59800 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu May 25, 2006 10:35am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reifying, upasaka_howard Hi, Dan - In a message dated 5/25/06 2:37:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time, onco111@... writes: > Or when the cittas are classified according to the accompanying > cetasikas (as in Abhidhammatha sangaha), the cetasikas are the > characteristics that define a moment (citta) as, say, "akusala rooted > in lobha and ditthi" or as "kusala, associated with somanassa and not > with wrong view." This highlights the importance of cetasika as > determinative of the of cognition. > ===================== Yes, very important. This supports your "flavor" terminology. :-) With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59801 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Thu May 25, 2006 3:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta ken_aitch Hi Herman, ------ H: > Hi Sarah and anyone else if Sarah is too busy, ------ Ken H to the rescue! ------------------- > Also, I don't wish to get into Abhidhamma-techno-speak with you, Herman, > but I think we need to distinguish here the rupas experienced through the > body-sense and the pleasant and unpleasant feelings which experience them. > When there is 'mildly pleasant body awareness', it is not pleasure in the > body, but in the mind. It's a nama which experiences the tangible object. > This is usually followed by clinging, just as unpleasant bodily feeling > (also a nama) is usually followed by aversion. Very natural when there's > no awareness or guarding of the sense doors. Isn't the aversion caused by > the clinging to pleasant experiences. H: > Actually, I would like it if you did some Abhidhamma speak. I have looked at useful posts under pain, vedana, bodily feeling and under vipaka, and am totally lost as to what is being maintained. ------------------------ Ah, but what were you looking for? When the Buddha taught anatta, he did not say, "You do not exist," he said, "Only dhammas exist, and all dhammas are anatta." Thereupon, his students thought, "Wow!" and they asked, "What are the dhammas that are arising now?" (Hence 45 years of explanations.) When you looked at Useful Posts, were you thinking and asking, "Wow! What are the dhammas that are arising now?" If not, you were unlikely to find the answers. -------------------------- H: > With regards to physical pain, where does vipaka come into it, according to the theory? And how are vedana and vipaka linked, if at all? --------------------------- As we speak, body-sense rupas are being assaulted by tactile rupas. Some of these attackers are desirable, and they are experienced with pleasant bodily feeling (the fruit of past good kamma) while others are undesirable, and they are experienced with unpleasant bodily feeling (the fruit of past bad kamma). So the vedana that is bodily feeling is not linked to vipaka; it is vipaka! Ken H Where did that masked man go? 59802 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu May 25, 2006 3:20pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... egberdina Hi Scott, Thanks for your reply, as always. On 25/05/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > Dear Herman, > > Thank you for your good reply. I think we are getting closer and > closer to starting to discuss something. I'm rather thick and you > seem to play your cards close to your chest. I notice that you, from time to time, attribute various motivations to me . It doesn't bother me in the slightest, but I do doubt that transference can be relied upon as a diagnostic tool over the Internet :-) For the sake of the faceless discussion we are having, it might be better to just concentrate on the dhamma-side of things. H: "My satisfaction with the suttas is based on exactly that; > satisfaction. If I read a sutta and it fills me joy, delight, > pleasure, ease, then I have read something that doesn't require faith, > the proof was in the pudding. And it sets up the foundations for > concentration and insight." > > This is helpful to me in understanding where you are coming from. You > value experience and seem to respond to truth in an emotional way. > This is, for you, the "proof" in your empiricism. I think this is > what it is: knowledge is derived from experience. Is this the sense > in which you are using the term "empirical?" Look, I'll be happy to admit that my use of empirical is quirky. I just don't know what other word to use, and I am very open to suggestions. Any good candidate would be a word that conveyed the understanding that a hypothesis cannot be verified, it can only be falsified. An example may help. If I hypothesise that plants need water to live, I can deprive them of water, and see what happens. if they survive I have falsified the hypothesis. But if they die I have not verified my hypothesis, simply because I do not know (and can never know) all the other variables in play (or know that I know them all), and cannot attribute the death of the plants to the lack of water. So feel free to put forward another word. Failing that, I'll stick with empirical, but will emphasise that this implies a knowing what is not the case. H: "Empirically, one discovers how the world isn't. Positively, one > sets out to find how the world is." > > Are you confusing method and result? "How the world is" and "how the > world isn't" - all the same in the end. Is and isn't are just two > sides of the same coin aren't they? No, I think that what is and isn't there are quite different. What-isn't-there cannot be a support for clinging, craving, consciousness. And the opposite applies to what-is-there. > Nibbaana, for example, is > described mostly in terms of what it is not, and yet one has to still > affirm that Nibbaana "is," that is has reality. I think Nibbaana as concept can be discussed conceptually. But Nibbaana as reality cannot. What is the discovery when, upon reading a sutta, you experience a > filling of joy? What is this moment? It is not a nothing. It is a > something. It wasn't there and then it is there, and soon it is gone. > With the experience as focus you seem to then find yourself able to > assert the truth of a given sutta and go beyond "faith" in your > experience of the sutta. Howard and Dan are having a nice discussion about reifying. Moment, thereness etc are all candidates for reifying, making them into discrete things. Newton's universe could be reified. There were, for him, discrete moments of time and discrete areas of space, in which discrete things were located. I do not think that is a useful model of the way things are. Far more useful, for me, is to consider things in terms of probability of their thereness. H: "Yes, I know what you mean. But when you go to find this dhamma, > can you tell me any more than that it isn't there?" > > What does this actually prove? You are using a literary device here I > realise, but do you actually misunderstand dhamma theory to suggest > that there are "old" dhammas in a warehouse somewhere, to be found by > looking at the labels on the shelves? Of course this is not the case. I am not so much concerned with having a correct understanding of dhamma theory. My aim remains to come to know what is real. If theory and reality clash at some point of time, of course the theory needs revising, not reality. It is a fact that the closer one looks at anything thought to be there, it will not be found to be so. And that includes paramattha dhammas. That is not a literary device, best as I can tell. The thing about warehouse is probably an aside, but such a warehouse is not as flawed an idea as you put forward. Later Buddhist schools treat of storehouse consciousness at length. Is memory storage and retrieval not fundamental to our being? Or do you think that "citta" adequately captures all the nuances? H: "No it is fine. And it is not code for nihilism. It is code for > dependent origination." > > We could look at DO from a sutta and an abhidhamma perspective to > compare and contrast if you wish. At some other time, perhaps. H: "The Buddha...does not enumerate different lists of categories > like nama/rupa, dhatus, khandas because they are ultimately real. He > enumerates them because they demonstrate what is not real, in this > case the "I" of me, mine, self." > > The self is a concept. It is not real in this sense, in my opinion. > I can't yet agree with your premise here. You are equating "self", > its conceptual nature, and subsequent lack of reality, with > naama/ruupa, dhatus, etc. and then stating that these have no reality > as if they are synonymous with the concept "self." This is in error, > in my opinion. I understand the Buddha to have taught that the self > is *nothing but* naama/ruupa, dhatus, khandas, etc. and that there is > no self in any of these. Again, I am saying that I think you are > considering naama/ruupa, dhatus, etc. to be as conceptual as "self," > and this is a misunderstanding. The Buddha used categories to demonstrate that the "self" is really made of components, like a chariot is really an assemblage of its parts. What some people have done after that is to reify the components. But the fact remains, if you examine the components closer, they too will vaporise into sub-components .... and so on, ad infinitum. The point of analysis is to demonstrate anicca, anatta and dukkha - full stop. (that precludes analysis from being used to demonstrate ultimate existence) H: "That is empiricisim in optima forma. We discover reality > negatively, by finding out what isn't real. The intention for > enumerating dhammas is for cessation...Empirically, the Buddha, after > having extinguished the mind, said that the world is empty of what is > not there. The world is not full of what is there, it is empty of what > isn't." > > Do you mean, by empty, su~n~nataa? Please explain. You seem to keep > saying that there is nothing rather than that existents are devoid of > self. Well, you are the one asserting thereness of stuff. You tell me what's there :-) H: "That is the difference between positivism and empiricism." > > I'm running out of response time here, I'll have to come back to this > later. It matters less than some of the other points, but one of us > is using these terms idiosyncratically. Yep. me. If you have an alternative word that suits, I'd be happy to use it. H: "The Dhamma theory as put forward in the Abhidhamma has a > different motivation. It is the pursuit of knowledge, for the sake of > having and keeping knowledge. It sets out to find out what the world > is like (positivism). And indeed, it finds what it sets out to do. It > findsultimate, irreducible existents. But there is no release in it. > Because irreducibilty is meaningless. And what's more, how can an > ultimate existent be known as an instance of a category? Only if the > category pre-exists the instance, which makes the instance neither > ultimate or irreducible. Dhamma theory, in its upshot, is no different > to Plato and his idealist universals." > > More to come. I just don't agree with you. What do you mean to be > discussing the "motivation" of dhamma theory as if it were some sort > of conspiracy? I'm sorry, but I think you are just grinding an axe. That's another attribution of motivation, Scott. You see no difference between the pursuit of Nibbana, and the pursuit of knowledge? If the Buddha teaches that all dhammas, khandas, dhatus, namas/rupas are anicca, anatta and dhukkha, what is the point of then attributing to him a grand taxonomy of all that "truly exists" and how it all relates to each other? H: "Before you ask me to clarify myself some more: if you feel > inclined to defend the notion of irreducibilty, and how that can be > known, please feel free to do so." > > I do, later, but I don't think we've done with preliminaries. We > aren't using terms in the same way and have to iron this out before we > can discuss this latter in a way that can be productive. I look forward to your thoughts on irreducibility. Kind Regards Herman 59803 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu May 25, 2006 3:28pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives egberdina Hi Tep, On 26/05/06, indriyabala wrote: > > > Hi Dan (and Howard), > > But what is the correct way? The fact that there are "several ways" > tells me that these are just different perspectives, and you are not > sure of any one of them. > > Waht did our Greatest Teacher, the Buddha, explain about citta & > cetasikas [mano and dhammarammana]? Is that the best explanation, or not? > > The thing about models is that they are just models. There are no correct models. You could even use a square as a model of a circle. Models vary in their usefulness, depending on their purpose. If you want to have a model that is correct in every detail, then you drop all models and go to the real thing. Kind Regards Herman 59804 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu May 25, 2006 3:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta egberdina Hi KenO, Nice to see you're still around :-) On 26/05/06, Ken O wrote: > > Hi Herman > > vipaka is kamma resultant. it is the result of suffering in > formations or suffering due to birth in the human realm, even Buddha > also experiences unpleasant vipaka vedana on his physical body when > he is sick or having a thorn on his toe. So vipaka vedana applies to the body ? I'm sorry if I seem picky, I just want to understand what it all means . Kind Regards Herman 59805 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu May 25, 2006 4:12pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta egberdina Hi Ken H, On 26/05/06, ken_aitch wrote: > > Hi Herman, Ken H to the rescue! I'm just imagining a tall man, wearing his underpants on the outside of his tracksuit pants. Hmmmm, very alluring :-) > > > > H: > Actually, I would like it if you did some Abhidhamma speak. I > have looked at useful posts under pain, vedana, bodily feeling and > under vipaka, and am totally lost as to what is being maintained. > ------------------------ > > Ah, but what were you looking for? When the Buddha taught anatta, he > did not say, "You do not exist," he said, "Only dhammas exist, and all > dhammas are anatta." Thereupon, his students thought, "Wow!" and they > asked, "What are the dhammas that are arising now?" (Hence 45 years of > explanations.) I wonder why the students would ask that ? Anyway, that's probably a side issue. And I am grateful for your reply, so I shouldn't push my luck. -------------------------- > H: > With regards to physical pain, where does vipaka come into it, > according to the theory? And how are vedana and vipaka linked, if at all? > --------------------------- > > As we speak, body-sense rupas are being assaulted by tactile rupas. > Some of these attackers are desirable, and they are experienced with > pleasant bodily feeling (the fruit of past good kamma) while others > are undesirable, and they are experienced with unpleasant bodily > feeling (the fruit of past bad kamma). So the vedana that is bodily > feeling is not linked to vipaka; it is vipaka! Thank you! I reckon there should be a useful paragraph section, or even a useful line section, because that last line leaves noone in any doubt. Just for completeness sake, is there mental vedana as well, and is that vipaka as well? I'll have some ruminations about bodily vedana (conditions allowing, of course :-)) > > > Where did that masked man go? He was last seen leaping over a tall mound of books :-) Kind Regards Herman 59806 From: "indriyabala" Date: Thu May 25, 2006 6:10pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives indriyabala Hi Herman (and Dan, Howard), Citta (mind) is a very important subject ! >Herman: >If you want to have a model > that is correct in every detail, then you drop all models and go to >the real thing. > Why do you still deal with models of citta and cetasikas? Didn't the Buddha know the "real thing"? Best wishes, Tep ======= --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Tep, > > On 26/05/06, indriyabala wrote: > > > > > > Hi Dan (and Howard), > > > > But what is the correct way? The fact that there are "several ways" > > tells me that these are just different perspectives, and you are not > > sure of any one of them. > > > > Waht did our Greatest Teacher, the Buddha, explain about citta & > > cetasikas [mano and dhammarammana]? Is that the best explanation, or not? > > > > > The thing about models is that they are just models. There are no correct models. You could even use a square as a model of a circle. Models vary in their usefulness, depending on their purpose. 59808 From: "indriyabala" Date: Thu May 25, 2006 6:46pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives indriyabala Hi Dan, [Please ignore a look-alike copy of this message that was posted a few minutes ago because I deleted it.] Concerning the Buddha's explanation about citta & cetasikas, you replied: >Dan: Buddha explained citta and cetasika in hundreds of ways. Which >of those is best? If you give me a chance to think about it, I could >tell you my favorite, but I'd rather not choose. The Buddha told us how to purify the mind from all defilements. Isn't that the most important Dhamma to know? Why should we care about those models or "perspectives" of the citta & cetasikas? Sincerely, Tep ===== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Dan D." wrote: > > Hi Tep, (snipped) > > Tep: > > What did our Greatest Teacher, the Buddha, explain about citta & > > cetasikas [mano and dhammarammana]? Is that the best explanation, or > not? > 59809 From: Ken O Date: Thu May 25, 2006 9:05pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta ashkenn2k Hi Herman I remember it is only for the five seneses and not for the mind sense. ( I hope I am right on this, pse correct me anyone if I am wrong). One example about vipaka vedana is that when we knock on something hard, we will feel pain, this is vipaka vedana. However some people enjoy pain. That is because of their mind citta with vedana and not vipaka vedana, in other words it is lobha together with wrong preception experience this enjoyment of pain as pleasurable. Even if the person enjoy pain, the person still experience pain first. And that experience pain first is vipaka vedana while the enjoyment of pain is not vipaka vedana but is mind vedana, sometime like the law of gravity. :-). Some other examples will be like listening to loud music, it could be painful to the ears but it is still pleasurable Cheers Ken O 59810 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu May 25, 2006 5:17pm Subject: Re: [dsg] kamma and vipaaka upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 5/24/06 2:16:01 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Dear Sarah and Howard, > After the funeral of the friend I mentioned, the husband wrote us a letter > telling us how much pain, after a fall, she had suffered for a few weeks > since there were metastases in her bones, inoperable. > Lodewijk and I were discussing kamma and vipaaka so hard to fathom. It is > among the unthinkables, the acinteyya. One can become mad trying to figure > it out. > Hard to hear about this happening to such a kind, selfless person. So we > talked about the Holocaust, how kind and excellent teachers and fellowpupils > at my school suddenly disappeared and never came back. > Howard, how was it with your parents and relatives? Were they in Europe? Did > you lose them? > =============================== My parents were born in the United States, my grandparents and their siblings and cousins in Latvia & Lithuania. I haven't heard of any of them having died or even been imprisoned during the holocaust, though I have no doubt that some relatives must have suffered so. I did know a friend of my mother's who had been in a concentration camp, and survived. She was a brilliant woman, a poet, and a person who, though Jewish, had a number of audiences with Pope John Paul II. She had his ear with regard to the Church making overtures to Judaism. I do believe she had some effect. I did hear stories from my father's mother of dreadful excesses against Jews where she lived in Latvia, of theft, and rape, and kidnapping of children - mostly forcing them into the army, and of pogroms. A terrible time and place. It is unbelievable, I think, how monstrous it is possible for humans to be. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59811 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Thu May 25, 2006 9:25pm Subject: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Sorry about intruding on you with the attributions of motivation. Just chalk it up to rudeness on my part (since I'm not on the clock you can forget the psychologist stuff - I'm just another guy.) My motivations, as you have picked up and as I see now, were to get you to be more "visible" than you want to be, and for that I apologise. Bad form on my part. Sorry for trying to draw you out. Re: empiricism and the verifiability of hypotheses: "Any good candidate would be a word that conveyed the understanding that a hypothesis cannot be verified, it can only be falsified." Why this narrow definitional range? This forces me to dig into my memory to retrieve some of what I thought were dreadfully boring statistics. Am I getting this right? There is a null hypothesis which, if I recall, states that the experimental manipulation will yield nothing or have no effect; there is an alternative hypothesis, and I think this would be that there will be an effect of some kind. And then, depending upon the outcome one would reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis, or not reject the null hypothesis. I'm not good with this stuff. Is this what you are saying? If so, "only falsification" would mean to me that one must never reject the null, and hence must always accept that there is no effect; the alternative hypotheses have been rendered irrelevant. Have I missed you entirely here? "If I hypothesise that plants need water to live, I can deprive them of water, and see what happens. if they survive I have falsified the hypothesis. But if they die I have not verified my hypothesis, simply because I do not know (and can never know) all the other variables in play (or know that I know them all), and cannot attribute the death of the plants to the lack of water." Let's drop this side-argument. The complexity and fallibility of experimental design is not of interest to me really. "I'll stick with empirical, but will emphasise that this implies a knowing what is not the case." Okay, if that's your definition, then that's what you mean by empirical: "knowing what is not the case." I'd be interested to know where this was derived, but only if you thought it relevant. "No, I think that what is and isn't there are quite different. What-isn't-there cannot be a support for clinging, craving, consciousness. And the opposite applies to what-is-there." Okay. "I think Nibbaana as concept can be discussed conceptually. But Nibbaana as reality cannot." I'd say it still has a "reality." Would you? "Howard and Dan are having a nice discussion about reifying. Moment, thereness etc are all candidates for reifying, making them into discrete things. Newton's universe could be reified. There were, for him, discrete moments of time and discrete areas of space, in which discrete things were located. I do not think that is a useful model of the way things are. Far more useful, for me, is to consider things in terms of probability of their thereness." Reification. A problem when that which is metaphysical and conceptual in the first place is accorded a reality it doesn't deserve. Take the concept of self again, for example. Not applicable when reality is concerned. "The thing about warehouse is probably an aside, but such a warehouse is not as flawed an idea as you put forward. Later Buddhist schools treat of storehouse consciousness at length. Is memory storage and retrieval not fundamental to our being? Or do you think that "citta" adequately captures all the nuances?" With all due respect to the beautiful, poetic, and nuanced metaphysics which evolved within the Mahayana schools (and to the Lankavatara Sutra itself), I'm not into discussing storehouse consciousness because, only in my totally own opinion, such a theory is replete with the wish that some form of self was eternal. "Memory," "storage," and "retrieval" are metaphors and modern neuropsychological theory (see Edelman, for example) does not use such metaphors, so no, it is not fundamental to our being. The "mind" is seen to be modelled after the brain nowadays, not after the computer. Ahbidhamma as a psychological theory, which is not what it is best at being, seems to make provision for "memory," "storage," and "retrieval." So yes, I do think that the constituents as outlined in the Abhidhamma are adequately explanatory. These would include citta, cetasika, the four elements, ruupa and are much better explained all over the place within the DSG. Okay, try this: "You may, Aananda, also keep in mind this marvellous and wonderful quality of the Perfect One: knowingly arise feelings in the Perfect One, knowingly they continue, knowingly they cease; knowingly arise perceptions in the Perfect One, knowingly they continue, knowingly they cease; knowingly arise thoughts in the Perfect One, knowingly they continue, knowingly they cease. This, Aananda, you may also keep in mind as a marvelous and wonderful quality of the Perfect One," (M. 123.) Are these feelings, perceptions, and thoughts referred to above real? Sincerely, Scott. 59812 From: Ken O Date: Thu May 25, 2006 9:26pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives ashkenn2k Hi Tep and Herman and others You are right to say that Buddha main aim is to purifying of the mind. Cetasikas and cittas model that kept coming up in the suttas as the five aggregates because it meant to point one thing, to dispell the notion of self. Hence understanding the interactions between them will help us to know that it is these aggregates at work and not self at work. There is only one model but different ways of looking at it like looking it from D.O. or 4NT. Citta is chief is because it the one that cognize the object, and that will deteremine the type of feelings that arise. when one knock on the head, citta regonize the object as hardness and vedana is pain because of unpleasant feeling due to the collision of the hardness. However citta need contact to meet the object. This happen so fast, hence in my opinion that is why it always said they arise together and why citta is chief. Cheers Ken O --- indriyabala wrote: > Hi Dan, > > [Please ignore a look-alike copy of this message that was posted a > few > minutes ago because I deleted it.] > > Concerning the Buddha's explanation about citta & cetasikas, you > replied: > > >Dan: Buddha explained citta and cetasika in hundreds of ways. > Which > >of those is best? If you give me a chance to think about it, I > could > >tell you my favorite, but I'd rather not choose. > > The Buddha told us how to purify the mind from all defilements. > Isn't > that the most important Dhamma to know? Why should we care about > those > models or "perspectives" of the citta & cetasikas? > > Sincerely, > > > Tep > ===== > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Dan D." > wrote: > > > > Hi Tep, > > (snipped) > > > Tep: > > > What did our Greatest Teacher, the Buddha, explain about citta > & > > > cetasikas [mano and dhammarammana]? Is that the best > explanation, or > > not? 59813 From: "abhidhammika" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 0:26am Subject: Other Operations Of The Mind -- Re: Reifying, abhidhammika Dear Howard, Herman, Tep, Dan, Nina, Mike N, Sarah and all How are you? Howard wrote: "Citta, or as I prefer it, vi~n~nana, is the operation of merely being aware of content." If you mean an object (aaramma.na)of the mind by the term 'content', we could re-write your above statement as "One of the operations of vi~n~nana is merely being aware of content." In the first verse of Dhammapada, the Buddha teaches us that the mind is the forerunner (leader/originator) of the mental phenomena (mano pubba^ngamaa dhammaa where dhammaa refers to cetasikas). Dhammapada commentary explains the meaning of dhamma in that verse as follows. "So atthato tayo arupino khandhaa vedanaakkhandho saññaakkhandho sa^nkhaarakkhandhoti." That term 'dhammo', as its meaning here, refers to the three mental aggregates: feeling aggregate, memory aggregate, and the aggregate of the remaining mental associates. Thus, we now know that another important operation of the mind is to lead and originate the three mental aggregates, namely, cetasikas. Hope I didn't disappoint you, Howard. :-) With regards, Suan www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: Hi, Dan - Citta, or as I prefer it, vi~n~nana, is the operation of merely being aware of content. That's all it is - the mere knowing of content. All the cetasikas are auxilliary to that, being specialized operations and activities. Vedana, for example, is affectively "tasting" the content. The term 'concomitant'seems pretty good to me. How do you see this? With metta, Howard 59814 From: sarah abbott Date: Fri May 26, 2006 1:04am Subject: Cetasikas' study corner 456- Non-Attachment/Alobha (d) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== Ch 28, Non-Attachment(Alobha)contd ***** Non-attachment, alobha, has many shades and degrees. It can be described as unselfishness, liberality or generosity. There is alobha when there are thoughts of sacrifice and sharing, when there is renunciation and dispassion(1). The Atthasåliní (I, Book I, Part IV, Chapter I, 127) gives the following definition of alobha: "… absence of greed (alobha) has the characteristic of the mind being free from cupidity for an object of thought, or of its being detached, like a drop of water on a lotus leaf. It has the function of not appropriating, like an emancipated monk, and the manifestation of detachment, like a man fallen into a foul place…" The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 143) gives a similar definition(2). *** 1) See The Roots of Good and Ev,i lp. 19, by Ven. Nyanaponika, The Wheel no.251-253, B.P.S. Kandy. 2) See also Dhammasangaùi, §32. •***** Non-Attachment(Alobha)to be contd Metta, Sarah ====== 59815 From: sarah abbott Date: Fri May 26, 2006 1:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Please don't ... sarahprocter... Hi Dan, Just a small clarification on this one - --- "Dan D." wrote: > >S: And to repeat a quote I've given before (the one I meant to give > the other > > day again), from the commentary to the Mahaparinibbana Sutta" > > > > " 'There a [true] renunciate (samana) is not found': it is meant > that > > there a first ascetic, namely a stream-enterer, does not > exist....'Others' > > doctrines are devoid of true renunciates': others' doctrines are > vain, > > empty, devoid of the twelve renunciates, namely the four who > undertake > > insight meditation (vipassanaa) for the sake of the four paths, the > four > > who are on the paths, the four who have fruition......'If they live > > rightly': If a stream-enterer explains what he has attained to > another > > person, and makes him attain stream-entry, then he is said to live > > rightly. The same thing applies to a once-returner and the rest. > If one > > is on the path of stream-entry.....If one practises insight > meditation for > > the sake of the path of stream-entry.....lives rightly....". > > ..... > Yet again, you cite where the texts explictly and unambigously > emphasize that insight at the level of sotapattimagga and deeper are > excluded outside the dispensation. .... S: The quote is not just talking about insight at the level of sotapattimagga. It is also referring to those 'undertaking vipassana' for the sake of the 4 paths. This refers to the development of insight before any paths have been attained as I read it. No development of any insight outside the Buddha's teachings. As I've quoted before from Sammohavinodani, 'the making known of the characteristic of no-self is not the province of anyone else; it is the province of the Fully Enlightened Ones only'. The characteristics of nama and rupa (no being, no self involved) have to be clearly known at the first stage of insight. ... >Big honking deal. We agree. > Furthermore, the very notion of sotapattimagga and deeper do not > exist outside the dispensation. Again, big honking deal! We > agree. "Enlightenment" is strictly a Buddhist concept and understood > only inside the dispensation. .... S: Along with the path to enlightenment - the path of satipatthana or insight development. There is only one path - that taught by the Buddha. Ven Samahita, recently gave another sutta on the 8fold Path not arising outside the Buddha's teachings. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/58860 A little more from the commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta on 'the only way (ekaayanoti ekamaggo)'. Here, in this sutta, it is the mundane path of satipatthana which is being referred to. "This is the only way." "... it is called the Buddha's because he creates it. Accordingly it is said: 'He, the Blessed One, is the creator of the uncreate path, o Brahmin.' It proceeds (or exists) only in this Doctrine-and-discipline and not in any other. Accordingly the Master declared: 'Subhadda, only in this Doctrine-and-discipline is the Eightfold Way to be found.' And further 'ekaayana' means: It goes to the one [eka'm ayati] - that is, it (the way) goes solely to Nibbaana." A little later,it indicates that 'the earlier part of the Path is intended to be presented, the preliminary part of the Way of Mindfulness (satipatthana) proceeding in the four objects of contemplation is meant here and *not the supramundane Way of Mindfulness*. And that preliminary part of the Path proceeds (for the aspirant) many times; or it may be said that there is many a going on it, by way of repetition of practice." **** I think this clearly shows that there is no path of satipatthana outside the Dhamma-Vinaya. So why does it bother you so much, Dan. Is it: a)Because it seems incompatible with your idealistic notions about open-mindedness? b)Because many of your close friends/associates.family seem to be very wise in their own way without any interest in the Dhamma? c)You'd just really like to find a way to incorporate your in-depth Christian studies and appreciation into with the Dhamma? d)You believe you had various experiences and insights before hearing the Dhamma and therefore see pariyatti as not being essential? e)Other - you tell me....:-) Metta, Sarah ====== 59816 From: sarah abbott Date: Fri May 26, 2006 2:07am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Please don't ... sarahprocter... Hi Dan, --- "Dan D." wrote: > > S: We will have to differ in how we read the sutta I quoted, Dan > (AN 10s, > > 123-127). > > Yes, there are several ways to read the sutta. One is to read it as > it is written. Another is to read it in the inimitable Sarah style > (we'll say SarahI for the inimitable one): .... S: I understand your reading and I'm not saying that this one isn't just referring to Path moments. In fact with the addition of the last 2 factors, it may well just be referring to arahant magga cittas. Jon and Tep were discussing the point of the inclusion of 'right knowledge and right liberation' in another sutta. However, I believe that there is no way any path factors will be developed without the development of satipatthana from the very beginning and I understand this to be implied in the 'Outside the Discipline of the Sublime Master' comments. But, you've given a strong defence to indicate that I did not read the sutta literally and you may be right here, Dan. A commentary would be helpful on this one. .... > I think the AN sutta discussed earlier refers to understanding at the > level of arahatta (right liberation), but the step to "no sotapannas > outside the dispensation" in the commentary you cite is > uncontroversial too. .... S: Yes. We can agree so far....for the rest see my last post. .... > You are strongly wedding the arising of mundane satipatthana to a > thoroughly conventional, speculative understanding of Buddha vacana. .... S: Not quite my choice of wording, Dan, but let's put it this way, without hearing and considering the path and the dhammas that make up our life now, with right understanding (pariyatti), there will be no conditions for any development of satipatthana (patipatti) leading to any realizations (pativedha). Metta, Sarah ======= 59817 From: nina van gorkom Date: Fri May 26, 2006 2:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] kamma and vipaaka nilovg Hi Howard, thank you for telling me of the story of your family, we often wondered about it. Yes, it was striking that the church changed attitudes, but it was high time. Perfide Judaei was chanted in all churches. No doubt your mother's friend had a good influence on Pope John Paul II. He was an openminded person. Nina. op 26-05-2006 06:17 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: > I did know a friend of my mother's > who had been in a concentration camp, and survived. She was a brilliant woman, > a poet, and a person who, though Jewish, had a number of audiences with Pope > John Paul II. She had his ear with regard to the Church making overtures to > Judaism. I do believe she had some effect. 59818 From: nina van gorkom Date: Fri May 26, 2006 2:19am Subject: our discussions in Paris, 2 nilovg Our Discussions in Paris. Part II. Han wrote: 1) As to seeing realities as conditioned elements: I accept that the realities or paramattha dhammas arise only when the conditions are present. For example, if my eye is good, if there is a visual object to be seen, if there is enough light, and if I have intention (manasikaara) to look at it, then the eye-consciousness will arise. If one of the conditions is absent the eye-consciousness will not arise. If all conditions are there nobody can prevent the arising of eye-consciousness. This much I accept. But what I believe is to some extent I can condition those conditions. Let us see the same example of eye-consciousness. The eye-consciousness is a vipaka citta. The conditions that are present to make the eye-consciousness arise are the results of past kamma. If I see a nasty road accident on my way to office, it is because of my past akusala kamma. If I see a pleasant object on my way to office it is because of my past kusala kamma. Therefore, by doing wholesome deeds, I can “to some extent“ influence those conditions that are necessary for the arising of eye-consciousness. > -------- Lodewijk said that we never know when kamma brings result, it is not in our hand. He said that when you throw a stone in the water there must be rippling of the water and waves, that cannot be avoided. When kamma is ripe it must produce result. But we cannot influence kamma when it produces result and what kind of result. N: Seeing, hearing, experiencing tangible object are results of kamma. They occur all the time. Moreover, the seeing of visible object is an extremely short moment. It is followed shortly afterwards by thinking on account of what we see, but it is hard to know these different moments precisely. Thinking is not vipaaka, it is either kusala citta or akusala citta. We immediately think, often with aversion, about an accident. We cannot tell about the different moments of seeing which are kusala vipaakacitta and which akusala vipaakacitta. When we Œsee¹ an overturned car, there may be flowers beside the car, and then there may be seeing of pleasant colour in between and that is kusala vipaaka. Cittas arise and fall away so fast, it is hard to distinguish the different moments. The there is kusala vipaakacitta, then akusala vipaakacitta, and in between thinking, often with akusala citta. Kamma is very complex, it is the field of the Buddhas. And the performing of kusala kamma is also dependent on conditions, it is conditioned by past accumulation of confidence in kusala, sati, hiri, ottappa, etc. This condition is called natural strong dependence-condition, pakatupanissaya-paccaya. (soon in Visuddhimagga studies). When you learn more about this, you may find it more acceptable when you hear: sati and paññaa arise because of conditions. You wrote: Perhaps yopu mean here: the performing of kusala kamma at the present, and not the results in the form of vipaakacittas? Instead of kamma we could say here: the accumulation of wholesome qualities. The accumulation of metta, renunciation, generosity, siila, of all the perfections, paramis, are necessary conditions for the development of satipa.t.thaana. Thus, to return to your remark: to some extent you can influence conditions, yes, as far as you are able to, you perform good deeds. These are necessary conditions for the development of paññaa. They are, all of them, means leading to detachment: when one is generous or abstains from harming others one does not think of one¹s own comfort. But also being able to do this is dependent on former kusala, done in the past or in past lives. ***** Nina. 59819 From: sarah abbott Date: Fri May 26, 2006 2:52am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Please don't run away yet, DAN 1.ii sarahprocter... Hi Kel, Thanks for your research and asking your teacher to help as well. --- kelvin_lwin wrote: > Hi Sarah, > > As far as I understand the Burmese Theravada stance is that cula- > sotapanna is only free of woeful existence in the very next life. > However, the common phrasing in commentaries is as you've read, > assured destiny 'niyatagatika'. My teacher says if there's no > possibility then usage is "woeful existence doors are forever > closed" like description for sotapanna. I told him I see no > difference at all without additional qualifications like if this > insight is maintained or for the next life. So he's looking at the > texts to see where they disambiguate it. .... S: I'll be interested to hear what he finds. Sometimes we want to add our own logic, but it may be unsupported. .... > >S: I would be interested in seeing any references Dr Mehm Tin Mon > > K: I don't know what references he uses but given the edition > number if he's wrong, he's probably been corrected by a Tipitaka > Sayadaw in Burma. .... S: I think it's a bit of a grey area, so they may hesitate to do so. .... > K: Doesn't it go back to our basic difference here? You see even > these lower insights as permanent and I say they don't have extra > powers compared to other maha-kusalas. So if one can lose the > insights then your logic doesn't follow unless you can point to the > Jatakas where Bodhisatta falls straight to a woeful realm > immediately after a life where he ordained. I doubt there's such a > specific story. .... S: Firstly, I don't believe any accumulations for good or bad, insight or the opposite are 'lost'. There may be conditions for good qualities not to arise (say in hell-planes) or for certain bad qualities not to arise (say in brahma realms), but they've still been accumulated on on the right conditions will arise again. Like Devadatta's jhana powers could no longer arise, but they were not 'lost'. Later he was destined to become a pacceka Buddha. Well, I believe when I gave the account of Jotipala (whom you and most other people claim had attained high insights)it mentioned that his next life was in a woeful realm and that he had ordained. (What difference does it make whether someone was ordained or not?) So even by the understanding of no woeful plane in the following life for cula-sotapannas, it would suggest (as I indicated) that he wasn't a cula-sotapanna as is generally believed. .... > So really our discussion has one main point of contention: How > stable are the insights. (I feel like Tep) My basic point is all > mundane cannot be since they are not lokuttara. .... S: All dhammas arise and fall away. But all good and bad qualities and any insights are 'accumulated'. We don't know when they will be conditioned to arise again. In the case of any insights, they will only arise again on hearing the teachings again. This is why one (unless one is a sotapanna at least already), one cannot become enlightened in the realms where there is no chance of hearing the teachings. I know and appreciate you have a different understanding here, Kel. .... > Kel: I'm sure you remember the crow simile for sankharupekkha-nana > so there's no guarantee of emergence. ... S: Yes. There's another one that a friend, Num, quoted from the Patisambhidamagga ages ago (#17540): Num: “ If one wants to cross a river and stand on the other side of the river. He grasps a rope, which tied to a tree, then he jumps and takes off fast. He then stands on the other side of the river. He is no longer frightened. One, who wants to overcome defilement, sees the dangers of sakayaditthi on this side of the river. Hecrosses the river and stands on the other side of the river, nibbana, which has no danger. He first grasps rupakhandha or namakhandha with udayabbayanupassana. Then he jumps with avajjana-citta, and takes off with anuloma-nana. He is then close to the other side of the river, he sees nibbana, and lets go of the rope with gotarabhunana. He then lands on ground, which is nibbana, with magganana.” .... S: Clearly at sankharupekkha nana, it is the panna which conditions the jumping off. Having jumped, there's no return. But really, Kel, this is all so far from what I can really understand. ... > > S: We read accounts of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis who had memorised > the entire > > teachings and taught them under previous Buddhas, but not attained > any > > insight at all. > > Kel: Again, not clear any insights or just no enlightenment. > They could be blocked by previous aspirations according to standard > theory as I understand it. ... S: Yes, sometimes it's not clear. I've given various accounts before, such as the one about Pu.n.naa as given in the commentary to the Therigatha. In brief, she'd made resolves under former Buddhas,ordained under Vipassi Buddha, learned the 3 Pitakas and was a teacher of them, with pure sila. The same happened to her under 5 succeeding Buddhas. Because of her pride, however, no defilements were eradicated. In her last life, she was born as a slave and became a sotapanna after hearing the Buddha's 'Lion's Roar' (MN). She later ordained and became an arahant. I agree it's not clear whether any insights at all had been attained in her previous lives, but if so, I doubt it would be to sankharupekkhanana! Just my thoughts, I agree. Please keep sharing anything you or your teacher finds. You might like to raise any of these points about accumulations with him as well. Always good to discuss with you, Dan and others who question every word I write, but are also happy to refer to the same textual sources:-). Metta, Sarah ========= 59820 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 2:05am Subject: Starving the Hindrances ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: What is Starving of the Mental Hindrances (Nivarana)? At Savatthi the Blessed Buddha once said: And what, friends, is the starvation, that prevents the arising of yet unarisen Sense-Desire and which also blocks any growth and increase of already arisen Sense-Desire ??? It is frequent, careful & rational attention to the Disgusting & Revolting Feature of things !!! This starvation prevents absent sensual lust from arising and reduces also already present greed… And what, friends, is the starvation that prevents the arising of yet unarisen Evil-Will and which also hinders any aggravation and inflation of already arisen Evil-Will ??? It is frequent, careful & rational attention to the Mental Release by Universal Friendliness !!! This starvation prevents absent aversion from arising & also inhibits all already present anger… And what, friends, is the starvation, that prevents the arising of yet unarisen Lethargy-&-Laziness and which also obstructs any deterioration and prolongation of already present Lethargy-&-Laziness ??? It is frequent, careful & rational attention to The Elements of: Initiative, Launching & Endurance !!! This starvation prevents absent sloth from arising & also avoids worsening of already present Laziness … And what, friends, is the starvation, that prevents the arising of yet unarisen Restlessness-&-Regret and which also slow down any escalation and acceleration of already present Restlessness-&-Regret ??? It is frequent, careful & rational attention to This serene, still, calm & peaceful Tranquillity of Mind! This starvation prevents upsetting of the mind & reduces the intensity of already arisen anxiety & worry… And what, friends, is the starvation, that prevents the arising of yet unarisen Doubt-&-Uncertainty and which also stops any expansion and proliferation of already present Doubt-&-Uncertainty ??? It is frequent, careful & rational attention to These 4 Dualities, which always should be evaluated: There are advantageous and disadvantageous states! There are blameable and blameless states! There are ordinary and excellent mental states! There are bright and dark mental states! This starvation prevents any confusion of the mind & dampen escalation of already present perplexity… On how to prevent the mental hindrances see: http://what-buddha-said.net/Canon/Sutta/AN/AN.I.3-4.htm and Explanatory comments on: http://www.what-buddha-said.org/Canon/Sutta/AN/AN.I.3-4c.htm Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V:105-6] section 46: The Links. 51: The Nutriments... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PS: Please include the word Samahita in any comment, since then will my automatic mail filters pick it up and I will see it & respond!! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. Friendship is the Greatest ... Let there be Calm & Free Bliss !!! <..> [ 59821 From: "matheesha" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 4:39am Subject: [dsg] Re: sati in the list of the Dhammasangani, manasikaara. matheesha333 Hi Herman, Howard, Tep, I think we are all projecting our fantasies on to Bikkhu Bodhi! We speculate and possibly judge him by our own way of approaching things. What his reality is only he will know (hopefully). regards Matheesha --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "indriyabala" wrote: > > > Hi Herman, > > You wrote: > > > > > I don't disagree about the value of humility, but I see neither > humility or conceit or pride, or whatever the opposite of humility > would be, in stating the bare facts of one's CV. > > > > That is along the same line of reasoning I have. > > > Sincerely, > > > Tep 59822 From: "matheesha" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 5:22am Subject: Leading to stream entry matheesha333 Hi Everyone, Here is the minimum requirement to become a saddanusarin (faith follower) or a dhammanusarin (dhamma follower). These two types of disciples are said to become sotapannas at least moments before death, and are stages prior to the sotapanna stage. I have read that their 5 precepts are very good as well apart from their faith in the buddha, dhamma, sangha. The sutta below shows how someone can become a saddanusarin or a dhammanusarin based on understanding and accepting the dhamma. SN XXV.3 Viññana Sutta Consciousness At Savatthi. "Monks, eye-consciousness is inconstant, changeable, alterable. Ear-consciousness... Nose-consciousness... Tongue- consciousness... Body-consciousness... Intellect-consciousness is inconstant, changeable, alterable. "One who has conviction & belief that these phenomena are this way is called a faith-follower: one who has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is incapable of doing any deed by which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal womb, or in the realm of hungry shades. He is incapable of passing away until he has realized the fruit of stream-entry. "One who, after pondering with a modicum of discernment, has accepted that these phenomena are this way is called a Dhamma-follower: one who has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is incapable of doing any deed by which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal womb, or in the realm of hungry shades. He is incapable of passing away until he has realized the fruit of stream-entry. "One who knows and sees that these phenomena are this way is called a stream-enterer, steadfast, never again destined for states of woe, headed for self-awakening." M: Consciousness is mentioned in this sutta. Other similar suttas are shown bellow refer to the following - How conviction in, and understanding of, inconstancy of.... Six sense Sense objects Forms Contact Feeling Perception Intention (cetana) Craving Six Elements Five Aggregates can lead to stream-entry http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/sutta/samyutta/index.html#okkanta With metta Matheesha 59823 From: han tun Date: Fri May 26, 2006 6:23am Subject: Re: [dsg] our discussions in Paris, 2 hantun1 Dear Nina and Lodewijk, I am very grateful for your kind explanations. I have noted the following points from your message. (1) We never know when kamma brings result, it is not in our hand. But we cannot influence kamma when it produces result and what kind of result. (2) Seeing of visible object is an extremely short moment. It is followed shortly afterwards by thinking on account of what we see. Thinking is not vipaaka, it is either kusala citta or akusala citta. We cannot tell about the different moments of seeing which are kusala vipaakacitta and which akusala vipaakacitta. Cittas arise and fall away so fast, it is hard to distinguish the different moments. There is kusala vipaakacitta, then akusala vipaakacitta, and in between thinking, often with akusala citta. (3) Kamma is very complex, it is the field of the Buddhas. And the performing of kusala kamma is also dependent on conditions, it is conditioned by past accumulation of confidence in kusala, sati, hiri, ottappa, etc. This condition is called natural strong dependence-condition, pakatupanissaya-paccaya. Sati and paññaa arise because of conditions. (4) You wrote: Perhaps you mean here: the performing of kusala kamma at the present, and not the results in the form of vipaakacittas? Instead of kamma we could say here: the accumulation of wholesome qualities. The accumulation of metta, renunciation, generosity, siila, of all the perfections, paramis, are necessary conditions for the development of satipa.t.thaana. (5) Thus, to return to your remark: to some extent you can influence conditions, yes, as far as you are able to, you perform good deeds. These are necessary conditions for the development of paññaa. They are, all of them, means leading to detachment: when one is generous or abstains from harming others one does not think of one¹s own comfort. But also being able to do this is dependent on former kusala, done in the past or in past lives. ------------------------------ Han: I will not argue against that we never know when kamma brings result, it is not in our hand, and that we cannot influence kamma when it produces result and what kind of result. But I also take Buddha’s own words: “cetanaa ‘ham bhikhhave kammam vadaami” It is volition, monks, that I declare to be kamma. Having willed, one performs an action by body, speech or mind.” (AN VI.63, Nibbedhika sutta). Therefore, if I perform wholesome deeds or kusala kamma with good cetanaa there must be good kamma resultants; the only thing is that I do not know when they will ripen. I cannot tell they will ripen in this life, and I also cannot tell they will NOT ripen in this life. There is also such a thing called “ditthadhammavedaniya-kamma, the immediately effective kamma which bears fruits in the present life. So, who knows? I may get good kamma results in this very life. Even if all my performing of kusala kammas in this life do not bear any fruits in this life, I have nothing to loose. At least I will have accumulation of wholesome qualities. At least I will be liked by humans and devas for my performance of kusala kammas, and I will sleep peacefully. And who knows, I may die peacefully. You remarked: “Thus, to return to your remark: to some extent you can influence conditions, yes, as far as you are able to, you perform good deeds.” That remark is good enough for me. I don’t expect anything more. That’s why I said: . Anyway, I sincerely thank both of you for all the trouble you have taken to explain all these things to me and for your warm cetanaa towards me. With metta and deepest respect, Han 59824 From: nina van gorkom Date: Fri May 26, 2006 7:48am Subject: Re: [dsg] our discussions in Paris, 2 nilovg Dear Han, op 26-05-2006 15:23 schreef han tun op hantun1@...: > I will not argue against that we never know when kamma > brings result, it is not in our hand, and that we > cannot influence kamma when it produces result and > what kind of result. But I also take Buddha’s own > words: “cetanaa aham bhikhhave kammam vadaami. It is > volition, monks, that I declare to be kamma. Having > willed, one performs an action by body, speech or > mind. (AN VI.63, Nibbedhika sutta). Therefore, if I > perform wholesome deeds or kusala kamma with good > cetanaa there must be good kamma resultants; the only > thing is that I do not know when they will ripen. I > cannot tell they will ripen in this life, and I also > cannot tell they will NOT ripen in this life. ------- N: Yes, that is right. Kamma is cetanaa cetasika. -------- > H: quotes: N: You remarked: “Thus, to return to your remark: to some > extent you can influence conditions, yes, as far as > you are able to, you perform good deeds. That remark is good enough for me. I don’t expect anything more. > That’s why I said: be up to my kamma.>. ------- N: Lodewijk also said that your attitude is examplary. Nina. 59825 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri May 26, 2006 4:50am Subject: Re: [dsg] Other Operations Of The Mind -- Re: Reifying, upasaka_howard Hi, Suan (and all) - In a message dated 5/26/06 3:28:06 AM Eastern Daylight Time, suanluzaw@... writes: > > Dear Howard, Herman, Tep, Dan, Nina, Mike N, Sarah and all > > How are you? > > Howard wrote: > > "Citta, or as I prefer it, vi~n~nana, is the operation of merely > being aware of content." > > If you mean an object (aaramma.na)of the mind by the term 'content', > we could re-write your above statement as "One of the operations of > vi~n~nana is merely being aware of content." ------------------------------------------- Howard: We *could* rewrite it so, but not as a paraphrase! To be *merely* the operation of being aware of content (or of the object, if you will), which is what I wrote, is not the same as being-aware-of-content as *one* of its operations. I don't conceive of vi~n~nana as some thing that has multiple operations, but as the single operation "being aware". (Of course, there are many, many instances of being aware, each a different event, with the object different and accompanied by different cetasikas in each case. There is not a single "being aware", and that is why vi~n~nana is spoken of as an aggregate.) ------------------------------------------ > > In the first verse of Dhammapada, the Buddha teaches us that the > mind is the forerunner (leader/originator) of the mental phenomena > (mano pubba^ngamaa dhammaa where dhammaa refers to cetasikas). ------------------------------------------ Howard: Okay. :-) ------------------------------------------ > > Dhammapada commentary explains the meaning of dhamma in that verse > as follows. > > "So atthato tayo arupino khandhaa vedanaakkhandho saññaakkhandho > sa^nkhaarakkhandhoti." > > That term 'dhammo', as its meaning here, refers to the three mental > aggregates: feeling aggregate, memory aggregate, and the aggregate > of the remaining mental associates. > > Thus, we now know that another important operation of the mind is to > lead and originate the three mental aggregates, namely, cetasikas. ------------------------------------------- Howard: To describe the mental activity of being aware as the lead mental operation is not to attribute a function of leadership to it, but just to place it properly within the bundle of mental operations. Vi~n~nana is the operation of being aware. That's all. Vi~n~nana is knowing, exactly. That operation is the central mental operation, for which all other mental operations and conditions are auxilliary. As for "mind", in the suttas 'citta' usually denotes "mind," the same as 'mano', I would guess, and has broad meaning. But in Abhidhamma I believe it is always identical with 'vi~n~nana' in meaning, and denotes the single basic operation of awareness, as I understand it. But you would know the terminological distinction better than I, as I am not so savvy when it comes to Abhidhamma. ------------------------------------------- > > Hope I didn't disappoint you, Howard. :-) ------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, you were less in opposition, at least in tone, to what I wrote than I've seen at other times, which I suppose is mildly disappointing. ;-)) ------------------------------------------- > > With regards, > > Suan ===================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59826 From: nina van gorkom Date: Fri May 26, 2006 11:04am Subject: metta 18 nilovg Dear friends, This is taken from Kh. Sujin's book on Metta. ****** Nina. 59827 From: nina van gorkom Date: Fri May 26, 2006 11:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Other Operations Of The Mind -- Re: Reifying, nilovg Hi Howard, May I say that I really appreciate what you say about objects and cetasikas. It shows your interest in the Abhidhamma. I enjoy your dialogue with Suan, and the spirit of it. Nina. op 26-05-2006 17:50 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: > (Of course, there are many, many > instances of being aware, each a different event, with the object different > and accompanied by different cetasikas in each case. There is not a single > "being aware", and that is why vi~n~nana is spoken of as an aggregate.) 59828 From: nina van gorkom Date: Fri May 26, 2006 11:04am Subject: Re: Reifying, insight stages. nilovg Hi Howard, thanks for your post on reifying. Well, you know how I think about citta and cetasikas. I would just like to add something about distinguishing between nama and rupa. Yes, I mean distinguishing. op 24-05-2006 20:58 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: > Howard: > If by "taking them together" you meaning conflating the two, I agree. > But they do *occur* together, in mutual dependence. > ----------------------------------------- N: Yes, right. > ---------------------------------------- > Howard: > I might agree to some extent with the foregoing if 'separate' were > replaced by 'distinguish'. I say "to some extent," because it seems to me > that I > hardly ever confuse nama with rupa, mental with material. > ---------------------------------------- N: Lodewijk thinks the same as you and we discussed this matter. Intellectually, we understand. But directly realizing their different characteristics is another matter. It needs the first stage of insight. Before, I found it difficult to understand the following: now, there is seeing, and we take colour and seeing together, as a whole. But, considering more the different processes of cittas clarifies, although even this is still intellectual understanding. Colour is experienced through the eye-door and then through the mind-door. Seeing can only be experienced in a mind-door process following closely upon the eye-door process. Cittas succeed one another so fast, and I do not claim to realize directly the different processes. Insight has not been developed to that stage. But, it is essential to know where the difficulty lies. If we think: O, that is very easy, we get more entangled. That is how I see it. So long as nama is not distinguished from ruupa by insight, there is still an underlying notion of I see, I experience. Kh. Sujin calls this the subtle self. It is very subtle, perhaps hardly noticeable, paññaa has to be very keen to realize it. It takes courage and sincerity to see where we are wrong. I learnt that at the moments of insight the difference between nama and rupa is realized in mind-door processes, and this makes sense to me. Nina. 59829 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 2:56pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... egberdina Hi Scott, On 26/05/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > Dear Herman, > > Sorry about intruding on you with the attributions of motivation. > Just chalk it up to rudeness on my part (since I'm not on the clock > you can forget the psychologist stuff - I'm just another guy.) My > motivations, as you have picked up and as I see now, were to get you > to be more "visible" than you want to be, and for that I apologise. > Bad form on my part. Sorry for trying to draw you out. No need to apologise. You and I both are well aware of how in communicating, people can attempt to manipulate. I don't chalk that up to rudeness, but I am aware that for the average Joe, the purpose in communicating is to extend their will in an outward direction. Of course this doesn't apply to us, because neither of us are attached to our doctrines, right? :-) > > "No, I think that what is and isn't there are quite different. > What-isn't-there cannot be a support for clinging, craving, > consciousness. And the opposite applies to what-is-there." > > Okay. > > "I think Nibbaana as concept can be discussed conceptually. But > Nibbaana as reality cannot." > > I'd say it still has a "reality." Would you? No, definitely not. I understand why you would think that, because the dhamma theory has nibbana as an element cognised by mind. But this is just thinly disguised dualism. There is an unbridgable gap between being and having. This is poorly understood. Any formulation which has an ultimate as a bearer of a characteristic, as having a characteristic, is dualistic, and cannot be ultimate. To be ultimate, of course, is to be a characteristic. But this doesn't apply to nibbana. Because nibbana is absence of characteristic, and is only known in retrospect. > > Reification. A problem when that which is metaphysical and conceptual > in the first place is accorded a reality it doesn't deserve. Take the > concept of self again, for example. Not applicable when reality is > concerned. I am leaving this section there, because I will refer to it down below. > Ahbidhamma as a psychological theory, which is not what it is best at > being, seems to make provision for "memory," "storage," and > "retrieval." So yes, I do think that the constituents as outlined in > the Abhidhamma are adequately explanatory. These would include citta, > cetasika, the four elements, ruupa and are much better explained all > over the place within the DSG. But of course no proper dsg discussion would be complete without reference to latent tendencies and accumulations. They seem fundamental notions in explaining what happens, and at least accumulations sound very much like memory of some kind. I have no idea what an accumulation is in abhidhamma terminology, perhaps you know? Okay, try this: > > "You may, Aananda, also keep in mind this marvellous and wonderful > quality of the Perfect One: knowingly arise feelings in the Perfect > One, knowingly they continue, knowingly they cease; knowingly arise > perceptions in the Perfect One, knowingly they continue, knowingly > they cease; knowingly arise thoughts in the Perfect One, knowingly > they continue, knowingly they cease. This, Aananda, you may also keep > in mind as a marvelous and wonderful quality of the Perfect One," (M. > 123.) > > Are these feelings, perceptions, and thoughts referred to above real? I am glad you brought this sutta up. Because it is unambiguous in treating of the identity of the Perfect One. Yet earlier on you say the concept of self is not applicable where reality is concerned. This is classic dsg argumentation. I suggest that you need to sort out whether the Buddha has or is identity or not, and if he does have or is his identity, what the ramifications of that are in relation to notions of self. When that's cleared up, we can progress to what is real. Kind Regards Herman 59830 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 3:01pm Subject: Re: [dsg] More on Cooran ken_aitch Hi Sarah, ------------ KH: > > Can we say that panna, at satipatthana, balances the indriyas, or is > the case that the indriyas are already balanced before satipatthana? ..... S: > I think we can say that the indiryas become balanced naturally as satipatthana and the foundation of satipatthana develops. As you say, panna always plays a key role. In a text I checked on this point (Sammohavinodani, transl as 'Dispeller'), it also stressed the role of sati too, 'like the salt-seasoning in all curries and like the minister-of-all-work in all the king's affairs.......For what reason? Because the mind has its refuge in mindfulness, and mindfulness is manifested as protection. And there is no exerting or restraining of the mind without mindfulness.' (1317). ------------ Thanks, as always, for your Abhidhamma explanations: they are just what we needed at Cooran. The book we were reading seemed (to me at least) to be giving a misleading, conventional, picture of the Dhamma. Plain old Abhidhamma lists and classifications can be just as off-putting for some. So these king-and-minister similes are an ideal compromise. ----------------------------------------- KH: > > However, it is not so easy to comprehend an imbalance of intellectual > path-panna <. . .> .... S: > Remember those examples of grasping the snake in the wrong way etc. ----------------------------------------- Yes, although I always assumed they were examples of wrong understanding. You are saying they are, more correctly, examples of how right [intellectual] understanding can lead to wrong understanding. ---------------- S: > I agree with you, Ken, I think it's a subtle area. Easy to give glib answers, but not so easy to really appreciate the conditioned nature of dhammas in this regard at any level. But I think we do see examples in the texts and in our encounters of following the teachings blindly (I think the texts give Vakkali as the example, the one who followed the Buddha everywhere) or getting bogged down with Abhidhamma or Pali details which we can't comprehend....There is some kusala saddha and panna, but it's weak because it's not balanced. I'm sure all your reflections were and are good ones, Ken H. Let me know if you have anything else to add, now you're 'in stride'. --------------- You have seen the extremes my theorising can lead to. Remember the one about the public executioner "just getting on with his job?" But, OK, here goes. When we are reading Abhidhamma we can sometimes get bogged down in details. But we can't say, "Oh look, the indriyas are out of balance! There is too much of [this] and not enough of [that.]" Putting one part of our reading aside, and going on to something less taxing, is more likely to be a sign of dosa and lobha than of panna and indriya-spotting. The solution is to have a fixed routine - this much Dhamma reading for this amount of time, no matter whether we feel it is doing us good or not. (Not that I follow my own advice, of course.) Ken H 59831 From: "kelvin_lwin" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 3:10pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Please don't run away yet, DAN 1.ii kelvin_lwin Hi Sarah, > S: I'll be interested to hear what he finds. Sometimes we want to add our > own logic, but it may be unsupported. Kel: It's not my own logic, this is what's been handed down in the Abhidhamma teachings in Burma. Although there are always different schools of thoughts I guess. I'm just saying it's very logical to me given all the facts as I see it. > S: Firstly, I don't believe any accumulations for good or bad, insight or > the opposite are 'lost'. There may be conditions for good qualities not to > arise (say in hell-planes) or for certain bad qualities not to arise (say > in brahma realms), but they've still been accumulated on on the right > conditions will arise again. Like Devadatta's jhana powers could no longer > arise, but they were not 'lost'. Later he was destined to become a pacceka > Buddha. Kel: We are talking about different things here when we refer to them being lost. Of course everything accumulates, that's not the argument. Devadatta should be reborn in jhana realms but he wasn't so it was 'lost' for immediate future. Jhana attainments are not permanent as you have to strive for them each live and "start over". Of course the ease of re-attaining them depends on past attainments but still have to try again in the present. Aren't you the one who makes the case only satipatthana can lead to enlightenment and hence to become a paccek-Buddha so why would jhana matter for Devadatta? What I mean by not permanent is that it does not destroy any fetters. It does not condition for some dhammas to never arise again. It merely influences future, well that's the same thing as all mundane cittas. Temporary suppression is not the same as permanent destruction. Magga-nanas are the only ones that do not required striving again in the present life. > S: Well, I believe when I gave the account of Jotipala (whom you and most > other people claim had attained high insights)it mentioned that his next > life was in a woeful realm and that he had ordained. (What difference does > it make whether someone was ordained or not?) Kel: I think we need to check the connection you posted in #45763. http://www.palikanon.com/english/pali_names/j/jotipaala.htm .. which Jotipala are we talking about? Usually if they are not ordained under a living Buddha then there's no reference to tipitaka and insightly, mainly jhana. > > Kel: I'm sure you remember the crow simile for sankharupekkha- nana > > so there's no guarantee of emergence. > ... > S: Yes. There's another one that a friend, Num, quoted from the > Patisambhidamagga ages ago (#17540): > .... > S: Clearly at sankharupekkha nana, it is the panna which conditions the > jumping off. Having jumped, there's no return. But really, Kel, this is > all so far from what I can really understand. Kel: Have you not looked at different grades of sankharupekkha- nana? According to that, there's the "mature" one that leads to magga vithi. There are also preliminary ones that occur many times refining the quality of the panna as the crow circles and comes back. > S: Yes, sometimes it's not clear. I've given various accounts before, such > as the one about Pu.n.naa as given in the commentary to the Therigatha. In > brief, she'd made resolves under former Buddhas,ordained under Vipassi > Buddha, learned the 3 Pitakas and was a teacher of them, with pure sila. Kel: hehe here is one of your fav question, adhi-sila? How is she able to undertake purity of sila without understanding? What was she doing under all those Buddhas if not satipatthana? - Kel 59832 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 3:16pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives egberdina Hi Tep, > > > Why do you still deal with models of citta and cetasikas? Didn't the > Buddha know the "real thing"? Good points. The Buddha knew that all conditioned dhammas are anatta, anicca and dukkha. That's what he taught. And the interesting thing is that there is not a single paramattha dhamma that can have its defining characteristic as well as being anatta, anicca or dukkha. Because how can an ultimate dhamma have two or more characteristics? Kind Regards Herman 59833 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 3:31pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta egberdina Hi KenO, On 26/05/06, Ken O wrote: > > Hi Herman > > I remember it is only for the five seneses and not for the mind > sense. ( I hope I am right on this, pse correct me anyone if I am > wrong). > > One example about vipaka vedana is that when we knock on something > hard, we will feel pain, this is vipaka vedana. However some people > enjoy pain. That is because of their mind citta with vedana and not > vipaka vedana, in other words it is lobha together with wrong > preception experience this enjoyment of pain as pleasurable. Even if > the person enjoy pain, the person still experience pain first. And > that experience pain first is vipaka vedana while the enjoyment of > pain is not vipaka vedana but is mind vedana, sometime like the law > of gravity. :-). Some other examples will be like listening to loud > music, it could be painful to the ears but it is still pleasurable Thanks for your replies. Your examples are good. I think pain is a very useful thing to study. We can understand from modern medicine and physiology that all pain is made in the brain/mind, and then referred back to or located in the body. The brain has many maps of the body in it. Even with all you limbs amputated, you can still feel pain in them. If you were to remove the map in the brain of a corresponding body part, then you'd never feel anything there. And of course dreams are full of sensations and dreams. But there doesn't seem to be rupas impinging on anything to cause all those sensations and feelings. Unless all rupas are mind-made? Because of these considerations, I do not understand the distinction between bodily feeling and mental feeling. To me it is all mental feeling. Do you know if the Buddha distinguished between bodily feeling and mental feeling, or was it our good friends the commentators? :-) Kind Regards Herman 59834 From: "indriyabala" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 3:33pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives indriyabala --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Tep, > > > > > > > Why do you still deal with models of citta and cetasikas? Didn't the > > Buddha know the "real thing"? > > > > Good points. The Buddha knew that all conditioned dhammas are >anatta, anicca and dukkha. That's what he taught. And the interesting >thing is that there is not a single paramattha dhamma that can have >its defining characteristic as well as being anatta, anicca or >dukkha. Because how can an ultimate dhamma have two or more >characteristics? > > I would like to offer an answer: It is because these three characteristics of most dhammas are not mutually exclusive. One exception is Nibbana: it is permanent, true happiness; and it is anatta. Warm regards, Tep ====== 59835 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 3:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives egberdina Hi Tep, On 27/05/06, indriyabala wrote: > > > > > > > > Good points. The Buddha knew that all conditioned dhammas are > >anatta, anicca and dukkha. That's what he taught. And the interesting > >thing is that there is not a single paramattha dhamma that can have > >its defining characteristic as well as being anatta, anicca or > >dukkha. Because how can an ultimate dhamma have two or more > >characteristics? > > > > > > I would like to offer an answer: It is because these three > characteristics of most dhammas are not mutually exclusive. One > exception is Nibbana: it is permanent, true happiness; and it is anatta. I know it is only words, but wouldn't timeless be a better description than permanent? Permanent carries with it the implication of being in time, enduring in time. Or do you see Nibbana as a positive state, rather than absence? Kind Regards Herman 59836 From: han tun Date: Fri May 26, 2006 3:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] our discussions in Paris, 2 hantun1 Dear Nina and Lodewijk, Thank you very much for your kind words and encouragement. The discussions that I have with you are very profitable for me. They produce a warm feeling in my heart, and a desire to read more of your messages. Maybe it is the accumulation of metta towards each other during past lives in the samsaraa. With metta and deepest respect, Han 59837 From: "indriyabala" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 4:22pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives indriyabala Hi Ken O, Sarah, Herman, Dan D. and anyone, As one of the five aggregates consciousness(vinnana) is interchangeable with 'citta'. Mind (mano, manayatana) is usually paired with dhammarammana as its object in many suttas (I have not seen citta & dhammarammana together). Some people believe that citta, vinnaana, and mano are the same; but I am not satisfied with that "lumping" definition because it does not assist the practitioner. PTS Dictionary is more specific : "Mano represents the intellectual functioning of consciousness, while vinnaaṇa represents the field of sense and sense-reaction ("perception"), and citta the subjective aspect of consciousness (cp. Mrs. Rh. D. Buddhist Psychology p. 19) -- The rendering with "mind" covers most of the connotation; sometimes it may be translated "thought." As "mind" it embodies the rational faculty of man, which, as the subjective side in our relation to the objective world..." >Ken O: >You are right to say that Buddha main aim is to purifying of the mind. Cetasikas and cittas model that kept coming up in the suttas as the five aggregates because it meant to point one thing, to dispell the notion of self. Hence understanding the interactions between them will help us to know that it is these aggregates at work and not self at work. Tep: Sounds good to me. Definitions should be made only to assist practitioners (not to entertain theoreticians). ............ >Ken O: >Citta is chief is because it the one that cognize the object, and that will deteremine the type of feelings that arise. when one knock on the head, citta regonize the object as hardness and vedana is pain because of unpleasant feeling due to the collision of the hardness. However citta need contact to meet the object. This happen so fast, hence in my opinion that is why it always said they arise together and why citta is chief. Tep: The real trouble I have starts when someone tells me that cetasikas also can cognize any object that citta can, and that whatever function the citta can perform, cetasikas also can. What do you think -- can cetasikas determine the type of feelings that arise? Take care ! Tep ======== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Ken O wrote: > > Hi Tep and Herman and others > > You are right to say that Buddha main aim is to purifying of the > mind. Cetasikas and cittas model that kept coming up in the suttas > as the five aggregates because it meant to point one thing, to > dispell the notion of self. Hence understanding the interactions > between them will help us to know that it is these aggregates at work > and not self at work. > > There is only one model but different ways of looking at it like > looking it from D.O. or 4NT. > (snipped) 59838 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 4:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: should, training, free will etc. egberdina Hi Nina, Perhaps I should explain more about what this means: everything is dhamma. I > am thinking out loud now:-)) > Not everybody is expected to learn Pali, but for some notions we need it > because there is a real danger that the original meaning gets lost when we > use only English. I truly feel concerned about this point. > Dhamma: it bears its own characteristic, dha means: to bear. It is almost > identical with dhaatu, element. It is devoid of self or person. > When we say everything is dhamma, or, we have to realize dhamma as dhamma, > it means understanding it as non-self. It is only dhamma, not what we used > to take for self. It has a characteristic, this means: it shows its own > characteristic that can be experienced. You may find the following quote helpful with regards to the original meaning; from http://www.buddhistinformation.com/dhamma_theory.htm I have pasted the relevant footnotes as well. The underlining is my effort to draw your attention to certain things :-) This influence is to be seen in the post-canonical exegetical literature of Sri Lanka where, for the first time, the term *sabhava* (Skt *svabhava*) came to be used as a synonym for *Dhamma*. Hence the recurrent definition: " *Dhammas* are so called because they bear their own nature" (*attano sabhavat dharenti ti dhamma*). [*24*] Now the question that arises here is whether the Theravadins used the term *sabhava* in the same sense as the Sarvastivadins did. Did the Theravadins assume the metaphysical view that the substance of a *Dhamma* persists throughout the three phases of time? In other words, does this amount to the admission that there is a duality between the *Dhamma* and its *sabhava*, between the bearer and the borne, a dichotomy, which goes against the grain of the Buddhist doctrine of *anattá* ? This situation has to be considered in the context of the logical apparatus used by the Abhidhammikas in defining the *Dhammas*. This involves three main kinds of definition. The first is called agency definition (* kattu-sadhana*) because it attributes agency to the thing to be defined. Such, for example, is the definition of *citta *(consciousness) as "that which thinks" (*cinteti ti cittat*). [*25*] The second is called instrumental definition (*karana-sadhana*) because it attributes instrumentality to the thing to be defined. Such, for example, is the definition of *citta *as "that through which one thinks" (*cinteti ti etena cittat*). [*26*] The third is called definition by nature (*bhava-sadhana*) whereby the abstract nature of the thing to be defined is brought into focus. Such, for example, is the definition," The mere act of thinking itself is *citta* (*cintanamattam eva cittat*)." [*27*] The first two kinds of definition, it is maintained, are provisional and as such are not valid from an ultimate point of view. [*28*] This is because the attribution of agency and instrumentality invests a *Dhamma* with a duality when it is actually a unitary and unique phenomenon. Such attribution also leads to the wrong assumption that a given *Dhamma* is a substance with inherent qualities or an agent, which performs some kind of action. Such definitions are said to be based on tentative attribution (* samaropana*) [*29*] and thus are not ultimately valid. [*30*] It is as a matter of convention (*vohara*), and for the sole purpose of facilitating the grasp of the idea to be conveyed, [*31*] that a duality is assumed by the mind in defining the *Dhamma*, which is actually devoid of such duality. [*32*] Thus both agency and instrumental definitions are resorted to for the convenience of description, and as such they are not to be understood in their direct literal sense. On the other hand, what is called definition by nature (*bhavasadhana*) is the one that is admissible in an ultimate sense. [*33*] This is because this type of definition brings into focus the real nature of a given *Dhamma *without attributing agency or instrumentality to it, an attribution that creates the false notion that there is a duality within a unitary *Dhamma*. It is in the context of these implications that the definition of *Dhamma*as that which bears its own nature has to be understood. Clearly, this is a definition according to agency (*kattu-sadhana*), and hence its validity is provisional. From this definition, therefore, one cannot conclude that a given *Dhamma* is a substantial bearer of its qualities or "own-nature." The duality between *Dhamma* and *sabhava* is only an attribution made for the convenience of definition. For in actual fact both terms denote the same actuality. Hence it is categorically stated that apart from *sabhava* there is no distinct entity called a *Dhamma*, [*34*] and that the term *sabhava*signifies the mere fact of being a *Dhamma*. [*35*] 24. Cf. e.g. MhNdA 261; DhsA 126; VsmS V 6. 25. See ADSVM 4. Cf. *Cintetr ti cittat. Órammanat vijanatr ti attho. Yathaha: Visayavijananalakkhanat cittan ti. Sati hi nissayasamanantaradipaccaye na vina arammanena cittam 1uppajjatr ti tassa ta lakkhanata vutta. Etena niralambanavadrmatat patikkhittat hoti* (ibid.). 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28.* Na nippariyayato labbhati* (ibid.). Cf. *Svayat kattuniddeso pariyayaladdho, dhammato allassa kattunivattanattho*. VismM 141. 29. Cf. *Paramatthato ekasabhavopi sabhavadhammo pariyayavacanehi viya samaropitarupehi bahuhi pakarehi pakasryati. Evat hi so sutthu pakasito hotr ti *(Abhvk 117). *Sakasaka-kiccesu hi dhammanat attappadhanatasamaropanena kattubhavo, tadanukulabhavena tatsampayutte dhammasamuhe kattubhavasamaropanena (patipadetabbassa) dhammassa karanatthal ca pariyayato labbhati *(ibid. 16). 30. VsmM 484. 31. Ibid. 491. 32. DM 28. 33.* Cittacetasikanat dhammanat bhavasadhanam eva nippariyayato labbhati*. Abhvk 16; ADSVM 4. 34.* Na ca sabhava allo dhammo nama atthi *(AMM 21). 35.* Dhammamatta-drpanat sabhava-padat *(ibid. 70). I too think there are real dangers of misreading the early texts, mainly through reading them in the light of later texts. Clearly, the introduction of the notion of sabhava is a very late one, and the dangers are clear: what is not-dual can so easily become dual when grasping conventionally at what is not conventional. Kind Regards Herman 59839 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 4:50pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives egberdina Hi Tep, me old mate :-) On 27/05/06, indriyabala wrote: Tep: Sounds good to me. Definitions should be made only to assist > practitioners (not to entertain theoreticians). > ............ I like it, I like it a lot! > Tep: The real trouble I have starts when someone tells me that > cetasikas also can cognize any object that citta can, and that > whatever function the citta can perform, cetasikas also can. > > What do you think -- can cetasikas determine the type of feelings that > arise? This is what the PTS Pali - English dictionary has to say about cetasika: Occurring in the Nikâyas in sg.(singular) only, it came to be used in pl.(plural) and, as an ultimate category, the 52 cetasikas, with citta as bare consciousness, practically superseded in mental analysis, the 5 khandha... I'd love to hear from anyone who needed cetasikas to become a sotapanna, because they failed to realise the implications of khandas :-) Kind Regards Herman 59840 From: LBIDD@... Date: Fri May 26, 2006 5:02pm Subject: Vism.XVII,78 lbidd2 "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga), Ch. XVII 78. (7) A state that assists by means of mutual arousing and consolidating is 'mutuality condition', as the three sticks of a tripod give each other consolidating support. With the immaterial aggregates, etc., it is threefold, according as it is said: 'The four immaterial aggregates are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]; the four great primaries are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]; at the moment of descent into the womb mentality and materiality are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]' (P.tn.1,3). *********************** 78. a~n~nama~n~na.m uppaadanupatthambhanabhaavena upakaarako dhammo a~n~nama~n~napaccayo a~n~nama~n~nuupatthambhaka.m tida.n.daka.m viya. so aruupakkhandhaadivasena tividho hoti. yathaaha ``cattaaro khandhaa aruupino a~n~nama~n~napaccayena paccayo. cattaaro mahaabhuutaa okkantikkha.ne naamaruupa.m a~n~nama~n~napaccayena paccayo''ti (pa.t.thaa0 1.1.7). 59841 From: "indriyabala" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 4:49pm Subject: Other Operations Of The Mind -- ... to lead & originate cetasikas indriyabala Hi Suan & Ken O, Dan D. Sarah, This post has the double purpose to thank Suan for his explanation on citta & cetasika and mind, as well as to draw Ken's and Sarah's attention to a better meaning of why "citta is chief". >Suan: 1>One of the operations of vi~n~nana is merely being aware of content. 2>..the mind is the forerunner of the mental phenomena : another >important operation of the mind is to lead and originate the three >mental aggregates, namely, cetasikas. With appreciation, Tep ====== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "abhidhammika" wrote: > > > > Dear Howard, Herman, Tep, Dan, Nina, Mike N, Sarah and all > > How are you? > (snipped) > In the first verse of Dhammapada, the Buddha teaches us that the > mind is the forerunner (leader/originator) of the mental phenomena > (mano pubba^ngamaa dhammaa where dhammaa refers to cetasikas). > > Dhammapada commentary explains the meaning of dhamma in that verse > as follows. > > "So atthato tayo arupino khandhaa vedanaakkhandho saññaakkhandho > sa^nkhaarakkhandhoti." > > That term 'dhammo', as its meaning here, refers to the three mental > aggregates: feeling aggregate, memory aggregate, and the aggregate > of the remaining mental associates. > (snipped) 59842 From: "Andrew" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 5:27pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: Do you know if the > Buddha distinguished between bodily feeling and mental feeling, or was it > our good friends the commentators? :-) Hi Herman and KenO Have a look at the Bahuvedaniya Sutta (MN 59)in which the Buddha describes how he has given many different presentations about various numbers of kinds of feeling. Bhikkhu Bodhi's note 616 explains that the Buddha's reference to 5 kinds of feeling refers to the faculties of: (bodily) pleasure (mental) joy (bodily) pain (mental) grief equanimity. Furthermore, the mental/bodily distinction is plainly set out in the Samyutta Nikaya 48:36 (Mahavagga Indriyasamyutta)- the pleasure faculty and the pain faculty are "born of body-contact" whereas the joy faculty and the displeasure/grief faculty are "born of mind-contact". If one argues that all 5 above are mental, how does one distinguish between pleasure/joy and pain/grief? (Your theory, Herman - you need to explain this). How does that viewpoint fit with the orthodoxy that an arahant can feel pleasure and pain but not (akusala) joy or grief? See the Dhatuvibhanga Sutta (MN 140) para 23 and BB's note # 1280: "though [the arahant] continues to experience feelings, he is free from lust towards pleasant feeling, from aversion towards painful feeling, and from ignorance about neutral feeling". Back to you guys. Best wishes Andrew 59843 From: "indriyabala" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 5:48pm Subject: Re: Leading to stream entry ... How can we tell? indriyabala Hi Matheesha (and all) - It is admirable that you have a consistently strong "interest" in attaining Sotaapatti in this very life. >M: >These two types of disciples are said to become sotapannas at least moments before death, and are stages prior to the sotapanna stage. I have read that their 5 precepts are very good as well apart from their faith in the buddha, dhamma, sangha. T: Only the five precepts?? But as you know, the sotapanna has the "perfect sila". What do they (the saddanusarin and dhammanusarin) have to go through in order to attain the perfect sila prior to the "moments before death"? ................. T: Let's discuss the following sutta (found in your "recommended" set of suttas). At Savatthi. "Monks, the eye is inconstant, changeable, alterable. The ear... The nose... The tongue... The body... The mind is inconstant, changeable, alterable. "One who has conviction & belief that these phenomena are this way is called a faith-follower: one who has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is incapable of doing any deed by which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal womb, or in the realm of hungry shades. He is incapable of passing away until he has realized the fruit of stream-entry. "One who, after pondering with a modicum of discernment, has accepted that these phenomena are this way is called a Dhamma-follower: one who has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is incapable of doing any deed by which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal womb, or in the realm of hungry shades. He is incapable of passing away until he has realized the fruit of stream-entry. "One who knows and sees that these phenomena are this way is called a stream-enterer, steadfast, never again destined for states of woe, headed for self-awakening." T: How would one tell when he/she has such insight? Warm regards, Tep === --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "matheesha" wrote: > > Hi Everyone, > > Here is the minimum requirement to become a saddanusarin (faith > follower) or a dhammanusarin (dhamma follower). These two types of > disciples are said to become sotapannas at least moments before > death, and are stages prior to the sotapanna stage. I have read that > their 5 precepts are very good as well apart from their faith in the > buddha, dhamma, sangha. > 59844 From: "indriyabala" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 6:20pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives indriyabala Hi Herman , Thank you for your observation about Nibbana. > Herman: I know it is only words, but wouldn't timeless be a better description than permanent? Permanent carries with it the implication of being in time, enduring in time. T: Yes, only words; but words can be like a two-edged sword. {:-|>> Here I used 'permanent' to convey the opposite meaning to 'impermanent'. Thus 'permanent' means not-changeable in the past, in the future, or in the present; which is the same as timeless or time-independent. >H: Or do you see Nibbana as a positive state, rather than absence? T: Don't laugh at me. I see Nibbana as omnipresent -- a positive state, yes. Sincerely, Tep ======= --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Tep, > > On 27/05/06, indriyabala wrote: > > > > > > I would like to offer an answer: It is because these three > > characteristics of most dhammas are not mutually exclusive. One > > exception is Nibbana: it is permanent, true happiness; and it is anatta. > > > 59845 From: "indriyabala" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 6:47pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives indriyabala Hi Herman, my young pal {:-|> Thanks for seeing my point about the definitions. > > Tep: What do you think -- can cetasikas determine the type of > > feelings that arise? > > Herman: > This is what the PTS Pali - English dictionary has to say about >cetasika: > Occurring in the Nikâyas in sg.(singular) only, it came to be used >in pl.(plural) and, as an ultimate category, the 52 cetasikas, with >citta as bare consciousness, practically superseded in mental analysis, the 5 khandha... ................ T: The combined term is also interesting: Citta-cetasika = mind & all that belongs to it, mind and mental properties, adjuncts. ............. >Herman: > I'd love to hear from anyone who needed cetasikas to become a >sotapanna, because they failed to realise the implications of khandas :-) > Tep: Your 'old mate' doesn't follow you this time. Why would only cetasikas help us become Sotapanna? Yours truly, Tep ===== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Tep, me old mate :-) > > On 27/05/06, indriyabala wrote: > > > Tep: Sounds good to me. Definitions should be made only to assist > > practitioners (not to entertain theoreticians). > > ............ > > > I like it, I like it a lot! > 59846 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 8:18pm Subject: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Here we go again . . . H: "...neither of us are attached to our doctrines, right?" Absolutely correct! What are yours, by the way? ["I think Nibbaana as concept can be discussed conceptually. But Nibbaana as reality cannot." I'd say it still has a "reality." Would you? "No, definitely not. I understand why you would think that, because the dhamma theory has nibbana as an element cognised by mind. But this is just thinly disguised dualism. There is an unbridgable gap between being and having. This is poorly understood. Any formulation which has an ultimate as a bearer of a characteristic, as having characteristic, is dualistic, and cannot be ultimate. To be ultimate, of course, is to be a characteristic."] What are your sources for this philosophical viewpoint? It sounds as if it comes from Naagaarjuna. I only say this because what little I've read of the Madhyamikas within Mahayana seems to focus on emptiness, non-dualism, and consider own-nature in just this fashion. If we are "debating" from these two separate vantage points, I'd rather not. I'm not ready to learn more from the Mahayana schools. H: "I have no idea what an accumulation is in abhidhamma terminology, perhaps you know?" Try anusaya. S: "Are these feelings, perceptions, and thoughts referred to above real?" You didn't really answer the question. Can you offer an opinion on this? Do you think it's an unfair question? Instead you suggest: H: "I am glad you brought this sutta up. Because it is unambiguous in treating of the identity of the Perfect One. Yet earlier on you say the concept of self is not applicable where reality is concerned. This is classic dsg argumentation. I suggest that you need to sort out whether the Buddha has or is identity or not, and if he does have or is his identity, what the ramifications of that are in relation to notions of self." In my opinion, prior to his parinibbaana, when the Buddha referred to himself, or his identity he was speaking conventionally. He would have had to have been, since he knew anatta. I have very little idea why I should have to "sort out whether the Buddha has or is identity or not." I don't for a moment find any of this confusing or in need of sorting out. What gives you cause to think I do? Did I indicate somehow that I am mixed up about this? If so, please show me. Can you give your opinions regarding the "identity" of a Buddha? I'd like something to respond to. I don't know enough to float this way in the midst of an unclarified conversation. I think that I'd like to either settle on a focus for our discussion, or bring this one to an end and come up with a new one with a clear focus. This is not to be abrupt or anything, you understand. Sincerely, Scott. 59847 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Fri May 26, 2006 10:51pm Subject: How 5 become 10 ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: How do the 5 Mental Hindrances become 10? The Blessed Buddha once explained: How, Bhikkhus, is the explanation of the five mental hindrances becoming ten??? Own sense-desire for anything internal is a hindrance. Others sense-desire and any sense-desire for anything external is a hindrance too. Sense-desire is thus twofold by this explanation: Internal and external. Own ill-will opposing anything internal is a hindrance. Others ill-will & any aversion opposing anything external are hindrances too. A dual ill-will can thus be defined. Any lethargy is a mental hindrance. Any laziness is indeed also a mental hindrance. Lethargy and laziness therefore, becomes an obstructing double mental hindrance. All restlessness there is, is a mental hindrance. Whatever regret there is, is also a hindrance. Therefore can restlessness & regret be explained as two hindrances. Any doubt and uncertainty about any internal personal condition, is a hindrance. Any doubt and uncertainty about any other external condition, is also a hindrance. Thus does doubt and uncertainty become explained, as a matched mirror pair. On how to prevent the mental hindrances see: http://what-buddha-said.net/Canon/Sutta/AN/AN.I.3-4.htm and http://www.what-buddha-said.org/Canon/Sutta/AN/AN.I.3-4c.htm Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V:110] section 46: The Links. 52: The Explanation... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PS: Please include the word Samahita in any comment, since then will my automatic mail filters pick it up and I will see it & respond!! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. Friendship is the Greatest ... Let there be Calm & Free Bliss !!! <...> 59848 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat May 27, 2006 3:28am Subject: Cetasikas' study corner 457- Non-Attachment/Alobha (e) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== Ch 28, Non-Attachment(Alobha)contd ***** When there is a moment of non-attachment there cannot be attachment at the same time. Non-attachment has the characteristic of non-adherence like a water drop on a lotus leaf. The lotus grows in the water but it is not wetted by the water, that is its nature. A drop of water glides off a lotus leaf without affecting it. So it is with non-attachment, alobha. It is not attached to the object which is experienced, it is unaffected by it. That is the nature of non-attachment. Sometimes there are conditions for non-attachment, but shortly afterwards we are affected again by objects. Through right understanding one will become less affected. We read in the Sutta Nipåta (Khuddaka Nikåya, The Group of Discourses, vs. 811-813,)(3): *** "… Not being dependent upon anything, a sage holds nothing as being pleasant or unpleasant. Lamentation and avarice do not cling to him, as water does not cling to a (lotus-)leaf. Just as a drop of water does not cling to a (lotus-)leaf, as water does not cling to a lotus, so a sage does not cling to what is seen or heard or thought. Therefore a purified one does not think that purity is by means of what is seen, heard, or thought, nor does he wish for purity by anything else(4). He is neither impassioned nor dispassioned." * The function of non-attachment is, as we have seen, “not appropriating, like an emancipated monk”. A monk who has attained arahatship does not hold on to any object which presents itself; he is not enslaved but completely detached and thus free, emancipated. *** 3) I am using the P.T.S. translation by K.R. Norman. 4) By any other way than the Noble Eightfold Path, according to the commentary. See the Discourse Collection, Wheel Publication no. 82, B.P.S. Kandy. •***** Non-Attachment(Alobha)to be contd Metta, Sarah ====== 59849 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat May 27, 2006 3:42am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' sarahprocter... Hi Tep (Suan & Ken O), --- indriyabala wrote: > S: I don't think the 'special function' of experience is 'supposed to > pertain only to the citta'. I haven't read that. Citta is the chief in > experiencing an object, but it cannot experience without supports as I > tried to indicate. > > T: Why is the citta "the chief" if it cannot perform certain functions > that no cetasikas can? Is a Police Chief not more capable than a > policeman? {:>|] .... S: The Police Chief is the leader, but he cannot do his job without his officers to assist and perform their particular functions. They all have their special functions. Suan just gave the Pali and translation and commentary explanation (#59813) of the first Dhp verse which indicates just this point that citta (or mano or vinnana) is the forerunner (in experiencing an object) and the other 3 mental khandhas follow and are associated with it. Ken O also explained how cittas and cetasikas arise together and 'why citta is chief'. I think your analogy of the Police Chief and his policemen is a good one here. Each one's work is affected by the other members of the team, but still they need a chief of operations. Suan & Ken O, always good to see you around:-). Metta, Sarah ======= 59850 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat May 27, 2006 4:28am Subject: Re: [dsg] park with trees sarahprocter... Hi Leo, You always ask unusual questions - often about art and trees. --- Leo wrote: > I was reading recently about trees of different Buddhas .... S: In the commentary to the Buddhavamsa, it lists all the different trees of Awakening for different Buddhas. This comes under 'Differences between the Buddhas, The Clarifier of Sweet Meaning' (PTS transl by I.B.Horner). .... >I would > really like to see a park with all Buddhas trees, that is mentioned in > Buddhavamsa. If you know anything about existance of such park, please > let me know. ..... S: Are you sure that such a park is mentioned in the Buddhavamsa? I've seen references there and in the commentary to the various trees, but don't recall seeing mention of a park of them all. As I mentioned to you before, I hope you have a chance to visit Kusinara where there are various trees, such as the Sal trees and Bo trees etc. I don't know enough about them to say more. Also Savatthi, where so many sermons were given, has been beautifully restored and the ruins are in a lovely cultivated park now. (Many of these sites are completley changed from when the overgrown ruins they used to be.) By the way, a long while back you asked a question about art references in the texts and I made some weak attempt at an answer. Afterwards, I thought I should have mentioned this quote to you from the 'Atthasalini', Analysis of Terms (PTS transl). "How is consciousness capable of producing a variety or diversity of effects in action? There is no art in the world more variegated than the art of painting. In painting, the painter's masterpiece is more artistic than the rest of his pictures. An artistic design occurs to the painters of masterpieces that such and such pictures should be drawn in such and such a way. "Through this artistic design there arise operations of the mind (or artistic operations) accomplishing such things as sketching the outline, putting on the paint, touching up, and embellishing... Thus all classes of arts in the world, specific or generic, are achieved by the mind. And owing to its capacity thus to produce a variety or diversity of effects in action, the mind, which achieves all these arts, is itself artistic like the arts themselves. Nay, it is even more artistic than the art itself, because the latter cannot execute every design perfectly. "For that reason the Blessed One has said, 'Monks, have you seen a masterpiece of painting?' 'Yes, Lord.' 'Monks, that masterpiece of art is designed by the mind. Indeed, monks, the mind is even more artistic than that masterpiece." And from Samyutta Nikaya, 22:100 'The Leash' (Bodhi transl): "Suppose, bhikkhus, an artist or a painter, using dye or lac or turmeric or indigo or crimson, would create the figure of a man or a woman complete in all its features on a well-polished plank or wall or canvas. "So too, when the uninstructed worldling produces anything, it is only form that he produces; only feeling that he produces; only perception that he produces; only volitional formations that he produces; only consciousness that he produces." **** S: I hope this helps. I'd be glad to hear back from you. Metta, Sarah ======== 59851 From: "Phil" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 6:17am Subject: Listening to Phra Dhammadaro (Allen?) philofillet Hi all It's been a very interesting week. I received two different sets of Dhamma talks led by Phra Dhammadaro (I would just as soon call him by his unordained name but I forget it at the moment) from the late 70s and, as expected, he is a compelling speaker indeed. Sincere thanks to the people who sent me the talks, really deeply appreciated. I've started writing down some things and will express my gratitude by posting bits every week. Here's one I thought was very helpful, referring to the Adze handle simile and what it implies - that when we want to know even when there are not the conditions for knowing, we risk going off the path: "One's thumb is not on the knife handle, because one wants to see, and the more one wants to see, the less conditions there are for the wearing away of the knife handle. Anytime you want to know, want to consider, want to think "have I got sati, how much sati do I have" at that moment sati is not being developed, so it doesn't help to want to know. The only kind of wanting to know (that is helpful) is wanting to know - if this makes any sense at all - that occurs at the moment of knowing...when you're doing it, it means that you really want to do it, so if there is mindfulness now, we could say that one really wants to be mindful, and that kind of wanting, no harm, because it's not just wishing and hoping, it's being mindful." Wanting to have sati is self-defeating, no doubt about that. Not the least amount of doubt about that. The Buddha's path is about detachment, not attachment. Not the least bit of doubt about that either, not tonight, anyways. :) Phil p.s I have found myself launched on an internet free stretch these days - will probably only be checking in on Saturday. But I don't think anyone would really want to discuss the above. It's such a ...dead horse? Let's just all believe what we believe and carry on with it instead of trying to convince each other we're wrong. That's the way I feel these days. p.p.s Really inspiring to hear Acharn Sujin, Nina, Sarah and others discussing the same topics in the same terms some 30 years ago. It gives me a lot of confidence that they are on to something very solid, and since they are my influential Dhamma friends it makes me feel that I am on to something solid too. Or has it just been 30 years of wonkery? Ah, only panna knows.... :) p.p.p.s Phra Dhammadaro's voice is groovy. Reminds me of some British movie star from the 40s, but can't quite put my finger on it. Maybe Laurence Olivier in Hamlet. 59852 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 6:16am Subject: Re: Please don't.... ken_aitch Hi Dan, -------------- D: > I think we differ on two points. 1. I don't believe there is such a thing as a "right conceptual explanation". All explanations fall short of the mark. Some help illumine a particular aspect of the world; some do not; and some cement the veil of ignorance to the face and splatter it with seven thick layers of black paint. --------------- Sorry, Dan, but don't those two sentences contradict each other? If, as you say, some conceptual explanations help to illume a particular aspect of the world, wouldn't they be right explanations? If I can remember what you have said previously on this thread, I might be able to explain away this apparent contradiction. But it would be quicker if you would do it for me. :-) ------------------------ 2. I don't believe that "right conceptualization" is a condition for samma-ditthi. However, I do think conceptualization plays a role in defining the limits to how deep insight can go. ------------------------ Here again, to the uninformed observer, the second sentence seems to contradict the first. Doesn't 'plays a role in' mean the same as 'is a condition for?' The term 'right conceptualisation' is a new one that seems to have originated in this DSG thread. I assume it is same as the more commonly used, 'right intellectual understanding.' The only difference might be that it refers to the citta as a whole more than to just panna-cetasika. To my mind, right conceptualisation must ultimately refer to any mind-door citta that has panna (that at least knows the difference betweeen concepts and realities) as one of its cetasikas and that has a concept as its object. The Eightfold Path, also, is a mind-door citta that has panna as one of its cetasikas, but it has nibbana as its object. Surely, therefore, right conceptualisation can be seen as a degree of Path consciousness. (?) Admittedly, it would be a tiny degree of Path consciousness, but, even so, one that was precious and very difficult to obtain. Just look at all the hard working Dhamma students here at DSG. With so much disagreement over the basic concepts, there would, at most, be a small number of us who had attained the stage of Right Conceptualisation. :-) Ken H 59853 From: "Phil" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 7:07am Subject: Do you want to see Lord of the Rings? philofillet Hi all One of my favourite moments in the recorded talks is when Acharn Sujin suddenly asks Jon "do you want to see Lord of the Rings?" I think the context was chanda vs lobha. Indeed, I am a big fan of Lord of the Rings and have downloaded dialogue from the Japanese version on to my ipod for study and empowerment. And it has made me realize that I no longer expect or want to gain courage from Dhamma - Dhamma should not be for constant, reliable emotional comfort, I feel. I get my courage, my wholesome, empowering fodder for the story of Phil from that movie and other stirring stories. I know it's just a story, no more or less real, really, than the story of Phil. (Just as a bunch of grapes is no more real than a painting of grapes.) I don't want to get emotionally comforting stories from Dhamma. No more morning Dhamma feelgood sessions for me anyome, for the time being. Dhamma should not be about starting the day by having pleasant thoughts about being a more wholesome person, I feel, but that's what it was for me. Being a better, more courageous, more wholesome person - that is the realm of the storytellers. Developing understanding that conditions the gradual letting go of the story of being a person - that is the realm of the Buddha. I don't know, just something I was thinking today. Phil 59854 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat May 27, 2006 4:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' upasaka_howard Hi, Sarah (and Tep, Suan, and Ken O) - In a message dated 5/27/06 6:51:47 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sarahprocterabbott@... writes: > Hi Tep (Suan &Ken O), > > --- indriyabala wrote: > > >S: I don't think the 'special function' of experience is 'supposed to > >pertain only to the citta'. I haven't read that. Citta is the chief in > >experiencing an object, but it cannot experience without supports as I > >tried to indicate. > > > >T: Why is the citta "the chief" if it cannot perform certain functions > > that no cetasikas can? Is a Police Chief not more capable than a > >policeman? {:>|] > .... > S: The Police Chief is the leader, but he cannot do his job without his > officers to assist and perform their particular functions. They all have > their special functions. > > Suan just gave the Pali and translation and commentary explanation > (#59813) of the first Dhp verse which indicates just this point that citta > (or mano or vinnana) is the forerunner (in experiencing an object) and the > other 3 mental khandhas follow and are associated with it. > > Ken O also explained how cittas and cetasikas arise together and 'why > citta is chief'. I think your analogy of the Police Chief and his > policemen is a good one here. Each one's work is affected by the other > members of the team, but still they need a chief of operations. > > Suan &Ken O, always good to see you around:-). > > Metta, > > Sarah =========================== I see it this way: Without cognizing any content (or "object"), there *is* no content, and with no content, there is none to concentrate on, none to attend to, none to be distracted from, none to affectively taste, none to desire, none to have disgust for, and so on. No object (in the sense of arammana) is present except as object of consciousness. This makes vi~n~nana the leader among all the mental operations. It is the only mental operation that is a sine qua non. However, without vedana, there is no sa~n~na, and without sa~n~na, the experiential presence of the object is without much in the way of cognitive content. And, of course, consider the enormous importance of such cetasikas as mindfulness, one-pointedness, intention, energy/effort, and attention. Thus the cetasikas constitute all the other mental operations without which vi~n~nana is not much of anything. What is the U.S. President [No comments on the current one!! LOL!] without his/her cabinet? What is the Sovereign of a country without his/her ministers? What is any leader without his/her "troops"? So, vi~n~nana is central but, still, is, on its own, a "blank-slate operation" requiring all the other mental functions to adequately fulfill its function of knowing. Disclaimer: It is impossible to avoid nouns and still communicate in a natural language, but I want to emphasize that all cittas and cetasikas are conditioned events (or activities, or operations) that occur and cease utterly dependent on other events, and thus lacking own-being. And they are not things that act - they are the acting. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59855 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 8:34am Subject: Re: Sila, samadhi, panna ... Satipatthana from three good conducts indriyabala Hi Jonathan It is now my turn to apologize for the delay in answering your post (#59702, May 23rd). >Jon: As usual, your post is packed with information, sutta quotes and comments on various aspects of the topic under discussion. I hope you don't mind if I am selective in what I reply to ... T: That is a mistake that most active members here (and at most other discussion places) don't make -- they are wiser than I, perhaps. Why? A post like that, sometimes, can cause pain (or suffering) to the readers and to myself. {:-|>> ......... > > Tep: > >That's one reason why the Sotapanna is > >known as one who has perfect Sila and the Anagami as one who has > >purified consciousness (perfect jhanas). And the Seven Chariot (the > >discourse of the arahant Punna Mantaniputta talking to the Chief > >Disciple Sariputta) also clearly affirms that fact. But (pardon me, if > >you feel my remark is negative) unfortunately, some commentaries > >contradict to this fact. But should we believe in the arahant's words > >or the words of those "ancient commentators"? > >Jon: >I am not aware of any commentaries that contradict this fact. >Please feel free to bring them up for discussion. Tep: Thank you for not saying it in such a way to make me feel I was untruthful! But it has the tone of a police officer who stops a drug-dealer suspect; he says: Sir, please show me your driver licence and then step outside the car with both hands above your head. I am unable to recall the commentaries you are asking me to show you, Officer Jonathan. Maybe you can help me out? Do you remember the several discussions about whether understanding or sila should come first? Nina, Sarah, you and others insisted that it was understanding. The seven chariots simile was brought up to support the step-by-step practice, starting at sila. Then some ancient commentaries from the "graudal sayings" and the Depositor were referenced to overule the sila-first approach. If you don't like helping me out, you may handcuff me now. ................... >Jon: >I thought we agreed earlier that sila was perfected at stream-entry. >So when you say that sila becomes 'sufficiently established' at >stream entry, you mean sufficiently established for what? T: Sufficiently establishing sotapatti. Sincerely, Tep ===== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > Hi Tep > > As usual, your post is packed with information, sutta quotes and > comments on various aspects of the topic under discussion. I hope you > don't mind if I am selective in what I reply to (please feel free to > come back on anything I omit to respond to) 59856 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 9:34am Subject: Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' indriyabala Hi Howard (Sarah, Suan, Ken O and others) - Is the idea about 'consciousness' in your post (#59854) your own discovery, a postulation, or adaptation from the Buddha's ? It is very interesting, but still imaginative to me. Can you give a convincing example or real evidence to support it? >Howard: >Without cognizing any content (or "object"), there *is* no content, >and with no content, there is none to concentrate on, none to attend >to, none to be distracted from, none to affectively taste, none to >desire, none to have disgust for, and so on. Tep: Are you saying that the citta totally controls the arising and passing away of cetasikas [the Creator Hypothesis] -- i.e. without citta, cetasikas do not exist? Or do you mean that cetasikas have their own "operations" that is dependent on the 'consciousness in charge' [dependent co-existence: the Hypothesis of the Police Chief and his Policemen] and that they are cognizable by the citta(as content, something to concentrate on, etc.) only when they become objects of consciousness? >Howard: >No object (in the sense of arammana) is present except as object of >consciousness. This makes vi~n~nana the leader among all the mental operations. >It is the only mental operation that is a sine qua non. Tep: I understand that cetasikas are nothing but the objects of the citta(consciousness). But there is no rule that says a cetasika cannot have an object (which can be another cetasika, but not the citta -- the chief) Do you believe that cetasikas do not and cannot have object ? Why or why not? Warm regards, Tep [:>|> ?? My avatar is getting confused .. ====== == --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Sarah (and Tep, Suan, and Ken O) - > > In a message dated 5/27/06 6:51:47 AM Eastern Daylight Time, > sarahprocterabbott@... writes: > > > Hi Tep (Suan &Ken O), > > > > --- indriyabala wrote: > > (snipped) > =========================== > I see it this way: > Without cognizing any content (or "object"), there *is* no content, and with no content, there is none to concentrate on, none to attend to, none to be distracted from, none to affectively taste, none to desire, none to have disgust for, and so on. No object (in the sense of arammana) is present except as object of consciousness. This makes vi~n~nana the leader among all the mental operations. It is the only mental operation that is a sine qua non. > However, without vedana, there is no sa~n~na, and without sa~n~na, the experiential presence of the object is without much in the way of cognitive content. And, of course, consider the enormous importance of such cetasikas as mindfulness, one-pointedness, intention, energy/effort, and attention. Thus the cetasikas constitute all the other mental operations without which vi~n~nana is not much of anything. What is the U.S. President [No comments on the current one!! LOL!] without his/her cabinet? What is the Sovereign of a country without his/her ministers? What is any leader without his/her "troops"? So, vi~n~nana is central but, still, is, on its own, a "blank-slate operation" requiring all the other mental functions to adequately fulfill its function of knowing. > Disclaimer: It is impossible to avoid nouns and still communicate in a natural language, but I want to emphasize that all cittas and cetasikas are conditioned events (or activities, or operations) that occur and cease utterly dependent on other events, and thus lacking own-being. And they are not things that act - they are the acting. > 59857 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat May 27, 2006 6:38am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' upasaka_howard Hi, Tep - In a message dated 5/27/06 12:35:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time, indriyabala@... writes: > Hi Howard (Sarah, Suan, Ken O and others) - > > Is the idea about 'consciousness' in your post (#59854) your own > discovery, a postulation, or adaptation from the Buddha's ? It is very > interesting, but still imaginative to me. Can you give a convincing > example or real evidence to support it? --------------------------------------- Howard: I don't understand what it is that is so unusual about my understanding of consciousness. The Buddha himself said that vi~n~nana "vi~n~nanizes". (I forget the Pali.) It is mere awareness (of sight, sound, taste, smell, odor, or mind-object). As far as I understand the Dhamma, that is what the Buddha meant by 'vi~n~nana'. --------------------------------------- > > >Howard: > >Without cognizing any content (or "object"), there *is* no content, > >and with no content, there is none to concentrate on, none to attend > >to, none to be distracted from, none to affectively taste, none to > >desire, none to have disgust for, and so on. > > Tep: Are you saying that the citta totally controls the arising and > passing away of cetasikas [the Creator Hypothesis] -- i.e. without > citta, cetasikas do not exist? ----------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, though I wouldn't use the word 'controls'. What I am saying is that without citta, there are no cetasikas. That seems about a straightforward a matter as I can imagine. ------------------------------------ > Or do you mean that cetasikas have their own "operations" that is > dependent on the 'consciousness in charge' [dependent co-existence: > the Hypothesis of the Police Chief and his Policemen] and that they > are cognizable by the citta(as content, something to concentrate on, > etc.) only when they become objects of consciousness? ------------------------------------- Howard: First of all, cetasikas don't *have* operations - they *are* operations, and, no, they do not operate in the absence of consciousness as far as I know or could imagine. (Of course, there never is a moment without consciousness. There are no temporal gaps in consciousness, though there are periods at which consciousness operates more or less subliminally, with little attention and mindfulness in effect.) ----------------------------------- > > >Howard: > >No object (in the sense of arammana) is present except as object of > >consciousness. This makes vi~n~nana the leader among all the mental > operations. > >It is the only mental operation that is a sine qua non. > > Tep: I understand that cetasikas are nothing but the objects of the > citta(consciousness). > ------------------------------------ Howard: That's not my understanding. Sometimes cetasikas are in action without being objects of consciousness. There is only one object of consciousness at any time. So, for example, when there is awareness of an unpleasant odor, that operation of feeling-as-unpleasant is not the current *object* of consciousness, but it is in effect and serves as background "flavoring" for the mindstate. ------------------------------------ But there is no rule that says a cetasika cannot> > have an object (which can be another cetasika, but not the citta -- > the chief) ---------------------------------- Howard: The object of a cetasika is the object of consciousness so far as I know. What else could it be? ---------------------------------- > Do you believe that cetasikas do not and cannot have object ? Why or > why not? ---------------------------------- Howard: Please see my previous sentence as answer to this. ---------------------------------- > > > Warm regards, > > > Tep [:>|> ?? My avatar is getting confused .. > =================== With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59858 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sat May 27, 2006 0:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' nilovg Hi Howard, I quote Visuddhimagga Ch XIV, 82 and Tiika, but as you may remember, I quoted this before to you: <82. 'Whatever has the characteristic of cognizing should be understood, all taken together, as the consciousness aggregate' was said above. And what has the characteristic of cognizing (vijaanana)? Consciousness (vi~n~naa.na); according as it is said, 'It cognizes, friend, that is why "consciousness" is said' (M.i,292). The words vi~n~naa.na (consciousness), citta (mind, consciousness), and mano (mind) are one in meaning.> Tiika: N: As we read in the Vis.: In Pali no article is used here. There is merely the declination of the verb cognizing in the third person singular.> As you rightly say, also cetasika experiences an object. It shares the same object with the citta it accompanies. Nina. op 27-05-2006 19:38 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: > The Buddha himself said that vi~n~nana "vi~n~nanizes". (I > forget the Pali.) It is mere awareness (of sight, sound, taste, smell, odor, > or mind-object). As far as I understand the Dhamma, that is what the Buddha > meant by 'vi~n~nana'. 59859 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sat May 27, 2006 0:32pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: the word dhamma. nilovg Hi Herman, thank you. I am just now on the Pali list reposting what I wrote before about Meanings of Dhamma, so this is of interest. We can translate sabhava also as: own characteristic. I shall read your post more thoroughly later on, it is late. But I prefer to approach dhamma from the point of view of practice, that is satipatthana. Karunadasa writes good things, but at first sight I miss something. There is the danger getting lost in theory. I like to keep on asking myself: does this help me to have more understanding now of realities? The realities that appear at this moment? I do not care much about the way sabhava is translated, own nature or own characteristic. There were many discussions on dsg about this subject. Nina. op 27-05-2006 01:27 schreef Herman Hofman op hhofmeister@...: > > You may find the following quote helpful with regards to the original > meaning; from http://www.buddhistinformation.com/dhamma_theory.htm 59860 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat May 27, 2006 8:37am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - Thank you for the reference! :-) With metta, Howard In a message dated 5/27/06 3:33:19 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > 'Whatever has the characteristic of cognizing should be understood, > all taken together, as the consciousness aggregate' was said above. And > what has the characteristic of cognizing (vijaanana)? Consciousness > (vi~n~naa.na); according as it is said, 'It cognizes, friend, that is > why "consciousness" is said' (M.i,292). /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59861 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 2:37pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... egberdina Hi Scott, I must say I am disappointed, but I say that in a non-manipulative way :-) S: "Are these feelings, perceptions, and thoughts referred to above > real?" > > You didn't really answer the question. Can you offer an opinion on > this? Do you think it's an unfair question? I have been clarifying, based on your request to do so, for a week or longer, and now you ask me a question that involves what is real, and I ask you to clarify that before I proceed. Which you are clearly reluctant to do. Anyway, if the conversation gives you no joy, much better to bail out. In the words of a famous Buddhist: "this will be my last post to you", but being aware of conditionality I must add "until the next one". :-) Kind Regards Herman 59862 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 2:45pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives egberdina Hi Tep, my fair (as in beautiful) pal :-) >Herman: > > I'd love to hear from anyone who needed cetasikas to become a > >sotapanna, because they failed to realise the implications of khandas :-) > > > > Tep: Your 'old mate' doesn't follow you this time. Why would only > cetasikas help us become Sotapanna? I was pointing to the ironies inherent in singing the praises of the Buddha very loudly but replacing what he taught with new, improved theories. Kind Regards Herman 59863 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 1:06pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Dependent Origination dacostacharles Hi Han, No. This idea in Mahayana B. is a good example, i.e., some cling to existence as a human to "spreading the Dharma and help others," thus giving rise birth as a Bodhisattva. Charles DaCosta -----Original Message----- From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of han tun Sent: Wednesday, May 24, 2006 00:50 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: RE: [dsg] Dependent Origination Dear Charles, Thank you very much for your explanation. In my message # 59665, I had summarized Nina's and Larry's explanations: "as the first javana-cittas of every living being are rooted in lobha or tanhaa, that is the time avijjaa also arises; and whichever links include rebirth-linking consciousness that is where the circle is completed." The above conclusion is not very much different from your explanation: "When we die in Ignorance, the ignorance does not die, it gives rise to more ignorance and clinging. The basic view has always been we die clinging to existence thus giving rise to a birth." The only question to your explanation is, "do beings always die in ignorance?" With metta, Han <...> 59864 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 1:11pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Dependent Origination dacostacharles YES Joop. -----Original Message----- > Hi Charles, > > > Sorry, I could not help butting in, DO is my main meditation. > Just curious, how do you do this meditation? > > regards > > Matheesha Hallo Matheesha, Charles, Tep, Han D.O. can also very good be used in vipassana- (insight-) meditation and of course also in being mindful in daily life. Especially "D.O. in one moment". The first six factors one can at that moment not influence. But one can be mindful that phassa (a contact) gives tanha (desire) And one can be mindful that a tanha gives upadana (attachment) The rest of the cycle as a result; but sometimes - by being mindful - phassa does just falls away and does not give tanha. That's not much but it's a beginning. Metta Joop 59865 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 1:18pm Subject: RE: [dsg] How Do We Test if He/She Is an Arahant? dacostacharles Hi Teb, Any arahant will not lie, cheat, or pretend. So the test questions would be always effective. Any "would-be" arahant MAY or MAY NOT lie, cheat, or pretend. So the test questions may not be always effective. Charles DaCosta -----Original Message----- From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of indriyabala Sent: Monday, May 22, 2006 13:35 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] How Do We Test if He/She Is an Arahant? Charles D. , Any would-be arahant does not lie or cheat or pretend. So the test questions are always effective. Regards, Tep ======= <...> 59866 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 4:12pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives indriyabala Hi Herman my buddy, Please allow me to deviate a little from the subject of 'mind & mind states'. > >Tep: > >Your 'old mate' doesn't follow you this time. Why would only > >cetasikas help us become Sotapanna? >Herman: >I was pointing to the ironies inherent in singing the praises of the >Buddha very loudly but replacing what he taught with new, improved >theories. Tep: Yes, you're right. I have had a hard time trying to understand why there is the urge to replace the dhammas the Buddha discovered (and did such a great job in teaching them) with some unproven new ideas and speculations. Your remark reminds me of Bhikkhu Bodhi's article on hiri & ottappa that points out the hipocrisy of modern people: BB: The driving forces of the human heart have remained fairly constant through the ages, and the toll they have taken in human misery surpasses calculation. But what we find today is a strange paradox that would be interesting if it were not sinister: while there appears to be a much wider verbal acknowledgment of the primacy of moral and human values, there is at the same time more blatant disregard for the lines of conduct such values imply. ['The Guardians of the World' by Bhikkhu Bodhi] Sincerely, Tep ===== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Tep, my fair (as in beautiful) pal :-) > > > >Herman: > > > I'd love to hear from anyone who needed cetasikas to become a > > >sotapanna, because they failed to realise the implications of khandas :-) > > > 59867 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 4:29pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Dependent Origination indriyabala Hi Charles D. , >Charles: > And one can be mindful that a tanha gives upadana (attachment) > The rest of the cycle as a result; but sometimes - by being mindful > phassa does just falls away and does not give tanha. That's not much > but it's a beginning. > Your argument/explanation makes sense to me. But, so far, what you have talked about still sounds very much like a postulate. Will you be kind enough to describe your personal experience with this single-moment D.O. for me? How effective is it? Does it really work, beyond all doubt? Warm regards, Tep, your friend =========== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Charles DaCosta" wrote: > > YES Joop. > ... ... > > Hallo Matheesha, Charles, Tep, Han > > D.O. can also very good be used in vipassana- (insight-) meditation > and of course also in being mindful in daily life. > Especially "D.O. in one moment". > The first six factors one can at that moment not influence. > But one can be mindful that phassa (a contact) gives tanha (desire) 59868 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 4:30pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta egberdina Hi Andrew, On 27/05/06, Andrew wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" > wrote: > Do you know if the > > Buddha distinguished between bodily feeling and mental feeling, or > was it > > our good friends the commentators? :-) > > Hi Herman and KenO > > Have a look at the Bahuvedaniya Sutta (MN 59)in which the Buddha > describes how he has given many different presentations about various > numbers of kinds of feeling. Bhikkhu Bodhi's note 616 explains that > the Buddha's reference to 5 kinds of feeling refers to the faculties of: > > (bodily) pleasure > (mental) joy > (bodily) pain > (mental) grief > equanimity. I see a little issue with method here, that needs to be kept in mind. You see, most suttas can be taken to be complete statements at one point of time, to one audience. They are sufficient statements within themselves. With the benefit of hindsight you, me and everybody can come up with a synoptic view of everything that was recorded, and so decide that what the Buddha said on one occasion actually meant all the other things he said on other occasions. I hope that you can recognise the same problem that I see in this approach. The problem becomes evident in BB's footnote in relation to MN59. The sutta is very specific, has no focus on differentiating between feelings at all, but progresses through to Nibbana, because this is the aim of teaching about feelings, not to arrive at a taxonomy of feelings. Furthermore, the mental/bodily distinction is plainly set out in the > Samyutta Nikaya 48:36 (Mahavagga Indriyasamyutta)- the pleasure faculty > and the pain faculty are "born of body-contact" whereas the joy faculty > and the displeasure/grief faculty are "born of mind-contact". > > If one argues that all 5 above are mental, how does one distinguish > between pleasure/joy and pain/grief? (Your theory, Herman - you need to > explain this). So there are two kinds of contact, and therefore two kinds of dependent origination? If so, tell me more. But in the meantiime I would ask, what is the purpose of the differentiation? And what is the result of the differentiation? Views of all sorts, I'd say. Like the view that certain feelings are always the results of past action. Which would be determined origination, not dependent origination. But what does the Buddha say? "Master Gotama, there are some priests & contemplatives who are of this doctrine, this view: Whatever an individual feels — pleasure, pain, neither-pleasure-nor-pain — is entirely caused by what was done before. Now what does Master Gotama say to that?" [The Buddha:] "There are cases where some feelings arise based on bile.You yourself should know how some feelings arise based on bile. Even the world is agreed on how some feelings arise based on bile. So any priests & contemplatives who are of the doctrine & view that whatever an individual feels — pleasure, pain, neither-pleasure-nor-pain — is entirely caused by what was done before — slip past what they themselves know, slip past what is agreed on by the world. Therefore I say that those priests & contemplatives are wrong." "There are cases where some feelings arise based on phlegm... based on internal winds... based on a combination of bodily humors... from the change of the seasons... from unevenca\ re of the body... from harsh treatment... from the result of kamma. You yourself should know how some feelings arise from the result of kamma. Even the world is agreed on how some feelings arise from the result of kamma. So any priests & contemplatives who are of the doctrine & view that whatever an individual feels — pleasure, pain, neither pleasure-nor-pain — is entirely caused by what was done before — slip past what they themselves know, slip past what is agreed on by the world. Therefore I say that those priests & contemplatives are wrong." (SN 36.21 my underlines.) I have no doubt that SN48:36 says what you say it says, but I have no access to it, and I cannot tell the context from your quote. You may like to post a copy or provide a link if you want to discuss that sutta further. I would like to refer you to a sutta that might be useful in demonstrating what I meant about all feelings being mental. http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/4Anguttara-Nikaya/Anguttara1/3-tikani\ pata/007-mahavaggo-e.htm I quote in part. Bhikkhus, my teaching is not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. Bhikkhus, how is my teaching not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. Bhikkhus, I teach these are the six elements and it is not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. I teach these are the six spheres of contact and it is not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. I teach these are the eighteen dwellings of the mind and it is not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. I teach these are the four noble truths and it is not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. Bhikkhus, it was said, these are the six elements that are not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. Why was it said so? Bhikkhus, the six elements, I say, are earth, water, fire, air, space and consciousness and it is not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. Bhikkhus, it was said, these are the six spheres of contact that are not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. Why was it said so? Bhikkhus, the six spheres of contact, I say are the sphere of eye contact, the sphere of ear contact, the sphere of nose contact, the sphere of tongue contact, the sphere of body contact and the sphere of mind contact and it is not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. Bhikkhus, it was said, these are the eighteen mental dwellings that are not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. Why was it said so? Seeing a form, the mind dwells in pleasure, dwells in displeasure and dwells in equanimity. Hearing a sound,...re...Scenting a smell...re.... Tasting something,...re.... Cognizing a touch,...re.... Cognizing an idea dwells in pleasure, dwells in displeasure and dwells in equanimity these are the eighteen mental dwellings that are not rebuked, not soiled and not blamed by the wise. This is dependent origination, best as I can tell. How do the vipaka teachings of determined origination fit in? How does that viewpoint fit with the orthodoxy that an arahant can feel > pleasure and pain but not (akusala) joy or grief? See the > Dhatuvibhanga Sutta (MN 140) para 23 and BB's note # 1280: "though [the > arahant] continues to experience feelings, he is free from lust towards > pleasant feeling, from aversion towards painful feeling, and from > ignorance about neutral feeling". I have never read an injunction by the Buddha to strive to arrive at a comprehensive and logical understanding of the tipitaka. So my aim would never be to make sense out of a large collection of books. But certainly pleasure and pain are things we deal with on a daily basis. The Dhatuvibhanga sutta was spoken to a man who was about to be gored to death. and this was said: Feeling pleasant feelings knows, it is impermanent, is not bent to it and knows that he does not delight in it. Feeling unpleasant feelings knows, it is impermanent, is not bent to it and knows that he does not delight in it. Feeling neither unpleasant nor pleasant feelings knows, it is impermanent, is not bent to it and knows that he does not delight in it. Feeling pleasant, unpleasant or neither unpleasant nor pleasant feelings feels them unyoked. Experiencing feelings that end the body he knows, I experience feelings that end the body. Experiencing feelings that end life he knows, I experience feelings that end life. He knows, at the breakup of the body, before the end of life that all feelings and enjoyments will be cooled. I really don't see anything here that even hints at distinguishing between bodily vs mental feeling. I do see something, though, that hints at the highest wisdom ie knowledge of cessation. Back to you guys. > > Thanks, and kind regards Herman 59869 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 4:57pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta egberdina Hi Sarah, .... > S: You'll see that I'm sticking to thinking of you as a 'hi proclivity > person'. Very touching comments from a non-anumodana man:-). I would encourage you to speak as naturally to me as you would to anyone that you have not yet formed a view of. Allow me to surprise you :-) With regards to anumodana, if I for a moment became self-conscious of doing "good deeds" it would be a great hindrance to me. What I don't understand is that in a culture that encourages the announcement of good deeds, why there is the great reluctance to announce attainments? Kind Regards Herman 59870 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 4:58pm Subject: Re: [dsg] How Do We Test if He/She Is an Arahant? indriyabala --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Charles DaCosta" wrote: > > Hi Teb, > > Any arahant will not lie, cheat, or pretend. So the test questions would be > always effective. > > Any "would-be" arahant MAY or MAY NOT lie, cheat, or pretend. So the test > questions may not be always effective. > > Teb: The Buddha's purpose was only to test the monks who declared arahantship. If a monk who had declared arahantship was sincerely mistaken, then he would find his error(s) after being asked the first few questions. I have not found a case in the suttas in which a shameless non-ariyan monk made such lion-roar declaration (except Devadhatta)! On the other hand, ariyan monks don't tell a lie, and you know that. BTW why would you waste your time asking any present-day monk who is not purified in sila (virtue, morality) with those top-notch questions? Sincerely, Teb {:-|>> ============ 59871 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 5:09pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' egberdina Hi Howard, Disclaimer: It is impossible to avoid nouns and still communicate in > a > natural language, but I want to emphasize that all cittas and cetasikas > are > conditioned events (or activities, or operations) that occur and cease > utterly > dependent on other events, and thus lacking own-being. And they are not > things > that act - they are the acting. Exactly. I am certainly not seeking to draw you into further discussion on this point, but I just want to make the point that it is entirely nonsensical to write a Dhammasangani / Patthana as an ultimate reduction of what is implied by some Suttas, to have it superceded by a convential commentary on that. The view that there is a person that acts is no different to the view that a citta/cetasika acts. Kind Regards Herman 59872 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 6:36pm Subject: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... scottduncan2 Dear Herman, my Disappointed Colleague, Allow me to attempt to allay this arisen mood. I've gone into the archives of our week-long conversation in an attempt to mine for your answer to my question about whether such things as feelings, perception, or thoughts are real. I'll summarise that below. First, just to be precise I checked the Paali version of the Achhariyabbutadhamma Sutta to determine exactly which words were being used in the translation. Let me first note these: feelings is "vedanaa," perception is "sa~n~na," and thoughts, in this portion of the sutta interestingly, is "vitakkaa." Please bear with me as I trot out definitions (according to Nyanaliloka). Vedanaa is: "'feeling,' sensation, is the 2nd of the 5 groups of existence. According to its nature it may be divided into 5 classes: (1) bodily agreeable feeling (kaayikaa sukhaa-vedanaa= sukhaa); (2) bodily disagreeable feeling (kaayikaa dukkhaa-vedanaa=dukkhaa); (3) mentally agreeable feeling (cetasikaa sukhaa vedanaa=somanassa); (4) mentally disagreeable feeling (cetasikaa dukkhaa vedanaa=domanassa); (5) indifferent or neutral feeling (adukkhaa.m asukkhaa vedanaa=upekkhaa). "With regard to the 6 senses, one distinguishes 6 kinds of feeling: feeling associated with seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, bodily impression and mental impression. The textual wording of it is 'feeling arisen through visual contact'(cakkhu-samphassajaa vedanaa). "Feeling is one of the 7 seven mental factors, inseparably associated with all consciousness whatever. In the formula of dependent origination, feeling is the condition for the arising of craving (tanhaa). The above mentioned 5 kinds of feeling are enumerated amongst the 22 faculties (indriya)." Sa~n~na is: "1. 'perception,' is one of the 5 groups of existence (khandha), and one of the 7 mental factors (cetasika) that are inseparably bound up with all consciousness. It is sixfold as perception of the 5 physical sense objects and of mental objects. It is the awareness of an object's distinctive marks. . .if, in repeated perception of an object, these marks are recognised, sa~n~na functions as memory. 2. sa~n~na stands sometimes for consciousness in its entirety... 3. sa~n~na may also refer to the 'ideas' which are the objects of meditation...or to wrong notions..." Vitakkaa is: "reflection, thought, thinking, 'initial application'...[having] the characteristic of fixity and steadiness," (PTS PED). These three things, vedanaa, sa~n~na, and vitakka, according to these above definitions, are real in the sense that they have certain characteristics which define their function and inhere to them for as long as they are arisen, persist, and fall away. To assert a lack of reality to these essential building blocks of Here some of your points from our earlier posts (in chronological order): 1. "Buddhist theory is anatta, anicca, and dukkha." 2. "...they deny theories of self-existence, permanence, and desirability." 3. "...anything that can be experienced is a mental product, but lending itself to the illusion of self-existence, permanence, or desirability." 4. "...anything that posits real, though momentary existence, is irreconcilably at odds with the middle way of neither existing or not-existing." 5. "...the whole positivist enterprise is to establish the reality of the present moment, while everything the Buddha said...was to uproot the very mind that creates the illusion of existence." 6. "Empirically one discovers how the world isn't." 7. "...the Buddha...enumerates [nama/rupa, dhatus, khandhas] because they demonstrate what is not real." 8. "I think Nibbaana as a concept can be discussed conceptually. But Nibbaana as a reality cannot." 9. "There is an unbrigeable gap between being and having...any formulation which has an ultimate as a bearer of a characteristic, as having a characteristic, is dualistic, and cannot be ultimate. To be ultimate, of course, is to be a characteristic." My synthesis of the above would begin with the impression that the argument seems to proceed from the hypothetical vantage point of one who has "attained Nibbaana" and is, as it were, looking back on the existence which has come to an end. That is, it seems as if the argument proceeds from the vantage point of a Buddha who is gone. From this hypothetical vantage point, the assertion seems to be that, since this has all ended, it doesn't exist. The central premise I see to ground this argument as I have rendered it is that some form of consciousness, albeit unlike anything else we can know of within sa.msara, exists to see things this way *from the vantage point of being in Nibbaana*. I think that this is a fundamental error. To say that something might persist following the "attainment of Nibbaana" is eternalistic. Cessation, in my opinion, is total. There is nothing remaining. The lamp has gone out. There can be nothing left over of the realities existing in sa.msara. To argue, therefore, that since everything ceases upon "attaining Nibbaana" it doesn't exist at any point, is nihilistic. To mix statements which seem eternalistic with statements which seem nihilistic is confusing. It seems to me, then, when the argument is taken to then state that there is no reality to anything that can be experienced now, this goes too far and makes no sense. I quoted the sutta in order to show that the Buddha was pointing out that his "marvelous and wonderful quality" was to be capable of knowing that feelings, perceptions, and thoughts "arise, continue, and cease." It was to the ability of the Buddha to know these three aspects of reality that I was pointing. Anatta, anicca, and dukkha are indeed central aspects of the Buddha's teachings. These are qualities or characteristics. There are existents which bear these qualities. The Buddha demonstrates, in the Acchariyabbutadhamma Sutta, that he was able to know these aspects in feeling, perception, and thought. This in no way says that these three things are themselves not real. What it teaches is that the permanence, satisfactoriness, and selfness of these things is illusory. The Buddha knew vedanaa while it existed from start to finish. He knew sa~n~na and vitakka in the same way. One doesn't discover how (that?) the "world isn't," in my opinion. One discovers that what we take to be the world arises, persists, and falls away. We do the same, lifetime after lifetime for countless aeons; and for countless moments throughout a lifetime. I'll leave it for now. Hockey game. What do you think? Sincerely, Scott. 59873 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 7:23pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' indriyabala Hi Herman & Howard : Interesting points of view ! It seems to me that your conversation is touching on something important, but I don't have a clear idea yet!! {:-(>> > >Howard: > > Disclaimer: It is impossible to avoid nouns and still > >communicate in a natural language, but I want to emphasize > >that all cittas and cetasikas are conditioned events > >(or activities, or operations) that occur and cease utterly > >dependent on other events, and thus lacking own-being. > >And they are not things that act - they are the acting. > > > Herman: > Exactly. I am certainly not seeking to draw you into further >discussion on this point, but I just want to make the point >that it is entirely nonsensical to write a Dhammasangani / Patthana > as an ultimate reduction of what is implied by some Suttas, >to have it superceded by a convential commentary on that. > > The view that there is a person that acts is no different to the view that a citta/cetasika acts. > Tep: Right. The citta that acts is a 'mini-self'. Best wishes to both, Tep ===== 59874 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat May 27, 2006 4:51pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 5/27/06 8:10:01 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > The view that there is a person that acts is no different to the view that > a > citta/cetasika acts. > ===================== I consider it also to be kind of atta view, but I do think it a less serious fault. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59875 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat May 27, 2006 5:00pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding dhammas, understanding realities/'realities' upasaka_howard In a message dated 5/27/06 11:51:55 PM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@... writes: > Hi, Herman - > > In a message dated 5/27/06 8:10:01 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > hhofmeister@... writes: > > >The view that there is a person that acts is no different to the view that > >a > >citta/cetasika acts. > > > ===================== > I consider it also to be kind of atta view, but I do think it a less > serious fault. > ============================ What I said was unclear. What I meant was that the view that there are dhammas that act is less serious than the view that there are persons who act, though I don't think that full enlightenment can be reached until both views are uprooted. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59876 From: "Andrew" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 11:13pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta corvus121 Hi Herman I thought I had helpfully answered a simple question you put up based on a suspicion you had that a point of Dhamma you disagreed with was not from the Suttas but from commentators. I see that the water at this point is deeper than I had anticipated, so I will give it one more go in the limited time available to me. (-: I will even type out the SN sutta quote you don't have access to: "And what, bhikkhus, is the pleasure faculty? Whatever bodily pleasure there is, whatever bodily comfort, the pleasant comfortable feeling born of body-contact: this, bhikkhus, is called the pleasure faculty. And what, bhikkhus, is the pain faculty? Whatever bodily pain there is, whatever bodily discomfort, the painful uncomfortable feeling born of body-contact: this, bhikkhus, is called the pain faculty. And what, bhikkhus, is the joy faculty? Whatever mental pleasure there is, whatever mental comfort, the pleasant comfortable feeling born of mind-contact: this, bhikkhus, is called the joy faculty. And what, bhikkhus, is the displeasure faculty? Whatever mental pain there is, whatever mental discomfort, the painful uncomfortable feeling born of mind-contact: this, bhikkhus, is called the displeasure faculty. And what, bhikkhus, is the equanimity faculty? Whatever feeling there is, whether bodily or mental, that is neither comfortable nor uncomfortable: this, bhikkhus, is called the equanimity faculty." Context (from the preceding section): the understanding of these 5 faculties, their origin, their cessation and the way leading to their cessation. --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > I see a little issue with method here, that needs to be kept in mind. You > see, most suttas can be taken to be complete statements at one point of > time, to one audience. They are sufficient statements within themselves. > With the benefit of hindsight you, me and everybody can come up with a > synoptic view of everything that was recorded, and so decide that what the > Buddha said on one occasion actually meant all the other things he said on > other occasions. I hope that you can recognise the same problem that I see > in this approach. > > The problem becomes evident in BB's footnote in relation to MN59. The sutta > is very specific, has no focus on differentiating between feelings at all, > but progresses through to Nibbana, because this is the aim of teaching about > feelings, not to arrive at a taxonomy of feelings. Who said the AIM of this, or any other sutta, was to arrive at a taxonomy of feelings or a taxonomy of anything else? Herman, you are boxing at shadows! Give me post numbers or I won't believe you. (-: > So there are two kinds of contact, and therefore two kinds of dependent > origination? If so, tell me more. No, Herman, you tell *me* more. When the Buddha spoke about body- contact and mind-contact, why do you jump to the conclusion that there are "two kinds of dependent origination"? > But in the meantiime I would ask, what is the purpose of the > differentiation? And what is the result of the differentiation? Views of all > sorts, I'd say. Like the view that certain feelings are always the results > of past action. Which would be determined origination, not dependent > origination. But what does the Buddha say? > > "Master Gotama, there are some priests & contemplatives who are of this > doctrine, this view: Whatever an individual feels — pleasure, pain, > neither-pleasure-nor-pain — is entirely caused by what was done before. The Buddha refutes that, of course! But, hang on, why am I being accused of peddling "determined origination"? Herman, after all this time of exposure to Abhidhamma (and its 24 conditions) and if you still feel it says that 'all feelings [by which I suspect you mean alot more than 'vedana'] are entirely caused by what was done before', there's nothing I can say that will assist. > I have no doubt that SN48:36 says what you say it says, but I have no access > to it, and I cannot tell the context from your quote. You may like to post a > copy or provide a link if you want to discuss that sutta further. It's above. > I would like to refer you to a sutta that might be useful in demonstrating > what I meant about all feelings being mental. > http://www.metta.lk/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/4Anguttara- Nikaya/Anguttara1/3-tikanipata/007-mahavaggo-e.htm I read the sutta and I do not think it supports your case any more than the other suttas support the opposite case. > This is dependent origination, best as I can tell. How do the vipaka > teachings of determined origination fit in? I don't see the Dhamma as teaching *determined* origination so I'll leave this question to any who do (don't think you'll find many on DSG). > I have never read an injunction by the Buddha to strive to arrive at a > comprehensive and logical understanding of the tipitaka. So my aim would > never be to make sense out of a large collection of books. Hang on, didn't you just say above: "With the benefit of hindsight you, me and everybody can come up with a synoptic view of everything that was recorded, and so decide that what the Buddha said on one occasion actually meant all the other things he said on other occasions." To come up with our synoptic view, don't we have to comprehensively study the Dhamma. Didn't the Buddha praise wide learning of the Dhamma? If all you're complaining about is having a view on every little academic controversy about translations etc, I would agree. As has been said on DSG innumerable times, it's the *understanding* of Dhamma that matters. Can you give me a post number where someone is saying that all one needs to do is memorise the tipitaka? If not, you are boxing at shadows again. But certainly > pleasure and pain are things we deal with on a daily basis. The > Dhatuvibhanga sutta was spoken to a man who was about to be gored to death. > > and this was said: > > Feeling pleasant feelings knows, it is impermanent, is not bent to it and > knows that he does not delight in it. Feeling unpleasant feelings knows, it > is impermanent, is not bent to it and knows that he does not delight in it. > Feeling neither unpleasant nor pleasant feelings knows, it is impermanent, > is not bent to it and knows that he does not delight in it. Feeling > pleasant, unpleasant or neither unpleasant nor pleasant feelings feels them > unyoked. Experiencing feelings that end the body he knows, I experience > feelings that end the body. Experiencing feelings that end life he knows, I > experience feelings that end life. He knows, at the breakup of the body, > before the end of life that all feelings and enjoyments will be cooled. > > > I really don't see anything here that even hints at distinguishing between > bodily vs mental feeling. I do see something, though, that hints at the > highest wisdom ie knowledge of cessation. Again, I think you have missed a very important point brought out by Abhidhamma studies, namely how body consciousness is very quickly followed by mind consciousness and just how much of 'our world' is mind consciousness focussed on conceptualisations. Let's hope the 'hint' of 'knowledge of cessation' we see in the Dhatuvibhanga Sutta helps condition right understanding. Time has run out for me now! Apologies if I've misread your points - although the fault may not be entirely mine. (-: Best wishes Andrew 59877 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sun May 28, 2006 1:18am Subject: our discussions in Paris. no. 3. nilovg Dear Han, our discussions in Paris. no. 3. Han wrote: (2) The relevance to the reality now. -------- Lodewijk said that the fact that a reality is conditioned means: it is not self. He said< we should apply this truth to each moment of our life, to all facets of our whole life. But not in a forced way, very naturally. Otherwise there is an idea of self again who does something.> N: I believe that we should not have a notion of having to be in time to catch the present reality. We learnt that visible object or colour falls away immediately and that what remains is a nimitta or sign of visible object. But this does not mean that sati and paññaa cannot be developed. There are different characteristics appearing of naama and ruupa, such as colour, or sound, hearing or feeling. They all have different characteristics, they can be objects of awareness, one at a time. I am not talking now about the three general characteristics, samañña lakkhana, which are to be realized by developed insight. I am just referring to specific characteristics, visesa lakkhana, such as the characteristic of seeing which is different from the characteristic of hearing. This is the beginning of the development of insight. If such characteristics could not be known, the eightfold Path could not be developed, but it can be developed. However, we have to learn, it cannot be known fast. If we want fast progress there is clinging to self. Lodewijk and I were discussing the first stage of insight: knowing the difference between the characteristic of naama and of ruupa. He had a question he likes to address to Sarah and Jon: Meanwhile I tried to answer: < This is thinking of the future that has not come yet. There is an idea of self who wants to know. Paññaa will know when time comes. When paññaa arises there is no doubt.> Han, this is a difficult subject, and perhaps many things are not clear yet. I may not have answered your remark satisfactorily. ****** Nina. 59878 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Sat May 27, 2006 11:46pm Subject: Colourful but Muddy ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: How does Sense-Desire Muddle up the Mind? A Brahmin Priest once asked the Blessed Buddha: Master Gotama, what is the cause of being unable to remember even something that has been memorized over a long period & also that which has not been memorized? Brahmin, when mind is obsessed by sense-desire, beset & dominated by sense-desire, and one does not understand any actual safe escape from this arisen sense-desire, in that very moment, one neither sees nor understands, what is truly advantageous, neither for oneself, nor for others, nor for both... On such occasions, even texts, that have been long memorized, cannot be recalled by mind. Why is this neglect so? Imagine a bucket of water mixed with dyes or paints: Yellow, blue, and crimson red. If a man with good eye-sight were to inspect the reflection of his own face in it, he would neither see nor recognize it, as it really is! So too, brahmin, when mind is obsessed by sense-desire, beset & dominated by sense-desire, on that occasion even those texts, that have been long memorized does not recur to the mind, not to speak of those texts, events and things, that have not been memorized at all… On how to prevent the mental hindrances see: http://what-buddha-said.net/drops/Why_Not.htm on Hedonism http://what-buddha-said.net/Canon/Sutta/AN/AN.I.1-2.htm on Sex http://what-buddha-said.net/Canon/Sutta/AN/AN.I.3-4.htm on Cure http://www.what-buddha-said.org/Canon/Sutta/AN/AN.I.3-4c.htm Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V:121-2] section 46: The Links. 55: To Sangarava... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PS: Please include the word Samahita in any comment, since then will my automatic mail filters pick it up and I will see it & respond!! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. Friendship is the Greatest ... Let there be Calm & Free Bliss !!! <...> 59879 From: Daniel Date: Sun May 28, 2006 5:14am Subject: Re: Brain & Mind daniell@... Hi Herman and all, > Daniel wrote: > > Hi all, > > Alcohol, which is only matter, only molecules, effects our mind. > Single drug > molecules have a very strong effect on our mind. Also, I think i've read > about > an expriment while someone that was having a brain surgery, was given an > electric pulse at a specific place in her brain. This caused her to laugh! > I > think it was repeated, and again, it caused her to laugh! If I remember > correctly, she said that there was suddenly something very funny, but > doesn't > know exactly what (hope I remember well). So, can we deduce from that > that > part of our mental events are caused by the brain, by matter only? >> Herman wrote : >> For thinking purposes it is always convenient to think of systems in >> isolation, as though they operate in a vacuum. But in reality I don't think >> there is anything that isn't interconnected with everything else. There are >> no closed systems. I think you are being a bit careful in your last >> sentence. Are there any mental events that would happen without a brain? Well, one mental event that buddhism claims to happen "without a brain" is rebirth. Rebirth is when one consciousness sort of "passes" from one body to another (because of craving and ignorance), right? But the reason why I was talking about alcohol&drugs is because it seems to be a counter-argument to rebirth. As far as I know, the main argument for rebirth is that consciousness cannot have matter as its origin. But, alcohol&drugs do cause specific cittas (the drug\alcohol molecules are the "origin" of the cittas), do they not? (Or is it cetasikas that they cause???) So, if there are a few cittas\cetasikas that are caused by alcohol&drugs why cannot the whole "bunch" of them be so? Yours, Daniel 59880 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun May 28, 2006 6:12am Subject: Re: [dsg] kamma and vipaaka sarahprocter... Dear Nina (& Howard), --- nina van gorkom wrote: > Dear Sarah and Howard, > After the funeral of the friend I mentioned, the husband wrote us a > letter > telling us how much pain, after a fall, she had suffered for a few weeks > since there were metastases in her bones, inoperable. > Lodewijk and I were discussing kamma and vipaaka so hard to fathom. It > is > among the unthinkables, the acinteyya. One can become mad trying to > figure > it out. > Hard to hear about this happening to such a kind, selfless person. So we > talked about the Holocaust, how kind and excellent teachers and > fellowpupils > at my school suddenly disappeared and never came back. ..... S: It must have had a big impact at the time. My mother still feels bitter about her uncles who were tortured and died in prison camps and so on. I think the extracts you quoted from the book 'Metta' recently on kamma and vipaka are very helpful indeed, just to reflect on in order to appreciate that no one else causes us any problems in life. No one else causes us or them misfortune, but 'their deeds are their relatives' and so on. Also 'people are born and they must die, they are born again and they must die again...'. Such reminders can be a condition for metta and alobha rather than having sadness and anger. .... > I said to Lodewijk that there is a Thai saying: me? > Because it has to be you.> > Lodewijk finds this a very good saying. ... S: Yes, I like it too. I've also heard 'why is it like this? Because it has to be like this.' Or when someone asked K.Sujin once why people behaved badly, even those who have heard the teachings, she answered 'it is the role of dhamma. Kusala and akusala.....' ... > I remember Kh Sujin saying something like: when one suffers now it is > better > than in a hell plane. > There were countless past lives and who knows whether he was once a > cruel > being? > Perhaps Sarah or Howard can add something? .... S: Yes, I've also heard her say that anything we experience here is nothing to that in a hell plane. Nina, I just sent a brief note to you off-list to give you the details about the passing away of a mutual dhamma friend (and lurking member here),who died from a long battle with cancer a few days ago. Apparently the article/book she wrote about her experiences during her long illness and the dhamma was distributed just a week or so ago at Wesak. K.Sujin had known her and been a good friend to her for a very long time. I spoke to KS very briefly and asked how she felt when she hears about the passing away of friends like this (at a relatively young age) and her comment was 'it's very natural' and 'it happens all the time'. Finally, 'she was born....and is born again (we don't know where or who as)'. It may sound heartless to others when they hear these words, but I don't find them to be so at all. No one had given the friend more kindness, assistance and dhamma support than she has. But, it's useless to feel sad when we can be assisting and helping others. .... > BTW Sarah, you have no idea how often Lodewijk and I notice conceit now > we > did not know of before. Like: someone's room is too dark, he does not > have > good lighting, etc. .... S: I find the same. We always forget about the 'role of dhamma', the nature of conditioned dhammas and keep on wondering why others don't do things the way we would and so on....completely forgetting about kusala and akusala, about objects appearing through the sense doors and forgetting about how everyone 'has their own way'. Metta, Sarah ======== 59881 From: han tun Date: Sun May 28, 2006 6:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] our discussions in Paris. no. 3. hantun1 Dear Nina and Lodewijk, Thank you very much for your continuing interest in my points. With regard to “living in the present”, please allow me to first open my heart. If I do not think of Abhidhamma principles my way of “living in the present” is very simple. (1) For example, when I practice anapanasati, when the in-breath ends and if I know that the in-breath ends, or when the out-breath starts and if I know that the out-breath starts, then I am living in the present. (2) For example, when a person makes me angry, and if I get angry, and if I know that I am angry within a second or two, before I can retaliate him with bodily and verbal action, and if I can stop my anger at that point, that is my another way of living in the present. (3) For example, if I had done something bad yesterday, if I do not think it over and over again, and if I forget about it altogether [what is done is done, I cannot undo it], that is my way of living in the present. (4) For example, if I do not long for something good that is to come in the future but not come yet, that is my way of living in the present. These are a few examples. There can be many more. However, if I apply Abhidhamma priciples to the above examples, there are many flaws which are too complicated for me to understand. One can tell me that all my above examples are all wrong views. That was why I asked the question, “how can one experience the present moment or live in the present moment?” ------------------------------ Another point is that we should not have a notion of having to be in time to catch the present reality, and that visible object or colour falls away immediately and that what remains is a nimitta or sign of visible object, and so on. But my point is, if the eye-consciousness arises and falls away and another eye-conscious arising from the same visual object arises and falls away, one after another in succession, for one thousand times, for one million times, I will not “see” the visual object at all. Because the life-time of a citta is less than one trillionth of a second, the eye-consciousness must arise and fall away, one after another in succession, for at least one trillion times so that I will have a fleeting vision of that object. Even if we take into consideration the secondary mano-dvaara vithi that follows the cakkhu-dvaara vithi, mano-dvaara vithi cittas must arise and fall away trillion of times to make me understand what object I am seeing. So it becomes very complicated and catching the present reality becomes even more difficult. That was why I asked the question, “how can one experience the present moment or live in the present moment?” ------------------------------ Dear Nina and Lodewijk, please do not worry if I do not get a satisfactory answer. The answer is not important; what is more important and what I value most is your cetana and metta to help me understand. With metta and deepest respect, Han --- nina van gorkom wrote: > Dear Han, > > our discussions in Paris. no. 3. > > Han wrote: > (2) The relevance to the reality now. > because naama and > ruupas arise and pass away so quickly. With normal > level of sati we will > always be > late to experience “the present moment. And you say > that sati itself will > arise only when the conditions are present. So how > can one experience the > present > moment or live in the present moment?> > -------- 59882 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun May 28, 2006 2:16am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Brain & Mind upasaka_howard Hi, Daniel - In a message dated 5/28/06 8:27:04 AM Eastern Daylight Time, daniell@... writes: > Well, one mental event that buddhism claims to happen "without a brain" is > rebirth. Rebirth is when one consciousness sort of "passes" from one body to > another (because of craving and ignorance), right? ======================= No, that is not the Buddhist understanding, but the point of view of Hinduism and other religions. The Buddhist perspective is that consciousness is an activity that occurs. And 'mind' in Buddhism refers either to thinking processes or to the entire group of mental operations. Neither consciousness nor mind is conceived of as some thing or substance or soul that is plunked down now here and now there. In fact, such a view was explicity refuted by the Buddha. It is known as Sati's Error. In the Dhamma, past and current mental operations and events serve as conditions for subsequent ones. There are no "things" continuing, but merely ever-new operations and events occurring conditioned by what has gone before. Imagine a storm system churning in some location that induces another storm system elsewhere, or a fire burning in a forest that generates sufficient heat that a new fire begins across a divide. The new storm and the new fire are not the same as the old, but they result from the old, arising in dependence on it. The Buddha used the analogy of a new candle flame lit from another. (I like the storm and fire similes, because I think they are nicely descriptive of the mental state of unenlightened "beings".) For me to understand how this applies to "rebirth" requires me to take a non-materialist stance - a perspective that I call "phenmenalist" or "experiential." Were I a materialist, I would be unable to accept the idea of rebirth and simultaneously accept anatta (not-self). But there are others who seem to manage both. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59883 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun May 28, 2006 2:21am Subject: Re: [dsg] kamma and vipaaka upasaka_howard Hi, Sarah (and Nina) - In a message dated 5/28/06 9:17:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, sarahprocterabbott@... writes: > Nina, I just sent a brief note to you off-list to give you the details > about the passing away of a mutual dhamma friend (and lurking member > here),who died from a long battle with cancer a few days ago. Apparently > the article/book she wrote about her experiences during her long illness > and the dhamma was distributed just a week or so ago at Wesak. > > K.Sujin had known her and been a good friend to her for a very long time. > I spoke to KS very briefly and asked how she felt when she hears about the > passing away of friends like this (at a relatively young age) and her > comment was 'it's very natural' and 'it happens all the time'. Finally, > 'she was born....and is born again (we don't know where or who as)'. > > ====================== Yes, but sad nonetheless. I'm sorry for your loss. With metta, Howard /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 59884 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 7:05am Subject: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... scottduncan2 Dear Herman, I see that the distractions of the evening left me rather scattered. I've completed the sentence I left dangling from this paragraph. "These three things, vedanaa, sa~n~na, and vitakka, according to these above definitions, are real in the sense that they have certain characteristics which define their function and inhere to them for as long as they are arisen, persist, and fall away. To assert a lack of reality to these essential building blocks of experience doesn't yet make sense to me." Scott. 59885 From: "matheesha" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 7:28am Subject: Re: Leading to stream entry ... How can we tell? matheesha333 Hi Tep, >T: It is admirable that you have a consistently strong "interest" in > attaining Sotaapatti in this very life. M: yes my main obsession...! > >M: > >These two types of disciples are said to become sotapannas at least > moments before death, and are stages prior to the sotapanna stage. I > have read that their 5 precepts are very good as well apart from their > faith in the buddha, dhamma, sangha. > > T: Only the five precepts?? But as you know, the sotapanna has the > "perfect sila". M: Well Tep, it is the 5 precepts which is mentioned as Sotapatti anga, so I think it is a reasonable assumption to go on. If possible there is nothing wrong in taking on more precepts as well - for example on uposatha days someone could take the 10 precepts and it comes highly recommended by the Buddha. It is interesting to think of adhi-sila being complete in the sotapatti state. Why should it be different for lay people and monks (5 precepts, 2-- vinaya rules)? Is it some quality which underlies all of them which needs to be fulfilled? There is one sutta which talks of aryan disciples being unable to hide a fault- so this might be reffering to breaking of some minor vinaya rules by such a disciple, not as gross a fault as breaking any of the 5 precepts. Lets face it - the word of the buddha that have been handed down to us doesnt come with complete clarifications, even though it probably was said clearly and completetly back then. SO we have to go on a 'best guess' principle, and just keep improving more and more. Talking of improving more and more, most suttas talk of not killing as the first precept. Another sutta talked of (Gamini sutta?) not killing and not inciting another to kill as well. I'm wondering whether this means that to improve one's sila one should think of taking that step as well. As you can see I'm not a vegetarian, but would consider it. Then on the other hand there is that story of a sotapanna woman who ran away with a hunter and would hand him his weapons every morning! Talk about not inciting! Maybe there is no intention in her mind to incite; if so equally when I eat meat there is no thought in my mind to incite killing either. If everyone suddenly stopped producing meat I wouldnt be angry/upset about it. :) tep: What do they (the saddanusarin and dhammanusarin) have > to go through in order to attain the perfect sila prior to the > "moments before death"? > ................. M: Two things IMO: contemplation and reviewing of sila. > > T: Let's discuss the following sutta (found in your "recommended" set > of suttas). > > At Savatthi. "Monks, the eye is inconstant, changeable, alterable. > The ear... The nose... The tongue... The body... The mind is > inconstant, changeable, alterable. > > "One who has conviction & belief that these phenomena are this way is > called a faith-follower: one who has entered the orderliness of > rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the > plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is incapable of doing any deed by > which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal womb, or in the realm > of hungry shades. He is incapable of passing away until he has > realized the fruit of stream-entry. > > "One who, after pondering with a modicum of discernment, has accepted > that these phenomena are this way is called a Dhamma-follower: one who > has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people > of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is > incapable of doing any deed by which he might be reborn in hell, in > the animal womb, or in the realm of hungry shades. He is incapable of > passing away until he has realized the fruit of stream-entry. > > "One who knows and sees that these phenomena are this way is called a > stream-enterer, steadfast, never again destined for states of woe, > headed for self-awakening." > > T: How would one tell when he/she has such insight? M: I would be careful of using the term Insight in this case. The sutta suggests that to accept on faith or a modicum of understanding is enough. Maybe understanding/accepting impermanance, is a more suitable way of putting it. Maybe the more subtle problem is, how would you tell if someone thought that any of these were permanant. You might ask the question ' do you think the 5 sense organs and the mind are impermanant?' from someone. (S)He might reply 'of course they are'. But could it be that, somewhere deep inside this person's belief system, there is a thought that (say for exameple) the mind is permanent, continuous from life to life??? Maybe the key is to finely explore one's own beliefs. To see if there is even the subtlest doubt that things might continue and be somehow permanant. Beased on this sutta, a monk who is natianally famous in Sri Lanka, has developed what he calls 'anicca bhavana' for mass consumption! It is simply a repetition that all these factors one after the other are impermanant. Maybe something of this sort would be the next step up, in practice. The third step is to actually do vipassana and see that these things are impermanant. Arising and passing away. Now we come more into the realm of the sotapanna, as the sutta describes a sotapanna as someone who knows and (also) 'sees' these truths. I suppose if someone has done vipassana and has insight into impermanance there is no need to take the two previous steps. with metta Matheesha > > > Warm regards, > > > Tep > === > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "matheesha" > wrote: > > > > Hi Everyone, > > > > Here is the minimum requirement to become a saddanusarin (faith > > follower) or a dhammanusarin (dhamma follower). These two types of > > disciples are said to become sotapannas at least moments before > > death, and are stages prior to the sotapanna stage. I have read that > > their 5 precepts are very good as well apart from their faith in the > > buddha, dhamma, sangha. > > > 59886 From: "matheesha" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 7:27am Subject: Re: Leading to stream entry ... How can we tell? matheesha333 Hi Tep, >T: It is admirable that you have a consistently strong "interest" in > attaining Sotaapatti in this very life. M: yes my main obsession...! > >M: > >These two types of disciples are said to become sotapannas at least > moments before death, and are stages prior to the sotapanna stage. I > have read that their 5 precepts are very good as well apart from their > faith in the buddha, dhamma, sangha. > > T: Only the five precepts?? But as you know, the sotapanna has the > "perfect sila". M: Well Tep, it is the 5 precepts which is mentioned as Sotapatti anga, so I think it is a reasonable assumption to go on. If possible there is nothing wrong in taking on more precepts as well - for example on uposatha days someone could take the 10 precepts and it comes highly recommended by the Buddha. It is interesting to think of adhi-sila being complete in the sotapatti state. Why should it be different for lay people and monks (5 precepts, 2-- vinaya rules)? Is it some quality which underlies all of them which needs to be fulfilled? There is one sutta which talks of aryan disciples being unable to hide a fault- so this might be reffering to breaking of some minor vinaya rules by such a disciple, not as gross a fault as breaking any of the 5 precepts. Lets face it - the word of the buddha that have been handed down to us doesnt come with complete clarifications, even though it probably was said clearly and completetly back then. SO we have to go on a 'best guess' principle, and just keep improving more and more. Talking of improving more and more, most suttas talk of not killing as the first precept. Another sutta talked of (Gamini sutta?) not killing and not inciting another to kill as well. I'm wondering whether this means that to improve one's sila one should think of taking that step as well. As you can see I'm not a vegetarian, but would consider it. Then on the other hand there is that story of a sotapanna woman who ran away with a hunter and would hand him his weapons every morning! Talk about not inciting! Maybe there is no intention in her mind to incite; if so equally when I eat meat there is no thought in my mind to incite killing either. If everyone suddenly stopped producing meat I wouldnt be angry/upset about it. :) tep: What do they (the saddanusarin and dhammanusarin) have > to go through in order to attain the perfect sila prior to the > "moments before death"? > ................. M: Two things IMO: contemplation and reviewing of sila. > > T: Let's discuss the following sutta (found in your "recommended" set > of suttas). > > At Savatthi. "Monks, the eye is inconstant, changeable, alterable. > The ear... The nose... The tongue... The body... The mind is > inconstant, changeable, alterable. > > "One who has conviction & belief that these phenomena are this way is > called a faith-follower: one who has entered the orderliness of > rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the > plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is incapable of doing any deed by > which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal womb, or in the realm > of hungry shades. He is incapable of passing away until he has > realized the fruit of stream-entry. > > "One who, after pondering with a modicum of discernment, has accepted > that these phenomena are this way is called a Dhamma-follower: one who > has entered the orderliness of rightness, entered the plane of people > of integrity, transcended the plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is > incapable of doing any deed by which he might be reborn in hell, in > the animal womb, or in the realm of hungry shades. He is incapable of > passing away until he has realized the fruit of stream-entry. > > "One who knows and sees that these phenomena are this way is called a > stream-enterer, steadfast, never again destined for states of woe, > headed for self-awakening." > > T: How would one tell when he/she has such insight? M: I would be careful of using the term Insight in this case. The sutta suggests that to accept on faith or a modicum of understanding is enough. Maybe understanding/accepting impermanance, is a more suitable way of putting it. Maybe the more subtle problem is, how would you tell if someone thought that any of these were permanant. You might ask the question ' do you think the 5 sense organs and the mind are impermanant?' from someone. (S)He might reply 'of course they are'. But could it be that, somewhere deep inside this person's belief system, there is a thought that (say for exameple) the mind is permanent, continuous from life to life??? Maybe the key is to finely explore one's own beliefs. To see if there is even the subtlest doubt that things might continue and be somehow permanant. Beased on this sutta, a monk who is natianally famous in Sri Lanka, has developed what he calls 'anicca bhavana' for mass consumption! It is simply a repetition that all these factors one after the other are impermanant. Maybe something of this sort would be the next step up, in practice. The third step is to actually do vipassana and see that these things are impermanant. Arising and passing away. Now we come more into the realm of the sotapanna, as the sutta describes a sotapanna as someone who knows and (also) 'sees' these truths. I suppose if someone has done vipassana and has insight into impermanance there is no need to take the two previous steps. with metta Matheesha > > > Warm regards, > > > Tep > === > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "matheesha" > wrote: > > > > Hi Everyone, > > > > Here is the minimum requirement to become a saddanusarin (faith > > follower) or a dhammanusarin (dhamma follower). These two types of > > disciples are said to become sotapannas at least moments before > > death, and are stages prior to the sotapanna stage. I have read that > > their 5 precepts are very good as well apart from their faith in the > > buddha, dhamma, sangha. > > > 59887 From: "sukinder" Date: Mon May 29, 2006 3:02pm Subject: RE: [dsg] RE: Please don't.... sukinderpal Hi Dan, I am thinking about taking a break from posting on DSG and reading only selected posts for about 3 months. So this is going to be my last response to you on this thread. Besides I think I have said all that needs to be said and don't want to be driven any deeper into speculation. This is likely to be the longest post yet, so brace yourself. ;-) Comments between your own. ----------------------------------- > No satipatthana was involved... > Furthermore, he went straight and got involved in "wrong practices" for 6 > years. I doubt he would have been driven to go through all that had > satipatthana arisen in between. Dan: Wouldn't anyone who has not shattered the fetter of silabbataparamasa be susceptible to "wrong practices"? Aren't "wrong practices" bound to be a part of our repertoire until sotapattimagga? Satipatthana must develop for a long, long time before there is immunity to "wrong practices," and dedication to "wrong practices" should not be used to conclude "No satipatthana for this person!" Sukin: This is why I particularly pointed to the Buddha himself. His accumulated panna was enough (I speculate of course), to see the difference between the moment of satipatthana and how the conditions for this must be vastly different from those that were connected with the other practices. If there *was* satipatthana itself upon which his accumulated panna could exercise, how could such understanding not have happened? I think there is one way to look at it, which is, that there was no satipatthana and he was in the dark with regards to it. Besides, isn't it said that the Buddha discovered the Middle Way, and isn't satipatthana in fact the mundane version of the Middle Way? ========================== >Sukin: Dan, I understand you to be saying that those outside of the sasana who saw > through the 'self' to the extent that they have, that this was because of > the experience of satipatthana. However, they did not insight or understand > the 'satipatthana' itself to know the causes and conditions for its arising. Dan: The depth of the understanding was not sufficient to know in detail the causes and conditions. The depth of understanding was only deep enough to realize that the understanding was not caused or conditioned by the Self. In fact, just the opposite. Only when the Self (or the dedication to "Self" or the idea of Self) retreats can the understanding arise. Sukin: And if these folks understood as you state here, what would have stopped the bodhisatta from insighting Anatta and even to become enlightened? Would he have come to the same conclusion as they and still continue with all those wrong practices? Of course you might say that I am in fact proving your point. ;-) ============================ > Sukin:> I don't think so. Obviously there is a difference between one who > understands and accepts the Dhamma in principle and one who doesn't, ..... Dan: Yes, in the world of concepts there is a difference. One calls himself "Buddhist". The other does not. But the label that one gives himself tells nothing about his level of understanding. Sukin: Or, the difference lies in the world of paramattha dhammas and conventional reality is of little consequence. There are Buddhists referring to Texts so different from one another, and there are Buddhists reading the same Texts with totally different interpretations. And depending on the accumulation to delusion, we identify with whatever that makes us happy. And of course there are the "Sujinian's" (the Unthinkers), and this is conceived by those who oppose. ;-) ============================= > Sukin:...between who understands correctly and one who does so wrongly. Or do you > think that it is a matter of the way it is 'thought about', perhaps the > ability to think logically about the subject? Dan: I do think that what you are saying is that the differences in the way people conceptualize their understanding ("one who...accepts the Dhamma in principle and one who doesn't") are very important. I am discounting stories and concept more than you'd like while emphasizing understanding. I'm saying that the stories are only stories; the realities that are understood are an entirely different matter. Sukin: I too prefer not to deal with stories. However, sometimes the stories by otherwise extremely intelligent people go like this: "Knowing present moment realities? What for?" To which I can't help coming to the conclusion that such a person is not going to appreciate the Dhammas any time soon. And yes, I too like to concentrate on "understanding" and not any acceptance of 'theory' through reasoning. Everyone on DSG accepts to a certain level, the principles of Dhamma; however we see everyday, arguments about interpretation. My own reaction to statements made by X saying that he or she agrees with C is with reservation at best, otherwise I just don't believe it to be the case that the understandings match. On the other hand, I can almost predict the reaction of A to Y based on my own similar understanding, not presuming to know any line of reasoning A takes. ============================ > At this very moment there are dhammas arising and falling away and obviously > there is no satipatthana arisen. However there can be an acknowledgement of > the fact of present moment dhammas, including that there *is no sati*. > Besides with this, there can also be some acknowledgement of the fact of > conditionality and anatta. And surely, this would be only intellectual, but > is it wrong? I don't think so. Is it a 'level' of understanding? I think it > is. Dan: If there is no understanding of "anatta" or "conditionality" or "sati" or "satipatthana" really are, then I'd say that the intellectualizing is mere speculation and is not "understanding". Sukin: You mean if there is no direct experience, then anything said about these is merely speculation. I wouldn't go so far, though I believe that this happens much more often than we would like. I however also give more credit to the mode of "knowing" of Panna. I agree though, that we speak mostly from ignorance of dhammas. Some people come to the conclusion when they consider what they have heard/read about Dhamma, that one needs to be "mindful of dhammas". I think that it is better to think in terms of "developing understanding". From this perspective I think, one gives pariyatti the importance that it deserves. In fact it seems to be here that the difference between pariyatti and patipatti is truly seen and one does not presume to be able to just "do it", i.e. to be more mindful. Another consequence of this is that one appreciates more and more the need of being reminded over and again, about the basics. After all, what has to be known first is not the Tilakkhana nor D.O., but the characteristic of dhammas of which there is total ignorance. So Dan, I agree about the danger of speculation and even that it happens very often. But still isn't it better to have moments of 'right' understanding and intellectualizing, than 'wrong' understanding and intellectualizing? In the former there is still seeing of the importance to *not* moving away from the *present* realities on to ideas about "doing" something else. On the other hand, one speculates about Dhamma and comes to the conclusion that something other than the developing understanding "Now" needs to be done. Do you see a difference? What do you think is the cause? Could it be Panna? Even of the intellectual level? ========================== > Pariyatti (also suttamaya panna and cintamaya panna) is reference to a level > of understanding got from hearing, and so by necessity has "concepts" as > object. It appears that according to you, there is no panna of this level at > all. Are you saying that panna (of vipassana) starts with satipatthana? Is > there no basic level than this? Dan: I still don't know what pariyatti, sutamayapanya, and cintamayapanya are. But, the definitions of "panya" shift, depending on context. When I talk about "understanding" it is usually as panya cetasika as samma-ditthi of the path (mundane unless otherwise noted). And that is satipatthana. Sukin: Fair enough. I think that only satipatthana can be said to be slowly removing the bricks of samsara. But I would think that also moments of pariyatti are with a degree of detachment. Now since we mention suttamaya panna and cintamaya panna, I am reminded of a discussion with Htoo in which he pointed out to me, that cintamaya panna is applicable only to Bodhisattas. I wasn't sure about this, however if this is true then it means that satipatthana which is a higher level of panna, indeed requires even more favourable conditions, and therefore harder to come by. =============================== > S:> I don't think it is about acquiring more knowledge in terms of lists of > concepts and any ability to think logically about them. But the opportunity > for the level of panna to arise and accumulate from "considering" the Dhamma > from whatever angle it has been presented, without expectations. In other > words panna will never say "no" to hearing and reading dhamma whenever the > opportunity arises. But I understand that most of the objection comes from > translating the above as the 'need to acquire more extensive knowledge of > ideas'. This latter would be a case of holding the snake by the wrong end, > imo. Dan: I think we are in agreement here. The difference might be that I think that "pure" concepts that are far beyond our understanding are not particularly useful--nor particularly "pure" for that matter. Sukin: Yes, and in one of your discussions with Sarah, you listed out what you thought were "useful enough" concepts to consider, I readily identified with the idea and had been thinking along the same lines for quite some time. However, I wasn't ready with a list of my own, not only because I am incapable of sorting them out, but also because I see no sense in trying to draw any limits. Who is to say what will click when? Besides, to actually know one's own limits requires quite a good deal of panna, which I am sure I don't have. When I skip posts that I judge to be too advanced for me, much of the time it's with dosa..:-/ ========================= > S:> One is wrong understanding of the way things are, the other is right. Dan: It's tough to argue with that! But "right" in what sense? And "wrong" in what sense? Wrong concept or wrong view? [The two are different...] Sukin: Wrong/right understanding of the object of consciousness. ========================= > > What would have stopped any "right" concepts from issuing forth...? Dan: Concepts are non-existent and do not arise. Dhammically speaking, there are no "right" concepts because the concepts are not the understanding. Only the understanding is the understanding; any description of reality or understanding has flaws. Confusing the concept with the understanding is called "ditthi", a fetter to be broken. Sukin: Yes, but given enough time any 'correct' explanation not actually based on right understanding will show, as long as the wrong understanding persists. Likewise, if there is right understanding, and wrong explanation is made, even this should in time, be corrected, if the right understanding continues to arise. Don't you think? Mental representation and the experience of reality itself are two different processes; there is no expectation that one could replace the other. This is just the way it is, so perhaps there is no need to point this out. What might be more useful to consider, is the use in context with reference to the six kinds of concepts mentioned in the commentaries. And even here, it's not easy and the important matter to consider might be one's own motivation. ======================= > Dan: > I agree that this conceptualization of the understanding must be > relinquished if enlightenment is to be achieved, but the diminution > in the attachment to "Self" (ditthi) is real and beneficial--beyond > what any purely conceptual understanding of anatta might bring, > whether outside the dispensation or not. The measure of understanding > is the degree of detachment from Self, not skill in intellectual games. > > S:> Your line of reasoning could lead to the belief that the Buddha taught > about all being only khandha, dhatu, nama/rupa, is just one of several ways > of getting the point across, and that he might just as well have taught an > imaginary "cause", God at the beginning. Dan: No. Not at all. What distinguishes Buddha's teaching is that it reflects an enlightened understanding. But Buddha's teaching model did include lots about devas and titans and Brahma and divine messengers. He did so because such concepts are helpful to some people. Sukin: Helpful to some people? And not to others? =========================== Dan: Surely there are no devas (or Selves of any kind, including "You" and "Me"). These are teaching models that point to certain aspects of reality. Perfect, flawless, correct concepts? No, of course not. But none are. Not devas, bhikkhus, and precepts; not dhammas, dhatus, and ayatanas; not God, sinners, and commandments; not Jesus, Sin, and Gospel. Sukin: Let's focus back to the main point of contention. Does God and Citta have the same reality/unreality status? =========================== > Whatever the case may be, it seems unlikely to me, that such a view about > the 'world' could at anytime condition the perception of a paramattha > dhamma. Impersonality, yes, but not anatta. > > Having some idea about 'conditions' in relation to one's experience is > possible. But if it is still in terms of 'self', it wouldn't be the > understanding of paccaya as the Buddha taught. Any appeal to conditions > would still be in terms of 'self view'. Dan: Any "appeal" is concept and not view. Is there clinging to the concept? Dosa? Confusing the concept for reality? Sukin: Possibly. But again, let's go back to the important point. Is saying, "God is the cause", the same as saying "Lobha is the cause"? The similarity might be that in both cases, the person who proclaims it, is just 'guessing'. However, in one with "God", what is thought about is an abstraction of a different order to the one being experienced. Whereas when someone says that "lobha is the cause", he is thinking about the same order of reality as the one he experiences now, and the fact that he is unclear about the actual nature and characteristic of the reality itself, is not important in this regard. =========================== > But no Dan, no satipatthana possible for them, I think. Dan: We differ only in our understanding of satipatthana. You prefer to link it more strongly to concept and conceptual understanding and arising from a base of speculative intellectualing first. Sukin: Sariputta heard just a few words and got enlightened. Some others took much longer, and yet others are still Buddhas away from reaching the goal. So no, I am not saying that one should intellectualize, only that one does need to 'hear' the dhamma, and not only this but also must have had to hear a lot of it in the past if there is going to be any enlightenment soon. Which means that if there is little or no satipatthana yet, then it might be good to be reminded about the four factors to stream- entry, i.e. hearing the dhamma, association with the wise and so on. =============================== Dan: I think of it as much more loosely linked to concept. Belief in any particular concept doesn't help satipatthana arise, but some conceptual models (those that have approximately the same depth as the person's level of understanding) help the understanding go just a bit deeper when satipatthana arises the next time. Sukin: I understand you to be saying that concepts make real sense only when referred to some actual experience of satipatthana. And that any subsequent experience of satipatthana will be appreciated with greater depth. I agree with pariyatti and patipatti going hand in hand each supporting the other. However, I make allowance for panna even when there is no satipatthana. How? There is experience all the time. And even conceptual experiences can serve as reference for any accumulated panna to act upon and be developed. This I believe to be the beginning step/steps that need to be taken again and again. ============================ Dan: Conceptual models that are outside the appropriate depth for a particular person at a particular time tend to not be helpful. But, that being said, these are only rough patterns. No rules, no expectations to the arising. Sukin: This I agree in full! ;-) Dan, I hope you don't mind that I don't respond anymore. If however in reading any response by you, it conditions a change of mind in me, I will surely acknowledge it. :-) Metta, Sukinder 59888 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 9:03am Subject: Re: Brain & Mind ... Three Suttas on Mind ... indriyabala Hi Dan (Howard and Herman & all) , Congratulations, Dan. Your point is very important; I believe it is valid: >Dan D. : > > So, can we deduce from that > > that part of our mental events are caused by the brain, > > by matter only? > Dan D.(#59879) So, if there are a few cittas\cetasikas > that are caused by alcohol&drugs why cannot the whole > "bunch" of them be so? Tep: Right. Why not? The following sutta (I) indicates that matters & minds are co-existing and do interact. (I) "It is as if two sheaves of reeds were to stand leaning against one another. In the same way, from name-&-form as a requisite condition comes consciousness, from consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form. [SN 12.67 Nalakalapiyo; Sutta Sheaves of Reeds] The following sutta (II) states that the cetasika "intention"(cetana) is responsible for "rebirth" of consciousness and the production of a new body for a renewed becoming: (II) "What one intends, what one arranges, and what one obsesses about: This is a support for the stationing of consciousness. There being a support, there is a landing [or: an establishing] of consciousness. When that consciousness lands and grows, there is the production of renewed becoming in the future. When there is the production of renewed becoming in the future, there is future birth, aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. Such is the origination of this entire mass of suffering & stress. [SN XII.38 Cetana Sutta] The following sutta (III) says that mind(mano), intellect(manas), and consciousness(vinnana) are the same. Importantly, release(vimutti) is man's freedom from the view(dassana) that his/her mind is 'me', 'my self', 'what I am'. (III) "But as for what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness,' the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is unable to grow disenchanted with it, unable to grow dispassionate toward it, unable to gain release from it. Why is that? For a long time this has been relished, appropriated, and grasped by the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person as, 'This is me, this is my self, this is what I am.' Thus the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is unable to grow disenchanted with it, unable to grow dispassionate toward it, unable to gain release from it. [SN 12.61 Assutava Sutta; Uninstructed] Warm regards, Tep ==== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Daniel wrote: > > Hi Herman and all, > (snipped) > > Well, one mental event that buddhism claims to happen "without a brain" is rebirth. Rebirth is when one consciousness sort of "passes" from one body to another (because of craving and ignorance), right? But the reason why I was talking about alcohol&drugs is because it seems to be a counter-argument to rebirth. As far as I know, the main argument for rebirth is that consciousness cannot have matter as its origin. But, alcohol&drugs do cause specific cittas (the drug\alcohol molecules are the "origin" of the cittas), do they not? (Or is it cetasikas that they cause???) So, if there are a few cittas\cetasikas that are caused by alcohol&drugs why cannot the whole "bunch" of them be so? > 59889 From: Ken O Date: Sun May 28, 2006 9:43am Subject: Re: [dsg] our discussions in Paris. no. 3. ashkenn2k Hi Han Tun Applying living the present or in the moment does not mean that I need to be doing this and doing that in the present. If one think one should do this at this moment or at that moment, the mind itself is already restless. Lobha arise as there is a need to feel the need to do this or do that. Be it mindfulness or being aware, it can be any moment, hence in Mahasatipatthana, mindfulness can be in any activity. That is the beauty of living the moment. Even during ones shopping, or reading a book, or eating one favourite food, at an instant when one realise that lobha has arise and this lobha is anatta, it is already living in the moment. Applying Abidhamma is just realising that lobha is just anatta, that is Abidhamma. The other information at Abhidhamma is to help us to understand anatta better. To me, I dont worry whether it is 17 cittas or 5 javana or 2 javanas or when lobha arise together with joy or wrong view. It is the moment that lobha is not self, that is Abhidhamma :-) Cheers Ken O 59890 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 10:23am Subject: Re: Leading to stream entry ... How can we tell? indriyabala Hi Matheesha , Here at DSG there are always more good questions than good answers. >M: >It is interesting to think of adhi-sila being complete in the sotapatti state. Why should it be different for lay people and monks (5 precepts, 2-- vinaya rules)? Is it some quality which underlies all of them which needs to be fulfilled? T: The five precepts is the lowest level, too low for a bhikkhu who has 227 "precepts" to keep (to be precise they are called the '227 rules for ordained monks, the Patimokkha'). http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/vinaya/bhikkhu-pati.html My understanding of perfect sila is the followings (see MN 39 and MN 53): 1) being pure in bodily actions, verbal actions, mental actions, 2) being pure in livelihood; 3) guarding the doors of the six senses; and 4) being moderate in eating and devoted to wakefulness. ..................... > > "One who knows and sees that these phenomena are this way is called a stream-enterer, steadfast, never again destined for states of woe, headed for self-awakening." > T: How would one tell when he/she has such insight? >M: >I would be careful of using the term Insight in this case. The sutta suggests that to accept on faith or a modicum of understanding is enough. Maybe understanding/accepting impermanance, is a more suitable way of putting it. Tep: If knowing and seeing of a stream-enterer that "these phenomena are this way" (i.e. they are impermanent) is not an insight (vipassanaa), then I have no idea what is. Insight is more than just understanding. Vism. XX, 3 : "Full understanding by investigating(tiirana-p.) is that insight-wisdom (vipassanaa-pannaa), which has the 3 general characteristics (impermanence, suffering, not-self) as its objects, and which arises when attributing a general characteristic to (physical and mental) phenomena, as for instance: 'Corporeality is impermanent, feeling is impermanent, etc.' ................. >M: >The third step is to actually do vipassana and see that these things are impermanant. Arising and passing away. Now we come more into the realm of the sotapanna, as the sutta describes a sotapanna as someone who knows and (also) 'sees' these truths. I suppose if someone has done vipassana and has insight into impermanance there is no need to take the two previous steps. T: Now you are saying that such knowing & seeing is an insight. The two previous steps are probably needed by most people, I think. Best wishes, Tep === --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "matheesha" wrote: > > Hi Tep, > (snipped) > > It is interesting to think of adhi-sila being complete in the > sotapatti state. Why should it be different for lay people and monks > (5 precepts, 2-- vinaya rules)? Is it some quality which underlies > all of them which needs to be fulfilled? There is one sutta which > talks of aryan disciples being unable to hide a fault- so this might > be reffering to breaking of some minor vinaya rules by such a > disciple, not as gross a fault as breaking any of the 5 precepts. > > Lets face it - the word of the buddha that have been handed down to > us doesnt come with complete clarifications, even though it probably > was said clearly and completetly back then. SO we have to go on > a 'best guess' principle, and just keep improving more and more. > (snipped) > > You might ask the question ' do you think the 5 sense organs and the > mind are impermanant?' from someone. (S)He might reply 'of course > they are'. But could it be that, somewhere deep inside this person's > belief system, there is a thought that (say for exameple) the mind is > permanent, continuous from life to life??? > > 59891 From: "matheesha" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 11:25am Subject: Re: Leading to stream entry ... How can we tell? matheesha333 Hi Tep, > T: The five precepts is the lowest level, too low for a bhikkhu who > has 227 "precepts" to keep (to be precise they are called the '227 > rules for ordained monks, the Patimokkha'). > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/vinaya/bhikkhu-pati.html > > My understanding of perfect sila is the followings (see MN 39 and MN 53): > 1) being pure in bodily actions, verbal actions, mental actions, > 2) being pure in livelihood; > 3) guarding the doors of the six senses; and > 4) being moderate in eating and devoted to wakefulness. > ..................... M: Let me outline why I dont agree! The Buddha does not say that all these are features of a sotapanna. They are not included in the sotapatti anga which is used to understand whether one is a sotapanna or not ('mirror of the dhamma'). Nor does MN 35 or 53 say that these features you mentioned above are features of sila: what MN 53 does say is: 'Mahànàma, how does the noble disciple become endowed with virtues? The noble disciple should abide by the higher code of rules. Become virtuous, should see fear in the slightest fault.' Thats all. Guarding the sense doors, being moderate in eating, are part of the gradual training and intended for monks. They have not be prescribed for lay people as far as I know, even though depending on the level of their practice it can be beneficial IMO. Indulging in sense pleasures is in domain of the lay person (see his sermon to Anathapindika the sotapanna about the types of pleasure a lay person can enjoy). That the buddha would prescribe guarding sense doors etc routinely for lay people is unlikely IMO. There were thousands of ariya lay people in the buddhas time. In one instance there is a story about a sakadagamin who engages in sex with his wife (the Buddha said he was a sakadagmin), so guarding the sense door seems an unlikely qualification to become a sotapanna. Sila is usually about actions through body and speech. It would also include right livelihood, as in the noble eightfold path. I dont agree that it includes 'being pure in mental actions'. Because for this to be complete, a person would have to be an arahath, with irradicated defilements. A sotapanna has craving, aversion and a host of other defilements. I suspect the source of your definition of Sila is commentarial! ---------------- > > > > "One who knows and sees that these phenomena are this way is > called a stream-enterer, steadfast, never again destined for states > of woe, headed for self-awakening." > > > T: How would one tell when he/she has such insight? > > >M: > >I would be careful of using the term Insight in this case. The > sutta suggests that to accept on faith or a modicum of understanding > is enough. Maybe understanding/accepting impermanance, is a more > suitable way of putting it. > > Tep: If knowing and seeing of a stream-enterer that "these phenomena > are this way" (i.e. they are impermanent) is not an insight > (vipassanaa), then I have no idea what is. Insight is more than just > understanding. M: My mistake. I should have been more clearer. Yes, a sotapanna should have insight. When I said insight is not the best word to describe this, I was talking about the panna of saddanusarins and dhammanusarins. with metta Matheesha 59892 From: nina van gorkom Date: Sun May 28, 2006 11:57am Subject: metta 19 nilovg Dear friends, This is taken from Kh. Sujin's book on Metta. ***** Nina. 59893 From: "matheesha" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 0:01pm Subject: Re: our discussions in Paris. no. 3. matheesha333 Dear Han, I'm butting in here... (1) For example, when I practice anapanasati, when the > in-breath ends and if I know that the in-breath ends, > or when the out-breath starts and if I know that the > out-breath starts, then I am living in the present. M: I agree completely. The Buddha said this type of practice could fulfil the first foundation of mindfulness. Can you sense the knowing that this is the begining/end of the breath, as opposed to feeling the sensation of the air on the skin in the nose, at the begining/end of the breath? If you can, you are seeing nama rupa my friend. Now can you see that the nama component in impermanant, and the rupa component in impermanant? How much more clarity do you need. Concepts are just thoughts. Even thoughts are impermanant. If you can see that, even that is good. I am sitting here hearing the seconds tic on the clock. I can sense the begining of the tic and the ending of the tic, and with some difficulty the begining,changing and ending of the tic. It is possible to do this. This idea that there are a million trillion moments etc are pure conjecture. The buddha never put a figure on it, but someone else has. Even if it were the case, its not important! All you need to see is that it is impermanant. If we are forever stuck in the identifying phase we will never get anywhere. There are stories of people understanfing impermanance watching a leaf fall from a tree - how much more watching the changing of the breath? One is never going to see all the moments which ever existed past, present and future. There is always a certain degree of applying the insights gained to everything else; generalising it. So there is no need to understand impermanance at a javana citta level, for exmaple. If you can see impermanance at a 5 aggragate level ('a sight, or a sound') that is enough. Doubt is clouding the mind. It is a great hindrenace to the path this self doubt. I say get rid of it, youre doing fine! We are not getting any younger. There is no case for 'catching' the present moment, after all there are only moments of awareness. You just need to be more aware. Turn on the clarity of that awareness. Concentrate! You will be the present moment. with metta Matheesha 59894 From: "indriyabala" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 1:27pm Subject: Re: Leading to stream entry ... Sotapanna & Perfect Sila ... indriyabala Hi Matheesha (and Sarah, Jon), Maybe you remember Hugo. His thinking was in a way like Herman's, our witty friend. Hugo used to say that a dhamma discussion is most useful only when there is a disagreement. I agree with Hugo's emphasis on disagreement. However, I disagree with having disagreement just for the sake of disagreement -- I feel that the most useful disagreement in any dhamma discussion is when both sides are open-minded and disagree with the willingness to let go of their belief (no stubborness because of self-pride: 'my understanding is higher than yours, so you'd better listen well') in order to reach a higher level of knowledge. Do you agree with me here? {:-|>> > >T: > > My understanding of perfect sila is the followings (see MN 39 and MN 53): > >1) being pure in bodily actions, verbal actions, mental actions, > >2) being pure in livelihood; > >3) guarding the doors of the six senses; and > >4) being moderate in eating and devoted to wakefulness. > ..................... >M: Let me outline why I dont agree! >The Buddha does not say that all these are features of a sotapanna. >They are not included in the sotapatti anga which is used to understand whether one is a sotapanna or not ('mirror of the dhamma'). Tep: I should have emphasized first that there are several levels of Sotapanna, starting at Cula-sotapanna (see Vism. XIX, 27). Even the factors for stream-entry are not uniquely defined (ask Sarah or Jon, they know it well). I think it is safe to say that "perfect sila" is defined for the highest level of stream-entry. Jon agrees with the notion of perfect sila too (it is seen in the Visuddhimagga, for example). The word "perfect" is the same as "fully accomplished": "There is the case where a monk is fully accomplished in virtue, partially accomplished in concentration, and partially accomplished in discernment. With reference to the lesser and minor training rules, he falls into offenses and rehabilitates himself. Why is that? Because it is not said to be disqualification (for the noble attainments). But as for the training rules that are basic to the holy life and proper to the holy life, his virtue is permanent, his virtue is steadfast. With the total ending of [the first] three fetters, he is a stream-winner, steadfast, never again destined for states of woe, headed for self-awakening." [AN III.87] ............................ >M: Nor does MN 35 or 53 say that these features you mentioned above are features of sila: what MN 53 does say is: 'Mahànàma, how does the noble disciple become endowed with virtues? The noble disciple should abide by the higher code of rules. Become virtuous, should see fear in the slightest fault.' Thats all. Tep: The "that's all" is a tough standard to meet, Matheesha! The "higher code of rules" is defined with regard to the Patimokkha. 'Become virtuous and 'see fear in the slightest fault' means perfect sila to me. Not guarding the sense doors is a fault ! Eating more than "moderate" is another fault ! Not devoted to wakefulness is another fault ! The sekha patipada (training of the learners) defines the practices for becoming ariyans but below the arahant. Some of these trainings that achieve purification of virtue should be assigned to the Sotapanna requirements (like I have shown in the list) -- that's my humble opinion. ....................... >M: Guarding the sense doors, being moderate in eating, are part of the gradual training and intended for monks. They have not be prescribed for lay people as far as I know, even though depending on the level of their practice it can be beneficial IMO. Indulging in sense pleasures is in domain of the lay person (see his sermon to Anathapindika the sotapanna about the types of pleasure a lay person can enjoy). That the buddha would prescribe guarding sense doors etc routinely for lay people is unlikely IMO. There were thousands of ariya lay people in the buddhas time. In one instance there is a story about a sakadagamin who engages in sex with his wife (the Buddha said he was a sakadagmin), so guarding the sense door seems an unlikely qualification to become a sotapanna. Tep: Again, we should keep in mind about which of the several levels of sotapanna we are aimimg at. Would you be kind enough to present a series of posts to shine a brighter light on what it takes to become a sotapanna lay-Buddhist? .................... >M: Sila is usually about actions through body and speech. It would also include right livelihood, as in the noble eightfold path. I dont agree that it includes 'being pure in mental actions'. Because for this to be complete, a person would have to be an arahath, with irradicated defilements. A sotapanna has craving, aversion and a host of other defilements. Tep: Nope. The Buddha defined being pure in mental actions for his son Rahula (MN 61) who was a kid. MN 35 also mentioned 'being pure in mental actions' early on before the talk on suppressing the five hindrances and first jhana. Our discussion would have tickled Hugo to death ! Respectfully, Tep ======== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "matheesha" wrote: > > Hi Tep, > > > T: The five precepts is the lowest level, too low for a bhikkhu .... ... > > My understanding of perfect sila is the followings (see MN 39 and > MN 53): > > 1) being pure in bodily actions, verbal actions, mental actions, > > 2) being pure in livelihood; > > 3) guarding the doors of the six senses; and > > 4) being moderate in eating and devoted to wakefulness. > > ..................... > > M: Let me outline why I dont agree! > > The Buddha does not say that all these are features of a sotapanna. > They are not included in the sotapatti anga which is used to > understand whether one is a sotapanna or not ('mirror of the > dhamma'). > > Nor does MN 35 or 53 say that these features you mentioned above are > features of sila: what MN 53 does say is: 'Mahànàma, how does the > noble disciple become endowed with virtues? The noble disciple >should abide by the higher code of rules. Become virtuous, should see >fear in the slightest fault.' Thats all. > (snipped) > > > > > T: How would one tell when he/she has such insight? > > > > >M: > > >I would be careful of using the term Insight in this case. The > > sutta suggests that to accept on faith or a modicum of understanding > > is enough. Maybe understanding/accepting impermanance, is a more > > suitable way of putting it. > > 59895 From: "Leo" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 10:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] park with trees leoaive Hi Thanks for your reply. I found from Chinese ancient pilgrims, that in ancient India, it was a common practice of relics as painted Buddha image on cloth or silk. Now that tradition is not really alive, but it was more original and dated close to Buddha time. With Metta Leo 59896 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 2:46pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta egberdina Hi Andrew, On 28/05/06, Andrew wrote: > > Hi Herman > > I thought I had helpfully answered a simple question you put up based > on a suspicion you had that a point of Dhamma you disagreed with was > not from the Suttas but from commentators. Thanks for your post. It included "(Your theory, Herman - you need to explain this)." Which I proceeded to do. > > So there are two kinds of contact, and therefore two kinds of > dependent > > origination? If so, tell me more. > > No, Herman, you tell *me* more. When the Buddha spoke about body- > contact and mind-contact, why do you jump to the conclusion that > there are "two kinds of dependent origination"? Because you will read, repeatedly, on this site that all bodily feelings are a result of past action. > > > The Buddha refutes that, of course! Yes, he does. But, hang on, why am I being > accused of peddling "determined origination"? Herman, after all this > time of exposure to Abhidhamma (and its 24 conditions) and if you > still feel it says that 'all feelings [by which I suspect you mean > alot more than 'vedana'] are entirely caused by what was done > before', there's nothing I can say that will assist. I looked at helpful posts to clarify something on pain, and I ended up being told that it was due to past action. I don't for a moment think any feelings are entirely caused by past action. I never did. > > I don't see the Dhamma as teaching *determined* origination so I'll > leave this question to any who do (don't think you'll find many on > DSG). As I said before, you will read, repeatedly, on this site that all bodily sensations are a result of past action. And as you say, the Buddha refutes that. I'll chalk this one up to us both agreeing with the Buddha :-) Thanks for your time, Andrew Kind Regards Herman 59897 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 2:52pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... egberdina Hi Scott, What do you think? If you feel inclined, tell me about the identity of the Buddha and his thoughts. When he said "This feeling arises in me" how is that different from when he said countless times "This thought is not-mine". Thanks and Kind Regards Herman 59898 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 4:25pm Subject: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... scottduncan2 Dear Herman, If this helps further the discussion... H: "If you feel inclined, tell me about the identity of the Buddha and his thoughts." "The Buddha's victory cannot be undone; No one in the world can approach it. By what path would you guide him, Who has no path, Whose field is endless? "The Buddha has no ensnaring, embroiling craving To lead him; By what path would you guide him, Who has no path, Whose field is endless? "Even the gods envy The awakened ones, The mindful ones, The wise ones Who are intent on meditation And delight in the peace of renunciation. "It is difficult to be born a human; Difficult is the life of mortals; It is difficult to hear the true Dhamma; Difficult is the arising of buddhas. "Doing no evil, Engaging in what's skillful, And purifying one's mind; This is the teaching of the buddhas. "Patient endurance is the supreme austerity. The buddhas say that Nibbaana is supreme. One who injures others is no renunciant; One who harms another is no contemplative. "Not disparaging others, not causing injury, Practising restraint by the monastic rules, Knowing moderation in food Dwelling in solitude, And pursuing higher states of mind, This is the teaching of the buddhas. "Not even with a shower of gold coins Would we find satisfaction in sensual craving. Knowing that sensual cravings are suffering, That they bring little delight, The sage does not rejoice Even in divine pleasures. One who delights in the ending of craving Is a disciple of the Fully Awakened One. "People threatened by fear Go to many refuges: To mountains, forests, Parks, trees, and shrines. None of these is a secure refuge; None is a supreme refuge. Not by going to such a refuge Is one released from all suffering." The Dhammapada, 179-189,(Fronsdal, tr.). As for me, the Buddha has no identity or thoughts. The Dhamma was left behind for those of us who struggle under these two factors. H: "When he said 'This feeling arises in me' how is that different from when he said countless times 'This thought is not-mine'?" "This feeling arises in me" relates to anicca. "This thought is not mine" relates to anatta. Anicca and anatta are two of the three *different* aspects of the ti-lakkhana - the three characteristics of existence, (dukkha being the third, as you are aware). Sincerely, Scott. 59899 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 4:34pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... egberdina Hi Scott, Thank you. We are getting closer to the point where I can explain some more about what is real. > > As for me, the Buddha has no identity or thoughts. The Dhamma was > left behind for those of us who struggle under these two factors. So, is the Buddha real? And are "his" thoughts real? (referring back to the Sutta MN123 you quoted) Kind Regards Herman 59900 From: "Andrew" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 5:02pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta corvus121 Hi again Herman Thanks for the clarification. As I suggested in my previous post, I think a large part of the communication problem may be definitional. When you say : "I don't for a moment think any feelings are entirely caused by past action. I never did." ... can you expand on what you mean by "feelings"? It's a common enough English word yet with a variety of different uses eg among poets, neuroscientists, shrinks etc. Add to this layer of connotation the problems of language translation (Pali) and there is every chance of getting into trouble. That is why I prefer sticking to the Pali term as much as possible (for a non- Pali speaker) and studying the overall Dhamma/Abhidhamma scheme in its own terms. I don't think of Dhamma as something that should match empirical science, but as something that does involve the "treasure" of saddha (in fact, when I read the suttas, I was very surprised at how often the Buddha stressed this - I no longer go around telling people Buddhism isn't a religion because we must 'prove' everything for ourselves before we can let our minds proceed to the next page. That is just the sort of cynicism that muddies the water and calls for the 'water-clearing gem' of saddha). Your reminder that the aim of sutta study is not an impressive body of seemingly consistent knowledge but a glimpse of true understanding especially of anicca, dukkha and anatta, is extremely valuable. Best wishes Andrew 59901 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 5:30pm Subject: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... scottduncan2 Dear Herman, H: "Thank you. We are getting closer to the point where I can explain some more about what is real." You're welcome. H: "So, is the Buddha real? And are "his" thoughts real? (referring back to the Sutta MN123 you quoted)" To paraphrase another famous Buddhist, I already answered that question. Might we please get to the part where you explain some more about what is real? Sincerely, Scott. 59902 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Sun May 28, 2006 9:34pm Subject: Boiling but burnt ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: How does Evil Will Infuriate the Enraged Mind? A Brahmin Priest once asked the Blessed Buddha: Master Gotama, what is the cause of being unable to remember even something that has been memorized over a long period & also that which has not been memorized? Brahmin, when mind is obsessed by evil-will, beset, enraged & dominated by evil-will, and one does not understand any actual safe escape from this arisen ill of evil-will, in that very moment, one neither sees nor understands, what is truly advantageous, neither for oneself, nor for others, nor for both... On such occasions, even texts, that have been long memorized, cannot be recalled by mind. Why is this neglect so? Imagine a bowl of water boiling and bubbling being well heated over a blazing fire. If a man with good eye-sight were to inspect the reflection of his own face in it, he would neither see nor recognize it, as it really is! So too, brahmin, when mind is obsessed by evil-will, maddened, beset & dominated by evil-will, on that occasion even those texts, that have been long memorized do not recur to the mind, not to speak of those texts, events & information, that have not been memorized at all… On how to prevent hate, anger, irritation, opposition, & stubbornness see: Metta, http://what-buddha-said.net/drops/Metta.htm Friendliness Frees, http://what-buddha-said.net/drops/Friendliness_Frees.htm Buddha on Noble Friendship, http://what-buddha-said.net/drops/The_Buddha_on_Noble_Frienship.htm Selfless Friendship is Sweetest, http://what-buddha-said.net/drops/Selfless_Friendship_is_Sweetest.htm Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V:121-2] section 46: The Links. 55: To Sangarava... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PS: Please include the word Samahita in any comment, since then will my automatic mail filters pick it up and I will see it & respond!! Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. Friendship is the Greatest ... Let there be Calm & Free Bliss !!! <....> 59903 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun May 28, 2006 10:26pm Subject: Cetasikas' study corner 458- Non-Attachment/Alobha (f) sarahprocter... Dear Friends, 'Cetasikas' by Nina van Gorkom http://www.vipassana.info/cetasikas.html http://www.zolag.co.uk/ Questions, comments and different views welcome;-) ========================================== Ch 28, Non-Attachment(Alobha)contd ***** The Atthasåliní states that non-attachment has the manifestation of detachment like someone who has fallen into a foul place. Someone who falls into a cesspool does not consider that a place of shelter where he could stay. He sees it as a danger, as something to be abhorred, and therefore he would get out of it as soon as possible. It is the same with non-attachment, it does not take refuge in what is actually a danger. Attachment to the objects which are experienced is dangerous, because attachment leads to all kinds of evil deeds which can produce an unhappy rebirth. Any form of attachment, even if it is more subtle, is dangerous, because so long as attachment has not been eradicated we are subject to rebirth and thus also to old age, sickness and death. •***** Non-Attachment(Alobha)to be contd Metta, Sarah ====== 59904 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun May 28, 2006 11:41pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: How Do We Test if He/She Is an Arahant? ... Sense of Danger ... sarahprocter... Hi Matheesha, Han, Tep & all, --- matheesha wrote: > Hi Han (and Tep) > > Your post on aadinava was wonderful. Thank you for that. > > I thought I would share with you this sutta, which gives a taste of > that danger you explained so well: > > Samyutta Nikaya III.25 > Pabbatopama Sutta > The Simile of the Mountains .... S: I also thought Han's post was wonderful and thank you, Math for sharing the beautiful Pabbatopama Sutta which we can never read too often. .... > "I inform you, great king, I announce to you, great king: aging and > death are rolling in on you. When aging and death are rolling in on > you, great king, what should be done?" > > "As aging and death are rolling in on me, lord, what else should be > done but Dhamma-conduct, right conduct, skillful deeds, meritorious > deeds? .... > Like massive boulders, > mountains pressing against the sky, > moving in from all sides, > crushing the four directions, > so aging and death > come rolling over living beings: > noble warriors, priests, merchants, > workers, outcastes, & scavengers. > They spare nothing. > They trample everything. > Here elephant troops can hold no ground, > nor can chariots or infantry, > nor can a battle of wits > or wealth win out. .... Han also wrote (after quoting from the Chachakka Sutta): "When touched by a feeling of neither pleasure nor pain, the meditator is obsessed with underlying tendency to ignorance (avijjaanusaya) and he does not see five things with regard to feelings. What five? (1) the origination (samudayanca) (2) passing away (atthangamanca) (3) allure (assaadanca) (4) drawback (aadinavanca) (5) escape (nissarananca) The Buddha added that without abandoning the ignorance (which veils the above five things with regard to feelings) and giving rise to clear knowing, it is impossible to put an end to suffering and stress in the here and now." ..... S: This is so true. We've often discussed how the veil (or curtain) of ignorance hides the truth of dhammas. It's only its opposite --wisdom-- that can abandon that ignorance and put and end to suffering by really seeing the danger/drawback inherent in all conditioned dhammas. Many thanks to you both and to Tep for encouraging your explanations too. Metta, Sarah ====== 59905 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon May 29, 2006 0:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] Do you want to see Lord of the Rings? sarahprocter... Hi Phil, Scott and other Canadiana, --- Phil wrote: > > Hi all > > One of my favourite moments in the recorded talks is when Acharn > Sujin suddenly asks Jon "do you want to see Lord of the Rings?" I > think the context was chanda vs lobha. .... S: I remember when she suddently asked this question and I wondered whether she was being serious:-) Actually, she was using it as an example to indicate the distinction between 'sasankharika' (prompted) and 'asankharika' (unprompted) cittas, as I recall. Sometimes the desire is strong and sometimes it's weak and only arises if prompted. > I don't want to get emotionally comforting stories from Dhamma. No > more morning Dhamma feelgood sessions for me anyome, for the time > being. Dhamma should not be about starting the day by having > pleasant thoughts about being a more wholesome person, I feel, but > that's what it was for me. Being a better, more courageous, more > wholesome person - that is the realm of the storytellers. .... S: And often the realm of lobha too... .... > Developing understanding that conditions the gradual letting go of > the story of being a person - that is the realm of the Buddha. > > I don't know, just something I was thinking today. .... S: Good comment. Keep up the Phil blogs....:-) [And Scott, I'm urging on the 'Edmonton Oilers' these days when we get a brief few secs in the news-sports highlights... I had a (Chinese)student years ago who was what we call a 'returnee' here. He'd returned to Hong Kong after a few years of living in Canada and was sent to me because he was having a lot of adjustment problems back in school here - no friends, no motivation, bad results and so on, after having done well in Canada. He was a small, chubby boy with thick glasses, but confided to me the first time I saw him that the problem was that he missed the 'ice haarkey' so much. We then set up 'an ice hockey' program - essays on ice hockey, mini talks to other students on ice hockey, videos of ice hockey, ice hockey results, magazines and anything else ice hockey and he was fine after that. I guess you guys get pretty addicted:-). Metta, Sarah ======== 59906 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon May 29, 2006 0:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta sarahprocter... Hi Andrew T & Herman, --- Andrew wrote: > Have a look at the Bahuvedaniya Sutta (MN 59)in which the Buddha > describes how he has given many different presentations about various > numbers of kinds of feeling. Bhikkhu Bodhi's note 616 explains that > the Buddha's reference to 5 kinds of feeling refers to the faculties of: > > (bodily) pleasure > (mental) joy > (bodily) pain > (mental) grief > equanimity. > > Furthermore, the mental/bodily distinction is plainly set out in the > Samyutta Nikaya 48:36 (Mahavagga Indriyasamyutta)- the pleasure faculty > and the pain faculty are "born of body-contact" whereas the joy faculty > and the displeasure/grief faculty are "born of mind-contact". .... S: I'd just like to stress that here, 'born of body-contact' refers to feelings accompaningy body consciousness which 'contacts' tangible objects, i.e solidity, temperature and motion. The feelings are always mental. ... > If one argues that all 5 above are mental, how does one distinguish > between pleasure/joy and pain/grief? (Your theory, Herman - you need to > explain this). .... S: All the feelings are namas ('mental')in that they experience objects. I think what you mean to be saying is that (bodily)pleasure (sukkha) and pain (dukkha) experience tangible objects only, accompanying body consciousness. .... > > How does that viewpoint fit with the orthodoxy that an arahant can feel > pleasure and pain but not (akusala) joy or grief? See the > Dhatuvibhanga Sutta (MN 140) para 23 and BB's note # 1280: "though [the > arahant] continues to experience feelings, he is free from lust towards > pleasant feeling, from aversion towards painful feeling, and from > ignorance about neutral feeling". .... S: Sukkha and dukkha are vipaka cetasikas accompanying vipaka cittas - common to all, including arahants. Whereas akusala joy or grief arise during javana processes (as you imply). Good quotes. Herman, you mentioned you'd been wading through U.P.s - I forget if you said if you tried the first 2 sections under 'Feelings'? They were good questions you raised. I think Ken O, Andrew and others have answered them, but let me know if you'd like to hear anything else. .... > Back to you guys. ... S: Likewose, back to you guys. Metta, Sarah ===== 59907 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon May 29, 2006 0:29am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Reifying, .. All of These Are Just Different Perspectives sarahprocter... Hi Herman (& Tep), --- Herman Hofman wrote: > > > Good points. The Buddha knew that all conditioned dhammas are > > >anatta, anicca and dukkha. That's what he taught. And the interesting > > >thing is that there is not a single paramattha dhamma that can have > > >its defining characteristic as well as being anatta, anicca or > > >dukkha. Because how can an ultimate dhamma have two or more > > >characteristics? .... S: All conditioned dhammas have the general characteristics of anicca, dukkha and anatta as well as having their particular defining characteristics. Have I missed your point? Metta, Sarah ====== 59908 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon May 29, 2006 0:38am Subject: RE: [dsg] RE: Please don't.... sarahprocter... Hey Sukin (& Dan), --- sukinder wrote: > Hi Dan, > > I am thinking about taking a break from posting on DSG and reading only > selected posts for about 3 months. So this is going to be my last > response > to you on this thread. Besides I think I have said all that needs to be > said > and don't want to be driven any deeper into speculation. > This is likely to be the longest post yet, so brace yourself. ;-) .... S: It's a real treat for me to read your discussion and to take a back seat for a change. I know it takes a lot of time, Sukin -- instead of taking a long sabbatical, see if you can help us all out with some short comments from time to time (or more long ones just to Dan:-)). Thanks anyway, for all your helpful posts in this discussion. Dan & Ken H, I enjoy your further discussions together too. I'd thought I'd ease out and leave the three of you to it, especially next month when I'll be away for a while:-). Metta, Sarah ======== 59909 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon May 29, 2006 1:03am Subject: Re: [dsg] More on Cooran sarahprocter... Hi Ken H and all, --- ken_aitch wrote: > Thanks, as always, for your Abhidhamma explanations: they are just > what we needed at Cooran. The book we were reading seemed (to me at > least) to be giving a misleading, conventional, picture of the Dhamma. > Plain old Abhidhamma lists and classifications can be just as > off-putting for some. So these king-and-minister similes are an ideal > compromise. .... S: I know what you mean (about these king-and-minister similes). Htoo was good at recalling them, wasn't it. .... > ----------------------------------------- > KH: > > However, it is not so easy to comprehend an imbalance of > intellectual > > path-panna <. . .> > .... > S: > Remember those examples of grasping the snake in the wrong way etc. > ----------------------------------------- > > Yes, although I always assumed they were examples of wrong > understanding. You are saying they are, more correctly, examples of > how right [intellectual] understanding can lead to wrong understanding. .... S: I think that there may be some right (intellectual) understanding, but by itself its not enough. Without any development of satipatthana and a growth in saddha, it remains intellectual and the kilesa on account of it (such as the mana and other attachments) can lead to 'mental derangement' as it suggests in the Atthasalini. As we know, right intellectual understanding and kilesa of various kinds can follow each other very rapidly. I'm thinking of examples in the texts like the bhikkhus who before hearing the Mulapariyaya sutta knew the theory, but were so puffed up by mana on account of it. Many others too. ..... > ---------------- > > When we are reading Abhidhamma we can sometimes get bogged down in > details. But we can't say, "Oh look, the indriyas are out of balance! > There is too much of [this] and not enough of [that.]" Putting one > part of our reading aside, and going on to something less taxing, is > more likely to be a sign of dosa and lobha than of panna and > indriya-spotting. .... S: I agree. Or more likely to be a sign of ditthi, I think. An idea of self being able to do something again. .... > > The solution is to have a fixed routine - this much Dhamma reading for > this amount of time, no matter whether we feel it is doing us good or > not. .... S: Oh no! This seems like the same kind of idea of adjusting the props. Dhammas perform their roles regardless. It's only (as you stressed before) by understanding with satipatthana what is appearing now, regardless of the props, that the indriyas will be balanced naturally and effortlessly so to speak. Metta, Sarah p.s To all, A little more on visible object -- I came across a summary Jon gave of some of our discussions in Cambodia a few years ago. This was a neat part of it, I thought: Jon: " 'Visible object as just that which appears through the eye-door' - The statement above says all there is to be said on the subject. Any attempt to embellish, eg as to whether v-o is simply colour or is with or without shape, depth etc is bound to cloud the issue. - The fact that things still appear as conceptualised objects does not mean that there is or can be no awareness of seeing or visible object." Also, a comment I heard this morning on a tape in response to a question about visible object as colour and light etc. "Visible object is 'what is seen'. It doesn't matter what words are used to explain it." In response to another question about the use of vanna (colour) in a kalapa etc - "We don't have to think about that at all. We don't have to think about colour or visible object because only eye (consciousness) can contact with it." Metta, Sarah ====== 59910 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon May 29, 2006 1:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Leading to stream entry sarahprocter... Hi Matheesha (& Tep), I think Tep also raised some good points. --- matheesha wrote: > SN XXV.3 > Viññana Sutta > Consciousness > "One who has conviction & belief that these phenomena are this way is > called a faith-follower: one who has entered the orderliness of > rightness, entered the plane of people of integrity, transcended the > plane of the run-of-the-mill. He is incapable of doing any deed by > which he might be reborn in hell, in the animal womb, or in the realm > of hungry shades. He is incapable of passing away until he has > realized the fruit of stream-entry. .... S: For those of us who understand that the phala cittas immediately succeed the magga citta of stream-entry, it isn't difficult to understand how this could be so. Someone may become a sotapanna and die instantly, but the fruit of sotapatti-magga was already attained. Metta, Sarah ===== 59911 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon May 29, 2006 1:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] Dependent Origination ... Correct Vision of Nama & Rupa sarahprocter... Hi Matheesha (& Tep), Hope you don't mind me butting in here too.... --- matheesha wrote: > Sankhara (I'm not 100% sure about this) can also be detected arising > prior to vinnana merging with a sense door,in the process of phassa, > but is very very subtle. .... S: I understand sankhara (in D.O.) to refer to past kamma (good and bad) which has resulted to the birth consciousness and other vipaka cittas in this life. I understand vinnana (in D.O.)to refer to this birth consciousness and these vipaka cittas in this life. .... > > Avijja can be infered because when there is lack of it (with the > continued awareness of tilakkana, at least impermanance) there is no > arising of sanakhara, no vinnana ..no sense perception -leading into > the phala experience where there is nothing arising and passing away. > This is the reverse of the DO. .... S: Only for an arahant is there no more kamma being produced. However, the arahant still has vipaka cittas (results of past kamma) - still 'vinnana' here, until parinibbana. Phala cittas follow magga cittas and are still accompanied by sanna, but the object is nibbana. Even these cittas arise and pass away. They are conditioned. (Even if we are talking about phala samapatti which the anagamis and arahants may experience). Just my understandings - feel free to ignore.... Metta, Sarah ======== 59912 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon May 29, 2006 1:24am Subject: Re: [dsg] Authority sarahprocter... Hi Herman (& Daniel), I was glad you responded to Daniel's questions. (Also STEVen, please continue sharing your good 'Creator' responses with us all). --- Herman Hofman wrote: > So the question becomes, what do you want to achieve? Then find someone > who > has achieved that. Check them out thoroughly, and if they pass muster, > ask > them if they will teach you everything they know. You might have to > become > their slave, or something, but, hey, it's gotta be worth it :-) .... S: Cool :-). Actually, you make a very good point when you say 'what do you want to achieve?'. The path will depend on the purpose and the goal. Metta, Sarah ======== 59913 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon May 29, 2006 3:05am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. our discussions in Paris. no. 3. nilovg Dear Han, I understand your examples of living in the present. I think you also realize that this is thinking, not the direct experience of arising and falling away of realities. Also by way of thinking we can get help from the teachings. For example, not worrying about yesterday which is already gone, as you indicated. op 28-05-2006 15:16 schreef han tun op hantun1@...:> . But my point is, if the > eye-consciousness arises and falls away and another > eye-conscious arising from the same visual object > arises and falls away, one after another in > succession, for one thousand times, for one million > times.... So it > becomes very complicated and catching the present > reality becomes even more difficult. > > That was why I asked the question, “how can one > experience the present moment or live in the present > moment? > > ------------------------------ N: As Ken O explained, Abhidhamma is understanding anattaa more. We do not have to worry about the number of cittas and processes, we cannot count anyway. You respect and have confidence in the Anattaalakkhanasutta. Anattaa of what? Anattaa of seeing now. Why now? Seeing has fallen away when you notice that you are seeing, but, it has a characteristic, and without thinking 'it has fallen away', this characteristic can be experienced. Hardness appears through touch, many times a day, and we usually think of a cup or a table which is touched. There can also be awareness of the characteristic of hardness when it appears. It shows its own characteristic. Gradually we can learn that it does not know anything, that it is only ruupa, different from seeing which is naama. It is a learning process, and it leads to detachment, detachment from self. In many suttas the Buddha speaks about the objects appearing one at a time through the six doors, and this is to help people to be mindful without thinking. Insight is developed step by step, and so long as the characteristics of dhammas are not directly known one at a time, without mixing them, their arising and falling away, one at a time, cannot be realized by paññaa. Thus, mindfulness of the present reality is actually direct awareness of the characteristic that appears now. I use the word: it appears, it appears to the sati. We do not count cittas, we do not think of the time involved. This conditions eventually the direct experience of the truth of anattaa, and this is more convincing than thinking about anattaa. We can develop 'our own' understanding, not just understanding from hearsay or from the book. It is direct understanding that conditions more confidence, saddhaa, in the teachings. ***** Nina. 59914 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon May 29, 2006 3:05am Subject: Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 78, and Tiika. nilovg Visuddhimagga Ch XVII, 78. Mutuality-condition, aññamañña-paccaya. Intro: Some of the phenomena which are related by conascence-condition are also related by mutuality-condition (aññamañña-paccaya). They condition one another reciprocally while they arise simultaneously. Since the realities involved condition one another mutually, each of them can be in turn conditioning dhamma (paccaya)and conditioned dhamma (paccayupanna dhamma). The dhammas that are related by way of mutuality-condition have to be conascent, but not all conascent dhammas are related by way of mutuality-condition. As we shall see, there are three classes of phenomena to which this condition pertains. ---------- Text Vis.: 78. (7) A state that assists by means of mutual arousing and consolidating is 'mutuality condition', as the three sticks of a tripod give each other consolidating support. ----- N: The Tiika explains that there is assistance for the dhamma that itself assists. U Narada (Conditional Relations, p.31)) adds to this: <...in mutuality condition, a conditioning state gives its force to the conditioned state and also receives the force of the conditioned state.> The simile of the tripod clarifies this. Three sticks which are leaning against each other at the upper ends mutually support one another.If one of the three legs is broken the other two cannot make it stand. Evenso the realities involved in mutuality-condition condition one another reciprocally. The Tiika states that the assistance that is given is because of mutuality (aññamañña), not because of conascence. Not all dhammas that are conascent are assisting each other by way of mutuality-condition, but those that assist each other by mutuality condition could not proceed without being also conascent, as the Tiika explains. Thus, the assistance is given precisely by virtue of reciprocity, not in mere conascence. The Tiika states that this condition pertains not only to the moment of arising (uppattiyaa) of the dhammas involved, but also to the moment of their presence (.thitiyaa). The Tiika refers to the Pa.t.thaana text which classifies as threefold the dhammas involved in the relationship of mutuality-condition. Kusala dhamma conditions kusala dhamma by way of mutuality-condition. The same is true for akusala dhamma and indeterminate (avyaakata) dhamma which includes kiriyacitta, vipaaka-citta and ruupa. ------- Text Vis.: With the immaterial aggregates, etc., it is threefold, according as it is said: 'The four immaterial aggregates are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]; the four great primaries are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]; at the moment of descent into the womb mentality and materiality are a condition, as mutuality condition, [for each other]' (P.tn.1,3). ------ N: At the moment of rebirth, the rebirth-consciousness and the heartbase that are produced by kamma are related to one another by way of mutuality-condition. In the case of human being, kamma also produces at the first moment of life the groups of ruupa with bodysense and with sex. However, the rebirth-consciousness and these two groups of ruupa are not related by way of mutuality-condition. Conclusion: as we have seen, the dhammas that assist each other by way of mutuality, are consolidated precisely by virtue of reciprocity, not in mere conascence. Thus, they give each other a firm support. For example, kusala citta and the sobhana cetasikas that accompany it give each other a firm support by virtue of reciprocity, not only by mere conascence. Paññaa cannot arise without detachment, alobha, which accompanies each kusala citta. When there is clinging to realities paññaa cannot arise at the same time. Alobha is still weak in the beginning, but as paññå develops there will also be more detachment from realities. Paññaa and alobha that arise together give each other a firm support by way of mutuality-condiiton. There are many degrees of paññaa and as paññaa grows the accompanying cetasikas develop as well. Mutuality-condition helps us to understand how the factors of the eightfold Path develop together. When the eightfold Path is being developed by kusala citta associated with paññaa, it needs sati which is mindful of naama and ruupa, paññaa supports sati. And in its turn, sati supports paññaa and the other accompanying dhammas. Sati is mindful of a naama or ruupa so that paññaa can realize their true nature. Right effort, sammaa-vayaama, which is viriya cetasika, is necessary for the development of paññaa, it supports paññaa. Paññaa in its turn conditions right effort so that it is balanced: it is not over strenuous, nor too weak. Concentration, ekaggata cetasika or samaadhi, is a factor necessary for the development of right understanding of naama and ruupa. It focusses on the naama or ruupa that appears. As Paññaa develops, also concentration develops. All the Path-factors develop together while they mutually consolidate each other. There is no person who can arrange for this condition, for the consolidation of the factors of the eightfold Path. The same goes for the wrong Path: when there is wrong view, it is accompanied by akusala cetasikas which are factors of the wrong Path and they all mutually consolidate each other. ****** Nina. 59915 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon May 29, 2006 3:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] RE: Please don't.... nilovg Hi Sukin, Since Sarah is going away in June, it is good if you stay on. Could you give me some details on the evening ceremonies for Kh Charupan? Did Kh Sujin speak? Is Kh. Sujin's birthday jan. 13? I tried to ask Betty, but she may be away. Nina. op 29-05-2006 09:38 schreef sarah abbott op sarahprocterabbott@...: > I know it takes a lot of time, Sukin -- instead of > taking a long sabbatical, see if you can help us all out with some short > comments from time to time (or more long ones just to Dan:-)). 59916 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon May 29, 2006 3:27am Subject: Re: [dsg] kamma and vipaaka nilovg Dear Sarah, op 28-05-2006 15:12 schreef sarah abbott op sarahprocterabbott@...: ' Or when someone asked K.Sujin once why people > behaved badly, even those who have heard the teachings, she answered 'it > is the role of dhamma. Kusala and akusala.....' -------- N: Excellent answer. Not a person behaves badly. Good to remember. ------- S: Apparently > the article/book she wrote about her experiences during her long illness > and the dhamma was distributed just a week or so ago at Wesak. ------- N: Perhaps Sukin could save a copy for me. ---------- S: K.Sujin had known her and been a good friend to her for a very long time. > I spoke to KS very briefly and asked how she felt when she hears about the > passing away of friends like this (at a relatively young age) and her > comment was 'it's very natural' and 'it happens all the time'. Finally, > 'she was born....and is born again (we don't know where or who as)'. > > It may sound heartless to others when they hear these words, but I don't > find them to be so at all. ------------ N: Not heartless, very realistic. Thank you for telling me about Kh. Charupan. -------- > S: We always forget about the 'role of dhamma', the > nature of conditioned dhammas and keep on wondering why others don't do > things the way we would and so on....completely forgetting about kusala > and akusala, about objects appearing through the sense doors and > forgetting about how everyone 'has their own way'. ------ N: Again: the role of dhammas. This makes us understand better what she often says: everything is dhamma. These are great reminders of anattaa. Not in the book! Nina. P.S. Have a good break in Switserland, may the wheather be better. We used to trek there in torrential rains. Warm regards to your mother. 59917 From: "seisen_au" Date: Mon May 29, 2006 4:19am Subject: Re: [dsg] More on Cooran seisen_au Hi Sarah, Jon and all, > A little more on visible object -- I came across a summary Jon gave of > some of our discussions in Cambodia a few years ago. This was a neat part > of it, I thought: > > Jon: " 'Visible object as just that which appears through the > eye-door' > - The statement above says all there is to be said on > the subject. The commentaries add quite a bit more than the statement above. >Any attempt to embellish, eg as to > whether v-o is simply colour or is with or without > shape, depth etc is bound to cloud the issue. Avijja clouds the issue. Again I believe the commentaries add helpful explanations with regards to visual object, colour and shape. > - The fact that things still appear as conceptualised > objects does not mean that there is or can be no > awareness of seeing or visible object." Ya Regards Steve PS. Thanks Sarah for the tanha posts. I don't really have any thing useful to add to that discussion at the moment. Maybe return to it sometime after going through the commentaries a bit more. Thanks Again. 59918 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Mon May 29, 2006 4:37am Subject: Re: [dsg] Do you want to see Lord of the Rings? scottduncan2 Dear Sarah, This is how it begins, Sarah... S: "And Scott, I'm urging on the 'Edmonton Oilers' these days when we get a brief few secs in the news-sports highlights...I guess you guys get pretty addicted." It's really quite interesting to observe one's "addiction" when following a team. I mean it's all really quite ephemeral in the end but there you are - totally identified with whether the team wins or loses, getting all caught up in the rivalry, actually coaching from the couch wanting to will the play to go a certain way, yelling at the guy to shoot the puck or whatever, buoyant when they win, deflated when they lose. And when it's all over, win or lose, it fades away - until next season and you're back at it. Hockey vatta. Go Oilers. Sincerely, Scott. 59919 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon May 29, 2006 4:57am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Brain & Mind egberdina Hi Daniel, On 28/05/06, Daniel wrote: > > Hi Herman and all, > > > There are > >> no closed systems. I think you are being a bit careful in your last > >> sentence. Are there any mental events that would happen without a > brain? > > > Well, one mental event that buddhism claims to happen "without a brain" is > rebirth. Rebirth is when one consciousness sort of "passes" from one body > to > another (because of craving and ignorance), right? But the reason why I > was > talking about alcohol&drugs is because it seems to be a counter-argument > to > rebirth. As far as I know, the main argument for rebirth is that > consciousness > cannot have matter as its origin. But, alcohol&drugs do cause specific > cittas > (the drug\alcohol molecules are the "origin" of the cittas), do they not? > (Or > is it cetasikas that they cause???) So, if there are a few > cittas\cetasikas > that are caused by alcohol&drugs why cannot the whole "bunch" of them be > so? > > Why not indeed! Just a small proviso, I wouldn't say alcohol or drugs cause thinking, but they certainly influence it. But this is what the Buddha has to say about any sort of monism or any sort of dualism. When one is of the view that the life-principle is the same as the body, there is no leading the holy life. And when one is of the view that the life-principle is one thing and the body another, there is no leading the holy life. Avoiding these two extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma via the middle: From birth as a requisite condition comes aging & death." from http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.035.than.html The Middle Way of the Buddha is dependent origination. So arguing in parallel with the above, it is not the case for the Buddha that the body is one thing and the mind another thing. Nor is it the case that the body and the mind are the same thing. What is the case is that in dependence on X, Y arises, and that in the absence of X, Y doesn't arise. I find theories of literal rebirth, as a causal continuation of a particular "stream of consciousness" unreconcilable with dependent origination. Because best as I can tell, the living body is a condition for the mind. It makes perfect sense, therefore, that in the absence of a living body, there is no mind. Kind Regards Herman 59920 From: han tun Date: Mon May 29, 2006 5:02am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. our discussions in Paris. no. 3. hantun1 Dear Nina and Lodewijk, Ken O and Matheesha, Thank you all very much for your valuable comments and kind advice. Respectfully, Han --- nina van gorkom wrote: > Dear Han, > I understand your examples of living in the present. > I think you also realize that this is thinking, not > the direct experience of arising and falling away of > realities. Also by way of thinking we can get > help from the teachings. > As Ken O explained, Abhidhamma is understanding > anattaa more. We do not have to worry about the > number of cittas and processes, we cannot count > anyway. You respect and have confidence in the > Anattaalakkhanasutta. Anattaa of what? > Anattaa of seeing now. Why now? Seeing has > fallen away when you notice that you are seeing, > but, it has a characteristic, and without > thinking 'it has fallen away', this characteristic > can be experienced. > Insight is developed step by step, and so long as > the characteristics of dhammas are not directly > known one at a time, without mixing them, their > arising and falling away, one at a time, cannot be > realized by paññaa. > Thus, mindfulness of the present reality is actually > direct awareness of the characteristic that appears > now. I use the word: it appears, it appears to > the sati. We do not count cittas, we do not think of > the time involved. This conditions eventually the > direct experience of the truth of anattaa, and > this is more convincing than thinking about anattaa. > We can develop 'our own' understanding, not just > understanding from hearsay or from the book. It > is direct understanding that conditions more > confidence, saddhaa, in the teachings. > Nina. > 59921 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon May 29, 2006 5:10am Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Suttas about Atta egberdina Hi Andrew, > ... can you expand on what you mean by "feelings"? It's a common > enough English word yet with a variety of different uses eg among > poets, neuroscientists, shrinks etc. Yes, you are quite right. There are many diferent yet common usages of the word feeling. I think the description of feelings as pleasant, unpleasant and neutral pretty well covers it. But I would sharply differentiate feelings from sensations. Any touching that happens, for example, whether that would be as pressure, or temperature, I would call a sensation, not a feeling. Add to this layer of connotation the problems of language translation > (Pali) and there is every chance of getting into trouble. That is > why I prefer sticking to the Pali term as much as possible (for a non- > Pali speaker) and studying the overall Dhamma/Abhidhamma scheme in > its own terms. I don't think of Dhamma as something that should > match empirical science, but as something that does involve > the "treasure" of saddha (in fact, when I read the suttas, I was very > surprised at how often the Buddha stressed this - I no longer go > around telling people Buddhism isn't a religion because we > must 'prove' everything for ourselves before we can let our minds > proceed to the next page. That is just the sort of cynicism that > muddies the water and calls for the 'water-clearing gem' of saddha). I certainly don't disagree with you. And I would not think it cynical to spurn attributions of specific events to kamma. Not as a denial of kamma, but as acknowledgement that grasping at the mechanics of it is speculative. Of course I am not saying that about you, but about vipika theories. > Your reminder that the aim of sutta study is not an impressive body > of seemingly consistent knowledge but a glimpse of true understanding > especially of anicca, dukkha and anatta, is extremely valuable. Thank you Kind Regards Herman 59922 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon May 29, 2006 6:55am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: A summary of the Teaching ... Taste Your Own Medicine First... egberdina Hi Scott, On 29/05/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > Dear Herman, > > H: "Thank you. We are getting closer to the point where I can explain > some more about what is real." > > You're welcome. > > H: "So, is the Buddha real? And are "his" thoughts real? (referring > back to the Sutta MN123 you quoted)" > > To paraphrase another famous Buddhist, I already answered that question. OK, I'll go with the Buddha having no identity or thoughts. But that leaves me guessing as to what is to be implied from your quote of MN123. "You may, Aananda, also keep in mind this marvellous and wonderful quality of the Perfect One: knowingly arise feelings in the Perfect One, knowingly they continue, knowingly they cease; knowingly arise perceptions in the Perfect One, knowingly they continue, knowingly they cease; knowingly arise thoughts in the Perfect One, knowingly they continue, knowingly they cease. This, Aananda, you may also keep in mind as a marvelous and wonderful quality of the Perfect One," Anyway, we'll leave it at that. Might we please get to the part where you explain some more about what > is real? Anicca is real. All phenomena are anicca. In the absence of anicca, there are no phenomena. The absence of phenomena is nibbana. Nibbana is real, too. One might be tempted to slip dhammas in as real. But nothing can be said about them, except that they are inferences about what isn't there. Chew on that for a while :-) Kind Regards Herman 59923 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon May 29, 2006 10:29am Subject: metta 20 nilovg Dear friends, This is taken from Kh. Sujin's book on Metta.