construct one's entire hermeneutic around this one utterance is bizarre in the extreme. More to the point, to infer from this utterance what you say in your second sentence requires a GIGANTIC leap in my opinion. Here's the passage you're referring to, from the Po.t.thapada Sutta: "Citta, just as from a cow comes milk, from milk comes curds, from the curds comes butter, from the butter comes ghee, and from the ghee comes cream of ghee; and on any occasion when there is milk, then at that time milk enters consideration, and curds, butter, ghee or cream of ghee do not enter consideration; on any occasion when there are curds, then at that time curds enter consideration, and milk, butter, ghee and cream of ghee do not enter consideration...etc. "...Even so, Citta, on any occasion when a coarse acquired- self (o.laarika atta-pa.tilaabha) is present, then at that time a coarse acquired-self enters consideration, and a mind-made acquired-self (manomaya atta-pa.tilaabha) and a formless acquired self (aruupa atta-pa.tilaabha) do not enter consideration. "On any occasion when a mind-made acquired-self is present, then at that time a mind-made acquired-self enters consideration, and a coarse acquired-self and a formless acquired self do not enter consideration. "On any occasion when a formless acquired-self is present, then at that time a formless acquired-self enters consideration and a coarse acquired-self and a mind-made acquired self do not enter consideration. "These then, Citta, are the agreed conventions of the world (loka-sama~n~na), idioms of the world (loka-nirutti), usages of the world (loka-vohaara), designations of the world (loka-pa~n~natti), with which the Tathaagata communicates without misapprehending them (voharati aparaamasa.m). Note: 1) It is only the three kinds of 'acquired self' that are designated as 'agreed conventions of the world...etc.' Attapa.tilaabha is a highly unusual term found nowhere else in the Tipitaka. It is not inconceivable that the Buddha intended his statement to apply only to the three kinds of attapa.tilaabha and nothing else. 3) He makes no mention of having something else more real at the back of his mind. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ The view of those ascetics and brahmins who are of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me' is close to non-attachment, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-cleaving, close to non-grasping. (Dighanakha Sutta) 37777 From: htootintnaing Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 11:38am Subject: Re: Dhamma Thread ( 095 ) Dear Connie, Thanks for your reply. What we need is to understand papanca. And that is that. I just contemplate on words. Dr Mehn Tin Mon is a retired professor of chemistry and wrote many books in Myanmar. There are a few translation. With Metta, Htoo Naing ---------------------------------------------------------------------- --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, connieparker wrote: > > Dear Htoo and Mike, > > The way you explained it to Mike (I think 'extend' has only one direction > while 'expand' comprises from a point to all directions that is 360 > degrees) sounds right to me and I personally wouldn't have any problem > saying either - that papanca extends or expands samsara. In the original > quote, though, Dr. Tin Mon wrote that papanca "is responsible for > extending the life cycle or the round of rebirth that is known as > samsara". Somehow, 'expanding the life-cycle' doesn't sound quite right > but does have a tempting "more panca-upadana-khanda is better/more > fullfilling" flavour to it. 'Life-cycle' would be extended in duration or > throughout ever more and more cycles. Still, our lifetimes also expand > into other bhumis than just this rare and current human one. > > A little later, Dr. Tin Mon touches on another aspect of papanca: "...moha > clouds the mind and blinds the eye not to see things as they really are. > It makes one see things as nicca (permanent), sukha (pleasant), atta (self > or person) and subha (beautiful). Because of this wrong vision, lobha > clings or attaches to this ‘self or person’ and di.t.thi takes the wrong > view that ‘self’ and ‘person’ really exist. > The most basic and universal wrong view is the ‘personality- belief’ > (sakkaaya-di.t.thi) or ‘ego-illusion’ (atta-di.t.thi). Sakkaaya- di.t.thi > believes that this combination of mind and body is ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, > ‘she’, ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘person’, etc. Atta-di.t.thi believes in the > existence of an ‘atta or soul’ or ‘ego’ or ‘life- entity’ in the body. > ***From this sakkaaya-di.t.thi or atta-di.t.thi as well as from the > ignorance due to moha there spring up thousands of wrong views.***" > > abhidhaultsci.pdf > eBUDDHANET'S BOOK LIBRARY > www.buddhanet.net > > peace, > con-cept 37778 From: nori Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 3:13pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Details on Vedana Hi Ken, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Ken O wrote: > Hi Nori and Larry > > As we know there are five types of feelings generally described in > the suttas which inlcudes the bodily feelings. It is also clear in > the suttas where each sensory rupas is felt by the respective sensory > cittas. So what is felt in the body sensation only belongs to the > body citta that arisen to cognise the bodily rupas. Hence > technicaly speaking it is not right to say that bodily sensation is > felt by the mind cittas. > When I speak of mind, I am speaking only through my current understanding of conventional (material) reality since this what I observe and know at this point. I meant the physical, mind - brain. If it is the case that cittas is dependant upon this material mind/brain then all the sensory cittas would also exist within/with it. ... but what do I know. Thanks for the reply. with metta, nori 37779 From: plnao Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 3:32pm Subject: Khandas as disease or dissolution? Hello all Reading SN XXII 122 this morning came across this key sentence: "A virtuous monk should attend in an appropriate way to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self." I wondered why we would attend to khandas as a disease, or alien (if they are alien, alien to what?) when it seems that by going straight to an understanding of khandas as dissolution, or emptiness, or anatta, we can get to a kind of liberation more directly, even if our understanding is basic. Why play around with concepts such as disease or alien when we can get straight to dissolution? After all, in another sutta (SN XXII 36) the Buddha says that "if one stays obsessed with form (and the other khandas) that's what one is measured by. What one is measured by, that's how one is classified." I also thought this when reading the series on removing distracting thoughts that Nina posted. Why reflect on foulness when going straight to elements (I would say understanding elements leads directly to understanding their dissolution) seems much more immediately effective? I guess it has to do with accumulations which way of understanding is most effective for a person, and at different times. Concepts are helpful because we have not developed insight to the point where we can have direct understanding of elements. And of course, the degree of insight into elements that I'm able capable of is still conceptual. I would also guess that people who have an appreciation of Abhidhamma are able to move more directly to "attending to" elements and dissolution of elements without getting caught up entirely in concepts such as disease or alien. Yet again, gratitude to the Buddha for his teaching of Abhidhamma and to Nina for her books that make the Buddha's teaching of Abhidhamma accessible for beginners like me. Metta, Phil Here's the sutta I was referring to: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/sn22-122.htm 37780 From: Larry Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 4:19pm Subject: Sarvastivada and Sautrantika Hi all, Here is a couple of sketches from "The Encyclopedia of Eastern Philosophy and Religion": SARVASTIVADA Skt., roughly "the teaching that says that everything *is*"; school of the Hinayana that split off from the Sthaviras under the reign of King Ashoka. The name of this school comes from its basic premise that everything--past, present, and future--exists simultaneously. The Sarvastivadin school prevailed primarily in Kashmir and Gandhara. It constitutes a transitional stage between the Hinayana and the Mahayana. The Sarvastivadins possessed their own cannon, composed in Sanskrit, which is partially preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translation. The most important works of this school are the "Mahavibasha" (Great Exegesis), which was composed under the supervision of Vasumitra at the council of Kashmir and to which the school owes the name "Vaibhashika", by which it is also known. The "Mahavibhasha" is a summary of the Sarvastivada teaching and is the latest of the seven works of the Abhidharma-pitaka. Another important work is the "Abhidharma-hridaya", the "Heart of Abhidharma" in ten chapters. The "Vibasha" by Katyayaniputra is also a summary of the doctrine. The "Lokaprajnapti" gives a description of the mythical universe of Buddhism. On matters of discipline, only the "Vinaya-vibhasha" is extant. The teaching of the Sarvastivada is a radical pluralism based on denial of the reality of a self as a substance or soul (anatman) and the affirmation of the existence of momentary entities, the so-called dharmas. The Sarvastivadins postulate seventy-five different dharmas, which (like the ancient notion of atoms) represent final, indivisible units, viewed as real. They distinguished conditioned (samskrita) and unconditioned (asamskrita) dharmas. Among the latter are space (akasha) apratishthita-nirvana, and pratishthita-nirvana [active and static nirvana]. The conditioned dharmas are divided into four categories: form or matter (rupa); consciousness (vijnana); mental factors (chetasika), meaning all psychological processes; and dharmas, which are neither form nor consciousness, and include, for example, old age, vitality, attainment, nonattainment, impermanence, and so on. According to the Sarvastivadins, these conditioned dharmas do not come into being but rather exist from beginningless time and only change from a latent to a manifest state. From this view results that "everything is", and that past, present, and future exist simultaneously in a single dharma. In addition, one finds in the Sarvastivada an early form of the Mahayana teaching of the trikaya and the belief, which continues to grow in importance , in the future buddha Maitreya. SAUTRANTIKA Skt.; Hinayana school that developed out of the Sarvastivada around 150 C.E. As its name indicates, the followers of this school draw their support only from the Sutra-pitaka and reject the Abhidharma-pitaka of the Sarvastivada as well as its "everything is" theory. The Sautrantiklas posit the existence of a refined consciousness that constitutes the basis of human life and that persists from one rebirth to the next. In contrast to the Vatsiputriyas, who postulate the existence of an entire "person" that persists from one life to the next, the Sautrantikas see the consciousness as no more than the bearer of the cycle of existence (samsara). Into this consciousness the remaining four skandhas are absorbed at the time of death. This notion of a continuously existing consciousness had a strong influence on the Yogachara school. The theory of the instantaneity of everything existing is very pronounced in the Sautrantika school. It sees in each existent nothing more than an uninterrupted succession of moments. Nirvana for the Sautrantikas is a purely negative spiritual event--it is nonbeing. He who has attained release is annihilated. --------------------- Larry 37781 From: kenhowardau Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 5:37pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Help with clarification of "control" (Concepts as Realities) Hi TG, You wrote: -------------------------- > Yea, I think you did mis-understand my post. My post had nothing to do with topic of concepts. My post was in regards to the topic of "control." > -------------------------- Point taken; and I agreed with what you wrote. But it is confusing to talk about anatta and "no control" in terms of concepts. For example, it would be confusing to talk about no control over a motor vehicle or no control over our arms and legs. And it would be confusing to suggest that motor vehicles are non-existent on our roads or that you and I have no arms or legs. -------------------- TG: > However, since you mention it, yes I do believe concepts are real. Concepts arise and cease due to conditions and are part of the Mental Formation and Consciousness aggregates. > ------------------- Our disagreement is partly over terminology and partly over the Dhamma. When you say concepts are real, you don't mean their referents are real (as you explain later in your post). So there is no great disagreement there. However, you do think there is a reality called a concept. This is a common mistake that can be cleared up very easily. It is due largely to some influential modern writers, some of whom have made a simple mistake, others of whom have deliberately undermined the teaching of paramattha dhammas. There are only dhammas, but some dhammas are 'thinking dhammas' and they create concepts. So, as the Urga Sutta tells us, there is an unreal aspect to the world: "9. He who neither goes too far nor lags behind and knows about the world: "This is all unreal," 10. greedless he knows: "This is all unreal," 11. lust-free he knows: "This is all unreal," 12. hate-free he knows: "This is all unreal," 13. delusion-free he knows: "This is all unreal," -- such a monk gives up the here and the beyond, just as a serpent sheds its worn-out skin." In an article,"The Worn out Skin," Nyanaponika Thera explains those lines from the Urga Sutta as follows: "The world is unreal in the sense of presenting a deceptive appearance, being quite different in actuality from the way it appears to a greedy, lustful, hating and ignorant mind. The Pali word vitatha, here rendered by "unreal," has both in Pali and Sanskrit the meaning of "untrue" or "false." These verses, however, are not meant to convey the idea that the world is mere illusion, a play of the imagination. What underlies its deceptive appearance, the flux of mental and physical processes, is real enough in the sense that it is effect-producing. The unreality lies in what we attribute to the world, and not in the world itself." end quote The writer accepts there is a world that is real but deceptive. As you and I agree, there are ultimately no referents-of-concepts (trees, cars, men and women). The next question is; does that real world include something that might be called a "concept" as opposed to the referent of a concept? The article continues: "What, now, is this "world" (loka) and this "all" (sabba), which should be seen as unreal, in the sense of being deceptive? When the Enlightened One was questioned about these two words, he gave the same answer for both: 1. "One speaks of 'the world,' Lord. In how far is there a world or the designation 'world'?" "When there is the eye and visible forms, visual consciousness and things cognizable by visual consciousness; when there is the ear and sounds... ; nose and smells... ; tongue and flavors... ; body and tangibles... ; mind and ideas, mind-consciousness and things cognizable by mind-consciousness -- then there is a world and the designation 'world'. Samyutta Nikaya, 35:68" End quote The group we have to examine is the last one:" things cognisable by mind-consciousness." (I gather the Pali is dhammayatana.) Remember; "things" refers here to things that are absolutely real. We all know the mind can cognise objects that are mind-made illusions (pannatti), are they somehow included in this group? I will cut and paste from DSG message # 33803, written by Sarah to Bhikkhu Bodhi (author of the guide to CMA): ---------------- S: > From CMA ch V11, Guide to #36 on Ayatanas: "the mental-object base does not completely coincide with mental object (dhammaaramma.na), but includes only those entities not found among the other bases. Thus it excludes the first five objective bases, the five types of sensitive matter, and citta, which is identical with the mind base. It also excludes concepts (pa~n~natti), since the notion of base (aayatana) extends only to ultimate realities, i.e. things existing by way of intrinsic nature (sabhaava), and does not extend to things that owe their existence to conceptual construction. The mental-object base comprises the fifty-two mental factors, the sixteen kinds of subtle matter, and nibbana." --------------- So it is clear isn't it? But there is a problem, and you, like many others, have been misled by it. Sarah continues: --------------------- > I agree with the Guide to #36 and I think it's important because of the (rather serious) error in Nyantiloka's dict -- which we all use so much on the discussion list-- which says the opposite to the point about dhammaayatana exluding pa~n~natti and not being synonymous with dhammaaramma.na. Modern commentators often suggest they are synonymous which leads to serious errors. (Your comments are also clearly confirmed in the comy and also in Abhidhamma texts such as the Vibhangaand Sammohavinodani.) > -------------------- So concepts are not real, and we are not required to look for them among the five khandhas. Your valiant efforts to describe certain cittas and cetasikas as concept were not required. :-) -------------------- TG: > Even according to abhidhamma analysis... the rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death (consciousness) may take a concept as an object for consciousness and refer to that concept during one's entire life during the "process-freed life continuum" consciousness. Sounds like something that REALLY arsies and ceases due to conditions. Once again, the referent doesn't arise and cease, but the concept does. > --------------------- Yes, mind-door consciousness can take a concept as its object (dhammaarammana), but at that time there is no real object (dhammaayatana), just the illusion of an object. Kind regards, Ken H 37782 From: Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 3:35pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Help with clarification of "control" (Concepts as Realities) Hi Ken H It seemed at some point during your reply you were clear on what I meant between a "referent of a concept" and the mental act of conceptualization. Then later I wasn't so sure. Didn't really follow the arguement against what I presented. Let me try once again. The mental act of conceptualizing is real. The referent of that conceptualization is mere imagination. That imagination might be right or wrong, but it is never real. The easiest way to determine whether conceptualization is a process that arises and ceases due to conditions; is to be minful of thought processes. If the mind is being mindful of thought processes, the mind can pretty easily see that one thought leads to another related thought and so on and so on. It seems to be a clear indication of a series of states that are arising and ceasing in a conditionally related manner. One question... When you say at the end of the previous post (seen below), that during life-continuum-consciousness, where consciousness can take a "concept" as its object, are you saying that -- consciousness can be structured based on an object that isn't real? Based on my understanding of the Buddha's teaching, that would be impossible. TG In a message dated 10/26/2004 5:40:29 PM Pacific Standard Time, kenhowardau@y... writes: Hi TG, You wrote: -------------------------- > Yea, I think you did mis-understand my post. My post had nothing to do with topic of concepts. My post was in regards to the topic of "control." > -------------------------- Point taken; and I agreed with what you wrote. But it is confusing to talk about anatta and "no control" in terms of concepts. For example, it would be confusing to talk about no control over a motor vehicle or no control over our arms and legs. And it would be confusing to suggest that motor vehicles are non-existent on our roads or that you and I have no arms or legs. -------------------- TG: > However, since you mention it, yes I do believe concepts are real. Concepts arise and cease due to conditions and are part of the Mental Formation and Consciousness aggregates. > ------------------- Our disagreement is partly over terminology and partly over the Dhamma. When you say concepts are real, you don't mean their referents are real (as you explain later in your post). So there is no great disagreement there. However, you do think there is a reality called a concept. This is a common mistake that can be cleared up very easily. It is due largely to some influential modern writers, some of whom have made a simple mistake, others of whom have deliberately undermined the teaching of paramattha dhammas. There are only dhammas, but some dhammas are 'thinking dhammas' and they create concepts. So, as the Urga Sutta tells us, there is an unreal aspect to the world: "9. He who neither goes too far nor lags behind and knows about the world: "This is all unreal," 10. greedless he knows: "This is all unreal," 11. lust-free he knows: "This is all unreal," 12. hate-free he knows: "This is all unreal," 13. delusion-free he knows: "This is all unreal," -- such a monk gives up the here and the beyond, just as a serpent sheds its worn-out skin." In an article,"The Worn out Skin," Nyanaponika Thera explains those lines from the Urga Sutta as follows: "The world is unreal in the sense of presenting a deceptive appearance, being quite different in actuality from the way it appears to a greedy, lustful, hating and ignorant mind. The Pali word vitatha, here rendered by "unreal," has both in Pali and Sanskrit the meaning of "untrue" or "false." These verses, however, are not meant to convey the idea that the world is mere illusion, a play of the imagination. What underlies its deceptive appearance, the flux of mental and physical processes, is real enough in the sense that it is effect-producing. The unreality lies in what we attribute to the world, and not in the world itself." end quote The writer accepts there is a world that is real but deceptive. As you and I agree, there are ultimately no referents-of-concepts (trees, cars, men and women). The next question is; does that real world include something that might be called a "concept" as opposed to the referent of a concept? The article continues: "What, now, is this "world" (loka) and this "all" (sabba), which should be seen as unreal, in the sense of being deceptive? When the Enlightened One was questioned about these two words, he gave the same answer for both: 1. "One speaks of 'the world,' Lord. In how far is there a world or the desiwnation 'world'?" "When there is the eye and visible forms, visual consciousness and things cognizable by visual consciousness; when there is the ear and sounds... ; nose and smells... ; tongue and flavors... ; body and tangibles... ; mind and ideas, mind-consciousness and things cognizable by mind-consciousness -- then there is a world and the designation 'world'. Samyutta Nikaya, 35:68" End quote The group we have to examine is the last one:" things cognisable by mind-consciousness." (I gather the Pali is dhammayatana.) Remember; "things" refers here to things that are absolutely real. We all know the mind can cognise objects that are mind-made illusions (pannatti), are they somehow included in this group? I will cut and paste from DSG message # 33803, written by Sarah to Bhikkhu Bodhi (author of the guide to CMA): ---------------- S: > From CMA ch V11, Guide to #36 on Ayatanas: "the mental-object base does not completely coincide with mental object (dhammaaramma.na), but includes only those entities not found among the other bases. Thus it excludes the first five objective bases, the five types of sensitive matter, and citta, which is identical with the mind base. It also excludes concepts (pa~n~natti), since the notion of base (aayatana) extends only to ultimate realities, i.e. things existing by way of intrinsic nature (sabhaava), and does not extend to things that owe their existence to conceptual construction. The mental-object base comprises the fifty-two mental factors, the sixteen kinds of subtle matter, and nibbana." --------------- So it is clear isn't it? But there is a problem, and you, like many others, have been misled by it. Sarah continues: --------------------- > I agree with the Guide to #36 and I think it's important because of the (rather serious) error in Nyantiloka's dict -- which we all use so much on the discussion list-- which says the opposite to the point about dhammaayatana exluding pa~n~natti and not being synonymous with dhammaaramma.na. Modern commentators often suggest they are synonymous which leads to serious errors. (Your comments are also clearly confirmed in the comy and also in Abhidhamma texts such as the Vibhangaand Sammohavinodani.) > -------------------- So concepts are not real, and we are not required to look for them among the five khandhas. Your valiant efforts to describe certain cittas and cetasikas as concept were not required. :-) -------------------- TG: > Even according to abhidhamma analysis... the rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death (consciousness) may take a concept as an object for consciousness and refer to that concept during one's entire life during the "process-freed life continuum" consciousness. Sounds like something that REALLY arsies and ceases due to conditions. Once again, the referent doesn't arise and cease, but the concept does. > --------------------- Yes, mind-door consciousness can take a concept as its object (dhammaarammana), but at that time there is no real object (dhammaayatana), just the illusion of an object. Kind regards, Ken H 37783 From: Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 4:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Khandas as disease or dissolution? Hi Phil This goes to show that the Buddha didn't view concepts with the same disdain that later types of Buddhist analysis do. The Buddha used the concepts below to point out -- impermanence, suffering, and no-self. This is the heart of the Buddha's teaching and method. The point of the Buddha's teaching has nothing to do with pointing out "ultimate realities." It has to do with overcoming suffering and the only way to do that is to be acutely aware of suffering. Even monks of highest standing in the Buddha's time would use this "conceptually riddled" type of teaching in order to attain arahatship. In fact, Ven. Sariputta was enlightened by a Sutta that contained virtually the same passage you pointed out. Majjhima Nikaya # 74. It is very important to understand what is real. But it is also important to understand that Insight develops from a combination of direct knowledge and conceptual knowledge. As for the Buddha being the teacher of Abhidhamma ... I personally doubt it based on the style and content disparity between Sutta/Vinaya and Abhidhamma. Can I say for sure that the Buddha didn't teach Abhidhamma? No. But anyone who says that he did teach Abhidhamma for sure isn't really being honest IMO. Its merely their opinion and probably based on religious fervor. TG In a message dated 10/26/2004 3:39:59 PM Pacific Standard Time, plnao@j... writes: Hello all Reading SN XXII 122 this morning came across this key sentence: "A virtuous monk should attend in an appropriate way to these five clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not-self." I wondered why we would attend to khandas as a disease, or alien (if they are alien, alien to what?) when it seems that by going straight to an understanding of khandas as dissolution, or emptiness, or anatta, we can get to a kind of liberation more directly, even if our understanding is basic. Why play around with concepts such as disease or alien when we can get straight to dissolution? After all, in another sutta (SN XXII 36) the Buddha says that "if one stays obsessed with form (and the other khandas) that's what one is measured by. What one is measured by, that's how one is classified." I also thought this when reading the series on removing distracting thoughts that Nina posted. Why reflect on foulness when going straight to elements (I would say understanding elements leads directly to understanding their dissolution) seems much more immediately effective? I guess it has to do with accumulations which way of understanding is most effective for a person, and at different times. Concepts are helpful because we have not developed insight to the point where we can have direct understanding of elements. And of course, the degree of insight into elements that I'm able capable of is still conceptual. I would also guess that people who have an appreciation of Abhidhamma are able to move more directly to "attending to" elements and dissolution of elements without getting caught up entirely in concepts such as disease or alien. Yet again, gratitude to the Buddha for his teaching of Abhidhamma and to Nina for her books that make the Buddha's teaching of Abhidhamma accessible for beginners like me. Metta, Phil 37784 From: Ken O Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 9:55pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Ultimate Reality Hi Eric k: I think there is no doubt there is a lot of conventional reality in the sutta. As to me, when Buddha talks about khandhas, bases, elements and sense it is ultimate reality. Conventional reality in my opninion touches on things like table, 'I' etc. When Buddha talks about form in khandhas, it is talking about the elements. Form is to me a very bad translation of the rupa khandha. Just my opinion :). > What is an object? k: Got to apologise my poor description of ultimate reality. I am still grappling to describe what I think to differentiate ultimate reality. Maybe I write it again, ultimate reality is something we can experience directly while things like table and chair we cannot actually experience directly, it is only through a mind construct then we are able to understand what is a table. Maybe a very crude example I can think of (just couldnt think of a good one), a tribal person who is out of the world for years, suddenly if you tell you about a table, the tribal fellow may not understand until he sees one but if you tell him about anger, joy, he may have experience it. Just my thoughts :). What is an object in terms of Abhidhamma? - see the Useful posts > > Another question is that is citta really that fast? I was > wondering > > if citta is not fast, how do we see light in a continuous stream > > without a breakage. It must be fast enough to take it as an > object. > > Do you see a light stream or color? Do you hear > a dog bark or sound? k: Again I am not saying this clearly. In order for a citta to contact an object, it has to be fast enough or not we will not see as continuous, if it is not fast enough, there will be like a "jaggle" kind of light. In the same way, if citta is not fast enough to hear a dog bark, when the dog bark, it may 1 -2 seconds later for us to listen just like listening to a jet boom from a fighter aircraft or a thunder cracking. Just my thoughts again :) regards Ken 37785 From: Ken O Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 10:07pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Details on Vedana Hi Nori > I meant the physical, mind - brain. > > If it is the case that cittas is dependant upon this material > mind/brain then all the sensory cittas would also exist within/with > it. Technically speaking no. Sensory citta arise on sensory bases which are not located in the brain. To me, sensory citta are very refine and subtle so it is difficult to notice on my level. An easy task will be when these sensory signals have been transmitted to the mind cittas, we will know it. As all sensory citta is followed by a immaterial mind proccess (have to qualify to say this is Abhidhamma), we felt senses coming from mind itself. Ken O 37786 From: plnao Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 10:14pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Khandas as disease or dissolution? Hi TG > Hi Phil > > This goes to show that the Buddha didn't view concepts with the same disdain > that later types of Buddhist analysis do. The Buddha used the concepts below > to point out -- impermanence, suffering, and no-self. This is the heart of > the Buddha's teaching and method. Certainly he knew that different people had different accumulations, and different degrees of insight. In my opinion - a beginner's opinion - that is why he used conventional similes to teach in the Suttanta. The danger is if we cling to these similes, especially in the internet age when most Western Buddhists approach the Suttanta without the assistance of a teacher, and in translation. But, as I've learned from Nina, we should refer to these similes if and when they're helpful. Yes, indeed, you have correctly identified the heart of the Buddha's teaching. Personally speaking, anatta, annica and dukkha were just cool sounding Pali terms until I came across Abhidhamma - that's when I began to see into them more deeply. Now when I come back to the Suttanta, the suttas can be appreciated at a deeper level (still not very deep) than when I first came across them. The metaphor I have used here before still stands soundly in my view - studying suttas without having studied Abhidhamma is like studying medical case studies without having studied an anatomy text book. > The point of the Buddha's teaching has nothing to do with pointing out > "ultimate realities." Ph: Call them what you will. The point of seeing ultimate realities is to better understand anatta, annica and dukkha. If this practice is not helpful towards udnerstanding the three characteristics, it will be discarded by a discerning mind. If it is helpful, the discerning mind will know. It has to be left up to one's examined experience. In my case, it is. Seeing the way nama and rupa rises and falls, even at the crude level to which I am capable of doing so, has been greatly liberating, particularly with respect to anger and sensual lust. And the Buddha did teach "ultimate realites." Read the Samyutta Nikaya. The vaggas (sp?) on the aggregates, the six senses, feelings - they are all related to better understanding nama and rupa. You will say that the word "nama" isn't used. It doesn't matter. The khandas are nama and rupa. That's clear through basic insight. (snip) > It is very important to understand what is real. But it is also important to > understand that Insight develops from a combination of direct knowledge and > conceptual knowledge. Very true. > As for the Buddha being the teacher of Abhidhamma ... I personally doubt it > based on the style and content disparity between Sutta/Vinaya and Abhidhamma. > Can I say for sure that the Buddha didn't teach Abhidhamma? No. But anyone > who says that he did teach Abhidhamma for sure isn't really being honest IMO. > Its merely their opinion and probably based on religious fervor. You can call it religious fervour. (Though I would say that referring to one of the three baskets in that way is a bit naughty.) I call it confidence based on what I have experienced in daily life, not my opinion. It's true that there was a kind of fervour when I first came across Abhidhamma through Nina's books. It just felt so right, so true. Some sleepless nights in fact, as I read and read. (and promptly forgot and forgot what I'd read and read.) But that fervour has been replaced by something calmer and more confident. Again, that is based on experience, not theory. But not to worry. If you can gain the insight that leads to detachment without Abhidhamma, I'm happy for you. There are many ways to gain insight. Let's respect each other and try not to use pejorative terms such as "religious fervour" or worse. (I think of Dig the Nutcracker's "drivelling faith-heads". What kind of appreciation of the essence of the Buddha's teaching does that demonstrate?) Manners, please. Remember that dsg was established several decades ago in the light of K Sujin's teaching, and those who don't respond to her teaching are guests here and should behave with the same manners that they would (presumably) if they attended one of her Dhamma talks. I sometimes think the moderators could be a little stricter about reminding people of this. There are so many internet groups out there! If one doesn't respond to and respect K Sujin's teaching, and if one doesn't believe Abhidhamma is the Buddha's teaching, wouldn't it be gracious (and sensible) to go elsewhere? That's my personal opinion. I'm a beginner and am easily distracted from what is important for me here and now. For others who are less restless and more knowledgeable of doctrinary issues, there is understanding to be gained from and/or confirmed by defending Abhdihamma and the ancient commentaries. Metta, Phil 37787 From: rjkjp1 Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 10:59pm Subject: Re: Khandas as disease or dissolution? Dear Phil, In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "plnao" wrote: > > Hello all > > Reading SN XXII 122 this morning came across this key sentence: > > "A virtuous monk should attend in an appropriate way to these five > clinging-aggregates as inconstant, stressful, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, > painful, an affliction, alien, a dissolution, an emptiness, not- self." > > I wondered why we would attend to khandas as a disease, or alien (if they > are alien, alien to what?) when it seems that by going straight to an > understanding of khandas as dissolution, or emptiness, or anatta, we can get > to a kind of liberation more directly, even if our understanding is basic. > Why play around with concepts such as disease or alien when we can get > straight to dissolution? ================ Dear Phil, Any words used to decribe paramattha dhammas (the five aggregates) must be a concept. Even anatta and anicca are purely conceptual as terms . Howeever these concepts are also so accurate as to what the really khandhas are. And surely they are a disease- that is what the whole paticasamupaadda shows. An ugly, chronic illness I would say. Alien is my favourite, I used to write posts about it in the early days of dsg. I forget the pali term now, but the English translation cpatures it well. There is nothing about any of the five khandhas (paramattha dhammas) that is me or mine, they are dangerous, vile and alien . It shows how deluded we are that we can think of them as being good at times! It is true that direct insight doesn't need to use any words but then when you consider the khandhas how else can you think about them except in words and these are the best terms to use. Robertk 37788 From: dighanakha Date: Tue Oct 26, 2004 11:54pm Subject: Re: Enter The Abhidhammika! Whereupon the Sautrantika grabbed him by the ears... Hello Andrew. A> Sorry if I took your words out of context. I didn't mean to A> misrepresent you. It's just that, at the moment, I am very A> interested in reflecting upon the place of saddha in Dhamma A> practice. No problem. I didn't suspect you had purposely misread me. A> In your post, you wrote: "some drivelling faith-head". A> As one Dhamma practitioner to another, do you have a sutta A> reference for this term or the use of this kind of language? (-: You mean you thought it was a bit too euphemistic? Okay, I take your point. You've probably noticed that I tend to be squeamishly tactful and diplomatic, but I just can't help myself. I don't know of a Sutta term corresponding to "faith-head", but possibly we could take the term "groundless faith" (amuulika saddhaa) and refer to those whose faith is of this sort as "faith-heads". Those with amuulika saddhaa, you may recall, were compared to builders who build a staircase leading up to a mansion that doesn't exist; or to a man who announces that he is looking for the fairest belle in the land, but cannot say who she is, whether she is tall or short, dark or fair, of which caste etc. Richard Dawkins used "faith-head" in a controversial article, "Religion's Misguided Missiles", that he wrote in the aftermath of 9/11. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4257777,00.html I had never heard the term before I read this article, so possibly it is his own coinage. In Dawkinsian usage 'faith-head' means anyone who has any kind of amuulika saddhaa. In Nutcrackerian usage it is confined to those who go against the Canki Sutta by presenting unsupported faith claims as if they were matters of certainty, or else pretend that there is room for doubt in matters where there is none, or else whose faith-based intransigence compels them to resort to ungentlemanly conduct when discussing issues with dissenters. As for "drivellers", this is the Rhys Davids and I.B. Horner translation of the Pali 'e.lamuuga'. It's an obscure term which literally means something like 'one who is goat-dumb' or perhaps 'dribbling like a goat'. Some recensions have the form 'e.lamukha' which means 'goat-faced'. Being goat-dumb, goat-faced or goat-dribbling seems to mean being struthious or timorous, and is one of the vices that makes a bhikkhu unfit for life in the forest. See, for example, the Bhayabherava Sutta (MN 4). A> Like Howard, Pali is all Swahili to me so I'll butt out of A> the discussion here and leave you to it. But it remains a A> very interesting thread ... You needn't feel obliged to butt out on that account. A knowledge of Pali is not really needed to understand the issues. As long as those who do read Pali are considerate enough to post translations, anyone should be able to participate. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37789 From: robmoult Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 0:25am Subject: Re: Rupa Hi Joop, Sorry for the delay in responding (between missing the orginal message and being very busy with work). --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "jwromeijn" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "robmoult" > wrote: > >> Hi All, > > I have uploaded this new section (only 6 pages) to the files > section > > (there are a number of diagrams). I will leave it there for a > couple > > of weeks. > > > Dear Rob M, > > After the comments I had on your first draft i~ august I will react > again on this new chapter (or paragraph?) > It's much better than the old one! > I will say that not because I'm an expert like Htoo Naing but as a > scientific thinking westerner who had to reduce the cognitive > dissonance between natural science and the rupa-aspect of nama- rupa > (and who wants to reduce because of my love for and faith in the > teachings of the Buddha) > > Of page 63 and 64 I can just say: good > > Page 65: very good, makes me enthousiastic. For me the drawing of the > circle has a soteriological meaning too: result of my (vipassana- > insight) meditation is making that circle smaller, till the radius is > zero; is that correct? ===== Precisely. The mind cannot be controlled (there is no "controller"), but it is trainable. The radius can never be zero; the smallest it can become is equal to the initial sensory input. This would be equivalent to having a mind trained to "see things as they truly are" with no mental proliferation (papanca). The Mulapiriyaya Sutta (Mn 1) explains what we do as "perceiving" whereas a trainee "directly knows". I find this diagram useful to explain to people how our mind adds layer upon layer of distortion onto what comes in through the senses to create our own reality. The commentary explains the nature of papanca as like layers of clounds obscuring the moon so that one only sees a fuzzy outline of the true object. ===== > > Page 66: I have big problems in understanding your explanation > - "The commentary uses this delineation to explain why eye-, ear-, > nose- and tong-sensitivity …" I don't see any explanation in the > metaphore of the hammer and the cotton-ball and I don't understand > body-sensitivity works on another way as eye-, ear, nose- and tongue- > sensitivity. And I don't see what is the role of the derivation of > the derived rupa from the great essentials in this explanation ===== Good point, I need to improve that section of the text (or take it out entirely because it disrupts the flow). The question that is answered by the commentary is "Why is it that bodily contact produces feeling (either pleasant or unpleasant) whereas all other forms of sense contact (eye-, ear-, nose- and tongue- ) do not produce feeling?" The answer to this question is that the natures of the sense-objects are inherently different. For body-sensitivity, the sense object is a great essential (solidity, temperature, pressure) whereas for other senses (seeing, hearing, smelling and tasing), the sense- object is a derived rupa (dependent upon the great essentials, but not great essentials themselves). To clarify this explanation, the commentary uses the analogy of the anvil, cotton and the hammer. The anvil and the hammer are the great essentials whereas the cotton is the derived rupa. A group of rupas with ear-sensitivity (and all of the other sensitivities, including body-sensitivity) starts with a base of the great essentials (the anvil) and then adds derived rupas (eye-sensitivity is a derived rupa). In the analogy, this is the anvil covered with cotton. When another derived rupa acts as the sense object it is like a cotton ball striking the cotton-covered anvil in the case of seeing / hearing / smelling / tasting, but it is like a hammer (a great essential) hitting the cotton-covered anvil in the case of body sensation. In hind-sight, it is probably better to exclude this explanation from my notes. ===== > > - A smaller problem is the use of the word 'things' in the second > half of this page: it is a not-elegant (a silly) word; I don't know a > better one: 'compound entities' is perhaps too formal. ===== Let me try to come up with a better term... ===== > - "Body-sensitivity": you don't mention that is a later invention of > a commentary, not used in the Dhamma-sangani. ===== Body-sensitivity is described in the Dhamma-sangani; it is "heart base" which was the later invention. ===== > > Page 67: Two (minor) problems: > - I don't understand the phrase "groups of rupas have the following > rupas", all rupas 'exist' in groups, isn't it? ===== Yes, all rupas exist in groups. Let me think about how to use less awkward wording. ===== > - The differences between 'decay', 'impermance' (of a collection of > rupas) and ''falling away' of an individual rupa is not clear. The > time-scales of these three are different (decades of years, seconds > (?) and billionths part of a second) but is that a real fundamental > difference; are all three chraracteristics on a ultimate level? ===== They are quite different. Anicca is a characteristic of all ultimate realities except Nibbana. Mental states arise and fall away instantaneously. Rupas arise and fall away instantaneously. The rupa that is the piece of paper that I am looking at has the four essentials, space, taste, visible object, flavour and nutritional essence. For a moment, I looked away from the paper and then looked back. When I looked back, it was not the same rupa as I saw earlier. In a conventional sense, it looks the same (same scribble, etc.), but if I were to leave the paper for a longer time (a year or a decade, I would be able to see the difference; it would be slightly discoloured. This happens because a rupa is subject to decay. In the commentary, they talk about decay using examples of wrinkles and gray hair. ===== > > Page 68: Two (minor) questions: > - 'Temperature' and 'Nutrition' are rupas themselves ànd causes rupa. > But isn't that an example of rupa interacting with other rupa of > which you say on page 65 that is in the domain of science and not in > the domain of the Buddha's focus? ===== Touche!! My sweeping generalities come back to bite me once again :-) I need to do some research on the origin of the description of formation of temperature-formed rupa and nutrition-formed rupa. I will consult Y Karunadasa's "Buddhist Analysis of Matter" at the temple library on Sunday. I hope that I find that this aspect was only added later (my gut feeling is that it probably arose together with the theory of moments about the time of the Abhidhammatthasangaha). ===== > - I will not call the last part 'Summary' but 'Conclusion' because > a 'Summary' should not contain new statement. > Or do you think the introduction of the relation between 'rupa' > and 'right understanding' is not new in this paragraph? ===== I have changed the text to read "Right Understanding" ===== > > ============================================ > > I will use this message to express my surpise when I this week for > the first time could read the Dhamma-sangani itself (translation of > C.A.F. Rhys Davids) and COULD HARDLY FIND THE FOUR MAHABHUTA in it. > > One point of our discussion a month ago, about the difference between > an ontological and a phenomenological view on the dhamma's (of which > Bhikku Bodhi and you say these two views are nearly the same and of > which Ven. Nyanaponika and I say they are fundamental different). > I think it's funny mrs Rhys Davids doesn't use the > term "phenomenology" but "Sensationalism"! (Introductory Essay, page > lv) what is not exact the same but is very near ! > > Book II of the Dhamma-Sangani is about Material Form (rupakandham). > After a short Introduction > Chapter I is about 'Exposition of [Material] Form under Single > Concepts > Chapter II: The category of [Material] Form considered by way of > dual attributes; in this chapter the derived forms are decribed > Chapter III … under Triple Aspects > Chapter IV … under Fourfold Aspects > … etc. till: > Chapter XI … under Elevenfold Aspect > > In Chapter V - nearly hided - the four not derived forms are > mentioned: earth-element, fluid-element, heat-element and air- element. > I thought till now these four 'elements' are the fundamental building > block of rupa and an exposition should start with it and then derive > the other 22 or 23 from them. Nina in her ebook, the Visuddhimagga > (very short) and the Abhidhammattha start with the Four; you did not. > Why? ===== In many parts of my book, I chose a non-conventional order in which to present things. I want to get away from the idea of rupa as building blocks (this is one of the reasons that I replaced my earlier writing on rupa which showed molecule-like structures). I see rupas as attributes of objects rather than building blocks. If I take this piece of paper (which as a whole has the rupas of earth, water, wind, fire, visible object, flavour, odour, nutrition and space) and tear it into a thousand pieces, I now have a thousand objects all with attributes of earth, water, wind, fire, visible object, flavour, odour, nutrition and space. As you probably know, I am drifting toward a position that the Suttas and the original six books of the Abhidhamma (not including the Kathavatthu) are not about "ultimate realities" and that the theme of "ultimate realities" was added later and eventually became the central part of the Abhidhammatthasangaha. The fact that the Dhammasangani treats earth, water, wind and fire as ways of experiencing an object (under the fourfold aspects) and NOT as a fundamental building block (ultimate reality approach) could be interpreted as supporting my position. Metta, Rob M :-) 37790 From: antony272b2 Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 0:39am Subject: Re: [dsg] Future Potential of Sense-objects Dear Howard, Rob K and all, Is it OK to say that visible objects can be *relatively* permanent? Common sense (which isn't always right view) says that some objects are more permanent than others. Thanks / Antony. --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Antony - > > In a message dated 10/23/04 9:30:44 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > antony272b@h... writes: > > > Do you think that the resistance to the perception of things breaking > > up is the "deja vu" effect where we believe that we have experienced > > the arising objects before in a reliable state? > > > ======================= > I think that the resistance to the perception of things breaking up is > due to our desire for stability - for an anchor, and to our fear of shifting > sands and the world's slipping out from under our feet as in an earthquake. > The irony is that the sands *are* shifting, there *is* no firm footing, and the > only real stability obtainable is obtained by letting go. > > With metta, > Howard > 37791 From: kenhowardau Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 0:48am Subject: Re: Teeth Clenching Hi DN, Our posts on this thread are getting longer and longer. I'll try to sum up your latest contribution: It seems you want to deny any profundity in the Dhamma: It has no deep meaning that would distinguish the conventional reality we are all familiar with, from an absolute reality known only to the wise. You say that the Oghatana Sutta teaches plain, ordinary moderation - not too much straining, not too much standing still. You think right effort is as simple as walking for a moderate period of time. Suppressing the hindrances comes down to teeth clenching and 'right positioning' of the tongue. Just as log sawing requires no training in nuclear physics, so too enlightenment requires no training in Abhidhamma. The middle way between 'all exists' and 'all does not exist' (I suppose you are saying) is 'half of all exists, the other half does not exist.' Dependent Origination is a straightforward teaching that requires no knowledge of Abhidhamma. Nothing can exist, however briefly, without being permanent; therefore, impermanence means there can only be events, no paramattha dhammas. Ven. Thanissaro is not an eternalist. The Buddha was a glorified Home Economics teacher. That brings us to my statement: > > The Buddha taught satipatthana and every word of his teaching should be understood in terms of satipatthana. > > To which you replied: > Poppycock. Back up your claim with a citation from the Suttas. > There you have me - I don't know many citations. Somewhere, the Buddha said he taught only two things, "dukkha and release from dukkha." Would you agree that satipatthana is right understanding of 'dukkha' and that only satipatthana leads to 'release from dukkha?' Is there any point in continuing further? I think you have proved that, without the Abhidhamma and the ancient commentaries, the suttas can be interpreted, quite plausibly, as meaningless mush. :-) Kind regards, Ken H 37792 From: dighanakha Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 1:08am Subject: Re: Thinking and thoughts -- status of Hello Ken O. K> Precisely that what Buddha trying to say, first the coming K> together then contact could be known or manifested. If he was "trying to say" that the manifestation occurs after the coming together then he would have said that. As I said in my last post, he only needed to add one syllable -- 'yaa' -- to the word sangati and the text would mean exactly what you and the commentators want it to. But he didn't. K> If not why did Maha Kaccana describe sense impingement in K> details I have no idea what your question is aiming at. Kaccaana's account is just the same as the Buddha himself gave in many other Suttas. Phassa is most often given in detail. K> << This situation occurs: that when there is eye, your K> reverences, when there is visible object, when there is K> visual consciousness, one will recognise the manifestation K> of sensory impingement (phassa)... ' ">> . When there is K> eye, visible objects and visual consciouness, one will K> recognise the manifestation of phassa. K> <> Here the K> coming together ryhmes with the above, when there is eye.... K> till visual citta. K> I dont see any digress because to me, linking them, < coming together, one will recognise the manifestation of K> sensory impingement>> Sure. One will recognize contact when there's a coming together, because that's what contact is. But I think we are just going around in circles now. Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37793 From: jwromeijn Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 2:01am Subject: Re: Rupa The art of ending a discussion --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "robmoult" wrote: (snip) Dear Rob Thanks for your answers. Discussions like ours, and other ones in this DSG, in fact are never really finished. But still they must end, if possible in a polite way; in an agreement, maybe 'agree to disagree'. It's my impression that some discussions continue to long. I think this is the right moment for ending our discussion about rupa. Metta Joop 37794 From: robmoult Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 2:13am Subject: Re: Rupa The art of ending a discussion Hi Joop, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "jwromeijn" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "robmoult" > wrote: > (snip) > > > Dear Rob > > Thanks for your answers. > Discussions like ours, and other ones in this DSG, in fact are never > really finished. > But still they must end, if possible in a polite way; in an > agreement, maybe 'agree to disagree'. > It's my impression that some discussions continue to long. > I think this is the right moment for ending our discussion about rupa. ===== I am still going to look into the origin of the utuja and aharaja rupas (suttas, original abhidhamma texts, commentaries or later additions). I really appreciate your input and I apologize again for destroying the momentum of the discussion by not responding in a timely manner. Metta, Rob M :-) 37795 From: dighanakha Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 6:17am Subject: Re: Teeth Clenching Hello Ken H. K> Our posts on this thread are getting longer and longer. I'll K> try to sum up your latest contribution. Thanks for the attempt. But your summary seems to owe far more to your imagination or perversity or obtuseness, than to anything I actually wrote. You have "summarized" my post in eleven clauses, of which only one is correct. K> It seems you want to deny any profundity in the Dhamma. Not at all. Where I think we differ is that I look for profundity in those of his teachings that the Buddha explicitly singled out as being profound. Some questions for you -- they're just for you to ask yourself, no need to reply: Without looking it up, do you know which of his teachings the Buddha singled out as being profound? If you don't know, which teachings would you guess them to be? On what basis do you suppose them to be profound? Do you know if they are actually from the Tipitaka or from Buddhaghosa's teaching? If they are from Buddhaghosa, would you in principle be prepared to reject them if they were contradicted by the Suttas (as the Mahaparinibbaana Sutta would require them to be)? K> It has no deep meaning that would distinguish the K> conventional reality we are all familiar with, from an K> absolute reality known only to the wise. Not at all. Where we differ is that I derive my understanding of what is paramattha from the Tipitaka, not from a 5th century CE sect of atomist philosophers. K> You say that the Oghatana Sutta teaches plain, ordinary K> moderation - not too much straining, not too much standing K> still. No, I did not say what *I* thought about the Sutta's meaning. I didn't think you would be interested in that, so I merely repeated what the Sub-commentary says. And you don't seem to have even read that accurately. K> You think right effort is as simple as walking for a K> moderate period of time. No, I didn't say anything at all about what right effort is. I merely gave the exertions of the monk Sona as one illustration of wrong effort. It is, after all, the most famous illustration, since it was with regard to Sona that the Buddha taught the simile of the lute. K> Suppressing the hindrances comes down to teeth clenching and K> 'right positioning' of the tongue. Not at all. I explicitly stated that this was the last step that one resorts to if the four preceding ones have failed. This is exactly what the Vitakkasanthana Sutta teaches. I think for most meditators, for most of the time, the first four steps will suffice. On those occasions when they don't, then it's time for the teeth-clenching this-town-ain't-big-enough-for-the-two-of-us kind of approach. K> Just as log sawing requires no training in nuclear physics, K> so too enlightenment requires no training in Abhidhamma. Not at all. I said nothing about Abhidhamma in relation to enlightenment. I merely pointed out the unsuitability of bringing Abhidhammic considerations to bear upon each and every one of the Buddha's teachings. K> The middle way between 'all exists' and 'all does not exist' K> (I suppose you are saying) is 'half of all exists, the other K> half does not exist.' No, I explicitly stated that it was dependent arising that avoids these extremes, and I gave you the source for this claim in the Suttas. K> Dependent Origination is a straightforward teaching that K> requires no knowledge of Abhidhamma. No, I said nothing at all about whether dependent arising was straightforward or difficult. But now that you've raised the matter, I would say that it's difficult. The Buddha in fact called it duddassa, "difficult to see". But its being difficult to see does not necessarily mean that one must leap on one or another of the competing sectarian Abhidharmas in the hope that this will make it easier to see. On the contrary, the reason given for it being difficult to see is not because people haven't studied Abhidharma, but because they are "enmeshed by the five hindrances which prevent calm and weaken wisdom." K> Nothing can exist, however briefly, without being permanent; K> therefore, impermanence means there can only be events, no K> paramattha dhammas. Not at all. It means that paramattha dhammas are viewed as events rather than atoms. K> Ven. Thanissaro is not an eternalist. You got one right at last! I have not read anything by Thanissaro that conformed to any of the 8 kinds of eternalism or partial-eternalism. Until I do, I'm not going to go slapping that label on him merely on your say-so. If your reading of Thanissaro is as careless as your reading of my posts, then I reckon the likelihood of you being correct is close to nil. K> The Buddha was a glorified Home Economics teacher. Not at all. I said that his teachings *included* guidance on everyday domestic concerns. In other words, this was *part* of of his teaching. In taking this to mean it was the whole of his teaching, you commit the fallacy of composition -- of taking a predicate of a part and treating it as if it were a predicate of the whole. K> That brings us to my statement: K>>> The Buddha taught satipatthana and every word of his K>>> teaching should be understood in terms of satipatthana. K> To which you replied: dig>> Poppycock. Back up your claim with a citation from the dig>> Suttas. K> There you have me - I don't know many citations. Somewhere, K> the Buddha said he taught only two things, "dukkha and K> release from dukkha." Would you agree that satipatthana is K> right understanding of 'dukkha' No. The teaching is that right view is the knowledge of dukkha (and the other 4NTs). See the Saccavibhanga Sutta (MN 141) K> and that only satipatthana leads to 'release from K> dukkha?' No. The teaching is that only the Eight-factored Path -- of which sammaasati is only one factor -- leads to release from dukkha. See the Mahaaparinibbaana Sutta (DN 16). K> Is there any point in continuing further? Not from my side. If you think that *you* may benefit from further discussion, then out of compassion I may continue. ;-) Sincerely, Dighanakha Nutcracker _____________________________ Truly, Master Gotama, I am of this persuasion, of this view: 'everything is not pleasing to me.' (Dighanakha Sutta) 37796 From: Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 3:39am Subject: Continuity and Speed (was Re: [dsg] Re: Ultimate Reality) Hi, Ken (and Eric) - In a message dated 10/27/04 12:56:39 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@y... writes: > k: Again I am not saying this clearly. In order for a citta to > contact an object, it has to be fast enough or not we will not see as > continuous, if it is not fast enough, there will be like a "jaggle" > kind of light. In the same way, if citta is not fast enough to hear > a dog bark, when the dog bark, it may 1 -2 seconds later for us to > listen just like listening to a jet boom from a fighter aircraft or a > thunder cracking. Just my thoughts again :) > > =========================== I have a slightly different view. In terms of experience, which, in fact, is all we ever know - we don't experience the unexperienced, consciousness is the presence of content, and there is no option other than their co-occurring. The matter of continuity is something else, I believe. There are no gaps between mindstates, at least that is the claim that Theravadin Abhidhamma makes. So there, already, is a *sort* of continuity. (That, however, is not the experienced continuity we are speaking of.) Speed of cittas doesn't enter into this at all, as far as I can see. When one talks of speed of cittas, the question is "In comparison to what?" After all, there is nothing that is knowable, nothing that can be experienced for comparison purposes, that does not occur as an aspect of a mindstate. There is no question of "keeping up". A matter that seems to be relevant to this issue is what the mind actually *registers* as opposed to merely experiences. It seems to me that a large part of what is experienced does not consciously register. What I would bet happens is that as part of our experience, there are constructed, from time to time, mindstates that are "reviewing states" that so-to-speak "sum up" the recent history of largely unregistered experience, and these states, which *do* register clearly, present an apparent continuity. So, what I'm saying is that our experience of continuity is a constructed one [created by sankharic, constructive processes], and has nothing to do with speed. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 37797 From: connieparker Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 10:13am Subject: Re: Rupa The art of ending a discussion Hi, Rob M, Joop, Not to confuse nama and rupa, but I like this from Narada's Manual of Abhidhamma: < Inseparably connected with heat is vaayo, the element of motion. Movements are caused by this element. Motion is regarded as the force or the generator of heat. "Motion and heat in the material realm correspond respectively to consciousness and Kamma in the mental." > peace, connie 37798 From: connieparker Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 10:13am Subject: Re: Khandas as disease or dissolution? Hi, Phil, Some alien posts: 33105, 12481, 11944, 11609, 8415, 7841, 6715, 3543, 1517, 610, 591. peace, connie 37799 From: htootintnaing Date: Wed Oct 27, 2004 1:15pm Subject: Dhamma Thread ( 097 ) Dear Dhamma Friends, If there is lobha cittas kingdom is ready to arise and there are no conditions for ditthi cetasika to arise, then mana has a place to throne along with the king lobha or tanha. In lobha mula cittas, lobha always arises with one of his queens ditthi and mana. But ditthi and mana never arise together in a single citta as the king lobha will not follow the wish of both queens. This happen because they both have a similar character but not exactly and as they are different, they are counted as separate cetasikas. Mana is a mental factor that arises with lobha cittas. When it arises with lobha citta, it advises the leader of all mental faculties, the citta to be lofty. Mana also helps other associated cetasikas to be in line with citta and then all become lofty. Mana cetasika has the qualities of proud, conceit, loftiness, haughtiness ( flaunting a flag ). Mana can sometimes be recognized easily. But as there are different forms of mana, some forms will not be easily recognized. Mana in the form of anusaya or subtle forms are eradicated only by arahatta magga nana. So whenever lobha citta arise, there will also be ditthi or mana. If ditthi is eradicated by sotapatti magga nana, then all lobha cittas in sotapams, sakadagams, and anagams will be accompanied by mana. There are many different things that mana possibly bases. For example, if someone is born a prince he will at a time have lobha citta with mana if he considers his princely birth. By birth, some breed mana or conceit in connection with their birth origin. Some think that their racial origin or clan or tribal qualities excel other and they will feel lofty in connection with their nationality. If someone who is not of their nationality speaks their language, the native speakers who hear foreigners' speech may have some mana if lobha citta with mana arises in connection with nationality. In each society, there are different families. There are families of which the members are all decent, educated, polite, rich on their own, etc etc and there are families the members of which may or may not have all the good qualities that the society has defined. If families are good as they would think, then they may become lofty in connection with their family and their membership in those families. Every being has body components when in pancavokara bhumis that is all will have physical body when they are in kama bhumis and rupa bhumis. There may be slight difference or marked difference between each other in these realms. Some are cling to body parts like beautiful face, beautiful body posture, beautiful hands, fingers, thighs, legs etc etc. These body parts may well be a source of mana. Some may cling to their voice quality. When they think that their voice is good and better than others' voice, this again may also be a source of mana. Especially when someone with croaky voice talks to them, they may hear such voice and may compare with their beautiful voice and then mana may arise. Aavasa or home or dwelling may also be a source of mana. This may happen when someone who has a good house visits other's house and finds unsighty, then mana possibly arises in him that his house is much better than the house he visits. Wealth is also a good source for mana to arise if there is clinging to their wealth. Someone who is a rich man will feel uneasy to travel in general public using the public transport. At that time, he may breed mana and he would think he otherwise use his own chopper next time. Someone who has studied a lot and well educated may cling to their education and knowledge. This clinging may bring up mana along with clinging. If someone who does not know nothing argues with him, he may breed mana at that time as he is well educated and well learned. Still there are many sources for mana to arise. They are status at work, type of job, craft works like sculpture, specific branch of science, intelligence, friends, wife, son, daughter, teacher, religin, and endless. Even though mana is mostly described as loftiness, this does not mean mana always arises in those who have better things or who are at better side. Mana can arise in all sorts of setting while comparison has been made. The comparison may be 'better' or 'equal' or 'inferior'. As an example, let us take 'wealth' as a source. The rich man may have mana when he thinks himself richer than others. Again when he realises that someone has almost the same amount of wealth, mana can still arise thinking he is equal to another rich man. This comparison may continue even when he meets people who are richer than he is. They have such amount of wealth. And I have my own wealth of such amount. I do not need to care about whatever they own. Mana can still arise when he compares with others'. As in case of wealth, all other sources may take the same implication as in case of wealth. One may breed mana when they are in better position and others are not, breed mana when they are the same position with others, breed mana when they are inferior to others'. In any case, mana is not a good cetasika. Initially even though lobha cittas arise, later other akusala cittas like dosa cittas may also arise. While pure moha cittas do not do any apparent akusala physically, lobha and dosa cittas may commit the wickest akusala. It is lobha and dosa who commit 5 precepts and more than 5 precepts. May you all be free from suffering. With Unlimited Metta, Htoo Naing PS: 1.Any comments are welcome and any queries are welcome and they will be valuable. If there is unclarity of any meaning, please just give a reply to any of these posts. 2.I acknowledge that Robert K has contributed a lot to 'mana' topic about 18 months ago. I would like to thank Ken O for his recent post on 'mana'.