#60800 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jun 26, 2006 10:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] death of dear ones.Family life. nilovg Dear Scott, thank you for your kind words :-)) It is always a pleasure to correspond with you, Nina. op 26-06-2006 16:00 schreef Scott Duncan op scduncan@...: Thanks again for your diligent and careful consideration of us all! #60801 From: nina van gorkom Date: Mon Jun 26, 2006 11:42 am Subject: Re: [dsg] On rebirth nilovg Dear Ken O, you make me smile, I remember. This is well said: she will reply that about reality, about simple aspect of life like seeing, hearing. Hmmm, listening, seeing are simple things but very deep and profound dhamma :-) I have a feeling that we make these simple dhammas so difficult because of our kilesa, always imagining them to be other than they are. We have accumulated this and it is so hard to give up such ideas we have of seeing and hearing. We always confuse them with thinking about what we see and hear. Nina. op 26-06-2006 16:34 schreef Ken O op ashkenn2k@...: This is quite nostalgic as it reminds me of the talk in Bangkok in 2004 where one person discusses jhanas issue with Ahjan Sujin and she will reply that about reality, about simple aspect of life like seeing, hearing. Hmmm, listening, seeing are simple things but very deep and profound dhamma :-) #60802 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jun 26, 2006 5:43 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles lbidd2 Joop: "A dhamma study question: what conditions ignorance? You say: "when there is dukkha there is ignorance and sorrow certainly qualifies as dukkha" But if I permit myself to be rude: that's not an answer. The same with the answer of KenO It's the not-perceiving dukkha AS dukkha (lack of knowledge of the Four Noble Truths) that has ignorance as result, not the fact that dukkha exists itself causes ignorance." Hi Joop, I think you are mixing together two questions: 1) does ignorance arise with sorrow, 2) what is the cause of ignorance. Sorrow is not the cause of ignorance, but ignorance arises with sorrow in ordinary, unenlightened people. The cause of ignorance is the "taints" (aasavas). MN.9,66: "With the arising of the taints there is the arising of ignorance." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.009.ntbb.html I agree to say 'when sorrow arises there is ignorance of sorrow' is a little peculiar. There is certainly no lack of awareness of sorrow, but is sorrow seen as it is? No, sorrow is not seen as it is, nor is any other painful feeling seen as it is. If it were seen as it is there would be no ignorance. Ignorance is not the result of not understanding. Ignorance IS not understanding. The result of not understanding is kamma formations. Not understanding (avijjaa) is classified as a 'taint' and a 'latent tendency' (anusaya), which basically means that it conditions itself. So ignorance is the cause of ignorance, ignorance is ignorance of dukkha, dukkha is painful feeling, when there is painful feeling there is ignorance of the true nature of that painful feeling, and that ignorance causes an emotional reaction (kamma formation) which causes further painful feeling which is accompanied by ignorance, which causes another emotional reaction and more painful feeling with more ignorance, seemingly without end, until the Buddha walks by your window. Larry #60803 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jun 26, 2006 10:11 pm Subject: Helpful reminder from Phra Dhammadaro philofillet Hi all Heard this while jogging, and it really hit home: "If it's not seeing, or hearing, or tasting, or touching, or smelling, then it's mind door.That's it. Finished. They are the realities of our daily life. At this moment, and every moment that's ever been, and every moment that will ever come. If it's not one of the five sense doorway, it's the mind doorway - the experience of an object through the mind doorway. Doesn't matter what happens to you, it's just a combination of those six doors in action. Doesn't matter what theories you have, about the way the world is, or was, or should be - it's only a kind of thinking, an event through mind door." Good point to reflect on before digging into a suttantic buffet. Phil #60804 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jun 26, 2006 10:29 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta is dark . The bitter Truth. philofillet Hi Nina > N: When we see it seems that the world is light. Visible object is light. > But seeing lasts only for an extremely short moment, and then there are > other cittas. However, it seems that what appeared through the eyes is still > lasting. This is because we think with perverted saññaa about what was seen, > but has fallen away. Ah, I see. Sanna vipallasa, right? Perverted perception that leads us to think that what is impermanent is permanent, what is ugly is beautiful and two others which I forget. How very prevalent it is. But understanding that is encouraging. We have to understand how very prevalent akusala is, like it or not. > Only visible object is light, it is the only object that can be seen. It > seems to appear all day long, it seems to last. All the moments when other > objects appear or when we are thinking of concepts of trees or persons, > there is no light, there is only darkness. But in between countless moments > of seeing arise and fall away, and therefore darkness is not known. > This reminds us of the ephemeral nature of dhammas. This is not comforting, > not giving security, but it is the truth. > The truth is bitter, people do not like to hear it. Should we not prefer the > truth to make believe things? We can't always handle the truth, so we seek comfort. I do at least. But then there are times, there are moments, when the truth can be reflected on without fear, and those moments condition more of the same. There is progress. When paññaa sees the > truth, there is detachment instead of attachment. Attachment and metta do > not go together. Paññaa leads to pure metta. You know, still a lot stress these days, and turning to new age visualization, non- Buddhist meditation, but fortunately there were conditions to abstain from abusing the Buddha's teaching of brahma- viharas for emotional comfort. Metta is a cetasika that arises when there are conditions for it. It is not something that we can use at will to feel better. If we do, we are fooling ourselves and passing up the opportunity to appreciate metta when it arises, due to conditions. Pure metta, when it arises - and it does, fairly often in daily life, I find. > We can still think of persons and take care of them. With more understanding > and less selfishness. In this way the Brahma Vihaaras can be developed. The object of metta is a concept (a person) not a paramattha dhamma. That's understood. > > I want to share what I heard last night: > Without shame, hiri, and fear of blame, ottappa, one finds it useless to > understand this moment. When hiri and ottappa arise they see the danger of > not knowing realities. I think I heard that it is the sotapanna who has hiri and ottapa for not knowing realities. But nevermind. > Ignorance and wrong view take everything for 'I'. PH: BTW,I heard a good talk that helped me to understand the difference between ignorance and wrong view. Ignorance (avijja) *cannot know* It simply cannot know. Ditthi (wrong view) knows, but understands things in the wrong way. There is more in this very helpful post of yours, Nina. I hope there are conditions for me to read and reflect on the rest of it someday! I used to print out your posts and put them in a binder. I should go back to that. Much better reading them away from the computer, for me at least. Phil > The truth is bitter, people prefer to hear poetry instead of Dhamma. This > reminds me of the Drum Peg sutta, and I took this from Rob K's forum today. > There was a kettle drum, called the summoner, that became cracked and people > put pegs in. had disappeared and only a collection of pegs remained.> > > Samyutta Nikaya IX (20)7 > p708 of Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation > <...In the same way, in the course of the future there will be > monks who > won't listen when discourses that are words of the Tathagata -- > deep, > deep in their meaning, transcendent, connected with emptiness -- > are > being recited. They won't lend ear, won't set their hearts on > knowing > them, won't regard these teachings as worth grasping or > mastering. > But they will listen when discourses that are literary works -- > the > works of poets, elegant in sound, elegant in rhetoric, the work > of > outsiders, words of disciples -- are recited. ... > In this way the disappearance of the discourses that are words > of > the Tathagata -- deep, deep in their meaning, transcendent, > connected > with emptiness -- will come about.> > ***** > Nina. #60805 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 1:46 am Subject: Visuddhimagga XVII, 85, and Tiika. nilovg Visuddhimagga XVII, 85. Prenascence condition, purejaata-paccaya. Intro: Phenomena can condition other phenomena by way of conascence (sahajåta- paccaya), by way of prenascence (purejåta-paccaya) or by way of postnascence (pacchåjåta-paccaya). In the case of prenascence-condition, the conditioning dhamma has arisen prior to the dhamma it conditions. Prenascence-condition is twofold: base-prenascence-condition and object-prenascence-condition. The ruupas which are bases (vatthus) condition the cittas which are dependent on them by way of prenascence, purejaata-paccaya. Seeing arises at the eyebase (cakkhu-vatthu). This ruupa which is the eyesense (cakkhu pasaada-ruupa) and has the capacity to receive visible object, is produced by kamma. Ruupa cannot function as base at its arising moment, since it is then too weak. It can only function as base after its arising moment, thus at the time when it is present. Ruupa lasts longer than citta. When we compare its duration with the duration of citta, ruupa lasts as long as seventeen moments of citta. Thus, the ruupa which can function as eyebase has to arise before seeing-consciousness, and when seeing-consciousness arises it is still present. Kamma keeps on producing this ruupa throughout our life, also when there is no seeing. It produces all the ruupas which can function as base throughout life. The eyebase (cakkhu-vatthu) is base only for seeing-consciousness, it is not base for the other cittas arising in the eyedoor process; these have the heartbase (hadaya-vatthu) as their base. As regards object-prenascence-condition, aaramma.na-purejaata-paccaya, this refers to ruupa which can be object of citta. Since ruupa is weak at its arising moment, it can only be experienced by citta during the moments of its presence. Thus, the ruupa which is object of citta has arisen previously to that citta; it conditions that citta by way of prenascence. Visible object which impinges on the eyesense is not experienced immediately; there are first bhavanga-cittas, and then the eyedoor adverting-consciousness arises, the first citta of the eyedoor process which experiences visible object. It is succeeded by seeing-consciousness and then by the other cittas of the eye-door process. Both base and sense object condition the cittas by way of prenascence. It is the same for the cittas which experience sense objects through the other sense-doors. ---------- Text Vis.: 85. (10) A state that assists by being present, having arisen previously, is a 'prenascence condition'. ------ N: The Tiika explains that the conditioning dhamma can only be ruupa, and the conditioned dhamma can only be naama (aruupa dhamma). Thus, this condition pertains to ruupa which conditions citta and its accompanying cetasikas. The ruupas that are base (vatthu) and object, can only assist the relevant citta and cetasikas at the moment of their presence, thus, after these ruupas they have arisen. Therefore, they are prenascence-condition. That is why it is stated in the text: it assists by being present (vattamaanabhaavena upakaarako), the Tiika adds. As we have seen (Vis. §79), the ruupas which are the sense-bases condition the cittas which are dependent on those bases by way of dependence-condition, nissaya-paccaya. These realities, the ruupas which are bases and the cittas which are dependent on them, are the same as the realities involved in base-prenascence-condition. The Tiika explains that they are treated separately under prenascence-condition with the purpose of showing that the conditioning realities have arisen prior to the conditioned realities. ----------- Text Vis.: It is elevenfold as physical basis and object in the five doors, and as the heart-basis, according as it is said: 'The eye base is a condition, as prenascence condition, for eye-consciousness element and for the states associated therewith. The ear base ... The nose base ... The tongue base ... The body base ... The visible-data base ... The sound base ... The odour base ... The flavour base ... The tangible data base is a condition, as prenascence condition, for the body-consciousness element and for the states associated therewith. The visible data base ... The sound base ... The odour base ... The flavour base ... The tangible data base [is a condition, as prenascence condition,] for the mind element. ------- N: The mind element, mano-dhaatu, includes the pañca-dvaaraavajjana-citta, five-door adverting-consciousness, and the two types of receiving-consciousness (sampa.ticchana-citta), which are kusala vipaaka and akusala vipaaka. ----- Text Vis.: The materiality with which as their support the mind element and mind-consciousness element occur is a condition, as prenascence condition, for the mind-element and for the states associated therewith, ------- Mind-consciousness-element,mano-viññaa.na-dhaatu,includes the cittas other than the dvi-pañca-viññaa.nas (two pairs of sense-cognitions) and the cittas classified as mind-element. ------- Text Vis.: and it is sometimes [as in the course of an existence] a condition, sometimes [as at rebirth-linking] not a condition, as prenascence condition, for the mind-consciousness element and for the states associated therewith' (P.tn.1,4-5). ---------- N: The Tiika states with regard to: ŒThe materiality with which as their support¹ that this is the heartbase, hadaya-vatthu. In the Pa.t.thaana the heartbase is designated as that ruupa. In the planes of existence where there are five khandhas, namely nåma and rúpa, each citta needs a physical base or place of origin, and these are the five sense-bases and the heartbase. This reminds us of the interdependence of nåma and rúpa from birth to death. As the Vis. text states, the heartbase is sometimes (kiñci kaale) a condition as prenascence-condition, and the Tiika explains that this is in the course of life (pavattikaale). Sometimes it is not and that is at the moment of rebirth (pa.tisandhi kaale). At that moment the heartbase is produced by kamma at the same time as the rebirth-consciousness, here designated as mind-consciousness element, they are conascent. The Tiika emphasizes that the ruupas which are prenascence-condition are classified as twofold, namely as base and as object. As to the ruupa which is visible object, this is the object of the cittas of the sense-door process. The Tiika explains that it is also experienced through the mind-door and that it is also in that case a condition by way of object prenascence-condition. It refers to the text of the Pa.t.thaana which states that learners (ariyans who are not arahats) and worldlings understand with insight the eye as impermanent, dukkha and anattaa. In this case indeterminate (avyaakata) dhamma, namely ruupa, conditions kusala dhamma by way of prenascence-condition. The Pa.t.thaana mentions separately the arahat who understands with insight the bases and sense objects as impermanent, dukkha and anattaa. He has mahaakiriyacittas instead of mahaa-kusala cittas, and thus in this case indeterminate dhamma (ruupa) conditions indeterminate dhamma (kiriyacitta) by way of prenascence-condition. ------- Conclusion: It seems that seeing, hearing or thinking occur all at the same time, but they arise at different moments, they are dependent on different bases and they experience different objects. Seeing could not arise without the eyebase and visible object, and these ruupas have to arise previously. Visible object is not only a condition by way of prenascence for seeing, but also for other cittas, for those included in the mind-element (mano-dhaatu) and those included in mind-consciousness-element (mano-viññaa.na-dhaatu). Thus, it conditions a series of cittas arising in a process. As is mentioned in the Pa.t.thaana, these cittas also include kusala cittas and akusala cittas. This shows us that in the Abhidhamma itself there is reference to processes of cittas. Several cittas arising in a process experience the same object. When we study the manifold conditions for the realities which arise it will be clearer that there is no self who coordinates all the different experiences. Nobody can manipulate the previous arising of the bases and the objects so that the cittas arising in processes at the appropriate bases experience the relevant objects. The text of the Pa.t.thaana reminds us that also worldlings can develop insight of visible object and the other sense objects that appear so that they are seen as impermanent, dukkha and anattaa. ******* Nina. #60806 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 2:53 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta is dark . The bitter Truth. nilovg Hi Phil, op 27-06-2006 07:29 schreef Phil op philco777@...: lasting. This is because we think with perverted saññaa about what was seen, > but has fallen away. Ah, I see. Sanna vipallasa, right? Perverted perception that leads us to think that what is impermanent is permanent, what is ugly is beautiful and two others which I forget. ------ N: Yes, vipallasa. The other two are: seeing self in what is anattaa, seeing happiness in what is dukkha. -------- Ph: We can't always handle the truth, so we seek comfort. I do at least. But then there are times, there are moments, when the truth can be reflected on without fear, and those moments condition more of the same. There is progress. --------- N: Yes, we accumulate the inclination to prefer what is true to what is crooked and make belief. We can unlearn to be contented with what is a fake. Less condiitons to mislead ourselves. --------- N:> Without shame, hiri, and fear of blame, ottappa, one finds it useless to > understand this moment. When hiri and ottappa arise they see the danger of > not knowing realities. ------- Ph:I think I heard that it is the sotapanna who has hiri and ottapa for not knowing realities. ------ N: with the sotaapanna these are more developed because of his/her understanding. But for us, it can begin. Hiri and ottappa can arise and can begin to see the danger of not understanding this moment. Otherwise satipa.t.thaana could not begin. It is very basic. Kh Sujin would say: we are seeing now, how much understanding of it is there? It hits directly: O, how forgetful I am of what is right at hand. There is seeing time and again. -------- PH: BTW,I heard a good talk that helped me to understand the difference between ignorance and wrong view. Ignorance (avijja) *cannot know* It simply cannot know. Ditthi (wrong view) knows, but understands things in the wrong way. ------ N: Yes, very good. I like this quote from Phra Dhammadharo: , It is simple, short and direct, that is what I like. He said: It doesn't matter what happens to you... This is similar to: whatever comes let it come. When you are hit hard by the four unwelcome worldly conditions, this is hard to apply, I know. But stress cannot stay, it falls away with the citta that thinks about it. Nina. Nina. #60807 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 2:53 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles nilovg Hi Larry and Joop, I shall not go into the D.O. much, I am concentrated on the Vis. passages and tiikas I am doing now. Just a few remarks. op 27-06-2006 02:43 schreef LBIDD@... op LBIDD@...: . The cause of ignorance is the "taints" (aasavas). MN.9,66: "With the arising of the taints there is the arising of ignorance." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.009.ntbb.html ---- I am glad Larry quotes this passage. And there is another one: with the arising of ignorance is the arising of the taints. We cannot say: this first, than that. There is no first beginning of ignorance. I am inclined to leave dukkha untranslated. Painful feeling (and unhappy mental feeling) is actually: dukkha/dukkha, dukkha that is obvious. But people may forget that there are also dukkha in change: pleasure cannot last, it is subject to change: this is viparinama dukkha. Then there is dukkha in the deepest sense: sa.nkhaara dukkha: all conditioned dhammas that arise and fall away cannot be a refuge, they are dukkha. The five khandhas are dukkha. What is impermanent is dukkha. ***** Nina. #60808 From: "Joop" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 3:06 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles jwromeijn --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, LBIDD@... wrote: > >.... Hallo Larry, Nina, all Many thanks for your message. You said: L: " I think you are mixing together two questions: 1) does ignorance arise with sorrow, 2) what is the cause of ignorance. Sorrow is not the cause of ignorance, but ignorance arises with sorrow in ordinary, unenlightened people. The cause of ignorance is the "taints" (aasavas)." J: But in D.O. the term "arising with" is a description of "being the cause of", better is: "conditioning". It's the causal logic of D.O. So this part of your message does not convince me. I agree that an unenlightened person has sorrow AND has ignorance, but this fact is not a part of D.O. Your referring of MN 9 is very helpfull. I had read it before but had not realised that is describes D.O. (and other aspects of the Dhamma) I looked in the text for the specific D.O.-fomula and found: "11 … With the arising of craving there is the arising of nutriment" This link is not continued with another step, this is not specific about D.O. Then the links of D.O. are described by Sariputta: "22 … With the arising of birth there is the arising of aging and death" "26 … With the arising of being there is the arising of birth." … (I skipped 8 links of D.O. described in 30 … 58) "62 … With the arising of ignorance there is the arising of formations" "66 … With the arising of the taints there is the arising of ignorance" "70 … With the arising of ignorance there is the arising of the taints" In this last two links "taints" and "ignorance" are conditioning each other! A kind of mini-cycle! And again: there is not a mega-cycle of 12 links; Sariputta does neither state: "With the arising of aging and death there is the arising of ignorance" nor state: "With the arising of aging and death there is the arising of the taints". I know I'm stubborn but I repeat myself: D.O. is not a description of a cycle, it's a description of a (causal) chain. And now I can add: starting with a mini-cycle taints-ignorance-taints. The rest of your message is a correct description of (a part of) the Dhamma but not a specific description of D.O. Metta Joop #60809 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 3:38 am Subject: Abhidhamma Framework. nilovg Hi Howard, I was tidying my files, because tomorrow I shall have a new computer. I started a post to you on namarupic streams, on citta not being a concept, etc. It went straight to cyber heaven I lost it. But I was not satisfied with my answer. I write anew, but in parts. By the way, I am worried about Sarah and Jon, it is unusual we do not hear anything. But Switserland is no good for internet cafe. I cannot find the right way to answer you. What you say is very logical, certainly worth thinking over. I cannot say much in response to it, but still, I feel that something is lacking that I cannot express so well. The main reason is that I very much take to the Abhidhamma: it is straight, clear and directed to the understanding of the dhamma appearing now. All the time I hear Kh Sujin¹s voice: what about this moment? I keep this in mind when learning about citta, cetasika, ruupa, nibbaana as being realities. What about this moment? All the rest are concepts, but concepts not to be despised I have to add. Citta is accompanied by several cetasikas, but citta and cetasikas are ultimate realities each with their own characteristic. Paññaa can directly experience these when they appear one at a time. Also this moment now when there is seeing or feeling uneasy. All of them are realities. On Rob K¹s forum there are some useful quotes which can clarify why I think the way I do, in the way of paramattha dhammas. Quote of Co to Kindred Sayings: ³Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many sheaths, each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional formations is an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own characteristic.² ³Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (maayaa) in the sense that it is insubstantial and cannot be grasped. Consciousness is even more transient and fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a person comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is different in each of these activities. Consciousness deceives the multitude like a magical illusion.² ------ N: Citta arises and falls away, and this we cannot say of concepts, these do not arise and fall away. Note: an assemblage of many phenomena as you also pointed out, but: each with its own characteristic.. This is important. The word characteristic points to reality that can be directly known by paññaa. Robert has on his forum a good quote from Karunadasa on paññatti: The Dhamma Theory Philosophical Cornerstone of the ABHIDHAMMA Y. Karunadasa The Wheel Publication No. 412/413 (Buddhist Publication society) Karunadasa: I know you do not like the word sabhaava, but when taken in the right way it is a term that can help to understand the difference between realities and concepts. I shall write more on this, but before concluding: you said that the relations between dhammas as described in the Patthaana are not realities (I cannot quote you since I lost your posts). I see it this way: there is a conditioning force in the conditioning dhamma and this force is inherent in it. We cannot separate the conditions from the dhammas, we should not think about them in an abstract way. Today I was studying the Vis.: Read for state: dhamma. The dhamma itself is prenascence condition. There is a conditioning force in it. In general I would say that the Abhidhamma does not refer to abstractions, it refers to this moment now. And this makes all the difference in the way we look at it and study it. If I have time I come back to other points, such as nama-rupic streams etc. Nina. #60810 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 1:24 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework. upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 6/27/06 7:00:44 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > I was tidying my files, because tomorrow I shall have a new computer. I > started a post to you on namarupic streams, on citta not being a concept, > etc. It went straight to cyber heaven I lost it. But I was not satisfied > with my answer. I write anew, but in parts. --------------------------------------- Howard: Thank you, Nina! :-) --------------------------------------- > By the way, I am worried about Sarah and Jon, it is unusual we do not hear > anything. But Switserland is no good for internet cafe. ------------------------------------- Howard: I hope (and suspect) that must be why. Have you written them by another email address of theirs that they use for personal mail only and not for the list? If internet cafes are difficult to come by there, perhaps they can't take the time to check DSG posts, but they might check their personal mail. Nina, I'm on my way out of the house now and don't have time at the moment for the rest of your post. I will read it and reply to it later today. ===================== With metta, Howard #60811 From: Ken O Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 6:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] On rebirth ashkenn2k Hi Nina When Ajhan Sujin keep saying about seeing is reality, it does not strike me when I first met her on 2004. Recently, I start to appreciate it because it starts to dawn on me that this is a very profund dhamma. As what you say kilesa, our senses are so quickly seize by pleasant objects. This below is a beautiful passage, all the gist of dhamma in one passage. Simple but profound dhamma. Kilesa, craving, 4NT, D.O are all encapsulate in one passage. AN I ii 1-10, Abandoning the Hindrances <> Cheers Ken O p.s. you are right, it is unusual for Sarah and Jon being absent for quite a few days. #60812 From: "kanchaa" Date: Mon Jun 26, 2006 7:50 pm Subject: Abhidhhama Guidence! kanchuu2003 Please suggest me how do I start understanding Abhiddhama Teching. Could anyone suggest me the site for the begginers? I would be very thankful if any Bhante or anyone would like to guide me. #60813 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 3:29 am Subject: Truth Triumphs ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: Drops of Dhamma Delight 2- Sabbedânam Dhammadânam Jinâti! The gift of Dhamma conquers all other gifts... Dhp 354 ------------------------------------------------------------------- For those looking for Devices to Calm, Ease, Freedom & Peace: Alien Remote and Other Anger and Irritation Assured & Ascertained Awakening At All Times Awareness by Breathing Because of Not Examining Because of Not Knowing Best Protection Beyond Release Blazing & Bright Blazing Friendliness Bodily and Mental Feeling Boiling but burnt Bondage Buddha on Kamma Burning By Nature Careful & Rational Attention Careless & Irrational Attention Cause of ruination & purification Cause of Identity View Cause of Ignorance Clinging to the notion I Am Clusters and Elements Colourful but Muddy Complete Comprehension Constructive Destruction Contentment Crushing the Carrot Curing Doubt and Uncertainty Curing Lethargy and Laziness Curing Restlessness and Regret Cut Craving Dependent on Contact Desire & Lust Detached from Feeling Devoted to Wakefulness Discrete States Divine Refuge Doubt and Uncertainty Effect of Action (kamma) is Delayed Emotional Storm Empty of What Encouraging Arousal Ending Pain Itself Ending Physical Pain Ending Sadness and Frustration Endowed with Wisdom Evaporating Bad Evil Kamma enhances other Evil Evil-smelling body Kamma Fading Away Failed by Neglect Feeding the Hindrances Feeling Causes and Effects Final Destination Final Knowledge Final Tools Four Personalities Fulfilled First Ghosts Petas Good Action dilutes Evil Kamma Good Action boost Good Kamma Good Friendship Good gets Better Guarding the Sense Doors Guarding the Senses Hands and Feet Happiness of the Flesh and Beyond Happy Habit Harmlessness and Tolerance Helpers to Stream Entry Highway to Nibbana How 5 Become 10 How to Cure Anger and Irritation How to Cure Cruelty and Revengefulness How to Cure Envy and Jealousy How to Cure Ill Will How to Enter How to Escape How to Overcome Doubt How to Remove Distracting Thoughts Imperturbable Equanimity In Control In Dependence on Contact Indifference Creates Ignorance Input 'I'-dentification Joys Beyond This World Joys of the Flesh and Beyond Just a Flash Kalyanamitta Kamma is the intention! Kamma => Beauty or Ugliness Kamma => Health or Sickness Kamma => Low or High Birth Kamma => Fame or Disrespect Kamma => Folly or Intelligence Kamma => Wealth or Poverty Kamma => Short or Long Life Latent Feeling Leaving All Behind Leaving Wrong View Lethargy and Laziness Like Foam Links to Stream Entry Magnificent Mind Meditation On the Body Kayagata-Sati Megalomania Middle Way Milk and Water Mistaken Deference Moderate in Eating Naturally Radiant Nine Supremes No Nostalgia No Panic Here No Substance 'Out There' Noble Purpose Non-'I'-dentification Non-Control Not Resisting Anything Not Yours Observance Day Obstructing Corruption Of Vital Importance Origin Origin of Abilities Pacceka-Buddha Peace Perceiving Transience Poson Poya Pride Proximate Causes of the Root Defilements Rare Emergence Released by Disgust Restlessness and Regret Resultants Sacred Sights Sakka's Question Samsara Sandcastles Seed of Good Serene Equanimity and Beyond Sila 1 to 5 Solo Self-Deception Source of What Seed of Good Serene Equanimity and Beyond Sila 1 to 5 Solo Self-Deception Source of What Starving the Hindrances Stilled but not Dead Stream-Enterer The 1st Noble Truth on Suffering The 2nd Truth: The Cause of Pain The 3rd Truth on Ceasing of Pain The 4th Truth on The Noble Way The 108 Feelings The 18 Principal Insights The 24 Conditional Relations The 2 Nibbânas The 3 kinds of Craving The 3 kinds of Suffering The 4 Doors The 4 Noble Truths The 4 Persons similar to Trees The 4 kinds of Clinging The 5 Clusters of Clinging The 5 Higher Chains The 5 Lower Chains The 5 Mental Hindrances The 7 Latent Tendencies The 7 Purifications The 8 Aspects of Feeling The 9 Supremes Explained The ALL The Burning Five The Canal The Causes of Ignorance The Charcoal Pit The Core Duality The Deathless The Deathless Dimension The External Transience The Eye The Final Goal The Fire of Sense-Desire The Fisherman's Hook The Formless Dimensions The Good Friend The Internal Transience The Mirror The Ocean of Stimuli The Other Side The Source of All The Three Diseases The Three Doors The Three Fermentations The Three Jewels The Three Searches The Uncreated The Way The purpose of purification Things that can be clung to Three Basic Kinds of Feeling Transient formations Two kinds of Desire United in Harmony Uprooting Egoism Wesak 2006 What is Contact What is Ignorance What is Mara What is Nibbana What is Progress What is Sensual and Sexual Misbehaviour What is Suffering What is Virtue Who is the Creator Why I am Buddhist Without Wavering --------------------------------------------------------------- Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. #60814 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 3:25 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework. upasaka_howard Hi again, Nina - In a message dated 6/27/06 7:00:44 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > I cannot find the right way to answer you. What you say is very logical, > certainly worth thinking over. I cannot say much in response to it, but > still, I feel that something is lacking that I cannot express so well. ------------------------------------ Howard: Perhaps it is a matter of emphasis, Nina, or perhaps it is the result of reading more into what I said than is there. ----------------------------------- > > The main reason is that I very much take to the Abhidhamma: it is straight, > clear and directed to the understanding of the dhamma appearing now. All the > time I hear Kh Sujin¹s voice: what about this moment? > I keep this in mind when learning about citta, cetasika, ruupa, nibbaana as > being realities. What about this moment? All the rest are concepts, but > concepts not to be despised I have to add. ------------------------------------ Howard: There is always and only "this moment". :-) ------------------------------------ > > Citta is accompanied by several cetasikas, but citta and cetasikas are > ultimate realities each with their own characteristic. Paññaa can directly > experience these when they appear one at a time. Also this moment now when > there is seeing or feeling uneasy. All of them are realities. ---------------------------------- Howard: Fine. :-) --------------------------------- > > On Rob K¹s forum there are some useful quotes which can clarify why I think > the way I do, in the way of paramattha dhammas. > > Quote of Co to Kindred Sayings: > ³Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) is an assemblage of many > sheaths, each with its own characteristic, so the aggregate of volitional > formations is an assemblage of many phenomena, each with its own > characteristic.² > ³Spk: Consciousness is like a magical illusion (maayaa) in the sense that it > is insubstantial and cannot be grasped. Consciousness is even more transient > and fleeting than a magical illusion. For it gives the impression that a > person comes and goes, stands and sits, with the same mind, but the mind is > different in each of these activities. Consciousness deceives the multitude > like a magical illusion.² > ------ ------------------------------------------- Howard: Excellent material! (Exactly as I see matters, also!) BTW, I am not a member of that forum. ------------------------------------------- > N: Citta arises and falls away, and this we cannot say of concepts, these > do > not arise and fall away. Note: an assemblage of many phenomena as you also > pointed out, but: each with its own characteristic.. This is important. The > word characteristic points to reality that can be directly known by paññaa. ------------------------------------------- Howard: I have no problem with that in the slightest, Nina. Where I would have a problem would be if one were to take "reality" and replace it by "separate reality" or "self-existent reality". -------------------------------------------- > > Robert has on his forum a good quote from Karunadasa on paññatti: > The Dhamma Theory Philosophical Cornerstone of the ABHIDHAMMA > Y. Karunadasa > The Wheel Publication No. 412/413 (Buddhist Publication society) > Karunadasa: > delimited by rise and fall; only of the dhammas and not of the pannattis can > it be said, "They come into being having not been (ahutva sambhonti); and, > after having been, they cease (hutva pativenti)." Pannattis have no > own-nature to be manifested in the three instants of arising, presence, and > dissolution. Since they have no existence marked by these three phases, such > temporal distinctions as past, present, and future do not apply to them. > Consequently they have no reference to time (kalavimutta). For this > self-same reason, they have no place in the traditional analysis of > empirical existence into the five khandhas, for what is included in the > khandhas should have the characteristics of empirical reality and be subject > to temporal divisions. Another noteworthy characteristic of pannattis is > that they cannot be described either as conditioned (sankhata) or as > unconditioned (asankhata), for they do not possess their own-nature > (sabhava) to be so described. Since the two categories of the conditioned > and the unconditioned comprise all realities, the description of pannattis > as exempt from these two categories is another way of underscoring their > unreality."> --------------------------------------- Howard: I think Karunadasa is wonderful! His name serves him well, I'd say. ;-) ---------------------------------------- > > I know you do not like the word sabhaava, but when taken in the right way it > is a term that can help to understand the difference between realities and > concepts. --------------------------------------- Howard: I have no problem with the meaning of that word in Theravada. My objection is to using a word whose structure screams out a different meaning. -------------------------------------- > I shall write more on this, but before concluding: you said that the > relations between dhammas as described in the Patthaana are not realities (I > cannot quote you since I lost your posts). I see it this way: there is a > conditioning force in the conditioning dhamma and this force is inherent in > it. We cannot separate the conditions from the dhammas, we should not think > about them in an abstract way. ---------------------------------------- Howard: No, Nina, I said the opposite. I said that though the relations are not paramattha dhammas, they are realities nonetheless! What I wrote exactly was "A relation is not a dhamma. And yet relations are not unreal!" ---------------------------------------- > Today I was studying the Vis.: being present, having arisen previously, is a 'prenascence condition'.> > Read for state: dhamma. The dhamma itself is prenascence condition. > There is a conditioning force in it. > In general I would say that the Abhidhamma does not refer to abstractions, > it refers to this moment now. And this makes all the difference in the way > we look at it and study it. > If I have time I come back to other points, such as nama-rupic streams etc. > > Nina. > > ======================== With metta, Howard #60815 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 7:22 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhhama Guidence! nilovg Dear Kanchuu, welcome here. I think I have not seen you before? I think the way of questions and answers would be a good beginning. Like: what is Abhidhamma? What does it teach? I post each day now a small part at a time of my book Abhidhamma in daily lIfe. This may help you. Would you tell me more about your background and interest? If you are new here, I can post for you Sarah's message for beginners. The mods are away on holiday now. Hoping to hear from you, I truly rejoice in your interest, Nina. op 27-06-2006 04:50 schreef kanchaa op kanchuu2003@...: Please suggest me how do I start understanding Abhiddhama Teching. Could anyone suggest me the site for the begginers? I would be very thankful if any Bhante or anyone would like to guide me. #60816 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 7:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] On rebirth nilovg Hi Ken O, op 27-06-2006 15:28 schreef Ken O op ashkenn2k@...: When Ajhan Sujin keep saying about seeing is reality, it does not strike me when I first met her on 2004. Recently, I start to appreciate it because it starts to dawn on me that this is a very profund dhamma. ------- N: It seems we are always asleep, but when we are reminded that seeing is right there, visible object is right there, we realize that we do not have to look far for an object to develop right understanding of. I find that I can never hear enough about seeing now, hearing now. Could you download some of the audio the mods placed on ? K:As what you say kilesa, our senses are so quickly seize by pleasant objects. -------- N: I was also referring to just thinking about what we see, arising so quickly. Just defining objects, and this is usually done with attachment. But since this may be accompanied by indifferent feeling we do not notice it. Thinking is done with either kusala citta or akusala citta, but mostly with akusala citta. It is very tricky that countless times a day these pass unnoticed. We may notice desire for a beautiful thing, but attachment while defining and remembering what we see is unnoticed. Thank you for the sutta. ------ K: p.s. you are right, it is unusual for Sarah and Jon being absent for quite a few days. -------- N: I wrote to their personal mail as Howard recommended. Nina. #60817 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 7:36 am Subject: E-card from Switzerland (was, Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework.) jonoabb Hi Nina (and Howard and KenO) and All --- nina van gorkom wrote: > By the way, I am worried about Sarah and Jon, it is unusual we do not > hear > anything. But Switserland is no good for internet cafe. Thanks for your concern, Nina, Howard and KenO, and my apologies to all for our lack of communication over the past few days. Yes, it is largely due to the difficulty of getting on-line in Switzerland. Just downloading the messages and printing them out to take back and read together takes forever, leaving little or no time to start joining in any of the threads. Then there is the fact that as we get older our recovery time from the rigours of long-haul travel gets longer! But rest assured we have been following all the messages with great interest. I am hoping to get my laptop coneected up tomorrow, and to then be able to join in regularly. Until then, thanks for all the good exchanges, and keep up the good work! Jon #60818 From: "abhidhammika" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 9:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] attention Suan. sabhava. The Abhidhamma Framework abhidhammika Dear Nina, Sarah, Scott D, Christine F, Ken H, Howard, Herman, Rob M, Larry and all How are you? To my knowledge,the Buddha used the term 'sabhaava' four times, his Right-Hand Disciple, Sariputta, used it four times, and one of his Chief Disciples, Mahaa Kaccaana used it at least 19 times. So we can easily see that the term 'sabhaava' is very common during the Buddha's time, and is used by the Buddha and Arahant Disciples. No wonder, then, that the ancient noble Theravada ascetic commentators continued the tradition of using the term 'sabhaava' in their commentaries. If misguided and / or uninformed non-Theravadii whingers don't like the term, too bad! It is their problem. :-) As the references where the term occurs are only relevant to the Pali scholars and students, I won't be providing them here in this general list. The general readers won't be understanding them, anyway. :-) When I have spare time, I will post them somewhere, perhaps, on Systems Theravada Forum on the bodhiology website, a specialist venue. Another reason I won't be providing references here is that those non-Theravadii whingers usually resort to downplaying and attacking the very Nikaaya Pali sources as late additions when someone like myself shows the occurences there of a particular term unpalatable to their personal ideological agenda. As you might remember the heated debate in early 2004, Jeffery Brooks quoted a verse of Dhammapada to support his claims about samatha jhaana. When I showed another verse of Dhammapada where the Buddha used the term 'vipassanaa' in its verb form, Jeffery began to attack Dhammapada as a late addition, and stopped the debate in defeat, which was good for the Theravada Samgha who have been under attack by Jeffery. With kind regards, Suan www.bodhiology.org --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: Hi Steve, Howard, Rob, op 23-06-2006 07:02 schreef seisen_au op seisen_@...: As far as I am aware the term 'sabhava' does not occur in the Abhidhamma Pitaka. The only occurance of 'sabhava' in either the Sutta or Abhidhamma Pitaka is in the Patisambhidamagga passage on voidness. --------- N: Suan wrote a post about this, showing its occurrence in the Tipitaka, but I am not good at searching. I found something in my file, not sure it is from Suan, on emptiness and good explanations about sabhava. It is from the Co. to the Patisambhidamagga which after all belongs to the Khuddaka Nikaya. Thus, to the Suttanta. Can this be of any help? ***** Nina. #60819 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 11:04 am Subject: Re: E-card from Switzerland (was, Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework.) nilovg Dear Jon, thank you, that is very nice to hear that you are well. I understand the difficulty of communication. We also like to hear about your walking. We follow the wheather news, wondering, how is it in Switserland. Nina. op 27-06-2006 16:36 schreef Jonothan Abbott op jonoabb@...: Thanks for your concern, Nina, Howard and KenO, and my apologies to all for our lack of communication over the past few days. #60820 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 10:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] attention Suan. sabhava. The Abhidhamma Framework nilovg Dear Suan, Thank you so much for the info. I did not know that it was used so often. I am so interested to know the places where it occurs, and rest assured, there are plenty of people here who are interested to know. There will not be long debates, because these have occurred already and we can always refer to the archives. So please, do not worry and please tell us more, if you care to. Thanking you in advance, Nina. op 27-06-2006 18:09 schreef abhidhammika op suanluzaw@...: To my knowledge,the Buddha used the term 'sabhaava' four times, his Right-Hand Disciple, Sariputta, used it four times, and one of his Chief Disciples, Mahaa Kaccaana used it at least 19 times. So we can easily see that the term 'sabhaava' is very common during the Buddha's time, and is used by the Buddha and Arahant Disciples. No wonder, then, that the ancient noble Theravada ascetic commentators continued the tradition of using the term 'sabhaava' in their commentaries. #60821 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 11:20 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework. nilovg Hi Howard, op 27-06-2006 16:25 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: Howard: There is always and only "this moment". :-) ------------------------------------ N: I am so glad to hear that from you! ------------ > On Rob K¹s forum there are some useful quotes which can clarify why I think > the way I do, in the way of paramattha dhammas. > > Quote of Co to Kindred Sayings: > ³Spk: As a plaintain trunk (kadalikkhandha) usness deceives the multitude > like a magical illusion.² ------------------------------------------- Howard: Excellent material! (Exactly as I see matters, also!) BTW, I am not a member of that forum. ------ N: There is also some old correspondance on this forum with student Howard! ------------------------------------------- > N: . The > word characteristic points to reality that can be directly known by paññaa. ------------------------------------------- Howard: I have no problem with that in the slightest, Nina. Where I would have a problem would be if one were to take "reality" and replace it by "separate reality" or "self-existent reality". -------------------------------------------- N: Sorry, I think I misunderstood you on several points. -------------------------------------- > I shall write more on this, but before concluding: you said that the > relations between dhammas as described in the Patthaana are not realities (I > cannot quote you since I lost your posts). I see it this way: there is a > conditioning force in the conditioning dhamma and this force is inherent in > it. We cannot separate the conditions from the dhammas, we should not think > about them in an abstract way. ---------------------------------------- Howard: No, Nina, I said the opposite. I said that though the relations are not paramattha dhammas, they are realities nonetheless! What I wrote exactly was "A relation is not a dhamma. And yet relations are not unreal!" ---------------------------------------- N: But as I see it, these relations are paramattha dhammas, see my quote below, and many other examples in the following paras of Vis. : A dhamma that... is this or this condition.The dhamma itself is a condition. It is very concrete. Vis.: being present, having arisen previously, is a 'prenascence condition'.> > Read for state: dhamma. The dhamma itself is prenascence condition. > There is a conditioning force in it. In the case of prenascence ruupa conditions citta and cetasikas, ruupa is that condiiton. In the case of postnascence, citta and cetasikas condition ruupa that has arisen before. ----- Nina. #60822 From: nina van gorkom Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 11:22 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, no 6. nilovg Dear friends, Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 12:23 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, no 6. mlnease Hi Nina, Thanks for this, always good to re-read. Can you please tell me the Paali verb rendered 'mark'? Thanks in Advance, mike ----- Original Message ----- From: nina van gorkom To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Sent: Tuesday, June 27, 2006 11:22 AM Subject: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, no 6. Dear friends, > Dear Nina, Sarah, Scott D, Christine F, Ken H, Howard, Herman, Rob > M, Larry and all > > How are you? > > To my knowledge,the Buddha used the term 'sabhaava' four times, his > Right-Hand Disciple, Sariputta, used it four times, and one of his > Chief Disciples, Mahaa Kaccaana used it at least 19 times. > > So we can easily see that the term 'sabhaava' is very common during > the Buddha's time, and is used by the Buddha and Arahant Disciples. > No wonder, then, that the ancient noble Theravada ascetic > commentators continued the tradition of using the term 'sabhaava' in > their commentaries. If misguided and / or uninformed non-Theravadii > whingers don't like the term, too bad! It is their problem. :-) > > As the references where the term occurs are only relevant to the > Pali scholars and students, I won't be providing them here in this > general list. The general readers won't be understanding them, > anyway. :-) When I have spare time, I will post them somewhere, > perhaps, on Systems Theravada Forum on the bodhiology website, a > > specialist venue. > > Another reason I won't be providing references here is that those > non-Theravadii whingers usually resort to downplaying and attacking > the very Nikaaya Pali sources as late additions when someone like > myself shows the occurences there of a particular term unpalatable > to their personal ideological agenda. > > As you might remember the heated debate in early 2004, Jeffery > Brooks quoted a verse of Dhammapada to support his claims about > samatha jhaana. When I showed another verse of Dhammapada where the > Buddha used the term 'vipassanaa' in its verb form, Jeffery began to > attack Dhammapada as a late addition, and stopped the debate in > defeat, which was good for the Theravada Samgha who have been under > attack by Jeffery. > > With kind regards, > > Suan > > ========================= Are you specializing in right speech today, Suan? Perhaps some modification of your practice would be in order? You began with "How are you?" If only that meant that. BTW, what does 'whinger' mean? It isn't English so far as I know. The AOL online dictionary gives the following: ____________ No Matching Entries Found. The word you've entered isn't in the dictionary. Spelling Suggestions for whinger: whiner winger whine Weiner winier winner wringer ------------------------------------ My guess is that by 'whinger' you meant 'whiner', but whatever nasty meaning you intended it to carry, the use of it says more about you than anyone else. If you had bothered to pay attention, my point about the use of 'sabhava' to mean "characteristic" instead of the literal meaning of "own being" or "own nature" was that it unnecessarily opened up Theravada to attack. You see, though you seem to think you are its sole defender, I do care about Theravada, as I consider it to be the most faithful Dhamma tradition. With metta, Howard #60825 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 3:47 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles lbidd2 Joop: "I know I'm stubborn but I repeat myself: D.O. is not a description of a cycle, it's a description of a (causal) chain." Hi Joop, I don't have any problem with this. There are several ways of looking at dependent arising. We could say it is three descriptions of the same process and three ways of explaining the cause of dukkha (2nd noble truth), for example. One view can't encompass all the possibilities and even a good explanation is inherently ungraspable, as are all dhammas. Larry #60826 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 5:13 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making Theory Pra egberdina Hi Scott, Thanks for the paraphrase. That is a good communication method. Some more clarifications follow. On 26/06/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > You are welcome. I may have more questions but first... > > H: "...We say that any consciousness has an object. And you say that > > to be an object means to be this. And that is where the party line > stops. But I don't. Because to be this means to be THIS AND NOT THAT. > An object is defined, bounded by WHAT IT IS NOT. The same goes for > notions of identity. You are defined by what you are not. To be you > means to be not anybody else." > > > You are saying, then, that something is both what it is and what it is > not. And you focus on the boundaries of a given thing, seeming to say > that it is a thing insofar as it is itself and then, its thing-ness > ends when its non-thing-ness begins. These are spatial metaphors, > really, if I am following you, especially when notions of boundary are > invoked. And you seem to be saying that what an object is not can > also be an object. > Yes, I can see the spatial emphasis. But the thrust of the argument is that any object is in fact a selection from an unobjective field of possibilities. It is intention that selectively attends, thereby creating a foreground object where there is none. The boundaries which delimit our intended objects also come out of nothing, as it were. They are also intentions. Take a page in a book. We say it is full of writing. But it is much fuller of non-writing. Take a piece of music. We say it is full of sound. Yet it is suffused with silence. Take the waking state. We say it is full of consciousness, yet it is abstracted out of unconsciousness. > H: "The Dhamma (the true one, the one that I know heaps about :-)), > > is also suffused with negation and nothingness. The 3 characteristics > are framed negatively. Anatta is a negation, as is anicca, and > argument could be made re dukkha in the same vein." > > > You seem to be stating that something is "suffused" with something > else. This implies a thing to be suffused and suffusing thing. These > are metaphors of volume (still spatial, really), or the dynamics of > liquids or gases. > > In stating that anatta and anicca, at least, are "negations" you seem > to be giving these things a dynamic force and the status of entities. > You then seem to be implying that, since at least these two of the > three characteristics of all conditioned dhammas are "negations" that > they therefore suffuse all dhammas with this "negation" therefore all > dhammas are "nothing." > > You essentially posit that a higher-order concept called "nothingness" > which is a force and a characteristic of two if not three of the > original characteristics of dhammas. > Nothingness is certainly higher-order, but nothingness, like emptiness, like anatta, like anicca, are not things. They are absence. They are what is there in the absence of intention. The world of things is nothing but the world of intentions. > H: "But most significant of all...the driving force of our being is > > craving. I want to highlight craving for becoming and not-becoming in > this regard. Why? Because this craving is simply a craving for WHAT IS > NOT (yet). We are forever looking to replace what is with what is not. > To be human is to be lacking." > > > Here you seem to be saying that since we crave something that is not > what we have now - that the craving is directed to some as yet not > clung to object - then the object of craving is a not-yet-object. > Here you seem to, as earlier, use the concept of time to shore up your > argument; at least, as in this case, the future, including its > potential objects which will be then subject to craving. > To be completely clear on these issues would require a very large volume of edited and re-edited writing, which is beyond my aim in discussing. But the more significant craving is not for objects, it is for being and not being. And that is dukkha, because it is simply inherent in the structure of being that being is predicated on nothing(ness). Being and nothingness are inseperably intertwined. Go Buddha!! Go Sartre! > Please let me know if I have it or not; or please clarify what I have > misunderstood. > I hope any of it makes some sense. If in doubt, keep asking, but the replies may take some time :-) Kind Regards Herman #60827 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 5:38 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework. egberdina Hi Howard and Nina, On 28/06/06, nina van gorkom wrote: > > > Howard: > There is always and only "this moment". :-) > ------------------------------------ > > N: I am so glad to hear that from you! > The quotation marks are significant. Because this moment is not available for analysis or synthesis. And "this moment" is whatever we intend it to have been. Kind Regards Herman #60828 From: "robmoult" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 6:58 pm Subject: The Development of the Theravada Abhidhamma robmoult Hi All, Some time ago, I was shocked when I heard a meditation teacher wrongly refer to the seventeen thought moments of the sense-door process as the word of the Buddha. For many people, the Abhidhamma is what is included in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha. This is because the Abhidhammattha Sangaha is the basis of popular Abhidhamma texts such as "A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma" by Bhikkhu Bodhi and "Buddha Abhidhamma Ultimate Science" by Dr. Mehm Tin Mon. The Abhidhammattha Sangaha was written about 1500 years after the Buddha's parinibbana and includes many concepts introduced after the compilation of the seven books of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. This article discusses the origin of the Abhidhamma Pitaka and the later additions (the seventeen thought moments are one of these "later additions"). The traditional view on the origin of the Abhidhamma ==================================================== The traditional origin of the Abhidhamma is detailed in the Introductory Discourse of Buddhaghosa's Atthasalini, his commentary to the Dhammasangani (the first book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka): "During the fourth week [after His enlightenment] He sat in a jewel house in the north-west direction. The jewel house here does not mean a house made of the seven jewels but the place where he contemplated the seven books [of the Abhidhamma]. And while He contemplated the contents of the Dhammasangani, His body did not emit rays; and similarly with the contemplation of the next five books. But when, coming to the Great Book [the Patthana], He began to contemplate the twenty-four causal relations of condition, of presentation, and so on, His omniscience certainly found its opportunity therein… Rays of six colours – indigo, golden, red, white, tawny, and dazzling [note: the origin of the colours of the Buddhist flag] – issued from the Teacher's body, as He was contemplating the subtle and abstruse Law by His omniscience which had found such opportunity." Seven years later, during the three months of the rainy season retreat, the Buddha went to Tavatimsa heaven to teach the Abhidhamma to his former mother and many other Devas. Reciting the entire Abhidhamma takes three months and only Devas can remain in a single posture for that length of time. Each day, when it was time for the Buddha to descend from Tavatimsa heaven for His alms-round, the Buddha created an image of Himself and willed that the created Buddha teach the Dhamma so much during His absence. After His daily alms- round, the Buddha met Sariputta and told him that so much had been taught during the interval. Thus, there are three versions of Abhidhamma: - Taught by the Buddha in Tavatimsa Heaven (long version) - Taught by the Buddha to Sariputta (short version) - Taught by Sariputta to 500 monks (medium length version; this is the version of the Abhidhamma passed to us) Buddghosa's Atthasalini continues, "The textual order of the Abhidhamma originated with Sariputta; the numerical series in the Great Book [the Patthana] was also determined by him. In this way the Elder, without spoiling the unique doctrine, laid down the numerical series in order to make it easy to learn, remember, study and teach the Law." Buddhaghosa explains that the table of contents of the fifth book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, the Kathavatthu, was initially laid out by the Buddha but later expanded upon by Moggaliputta Tissa at the time of the third council, as foreseen by the Buddha. Buddhaghosa thereby justifies the inclusion of the Kathavatthu as one of the seven books of the Abhidhamma Pitaka. My personal view on the origin of the Abhidhamma ================================================ The Pasadika Sutta (DN29) recounts the dissention among the followers of the Jain founder, Nigantha Nataputta, immediately following his death. The Buddha then instructs that shortly after His death, the Sangha should, "… come together and recite [the 37 Bodhipakkhiya- Dhamma, the requisites of enlightenment], setting meaning beside meaning and expression beside expression, without dissension, in order that this holy life may continue and be established for a long time…". The Sangiti Sutta (DN33) takes place soon after the events of the Pasadika Sutta. In the Sangiti Sutta, Sariputta leads a group of monks in chanting an extended list of 230 items. In his translation of the Digha Nikaya, Maurice Walshe comments that the listing has been compared by different writers to the matika of the Abhidhamma. The matika is an extensive "table of contents" which appears at the beginning of the Dhammasangani; it lists 122 modes of classification found in the Abhidhamma texts. My personal view is that at the time of the first recital, held soon after the Buddha's parinibbana, the Abhidhamma texts may not have existed in their present form (as claimed by Buddhaghosa), but that there were certainly a lot of lists in existence with accompanying material "setting meaning beside meaning and expression beside expression". It is quite possible that the matika of the Abhidhamma was already in place by this time. The first schism occurred at the second council, held about a century after the Buddha's parinibbana. At this time, the Mahasangha monks (the first Mahayanists) split from the more traditional Sthaviravada monks (the forerunners of the Theravadins) over doctrinal points. The most important disagreement involved the handling of money. The Sthaviravada monks did not want to change the original rule banning the handling of money by monks. In his historical book, "Indian Buddhism", A K Warder states, "already within the first two centuries after the parinibbana, and in a great part before the First Schism, a substantial development [of the Abhidhamma] had taken place." My personal view is that if the Abhidhamma texts as we know them today were largely developed within such a short time of the parinibbana, that the conservative Sthaviravada monks would not have been willing to create a third Pitaka (the Abhidhamma) if much of the material were not known to be in existence at the time of the Buddha. The evolution of the Abhidhamma =============================== The Abhidhamma Pitaka consists of seven books, each with a very different style of presentation: - Dhammasangani (Buddhist Psychological Ethics): A detailed listing of all phenomena with an analysis of consciousness (citta) and accompanying mental factors (cetasikas) - Vibhanga (Book of Analysis): Eighteen essays analyzing topics such as aggregates (khandha), bases (ayatana), elements (dhatu), truths (sacca), faculties (indriya), dependent origination (paticcasamuppada), etc. - Dhatukatha (Discourse on Elements): Sub-groupings of the five aggregates (khandha), twelve bases (ayatana) and eighteen elements (dhatu) - Puggalapannatti (Designation of Human Types): Different types of individuals are classified in a form following the Anguttara Nikaya. - Kathavatthu (Points of Controversy): Written by Moggaliputta Tissa during the third council to list and refute doctrinal points of other schools - Yamaka (Book of Pairs): This text has not been translated. It records pairs of questions with their opposites. - Patthana (Conditional Relations): This massive text has only been partially translated. The Patthana details the 24 ways in which the phenomena described in the Dhammasangani interrelate with each other. The Abhidhamma Pitaka was maintained as an oral tradition for about five hundred years. About two thousand years ago, the three Pitakas (Vinaya, Sutta and Abhidhamma) were written down in Sri Lanka. A large number of commentaries, some dating back to the time of the Buddha, were also written down at this time. These commentaries were the source material for Buddhaghosa's commentaries written about fifteen hundred years ago. Buddhaghosa saw himself as compiler of existing materials. He made an effort not to insert his own opinion into the commentaries (in those few cases where Buddhaghosa does express an opinion, it is clearly identified). Because much of the source material dated back to the time of the Buddha, the Theravada tradition accepts Buddhaghosa's works as supplements to the canon. According to legend, Buddhaghosa was converted to Buddhism when he heard a passage from the Dhammasangani. Buddhaghosa's commentaries not only explain the Abhidhamma, they also show how the Abhidhamma can be applied to interpret the Suttas. Buddhaghosa's source materials have all been lost with the exception of the Milinda Panha (Debates of King Milinda) and Upatissa's Vimuttimagga (Path of Freedom). The Vimuttimagga has a similar structure to Buddhaghosa's encyclopedic Visuddhimagga (Path of Purity); both texts are structured around the themes of virtue / concentration / wisdom (sila / samadhi / panna). The main contribution of the Vimuttimagga to the Abhidhammattha Sangaha is the laying out of the names and order of the thought moments in the sense door process. The Abhidhammattha Sangaha expands on this structure by providing quantities (such as seven javana thought moments), crafting a mind door process and the processes for events such as rebirth and attainments. At the same time that Buddhaghosa was expanding on the Tipitaka with his commentaries, Buddhadatta was developing a condensed version of the Abhidhamma Pitaka to be used as a study guide. His text, Abhidhammavatara, is only 138 pages long and is written completely in verse to make it easy to memorize. Buddhadatta provided a simple yet comprehensive structure to condense the massive collection of details found in the Abhidhamma Pitaka. For example, the opening section of the Dhammasangani lists wholesome "dhammas" using multiple overlapping groupings (absorption factors, faculties, path factors, powers, wholesome roots, etc.) largely taken from the Suttas. Buddhadatta eliminates the overlap ("wisdom" is part of seven different groupings in the Dhammasangani). Using this approach of eliminating overlap, Buddhadatta comes up with a condensed list of 52 mental factors (cetasikas) and this structure was also used by Anuruddha in his Abhidhammattha Sangaha. The Abhidhammattha Sangaha serves the same purpose as the Abhidhammavatara – to provide a concise overview of the Abhidhamma Pitaka and related materials. The Abhidhammattha Sangaha owes much of its framework to the Abhidhammavatara. For example, it was Buddhadatta who introduced consciousness, 52 mental factors, 28 types of matter and Nibbana as metaphysical "realities" as distinct from "concepts". The Abhidhammattha Sangaha fills only 50 pages in Pali. Though it is quite short, the scope of the Abhidhammattha Sangaha is extensive. The Abhidhammattha Sangaha builds on previous works and adds considerable detail not found in earlier works. My advice ========= One should view the Abhidhammattha Sangaha as it was intended – as a starting point in the study of the Abhidhamma. Having grasped an overview of the subject from the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, one should then proceed to study the Abhidhamma Pitaka and it will then be clear what materials in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha were "later additions". These later additions are not necessarily wrong or embellishments, but they can be viewed as non-core teachings. Though non-core teachings may be interesting to discuss, they should not distract us from the important themes contained in the Tipitaka. Metta, Rob M :-) #60829 From: "robmoult" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 7:33 pm Subject: Communication robmoult Hi Ken H, I am acutely aware that I have an outstanding message from you to which I have not replied. I am also aware that this is not the first time that I have left you hanging. You put thought and effort into your message to me and it feels wrong not to reply. For years, I have had a wish to bridge the communication gap that I feel arises between us. Somehow, I want to get close to being on the same page as you. I have even voiced this desire to build a bridge between you and I when I have had face to face chats with Phil, Sukin and Sarah (all on separate occasions). In a recent message to me (the one that I have not answered), you wrote, "Maybe I can't speak as an impartial observer, but it seems to me that these perennial objections have been comprehensively dealt with at DSG every time they have been raised. But I am happy to start again. :-) Just taking one of them for now: please explain how ontological arguments could be other than central to any and every rational field of endeavour. Surely, in order that sensible, cohesive, progress can be made, all sciences and philosophies begin by settling on what is to be accepted as real and what is to be rejected as imaginary." Perhaps this is at the core of our communication gap. You view ontology as "central to any and every rational field of endeavour". I view ontology as a narrow slice of intellectual metaphysics with little if any relevance to any other subject. I do not see ontology as being linked to any of the subjects that we group under the term, "science". I am not aware of any ontological discussions in other religions (Christianity, Islam, Judiasm, etc.), though I could be wrong. I also do not see any ontology in the Tipitaka - I view ontology as a later topic of discussion that found its way into Buddhism, but not at all core to the Buddha's teachings. Obviously, you strenuously diagree with my perspective. Ken H, I have a proposal to help in our communication. Can we put aside any discussion of ontology in our exchanges? Perhaps over time, our viewpoints may converge. I make this proposal because I don't like leaving threads dangling as I have with you, but at least for now, ontological differences between us seem unresolvable. Metta, Rob M :-) #60830 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 5:34 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework. upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 6/27/06 2:54:02 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > BTW, I am not a > member of that forum. > ------ > N: There is also some old correspondance on this forum with student Howard! > ======================== There IS? I thought that was a rather new forum, and one that I am not a member of. Can you say more please? With metta, Hwoard #60831 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 5:41 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework. upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 6/27/06 2:54:02 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > N: But as I see it, these relations are paramattha dhammas, see my quote > below, and many other examples in the following paras of Vis. : A dhamma > that... is this or this condition.The dhamma itself is a condition. It is > very concrete. > Vis.: >being present, having arisen previously, is a 'prenascence condition'.> > >Read for state: dhamma. The dhamma itself is prenascence condition. > >There is a conditioning force in it. > In the case of prenascence ruupa conditions citta and cetasikas, ruupa is > that condiiton. In the case of postnascence, citta and cetasikas condition > ruupa that has arisen before. > ----- > ======================== Relations are associations between or among dhammas, but they are not dhammas themselves. Co-occuring is not a dhamma. Preceding is not a dhamma. The realtion "being an object of" is not a dhamma. It is a relation holding between a dhamma and the citta that is the knowing of that dhamma. The relation is not the citta, nor is it the known dhamma. It is the association between the two. Because it actually does hold, it is real. But it is not itself a dhamma. It is neither nama nor rupa. The dhammas that are related are not the same as the relation holding between them. With metta, Howard #60832 From: "abhidhammika" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 11:40 pm Subject: Sabhaava Not A Liability For Theravada Re: attention Suan: Abhidhamma Framework abhidhammika Dear Howard, Mike N, Scott D, Nina, Sarah, Herman and all How are you? (I meant it) :-) Howard asked: "BTW, what does 'whinger' mean? It isn't English so far as I know." You can look the word 'whinge' up in the Webster's Third International English Dictionary. It defines the word to mean 'moan', 'whimper'. In Australia, we sometimes hear 'whinging Pom' where Pom means a British. I got that word from the Canberra Times, TV and other Aussie media, not from a dictionary. In fact, I double-checked the spelling of that word from 'Letters To The Editor' page in the Monday, June 26 edition of the Canberra Times. I sense the word to convey the meaning of complaining in the alarmist way or whimpering way as I often hear it being used when the people in Canberra complain about government services not up to their expectation or project proposals against their wishes. Howard, if I needed to explain an Englsih word to a native speaker of English language like yourself, no wonder that a Pali term like 'sabhaava' may cause confusion and paranoia in the minds of general readers who are not familier with Pali language and its usages. Howard also warned: "If you had bothered to pay attention, my point about the use of 'sabhava' to mean "characteristic" instead of the literal meaning of "own being" or "own nature" was that it unnecessarily opened up Theravada to attack." No, Howard, the term 'sabhaava' does not open up Theravada to attack as the term 'atta' cannot open up Theravada to attack. The terms 'self', 'self-being (attabhaavo)', and 'person' are more un- Theravada than the term 'sabhaava'. But, we use those terms all the time as covenient terms of communication. So do we the term 'sabhaava'. The Burmese people adopted the Pali terms into the Burmese language since 11th century AD to the extent that we no longer have pure or stand-alone Burmese terms to describe the mental affairs (psychology, philosophy etc). That is to say, do not ask me what a consciousness is in Burmese. No, Howard, I don't know. As a Burmese, I will just say it is viññaa.na, or cit, or mano. And, what is memory in Burmese? No, I don't know. I will just say saññaa or making saññaa. What I am trying to say is that the terms like 'sabhaava' or nimit from 'nimitta' are part of every day vocabulary of Burmese people. I heard and learnt them ever since I could listen to and understand spoken Burmese. And I never understood the term 'sabhaava' to mean 'own being'. The Burmese always understand 'sabhaava' to mean nature or characteristic. Thus, if a Burmese were asked what is sabhaava of all conditioned pehnomena, then that Burmese would answer "Impermanence is sabhaava of all conditioned phenomena." Because impermanence is defined as the fact of a dhamma emerging and vanishing on the spot ("hutvaa abhaavo", from Chief Arahant Disciple Mahaa Kaccaana), we cannot substitute sabhaava of all conditioned phenomena with own-being of all conditioned phenomena. Only totally misguided and uninformed non-Theravadii would do that! Howard also wrote: "You see, though you seem to think you are its sole defender, I do care about Theravada, as I consider it to be the most faithful Dhamma tradition." Thank you, Howard. One of the best statements I read on DSG this year. But, I have reservations about your impression of me thinking myself as the sole defender of Theravada. :-) I have been feeling that I gradually becomes a follower of Theravada. Might I dare say that I am merely a beginner on the path of Theravada, starting only from last year that is 2005 as Year Zero? As I am only about one- year-old Theravadii, how can I think I am the sole defender of Theravada? Howard, my good friend, you must have been overestimating me. :-) With kind regards, Suan www.bodhiology.org #60833 From: Jaran Jainhuknan Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 11:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhhama Guidence! jjnbdal Dear Kanchaa: Your name sounds Thai. Please see the sites below for the books. Unfortunately, it a bit difficult for beginners. It is never to be read alone. We normally take our time and sit down and read together and ask questions. Here at this group, you can still ask a lot of questions. http://www.dhammastudy.com/thpar.html (thai) http://abhidhamma.org/survey6.pdf (english) http://abhidhamma.org/contents.htm (english) May I ask why are you interested in Abhidhamma? Best Regards, jaran --- kanchaa wrote: > Please suggest me how do I start understanding Abhiddhama > Teching. > Could anyone suggest me the site for the begginers? I would be > very > thankful if any Bhante or anyone would like to guide me. #60834 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 12:19 am Subject: Abh. Origin, Rob K's forum, no 1. nilovg Dear friends, here is a quote from Rob K's forum: Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 12:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The Development of the Theravada Abhidhamma nilovg Dear Rob M, thank you for your post. I add some of my 'musings' on Abhidhamma. op 28-06-2006 03:58 schreef robmoult op rob.moult@...: One should view the Abhidhammattha Sangaha as it was intended – as a starting point in the study of the Abhidhamma. Having grasped an overview of the subject from the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, one should then proceed to study the Abhidhamma Pitaka and it will then be clear what materials in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha were "later additions". These later additions are not necessarily wrong or embellishments, but they can be viewed as non-core teachings. Though non-core teachings may be interesting to discuss, they should not distract us from the important themes contained in the Tipitaka. ------- N: Abhidhammattha Sangaha certainly helps as a start. Good advice! There were many posts from Sarah, Rob K and others about the origin of the Abhidhamma. First of all: what is Abhidhamma? Not a textbook, it deals with our life now: citta, cetasika and ruupa. We cannot verify all that is in the Abhidhamma, but at least part of it. When citta with aversion arises it is accompanied by unpleasant feeling. We can verify this, the Buddha taught this. This citta is conditioned, and nobody can manipulate citta. It arises because there is the latent tendency of dosa that can condition the arising of akusala citta. When kusala citta arises it may be accompanied by pleasant feeling or by indifferent feeling. At that moment there are the cetasikas that are calm, confidence in kusala, detachment and many others. Can we not notice that the heatedness of dosa has gone and there is calm instead? These are just a few examples that Abhidhamma is our life now. This is our starting point of the study of the Abhidhamma. Also the first book, the Dhammasangani, is not a list with enumerations. It is very deep: at a certain time when kusala citta with understanding arises, there are many beautiful cetasikas that are assisting the kusala citta. Not only in the Patthaana but also here we see the intricate conditions for the arising of one citta at one moment. Also, as said before in other posts, the suttas are full of Abhidhamma. When understanding of this moment when there is seeing or attachment to what we see is developing, we can see this more and more. The suttas are full of it: when there is no sati: he sees visible object and he is attached. And so on for the other sense-doors. When there is sati he is not infatuated by the object. All the time we read about the objects experienced through the six doors, and that is Abhidhamma. The Abhidhamma is quite near to us. In this way we may discover that the Abhidhamma is the Buddha's word. But everybody has to discover it by himself. We have to develop our own understanding, not from hearsay. See the Kesaputtasutta (also called Kalamasutta). I understand that people are also wondering about the historical aspects. Rob K has collected a great deal of info from dsg archives and other articles. I shall quote from this material part by part. Dsg is a study forum and it is good when people hear different opinions. Nina. #60836 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 12:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework. nilovg op 28-06-2006 02:38 schreef Herman Hofman op hhofmeister@...:> > Howard: > There is always and only "this moment". :-) > ------------------------------------ > > N: I am so glad to hear that from you! > Herman: The quotation marks are significant. Because this moment is not available for analysis or synthesis. And "this moment" is whatever we intend it to have been. ____ N: You thought over this very well. It reminds me of Kh Sujin. She said that visible object falls away immediately and only the sign of it remains. It seems that it lasts. Being reminded that it is the sign, nimitta, helps detachment. We find visible object so important. We live as in a dream. However, this does not mean that insight cannot be developed of characteristics that appear. Sati can be aware of what has just fallen away. When insight has been developed in stages understanding becomes more precise: it can realize the arising and falling away of precisely this or that dhamma. Nina. #60837 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 12:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, no 6. nilovg Hi Mike and Larry, op 27-06-2006 21:23 schreef m. nease op mlnease@...: In the Visuddhimagga (XIV, 130) we read that saññå has the function of perceiving: ... Its function is to make a sign as a condition for perceiving again that ``this is the same'', as carpenters, etc., do in the case of timber... Thanks for this, always good to re-read. Can you please tell me the Paali verb rendered 'mark'? ------ N: The technician coming soon to change computer. Larry, if you have time, could you please find the Pali? For me, it will take a few days, I think. Nina. #60838 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 12:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] attention Suan. sabhava. The Abhidhamma Framework nilovg Hi Howard, op 27-06-2006 22:56 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: I do care about Theravada, as I consider it to be the most faithful Dhamma tradition. ______ Howard, I am really very happy to hear this from you. So there is no room for heated debates about sensitive issues. I shall also be more careful when I write to you not to ascribe ideas to you which you do not have. But certain words used can give rise to misunderstandings. We all appreciate Suan's deep knowledge and skill, and I hope he will post here his findings about sabhaava, No problem at all. Nina. #60839 From: nina van gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 12:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework, Rob Forum. nilovg Hi Howard, It is a new forum with mostly old correspondance brought together by Robert and his assistants. It is just for study and very friendly. I was pleased to see you name also in old letters. What I like is that very conveniently articles and posts about one subject are brought together. You can ask Rob himself for more info. Nina. op 28-06-2006 06:34 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: There IS? I thought that was a rather new forum, and one that I am not a member of. Can you say more please? #60840 From: "robmoult" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 1:04 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The Development of the Theravada Abhidhamma robmoult Hi Nina, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > > Dear Rob M, > thank you for your post. I add some of my 'musings' on Abhidhamma. ===== I had been asked to write an article on this subject for a Buddhist Magazine. I felt that there was something important missing from my draft, so I decided to post it on DSG. Your feedback about applying Abhidhamma in daily life is exactly what I was missing. You repeatedly stress this point so eloquently in your books and it is extremely important. I am going to add another paragraph to the closing section, "My advice" to stress the importance of viewing Abhidhamma, not merely as an academic subject, but rather a desciption of what we experience every day (if we are looking closely enough). Metta, Rob M :-) #60841 From: "matheesha" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 2:03 am Subject: Re: The Development of the Theravada Abhidhamma matheesha333 Hi RobM, I read your article and found it informative and interesting. Your permission to send it to another egroup? with metta Matheesha #60842 From: "Joop" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 2:34 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles jwromeijn Hallo Larry This discussion (with you) has helped me in my insight in DO Thanks Joop --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, LBIDD@... wrote: > > Joop: "I know I'm stubborn but I repeat myself: D.O. is not a > description of a cycle, it's a description of a (causal) chain." > > Hi Joop, > > I don't have any problem with this. There are several ways of looking at > dependent arising. We could say it is three descriptions of the same > process and three ways of explaining the cause of dukkha (2nd noble > truth), for example. One view can't encompass all the possibilities and > even a good explanation is inherently ungraspable, as are all dhammas. > > Larry > #60843 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 5:22 am Subject: Re: Communication ken_aitch Hi RobM, Thanks for your reply: it was very much appreciated. -------------- <. . .> RM: > For years, I have had a wish to bridge the communication gap that I feel arises between us. Somehow, I want to get close to being on the same page as you. I have even voiced this desire to build a bridge between you and I when I have had face to face chats with Phil, Sukin and Sarah (all on separate occasions). -------------- I hope we can bridge this gap. On matters of Dhamma, I follow K Sujin and her students as closely as I can, but you don't seem to have the same problem with them. It must be my dogmatic manner that makes the difference. You would not be the first to have a problem with that. :-) -------------------- <. . .> RM: > Perhaps this is at the core of our communication gap. You view ontology as "central to any and every rational field of endeavour". I view ontology as a narrow slice of intellectual metaphysics with little if any relevance to any other subject. I do not see ontology as being linked to any of the subjects that we group under the term, "science". I am not aware of any ontological discussions in other religions (Christianity, Islam, Judiasm, etc.), though I could be wrong. --------------------- Perhaps I am misusing the word. Sciences have axioms: is that different from ontology? If I wanted to join a mathematics discussion I would have to agree that one plus one equalled two. Any crazy theory about it equalling three would reduce the discussion to a farce. If we are going to discuss Dhamma, we will have to agree on what it was the Buddha described as having the characteristics anicca dukkha and anatta. It was not a flying purple elephant: to say it was would reduce the discussion to a farce. Nor was it any other illusory thing. Or was it? We need be clear on this. ------------------------------- RM: > I also do not see any ontology in the Tipitaka - I view ontology as a later topic of discussion that found its way into Buddhism, but not at all core to the Buddha's teachings. Obviously, you strenuously disagree with my perspective. -------------------------------- It is not a minor disagreement. There are many versions of the Dhamma, and the one that describes the real world in terms of conditioned dhammas is unique. In my opinion, the other (conventional) versions do not especially stand out among philosophies and religions. I would rather be a Humanist than an anti-Abhidhamma Buddhist. (I am not suggesting you are anti-Abhidhamma.) My question is: why is ontology such a bugbear to your way of understanding? I don't want to pry. You have loyalties to certain teachers etc., so perhaps that question is too personal. -------------------- RM: > Ken H, I have a proposal to help in our communication. Can we put aside any discussion of ontology in our exchanges? Perhaps over time, our viewpoints may converge. I make this proposal because I don't like leaving threads dangling as I have with you, but at least for now, ontological differences between us seem unresolvable. --------------------- We certainly do have a problem. My practice of reducing everything to a moment of nama and rupa has ramifications that are not always acceptable to you. By all means let's try something else. I can't imagine how it is going to work, but I look forward to seeing what you have in mind. Thanks for trying. Ken H #60844 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 5:19 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making Theory Pra scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Thank you for your ongoing clarifications. H: "...the thrust of the argument is that any object is in fact a selection from an unobjective field of possibilities. It is intention that selectively attends, thereby creating a foreground object where there is none. The boundaries which delimit our intended objects also come out of nothing, as it were." In what sense do you mean "intention?" When the selective attention of intention "creates" a foreground object, from whence does this object come? Are you saying that it doesn't exist ("come[s] out of nothing") and then is created at the moment of selective attention by intention? H: "...Take a page in a book. We say it is full of writing. But it is much fuller of non-writing. Take a piece of music. We say it is full of sound. Yet it is suffused with silence. Take the waking state. We say it is full of consciousness, yet it is abstracted out of unconsciousness." I'll need to know, as above, how you define "unconsciousness," if you can clarify. I keep reading you to posit a nothing out of which something appears. H: "Nothingness is certainly higher-order, but nothingness, like emptiness, like anatta, like anicca, are not things. They are absence. They are what is there in the absence of intention. The world of things is nothing but the world of intentions." What do you mean when you say that anatta and anicca "are not things [but] are absence?" Again, without a clear sense of what you mean by "intention," it is difficult to follow you when you assert "[t]hey are there in the absence of intention." To demonstrate my lack of understanding, the above seems as if you are saying that anatta and anicca are absence and, at the same time, they are existents in some sort of state prior to the working of "intention." I get the figure-ground analogy, except is this merely an analogy or is this more? H: "To be completely clear on these issues would require a very large volume of edited and re-edited writing, which is beyond my aim in discussing." But can't you at least clear up these definitional details? I'm thick but surely not that thick that I require "a very large volume" as a reply. (See here one of those funny faces you guys put in when you say something light and funny as I just did.) A little more clarity on some of your key points would suffice. H: "But the more significant craving is not for objects, it is for being and not being. And that is dukkha, because it is simply inherent in the structure of being that being is predicated on nothing(ness)." I wonder if it is different when one says one craves "becoming" as opposed to "being and not being?" Dukkha is "craving for being and not being?" Some of your usage of terms, to me, is idiosyncratic, and I'm afraid I get lost. Hoping you can patiently clarify... Sincerely, Scott. #60845 From: "robmoult" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 6:16 am Subject: Re: The Development of the Theravada Abhidhamma robmoult Hi Matheesha, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "matheesha" wrote: > > Hi RobM, > > I read your article and found it informative and interesting. Your > permission to send it to another egroup? > > with metta > > Matheesha ===== Certainly, I would be honoured. Metta, Rob M :-) #60846 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 2:38 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Sabhaava Not A Liability For Theravada Re: attention Suan: Abhidham... upasaka_howard Hi again, suan - In a message dated 6/28/06 2:40:56 AM Eastern Daylight Time, suanluzaw@... writes: > Dear Howard, Mike N, Scott D, Nina, Sarah, Herman and all > > How are you? (I meant it) :-) ---------------------------------------- Howard: I'm fine, thank you. I'm mollified, in fact, by your pleasant parenthetical remark. Thank you. I hope you are well also. ---------------------------------------- > > Howard asked: > > "BTW, what does 'whinger' mean? It isn't English so far as I know." > > You can look the word 'whinge' up in the Webster's Third > International English Dictionary. It defines the word to > mean 'moan', 'whimper'. -------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, good. While the dictionary, oddly, gave no listing for 'whinger' it did give a listing for 'whinge' with the meaning of 'whine'. So I did understand you correctly. -------------------------------------- > > In Australia, we sometimes hear 'whinging Pom' where Pom means a > British. > > I got that word from the Canberra Times, TV and other Aussie media, > not from a dictionary. In fact, I double-checked the spelling of > that word from 'Letters To The Editor' page in the Monday, June 26 > edition of the Canberra Times. > > I sense the word to convey the meaning of complaining in the > alarmist way or whimpering way as I often hear it being used when > the people in Canberra complain about government services not up to > their expectation or project proposals against their wishes. > > Howard, if I needed to explain an Englsih word to a native speaker > of English language like yourself, no wonder that a Pali term > like 'sabhaava' may cause confusion and paranoia in the minds of > general readers who are not familier with Pali language and its > usages. ------------------------------------------ Howard: It is likely that virtually no American except possibly for William F. Buckley has heard the word. It isn't part of the common lexicon of even literate Americans, of whom, despite current world-wide presumptions to the contrary, there are many. It seems, unfortunately, that you are in the unenviable position of having to include the great Sariputta among those you consider to be whiners. It is he who is traditionally credited with the authorship of the Patisambhidamagga. That is the only place that I personally have come across 'sabhava' in the Sutta Pitaka, and there it is negatively criticized. ----------------------------------------- > > Howard also warned: > > "If you had bothered to pay attention, my point about the use of > 'sabhava' to mean "characteristic" instead of the literal meaning > of "own being" or "own nature" was that it unnecessarily opened up > Theravada to attack." > > No, Howard, the term 'sabhaava' does not open up Theravada to attack > as the term 'atta' cannot open up Theravada to attack. The > terms 'self', 'self-being (attabhaavo)', and 'person' are more un- > Theravada than the term 'sabhaava'. But, we use those terms all the > time as covenient terms of communication. So do we the > term 'sabhaava'. --------------------------------------- Howard: In Theravada, 'atta' is used to mean what the standard meaning is, namely "self". But 'sabhava', which literally means almost the same, is used differently, and that is a poor choice. It is as if one used atta to mean something harmless like "characteristic". But the PTSM objects to the use of 'sabhava' as violating voidness! So, evidently, it's being problematical wasn't discovered just by me (or by those dreadful Mahayanists ;-). ---------------------------------------- > > The Burmese people adopted the Pali terms into the Burmese language > since 11th century AD to the extent that we no longer have pure or > stand-alone Burmese terms to describe the mental affairs > (psychology, philosophy etc). That is to say, do not ask me what a > consciousness is in Burmese. No, Howard, I don't know. As a Burmese, > I will just say it is viññaa.na, or cit, or mano. And, what is > memory in Burmese? No, I don't know. I will just say saññaa or > making saññaa. > > What I am trying to say is that the terms like 'sabhaava' or nimit > from 'nimitta' are part of every day vocabulary of Burmese people. I > heard and learnt them ever since I could listen to and understand > spoken Burmese. And I never understood the term 'sabhaava' to > mean 'own being'. ---------------------------------------- Howard: Then that explains a lot. But apparently at the time of the PTSM, the literal meaning of "own being" was alive and well. ---------------------------------------- > > The Burmese always understand 'sabhaava' to mean nature or > characteristic. > > Thus, if a Burmese were asked what is sabhaava of all conditioned > pehnomena, then that Burmese would answer "Impermanence is sabhaava > of all conditioned phenomena." > > Because impermanence is defined as the fact of a dhamma emerging and > vanishing on the spot ("hutvaa abhaavo", from Chief Arahant Disciple > Mahaa Kaccaana), we cannot substitute sabhaava of all conditioned > phenomena with own-being of all conditioned phenomena. Only totally > misguided and uninformed non-Theravadii would do that! ----------------------------------------- Howard: Perhaps in Burma, Suan. But it is not a good idea to extrapolate. --------------------------------------- > > Howard also wrote: > > "You see, though you seem to think you are its sole defender, I do > care about Theravada, as I consider it to be the most faithful > Dhamma tradition." > > Thank you, Howard. One of the best statements I read on DSG this > year. But, I have reservations about your impression of me thinking > myself as the sole defender of Theravada. :-) I have been feeling > that I gradually becomes a follower of Theravada. Might I dare say > that I am merely a beginner on the path of Theravada, starting only > from last year that is 2005 as Year Zero? As I am only about one- > year-old Theravadii, how can I think I am the sole defender of > Theravada? Howard, my good friend, you must have been overestimating > me. :-) ------------------------------------------ Howard: Suan, I underestimated you! This post of yours is a very friendly, very kind, reply to a somewhat angry post of mine. I thank you, and I congratulate you! If my previous statement was pleasing to you, I must say that your entire post is greatly pleasing to me! Thank you very much, my friend! ---------------------------------------- > > With kind regards, > > Suan > > www.bodhiology.org ============================ With metta, Howard #60847 From: kanchuu dhakal Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 7:05 am Subject: Hello! kanchuu2003 Dear Friends, Namaste! I am Nitesh Dhakal from Nepal. I was looking for Abhidhamma studies in Google and I found this group. I am interested in learning Abhidhamma. I hope with help from all the group members, I can learn some.. Sincerely, Nitesh #60848 From: Bhikkhu samahita Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 3:59 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The Unsurpassable Gift ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Dear friend Howard: It is because DSG unfortunately have chosen to disable posting in HTML Giving all the URLS would not be nice to look at. Go here: http://What-Buddha-Said.net/drops/Index.Dhamma.Drops1.htm http://What-Buddha-Said.net/drops/II/Index.Dhamma.Drops2.htm -- vandana Friendship is the Greatest... Bhikkhu Samahita #60849 From: "kanchaa" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 11:04 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhhama Guidence! kanchuu2003 Dear Nina, Thank you very much for warm welcome. I am Nitesh (Kanchuu) from Nepal. I have been trying to learn Abhidhamma from quite a time, on my own, and got lost. I would be very thankful if you could help me to start up. Once again, thank you very much for your warmth welcome.... Sincerely, Kanchuu #60850 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 1:34 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles dacostacharles Desire conditions ignorance Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of LBIDD@... Sent: Tuesday, June 27, 2006 02:44 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles Hi Joop, I think you are mixing together two questions: 1) does ignorance arise with sorrow, 2) what is the cause of ignorance. Sorrow is not the cause of ignorance, but ignorance arises with sorrow in ordinary, unenlightened people. The cause of ignorance is the "taints" (aasavas). MN.9,66: "With the arising of the taints there is the arising of ignorance." http://www.accessto insight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.009.ntbb.html ... #60851 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 1:28 pm Subject: RE: [dsg] Book review -- The Buddha's Path dacostacharles Dear Nina, This is a quick reply; I get to the rest later. When I said �basic� I meant simplistic, the Abhidhamma is far from simplistic. Therefore, when you say something is �not easy to understand� that means it is not basic. What would be basic is to hold a view that the tree is real, impermanent, has component parts, and does not have a soul. Impermanent means not lasting, changing, -- it does not matter what it is, tree, visible object, concept, � etc.. All these things are impermanent, i.e., have a limited existence, and changes. The Kindred Sayings IV describes concepts at a level that is somewhat basic. The Abhidhamma greatly expands on those same concepts. Now whether or not the Abhidhammic (i.e., philosophical) description of the same concepts is correct for interpreting the sutras is another story. I say this because I believe they are different teachings for different types of people; and in a lot of places they are not meant to be unified, and some times they may even contradict. Now I do believe that the Abhidhamma is a philosophical attempt to explain what is in a lot of the sutras. Got to go Charles DaCosta _____ The 5 ascetics: N: They had deeply accumulated pa��aa in former lives, a few words were enough for them. When we carefully read the suttas we can see that they are full of Abhidhamma. In the Kindred Sayings IV this is very obvious. -------- I don�t recall the sutras saying anything about the past lives of the 5 ascetics. Ch: It even cleared up a misunderstanding of Sara's posts on ". Trees ." about trees not being real - only the visual objects: color, light, etc.. Because of what I read, now I can tell Sara that realities are compounded entities and in the case of "Trees" the visual objects are in the list of aggregates that make up the entity called a Tree. ------ N: This is not quite so, but the subject is not easy to understand. Through eyes visible object or colour appears but this falls away immediately. We keep on thinking of the shape and form of a tree and it seems to be staying in a certain place. In fact every single ruupa arises and falls away all the time. Since ruupas are replaced it seems that there is a tree everlasting. We think of the concept tree, and thinking of a concept is not always wrong. It depends on the citta that thinks, whether it is right thinking or wrong thinking. But I only want to touch a little on this subject now. ----------- ... #60852 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 11:21 pm Subject: The Seven Fruits ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: The Seven Fruits of Developing the Seven Links to Awakening! The Blessed Buddha once said: Bhikkhus, when the Seven Links to Awakening have been developed, completed and refined, the winning of the seven fruits is indeed to be expected. What are the benefits of these seven fruits? Regarding this, either: 1: One attains final knowledge early in this very life. Or: 2: One attains final knowledge at the time of death. Or: Having destroyed the five lower chains and spontaneously re-arisen; 3: One attains Nibbana in the first half of the life as a divine brahma. Or: 4: One attains Nibbana in the second half of the life in these pure abodes. Or: 5: One attains Nibbana as a noble non-returner without effort. Or: 6: One attains Nibbana as a noble non-returner with some effort. Or: 7: One is bound upstream, surely heading towards the Akanittha realm. When, bhikkhus, these Seven Links to Awakening have been thoroughly developed and cultivated exactly in this way, these seven fruits & benefits may be expected... Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V:69-70] section 46: The Links.3: Morality... Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. #60853 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Tue Jun 27, 2006 6:38 am Subject: RE: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles dacostacharles HI Joop, I am sorry for you but glad at the same time. Reading your struggles with DO is a good thing to me. I will add that it was a common belief among Indians at the time of the Buddha that life/all was cyclic, like the seasons. Therefore it is a common logical/intuitive short leap that sees sorrow giving rise to ignorance or wisdom, and ignorance giving rise to sorrow. However, there is a linear approach to DO too. This relates more to the one life-time model. PS: one hint, it is best to study DO in light of the WoL. Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Joop Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 11:05 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles Hallo Larry, All You ended your message with a question: "You are correct. The Buddha doesn't say, 'when there is sorrow there is ignorance', as far as I know (which isn't far). But he does say ignorance is not knowing dukkha. Therefore it seems reasonable to say when there is dukkha there is ignorance and sorrow certainly qualifies as dukkha. How do you see it?" I don't have an definitive answer. The last month I tried to understand Dependent Origination; I don't know why, call it 'buddhist intuition' that I had to do it now. I tried to understand the principles behind D.O., the individual factors and the individual links between the factors. And the ways DO can be applied, three in my opinion: within one moment, within a life and three lifetimes. And all the time it was implicit evident that D.O. was a cycle (Most times the term 'wheel' is used but after my mathematics study I define a wheel as a cycle) So I was very surprised a week ago when I realised that that was not based on the Teachings of the Buddha in the Suttas. It was based on the many drawing I have seen and admired: Tibetan and Thai. But it is a mystification and I'm afraid Ven. Buddhaghosa played a role in this mystification. ... #60854 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 2:48 am Subject: Re: [dsg] attention Suan. sabhava. The Abhidhamma Framework upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 6/28/06 3:19:47 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > op 27-06-2006 22:56 schreef upasaka@... op upasaka@...: > I do care about > Theravada, as I consider it to be the most faithful Dhamma tradition. > > ______ > Howard, I am really very happy to hear this from you. So there is no room > for heated debates about sensitive issues. I shall also be more careful when > I write to you not to ascribe ideas to you which you do not have. But > certain words used can give rise to misunderstandings. > We all appreciate Suan's deep knowledge and skill, and I hope he will post > here his findings about sabhaava, No problem at all. > Nina. > > ======================= I found Suan's last post to me to be not less than delightful! Due to Suan's temperate and kind words, all heat has dissipated! :-) With metta, Howard #60855 From: "jonoabb" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 8:01 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) jonoabb Hi Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Sarah and all, ... > I would equate the statement that the world is this single citta with > a definition of solipsism. Not sure why you say this, and would appreciate your elaboration if you cared. As I see it, 'the world' as used by the Buddha in the teachings means the world of the present instant, not the world at large in the conventional sense. > I would agree that such notions are > implicit in certain revered texts. But texts that cannot or do not > account for the existence of other beings/minds are solipsist. And > they are extremely poor philosophy, in my book. Because the very fact > of the existence of the text denies the beliefs held in them. Why > write a book if there is no audience? Well that is one inference to be argued. But could it not equally be said that that existence of such texts indicates that the existence of other beings is *not* being denied. Perhaps the statement has a different meaning to that which you take it to have. > I think that you are equating > Dhamma with solipsism in the above, and I would suggest that > displacing the reality of suffering from a human level to a citta > level can only be temporarily maintained, and is at best a diversion. More inferences on your part ;-)). But as a general comment I would say that seeing the teachings as relating at the level of cittas, etc does not mean forfeiting the human aspect of the world. If anything, it helps one have more respect for other beings (if that's the kind of thing you have in mind). Jon #60856 From: "jonoabb" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 7:47 am Subject: E-card from Switzerland (was, Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework.) jonoabb Hi Nina and All Thanks for the note. We are staying in a small flat in a chalet in Zermatt (in the Swiss alps). We are out of the door by 6:00 in the morning for an early walk, with our main walking for the day done after breakfast. After the day's walking is done there are meals to be prepared, internet cafe to visit, downloaded posts to be read, and for me some office commitments to keep up on (I have just managed to get my laptop connected in an internet cafe, so at least I can now download my incoming work files. Still working on getting on-line in the flat itself ...). Weather is mainly fine with the occasional rainstorm (just to keep us on our toes). The flat is a self-catering arrangement, so we do all our own cooking, washing, shopping for food etc. Sarah's mother Kate (who sends her regards to you and Lodevijk) has the living room sofa for her bed. Life is simple but enjoyable ;-)) Best to all Jon --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, nina van gorkom wrote: > > Dear Jon, > thank you, that is very nice to hear that you are well. I understand the > difficulty of communication. We also like to hear about your walking. We > follow the wheather news, wondering, how is it in Switserland. > Nina. #60857 From: Daniel Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 8:06 am Subject: Words sbhtkk Hi all, I was wondering if anyone has any insights on how we understand words of other people and what levels of understanding exist? I am not sure of that, but it might be that we never know the meaning of other's person's words since we can never read their mind. I define the "meaning" of a word as "that which the person himself wants to express with the word". Using this definition, I would say that one can Never know the meaning of of another person's word in the way that we know the meaning of the words we use. So how do you think communication works? Yours, Daniel #60858 From: "jonoabb" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 8:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) jonoabb Hi Howard Thanks for explaining the meaning of 'solipsism', which has helped me understand Herman's post to Sarah on this point ;-)) Regarding what you refer to here as the impact of other mindstreams on one's own, I'm wondering in what respect it is said the abhidhamma fails to take account of that (I realise you are not putting that view rofward as your own). It seems to me that the paramattha dhammas of the teachings take account of all 'impacts' on the mindstream regardless of the source of those impacts (other mindstreams or non-mindstreams, as it were). Grateful for anything you could add on this. Thanks. Jon --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Nina (and Herman) - ... > Unless I'm misunderstanding Herman, I don't think he's addressing the > conventional-versus-actual issue, but the matter of multiple mindstreams. Both > the Sutta Pitaka and the Abhidhamma Pitaka talk in terms of the phenomena of > a single namarupic stream, analyzing its elements into 5 khandhas or into > ayatanas or into rupas, cittas, and cetasikas, but always within a single > mindstream. I think there is a good reason for doing that, namely that this is all > that is directly available within a given mindstream, and liberation is achieved > within individual mindstreams, and not by inferential knowledge, but by direct > knowing. > But part of what occurs within a mindstream "points" to other > namarupic streams, and not dealing with them and their impact on "one's own" > mindstream at the "ultimate" level of analysis seems to be missing from the Dhamma, > though, of course, the Dhamma recognizes other namarupic streams at the > conventional level of "other beings". If one were to take the ignoring of other > namarupic streams at the dhammic level of analysis to imply that there is, in fact, > only one's own mindstream, that would be an instance of solipsism, the > philosophical belief that "I" alone exist. > > With metta, > Howard #60859 From: Ken O Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 8:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On Rebirth to Daniel ashkenn2k Hi Daniel > Could you tell me why do you think that the point of view of the > Theravada is more right than the annihilistic view? > I think that it is not evident ; so one needs a reason for this. Sorry for the delay reply DN 1, Brahmajala Sutta <<3.10 [Wrong View 51] "Here a certain ascetic or Brahim declares and holds the view: "Since this self is material, composed of the four great elements, the product of mother and father, at the breaking-up of the body it is annihilated and persihes and does not exist after death. This is the way in which self is annihilated." That is how some proclaim the annihilation, destruction and non-existence of being">> If there is total annhilation, one will do unwholesome conduct as one does not see the danger in them. MN60 Apannaka Sutta <<5 (A) "Householders, there are some recluses and brahims whose doctrine and view is this: "There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother; no father no beigns who are born spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and brahims in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world. . . 7 (A.i) "Now householders of those recluses and brahims whose doctrine and view is this "There is nothing given....... no good and virtuous recluses and brahims in the world who have themselves realised by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world," it is expected that they will avoid these three wholesome states, namely good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct and good mental conduct and that they will undertake and practise these three unwholesome states, namely bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct and mental misconduct. Why is that? Because those good recluses and brahims do not see in unwholesome states the danger, degration and defilement nor do they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunication, the aspect of cleansing. . . 21 (A) Householders, there are some recluses and brahims whose doctrine and view is this: 'There is no cause or conditon for defilement of beings; beings are defiled without cause or condition. There is no cause or condition for the purificaiton of beings; beings are purified without cause or condition. There is no power, no energy, no manly strength, no manly endurance. All beings, all living beings, all creatures, all souls are without mastery, power and energy; moulded by destiny, circumstances and nature, they experience pleasure and pain in the six classess. . . 23 (A.i) Now householders, of those recluses and brahims whose doctrine and view is that: "'There is no cause or conditon for defilement of beings..., it is expected that they will avoid these three wholesome states, namely good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct and good mental conduct and that they will undertake and practise these three unwholesome states, namely bodily misconduct, verbal misconduct and mental misconduct. Why is that? Because those good recluses and brahims do not see in unwholesome states the danger, degration and defilement nor do they see in wholesome states the blessing of renunication, the aspect of cleansing.>> I hope this clarify your questions. Please do ask if you have other questions to clarify. Cheers Ken O #60860 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 4:37 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 6/28/06 11:13:40 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > > Hi Howard > > Thanks for explaining the meaning of 'solipsism', which has helped me > understand Herman's post to Sarah on this point ;-)) > > Regarding what you refer to here as the impact of other mindstreams on > one's own, I'm wondering in what respect it is said the abhidhamma > fails to take account of that (I realise you are not putting that view > rofward as your own). It seems to me that the paramattha dhammas of > the teachings take account of all 'impacts' on the mindstream > regardless of the source of those impacts (other mindstreams or > non-mindstreams, as it were). > > Grateful for anything you could add on this. Thanks. ----------------------------------------- Howard: I agree with you that what arises within a given mindstream is what arises there - period, regardless of the source. I also believe that the conventional discussion of many beings, not only in the suttas but also in parts of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, shows that without a doubt the Dhamma is not solipsistic. All that I maintain is that there is no detailed discussion (at the level of analysis found in the Samyutta Nikaya and in the Dhammasangani and Patthana) of inter-stream interactions. Perhaps such details were intentionally omitted as simply unneeded for purposes of liberation, though I think that a dhamma-level ("paramatthic") analysis of such inter-stream relations could be illuminating as regards such matters as kamma and sila. Of course, too much discussion of multiple mindstreams might lead folks to reify mindstreams as "things" or, even worse, as "persons", and that would certainly be counterproductive. ------------------------------------------------- > > Jon > ======================== With metta, Howard #60861 From: Daniel Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 7:53 am Subject: Re : Impermanence & Hapiness sbhtkk Hi Scott, I think it is more a state of confusion than a state of insight that I am in... But thank you. Yours, Daniel #60862 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 10:33 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life nilovg Dear friends, < Although citta and cetasika are both nåma, they each have different characteristics. One may wonder how cetasikas can be experienced. When we notice a change in citta, a characteristic of cetasika can be experienced. For instance, when akusala cittas with stinginess arise after kusala cittas with generosity have fallen away, we can notice a change. Stinginess and generosity are cetasikas which can be experienced; they have different characteristics. We may notice as well the change from attachment to aversion, from pleasant feeling to unpleasant feeling. Feeling is a cetasika we can experience, because feeling is sometimes predominant and there are different kinds of feeling. We can experience that unpleasant feeling is different from pleasant feeling and from indifferent feeling. These different cetasikas arise with different cittas and they fall away immediately, together with the citta they accompany. If we know more about the variety of citta and cetasika, it will help us to see the truth. Since citta and cetasika arise together it is difficult to experience the difference in their characteristics. The Buddha was able to directly experience the different characteristics of all cittas and cetasikas because his wisdom was of the highest degree. We read in the Questions of King Milinda (Book III, ``The Removal of Difficulties'', chapter 7, 87) that the arahat Någasena said to King Milinda: ``A hard thing there is, O King, which the Blessed One has done.'' ``And what is that?'' ``The fixing of all those mental conditions which depend on one organ of sense, telling us that such is contact, such is feeling, such is saññå (perception), such is volition and such is citta.'' ``Give me an illustration.'' ``Suppose, O King, a man were to wade down into the sea, and taking some water in the palm of his hand, were to taste it with his tongue. Would he distinguish whether it were water from the Ganges, or from the Jamunå, or from the Aciravatí, or from the Sarabhú, or from the Mahí?'' ``Impossible, Sir.'' ``More difficult than that, great King, is it to have distinguished between the mental conditions which follow on the exercise of any one of the organs of sense!''> *** Nina. #60863 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 11:08 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhhama Guidence! nilovg Dear Kanchuu, You could ask questions, for example on account of what I posted today from Abh in Daily life. Do you live in Kathmandu? We were many times in Nepal for our treks, like Anapurna base camp. I love your country. My Abh. in Daily life has been translated in Nepali by Devendra Raj Upadhya his address was: KHA-2-282 21/452 Ram Sha Path Kathmandu. I do not know whether he is still there. I post now the moderator's letter to newcomers: Other suggestions: 1. Introduce yourself, your interest in the Buddha's teachings and give us an idea of what you'd like to hear about or discuss. Basic questions are often the best. 2. For now, just ignore all threads which make little or no sense and focus on your own threads. 3. Go to the files section of DSG http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ and scroll down to 'Useful Posts'. Here, scroll down to 'New to the list and new to Buddhism', also 'Abhidhamma-beginners', 'Kamma-beginners' and many more sections which may be relevant. [If it's all too much, just go to posts saved under 'zany' at the bottom:-)]. 4. If the Pali words are bugging you and you'd like to have help, consider printing out the simple Pali glossary in the files and having it next to your computer. 5. Keep asking people to clarify what they are talking about in simple language. You'll do everyone a favour. But we need an indication of what you're interested to have clarified first. If you give us a chance to offer you (and anyone else new to the list) a chance, you'll find a group of really friendly and helpful people who'll be glad to discuss the teachings with you anytime. Metta, Sarah ======= Nina. Op 27-jun-2006, om 20:04 heeft kanchaa het volgende geschreven > I am Nitesh (Kanchuu) from Nepal. I have been trying to learn > Abhidhamma from quite a time, on my own, and got lost. I would be very > thankful if you could help me to start up. > #60864 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 11:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The Development of the Theravada Abhidhamma nilovg Hi Rob M, I really appreciate your answer. You are so sincere. I am glad you will add to your advice another paragraph. Nina. Op 28-jun-2006, om 10:04 heeft robmoult het volgende geschreven > I am going to add another paragraph to the closing section, "My > advice" to stress the importance of viewing Abhidhamma, not merely as > an academic subject, but rather a desciption of what we experience > every day (if we are looking closely enough). > #60865 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 11:37 am Subject: Abhidhamma Framework nilovg Hi Howard, I quickly read your answer but with all the confusion of the new computer, it got lost.I have to change each old document to the new word processor. I think your approach is more philosophical, and I take to the Visuddhimagga. It is thanks to our correspondence that I looked more carefully at recent texts, and I was so impressed that the dhammas themselves are called this or that condiiton. to repeat: A state that assists by being present, having arisen previously, is a 'prenascence condition'. In Pali: pa.thamatara.m uppajjitvaa vattamaanabhaavena upakaarako dhammo purejaatapaccayo. Thus, the assiting dhamma itself (upakaarako dhammo) IS the prenascence-condition. It is the ruupa itself that is the condition. The condiitonioning force is inherent in the dhamma itself. It is not a concept, but a paramattha dhamma. We just have different approaches, that is all. Nina. #60866 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 11:19 am Subject: Re: E-card from Switzerland (was, Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework.) nilovg Dear Jon, Thank you for your card, I hope you can fit in more walking you and Sarah need it, take the chance. . Give our love to Kate, Nina. Op 28-jun-2006, om 16:47 heeft jonoabb het volgende geschreven: > tWe are out of the door by 6:00 in the > morning for an early walk, with our main walking for the day done > after breakfast. #60867 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 8:27 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 6/28/06 2:50:23 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > I quickly read your answer > but with all the confusion of the new computer, it got lost.I have to > change each old document to the new word processor. > I think your approach is more philosophical, and I take to the > Visuddhimagga. -------------------------------- Howard: Well, the Visuddhimagga has a better and longer track record than I do! ;-)) -------------------------------- > It is thanks to our correspondence that I looked more carefully at > recent texts, and I was so impressed that the dhammas themselves are > called this or that condiiton. to repeat: > A state that assists by being present, having arisen previously, is > a 'prenascence condition'. > In Pali: pa.thamatara.m uppajjitvaa vattamaanabhaavena upakaarako dhammo > purejaatapaccayo. > Thus, the assiting dhamma itself (upakaarako dhammo) IS the > prenascence-condition. > It is the ruupa itself that is the condition. > The condiitonioning force is inherent in the dhamma itself. It is not > a concept, but a paramattha dhamma. --------------------------------------- Howard: Of course it is the dhammas themselves that are the conditions. It is dhammas that are conditions and it is dhammas that are conditioned. I would say nothing to the contrary! But that doesn't mean that relations are dhammas! Let me explain: You wrote above "A state that assists by being present, having arisen previously, is a 'prenascence condition'." Notice that this says nothing about a relation as it is formulated. What is missing is what is assisted, namely a particular citta or cetasika. The state A that is a "prenascence condition" is not a prenascence condition on its own, independent of the citta or cetasika B that it is a prenascence condition *for*. Prenascence is relational. It is a relation holding between two conditions, condition A and condition B, namely the relation of A arising prior to B and still existing simultaneously with B and assisting B in some way. Without B, A is not a prenascence condition. It is a prenascence condition *for* B. Although the word 'relation' is used in translating 'patthana', the word 'condition' would be better. Of course, when A is condition for B in some way, that means that a particular sort of relation holds between A and B. But the relation is not A and the relation is not B. You see, a relation of a different sort might well hold between A and C. That relation cannot also be A. ;-) Dhammas are one thing, and relations among them another. ------------------------------------- > We just have different approaches, that is all. ------------------------------------- Howard: No, I think there is a bit more to it than that, Nina. I think that to identify relations with dhammas is a category error. ------------------------------------- > Nina ================= With metta, Howard #60868 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 3:31 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The Development of the Theravada Abhidhamma egberdina Hi RobM, On 28/06/06, robmoult wrote: > Hi All, > > Some time ago, I was shocked when I heard a meditation teacher > wrongly refer to the seventeen thought moments of the sense-door > process as the word of the Buddha. For many people, the Abhidhamma is > what is included in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha. I was very pleased to read what you had to say. Not so much because I agreed with it, which I do, but because you differentiated between tradition and history. When you submitted your Abhidhamma handbook for review some time ago, I was critical of it in the sense that it took a traditional view of history, which this article certainly redresses, because it presents an historical view of tradition. Well Done, and Kind Regards Herman #60869 From: "kelvin_lwin" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 4:27 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma Framework kelvin_lwin Hi Howard, I wonder if you read Ledi Sayadaw's explanation of the use of dhamma and dhamma-niyama. I think it's related but maybe not :/ Link: http://www.ubakhin.com/ledi/MANUAL04.html Under section:Dhamma-Niyama, a discussion Sayadaw's main materl is in section: Note on Dhamma-Niyama - Kel > ------------------------------------- > Howard: > No, I think there is a bit more to it than that, Nina. I think that to > identify relations with dhammas is a category error. > ------------------------------------- #60870 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 4:46 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework ken_aitch Hi Howard, As Nina suggested, your approach is more philosophical than the Visuddhimagga's. ------ H: > Of course it is the dhammas themselves that are the conditions. It is dhammas that are conditions and it is dhammas that are conditioned. I would say nothing to the contrary! But that doesn't mean that relations are dhammas! -------- Could you give a simile for the separate existence of dhammas and relations? Meanwhile, I will suggest a simile for how there are only dhammas. Consider the case where people went to a concert because their favourite singer was performing. Both singer and audience appeared together, but the singer was prenasence condition for the audience. The singer remained on stage because her audience was present, and the audience remained in their seats because she was present. Individual members of the audience remained because other members did so too. So everyone was conasence condition for everyone else. ------------- <. . .> H: > when A is condition for B in some way, that means that a particular sort of relation holds between A and B. But the relation is not A and the relation is not B. You see, a relation of a different sort might well hold between A and C. That relation cannot also be A. ;-) Dhammas are one thing, and relations among them another. ------------- At the concert there were only people. Each conditioned others in various ways and was conditioned by others in various ways, but there were no 'ways' at the concert - there were only people. Ken H #60871 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 4:44 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Reading and Hearing the Dhamma egberdina Hi Jon, On 12/06/06, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > Hi Herman > > > Is this last the 'fundamental difference' you refer to earlier? Writing > and speech have in common that they are are intended to communicate > meaning. When we hear speech we also automatically attribute meaning. > I'm slowly wading through this ever-growing "to-be-replied-to" inbox of mine. The myth of Sysiphus comes to mind. He was condemned for all eternity to rolling a boulder up hill only to watch it come rolling down again :-) Anyways.... > > >In fact, I doubt that a well-trained reader could even see the > >marks without the meanings. > > > > > Nor could a person hear speech without the meaning. > Yes, I agree with you. And I did say that the theory requires more work. But there is something quite different between hearing meaning from speech and reading meaning in writing. Hearing is a much more immediate sense than vision. We do have eyelids but no earlids. We can at will choose to not see, to not read, but we cannot escape spoken instructions. And that is the gist of the difference. Speech is the means par excellence whereby one person can convey their will to a susceptible other. That just does not happen with reading. And the Suttas are spoken instructions to those inclined to carry them out. "Do this" as a spoken meaning has far more impact than "Do this" as a read meaning. > > >In relation to Buddhism, that has implications > >for the possibility for mindfulness to arise, for I would consider the > >seeing of meaning where there is none to be the very opposite of > >mindfulness. > > > > > > > Meaning is not seen, of course, it is attributed from the seen. In order > for there to be meaning, there must first have been moments of (mere) > seeing of visible object, no matter how quickly the one succeeds the > other. I think there is a certain theory of mind in what you say, and I have doubts about its usefuleness. You seem to be inferring momentary but meaningless sense data. That may well be the case, but it is an inference. I suggest that humans do not consciously operate at a level below name/form, so the basic unit of consciousness in my scheme is always a concept. Now Mindfulness may take (mere) visible object as its object or > it may take the thinking that sees meaning as its object. Again, the > parallel with hearing speech and understanding its meaning seems > appropriate. > > As I suggested above, mere visible object is speculation (harmless, but speculative nonetheless). As I see it, all objects of consciousness are concepts. > >Now of course the hearing of a sutta can generate meaning beyond the sound > >also. But I don't think we should equate the hearing of a sutta by a > >reading-trained mind with the hearing of a sutta 2500 years by an illiterate > >mind. > > > > > Literacy (and intelligence) are not the preserve of current times!! > ;-)). The main difference I would see between then and now is the level > of developed panna among the Buddha's followers (much higher then than now). > > > >And that is where the theory requires more work. But I'd be happy to > >read any comments you might have so far. No obligation of course. > > > > > > > Even if there is a difference, and even if we are thereby disadvantaged > as regards the development of the path compared to those of 2500 years > ago (although I can't as yet see how that could be), you haven't said > what bearing that has for us on the development of the path. Does it > change the game in any regard? > You see the difference between then and now as being the greater developed panna in the Buddha's followers. I see the main difference as being the greater willingness (intent) to do the Master's bidding. The Buddha was a heterodox forest-dwelling contemplative. The impact of his spoken words lead in that direction. Kind Regards Herman #60872 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 4:50 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, no 6. lbidd2 Mike: "Can you please tell me the Paali verb rendered 'mark'? Hi Mike and Nina, The pali for "make a sign" is nimittakara.na. Do you have a text reference for "mark"? Below is Vism.XIV,130 Larry 130. But though classed in the same way as consciousness, nevertheless, as to characteristic, etc., it all has just the characteristic of perceiving. Its function is to make a sign as a condition for perceiving again that 'this is the same', as carpenters, etc., do in the case of timber, and so on. It is manifested as the action of interpreting by means of the sign as apprehended, like the blind who 'see' an elephant (Ud. 68-69). Its proximate cause is an objective field in whatever way that appears, like the perception that arises in fauns that see scarecrows as men. This is the section of the detailed explanation dealing with the perception aggregate. **************************** 130. saa panesaa eva.m vi~n~naa.nena samappabhedaapi lakkha.naadito sabbaava sa~njaananalakkha.naa, tadevetanti puna sa~njaananapaccayanimittakara.narasaa daaruaadiisu tacchakaadayo viya, yathaagahitanimittavasena abhinivesakara.napaccupa.t.thaanaa hatthidassakaandhaa (udaa0 54) viya, yathaaupa.t.thitavisayapada.t.thaanaa ti.napurisakesu migapotakaana.m purisaati uppannasa~n~naa viyaati. ida.m sa~n~naakkhandhe vitthaarakathaamukha.m. #60873 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 4:56 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye egberdina Hi Jon and Scott, On 16/06/06, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > >J: "I think the idea of experience originating in the brain is one > >area where science and the Dhamma are very far apart (not that I > >really know anything about the scientific view on this." > > > >What about the possibility that "brain" might only be ruupa and that > >ruupa is the reality that does not experience and hence experience > >cannot "somehow originate" in goo? > > > > I think what you give here is clearly how things are contemplated to be > in the Tipitaka. I suspect Herman is inclined to attribute a greater > role to the brain, perhaps based on observations of his own experiences. > I am not so sure that you guys are contemplating in accordance with the Suttas. There is this, which is quite representative: "And there is only this modicum of disturbance: that connected with the six sensory spheres, dependent on this very body with life as its condition." (MN121) To me, there can be no clearer statement that experience and the body are inseperably intertwined. OK, so it does not pinpoint the brain as the main game in the body. But neither is the heart base the point of any teachings by the Buddha. Which fact does not seem to have bothered any commentator :-) > >Of course, then I think of > >"heart-base," and whether one takes this literally or not. > > > > Later, dudes Herman #60874 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 11:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Abhidhamma Framework upasaka_howard Hi, Kel - In a message dated 6/28/06 7:36:31 PM Eastern Daylight Time, kelvin_lwin@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > I wonder if you read Ledi Sayadaw's explanation of the use of dhamma > and dhamma-niyama. I think it's related but maybe not :/ --------------------------------------- Howard: I hadn't read it. I've looked it over quickly now, and I don't *think* there is any relation (no pun intended! ;-) to the matter of distinguishing thing related from the relations among them. I don't see that as an issue that is involved in that piece. ------------------------------------ > > Link: http://www.ubakhin.com/ledi/MANUAL04.html > Under section:Dhamma-Niyama, a discussion > Sayadaw's main materl is in section: Note on Dhamma-Niyama > > - Kel > ===================== With metta, Howard #60875 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 5:09 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' yet !) egberdina Hi Jon, > > > > No, not at all; medical science does indeed attribute mental > functionality to the brain. But I'm saying that as far as I know there > is nothing in the findings of medical science that precludes the > hypothesis that mental functionality originates outside the brain. > I hope you and Sarah are enjoying the Alps. What you are saying is correct, of course. But then, there is also nothing in medical science that precludes the existence of God. Notions that are untestable fall outside of the domain of science. And science is simply the exercise of framing hypotheses in such a way so that they can be tested. And I'm sure there is also a word that describes the intent of defying all efforts at reframing untestable beliefs so that they do become testable. Here's an idea. Carefully remove Sarah's brain, and then ask her if she wants a cup of tea. Be sure to put the brain back, of course. :-) Kind Regards Herman #60876 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 5:22 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: ‘Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' yet !) egberdina Hi Jon, On 17/06/06, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Hi Herman > > > > >See my post to Scott. > > > > > > I've read your post to Scott, but I can't say I'm any the wiser ;-)) > > You said in your earlier post: > > "But then, the tipitaka also has fermented cows urine, molasses and > > honey as medication for most conditions that ail a person. People vote > > with their feet, I always reckon, so if a tipitaka purist, in speech, > > insists on being treated by systems of medicine that are founded in > > quite a non-tipitaka view of causality, I know what they really > > believe, deep down." > > I am familiar with references to "fermented cows urine, molasses and > honey as medication" in the context of certain ascetic observances that > may be undertaken by monks, along with observances regarding the > acquisition of robes from charnel grounds, not lying down to sleep, and > the like. I am not aware that this form of medication is anywhere given > as being suitable for the general monks, let alone for lay folk. > I have no reason to doubt you. I don't know what a general monk would be, and whether the Vinaya applies to them or not. Anyway, the Vinaya has interesting reading with regards to the various medications that are prescribed in different circumstances. > The Buddha himself had the benefit of the best medical treatment > available (one of his followers, Jivaka, was the foremost physician of > the time), and this did not include fermented cows urine, molasses and > honey as medication as far as I'm aware (does that make him not a > Tipitaka purist, I wonder?). > > As far as the undertaking of ascetic observances goes, the references to > fermented cows urine, molasses and honey as medication are as relevant > today as they were 2500 years ago. So if your point is that the > Tipitaka needs revision to keep up with medical/scientific development, > I don't think the example you've chosen supports the argument. Just my > personal view, of course ;-)). > My reading of some of the prescriptions in the Vinaya lead me to disagree with your finding that my example is not relevant. But my point was not in the specifics of urine or molasses or honey. I think the general observation holds. Times change, as do beliefs and practices. And what people actually believe, despite what they say, is most readily observable from what they do. Kind Regards Herman #60877 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 12:18 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - Your post that I'm now replying to is very, very useful, bacuase it is enabling a great clarification, I think. I thank you for it. In a message dated 6/28/06 7:48:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, ken_aitch@... writes: > > Hi Howard, > > As Nina suggested, your approach is more philosophical than the > Visuddhimagga's. ------------------------------- Howard: Okay. :-) ------------------------------ > > ------ > H: >Of course it is the dhammas themselves that are the conditions. > It is dhammas that are conditions and it is dhammas that are > conditioned. I would say nothing to the contrary! But that doesn't > mean that relations are dhammas! > -------- > > Could you give a simile for the separate existence of dhammas and > relations? Meanwhile, I will suggest a simile for how there are only > dhammas. > > Consider the case where people went to a concert because their > favourite singer was performing. Both singer and audience appeared > together, but the singer was prenasence condition for the audience. > > The singer remained on stage because her audience was present, and the > audience remained in their seats because she was present. Individual > members of the audience remained because other members did so too. So > everyone was conasence condition for everyone else. ---------------------------------------- Howard: I don't see that this is a simile, Ken. It's an example. It's a useful example. Everything that you say is fine (except I would write << *a* prenasence condition for the audience >> and << *a* conasence condition for everyone else >>. But the relations that held between the audience and the singer, and the relations that held among the audience members are neither the singer nor the audience nor any member of the audience. But, as I shall emphasize further on, relation-talk is dangerous unless one is very careful. Another example, which unfortunately uses reifying terminology (but c'est la vie) is the following: The object relation holding between an olfactory citta and the odor known by that citta is neither the citta nor the odor. That specific relation is not a dhamma at all - it is an association holding between those two dhammas. There is no question that the odor is object condition for that citta. That is another way of saying that it is the object of that citta. And yet another way of saying it, actually a angerous reifying, is "The relation 'object of' holds between the odor and the citta in that order". ---------------------------------------------- > > ------------- > <. . .> > H: >when A is condition for B in some > way, that means that a particular sort of relation holds between A and > B. But the relation is not A and the relation is not B. You see, a > relation of a different sort might well hold between A and C. That > relation cannot also be A. ;-) > Dhammas are one thing, and relations among them another. > ------------- > > At the concert there were only people. Each conditioned others in > various ways and was conditioned by others in various ways, but there > were no 'ways' at the concert - there were only people. ---------------------------------------- Howard: You are quite right! No one can point to a relation. And yet, in truth but poorly and dangerously said, relations do hold among things. Getting back to realities, and not just concepts - relations do hold among dhammas, but none of those dhammas is a relation. Relations, are not dhammas at all. It is meaningful and TRUE, for example, to say that craving follows contact (or contact preceds craving). The contact is not the precedence relation, the craving is not that relation, and the relation is not dhamma knowable through any sense door. Relations are entirely determined by what they relate. Relations, in fact, are not "things" at all, nor are they events. They are associations that hold, truly hold, between (or among) dhammas [and concepts as well - conventionally]. Relations are well grounded pa~n~natti, but there is danger in speaking of them because of how easily reified they are! I think that what Nina and you are trying to emphasize - and I agree with you in this - is that it is the dhammas alone that exist. Dhammas are truly related to each other in specific ways, and we speak of "relations" to describe that. What I think you and Nina find objectionable - and I do as well - is reifying relations. But linguistically that is hard to avoid. Quite possibly that is why the Patthana doesn't actually speak of relations but of conditions, and that is why I said before that it would be better in talking about the Patthana to not even use the word 'relation', but to stick to 'condition'. ------------------------------------------------- > > Ken H > > ======================= With metta, Howard #60878 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 5:45 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: ?Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye egberdina Hi Jon, On 17/06/06, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > > > > >An understanding of causality underlies every ethical prescription > >known to man. For the purpose of ethical systems is future happiness. > >The tipitaka abounds in moral prescriptions, based on particular > >understandings of causality. Science has significantly altered the way > >the world can be understood, which makes a re-evaluation of the > >ethical systems of days gone by an imperative. > > > > > > I notice below you say that 'Dhamma is timeless and immediate, and > neither science or any other -ism will have any effect on it', so I'm > not sure I understand what you mean when you say that advances in > science have superseded some of the understandings of causality > contained in the Tipitaka. Would you mind giving a specific example or two. > I hope general examples from memory will suffice. Please let me know if you doubt that they have an actual source in the Tipitaka. The most pervasive idea in the Tipitaka that has been debunked by modern science is identical with Lamarckian heritance. This is simply the false notion that characteristics acquired in one generation are transmitted to future generations. The Suttas have many examples of instructions how to be reborn wealthy, healthy, happy, beautiful. In that non-scientific view, some sort of action today is held to affect in which circumstances you are reborn. There are also references to the immoral actions that cause sickness and madness, and generousity to the sangha is held to be especially beneficial. > > Yes, but whether the would-be earnest striver is truly earnestly > striving or only thinks he is is another question. Can there be truly > earnest striving (vipassana) without a substantial knowledge of material > that originates only from the teachings (of which the Tipitaka is the > best record available)? > The only earnest striving I know about is not identifying with any consciousness of any kind. What ingesting a wall-to-wall library has to do with that earnest striving is honestly totally beyond me. > As a matter of interest, what is an example of something that needs to > be known but is not found in the Tipitaka? > In your case, Jon, it would be "Where are my glasses"? Your library is useless without them :-) Kind Regards Herman #60879 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 6:17 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the abhidhamma of existentialism egberdina Hi Larry, On 19/06/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > Hi all, > > I recently read a book called "Tete a Tete" about Sartre and Simone de > Beauvoir and their life together. I liked it so much I started reading > their philosophy and came up with this view: > > The dictum 'existence precedes essence' could be read as a kind of > circular cause and effect principle in terms of dependent arising as > 'kamma result precedes kamma formations'. Kamma formation is regarded as > the 'essence' of what it means to be human and is bound up with action. > Action is freedom. Paradoxically, freedom is suffering (anguish) because > it cuts one off from the other. Perhaps this freedom in exile is rooted > in the difference between kamma result and kamma formation. Kamma > formation is more of a reaction to kamma result than it is a simple > action. And the essence of reaction is separation. Hence, dukkha. > I think I've caught up enough. I agree with you in regards to action being freedom. We are not free to choose the context in which we act, neither are we free to not act, but any action we undertake is free. There are paradoxes, however. The preferring of the seeming safety of a determined mindlessness, as opposed to an undetermined, free mindfulness, is freedom in action, but in preferring mindlessness all freedom ceases while action abounds. On the other hand, preferring mindfulness is also freedom in action, and all freedom is gained while all action ceases. How say you? Kind Regards Herman #60880 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 7:18 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework egberdina Hi Howard and Howard, I think it is a very interesting discussion. On 29/06/06, ken_aitch wrote: > > > Hi Howard, > > As Nina suggested, your approach is more philosophical than the > Visuddhimagga's. > > ------ > H: > Of course it is the dhammas themselves that are the conditions. > > It is dhammas that are conditions and it is dhammas that are > conditioned. I would say nothing to the contrary! But that doesn't > mean that relations are dhammas! > > -------- > > Could you give a simile for the separate existence of dhammas and > relations? Meanwhile, I will suggest a simile for how there are only > dhammas. > Please don't allow my input to sidetrack the discussion, but I'm just busting to put my two cents in. As I read it, the statement "there are only dhammas" says that only the phenomenal aspect of experience is real. Things are their appearance - full stop. But that is not the limit of reality. For me, conditions come into it in the following way. Things are what is done in order to bring them about. A thing can be defined by it's recipe. Both views are entirely self-consistent ie non-contradictory, nor do they exclude each other. But there is the possibility of a third view as well, I think. A thing is what it does, a thing is its function / effect. So a dhamma can be: It's appearance It's causation It's function Whichever view is taken of things arises from different intent, and results in different, selective emphasis. Still, there are only dhammas :-), but it is not any single one of the above. Kind Regards Herman #60881 From: "robmoult" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 7:46 pm Subject: Re: Words robmoult Hi Daniel, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Daniel wrote: > > Hi all, I was wondering if anyone has any insights on how we understand > words of other people and what levels of understanding exist? I am not sure > of that, but it might be that we never know the meaning of other's person's > words since we can never read their mind. I define the "meaning" of a word as > "that which the person himself wants to express with the word". Using this > definition, I would say that one can Never know the meaning of of another > person's word in the way that we know the meaning of the words we use. > So how do you think communication works? Yours, Daniel ===== According to the Abhidhamma, there are two forms of communication: - Sound - Gesture (called "bodily intimation" in the texts) Two people may hear the same sound or see the same gesture but interpret it very differently because of their conditioning. For example, two people hear the word "air"; the English-speaking person thinks of the atmosphere whereas the Indonesian-speaking person thinks of water. As another example, the traditional Maori greeting of sticking out of the tongue is considered rude in some cultures. This conditioning impacts everything we sense. For example, imagine that you and I are walking down the street together and we both see a woman walking the other way. To you, she is a stranger but to me, she is my wife. The initial visual image is the same for both of us, but after that our minds progress along very different paths as we process the visual information. Communication works very well when we share common conditioning but less well when our conditioning is different. These conditionings are accumulated since birth and even pass from one lifetime into the next. You have touched on a broad subject. Hope that my reply helps. Metta, Rob M :-) #60882 From: "Phil" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 8:05 pm Subject: Yet another sign off from Phil!!! philofillet Hi all (esp Nina and the moderators) We bought a second-hand computer for me to use for my writing in the next room, without internet access, and it does feel that this could be it - a clean break from the internet. Most people are able to use the internet effectively, but for me, alas, it is always time and energy draining. I'm not capable of limiting myself to DSG, alas, and spend way too much time on baseball and news and stupid little videos of people doing stupid little things. (Called "Youtube" - also great for seeing rare footage of bands, musicians etc. Very addictive.) So this is another sign-off. Nina, thank you so much for your constant support. I will be listening to talks and re-rereading ADL and Cetasikas and the SPD and studying SN 35 and 22 so will be in good hands, no need to worry. Best of luck to you all on the path. Phil p.s I won't be able to see any off-list e-mails for the time being, either. #60883 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 9:29 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the abhidhamma of existentialism lbidd2 Hi Herman, Thanks for replying. Regarding freedom, what I'm interested in is what existentialists think it is. I'm looking for someone to explain Sartrean existentialism in abhidhamma terms. There's a good existentialist e-group but I can't understand a word they're saying. If I had to define freedom I would say freedom is free from self view. Action (bhaava) does, in a sense, define a person in the eyes of the world, but if there is no self view there is no self to define. All there is is reality, so to speak. And I agree, this doesn't really have anything to do with action. So where did the existentialists go wrong? They started out with a complicated phenomenology, which I haven't really looked into, and somehow got derailed into political activism. This seems to have something to do with a rejection of inaction ("quietism"), but I don't know the rationale behind that. Any insight into what these guys are up to would be interesting. Larry -------------------------- Herman: "I think I've caught up enough. I agree with you in regards to action being freedom. We are not free to choose the context in which we act, neither are we free to not act, but any action we undertake is free. There are paradoxes, however. The preferring of the seeming safety of a determined mindlessness, as opposed to an undetermined, free mindfulness, is freedom in action, but in preferring mindlessness all freedom ceases while action abounds. On the other hand, preferring mindfulness is also freedom in action, and all freedom is gained while all action ceases. How say you?" #60884 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 9:46 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Yet another sign off from Phil!!! nilovg Hi Phil, would you like me to send through mails to your personal address? Do you still keep that? But hopefully you will miss dsg after a while. Nina. Op 29-jun-2006, om 5:05 heeft Phil het volgende geschreven: > We bought a second-hand computer for me to use for my writing in > the next room, without internet access, and it does feel that this > could be it - a clean break from the internet. #60885 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 5:56 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Ken) - In a message dated 6/28/06 10:51:08 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > As I read it, the statement "there are only dhammas" says that only > the phenomenal aspect of experience is real. Things are their > appearance - full stop. But that is not the limit of reality. For me, > conditions come into it in the following way. Things are what is done > in order to bring them about. A thing can be defined by it's recipe. > Both views are entirely self-consistent ie non-contradictory, nor do > they exclude each other. But there is the possibility of a third view > as well, I think. A thing is what it does, a thing is its function / > effect. > > So a dhamma can be: > > It's appearance > It's causation > It's function > ===================== That's interesting. Appearance: the dhamma as mere element of experience, Causation: the dhamma as the totality of conditions without which it doesn't exist, Function: the dhamma as activity/event. BTW, your scheme reminds me of the Abhidhammic-commnetarial scheme! ;-) With metta, Howard #60886 From: "abhidhammika" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 11:04 pm Subject: [dsg] Sabhaava Not A Liability For Theravada Re: attention Suan: Abhidham... abhidhammika Dear Howard, Nina, Mike N, Scott D, Herman and all How are you? Howard wrote: "It seems, unfortunately, that you are in the unenviable position of having to include the great Sariputta among those you consider to be whiners. It is he who is traditionally credited with the authorship of the Patisambhidamagga. That is the only place that I personally have come across 'sabhava' in the Sutta Pitaka, and there it is negatively criticized." Can't be, Howard. I would never consider the Right-Hand Disciple of the Buddha to be a whinger. How did you arrive at that speculation? :-) Howard continues: "But the PTSM objects to the use of 'sabhava' as violating voidness! So, evidently, it's being problematical wasn't discovered just by me (or by those dreadful Mahayanists ;-)." And, how does Pa.tisambhidamagga object to the use of 'sabhaava'? There must be some misunderstanding somewhere. Please elaborate the matter? Howard wrote: "Suan, I underestimated you! This post of yours is a very friendly, very kind, reply to a somewhat angry post of mine. I thank you, and I congratulate you! If my previous statement was pleasing to you, I must say that your entire post is greatly pleasing to me! Thank you very much, my friend!" I thank you, too, for your compliments. With kind regards, Suan --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: #60887 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 1:32 am Subject: sabhaava nilovg Hi all who are interested in texts about sabhaava, I quote more from Rob K's forum and this is a former letter of Sarah. < QUOTE The majjhimanikaya tika (mulapariyaya sutta) has the following to say. I use bhikkhu bodhi's translation p39. It comments on the atthakatha which says "they bear their own characteristics, thus they are dhammas." The tika(subcommentary ) notes, "although there are no dhammas devoid of their own characteristics this is said for the purpose of showing that mere dhammas endowed with their specific natures devoid of such attributes as being etc... whereas such entities as self, permanence or nature, soul, body etc are mere misconstructions due to craving and views...and cannot be discovered as ultimately real actualities, these dhammas (ie.those endowed with a specific sabhava) can. these dhammas are discovered as actually real actualties. And although there IS NO REAL DISTINCTION between these dhammas and their characteristics, still, in order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device. Also they are borne, or they are discerned, known , acccording to their specific nature, thus they are dhammas" It should be noted that when it says they are real, essence etc. this doesn't imply existence in the usual sense of an independent lasting thing. All dhammas are conditioned in complex ways by other dhammas It is just a flux happening so fast that time itself can only be understood by reference to the change of dhamma ********** Q.: Is there any example anywhere of the sabhava for any dhamma? To be consistent, sabhava (leaving nibbana aside) has to be causal/ conditioned, then how can it be a dhamma's own-being? Or is it that sabhava = the causal/conditioned nature...which would be like saying that sabhava is sunyata...which is where my questions probably started from... .......... In the Vism quote above it mentions the nature (sabhava) of hardness. As I understand (just from my own considering now), the nature of hardness when touched now is quite different to the nature of heat or cold. Furthermore the sabhava of the hardness experienced at this moment of touching is very different again from the sabhava of hardness experienced a moment later. Each reality has its own sabhava even though they have common characteristics (lakkhana) such as the tri-lakkhana which themselves are asabhava (without sabhava). If these realities had no sabhava and no lakkhana, they would not arise, fall away and be inherently unsatisfactory. Anatta (sunyata) is one of the lakkhana of all realities. We don’t talk about the conditioned nature of anatta, lakkhana or sabhava because they are always the characteristics and nature of the paramattha dhammas. sarah> end quote. Nina. #60888 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 1:49 am Subject: Abhidhamma origins nilovg Dear all, some more quotes from Rob K's forum: < http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/12857 Dear Group, This is a reply by Dr. Maung Lwin to some comments made on another list about Suan's post on Abhidhamma. Thought you might be interested. Dear All, All three parts of the Tipitaka (Vinaya, Suttanta and Abhidhamma) can be a valuable source of knowledge, inspiration and encouragement to the practice. As one learns deeper, he or she will become clearer on the Teachings of the Buddha presented in these 3 different parts. Let us go back to the period around the Enlightenment of the Buddha who preached the first two Sermons to his former 5 Companions. In the First Discourse called DHAMMACAKKAPPAVATTANA SUTTA, the Buddha explained that the 5 constituent groups of existence, which are the objects of clinging, are Suffering: this is clearly Abhidhamma. The Second Sermon, ANATTA LAKKHANA SUTTA is also Abhidhamma, dealing with corporeality, sensation, perception, kamma activities and consciousness, and the 11 different distinctions of each Aggregate. The Buddha then continued delivering discourse after discourse. It was recorded that in his 7th year of ministry, the Buddha went up to the world of the Devas to teach them the entire Abhidhamma. He also taught his Chief Disciple Venerable Sariputta who passed on to five hundred newly ordained monks. They became masters of the seven books of the Abhidhamma; i.e., Dhammasangani (the entire Dhamma is assembled and taught all together), Vibhanga (analysis into separate parts), Dhatukatha ( further analysis into detail according to elements), Puggalapannati ( Analysis into minute parts in relation to individuals), Kathavatthu (about the different doctrines existing in the world), Yamaka (Analysis of the Dhamma in pairs) and finally, Pathana (the doctrine of causal relations). All became arahants during the rains-retreat of that year. So it is very likely that Abhidhamma may cover all discourses in Suttanta Pitaka. In the latter, Dhamma is explained to different people at different places. As regards the Abhidhamma, it is the exposition of everything which is real without reference to individuals. The understanding of ultimate reality form the back ground of Insight Meditation, Vipassana. It was often said (as Robert has mentioned) that a Bhikkhu who knew Abhidhamma was a true preacher of the Dhamma as he could understand correctly and avoid confusion for himself and his devotees. As lay followers, we still need to supplement our knowledge of Buddhism by reading the discourses written in conventional terms in Suttanta Pitaka. It is much more enjoyable to read the suttas. But with a knowledge of he Abhidhamma, the sutta discourses of the Buddha can be understood in their full and proper meaning. So it is the 'recommended' route. This better understanding of theory (pariyatti) will encourage us to practice (patipatti) towards the realization of the truth (pativedha). So to go back to the original question and conclude, I think, "Abhidhamma is the Buddha's Basic Teaching which is given in the form of various discourses to different people at different time and locations (Suttas), often repeatedly on the same dhamma issue on different occasions." Best wishes, Maung Lwin> End quote. ***** Nina. #60889 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 2:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework nilovg Hi Howard, I am glad Ken H's simile helped. I see that you prefer conditions to relations. Basically we agree, but some differentiations have to be made. What you wrtite about A and B is logically true, but, it does not help me . As you saw in Rob's quote of Sitagu Sayadaw, the aim of the Abhidhamma is insight. Think of the second stage of insight; direct understanding of conditions. This is not by reasoning, by labelling, no, it is direct understanding. Then, the Vis. texts help me more: this or that dhamma is a condition for this or that other dhamma. No reasoning, no concepts, only dhammas. You also said: only dhammas, I know. This morning I heard Kh sujin say that knowing names is different from understanding characteristics, lakkhana. We think of names, and then we know that the dhamma is thinking. When characteristics appear, there can be direct understanding. I know that you agree with this, but I like to emphasize it. Otherwise we get lost in terms and names. I would like to leave the idea of concept, paññatti entirely out when dealing with conditions. Another example is kamma condition. Look at U Narada, Guide to Conditional Relations, p. 52, kamma as a special force accumulated in the continuity of cittas. He says it is present like the latent tendencies and can produce result later on. Then he states: Nina. Op 28-jun-2006, om 21:27 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven:In a message dated 6/28/06 2:50:23 PM Eastern Daylight Time, > > rd: > --------------------------------------- > Howard: > Of course it is the dhammas themselves that are the conditions. It is > dhammas that are conditions and it is dhammas that are conditioned. > I would > say nothing to the contrary! But that doesn't mean that relations > are dhammas! > Let me explain: > You wrote above "A state that assists by being present, having arisen > previously, is a 'prenascence condition'." Notice that this says > nothing about > a relation as it is formulated. What is missing is what is > assisted, namely a > particular citta or cetasika. The state A that is a "prenascence > condition" > is not a prenascence condition on its own, independent of the citta > or cetasika > B that it is a prenascence condition *for*. Prenascence is > relational. It is > a relation holding between two conditions, condition A and > condition B, namely > the relation of A arising prior to B and still existing > simultaneously with B > and assisting B in some way. Without B, A is not a prenascence > condition. It > is a prenascence condition *for* B. > Although the word 'relation' is used in translating 'patthana', the > word 'condition' would be better. Of course, when A is condition > for B in some > way, that means that a particular sort of relation holds between A > and B. But > the relation is not A and the relation is not B. You see, a > relation of a > different sort might well hold between A and C. That relation > cannot also be A. ;-) > Dhammas are one thing, and relations among them another. > ------------------------------------- > > No, I think there is a bit more to it than that, Nina. I think that to > identify relations with dhammas is a category error. > ------------------------------------- > > > #60890 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 3:03 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework ken_aitch Hi Herman, Nina and Howard, We are getting into some serious Abhidhamma now. ---------- Herman: > > As I read it, the statement "there are only dhammas" says that only > the phenomenal aspect of experience is real. Things are their > appearance - full stop. > > ----------- I don't know why the statement would be limited to that one meaning, but I agree; dhammas are in part their manifestation. I think (and I could be mistaken) citta can experience the manifestation of a dhamma, and, at that time, only its manifestation is experienced. However, as you say, dhammas have other features as well. According to the Abhidhamma, they have characteristics, manifestations, functions and proximate causes. Any of those features can be directly experienced, but only one at a time. I hope Nina will help out if this is too wide of the mark. We really must go back to our books and brush up on these things. ----------------- Herman: > > But that is not the limit of reality. For me, > conditions come into it in the following way. Things are what is done in order to bring them about. A thing can be defined by it's recipe. > Both views are entirely self-consistent ie non-contradictory, nor do > they exclude each other. But there is the possibility of a third view > as well, I think. A thing is what it does, a thing is its function / > effect. > > So a dhamma can be: > > It's appearance > It's causation > It's function > ===================== Howard: > That's interesting. Appearance: the dhamma as mere element of experience, Causation: the dhamma as the totality of conditions without which it doesn't exist, Function: the dhamma as activity/event. BTW, your scheme reminds me of the Abhidhammic-commnetarial scheme! ;-) ----------------- Yes, there are uncanny similarities. I don't know if Herman will be pleased to know that. :-) Ken H #60891 From: "kanchaa" Date: Wed Jun 28, 2006 7:35 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhhama Guidence! kanchuu2003 Dear Nina, Thank you for your suggestions. I live in Kathmandu. I am studying Masters in Tourism. Thank you for loving Nepal. It is indeed very baeutiful.. I have copied Abhidhamma in Daily Life from I to VI. I will study it after a while. Nina, my intention of learning Abhidhamma is to implement it into my daily life. At the moment, I want to start with layman point of view and later get a deeper understanding. There are lots of questions in me, which I presume, with the help of Abhidhamma, would be answered. I would like to inherit teaching of the Buddha into myself and implement into daily life. Actually I want answers to everything happening around and within me. I want to go slow.. I just dont want only to be Buddhist scholar, but become "Conscious". Sincerely, Nitesh #60892 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 1:20 am Subject: Vast Penetration... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: How does the 7 Links to Awakening induce Perforating Penetration? The Blessed Buddha once said: And what, bhikkhus, is the way that induce penetration? It is: The Seven Links to Awakening! What seven? 1: The Awareness Link to Awakening. 2: The Investigation Link to Awakening. 3: The Energy Link to Awakening. 4: The Joy Link to Awakening. 5: The Tranquillity to Awakening. 6: The Concentration Link to Awakening. 7: The Equanimity Link to Awakening. Then, the Venerable Udayi asked the Blessed Buddha: Venerable Sir, how are the Seven Links to Awakening developed & cultivated so that they lead to, and induce penetration? Udayi, when a Bhikkhu develops the Seven Links to Awakening supported by seclusion, disillusion, and ceasing, culminating in a mental release; which is vast, exalted, & infinite, without any trace of ill will. With such a mind matured and refined by these Seven Links to Awakening, he penetrates, smashes & eliminates the mass of greed that he has never before penetrated, smashed & eliminated; he penetrates, demolishes & eradicates the heap of hate that he has never before penetrated, demolished & eradicated; and he penetrates, disintegrates and disperses the accumulation of confusion that he has never before penetrated, disintegrated and dispersed.... It is, Udayi, when these Seven Links to Awakening are developed & cultivated in exactly this way that they lead to incisive penetration... Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V: 87-88] section 46: The Links.28: Leading to Penetration... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. <.....> #60893 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 6:15 am Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye scottduncan2 Dear Herman, H: "To me, there can be no clearer statement that experience and the body are inseperably intertwined. OK, so it does not pinpoint the brain as the main game in the body..." How is this important though? Sincerely, Scott. #60894 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 6:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhhama Guidence! nilovg Dear Nitesch, that is the right attitude. You questions are most welcome, any question. Nina. Op 29-jun-2006, om 4:35 heeft kanchaa het volgende geschreven: > I would like to inherit teaching of the Buddha into myself and > implement into daily life. Actually I want answers to everything > happening around and within me. #60895 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 9:19 am Subject: Sarah's e-Card frorm Switzerland sarahprocter... Dear Friends, (Kanchuu - a big welcome and thank you for introducing yourself¡KI'm very interested to read your comments and any points/questions you raise. Whereabouts in Nepal do you live? Kathmandu? Hope it's more peaceful now.) We have a complete change of lifestyle here in the Swiss mountains with my mother - early morning hikes with views of snowy mountains, later hikes into the mountains themselves, simple living in a 'basic' chalet, where we do our own cooking, carrying provisions up the hill, sitting out on the terrace to eat our (mostly) rice, dahl, veggies and ripe peaches. Yet, whatever the lifestyle, whether here or in Hong Kong, still there's the never-ending streams of kusala, akusala, vipaka and kiriya cittas. Visible object is just visible object wherever we are, sound is just sound, thinking about the details and stories of what has been experienced is just thinking about details and stories. As I heard on my i-pod this morning as we walked, K.Sujin reminded us that 'without satipatthana, nothing can hinder the arising of lobha.' She added that the lobha is 'very, very tricky all the way'. It's so true. Lobha might seem obvious when we're hiking in the mountains, but as she also went to to remind a friend, even 'while you're thinking of reading [dhamma] on and on, so that there will be sati, where is lobha?' In other words, it's always ready to follow the sense door experiences unless there is sati arising and developing, no matter where we are or what activities we're involved in. Thanks for all the super posts which we read with some wise reflection and much lobha every eveningƒº [Nina, Suan & all - on sabhava, see 'Useful Posts' in the files section of the DSG homepage under 'Sabhava'. I think the posts you've referred to, Nina, on the topic are there as well as other helpful ones. I believe the one you thought was written by Suan was written by Ven Dhammanando. Also with regard to another thread, on the Abhidhamma, posts can be found under 'Abhidhamma-Origins' if anyone wishes to pursue further. Nina, I'm appreciating the Vism series - while it might seem that certain details are only given in the commentaries such as on the process of cittas, when we appreciate the meaning of the Tipitaka texts a little more, we begin to appreciate more and more how it all 'hangs together' ] Metta, Sarah p.s My apologies too for any concerns about our silence - as I think Jon indicated, until today, the only internet access has been in a noisy bar in town which I've been avoiding. Fortunately, Jon's now been able to purchase a few wires and adaptors, so we can now get a sloooow connection in our flat. ==========ƒº #60896 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 5:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] sabhaava upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 6/29/06 4:33:58 AM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > > Hi all who are interested in texts about sabhaava, > I quote more from Rob K's forum and this is a former letter of Sarah. > > The majjhimanikaya tika (mulapariyaya sutta) has the following to > say. I use bhikkhu bodhi's translation p39. It comments on the > atthakatha which says "they bear their own characteristics, thus they > are dhammas." > The tika(subcommentary ) notes, "although there are no dhammas devoid > of their own characteristics this is said for the purpose of showing > that mere dhammas endowed with their specific natures devoid of such > attributes as being etc... whereas such entities as self, permanence > or nature, soul, body etc are mere misconstructions due to craving > and views...and cannot be discovered as ultimately real actualities, > these dhammas (ie.those endowed with a specific sabhava) can. these > dhammas are discovered as actually real actualties. And although > there IS NO REAL DISTINCTION between these dhammas and their > characteristics, still, in order to facilitate understanding, the > exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device. Also > they are borne, or they are discerned, known , acccording to their > specific nature, thus they are dhammas" > It should be noted that when it says they are real, essence etc. this > doesn't imply existence in the usual sense of an independent lasting > thing. All dhammas are conditioned in complex ways by other dhammas > It is just a flux happening so fast that time itself can only be > understood by reference to the change of dhamma > ********** > Q.: Is there any example anywhere of the sabhava for any dhamma? To > be consistent, sabhava (leaving nibbana aside) has to be causal/ > conditioned, then how can it be a dhamma's own-being? Or is it that > sabhava = the causal/conditioned nature...which would be like saying > that sabhava is sunyata...which is where my questions probably > started from... > .......... > In the Vism quote above it mentions the nature (sabhava) of hardness. > As I understand (just from my own considering now), the nature of > hardness when touched now is quite different to the nature of heat or > cold. Furthermore the sabhava of the hardness experienced at this > moment of touching is very different again from the sabhava of > hardness experienced a moment later. Each reality has its own sabhava > even though they have common characteristics (lakkhana) such as the > tri-lakkhana which themselves are asabhava (without sabhava). If > these realities had no sabhava and no lakkhana, they would not arise, > fall away and be inherently unsatisfactory. Anatta (sunyata) is one > of the lakkhana of all realities. We don’t talk about the conditioned > nature of anatta, lakkhana or sabhava because they are always the > characteristics and nature of the paramattha dhammas. > sarah> > > end quote. > Nina. > > ========================= Useful material, Nina! It is clear to me that the central Theravadin use of 'sabhava' is that of "distinguishing quality" as opposed to "own being" or "own nature" or "self-nature" or "essence" or "core" or "identity". Clearly hardness is distinguishable from the knowing of it as well as from other rupas and namas. No one confuses hardness with heat, sweet taste, or visual object, or namas like effort, concentration, and craving! Evidently, though, in some Theravadin circles around the time of the writing of the PTSM, there must have been a remnant of the substantialist, atta-sense of the term, because "sabhava" was strongly criticized in that work. With metta, Howard #60897 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 4:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Sabhaava Not A Liability For Theravada Re: attention Suan: Abhidham... upasaka_howard Hi, Suan - In a message dated 6/29/06 2:04:43 AM Eastern Daylight Time, suanluzaw@... writes: > > Dear Howard, Nina, Mike N, Scott D, Herman and all > > How are you? > > Howard wrote: > > "It seems, unfortunately, that you are in the unenviable position of > having to include the great Sariputta among those you consider to be > whiners. It is he who is traditionally credited with the authorship > of the Patisambhidamagga. That is the only place that I personally > have come across 'sabhava' in the Sutta Pitaka, and there it is > negatively criticized." > > Can't be, Howard. I would never consider the Right-Hand Disciple of > the Buddha to be a whinger. How did you arrive at that > speculation? :-) ---------------------------------- Howard: Well, of course I don't for a second think you would criticize Sariputta. My point was to direct your attention to what the PTSM says about sabhava (as the term was used then). -------------------------------- > > Howard continues: > > "But the PTSM objects to the use of 'sabhava' as violating voidness! > So, evidently, it's being problematical wasn't discovered just by me > (or by those dreadful Mahayanists ;-)." > > And, how does Pa.tisambhidamagga object to the use of 'sabhaava'? > There must be some misunderstanding somewhere. Please elaborate the > matter? --------------------------------------- Howard: I have no online source, Suan, an so it would be difficult for me to quote the material. (And I don't want to paraphrase.) Don't you have a copy of the PTSM? --------------------------------------- > > Howard wrote: > > "Suan, I underestimated you! This post of yours is a very friendly, > very kind, reply to a somewhat angry post of mine. I thank you, and I > congratulate you! If my previous statement was pleasing to you, I > must say that your entire post is greatly pleasing to me! Thank you > very much, my friend!" > > I thank you, too, for your compliments. > > With kind regards, > > Suan > =================== With metta, Howard P.S. I don't see this "sabhava business" as a matter of Theravadin understanding of the Dhamma, but only as a matter of word usage and word choice. So this is probably a less important issue than all the conversation warrants. #60898 From: Daniel Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 10:06 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance ( was Re: Cetasikas study corner 433 ) sbhtkk Hi all, > On 16/06/06, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > >J: "I think the idea of experience originating in the brain is one > >area where science and the Dhamma are very far apart (not that I > >really know anything about the scientific view on this." > > > >What about the possibility that "brain" might only be ruupa and that > >ruupa is the reality that does not experience and hence experience > >cannot "somehow originate" in goo? > > My opinion is that it is a nice argument that the brain is only ruupa, therefore it can no more "experience" than a finger can experience. But on the other hand, we might say that the brain causes experience, which is something else. I think there is an additional complication here because we tend to think of the problem in two ways : either there is a non-material I which "has" the quality of experiencing, either there is a sort of material I which is the brain which also "has" the experience. Buddhism doesn't agree with either, as far as I understand because of the annata idea.Some day I hope I will manage to understand not only what buddhism does not say, but also what it does say... :) Daniel #60899 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 6:49 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance ( was Re: Cetasikas study corner 433 ) upasaka_howard Hi Daniel (and Jon) - In a message dated 6/29/06 1:18:57 PM Eastern Daylight Time, daniell@... writes: > Hi all, > > > On 16/06/06, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > > > >J: "I think the idea of experience originating in the brain is one > > >area where science and the Dhamma are very far apart (not that I > > >really know anything about the scientific view on this." > > > > > >What about the possibility that "brain" might only be ruupa and that > > >ruupa is the reality that does not experience and hence experience > > >cannot "somehow originate" in goo? > > > > > > My opinion is that it is a nice argument that the brain is only ruupa, > therefore > it can no more "experience" than a finger can experience. But on the other > hand, > we might say that the brain causes experience, which is something else. > > > I think there > is an additional complication here because we tend to think of the problem > in > two ways : either there is a non-material I which "has" the quality of > experiencing, either there is a sort of material I which is the brain which > also "has" the experience. Buddhism doesn't agree with either, as far as I > understand because of the annata idea.Some day I hope I will manage to > understand not only what buddhism does not say, but also what it does say... > :) ----------------------------------- Howard: Daniel! I think you are getting hold of what the Dhamma is about darn quickly and deeply! Well done! :-) ----------------------------------- > > > Daniel > ================== With metta, Howard #60900 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 11:08 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Sarah's e-Card frorm Switzerland nilovg Dear Sarah, thank you for your e-Card, now I get a better picture, you do mountain hikes and I am glad. BTW thank you for the pics of the Bgk outing with your mother we received today. I appreciate all the dhamma reminders and the ones of Kh Sujin, lobha arising also when wanting to read on Dhamma. Phil would have liked that, but he is gone. Lodewijk and I are wrestling each with a new computer. Having to solve some problems with Email viewing and writing. Enjoy your stay. Lodewijk emphasizes that you both should relax, Nina. Op 29-jun-2006, om 18:19 heeft sarah abbott het volgende geschreven: > We have a complete change of lifestyle here in the Swiss mountains > with my > mother - early morning hikes with views of snowy mountains, later > hikes > into the mountains themselves, simple living in a 'basic' chalet, #60901 From: "m. nease" Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 11:19 am Subject: Re: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, no 6. mlnease Hi Larry (and Nina) I was actually quoting from Nina's Abhidhamma in Daily Life, no 6.: "...Citta only experiences or cognizes an object; it does not "mark'' the object. Saññå marks the object so that it can be recognized later." Thanks for 'nimittakara.na.' I've often noticed 'mark' before used synonymously with "make a sign" the latter which makes more sense to me. I am curious as to whether the word translated 'mark' may have been translated with the idea of a somewhat archaic use of the word as in 'mark my words'. There are a fair few meanings of 'mark' in English and I would just like to know which Paali word has been rendered that way, if in fact it appears that way in the usual English translations of the texts. Thanks again and in advance. mike ----- Original Message ----- From: m_nease To: mlnease@... Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 11:05 AM Subject: Fwd: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, no 6. --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, LBIDD@... wrote: Mike: "Can you please tell me the Paali verb rendered 'mark'? Hi Mike and Nina, The pali for "make a sign" is nimittakara.na. Do you have a text reference for "mark"? #60902 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 11:18 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life 8 nilovg Dear friends, Citta and cetasika are paramattha dhammas (absolute realities) which each have their own unchangeable characteristic. These characteristics can be experienced, regardless how one names them. Paramattha dhammas are not words or concepts, they are realities. Pleasant feeling and unpleasant feeling are real; their characteristics can be experienced without having to call them ``pleasant feeling'' or ``unpleasant feeling''. Aversion is real; it can be experienced when it presents itself. There are not only mental phenomena, there are also physical phenomena. Physical phenomena or rúpa are the third paramattha dhamma. There are several kinds of rúpas which each have their own characteristic. There are four principle rúpas which are called the Great Elements (in Påli: mahå-bhúta-rúpa). They are: Element of Earth or solidity (to be experienced as hardness or softness) Element of Water or cohesion Element of Fire or temperature (to be experienced as heat or cold) Element of Wind or motion (to be experienced as oscillation or pressure) These ``Great Elements'' are the principle rúpas which arise together with all the other kinds of rúpa, which are the derived rúpas (in Påli: upådå-rúpa). Rúpas never arise alone; they arise in ``groups'' or ``units''. There have to be at least eight kinds of rúpa arising together. For example, whenever the rúpa which is temperature arises, solidity, cohesion, motion and other rúpas have to arise as well. ``Derived rúpas'' are, for example, the physical sense-organs of eyesense, earsense, smellingsense, tastingsense and bodysense, and the sense-objects of visible object, sound, odour and flavour. Different characteristics of rúpa can be experienced through eyes, ears, nose, tongue, bodysense and mind. These characteristics are real since they can be experienced. We use conventional terms such as ``body'' and ``table''; both have the characteristic of hardness which can be experienced through touch. In this way we can prove that the characteristic of hardness is the same, no matter whether it is in the body or in the table. Hardness is a paramattha dhamma; ``body'' and ``table'' are not paramattha dhammas but only concepts. We take it for granted that the body stays and we take it for ``self'', but what we call ``body'' are only different rúpas arising and falling away. The conventional term ``body'' may delude us about reality. We will know the truth if we learn to experience different characteristics of rúpa when they appear. ******** Nina. #60903 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 10:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] sabhaava nilovg Hi Howard, I like your remarks, especially what you said as to different characteristics that are distinguishable. They are distinguishable. Then you say: no one confuses... Yes, I do! Not in theory, but I am not sure when nama appears and when rupa, at this moment. I mix up nama and rupa. I know that at the first stage of insight the difference will be realized. Not yet, not yet. It is good to know what one does not know yet. As Kh Sujin says, gradually we have to become familiar with the characteristics of nama and rupa as they appear one at a time. That 'one at a time' is still difficult. Don't you think so? One dhamma appears through one doorway at a time and we may begin, sometimes, to understand this. Nina. Op 29-jun-2006, om 18:10 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Clearly > hardness is distinguishable from the knowing of it as well as from > other > rupas and namas. No one confuses hardness with heat, sweet taste, > or visual > object, or namas like effort, concentration, and craving! #60904 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 12:01 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, saññaa nilovg Hi Mike, I notice in PED that one of the meanings of saññaa, apart from remembrance and perception, is: sign, gesture, token, mark. This is interesting because people often wonder: is saññaa making a mark and remembering at the same time. we see the connection of meanings here. Saññaa does both and mark in English as you mention is not exactly the same meaning. But, anyway, we should not fall over words. What about its characdteristic when it appears? We need not think or worry about it. Nina. Op 29-jun-2006, om 20:19 heeft m. nease het volgende geschreven: > > I was actually quoting from Nina's Abhidhamma in Daily Life, no 6.: > "...Citta only experiences or cognizes an object; it does not > "mark'' the object. Saññå marks the object so that it can be > recognized later." > > Thanks for 'nimittakara.na.' I've often noticed 'mark' before used > synonymously with "make a sign" the latter which makes more sense > to me. I am curious as to whether the word translated 'mark' may > have been translated with the idea of a somewhat archaic use of the > word as in 'mark my words'. There are a fair few meanings of 'mark' > in English and I would just like to know which Paali word has been > rendered that way, if in fact it appears that way in the usual > English translations of the texts. > #60905 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 8:08 am Subject: Re: [dsg] sabhaava upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 6/29/06 2:46:26 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > Hi Howard, > I like your remarks, especially what you said as to different > characteristics that are distinguishable. > They are distinguishable. Then you say: no one confuses... Yes, I do! > Not in theory, but I am not sure when nama appears and when rupa, at > this moment. I mix up nama and rupa. I know that at the first stage > of insight the difference will be realized. Not yet, not yet. It is > good to know what one does not know yet. As Kh Sujin says, gradually > we have to become familiar with the characteristics of nama and rupa > as they appear one at a time. That 'one at a time' is still > difficult. Don't you think so? > ------------------------------------------ Howard: Yes, certainly 'one at a time' is very hard to perceive. For all but the most advanced ariyan, I suspect, unless one is benefiting at the time from sharp meditative discernment, the detailed perception needed is missing. The ordinary mind of the ordinary person can't pick that up, though is possible on occasion even for "ordinary folks" when meditating with sufficient calm and clarity. ------------------------------------------ One dhamma appears through one doorway > > at a time and we may begin, sometimes, to understand this. > Nina. > ==================== With metta, Howard #60906 From: "m. nease" Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 2:03 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, saññaa mlnease Hi Nina, ----- Original Message ----- From: Nina van Gorkom To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 12:01 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma in Daily LIfe, saññaa Hi Mike, I notice in PED that one of the meanings of saññaa, apart from remembrance and perception, is: sign, gesture, token, mark. This is interesting because people often wonder: is saññaa making a mark and remembering at the same time. we see the connection of meanings here. Saññaa does both and mark in English as you mention is not exactly the same meaning. But, anyway, we should not fall over words. What about its characteristic when it appears? We need not think or worry about it. Understood, Nina, thanks. mike #60907 From: LBIDD@... Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 4:27 pm Subject: Vism.XIV,86 lbidd2 "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga), Ch. XIV 86. (11) An immaterial state that [while present] assists prenascent material states [also present] by consolidating them is a 'postnascence condition', like the volition of appetite for food, which assists the bodies of vultures' young. Hence it is said: 'Postnascence states of consciousness and its concomitants are a condition, as postnascence condition, for the prenascent [co-present] body' (P.tn.1,5). ********************** 86. purejaataana.m ruupadhammaana.m upatthambhakattena upakaarako aruupadhammo pacchaajaatapaccayo gijjhapotakasariiraana.m aahaaraasaacetanaa viya. tena vutta.m ``pacchaajaataa cittacetasikaa dhammaa purejaatassa imassa kaayassa pacchaajaatapaccayena paccayo''ti (pa.t.thaa0 1.1.11). #60908 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 7:23 pm Subject: [dsg] Ignorance ( was Re: Cetasikas study corner 433 ) scottduncan2 Dear Daniel, Hello again. D: "My opinion is that it is a nice argument that the brain is only ruupa, therefore it can no more "experience" than a finger can experience. But on the other hand, we might say that the brain causes experience, which is something else." I'm not much for "comparative" discussions, however, you make an interesting point which causes me to consider this. I'd be interested to here more on how you see the brain as "causing" experience. It makes me think that the synthetic function of the brain - the tendency for the neural process to integrate inputs from all modalities and "create" the apparent wholes and the apparent fluidity which constitute conscious experience - "causes" illusions. I realise here that I'm now referring to naama, not ruupa. D: "I think there is an additional complication here because we tend to think of the problem in two ways : either there is a non-material I which "has" the quality of experiencing, either there is a sort of material I which is the brain which also "has" the experience. Buddhism doesn't agree with either, as far as I understand because of the annata idea. Some day I hope I will manage to understand not only what buddhism does not say, but also what it does say." This is a good point with which I agree. Anatta pretty well vitiates any need to discuss these finer points of neurological philosophy. But then, as a colleague who is a Zen practitioner told me the other day after a friendly chat, I'm just a Theravadan fundamentalist. Sincerely, Scott. #60909 From: Illusion Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 8:24 pm Subject: Einstein and Buddha - Parallel Sayings vvhite_illusion Dear Dhamma Friends, Attached is a sample of a newly released book called "Einstein and Buddha". Enjoy! -- []\/[][]D (Maya Putra) "I am nothing but the constituents of the clinging aggregates that is subject to change, decay, and unsatisfaction." #60910 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 2:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] sabhaava nilovg Hi Howard, ----------------- Howard: Yes, certainly 'one at a time' is very hard to perceive. For all but the most advanced ariyan, I suspect, unless one is benefiting at the time from sharp meditative discernment, the detailed perception needed is missing. The ordinary mind of the ordinary person can't pick that up, though is possible on occasion even for "ordinary folks" when meditating with sufficient calm and clarity. ------------------------------------------ This morning I listened to someone who asked whether one has to be an ariyan to be able to practice, pa.tipatti. Kh. Sujin had explained that one has first theoretical understanding of the characteristics of nama and rupa, and this is the stage of pariyatti, not yet pa.tipatti. Her answer was that one can begin. If the Buddha had not explained the characteristics of realities than we could not know them. She said: 'At this moment there is dhamma and there can gradually be understanding of this, so that it gradually becomes pa.tipatti, knowing the characterstics of the dhammas that appear.' Sure, if we have some basic understanding of naama and ruupa and of the fact that they appear one at a time through the six doors, we can begin to be aware of them. Actually, this discussion was during a Thai session where a sutta was the subject, as mentioned before: Gardual Sayings IV, 151 (Book of the eights, Ch 1, § 2, insight). Eight conditions for insight. Among others, asking questions is one of the conditions. And another one: 'Learned is he, with memory retentive and well stored. Those tenets, lovely in the beginning,lovely in the middle and lovely in the end,which set forth in spirit and in letter the godly life of purity, perfect in its entirety- even those are fully mastered by him, resolved upon, familiarized by speech, pondered over in mind, fully understood in theory. This is the fifth condition...' ****** Nina. #60911 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 2:26 am Subject: Abh. Framework nilovg Hi Ken H, Ken H: However, as you say, dhammas have other features as well. According to the Abhidhamma, they have characteristics, manifestations, functions and proximate causes. Any of those features can be directly experienced, but only one at a time. I hope Nina will help out if this is too wide of the mark. We really must go back to our books and brush up on these things. ------- N: Those features are given to help us to have more understanding of different dhammas. For example, lobha has the characterfistic of grasping an object like monkey lime. Dosa has the characteristic of flying into anger or churlishness. These are descriptions. But when they actually appear there is no need to think of all those words. We can know that lobha is entirely different from dosa, that they have different characteristics which are unalterable. Here the word characteristic is not used in the sense of the descriptions just mentioned. I heard this morning from Kh Sujin: ***** Nina. #60912 From: Gregory Parcell Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 3:52 pm Subject: Hello* gregoryparce... Hello friends. My name is Greg. I am 41 married and live in a small town in Va. I am fairly new to Buddhism. I wandered around for a while studying different traditions like Zen, Tibetan and so on. I noticed that no matter how much I studied one tradition I always returned to Theravada so I have committed myself to studying the Theravada tradition. I started doing breath meditation December of last year. I am still having trouble with an overactive mind during meditation so if any of you have some advice on calming the mind I would be appreciative. Metta, Greg. #60913 From: "Bhante Seelagawesi" Date: Thu Jun 29, 2006 12:02 pm Subject: Gratitude for my membership bhanteseelag... Dear Dhamma friends, I am a new member of Dhamma Study Group. I pay my humble gratitude for your remarkable contribution for Dhamma Studies. I believe that it is my duty to introduce myself. I am Seelagawesi Thero, a monk from Sri Lanka. I came to this monk hood, when I was 27 years old. It was my personal wish with the proper consideration. I am fine in this robe and aware of my destination. These days I am conducting some meditation programs in Denmark. I have planned to leave here for London on the 09th of July. I am going to observe my rain retreat in London. There are some devotees who wish to practice meditation, to follow Dhamma Discussions, to seek peace solutions through personal discussions, to get some healing sessions and so on. Every year I have a Dhamma Tour to USA, London and Denmark. I enjoy this devotion with selfless joy. It is a pleasure to share the Dhamma with my personal experience. I am aware of looking forward to learn more and gain more for the search of freedom. Please be kind and contact me for any request. Thank you very much once again. May you find peace and happiness through meditation! With much love and compassion, Seelagawesi Thero #60914 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 12:35 am Subject: Leading to Enlightenment ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: How do the 7 Links to Awakening lead to Enlightenment? Then a certain not very well known Bhikkhu approached the Blessed Buddha and asked: Venerable Sir, 'The 7 Links to Awakening, The Links to Awakening' is it always said. In what way are they called Links to Awakening? They lead to Enlightenment, friend, therefore are they called links to Awakening. Here, Bhikkhu, when one develops, trains, cultivates and refines: 1: The Awareness Link to Awakening. 2: The Investigation Link to Awakening. 3: The Energy Link to Awakening. 4: The Joy Link to Awakening. 5: The Tranquillity to Awakening. 6: The Concentration Link to Awakening. 7: The Equanimity Link to Awakening. based upon seclusion, disillusion, and ceasing, maturing & culminating in release, then these Seven Links to Awakening, becomes Noble and liberating. They lead any one who trains them all out, they lead to utter revulsion, to intense disgust, to dispassion, to cessation of craving and greed, to peace, to direct knowledge, to complete destruction of suffering. They lead to Enlightenment, to Nibbana... Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V: 82-83] section 46: The Links.19-21: Noble Revulsion leads to Enlightenment.... Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. #60915 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 5:53 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello* nilovg Dear Greg. Welcome to dsg and thank you for telling us about your background. If you like you could scroll down the Useful posts of dsg where you will find material under: breathing meditation. The best way would be to ask questions. I repost here the moderator Sarah's message to newcomers, since she is away for a few weeks on holidays. 1. Introduce yourself, your interest in the Buddha's teachings and give us an idea of what you'd like to hear about or discuss. Basic questions are often the best. 2. For now, just ignore all threads which make little or no sense and focus on your own threads. 3. Go to the files section of DSG http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/ and scroll down to 'Useful Posts'. Here, scroll down to 'New to the list and new to Buddhism', also 'Abhidhamma-beginners', 'Kamma-beginners' and many more sections which may be relevant. [If it's all too much, just go to posts saved under 'zany' at the bottom:-)]. 4. If the Pali words are bugging you and you'd like to have help, consider printing out the simple Pali glossary in the files and having it next to your computer. 5. Keep asking people to clarify what they are talking about in simple language. You'll do everyone a favour. But we need an indication of what you're interested to have clarified first. If you give us a chance to offer you (and anyone else new to the list) a chance, you'll find a group of really friendly and helpful people who'll be glad to discuss the teachings with you anytime. ******* Nina. Op 30-jun-2006, om 0:52 heeft Gregory Parcell het volgende geschreven: > Hello friends. > My name is Greg. I am 41 married and live in a small town in Va. I > am fairly new to Buddhism. I wandered around for a while studying > different traditions like Zen, Tibetan and so on. I noticed that no > matter how much I studied one tradition I always returned to > Theravada so I have committed myself to studying the Theravada > tradition. I started doing breath meditation December of last year. > I am still having trouble with an overactive mind during meditation > so if any of you have some advice on calming the mind I would be > appreciative. > #60916 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 5:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Gratitude for my membership nilovg Venerable Bhante Seelagawesi, Welcome to our group. Thank you for your kind words and introduction. I hope you have a fruitful Dhamma tour, with respect, Nina. Op 29-jun-2006, om 21:02 heeft Bhante Seelagawesi het volgende geschreven: > I am a new member of Dhamma Study Group. I pay my humble gratitude for > your remarkable contribution for Dhamma Studies. I believe that it is > my duty to introduce myself. I am Seelagawesi Thero, a monk from Sri > Lanka. > -- > #60917 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 4:08 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Gratitude for my membership upasaka_howard Dear Bhante - In a message dated 6/30/06 7:02:37 AM Eastern Daylight Time, bhanteseelagawesi@... writes: > Dear Dhamma friends, > > I am a new member of Dhamma Study Group. I pay my humble gratitude for > your remarkable contribution for Dhamma Studies. I believe that it is > my duty to introduce myself. I am Seelagawesi Thero, a monk from Sri > Lanka. I came to this monk hood, when I was 27 years old. It was my > personal wish with the proper consideration. I am fine in this robe and > aware of my destination. > > These days I am conducting some meditation programs in Denmark. I have > planned to leave here for London on the 09th of July. I am going to > observe my rain retreat in London. There are some devotees who wish to > practice meditation, to follow Dhamma Discussions, to seek peace > solutions through personal discussions, to get some healing sessions and > so on. Every year I have a Dhamma Tour to USA, London and Denmark. I > enjoy this devotion with selfless joy. > > It is a pleasure to share the Dhamma with my personal experience. I am > aware of looking forward to learn more and gain more for the search of > freedom. Please be kind and contact me for any request. > > Thank you very much once again. May you find peace and happiness > through meditation! > > With much love and compassion, > > Seelagawesi Thero > ========================= As a long-time member of the list, I happily welcome you! It is wonderful that a bhikkhu is willing to take the time to join with us in discussing the Dhamma. I hope to gain from your knowledge, knowledge you obtained both from your studies and as a result of your practice. I belong to several internet Buddhist lists, sir, but Dhamma Study Group is by far the most of value to me. I do hope that there will be mutual benefit between you and the other list members on DSG. I'm sure that will be so. :-) With metta, Howard #60918 From: "jonoabb" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 8:17 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) jonoabb Hi Howard Thanks very much for this reply and further explanation. However, I still have no idea what folks have in mind when they talk about dhamma-level analysis of inter-stream relations. My difficulty is that as I see it the analysis of dhammas as found in the texts as being all encompassing. What sort of matters would a dhamma-level analysis of inter-stream relations cover? Jon --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Jon - ... > I agree with you that what arises within a given mindstream is what > arises there - period, regardless of the source. I also believe that the > conventional discussion of many beings, not only in the suttas but also in parts of > the Abhidhamma Pitaka, shows that without a doubt the Dhamma is not > solipsistic. All that I maintain is that there is no detailed discussion (at the level > of analysis found in the Samyutta Nikaya and in the Dhammasangani and Patthana) > of inter-stream interactions. Perhaps such details were intentionally omitted > as simply unneeded for purposes of liberation, though I think that a > dhamma-level ("paramatthic") analysis of such inter-stream relations could be > illuminating as regards such matters as kamma and sila. Of course, too much discussion > of multiple mindstreams might lead folks to reify mindstreams as "things" or, > even worse, as "persons", and that would certainly be counterproductive. #60919 From: "jonoabb" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 8:21 am Subject: Re: Hello* jonoabb Hi Greg Thanks for introducing yourself. There have been many long discussions on the list on the subject of breath meditation, and you may find much of interest in the archives (see our 'Useful Posts' collection in the 'Files' section on the homepage). Without going into detail at the moment, we like to stress here that insight is something that can be developed regardless of how active one's mind is. Are you familiar with the Satipatthana Sutta? Jon --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Gregory Parcell wrote: > > Hello friends. > My name is Greg. I am 41 married and live in a small town in Va. I am fairly new to Buddhism. I wandered around for a while studying different traditions like Zen, Tibetan and so on. I noticed that no matter how much I studied one tradition I always returned to Theravada so I have committed myself to studying the Theravada tradition. I started doing breath meditation December of last year. I am still having trouble with an overactive mind during meditation so if any of you have some advice on calming the mind I would be appreciative. > > Metta, > Greg. #60920 From: "jonoabb" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 8:23 am Subject: Re: Gratitude for my membership jonoabb Dear Bhante We are delighted to have your presence, and look forward to your contribution to the discussions here. Please feel free to join in any thread, or to start threads of your own. Jon --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Bhante Seelagawesi" wrote: > > Dear Dhamma friends, > > I am a new member of Dhamma Study Group. I pay my humble gratitude for > your remarkable contribution for Dhamma Studies. I believe that it is > my duty to introduce myself. I am Seelagawesi Thero, a monk from Sri > Lanka. I came to this monk hood, when I was 27 years old. It was my > personal wish with the proper consideration. I am fine in this robe and > aware of my destination. > > These days I am conducting some meditation programs in Denmark. I have > planned to leave here for London on the 09th of July. I am going to > observe my rain retreat in London. There are some devotees who wish to > practice meditation, to follow Dhamma Discussions, to seek peace > solutions through personal discussions, to get some healing sessions and > so on. Every year I have a Dhamma Tour to USA, London and Denmark. I > enjoy this devotion with selfless joy. > > It is a pleasure to share the Dhamma with my personal experience. I am > aware of looking forward to learn more and gain more for the search of > freedom. Please be kind and contact me for any request. > > Thank you very much once again. May you find peace and happiness > through meditation! > > With much love and compassion, > > Seelagawesi Thero #60921 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 4:42 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello* upasaka_howard Hi, Greg - In a message dated 6/30/06 7:03:08 AM Eastern Daylight Time, gregoryparcell@... writes: > Hello friends. > My name is Greg. I am 41 married and live in a small town in Va. I am > fairly new to Buddhism. I wandered around for a while studying different > traditions like Zen, Tibetan and so on. I noticed that no matter how much I studied > one tradition I always returned to Theravada so I have committed myself to > studying the Theravada tradition. I started doing breath meditation December of > last year. I am still having trouble with an overactive mind during meditation > so if any of you have some advice on calming the mind I would be > appreciative. > > Metta, > Greg. > > ======================== Welcome to the list from another member and fellow breath meditator. In my opinion, it is best not to worry about whether the mind is overactive or any other way, but to notice how the mind is, which you do, to relax while meditating, and not to tense up because "things are not as I want them", but to meditate happily and with a smile, and to pay attention as best you can to whatever is happening at the moment. As practice for strengthening mindfulness, focus, and clarity, whenever you notice that you are not attending to the breath, after seeing clearly but briefly what *is* going on, simply let that "other matter" go, smillingly relax both body and mind, and return your attention to the primary object of meditation, the breath sensations. That process of noting, relinquishing, calming, and returning is central to meditating. A major part of what constitutes meditating is observing where the attention is and, smilingly letting go of being caught up in something. Calm, clear, and detached is what you are after, and whatever arises, arises. One thing that I have found that is very helpful and that is a clear teaching of the Buddha with regard to anapanasati practice (i.e., mindfulness of the breath) is to notice pleasant bodily sensation arising as the result of attending to (a calmed) breath, and to put some of your attention on that pleasant sensation as the entire body is suffused with it, though still keeping the breath sensations central. This then becomes extremely calming to the mind, and mindfulness, focus, and ease of attention are greatly heightened. With metta, Howard P.S. What I said here is based mainly on my own meditation experience, but I also believe it is perfectly in step with what the Buddha taught in the Anapanasati Sutta. The *way* in which I expressed this was somewhat influenced by the meditation teachings of a meditation teacher, Bhikkhu Vimalaramsi, whose approach I have high regard for. #60922 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 4:47 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) upasaka_howard Hi, Jon - In a message dated 6/30/06 11:22:02 AM Eastern Daylight Time, jonabbott@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Thanks very much for this reply and further explanation. However, I > still have no idea what folks have in mind when they talk about > dhamma-level analysis of inter-stream relations. My difficulty is > that as I see it the analysis of dhammas as found in the texts as > being all encompassing. What sort of matters would a dhamma-level > analysis of inter-stream relations cover? > > Jon > ==================== Okay. :-) Actually, the issue isn't important. It is true that all we need to know is, in fact, all we can directky know, namely whatever arises in one's own mindstream. With metta, Howard #60923 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 11:20 am Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life 9 nilovg Dear friends, Citta, cetasika and rúpa only arise when there are the right conditions, they are conditioned dhammas (in Påli: saòkhåra dhammas). Seeing cannot arise when there is no eyesense and when there is no visible object; these are necessary conditions for its arising. Sound can only arise when there are the right conditions for its arising. When it has arisen it falls away again. Everything which arises because of conditions has to fall away again when the conditions have ceased. One may think that sound stays, but what we take for a long, lasting moment of sound are actually many different rúpas succeeding one another. The fourth paramattha dhamma is nibbåna. Nibbåna is a paramattha dhamma because it is real. Nibbåna can be experienced through the mind-door if one follows the right Path leading towards it: the development of the wisdom which sees things as they are. Nibbåna is nåma. However, it is not citta or cetasika, paramattha dhammas which arise because of conditions and fall way. Nibbåna is the nåma which is an unconditioned reality; therefore it does not arise and it does not fall away. Citta and cetasika are nåmas which experience an object; nibbåna is the nåma which does not experience an object, but nibbåna itself can be the object of citta and cetasika which experience it. Nibbåna is not a person, it is non-self, anattå. Summarizing the four paramattha dhammas, they are: citta cetasika rúpa nibbåna When we study Dhamma it is essential to know which paramattha dhamma such or such reality is. If we do not know this we may be misled by conventional terms. We should, for example, know that what we call ``body'' are actually different rúpa-paramattha dhammas, not citta or cetasika. We should know that nibbåna is not citta or cetasika, but the fourth paramattha dhamma. Nibbåna is the end of all conditioned realities which arise and fall away: for the arahat, the perfected one, who passes away, there is no more rebirth, no more nåmas and rúpas which arise and fall away. All conditioned dhammas, citta, cetasika and rúpa, are impermanent, ``anicca''. All conditioned dhammas are ``dukkha''; they are ``suffering'' or unsatisfactory, since they are impermanent. All dhammas are non-self, ``anattå'' (in Påli: sabbe dhammå anattå, Dhammapada, vs. 279). Thus, the conditioned dhammas, not nibbåna, are impermanent and dukkha. But all dhammas, that is, the four paramattha dhammas, nibbåna included, have the characteristic of anattå, non-self. ****** Nina. #60924 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 3:24 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the abhidhamma of existentialism egberdina Hi Larry, On 29/06/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > Hi Herman, > > Thanks for replying. Regarding freedom, what I'm interested in is what > existentialists think it is. I'm looking for someone to explain Sartrean > existentialism in abhidhamma terms. There's a good existentialist > e-group but I can't understand a word they're saying. > > If I had to define freedom I would say freedom is free from self view. > Action (bhaava) does, in a sense, define a person in the eyes of the > world, but if there is no self view there is no self to define. All > there is is reality, so to speak. And I agree, this doesn't really have > anything to do with action. So where did the existentialists go wrong? > They started out with a complicated phenomenology, which I haven't > really looked into, and somehow got derailed into political activism. > This seems to have something to do with a rejection of inaction > ("quietism"), but I don't know the rationale behind that. Any insight > into what these guys are up to would be interesting. > I am neither a good Buddhist or a good existentialist, but I know enough about both to be dangerous :-). This is from Wikipedia about Being and Nothingness, which was Sartre's magnum opus. "Sartre's overriding concern in writing Being and Nothingness was to vindicate the fundamental freedom of the human being, against determinists of all stripes. It was for the sake of this freedom that he asserted the impotence of physical causality over human beings, that he analysed the place of nothingness within consciousness and showed how it intervened between the forces that act upon us and our actions." As I understand what I have read so far, Sartre sees the human will as being free, to the extent that it MUST always choose, and always in a context that is not of it's own making. I understand what you mean about unreadability, but we can perhaps spare a thought for the novice who attempts to join our ranks :-) Like the Buddha, Sartre has a following, and they will make of the writings what they will. But Sartre's journey is one of personal redemption, coming to full-well understand his place in the scheme of things. I think existentialists go wrong in the same places that Buddhists go wrong. Sartre has much to say about magical thinking, which is akin to sîlabbata-parâmâsa as an ignorance or denial of causality. The other biggie for Sartre is "bad faith", which is a repression of the knowledge of nothinghness, such repression expressing itself in the construction of a self that must act in a determined way. But these are just flights from anguish (dukkha). An example of such bad faith is that everybody knows that everyone is bound for death, but most yet proceed to entrench themself into life, and react with indignance or surprise etc, when death strikes. I think that in the recognition of the role which "the other" plays in consciousness that existentialism leaves Buddhism for dead. I hope that any of the above is helpful Kind Regards Herman #60925 From: LBIDD@... Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 4:20 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the abhidhamma of existentialism lbidd2 Hi Herman, Thanks for the precis of existentialism. Could you explain more about 'nothingness'? How is it different from emptiness or nibbana? I didn't understand its role in choice. Or is 'nothingness' simply an expression of dukkha ('anguish')? The idea that we constantly must choose is interesting. I wonder if there is a way of explaining that in abhidhamma terms. Also, there's a question about this: Herman: "I think that in the recognition of the role which "the other" plays in consciousness that existentialism leaves Buddhism for dead." L: What role does 'the other' play in existentialism? Larry #60926 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 5:24 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework egberdina Hi Howard and Howard (Ken), On 29/06/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > Hi, Herman (and Ken) - > > That's interesting. Appearance: the dhamma as mere element of > experience, Causation: the dhamma as the totality of conditions without which it > doesn't exist, Function: the dhamma as activity/event. BTW, your scheme reminds me > of the Abhidhammic-commnetarial scheme! ;-) > > Haven't you heard about the new me? The one that academically considers ideas, just as ideas. I do also have another idea, that the conceiving of ideas and consideration of them is not actually what the Buddha is all about, but that's another story :-) Kind Regards Herman #60927 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 5:10 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making Theory Pra egberdina Hi KenH, On 24/06/06, ken_aitch wrote: > > > > > You quoted the Abhidhammattha Sangaha where it explained that the path > > factors were simply cetasikas. That means that the path, itself, is a > > citta. > > > > > H: The right phrasing of the conclusion should be "That means that the > > path, itself, is a citta, if the path factors, in fact, are cetasikas" > > ------------- > > No prizes for guessing which student this belongs to! Yes, his handwriting is atrocious enough to qualify him as a doctor :-) > > His corrections would have been valid if the legitimacy of the > Abhidhammattha Sangaha had been in question. But it wasn't and they > aren't. > The Abhidhammattha Sangaha is what it is, a book with ideas in it, based to a large extent on earlier sourcers. If we wanted to, we could academically consider its place in the scheme of things, and analyse its ideas, and determine whether there is any totally new content in there, and whether that relates to what is real, and how. But we don't want to do that :-) > ----------------------------- > > > > > The entire world (loka) is described in many suttas as a citta with > > its object and its cetasikas. In other words, it is only the momentary > > arising of the five khandhas, in one form or another. > > > H: Cetasikas are not mentioned in the suttas. There is a mixing of > metaphors going on here. > ----------------------------- > > I don't know if they are called that by name, but cetasikas are > mentioned throughout the suttas. Academically, I think it is very poor practice to read former texts in the light of later developments of those texts. That would be like trying to get a grasp on Kant through Hegel's glasses. A totally deluded exercise, of course. Cetasikas are not in the suttas - full stop. But what there is, to be recognised when it is the case, is an intention to read the Suttas as though they are the Abhidhamma. That intention denies history, and historical development, and ends up denying the original ideas. > > > > When, figuratively speaking, the Noble Eightfold Path is being > > travelled, the world is still the five khandhas. It is a citta > > (vinnana-khandha) with supramundane cetasikas (sankhara-khandha) sanna > > and vedana (s-and-v-khandhas) arising at the mind-door (I'm not sure > > if we can class that as rupa-khandha) and with nibbana as its object. > > And it is called the Path. > > > H: More mixing of metaphors. Supramundane cetasikas and khandas. > > Nibbana as object Hmmmmm. I wonder if it's too late to switch to > basketweaving. > > ---------------------------------- > > Nibbana can be an object of consciousness: this is elementary. Basket > Weaving is a postgraduate course. > :-) I think I'll do a major in accounting instead. They say there is safety in numbers. Nibbana and any idea of Nibbana are not the same. Anything that is an object of consciousness is not Nibbana. That is more elementary. :-) Read the Suttas. > > > > As I was saying, this spoils our fun if we want to see our world as a > > place in space and time in which saintly people are performing acts of > > dana and sila and progressing, one factor at a time, on some kind of > > spiritual journey. > > > H: How is citta as agent an improvement on people as agent? > ------------------ > > There was no mention of citta as agent. The point was that people were > attached to their conventional (illusory) worlds. > Fair enough. > ----------------------------- > > > > > BTW, I hope I'm not shedding a negative light on the Dhamma; sometimes > > I tend to overstate my case. :-) > > > > > H: The Dhamma of the Dhammasangani reads like a solipsist treatise. > I hope it is not on the required reading list, or in the exams. > ----------------------------- > > I have never read it myself. To pass this subject, students only need > to know the difference between concepts and realities. > I think it would be useful if in a future lecture you could address why the Abhidhammic basic unit of reality, the paramattha dhamma, is not a concept? Have you any experience of pd's? Kind Regards Herman #60928 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 2:25 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma Framework upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Ken) - In a message dated 6/30/06 8:26:13 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > Hi Howard and Howard (Ken), > > On 29/06/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > > >Hi, Herman (and Ken) - > > > > That's interesting. Appearance: the dhamma as mere element of > > experience, Causation: the dhamma as the totality of conditions without > which it > > doesn't exist, Function: the dhamma as activity/event. BTW, your scheme > reminds me > > of the Abhidhammic-commnetarial scheme! ;-) > > > > > > Haven't you heard about the new me? The one that academically > considers ideas, just as ideas. ----------------------------------- Howard: Yeah, I recall hearing something along those lines! ;-) ---------------------------------- > > I do also have another idea, that the conceiving of ideas and > consideration of them is not actually what the Buddha is all about, > but that's another story :-) ----------------------------------- Howard: Yes. Well, I agree at least that it's not *all* about ideas and their consideration. But, actually, I do think the Buddha intended for folks to give serious consideration to the ideas he presented and to contemplate them! Of course, as I see it, the main thing he wanted us to consider were his teachings on practice. With the right understanding of what Dhamma practice is and with the consistent and persistent carrying out of that practice, all that needs to be done will be done, and all that can be known will be known. But without understanding the practice, or understanding it but not carrying it out, what needs to be done will not be done, and nothing that can be known will be known as it should be known. ----------------------------------- > > Kind Regards > > > > Herman > ======================= With metta, Howard P.S. If the legends of past Buddhas are to be believed, even the Bodhisatta first heard the Dhamma from the lips of a prior Buddha, and if, in fact, that story is not to be taken literally, the implication is that a degree of Dhamma knowledge is required before proper practice can begin, even for a Buddha. #60929 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 6:45 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The Abhidhamma Framework - My Understanding, no 2. egberdina Hi Howard, On 24/06/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Larry - > > > > > Contrast this with the madhyamika strategy of regarding all experience > > as conceptual: > > > > MMK IV,1: "Apart from the cause of form, form cannot be conceived. Apart > > from form, the cause of form is not seen." > > > ------------------------------------------ > Howard: > ................ and I certainly disagree with the notion > that all experience is conceptual. > ---------------------------------------- Could you say more about this, Howard? I can see that experience in general, as undifferentiated thereness, is not conceptual, but as for the rest, how is that not conceptual? Kind Regards Herman #60930 From: Ken O Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 6:42 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance ( was Re: Cetasikas study corner 433 ) ashkenn2k Hi Daniel > My opinion is that it is a nice argument that the brain is only > ruupa, therefore it can no more "experience" than a finger can experience. But on the other hand, we might say that the brain causes experience, which is something else. > think there is an additional complication here because we tend to think of the problem in two ways : either there is a non-material I which "has" the quality of experiencing, either there is a sort of material I which is the brain which also "has" the experience. Buddhism doesn't agree with either, as far as I understand because of the annata idea.Some day I hope I will manage to understand not only what buddhism does not say, but also what it does say... :) k: Anatta is about dispelling the notion of self. Nothing more and nothing less and it is not something that cannot be fathom. There is a lot of tendency to equate anatta as something not here nor there or it is not this or it is not that. Take for eg feeling. Can we say feeling is not real, we cant because we do experience feelings. Can we say feeling is self, we cant because if it is self, we could have pleasant feelings all the time and it will not have caused sufferings. Again please let me repeat, there is this popular tendency to think that feelings is not real because it is conditioned, or dhamma is something in between. Honestly speaking, I felt these are all ambigious and not helpful to the development of path and confuse people further. Anatta is just not self. Even though we know dhamma is profund, I think it is good to keep it simple. :-) Cheers Ken O #60931 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 2:47 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Ken) - Herman, as you must know, on many counts if not most, we are much closer together than far apart. But I do disagree with you on a few points in the following, as you will see below. In a message dated 6/30/06 8:29:36 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > Hi KenH, > > On 24/06/06, ken_aitch wrote: > > > > > > > > You quoted the Abhidhammattha Sangaha where it explained that the path > > > factors were simply cetasikas. That means that the path, itself, is a > > > citta. > > > > > > > > > H: The right phrasing of the conclusion should be "That means that the > > > > path, itself, is a citta, if the path factors, in fact, are cetasikas" > > > > ------------- > > > > No prizes for guessing which student this belongs to! > > Yes, his handwriting is atrocious enough to qualify him as a doctor :-) > > > > > His corrections would have been valid if the legitimacy of the > > Abhidhammattha Sangaha had been in question. But it wasn't and they > > aren't. > > > > The Abhidhammattha Sangaha is what it is, a book with ideas in it, > based to a large extent on earlier sourcers. If we wanted to, we could > academically consider its place in the scheme of things, and analyse > its ideas, and determine whether there is any totally new content in > there, and whether that relates to what is real, and how. But we don't > want to do that :-) > > > > ----------------------------- > > > > > > > > The entire world (loka) is described in many suttas as a citta with > > > its object and its cetasikas. In other words, it is only the momentary > > > arising of the five khandhas, in one form or another. > > > > > > H: Cetasikas are not mentioned in the suttas. There is a mixing of > > metaphors going on here. > > ----------------------------- > > > > I don't know if they are called that by name, but cetasikas are > > mentioned throughout the suttas. > > Academically, I think it is very poor practice to read former texts in > the light of later developments of those texts. That would be like > trying to get a grasp on Kant through Hegel's glasses. A totally > deluded exercise, of course. Cetasikas are not in the suttas - full > stop. But what there is, to be recognised when it is the case, is an > intention to read the Suttas as though they are the Abhidhamma. That > intention denies history, and historical development, and ends up > denying the original ideas. ------------------------------------------ Howard: The term 'cetasika' is not in the suttas, but everything that the Abhidhamma calls a cetasika is a khandhic element, and vice-versa, is that not so? So why make a big deal over the term 'cetasika'? ------------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > When, figuratively speaking, the Noble Eightfold Path is being > > > travelled, the world is still the five khandhas. It is a citta > > > (vinnana-khandha) with supramundane cetasikas (sankhara-khandha) sanna > > > and vedana (s-and-v-khandhas) arising at the mind-door (I'm not sure > > > if we can class that as rupa-khandha) and with nibbana as its object. > > > And it is called the Path. > > > > > > H: More mixing of metaphors. Supramundane cetasikas and khandas. > > > > Nibbana as object Hmmmmm. I wonder if it's too late to switch to > > basketweaving. > > > > ---------------------------------- > > > > Nibbana can be an object of consciousness: this is elementary. Basket > > Weaving is a postgraduate course. > > > > :-) I think I'll do a major in accounting instead. They say there is > safety in numbers. --------------------------------- Howard: LOL! That *is* amusing! -------------------------------- > > Nibbana and any idea of Nibbana are not the same. Anything that is an > object of consciousness is not Nibbana. That is more elementary. :-) > Read the Suttas. ------------------------------- Howard: For sure any idea of nibbana is different from nibbana! But it is also so that any idea of hardness is totally different from experienced hardness. The same for sights, sounds, tastes, smells, emotions, and so on. I agree that there is no knowing of nibbana as an object. Dualistic, subject-object knowing is, as I see it, the essence of samsaric cognition. But there is also nibbanic experience also, is there not? I'd say there is. -------------------------------- > > > > > > > > As I was saying, this spoils our fun if we want to see our world as a > > > place in space and time in which saintly people are performing acts of > > > dana and sila and progressing, one factor at a time, on some kind of > > > spiritual journey. > > > > > > H: How is citta as agent an improvement on people as agent? > > ------------------ > > > > There was no mention of citta as agent. The point was that people were > > attached to their conventional (illusory) worlds. > > > > > Fair enough. > > > > ----------------------------- > > > > > > > > BTW, I hope I'm not shedding a negative light on the Dhamma; sometimes > > > I tend to overstate my case. :-) > > > > > > > > > H: The Dhamma of the Dhammasangani reads like a solipsist treatise. > > I hope it is not on the required reading list, or in the exams. > > ----------------------------- > > > > I have never read it myself. To pass this subject, students only need > > to know the difference between concepts and realities. > > > > I think it would be useful if in a future lecture you could address > why the Abhidhammic basic unit of reality, the paramattha dhamma, is > not a concept? Have you any experience of pd's? --------------------------------- Howard: Herman, do you not directly experience sights, sounds, tastes, smells, hardness, warmth, thoughts, feelings, emotions, etc? They are all pd's. No mystery to them. So we miss starts and ends of dhammas. So what? Maybe there are no graspable starting and ending points. I can't detect the exact beginning or ending of a sensation of warmth, but I sure do detect the sensation. That is experiencing a pd! ---------------------------------- > > > > Kind Regards > > > > Herman > =================== With metta, Howard #60932 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 2:56 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The Abhidhamma Framework - My Understanding, no 2. upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 6/30/06 9:45:45 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > > > > > Hi Howard, > > On 24/06/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > >Hi, Larry - > > > > > > > >Contrast this with the madhyamika strategy of regarding all experience > > >as conceptual: > > > > > >MMK IV,1: "Apart from the cause of form, form cannot be conceived. Apart > > >from form, the cause of form is not seen." > > > > > > ------------------------------------------ > > Howard: > > ................ and I certainly disagree with the notion > > that all experience is conceptual. > > ---------------------------------------- > > Could you say more about this, Howard? I can see that experience in > general, as undifferentiated thereness, is not conceptual, but as for > the rest, how is that not conceptual? > > Kind Regards > > > > Herman ======================= The Tibetans agree with you that all experience is conceptual. But I don't see that as at all true. Feeling warmth is quite diffferent from naming it, thinking about it, imagining it, recalling it, or defining it. It is an experience - a bodily experience, and it has nothing to do with conceptualization. For a more dramatic example think of the sharp, unbearable pain of a dentist's probe quickly inserted into an exposed nerve. At the moment that is experienced there are no concepts. Your entire world is pain! (Afterwards we may name it.) With metta, Howard #60933 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 7:00 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) egberdina Hi Nina, Thank you for your further reflections. On 25/06/06, nina van gorkom wrote: > > > > > I think we can also see that the Dhamma really is our only refuge - > > understanding that all the problems in life are just in a single citta > > now. > > > H: > > I think that you are equating > Dhamma with solipsism in the above, and I would suggest that > displacing the reality of suffering from a human level to a citta > level can only be temporarily maintained, and is at best a diversion. > > ----- > N: In fact, it is true that all our worries, sadness, problems are thinking > of concepts, and that citta which thinks is a reality which falls away > immediately. But we make it so important, it seems to last, we think on and > on. We concentrate on ourselves in that way, we are not concerned for > others. It is very confusing for me when cittas and "we" get used in the same context. As an academic concept, at the citta level there is no "we", other than as the product and content of citta. But I understand why the person creeps into it again and again. Because that is the reality of our being, that is what we are, and disembodied cittas are nowhere to be found. > Sarah and I find the following passage of the Vis. often quoted here, very > consoling: > > (Vis. XX, 72): > > Join in one conscious moment that flicks by... > No store of broken states, no future stock; > Those born balance like seeds on needle points. > Break-up of states is foredoomed at their birth; > Those present decay, unmingled with those past. > They come from nowhere, break up, nowhere go; > Flash in and out, as lightning in the sky...> > > Understanding of naama and ruupa leads to detachment from self. This means: > more openness to the needs of others, more mettaa. Less thinking of one's > own comfort and pleasure. > Sarah gave examples before that we blame other people or the circumstances > for our unhappiness. We keep on thinking long stories with akusala cittas. > But if there can be a moment of understanding of the citta that thinks, it > leads to a degree of detachment, even slightly so. We shall look into > ourselves as the cause of troubles in life, not other people. This helps our > social life. > Remember the sutta: what is the cause of all trouble in the world: lobha, > dosa, moha, the three unwholesome roots. > It is through the Abhidhamma that we gain more knowledge of the different > types of defilements and this can lead to the growth of generosity, of > siila, of all kusala. Understanding of realities is beneficial both for > ourselves and for others. If we can contribute a little to it that others > have more understanding of the Dhamma it is good. > > Herman, did you notice what Sarah did? She had to go to the airport, but > still found time to have coffee with a person who had lost her parents, and > she found time to answer Scott's post on death. > Look, Nina, I agree with just about everything you say. Because you are writing about people, real people and what they do and how they relate to each other. And Sarah is a gem ! Thanks again and Kind Regards to you and Lodewijk Herman #60934 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 7:17 pm Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Pardon the further delving into the black arts of amature translation: "And there is only this modicum of disturbance: that connected with the six sensory spheres, dependent on this very body with life as its condition." (MN121)" I took a look at the Cula Sunnata Sutta, and pulled a similar passage from further on in the scripture: "And there is just this non-emptiness, that connected with the six sensory spheres, dependent on this very body with life as condition." A second translation of the same passage: "There is non-voidity on account of life and the body of six mental spheres." The Paali: "Atthi cevida.m asu~n~nata.m yadida.m imameva kaaya.m paticca salaayatanika.m jiivitapaccayeti" atthi: object; essence or value or profitablenss; to recognise the nature of; to realise; to know; to understand. cevida.m: ce=if vidanati=to make appear; to show vi=two; duality or separation; prefix of separation and expansion; asunder; "dis" ida=in this here. asu~n~nata.m: absence of voidness or emptiness. yadida.m: ya=which yadida="as that;" which is this; viz; just this; in other words; so to speak; just this; I mean. imameva: so, even, just ("eva") kaaya.m: to heap up; accumulate; an aggregate of a multiplicity of elements(physical sense); seat of sensation, fundamental organ of touch (psychological). paticca: "paccaya" support; resting on; falling back on; requisite; relation; condition. salayatanika.m: the six organs of sense and the six objects. jiivitapaccayeti: jivita=that which is lived; individual life. paccayeti=by means of; cause by; resting on. Obviously I had difficulty with some of these (again, Paali experts, please correct!) Here's what I get: "Recognising and knowing the essence in the absence of voidness or emptiness, even this aggregate of a multiplicity of elements, this seat of sensation, resting upon the six organs of sense and the six objects, being conditioned by means of this life which is lived." Given this utter butchery, the six organs of sense and the six objects are meant, and, as you say, no real implication of a brain in any of this.. The "kaaya" is "body" all right but a body described as an "aggregate," an aggregate made up of "a multiplicity of elements." For what its worth... Help from the Paali experts would be greatly appreciated. Sincerely, Scott. #60935 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 7:37 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) egberdina Hi Nina and Howard, On 25/06/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > > > > I think we can also see that the Dhamma really is our only refuge - > > > understanding that all the problems in life are just in a single citta > > > now. > > > > H: > > I think that you are equating > > Dhamma with solipsism in the above, and I would suggest that > > displacing the reality of suffering from a human level to a citta > > level can only be temporarily maintained, and is at best a diversion. > ======================= > Unless I'm misunderstanding Herman, I don't think he's addressing the > conventional-versus-actual issue, but the matter of multiple mindstreams. Both > the Sutta Pitaka and the Abhidhamma Pitaka talk in terms of the phenomena of > a single namarupic stream, analyzing its elements into 5 khandhas or into > ayatanas or into rupas, cittas, and cetasikas, but always within a single > mindstream. I think there is a good reason for doing that, namely that this is all > that is directly available within a given mindstream, and liberation is achieved > within individual mindstreams, and not by inferential knowledge, but by direct > knowing. > But part of what occurs within a mindstream "points" to other > namarupic streams, and not dealing with them and their impact on "one's own" > mindstream at the "ultimate" level of analysis seems to be missing from the Dhamma, > though, of course, the Dhamma recognizes other namarupic streams at the > conventional level of "other beings". If one were to take the ignoring of other > namarupic streams at the dhammic level of analysis to imply that there is, in fact, > only one's own mindstream, that would be an instance of solipsism, the > philosophical belief that "I" alone exist. You have understood my gist, Howard. We discussed recently some of the various ways in which a dhamma can be apprehended eg as appearance, as cause, as function/ effect, none of which can individually capture what it is to be a dhamma. So, as Karunadasa points out in his brilliant article on Dhamma Theory, if you limit yourself to apprehending dhammas as appearance you are a pluralist. And you are bound to be a monist when thinking in terms of conditionality. "Analysis, when not supplemented by synthesis, leads to pluralism. Synthesis, when not supplemented by analysis, leads to monism. What one finds in the Abhidhamma is a combined use of both methods. This results in a philosophical vision, which beautifully transcends the dialectical opposition between monism and pluralism." So undue emphasis on a single perspective becomes distortion. How does this all relate to solipsism? Well, anything that does not consider the cause of mindstream in its analysis of mindstream is bound to be a distortion. And what is the origin of mindstream but "the other"(s). Atta-consciousness is a social product. An individual consciousness is a contradiction in terms. And that is why the Buddha's path of liberation is inextricably one of isolation, seclusion, renunciation of the world inhabited by "others". There can be no meaningful subsiding of atta-consciousness in a social context. For just as a dog becomes transfixed on the seeing of another dog, so we too have an innate sense of when we encounter one who is like us. And we tend to become determined by that "other" to an incredible degree. Needless to say, hiri and ottappa are entirely predicated on the "other". Any notion of sila is meaningless in the absence of the "other". Come to think of it, most of our action in the world is based on our relationship to "others". How can the other not figure in any worthwhile analysis of reality? Well, I've convinced myself even more of the dangers of analysis without corresponding synthesis in the same breath. Perhaps it's safer to just refrain from analysis altogether :-) Here's hoping any of it makes sense. Kind Regards Herman #60936 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 7:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) egberdina Hi Jon, On 29/06/06, jonoabb wrote: > > > Hi Herman > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" > wrote: > > > > Hi Sarah and all, > ... > > > I would equate the statement that the world is this single citta with > > a definition of solipsism. > > > Not sure why you say this, and would appreciate your elaboration if > you cared. Perhaps my replies to Howard and Nina will suffice, if not, just let me know. > > As I see it, 'the world' as used by the Buddha in the teachings means > the world of the present instant, not the world at large in the > conventional sense. > You would say that, wouldn't you? :-) What do you make of the Buddha's saying that friendship is all of the holy life? > > > I would agree that such notions are > > implicit in certain revered texts. But texts that cannot or do not > > account for the existence of other beings/minds are solipsist. And > > they are extremely poor philosophy, in my book. Because the very fact > > of the existence of the text denies the beliefs held in them. Why > > write a book if there is no audience? > > > Well that is one inference to be argued. But could it not equally be > said that that existence of such texts indicates that the existence of > other beings is *not* being denied. Perhaps the statement has a > different meaning to that which you take it to have. > That may well be the case. Bring forward your arguments. But I will reserve the right to consider them as coming from a man, whom I have met and am fonds of, who together with his lovely wife are in Switzerland at the moment, as husband and wife, and not as nama/rupic aggregates. > > > I think that you are equating > > Dhamma with solipsism in the above, and I would suggest that > > displacing the reality of suffering from a human level to a citta > > level can only be temporarily maintained, and is at best a diversion. > > > More inferences on your part ;-)). But as a general comment I would > say that seeing the teachings as relating at the level of cittas, etc > does not mean forfeiting the human aspect of the world. If anything, > it helps one have more respect for other beings (if that's the kind of > thing you have in mind). > As I see it, a teaching about cittas is that in the context of two or more people so engaged. What is to be recognised is the fugue into illusion when that is the case. Any notion of disembodied cittas would be a case in point. Kind Regards Herman #60937 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 8:07 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye egberdina Hi Scott, On 29/06/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > Dear Herman, > > H: "To me, there can be no clearer statement that experience and the > body are inseperably intertwined. OK, so it does not pinpoint the > brain as the main game in the body..." > > How is this important though? > To be honest, I do not remember the context of that discussion anymore. But as a general point I would say that we need look no further than daily life to see that we do believe these things are important. Do your beloved Oilers wear helmets on the ice? I wonder why :-) I get the feeling sometimes that you denounce all modern science. But if you have ensured that your children are innoculated, then that denouncement would be a case of bad faith. I am saying this, because I remember a case in Holland where some religious fruitcakes prevented their children from being innoculated, as that would be tempting God. Some of the kids contracted polio and there was a public outcry. Kind Regards Herman #60938 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 8:17 pm Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye scottduncan2 Dear Herman, H: "I get the feeling sometimes that you denounce all modern science. But if you have ensured that your children are innoculated, then that denouncement would be a case of bad faith. I am saying this, because I remember a case in Holland where some religious fruitcakes prevented their children from being innoculated, as that would be tempting God. Some of the kids contracted polio and there was a public outcry." I certainly in no way denounce all modern science. I don't see where you get that notion from. I simply have absolutely no interest in it when it comes to Dhamma study. That I don't revere or idealise science doesn't mean that I therefore denounce it. It is simply a mundane and conventional enterprise with its own aims and results. I use and appreciate its benefits. I deplore its follies and nightmarish creations. It is not Dhamma. I don't need science in any way to shore up the Buddhadhamma. With loving kindness, Scott. #60939 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 8:46 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making Theory Pra egberdina Hi Scott, On 28/06/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > Dear Herman, > > Thank you for your ongoing clarifications. > > H: "...the thrust of the argument is that any object is in fact a > > selection from an unobjective field of possibilities. It is intention > that selectively attends, thereby creating a foreground object where > there is none. The boundaries which delimit our intended objects also > come out of nothing, as it were." > > > In what sense do you mean "intention?" When the selective attention > of intention "creates" a foreground object, from whence does this > object come? Are you saying that it doesn't exist ("come[s] out of > nothing") and then is created at the moment of selective attention by > intention? You might be aware of the Necker cube, just some lines on a page really. But it can be seen as cube with different spatial orientations. Or the picture of the vase that could also be two profiles kissing. The mind resolves what is ambiguous into something discrete, but that discrete object is not "there" objectively. It is intention at work. The object-as-meaning is entirely mindmade; prior to the intentional resolving into a particular form and orientation there was only an inferred field of possibilities. > > H: "...Take a page in a book. We say it is full of writing. But it is > > much fuller of non-writing. Take a piece of music. We say it is full > of sound. Yet it is suffused with silence. Take the waking state. We > say it is full of consciousness, yet it is abstracted out of > unconsciousness." > > > I'll need to know, as above, how you define "unconsciousness," if you > can clarify. I keep reading you to posit a nothing out of which > something appears. > In the case above I meant something like unawareness. We infer that there is consciousness 24/7, but we can really say nothing about it. When there is consciousness of consciousness, that is when there is awareness, or mindfulness would be another good word. I think we can safely infer that though we call it a waking state, most of it is spent unaware. > H: "Nothingness is certainly higher-order, but nothingness, like > > emptiness, like anatta, like anicca, are not things. They are absence. > They are what is there in the absence of intention. The world of > things is nothing but the world of intentions." > > > What do you mean when you say that anatta and anicca "are not things > [but] are absence?" Again, without a clear sense of what you mean by > "intention," it is difficult to follow you when you assert "[t]hey are > > there in the absence of intention." > Well, anatta is the absence of agency, and anicca is the absence of any enduring form. It might become clearer if you cease willing anything to be a particular way for a while. You might only succeed for a millisecond, but what was there in the absence of intention? > To demonstrate my lack of understanding, the above seems as if you are > saying that anatta and anicca are absence and, at the same time, they > are existents in some sort of state prior to the working of > "intention." I get the figure-ground analogy, except is this merely > an analogy or is this more? > No, I reject any existents. Without intention there is just voidness, emptiness. Voidness, emptiness are not existents, but they are reality. I guess that's more about the meanings of words. > H: "To be completely clear on these issues would require a very large > > volume of edited and re-edited writing, which is beyond my aim in > discussing." > > > But can't you at least clear up these definitional details? I'm thick > but surely not that thick that I require "a very large volume" as a > reply. (See here one of those funny faces you guys put in when you > say something light and funny as I just did.) A little more clarity > on some of your key points would suffice. > I hope the above clarifies :-) > H: "But the more significant craving is not for objects, it is > > for being and not being. And that is dukkha, because it is simply > inherent in the structure of being that being is predicated on > nothing(ness)." > > > I wonder if it is different when one says one craves "becoming" as > opposed to "being and not being?" Dukkha is "craving for being and > not being?" Some of your usage of terms, to me, is idiosyncratic, and > I'm afraid I get lost. Hoping you can patiently clarify... > Yeah, sometimes I confuse myself as well. But I take heart from the fact that a long time ago there was some agreement on dsg that consistency is the hallmark of a small mind. Or words to that effect :-) Later, dude Herman #60940 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 8:50 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye egberdina Hi Scott, On 01/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > I simply have absolutely no interest in it when it comes to Dhamma study. > I appreciate your point. For me that would be a great way of defining what Dhamma study is and isn't. Dhamma study is the mind studying itself, no props required. Kind Regards Herman #60941 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 9:07 pm Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye scottduncan2 Dear Herman, I'm going to get a reputation, I swear... H: "Dhamma study is the mind studying itself, no props required." Dhamma study (pariyatti) is learning the Dhamma (read teachings). "Mind studying itself" is, loosely, practise or patipatti; and the penetrating of the Dhamma (pativedha) is the end. If by "mind" you mean "citta," I half understand your point. I don't follow the apparent self-reflexiveness: citta is the reality which experiences; objects are those which citta experiences. Does citta experience citta? I don't think so. Corrections welcome. With loving kindness, Scott. #60942 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 4:03 am Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ken_aitch Hi Scott and Herman, ------------ H: > > Dhamma study is the mind studying itself, no props required. > > S: > Dhamma study (pariyatti) is learning the Dhamma (read teachings). "Mind studying itself" is, loosely, practise or patipatti; and the penetrating of the Dhamma (pativedha) is the end. If by "mind" you mean "citta," I half understand your point. I don't follow the apparent self-reflexiveness: citta is the reality which experiences; objects are those which citta experiences. Does citta experience citta? I don't think so. Corrections welcome. ----------------- That sounds right to me. The idea of a self-reflexive mind is one of the early hurdles a Dhamma student has to get over. When the Satipatthana Sutta, for example, says that a monk practising satipatthana knows citta with dosa as citta with dosa, a student can easily get the impression of an unwholesome citta reflecting wholesomely on itself. But citta cannot take itself as object, nor can it take one of its own cetasikas as object. Nor can an unwholesome citta ever have insight. However a citta or cetasika can become the object of a subsequent citta. When a monk knows 'citta with dosa' as 'citta with dosa' it is a closely following, wholesome, citta that does the knowing. Ken H #60943 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 6:16 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making Theory Pra scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Thanks again for your further clarifications: H: "You might be aware of the Necker cube, just some lines on a page really. But it can be seen as cube with different spatial orientations. Or the picture of the vase that could also be two profiles kissing. The mind resolves what is ambiguous into something discrete, but that discrete object is not "there" objectively. It is intention at work. The object-as-meaning is entirely mindmade; prior to the intentional resolving into a particular form and orientation there was only an inferred field of possibilities." By "the mind," are you referring to "the person who thinks?" Are you referring to the illusion of wholeness and continuity created by the integrative function of the neural networks in the brain? H: "In the case above I meant something like unawareness. We infer that there is consciousness 24/7, but we can really say nothing about it. When there is consciousness of consciousness, that is when there is awareness, or mindfulness would be another good word. I think we can safely infer that though we call it a waking state, most of it is spent unaware." You then equate "consciousness of consciousness" with awareness or mindfulness. Do you mean that there is a superimposition of consciousnesses such that one is aware of the other at the same time? H: "Well, anatta is the absence of agency, and anicca is the absence of any enduring form. It might become clearer if you cease willing anything to be a particular way for a while. You might only succeed for a millisecond, but what was there in the absence of intention?" Self view, I think, Herman. None of the above is possible. There is no one to cease willing, no one to will, and no one will succeed, even for that millisecond you are hoping for. H: "No, I reject any existents. Without intention there is just voidness, emptiness. Voidness, emptiness are not existents, but they are reality. I guess that's more about the meanings of words." I really don't follow here. Is intention "cetanaa?" Where are you getting these ideas from? Are there any Suttas you might use to clarify? What do you mean when you say that there is just voidness and emptiness without intention? Are you saying that the mind creates everything by will? H: "Yeah, sometimes I confuse myself as well. But I take heart from the fact that a long time ago there was some agreement on dsg that consistency is the hallmark of a small mind. Or words to that effect." Well, now my mind is shrinking because I'm consistently confused. A delusional guy gave me a solution, the other day, when he said that being sprayed with bear spray can cause one's skull to grow temporarily. Think I'll give it a shot... With loving kindness, Scott. #60944 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 6:33 am Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' scottduncan2 Dear Ken H, K: "When the Satipatthana Sutta, for example, says that a monk practising satipatthana knows citta with dosa as citta with dosa, a student can easily get the impression of an unwholesome citta reflecting wholesomely on itself. But citta cannot take itself as object, nor can it take one of its own cetasikas as object. Nor can an unwholesome citta ever have insight. "However a citta or cetasika can become the object of a subsequent citta. When a monk knows 'citta with dosa' as 'citta with dosa' it is a closely following, wholesome, citta that does the knowing." Yeah, the arising and the falling away and the arising. Knowing is only this moment. And there is no self who knows anything. With loving kindness, Scott. #60945 From: "Bhante Seelagawesi" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 10:38 pm Subject: Awareness with Bodhisattava Nature bhanteseelag... Dear Dhamma friends, I am grateful to hear that you are keen with your spiritual practice with love and compassion. There is a very important reality that we should be aware. What is that? That is the intention of awakening our potential Buddha hood, the Bodhisattva nature. Though we are good we are still ignoble. That means we have not reached the freedom of suffering. Therefore when there is a reason for the sadness, we are not good any more. Our goodness is being destroyed by our difficulties and problems. The nature of the Bodhisattva is to be strong with the intention of fulfillments to reach freedom. If we don’t be aware of it we don’t find the opportunity of cultivation of the mind for the freedom. This is very important to be considered. We should focus our mind with the awareness to concentrate how to attend the daily life with the Bodhisattva nature. This attempt helps us to have a peaceful life with happiness. The Bodhisattva nature within us makes a loving relationship in the world. Bodhisattva nature is aware of personal and universal duty and the responsibility. It encourages us to devote ourselves to achieve our rights through the social relationship. This is very important to us to have indifference stability. The thought, word and deed are full of strength with determination to find freedom, when we are aware of this nature. Therefore we find enormous energy within us to tolerate our difficulties whether it is internal or external. I would like to invite you for the awareness of finding the Buddha hood within. I am really happy to see that you may find the benefit of this selfless suggestion. Thank you very much for your emotional appreciation. May you find the peace and happiness with effortful practice! With much love and compassion, Seelagawesi Thero #60946 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 10:45 pm Subject: Falling Upwards ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: Inclining, sloping, bending & falling towards Enlightenment! The Blessed Buddha once said: Bhikkhus, just as all the rafters in a peaked house slant, slope, tilt, tend, veer & incline towards the roof top, even so, when any bhikkhu begins to train, develop & cultivate the Seven Links to Awakening, then he indeed slants, slopes, tilts, tends, inclines & veers towards Nibbana... Why and how is this convergence so? When, friends, a Bhikkhu trains, develops, expands, consolidates & refines: 1: The Awareness Link to Awakening. 2: The Investigation Link to Awakening. 3: The Energy Link to Awakening. 4: The Joy Link to Awakening. 5: The Tranquillity to Awakening. 6: The Concentration Link to Awakening. 7: The Equanimity Link to Awakening. based upon seclusion, disillusion, and ceasing, maturing & culminating in release, then these Seven Links to Awakening and the repeated training of them, in & by themselves, make him slant, slope, tilt, tend, veer and incline towards Nibbana... Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V: 75-6] section 46: The Links.7: The Peaked House.... Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. #60947 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 2:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Scott (and Herman) - In a message dated 7/1/06 9:23:30 AM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > Dear Herman, > > Thanks again for your further clarifications: > > H: "You might be aware of the Necker cube, just some lines on a page > really. But it can be seen as cube with different spatial > orientations. Or the picture of the vase that could also be two > profiles kissing. The mind resolves what is ambiguous into something > discrete, but that discrete object is not "there" objectively. It is > intention at work. The object-as-meaning is entirely mindmade; prior > to the intentional resolving into a particular form and orientation > there was only an inferred field of possibilities." > > By "the mind," are you referring to "the person who thinks?" Are you > referring to the illusion of wholeness and continuity created by the > integrative function of the neural networks in the brain? > > H: "In the case above I meant something like unawareness. We infer > that there is consciousness 24/7, but we can really say nothing about > it. When there is consciousness of consciousness, that is when there > is awareness, or mindfulness would be another good word. I think we > can safely infer that though we call it a waking state, most of it is > spent unaware." > > You then equate "consciousness of consciousness" with awareness or > mindfulness. Do you mean that there is a superimposition of > consciousnesses such that one is aware of the other at the same time? ------------------------------------ Howard: That is a good question, Scott. I don't think that there is oconsciousness of current consciousness (as an object) at that time. On any occasion, there is but a single object of consciousness. However, I do believe there is a nondual awareness of being conscious all the time, for otherwise we would be unable to know that we had just been aware of something (after the fact). After an odd sound, when someone asks "Did you hear that?" you are able to truly answer in the affirmative. I conclude from this that there had been some form of awareness of being aware, and yet, at the moment of hearing, the only *object* of consciousness was the sound. Thus, I believe there is more than one way of knowing: knowing as an object, and "participative knowing". For example, when feeling an emotion, that is a form of participative knowing. Sometimes the emotion is associated with an object of consciousness, but other times it is merely the affective state of mind. (What I say here is my evaluation of my own experience. It differs, I believe, from the Abhidhammic perspective.) ------------------------------------- > > H: "Well, anatta is the absence of agency, and anicca is the absence > of any enduring form. It might become clearer if you cease willing > anything to be a particular way for a while. You might only succeed > for a millisecond, but what was there in the absence of intention?" > > Self view, I think, Herman. None of the above is possible. There is > no one to cease willing, no one to will, and no one will succeed, even > for that millisecond you are hoping for. ---------------------------------------- Howard: For events to occur, including willing, there is no need for there to be an agent. To say that "none of the above is possible" is to assume that a self is required for things to happen. That is actually an atta-view. Willing occurs all the time, Scott. When "your hand lifts", there was willing. When "your head turns" at hearing a sound, there was willing. ----------------------------------------- > > H: "No, I reject any existents. Without intention there is just > voidness, emptiness. Voidness, emptiness are not existents, but they > are reality. I guess that's more about the meanings of words." > > I really don't follow here. Is intention "cetanaa?" Where are you > getting these ideas from? Are there any Suttas you might use to > clarify? What do you mean when you say that there is just voidness > and emptiness without intention? Are you saying that the mind creates > everything by will? --------------------------------------- Howard: LOL! I'm not following either of you here! ;-) ------------------------------------- > > H: "Yeah, sometimes I confuse myself as well. But I take heart from > the fact that a long time ago there was some agreement on dsg that > consistency is the hallmark of a small mind. Or words to that effect." > > Well, now my mind is shrinking because I'm consistently confused. A > delusional guy gave me a solution, the other day, when he said that > being sprayed with bear spray can cause one's skull to grow > temporarily. Think I'll give it a shot... > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > ==================== With metta, Howard #60948 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen n... upasaka_howard Hi, Scott and Ken - In a message dated 7/1/06 9:35:31 AM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > Dear Ken H, > > K: "When the Satipatthana Sutta, for example, says that a monk > practising satipatthana knows citta with dosa as citta with dosa, a > student can easily get the impression of an unwholesome citta reflecting > wholesomely on itself. But citta cannot take itself as object, nor can > it take one of its own cetasikas as object. Nor can an unwholesome > citta ever have insight. > > "However a citta or cetasika can become the object of a subsequent > citta. When a monk knows 'citta with dosa' as 'citta with dosa' it is > a closely following, wholesome, citta that does the knowing." --------------------------------- Howard: I don't believe that. The prior consciousness may be remembered, but it cannot be an object of consciousness, as it DOES NOT EXIST. The view that it still exists in some form was a Sarvastivadin view resembling eternalism that was properly roundly criticized. Whatever is known, unless it is a concept, must be present at the moment of knowing. ---------------------------------- > > Yeah, the arising and the falling away and the arising. Knowing is > only this moment. And there is no self who knows anything. > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > > ==================== With metta, Howard #60949 From: Gregory Parcell Date: Fri Jun 30, 2006 1:26 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Hello* gregoryparce... Hi Jon, Thank you for your kind guidance. I am somewhat familiar with the Satipatthana Sutta. I will go into more detail with it tonight. Metta, Greg. jonoabb wrote: Hi Greg Thanks for introducing yourself. There have been many long discussions on the list on the subject of breath meditation, and you may find much of interest in the archives (see our 'Useful Posts' collection in the 'Files' section on the homepage). Without going into detail at the moment, we like to stress here that insight is something that can be developed regardless of how active one's mind is. Are you familiar with the Satipatthana Sutta? Jon <....> #60950 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 7:24 am Subject: Hello. Calming the mind. nilovg Dear Gregg, Your question is so human, feeling disturbed because of distractions. This problem can be seen from different angles. I have been pondering over it while walking today. What is true calm? It is freedom of defilements, such as attachment, aversion, delusion, restlessness. We do not like to feel restless, we would rather be calm. But the Buddha taught that whatever state of mind arises, does so because there are conditions for it. We cannot have calm whenever we want to. We can learn from this: calm arises when there are the proper conditions for it. Calm is not the same as pleasant feeling or indifferent feeling. The Buddha taught that kusala citta (wholesome consciousness) can be accompanied by pleasant feeling or by indifferent feeling. He also taught that citta with attachment can be accompanied by pleasant feeling or by indifferent feeling. Understanding this helps us not to mislead ourselves into thinking that whenever we feel happy or indifferent there must be calm. Usually there is likely to be attachment at such a moment. Attachment can be very subtle, there can also be attachment to calm and then there is no true calm. Attachment and calm do not go together. When there is calm there is a degree of detachment, detachment from defilements. When one finds that one is distracted, it is helpful to remember that this is condiitoned. At the same time we can feel gratefulness and respect to the Buddha who taught us so many details about consciousness, feeling, all realities inside us and around us. At such a moment there can be recollection of the Buddha's excellent qualities and that is calm. We do not need to go to a special place, it can arise now while we study the teachings. We are born as humans and by conditions we came into contact with the Buddha's teachings which is really a rare occasion. And this did not happen by accident, it is conditioned by kusala kamma (good deeds) in the past, even in past lives. These are just some personal thoughts and I hope they can be of use to you, ******* Nina. #60951 From: "Kenneth" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 8:06 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles ashkenn2k Hi Joop and Charles DeCoasta Joop : You said it is D.O. casual chain, could you tell me, then after death, what will arise. Charlse: A linear direction. I would apprieciate if you explain these from the suttas If it is birth, first or ignorance or ... If it is birth what condition it, is it ignorance or is it craving or kamma. If it is the in reverse order, have you seen Buddha said craving is the condition for feeling, feeling for cotact. In another way do you see Buddha said in the reverse order Depending on feeling, craving arise or Depending on craving, feeling arise? Kind regards Ken O #60952 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 9:07 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Howard, Good to correspond with you! Howard: "That is a good question, Scott. I don't think that there is consciousness of current consciousness (as an object) at that time. On any occasion, there is but a single object of consciousness. However, I do believe there is a nondual awareness of being conscious all the time, for otherwise we would be unable to know that we had just been aware of something (after the fact). After an odd sound, when someone asks "Did you hear that?" you are able to truly answer in the affirmative. I conclude from this that there had been some form of awareness of being aware, and yet, at the moment of hearing, the only *object* of consciousness was the sound. Thus, I believe there is more than one way of knowing: knowing as an object, and "participative knowing". For example, when feeling an emotion, that is a form of participative knowing. Sometimes the emotion is associated with an object of consciousness, but other times it is merely the affective state of mind. (What I say here is my evaluation of my own experience. It differs, I believe, from the Abhidhammic perspective.)" There is knowing or pa~n~na. And there is thinking about things after the fact. For instance, is there not sa~n~na, which arises with each citta? The function of sa~n~na is remembering, I think. When I affirm, as per your example, that I heard an odd sound after having heard the sound, don't I mean that I remember having heard the sound? Isn't this now citta with concept as object? The "nondual awareness of being conscious all the time" may be a fiction if one considers that "being conscious" is for only one moment at a time - a moment that arises and falls away and serves as condition for the next moment. I guess you are suggesting an alternative to what I see as the sort of classic Abhidhamma view. There is consciousness "all the time" in that, technically, cittas arise and fall away "all the time." Continuity is a concept, is it not? What is "participative knowing?" Who knows? Who participates? How does "emotion...associated with an object of consciousness" differ from "an affective state of mind?" Now we are dealing with vedanaa (feeling or sensation) which, as well, arises with each citta. As with sa~n~na, vedanaa arises and falls away, with "new" object each time. It seems to me that an "affective state of mind" might be thinking about feeling. Howard: "For events to occur, including willing, there is no need for there to be an agent. To say that "none of the above is possible" is to assume that a self is required for things to happen. That is actually an atta-view. Willing occurs all the time, Scott. When "your hand lifts", there was willing. When "your head turns" at hearing a sound, there was willing." Yes, you may have misunderstood me (and likely because I miscommunicated). Can you say what you mean when you say that "to say that 'none of the above is possible' is to assume that a self is required for things to happen?" I don't think that a self is required. I was trying to say that since there is no self, there is no one who can actually do any of those things Herman suggested in the mind experiment. I suspect we are in agreement. Willing arises and hand lifts but when I think that I made my hand rise, because I wanted to lift it, I am only believing in a complex set of interpenetrating concepts. A self did not control the hand movement. I'd be using something non-existant ("I made") to describe something else non-existant ("my hand") in relation to something that does exist ("lifting" or movement). And then, I'd be believing in the non-existants... Is this how you see it? I hope we can keep discussing... With loving kindness, Scott. #60953 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 10:14 am Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye scottduncan2 Dear Herman, I was reading the other day (a dangerous occupation, I know)... H: "To me, there can be no clearer statement that experience and the body are inseperably intertwined. OK, so it does not pinpoint the brain as the main game in the body..." From one of your favourite sources of reference, the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (pp. 366-367): "There are four Graspings (upaadaanaani). 1. Sense-desires, 2. False views, 3. Adherence to rites and ceremonies, 4. Soul theory." This latter, soul theory, or attavaaduupadaana, is elaborated as follows: "Commentaries mention twenty kinds of soul-theories associated with the five Aggregates as follows (in this case, ruupa-kkhanda): (i) Soul is identical with the body, (ii) Soul is possessed of a body, (iii) Soul is in the body, (iv) Body is in the soul. Four soul-theories connected with each of the remaining four Aggregates should be similarily understood." To refer to the consciousness group of kkhandhas, vi~n~nana kkhandha, the associated soul-theory would be as follows: (i) Soul is identical with consciousness, (ii) Soul is possessed of consciousness, (iii) Soul is in consciousness, (iv) Consciousness is in the soul. "Soul" is "atta" in the above. I realise you are saying something like "experience is identical ('inseparably intertwined') with the body." I realise that you are not exactly saying directly that "experience" and "soul" are synonymous. But I do think you keep coming close to asserting something like that. If you are into it, and, in keeping with "the new Herman" - as a mere scholarly approach - might you be able to show how your assertions are not "soul theory?" With loving kindness, Scott. #60954 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 7:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Scott - In a message dated 7/1/06 12:09:06 PM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > Dear Howard, > > Good to correspond with you! > > Howard: "That is a good question, Scott. I don't think that there is > consciousness of current consciousness (as an object) at that time. On > any occasion, there is but a single object of consciousness. However, > I do believe there is a nondual awareness of being conscious all the > time, for otherwise we would be unable to know that we had just been > aware of something (after the fact). After an odd sound, when someone > asks "Did you hear that?" you are able to truly answer in the > affirmative. I conclude from this that there had been some form of > awareness of being aware, and yet, at the moment of hearing, the only > *object* of consciousness was the sound. Thus, I believe there is more > than one way of knowing: knowing as an object, and "participative > knowing". For example, when feeling an emotion, that is a form of > participative knowing. Sometimes the emotion is associated with an > object of consciousness, but other times it is merely the affective > state of mind. (What I say here is my evaluation of my own experience. > It differs, I believe, from the Abhidhammic perspective.)" > > There is knowing or pa~n~na. And there is thinking about things after > the fact. For instance, is there not sa~n~na, which arises with each > citta? The function of sa~n~na is remembering, I think. > ------------------------------------ Howard: As I conceive of it, pa~n~na is similar to an undefiled sa~n~na. San~n~na is recognition based on prior noting (or 'marking') or it is current noting for future recognition. What is recognized is the object. But what I am speaking of is the realization of past *awareness*. When I know that I heard a sound, there is recollection not only of the sound, but of hearing it. I believe that is due to having been aware of the knowing at the time of the knowing. Scott, as you read these words, are you unaware of being aware? I think not. As I hear a sound, there is also a participative awareness of being aware at the very same time that the sound is heard. Only the sound, however, is object at that time. ---------------------------------- When I> > affirm, as per your example, that I heard an odd sound after having > heard the sound, don't I mean that I remember having heard the sound? > Isn't this now citta with concept as object? -------------------------------- Howard: Yes, it is. But I maintain this would never occur had one been unaware of being aware previously. ------------------------------- > > The "nondual awareness of being conscious all the time" may be a > fiction if one considers that "being conscious" is for only one moment > at a time - a moment that arises and falls away and serves as > condition for the next moment. > ------------------------------------ Howard: I don't believe in "moments". They are zero-duration time points. Such "things" are never observed. They are mere concept. And if there were such things, no event could occur then, as nothing transpires in zero time. When we say that we are conscious at a given moment, or that we are recalling something at that moment, or that we are calm at that moment, all that means is that the given operation or conditions is in effect on that occasion, as it was previously (for a brief while) and will be subsequently (for a brief while). Operations neither start nor stop on a dime, and there is no seeing by any of us of precise starting and ending times. ------------------------------------- I guess you are suggesting an> > alternative to what I see as the sort of classic Abhidhamma view. > There is consciousness "all the time" in that, technically, cittas > arise and fall away "all the time." Continuity is a concept, is it not? ------------------------------------ Howard: Even Abhidhamma presumes no gaps in consciousness, Scott. ------------------------------------ > > What is "participative knowing?" Who knows? Who participates? ---------------------------------- Howard: The adjective 'participative' suffers from its literal sense in the same way that 'sabhava' does. Perhaps a better adjective would be nondual. That terminology is misleading also, however, as sense of self is almost always present for non-arahants. Another alternative termnology might be the 'reflexive knowing', except for the hint of the connotation of knowing (of "itself") as object. (That's why I chose 'participative', as it avoids the connotation of knowing as an object.) So, I guess I'd stick with 'participative'. As for the rest of your question: Nobody knows, nobody participates, nobody recognizes, nobody remembers, and, more generally, nobody engages in any activity. But activities occur. ----------------------------------- > > How does "emotion...associated with an object of consciousness" differ > from "an affective state of mind?" Now we are dealing with vedanaa > (feeling or sensation) which, as well, arises with each citta. As > with sa~n~na, vedanaa arises and falls away, with "new" object each > time. It seems to me that an "affective state of mind" might be > thinking about feeling. ---------------------------------- Howard: No, that's incorrect. Emotions are not the same as vedana. Emotions, like anger, love, depression, anxiety, and so on are different. They fall into the sankharakkhandha. And not all emotions are associated with particular objects, in my experience. There may, for example, be a background emotion of sadness or anxiety that lasts for a period of time during which many objects arise and cease. And emotions are quite different from thinking, though proliferative thinking is a major cause of emotions. --------------------------------- > > Howard: "For events to occur, including willing, there is no need for > there to be an agent. To say that "none of the above is possible" is > to assume that a self is required for things to happen. That is > actually an atta-view. Willing occurs all the time, Scott. When "your > hand lifts", there was willing. When "your head turns" at hearing a > sound, there was willing." > > Yes, you may have misunderstood me (and likely because I > miscommunicated). Can you say what you mean when you say that "to say > that 'none of the above is possible' is to assume that a self is > required for things to happen?" > > I don't think that a self is required. I was trying to say that since > there is no self, there is no one who can actually do any of those > things Herman suggested in the mind experiment. I suspect we are in > agreement. ----------------------------------- Howard: Good. It seems that we are! :-) --------------------------------- > > Willing arises and hand lifts but when I think that I made my hand > rise, because I wanted to lift it, I am only believing in a complex > set of interpenetrating concepts. A self did not control the hand > movement. ------------------------------ Howard: I agree entirely. ------------------------------ > > I'd be using something non-existant ("I made") to describe something > else non-existant ("my hand") in relation to something that does exist > ("lifting" or movement). And then, I'd be believing in the > non-existants... Is this how you see it? ----------------------------- Howard: Yes. --------------------------- > > I hope we can keep discussing... ---------------------------- Howard: Likewise. :-) -------------------------- > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > > ===================== With metta, Howard #60955 From: "Joop" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 11:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles jwromeijn Hallo Ken O, Charles Based on the Suttas (when explaining DO) there is a chain with two mini-cycles: (1) With the arising of birth there is the arising of aging and death And (in conventional language) after death there is birth again (of somebody) … (chain) … (2) With the arising of the taints there is the arising of ignorance  ^  With the arising of ignorance there is the arising of the taints (Quotes from MN 9) I agree with you that it surprised me too that nowhere in the Suttas there is said: "With the arising of aging and death there is the arising of ignorance" Nowhere. Metta Joop --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Kenneth" wrote: > > Hi Joop and Charles DeCoasta > > > Joop : You said it is D.O. casual chain, could you tell me, then > after death, what will arise. > > Charlse: A linear direction. > > I would apprieciate if you explain these from the suttas > > If it is birth, first or ignorance or ... > If it is birth what condition it, is it ignorance or is it craving > or kamma. > If it is the in reverse order, have you seen Buddha said craving is > the condition for feeling, feeling for cotact. In another way do > you see Buddha said in the reverse order Depending on feeling, > craving arise or Depending on craving, feeling arise? > > > > > Kind regards > Ken O > #60956 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 12:03 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) nilovg Hi Herman,Howard, Op 1-jul-2006, om 4:00 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > Look, Nina, I agree with just about everything you say. Because you > are writing about people, real people and what they do and how they > relate to each other. And Sarah is a gem ! > > Thanks again and Kind Regards to you and Lodewijk -------------------- > N: You are very kind. Greetings from Lodewijk and at the table we > discussed your points. He thinks that cittas should not be seen as academical. Nor are they concepts, they are real. There is no danger to use cittas and we in the same context, because cittas are part of our life. The word we is not wrong, when we realize that in the ultimate sense there are only citta, cetasika and rupa, not a self. So, let us use examples from daily life to come to understand more what citta is. We do not fall over words, we pay attention to characteristics. Lodewijk remarked that citta is essential for human life, that citta conditions rupa and rupa conditions citta. But I think that you also find this. I said to Lodewijk that Kh Sujin would say, is there no seeing now, hearing now? He said that this is a very good example, we are seeing and hearing (I use we here, to show that it is daily life). Seeing and hearing are real, not concepts. I read to him Abh in Daily Life about the Khandhas and then he said he would watch football. We discussed that also at those moments there is seeing, thinking, attachment, paramattha dhammas arising just naturally in daily life. Is there anything in the Abhidhamma that is not daily life? Just a remark to Howard about awareness: I know he uses this for citta, cognizing. But the word awareness is usually reserved for mindfulness, sati. It may lead to confusion for some people. Howard, speaking about mindfulness of the presently appearing dhamma, see Nyanaponika about the present moment, p. 119, Abhidhamma studies. Also in the Vis. studies, Ch XIV, we learnt that there are different meanings to present. Momentary presence and serial presence. When dosa has fallen away as Ken H explained, citta with sati sampajañña arising shortly afterwards in another process can be aware of it. Otherwise characteristics of dhammas could not be understood as they are. Insight could not be developed. Insight of paramattha dhammas not of concepts. The Buddha taught us to develop understanding of realities when preaching the four applications of Mindfulness, as I mentioned before. And once again, Howard, citta is the same as viññaa.nakhandha. Here is a quote: However, in different contexts there is a differentiation of terms. The aggregate of consciousness is called vi~n~naa.nakkhandha, and it includes all cittas. For seeing-consciousness, the word cakkhuvi~n~naa.na is used. > I took this from my writing about the Meanings of Dhamma. By the way, there are 23 or 24 meanings of dhamma. I saw that an article you mentioned that overlooked that there are many meanings. Nina. -------------- > H:It is very confusing for me when cittas and "we" get used in the > same > context. As an academic concept, at the citta level there is no "we", > other than as the product and content of citta. But I understand why > the person creeps into it again and again. Because that is the reality > of our being, that is what we are, and disembodied cittas are nowhere > to be found. #60957 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 12:17 pm Subject: Abhidhamma in Daily Life, no 10. nilovg Dear friends, Chapter 2 The Five Khandhas The Buddha discovered the truth of all phenomena. He knew the characteristic of each phenomenon by his own experience. Out of compassion he taught other people to see reality in many different ways, so that they would have a deeper understanding of the phenomena in and around themselves. When realities are classified by way of paramattha dhammas (absolute realities), they are classified as: citta cetasika ruupa nibbåna Citta, cetasika and ruupa are conditioned realities (sa.nkhåra dhammas). They arise because of conditions and fall away again; they are impermanent. One paramattha dhamma, nibbåna, is an unconditioned reality (asa.nkhata dhamma); it does not arise and fall away. All four paramattha dhammas are anattå, non-self. Citta, cetasika and rúpa, the conditioned realities, can be classified by way of the five khandhas. Khandha means ``group'' or ``aggregate''. What is classified as khandha arises because of conditions and falls away again. The five khandhas are not different from the three paramattha dhammas which are citta, cetasika and rúpa. Realities can be classified in many different ways and thus different names are given to them. The five khandhas are: Rúpakkhandha, which are all physical phenomena Vedanåkkhandha, which is feeling (vedanå) Saññåkkhandha, which is remembrance or ``perception'' (saññå) Sa.nkhårakkhandha, comprising fifty cetasikas (mental factors arising with the citta) Viññåùakkhandha, comprising all cittas (89 or 121) ******* Nina. #60958 From: "Joop" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 11:56 am Subject: Re: Awareness with Bodhisattava Nature jwromeijn Hallo Seelagawesi Thero Your first message (after the one introducing yourself) is an interesting contribution to discussion here in DSG. Some time ago (see for example # 59009 and quote below) we had in this forum a discussion about the bodhisattva-concept in Theravada, compared with the one in Mahayana. For some 'bodhisattva' was the name of Gautama the Buddha in His former lifes, for other it has a broader meaning. I like the way you describe 'bodhisattva-nature', nearly as 'Buddha- nature' in Mahayana, an idea of what I long time thought it was not correct because of its atta-reminiscence, but now see as a deeper concept. Your message is inspiring. Metta Joop In the reader 'Buddhist Spirituality' I found in an essay of Kajiyama Yuichi a (in my opinion) good description, based on historical facts: " The Bodhisattva Cult One of the most vivid innovations of Mahayana spirituality is the development of the notion of the bodhisattva. Gautama the Buddha was thought have been a follower of other Buddhas in many previous lives. The existence of many Buddhas in the past and the future meant that there could be many aspirants to Buddhahood, or bodhisattvas, in any age, and these need not be monks. We cannot ascertain the exact date of the first appearance of Jataka stories, in which the extent forms the word bodhisatta (skt. Bodhisattva), referring to the previous incarnations of Gautama teh Buddha, is found repeatedly. …the stories must have originated at the latest by the middle of the second century B.C.E. The word bodhisattva however emerged later then the Jataka stories and was interpolated into them. … he represents exactly what the word bodhisattva means - a being destined for, or seeking, full enlightenment. This concept became commonly known by 100 B.C.E. The compound word bodhisattva can be analysed in many ways, but only three interpretations are well attested in Buddhist literature: (1) In Pali suttas the Buddha often says, referring to his past experience: "When I was a bodhisattva, and not yet fully enlightened … (2) The Pali word satta can be equivalent to Skt. Sakta, which means "attached to, devoted". Buddhaghosa takes the word bodhisatta to signify a being devoted to enlightenment … (3) The Sutra on Perfect Wisdom in 8,000 Lines … so that bodhisattva denotes a being whose mind or intention is directed toward full enlightenment. … In India the bodhisattva concept developed in four stages: (1) Bodhisattva as Gautama before his enlightenment … (2) The Jataka: ancient Indian popular fables, in which not only men and womanof all classes and professions … were introduced to Buddhism. The Buddhist monastics identified the leading characters of the stories with the various incarnations of Gautama the Buddha in his innumerable former lives. Forbidden to listen or tell worldly stories, they resorted to this adaptation for the purpose of spreading Buddhist teachings. They called the protagonist of a story a bodhisattva. The stories wre later incorporated into the Buddhist canon under the name of Jataka or stories of the Buddha in his former births. (3) Heavenly bodhisattvas: Even before the appearance of Mahayana Buddhism heavenly saviors … manifested themselves in rwesponse to the earnest desires of the suffering masses … (4) Bodhisattvas as any and every Mahayana Buddhist" (p. 145-147) #60959 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 12:35 pm Subject: attaavaaduppaadaana. nilovg Dear Scott and all, I would like to post again Sarah's well thought out Email on attaavaaduppaadaana, since you were discussing sakkaaya di.t.thi today. Sarah: < 1. As I mentioned, I understood from our discussions with A.Sujin that atta-vaadupaadaana doesn't only refer to sakkaaya-di.t.thi but is wider in meaning. As we all know, the object of sakkaaya-di.t.thi has to specifically refer to the taking of one of the khandhas as self in one of the four ways, i.e. as identical with, possessing, contained in or containing the khandha in question. If the view is not the taking of one of the khandhas for self (one at a time only), it's not this kind of wrong view(see SN 22:47), even though it's clear that all wrong views arise from these (see SN 1V.41:3). 2. I understood that when the other vipallaasas arise that take the impermanent khandhas for permanent and the wrong view that the painful is pleasant and the impure is pure, that these can also be included under atta-vaadupaadaana. For example, anything can be taken for being permanent and pleasant, including the khandhas we take for self, but not just these. The rupas we take for a pen or computer or rock can also be taken for being permanent or pleasant with wrong view. In other words, I believe atta or attan ('soul') can refer to any conditioned dhammas taken as being permanent and satisfactory. (See notes in P.E.D under 'attan' which Nina referred to for more on this). K. Sujin stresses that while we haven't had direct experience of the ti-lakkana, what is seen is likely to be considered as nicca, sukkha and atta. But when one of the khandhas, such as a rupa of this body is taken for self, it's sakkaaya di.t.thi. In Sammohavinodanii 2453, it refers to attaanudi.t.thi as the 'wrong view which follows self' and micchaadi.t.thi as being 'bad wrong view'. Does this have significance, I wonder? 3. Texts such as the Dhammasa'nganii (1223) do seem to unequivocally suggest that atta-vaadupaadaana is the same as sakkaaya-di.t.thi when it lists the 20 kinds of the latter. Perhaps, however, we could say that it just as unequivocally suggests the first kind of clinging, kaamupaadaana (sensuous clinging) simply refers to sensuous desire from the definition given. In fact we know that according to the commentaries (the Vism Tiika, I believe) the bhavupaadaana of the anagami is also included here. So perhaps the Dhs gives prime examples for each category? Under siilabbatupaadaana (clinging to wrong practice), any wrong practice based on any wrong view should be included, but again it may not be apparent from the definitions given. If we have an idea that it's better to sit under a tree to develop satipatthana and move over to a tree with this purpose in mind, I would suggest it's an example. So it doesn't just refer to those 'outside the Teaching' as mentioned by the Dhs, but even for those who have an understanding of the Path, when there's attachment, it can condition wrong practice and the wrong path is taken for the right path. (These are just suggestions for consideration - I certainly agree that texts such as the Dhs and Vism do suggest that atta-vaadupaadaana is the same as sakkaaya-di.t.thi) 4. In the Brahmajaala Sutta (DN1), all the various kinds of wrong views are given, including those connected with the idea of self but which wouldn't (I believe) fall under the strict definition of sakkaaya-di.t.thi. I'm sure there are lots of examples, but here's one given in the commentaries to this sutta(p193 in B.Bodhi's BPS translation) which is interesting because it's the same question which has often raised on DSG and is very common. In brief, someone asks that if it's true that there is no self and the khandhas are momentary, then what self do kammas affect when they bring their result,[ i.e. Who experiences the vipaka?] The kind of person who asks this question is said to be 'immersed in ignorance' and 'dominated by craving' for thinking like this in terms of people receiving results. It is 'a mind accompanied by attavaadupaadaana', because 'though formations are momentary, the kamma and the fruit in the assemblage of dhammas (constituting an individual) are connected together by the fact that the fruit arises in the same continuum in which the kamma was originally done.' I wouldn't have thought this was an example of sakkaaya-di.t.thi, because it's not a particular dhamma or khandha which is taken for self in one of the 4 ways at that moment is it? Rather, a general wrong idea of Self and people experiencing results, perhaps. I'm not sure. ..... End quote. I remember we had some discussion about attaanudi.t.thi, but this is clear now. Pali anu can mean: follow. wrong view following self. Sakkaayadi.t.thi conditions all other kinds of wrong view, I understood. This is what I also remember from the discussions and I found it very helpful. Nina. #60960 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 2:23 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Howard, Thanks for your kind correspondence. Stimulating... Howard: "As I conceive of it, pa~n~na is similar to an undefiled sa~n~na. San~n~na is recognition based on prior noting (or 'marking') or it is current noting for future recognition. What is recognized is the object. But what I am speaking of is the realization of past *awareness*. When I know that I heard a sound, there is recollection not only of the sound, but of hearing it. I believe that is due to having been aware of the knowing at the time of the knowing." Pa~n~na as virginal sa~n~na. I think they are different in function hence, different. H: "Scott, as you read these words, are you unaware of being aware? I think not. As I hear a sound, there is also a participative awareness of being aware at the very same time that the sound is heard. Only the sound, however, is object at that time." Is this not satipatthaana? Satipatthaana is literally awareness of mindfulness, isn't it? It doesn't arise at all times. Howard: "Yes, it is. But I maintain this would never occur had one been unaware of being aware previously." This is conditionality. You needn't, in my opinion, add another layer of awareness to an already economical and elegant theory. Howard: "I don't believe in "moments". They are zero-duration time points. Such "things" are never observed. They are mere concept. And if there were such things, no event could occur then, as nothing transpires in zero time. When we say that we are conscious at a given moment, or that we are recalling something at that moment, or that we are calm at that moment, all that means is that the given operation or conditions is in effect on that occasion, as it was previously (for a brief while) and will be subsequently (for a brief while). Operations neither start nor stop on a dime, and there is no seeing by any of us of precise starting and ending times." Let's agree to disagree, since this is a matter of belief. Howard: "Even Abhidhamma presumes no gaps in consciousness, Scott." I believe it does. Is the oft used phrase "arises and falls away" to be considered in any other way except literally? The flame burns through the night but it is not the same flame. This is a function of serial arisings. I recall we've met at this impasse when I first came aboard. Sorry I've gotten no further since then! Howard: "The adjective 'participative' suffers from its literal sense in the same way that 'sabhava' does. Perhaps a better adjective would be nondual. That terminology is misleading also, however, as sense of self is almost always present for non-arahants. Another alternative terminology might be the 'reflexive knowing', except for the hint of the connotation of knowing (of "itself") as object. (That's why I chose 'participative', as it avoids the connotation of knowing as an object.) So, I guess I'd stick with 'participative'." Thanks for the clarification. I think this is redundant theory-wise. Knowing is knowing. There is no participant. Howard: "No, that's incorrect. Emotions are not the same as vedana. Emotions, like anger, love, depression, anxiety, and so on are different. They fall into the sankharakkhandha..." Thank you, Howard. That' right. I appreciate the correction. H: "...And not all emotions are associated with particular objects, in my experience. There may, for example, be a background emotion of sadness or anxiety that lasts for a period of time during which many objects arise and cease. And emotions are quite different from thinking, though proliferative thinking is a major cause of emotions." Now here we part ways again. I don't think it is theoretically tenable to postulate a "background" anything. There is nothing within the realm of conditioned phenomena able to persist beyond one moment hence an objectless emotional state somehow persisting behind the "original" flux of dhammas is just not possible, in my opinion. The emotions are cetaskikas and accompany cittas, and all arise and fall away, but here we are back again at this point. I see how you cannot hold the view of background emotion and the view of thought moments at the same time. They are, in my opinion, totally mutually exclusive. At any rate, Howard, I'm glad to correspond with you. With loving kindness, Scott. #60961 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 10:32 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/1/06 3:08:54 PM Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: > When > dosa has fallen away as Ken H explained, citta with sati sampajañña > arising shortly afterwards in another process can be aware of it. > ====================== I don't believe it, Nina. There is no knowing of what does not exist. There is remembering it, but that is not the same. With metta, Howard #60962 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 10:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Scott - In a message dated 7/1/06 5:25:39 PM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > H: "Scott, as you read these words, are you unaware of being aware? I > think not. As I hear a sound, there is also a participative awareness > of being aware at the very same time that the sound is heard. Only the > sound, however, is object at that time." > > Is this not satipatthaana? Satipatthaana is literally awareness of > mindfulness, isn't it? It doesn't arise at all times. > ====================== Satipatthaana means foundation of mindfulness. It isn't wisdom, pa~n~na is. And being aware that one is hearing (or seeing or tasting or generally knowing) is a wordless, thought-free knowing that occurs almost always. But it certainly isn't sati, or a foundation for sati, or pa~n~na, as I see it. It is common. With metta, Howard #60963 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 2:48 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making Theory Pra egberdina Hey Scott, On 01/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > H: "Well, anatta is the absence of agency, and anicca is the absence > > of any enduring form. It might become clearer if you cease willing > anything to be a particular way for a while. You might only succeed > for a millisecond, but what was there in the absence of intention?" > > > Self view, I think, Herman. None of the above is possible. There is > no one to cease willing, no one to will, and no one will succeed, even > for that millisecond you are hoping for. > Rest assured, I am not offended :-) :-) (see, I'm smiling just to prove it :-), but I think I will not spend any more time on this. Enjoy the view. Kind Regards Herman #60964 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 2:41 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] The Abhidhamma Framework - My Understanding, no 2. egberdina Hi Howard, On 01/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > Hi, Herman - > > The Tibetans agree with you that all experience is conceptual. But I > don't see that as at all true. > Feeling warmth is quite diffferent from naming it, thinking about it, > imagining it, recalling it, or defining it. It is an experience - a bodily > experience, and it has nothing to do with conceptualization. > For a more dramatic example think of the sharp, unbearable pain of a > dentist's probe quickly inserted into an exposed nerve. At the moment that is > experienced there are no concepts. Your entire world is pain! (Afterwards we > may name it.) > There's nothing quite as a effective as a sharp example that can be related to rather directly :-). Well said. The problem for me lies in that that undeniable experience is totally unquantifiable, until one starts to quantify it, by which time one is dealing with a billowing mushroom cloud of experience that was not the same as what was first reacted to. Perhaps I am too pre-occupied with refuting the discrete and knowable packet of experience view :-) Kind Regards Herman #60965 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 2:55 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye egberdina Hey Scott, On 01/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > Dear Herman, > > I'm going to get a reputation, I swear... > > H: "Dhamma study is the mind studying itself, no props required." > > Dhamma study (pariyatti) is learning the Dhamma (read teachings). > "Mind studying itself" is, loosely, practise or patipatti; and the > penetrating of the Dhamma (pativedha) is the end. > You and Ajahn Chah could have been great mates, no doubt. "Don't read books! Read your own heart instead. Take Wat Pah Pong for example. These days many university graduates are coming to ordain. I try to stop them from spending their time reading books about Dhamma, because these people are always reading books. They have so many opportunities for reading books, but opportunities for reading their own hearts are rare. So, when they come to ordain for three months following the Thai custom, we try to get them to close their books and manuals. While they are ordained they have this splendid opportunity to read their own hearts." Kind Regards Herman #60966 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 10:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi again, Scott - In a message dated 7/1/06 5:25:39 PM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > > Howard: "Yes, it is. But I maintain this would never occur had one > been unaware of being aware previously." > > This is conditionality. You needn't, in my opinion, add another layer > of awareness to an already economical and elegant theory. --------------------------------------- Howard: You could be right about that, Scott. But independently of that, I do not believe that there are knowings of any sort without awareness of those knowings. When I hear, I know that I do. (I'm speaking conventionally as regards the I-usage.) -------------------------------------- > > Howard: "I don't believe in "moments". They are zero-duration time > points. Such "things" are never observed. They are mere concept. And > if there were such things, no event could occur then, as nothing > transpires in zero time. When we say that we are conscious at a given > moment, or that we are recalling something at that moment, or that we > are calm at that moment, all that means is that the given operation or > conditions is in effect on that occasion, as it was previously (for a > brief while) and will be subsequently (for a brief while). Operations > neither start nor stop on a dime, and there is no seeing by any of us > of precise starting and ending times." > > Let's agree to disagree, since this is a matter of belief. ----------------------------------- Howard: This whole thread is! ----------------------------------- > > Howard: "Even Abhidhamma presumes no gaps in consciousness, Scott." > > I believe it does. Is the oft used phrase "arises and falls away" to > be considered in any other way except literally? The flame burns > through the night but it is not the same flame. This is a function of > serial arisings. I recall we've met at this impasse when I first came > aboard. Sorry I've gotten no further since then! ------------------------------------ Howard: No. There are literally no gaps. ----------------------------------- > > Howard: "The adjective 'participative' suffers from its literal sense > in the same way that 'sabhava' does. Perhaps a better adjective would > be nondual. That terminology is misleading also, however, as sense of > self is almost always present for non-arahants. Another alternative > terminology might be the 'reflexive knowing', except for the hint of > the connotation of knowing (of "itself") as object. (That's why I > chose 'participative', as it avoids the connotation of knowing as an > object.) So, I guess I'd stick with 'participative'." > > Thanks for the clarification. I think this is redundant theory-wise. > Knowing is knowing. There is no participant. ----------------------------------- Howard: Doesn't need to be. I though I clarified that. ---------------------------------- > > Howard: "No, that's incorrect. Emotions are not the same as vedana. > Emotions, like anger, love, depression, anxiety, and so on are > different. They fall into the sankharakkhandha..." > > Thank you, Howard. That' right. I appreciate the correction. > > H: "...And not all emotions are associated with particular objects, > in my experience. There may, for example, be a background emotion of > sadness or anxiety that lasts for a period of time during which many > objects arise and cease. And emotions are quite different from > thinking, though proliferative thinking is a major cause of emotions." > > Now here we part ways again. I don't think it is theoretically > tenable to postulate a "background" anything. There is nothing within > the realm of conditioned phenomena able to persist beyond one moment > hence an objectless emotional state somehow persisting behind the > "original" flux of dhammas is just not possible, in my opinion. -------------------------------------- Howard: Yep, party line! -------------------------------------- > > The emotions are cetaskikas and accompany cittas, and all arise and > fall away, but here we are back again at this point. I see how you > cannot hold the view of background emotion and the view of thought > moments at the same time. They are, in my opinion, totally mutually > exclusive. -------------------------------------- Howard: The emotions do indeed rise & fall. But the same emotion may repeat again and again as objects change - even as sense doors change. I'm simply saying that the emotion may well be independent of the object of the moment. ------------------------------------ > > At any rate, Howard, I'm glad to correspond with you. > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > ====================== With metta, Howard #60967 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:02 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye egberdina Hi Scott, On 02/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > > Dear Herman, > > I was reading the other day (a dangerous occupation, I know)... > > > If you are into it, and, in keeping with "the new Herman" - as a mere > scholarly approach - might you be able to show how your assertions are > not "soul theory?" > You're a scary guy, Scott :-) By the grace of God, you have been unentwined from fundamentalist Christianity. Then you go and repay God's kindness by ceasing to believe in him :-), and next thing you hurtle yourself fundamentally into scholastic Buddhism. Would you reckon that studiously avoiding any semblance of soul theory would be any less tainted by soul theory than just being what you are, where you are? Kind Regards Herman #60968 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:03 pm Subject: Re: Abh. Framework ken_aitch --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Hi Ken H, > > Ken H: > > However, as you say, dhammas have other features as well. According to > the Abhidhamma, they have characteristics, manifestations, functions > and proximate causes. Any of those features can be directly > experienced, but only one at a time. > > I hope Nina will help out if this is too wide of the mark. We really > must go back to our books and brush up on these things. > ------- > > N: Those features are given to help us to have more understanding of > different dhammas. For example, lobha has the characterfistic of > grasping an object like monkey lime. > > Dosa has the characteristic of flying into anger or churlishness. > > These are descriptions. But when they actually appear there is no > need to think of all those words. We can know that lobha is entirely > different from dosa, that they have different characteristics which > are unalterable. Here the word characteristic is not used in the > sense of the descriptions just mentioned. Hi Nina, Thanks for helping out. I dimly remember having had this conversation at regular intervals over the past few years. I tend to confuse explanations of characteristics with the characteristics themselves. ------------- N: > I heard this morning from Kh Sujin: ------------- And is there viriya to know the difference between the two? :-) Ken H #60969 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 2:57 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making Theory Pra scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Okay :-) (Look! I made one myself!) H: "Rest assured, I am not offended :-) :-) (see, I'm smiling just to prove it :-), but I think I will not spend any more time on this. Enjoy the view." With loving kindness, Scott. #60970 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:25 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... egberdina Hi Howard, On 01/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > Hi, Herman (and Ken) - > > Herman, as you must know, on many counts if not most, we are much > closer together than far apart. Yes, quite often I could just cut and paste what you have written, and put my name under it. It would be plagiarism, though, because while the expressed sentiment would be the same, you've got that right-speech thing down pat ! :-) But I do disagree with you on a few points in the > following, as you will see below. > Allow me to reveal my sinister motives :-) > > > ----------------------------- > > > > > > I don't know if they are called that by name, but cetasikas are > > > mentioned throughout the suttas. > > > > Academically, I think it is very poor practice to read former texts in > > the light of later developments of those texts. That would be like > > trying to get a grasp on Kant through Hegel's glasses. A totally > > deluded exercise, of course. Cetasikas are not in the suttas - full > > stop. But what there is, to be recognised when it is the case, is an > > intention to read the Suttas as though they are the Abhidhamma. That > > intention denies history, and historical development, and ends up > > denying the original ideas. > > ------------------------------------------ > Howard: > The term 'cetasika' is not in the suttas, but everything that the > Abhidhamma calls a cetasika is a khandhic element, and vice-versa, is that not so? > So why make a big deal over the term 'cetasika'? > ------------------------------------------ I accept that khandic-type considerations are paraphrased and expanded on in the Abhidhamma as cetasikas. The reason for my pedantic differentiation between the two is that I cannot accept on the basis of any evidence available to me that the Buddha of the Suttas is the author of the Abhidhamma. And the efforts to portray the matter as being such are unabating to this day. So, purely in order to give no footing at all to any efforts to bend history to gain external credibility for a book, I differentiate between an idea as expressed in the Suttas, and an idea as expressed in the Abhidhamma, even if the ideas are very similar. > > > > > Nibbana and any idea of Nibbana are not the same. Anything that is an > > object of consciousness is not Nibbana. That is more elementary. :-) > > Read the Suttas. > > ------------------------------- > Howard: > For sure any idea of nibbana is different from nibbana! But it is also > so that any idea of hardness is totally different from experienced hardness. > The same for sights, sounds, tastes, smells, emotions, and so on. I agree > that there is no knowing of nibbana as an object. Dualistic, subject-object > knowing is, as I see it, the essence of samsaric cognition. But there is also > nibbanic experience also, is there not? I'd say there is. > -------------------------------- I still do not know in myself whether there is experience of Nibbana or whether it is realised, through a thinking process, as "having been there" but now gone. I alternate between these positions. There is this from the Nibbana Sutta which lends credibility to the view that Nibbana is realised with hindsight. "I have heard that on one occasion Ven. Shariputra was staying near Rajagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrels' Feeding Sanctuary. There he said to the monks, "This Unbinding is pleasant, friends. This Unbinding is pleasant." When this was said, Ven. Udayin said to Ven. Shariputra, "But what is the pleasure here, my friend, where there is nothing felt?" "Just that is the pleasure here, my friend: where there is nothing felt." "Furthermore, there is the case where a monk, with the complete transcending of the dimension of nothingness, enters and remains in the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception. If, as he remains there, he is beset with attention to perceptions dealing with the dimension of nothingness, that is an affliction for him. Now, the Blessed One has said that whatever is an affliction is stress. So by this line of reasoning it may be known how pleasant Unbinding is. "Furthermore, there is the case where a monk, with the complete transcending of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception, enters and remains in the cessation of perception and feeling. And, having seen that with discernment, his mental fermentations are completely ended. So by this line of reasoning it may be known how Unbinding is pleasant." > > > > > > > I think it would be useful if in a future lecture you could address > > why the Abhidhammic basic unit of reality, the paramattha dhamma, is > > not a concept? Have you any experience of pd's? > > --------------------------------- > Howard: > Herman, do you not directly experience sights, sounds, tastes, smells, > hardness, warmth, thoughts, feelings, emotions, etc? They are all pd's. No > mystery to them. So we miss starts and ends of dhammas. So what? Maybe there are > no graspable starting and ending points. I can't detect the exact beginning > or ending of a sensation of warmth, but I sure do detect the sensation. That is > experiencing a pd! > ---------------------------------- I see what you mean. If that is what is meant by a pd, then no probs. I'll wait and see if there is any abhidhammic dissent before I get with them pd's :-) Kind Regards Herman #60971 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:32 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... egberdina Hi Howard and Scott, On 01/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > > > You then equate "consciousness of consciousness" with awareness or > > mindfulness. Do you mean that there is a superimposition of > > consciousnesses such that one is aware of the other at the same time? > > ------------------------------------ > Howard: > That is a good question, Scott. I don't think that there is > oconsciousness of current consciousness (as an object) at that time. On any occasion, > there is but a single object of consciousness. However, I do believe there is a > nondual awareness of being conscious all the time, for otherwise we would be > unable to know that we had just been aware of something (after the fact). After > an odd sound, when someone asks "Did you hear that?" you are able to truly > answer in the affirmative. I conclude from this that there had been some form of > awareness of being aware, and yet, at the moment of hearing, the only > *object* of consciousness was the sound. Thus, I believe there is more than one way > of knowing: knowing as an object, and "participative knowing". I see it exactly like this, and also based purely on experience. Hey Scott, what Howard wrote. The patience is his though, not mine :-) KInd Regards Herman #60972 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:32 pm Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye scottduncan2 Herman? Is that you again? S: "You're a scary guy, Scott :-) By the grace of God, you have been unentwined from fundamentalist Christianity. Then you go and repay God's kindness by ceasing to believe in him :-), and next thing you hurtle yourself fundamentally into scholastic Buddhism." See my other diatribe in the other thread! I wish we had one of those science-fiction two-way televisions and then we'd have a great old time! "Would you reckon that studiously avoiding any semblance of soul theory would be any less tainted by soul theory than just being what you are, where you are?" Of course not, Herman. I'm not an eedjit. We're just differently constituted, you and I. I have a daily practise, you know. So what if I'm into scholastic Buddhism? I'm not a Zen monk. (No offense to any scholarly Zen monks real or imaginary). I wish we could go for coffee sometime, man... With loving kindness, Scott. #60973 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:38 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Guys, Hey, no fair - ganging up! H: "Hey Scott, what Howard wrote. The patience is his though, not mine :-)" Double teaming, eh. Well, I'll just have to study that much harder... With loving kindness, Scott P.S. Herman, what do you mean you're not patient? Haven't you put up with me all this time until now? {/-[ (Tried to make a new kind of face...) #60974 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:25 pm Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Hello again! H: "You and Ajahn Chah could have been great mates, no doubt." An anecdote: I was in a Chapters store (a local bookstore chain) and met, totally out of his element, a Thai Forest monk. He was in town to care for his dying father. Ignorant of the fineries of interacting with monks, but thinking that others took care of their needs, I offered him some money but he, of course, declined. He did let me buy a book for his mother, and gave me a book by Ajahn Chah to buy for myself, telling me that he had been taught by the Venerable Chah. So I guess, really stretching it of course, we've sort of met. And I read the book (to no-one's surprise). H: "'Don't read books! Read your own heart instead. Take Wat Pah Pong for example. These days many university graduates are coming to ordain. I try to stop them from spending their time reading books about Dhamma, because these people are always reading books. They have so many opportunities for reading books, but opportunities for reading their own hearts are rare. So, when they come to ordain for three months following the Thai custom, we try to get them to close their books and manuals. While they are ordained they have this splendid opportunity to read their own hearts.'" I take your point, Herman. I suspect, as this seems to happening everywhere, we'll have to agree to disagree, but... Not learning the Dhamma through a study of its texts, and attempting to rely only on experience (which is fine) that is inevitably accompanied by all sorts of foolish ideation and theorising is folly and hubris, in my opinion. Of course I'm aware that one needs to practise. This is self-evident to all but the thickest of the thick. Do you actually think that one can hope to achieve anything (except to get hopelessly lost) by blindly firing off and practising without any structure? Its just my opinion, of course, but I find the "don't study" admonishment to be ridiculous. I happen to have certain predilections and a study of Dhamma texts fits with that. I don't have the balls to just think I know what it all is and practise all in isolation and the security of my own way of seeing things. You might think me a fundamentalist, but I strive to never believe anything I think that starts with "I believe" when it comes to knowledge of the Dhamma teachings. So, since you offer me the free advice, I'll submit to you that you ought to read some more texts and rely less on your own way of seeing things. I'll have to quote myself, since I have no famous Ajahn to quote. ;-) (Look, this time I made a guy with a winking, wry sort of expression! Or a smug expression. Ecch.) Perhaps we could debate the relative merits of study and "practise" in an effort to each learn balance... With loving kindness, Scott. #60975 From: "matheesha" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:50 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Hello* breath meditation matheesha333 Hello Greg, I endorse what Howard has said. Give it time, it will come. Patience with yourself is essential. Knowing when one of the 5 hinderences have arisen and how to deal with those is essential. Make daily pracitce your goal, and not any meditation experience. Samatha and vipassana both are essential to go up this path. Perfect one-pointedness is possible. Jhanas are possible. Insight is possible. It just takes practice. I hope you have the determination and good kamma to reach these. with metta Matheesha #60976 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 11:56 am Subject: Re: [dsg] The Abhidhamma Framework - My Understanding, no 2. upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 7/1/06 5:54:38 PM Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > On 01/07/06, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > > >Hi, Herman - > > > > The Tibetans agree with you that all experience is conceptual. But I > > don't see that as at all true. > > Feeling warmth is quite diffferent from naming it, thinking about it, > > imagining it, recalling it, or defining it. It is an experience - a bodily > > experience, and it has nothing to do with conceptualization. > > For a more dramatic example think of the sharp, unbearable pain of a > > dentist's probe quickly inserted into an exposed nerve. At the moment that > is > > experienced there are no concepts. Your entire world is pain! (Afterwards > we > > may name it.) > > > > There's nothing quite as a effective as a sharp example that can be > related to rather directly :-). Well said. > > The problem for me lies in that that undeniable experience is totally > unquantifiable, until one starts to quantify it, by which time one is > dealing with a billowing mushroom cloud of experience that was not the > same as what was first reacted to. ------------------------------------ Howard: Well, you're quite right! But that's no problem at all. Once there is quantifying, objectifying, and any "-fying", the original experience is way gone! :-) ------------------------------------ > > Perhaps I am too pre-occupied with refuting the discrete and knowable > packet of experience view :-) -------------------------------------- Howard: :-) ------------------------------------ > > Kind Regards > > > Herman > ================= With metta, Howard #60977 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 3:57 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the abhidhamma of existentialism egberdina Hi Larry, On 01/07/06, LBIDD@... wrote: > > > Hi Herman, > > Thanks for the precis of existentialism. Could you explain more about > 'nothingness'? How is it different from emptiness or nibbana? I didn't > understand its role in choice. Or is 'nothingness' simply an expression > of dukkha ('anguish')? These are big issues, and I have all the willingness to go further into this. But I first want to do a bit more brushing-up reading, so that I don't misrepresent Sartre too much :-) I'll get back to these points in a few days time, if that's OK. >The idea that we constantly must choose is interesting. I wonder if there is a way of >explaining that in abhidhamma terms. I'm not well-up on Abhidhamma, but I see the votthapana moment as being the parallel point in daily life where the undetermined becomes the determined. That is the moment of freedom,.because whichever outcome eventuates is not necessarily so. But AN outcome there must be. Again and again, world without end. There is no freedom to not determine. > > Also, there's a question about this: > > Herman: "I think that in the recognition of the role which "the other" > > plays in consciousness that existentialism leaves Buddhism for dead." > > > L: What role does 'the other' play in existentialism? > In existentialism, in the absence of whatever the existentialist counterpart of mindfulness is, the other defines the self. This is so readily apparent in daiy life. We become self-conscious only when we believe we are in the presence of others. And mindlessly, we will take on whatever role we believe others to be writing for us. I do sincerely appreciate the questions. I find existentialism to be such an astute observation of daily life, which is where most of us find ourselves. My program in writing is not an existentialist one, but a daily life one :-) Kind Regards Herman #60978 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 4:18 pm Subject: Re: attaavaaduppaadaana. scottduncan2 Dear Nina, Thank you for that quote. Food for thought... N: "I remember we had some discussion about attaanudi.t.thi, but this is clear now. Pali anu can mean: follow. wrong view following self. Sakkaayadi.t.thi conditions all other kinds of wrong view, I understood. This is what I also remember from the discussions and I found it very helpful." I'll have to look at it all again... With loving kindness, Scott. #60979 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 4:21 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello* egberdina Hi Greg, Welcome aboard. On 30/06/06, Gregory Parcell wrote: > I am still having trouble with an overactive mind during meditation so if any of you have some advice on calming the mind I would be appreciative. > Here's a little something I stumbled upon by trial and error, and I find it works a treat with any sort of rampant discursive thinking. I basically focus my attention on my voice box area, with the mindset "No thought shall pass here", and bingo, a deafening silence ensues! A little unorthodox, I know, but hey, whatever works :-) Kind Regards Herman #60980 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 4:25 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye egberdina Hey Scott, > > I wish we could go for coffee sometime, man... > My wife and I have this crazy wish to fall over on the slopes of Whistler. We have promised ourselves to go there in 3 years time, when we are 50. Are you free then? If so, count us in for coffee, bro! Kind Regards Herman #60981 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 4:30 pm Subject: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Yeah, of course! H: "My wife and I have this crazy wish to fall over on the slopes of Whistler. We have promised ourselves to go there in 3 years time, when we are 50. Are you free then? If so, count us in for coffee, bro!" Now, Whistler is in a neighbouring province, so the details will have to be worked out. Perhaps, if your old bones aren't broken, you can go east to the Rockies and I'll meet you in Jasper. And turning fifty is in like two years for me, I don't know about you. With loving kindness, Scott. #60982 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 4:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Ignorance (was Re: �Cetasikas' study corner 433- You ain't seen nothin' ye egberdina Hi Scott, Last post of the day. On 02/07/06, Scott Duncan wrote: > > > Not learning the Dhamma through a study of its texts, and attempting > to rely only on experience (which is fine) that is inevitably > accompanied by all sorts of foolish ideation and theorising is folly > and hubris, in my opinion. > > Of course I'm aware that one needs to practise. This is self-evident > to all but the thickest of the thick. Do you actually think that one > can hope to achieve anything (except to get hopelessly lost) by > blindly firing off and practising without any structure? > > Its just my opinion, of course, but I find the "don't study" > admonishment to be ridiculous. Look, I really understand what you are saying. But the danger of studying reality from a tightly clutched Theravadin perspective, or any other well established orthodoxy, is that you won't see reality for the orthodoxy. And that this does happen is readily apparent to me. I happen to have certain predilections > and a study of Dhamma texts fits with that. I don't have the balls to > just think I know what it all is and practise all in isolation and the > security of my own way of seeing things. You might think me a > fundamentalist, but I strive to never believe anything I think that > starts with "I believe" when it comes to knowledge of the Dhamma > teachings. I, too, am a fundamentalist. I am a heterodox fundamentalist. If I start seeing the world in predictable ways, I know I am not seeing the world, but my glasses (metaphorically), and I will discard them, but not before some heavy trampling underfoot :-) > > So, since you offer me the free advice, I'll submit to you that you > ought to read some more texts and rely less on your own way of seeing > things. I'll have to quote myself, since I have no famous Ajahn to > quote. ;-) (Look, this time I made a guy with a winking, wry sort of > expression! Or a smug expression. Ecch.) > > Perhaps we could debate the relative merits of study and "practise" in > an effort to each learn balance... > OK. Let's do it! The Buddha was a forest-dwelling contemplative. He left wife, kid, home, riches, the world and it's promises and obligations, to be free of suffering on the forest floor, with daily abiding in the jhanas. Just how balanced do you want to get? :-) Kind Regards Herman #60983 From: LBIDD@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 5:17 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] the abhidhamma of existentialism lbidd2 Hi Herman, L: "The idea that we constantly must choose is interesting. I wonder if there is a way of explaining that in abhidhamma terms." H: "I'm not well-up on Abhidhamma, but I see the votthapana moment as being the parallel point in daily life where the undetermined becomes the determined. That is the moment of freedom,.because whichever outcome eventuates is not necessarily so. But AN outcome there must be. Again and again, world without end. There is no freedom to not determine." L: Am I right in thinking there is a slightly paradoxical nature to freedom for the existentialists, i.e., that there is no freedom to not be free? I'm understanding freedom here as choice; so there is no freedom to not choose. Regarding the determining consciousness (votthapana citta), I see it as instigating the reaction that is javana citta, but I'm not sure if I would call this a choice. In dependent arising the accumulation of javana cittas precipitates action, as I understand it so far, and even this doesn't seem to be a choice. What we call 'choice' doesn't seem to figure into this micro-environment, but we obviously make choices all the time. Perhaps we just have to say that abhidhamma, like science in general, is a deterministic system. You bring up an interesting point that 'choice' means the outcome is not necessarily so. This scenario is usually pointed out in the feeling>craving arising. Feeling doesn't necessarily condition the arising of craving while contact, for example, does necessarily condition the arising of feeling. I believe this unnecessary reaction is due to latent tendencies which can be eradicated by insight, but I don't think either 'insight' or emotional reaction is what we mean by 'choice'. I'm much more inclined to put choice further along in the process between javana and action. If you come cross an existential phenomenology of choice that might help us understand it in Buddhist terms. Larry #60984 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 6:06 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... scottduncan2 Dear Howard, Thanks for your reply. I hope I'm not annoying you. Howard: "You could be right about that, Scott. But independently of that, I do not believe that there are knowings of any sort without awareness of those knowings. When I hear, I know that I do. (I'm speaking conventionally as regards the I-usage.)" Since, according to the much maligned "party line," citta is considered to be variegated, isn't it possible for a combination of mental factors to arise such that, say, pa~n~na and [is it?]sati could arise together in a given constellation? As such a moment would I be aware that I'm hearing? Howard: "This whole thread is [about belief]!" Really? Are there no realities? And I'm not trying to be clever, that is a serious question, Howard. Howard: "No. There are literally no gaps." Can you please say more about this? H: "Doesn't need to be [a participant]. I thought I clarified that." Sorry, I'll look back and re-read. Howard: "Yep, party line!" Again, why is this a bad thing? Is "the party line" wrong? Between you and Herman, today, I'm getting to feel like a bit of a fool for trying to get "the party line" clear in my head! (I don't really, Howard, you understand.) Howard: "The emotions do indeed rise & fall. But the same emotion may repeat again and again as objects change - even as sense doors change. I'm simply saying that the emotion may well be independent of the object of the moment." It is with this latter statement, regarding mental factors said to be independent of the object of the moment, that I find myself in constant (not literally of course - there seem to be little gaps in between) disagreement. I likely don't understand the point you are trying to make, and my apologies. Yes, a mental factor can arise again and again. Apologies, Howard, if this reflects a misunderstanding, but this is never, in my opinion, the *same* mental factor. A certain mental factor can arise, with its characteristic and out of its conditions but I'd say it is never "the same" as the last time a mental factor with those characteristics and out of those conditions arose. To say so would be to say that there is self, in a narrow sense. In other words, to suggest an existence outside of conditions or beyond the parameters of arising, persisting, and falling away is, to me, suggesting the existence of an eternal dhamma within conditioned sa.msara. Are you postulating some sort of "free-floating" mental factor? The notion of complex conditionality would mitigate against such a theory, would it not? Can you say more about objectless emotion? Until your (hopefully upcoming) clarification, I find myself thinking that to say that there can be a mental factor in existence now that is independent of now, even for more than one "now," is to state an impossibility. Please let me know if my style of discourse is offensive or in need of tweaking. I've just shadowed the group for long enough to feel like entering in more fully. With loving kindness, Scott. #60985 From: Ken O Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 10:21 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles ashkenn2k Hi Joop and Charles > Based on the Suttas (when explaining DO) there is a chain with two > mini-cycles: > (1) With the arising of birth there is the arising of aging and > death And (in conventional language) after death there is birth > again (of somebody)(chain) k: as you said it is a mini cycle, birth to death and death to birth then birth to death. I am assuming that you are saying there is a mini cycle in the chain, then how does ignorance and craving play in the D.O.? > (Quotes from MN 9) > > I agree with you that it surprised me too that nowhere in the > Suttas there is said: "With the arising of aging and death there is the arising of ignorance" k: Sorry Joop, I am not surprised it is not mentioned because to me it is implicit. It was mentioned in 4NT, that craving is the source of becoming, but after that it does not talk becoming conditioned about birth... So how does we going to say birth and then death and then suffering .... . If we used the D.O at this junction, becoming...to death, then how does ignorance takes place. Then since we born again, why should craving take place again because in the casual chain, it should be death after birth. Then how does ignorance play a role in D.O. Since you said it is in the casual chain, I would like to know your views on these Cheers Ken O #60986 From: Ken O Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 10:32 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) ashkenn2k Hi Howard, I don't believe it, Nina. There is no knowing of what does > not exist. There is remembering it, but that is not the same. k: It can be an object because they are mental. Even though we know citta cease to exist, we cannot parallel it with physical. It is neither enscapulation. Remembrance is a powerful thing, just like recalling the favourite music we hear. We seem to listen to it again which in fact we did not listen, it is just sanna at work. Cheers Ken O #60987 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 6:48 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Scott - In a message dated 7/1/06 9:17:25 PM Eastern Daylight Time, scduncan@... writes: > Dear Howard, > > Thanks for your reply. I hope I'm not annoying you. ----------------------------------- Howard: Of course not! When conversation on a thread goes on for a long time, though, I do tend to start pretty much repeating myself. That's when I know it's time to close up shop on that conversation! ;-) I'll let you know when and if I think that is happening. But no annoyance in any case! -------------------------------- > > Howard: "You could be right about that, Scott. But independently of > that, I do not believe that there are knowings of any sort without > awareness of those knowings. When I hear, I know that I do. (I'm > speaking conventionally as regards the I-usage.)" > > Since, according to the much maligned "party line," > --------------------------------- Howard: LOL! You noticed that, eh? ;-)) --------------------------------- citta is> > considered to be variegated, isn't it possible for a combination of > mental factors to arise such that, say, pa~n~na and [is it?]sati could > arise together in a given constellation? As such a moment would I be > aware that I'm hearing? -------------------------------- Howard: There is no doubt that there are moments when the two arise together. (I suspect, BTW, that whenever pa~n~na occurs, so does sati.) I think that knowing that I'm hearing (or whatever) is much more common than that, however. --------------------------------- > > Howard: "This whole thread is [about belief]!" > > Really? Are there no realities? And I'm not trying to be clever, > that is a serious question, Howard. ---------------------------------- Howard: Of COURSE there are realities! But what we are discussing is what we BELIEVE to be true about realities. We are discussing our take on things. --------------------------------- > > Howard: "No. There are literally no gaps." > > Can you please say more about this? --------------------------------- Howard: That's standard Abhidhamma, Scott. Whenever a cetasika ceases or a new cetasika arises or an old object is replaced by a new one, it is considered a citta boundary, but there are no moments of unknowing that separate cittas. One citta follows upon the previous without break. (I personally don't presume the sharp object boundaries and sharp cetasika boundaries presumed by Abhidhamma, but that is a different matter.) ----------------------------------- > > H: "Doesn't need to be [a participant]. I thought I clarified that." > > Sorry, I'll look back and re-read. > > > Howard: "Yep, party line!" > > Again, why is this a bad thing? Is "the party line" wrong? > ---------------------------- Howard: Not in principle. It could be right. Depends. It's for each of us to judge based on our direct experience as best we can. But all beliefs should be held tentatively. It's not good to be a true believer. Better to be a "believer for now". Nothing should be clung to, and beliefs are included in that. --------------------------- Between> > you and Herman, today, I'm getting to feel like a bit of a fool for > trying to get "the party line" clear in my head! (I don't really, > Howard, you understand.) --------------------------- Howard: Please don't be convinced one way or another by ANYONE! Don't accept things on the basis of who said it, or how many people said it, or on basis of authority. Consider all perspectives, including what I jokingly called "th party line", and also look within(!). Most of all, read what the Buddha had to say. The primary record of his 45 years of teaching is included in the Sutta Pitaka. I find it best to study that deeply, contemplate it for purposes of understanding it as well as possible, and, most of all, do what he says there to do. Read the suttas and you will see what he says to do. Read it for yourself. --------------------------- > > Howard: "The emotions do indeed rise &fall. But the same emotion may > repeat again and again as objects change - even as sense doors change. > I'm simply saying that the emotion may well be independent of the > object of the moment." > > It is with this latter statement, regarding mental factors said to be > independent of the object of the moment, that I find myself in > constant (not literally of course - there seem to be little gaps in > between) disagreement. I likely don't understand the point you are > trying to make, and my apologies. --------------------------------- Howard: My point is the following: When we see, we are conscious of visual object. When we experience warmth, we are conscious of that body-door object. When we feel that visual object as neutral and that warmth as pleasant, the feeling pertains to the object. But when we are sad or happy or nervous, that activity does not pertain to any object at all, but simply occurs at the same time that one or another dhamma is object of consciousness. Sadness, happiness, and nervousness are not cognitive operations. They don't know objects [by mere knowing like vi~n~nana, or by affective tasting like vedana, or by recognizing like sa~n~na, or any other way], though they may arise because having known objects of certain sorts, but they are mental activities nonetheless. And when one is sad, one knows it! When one is happy one knows it! When one is nervous, one knows it! ------------------------------ > > Yes, a mental factor can arise again and again. Apologies, Howard, if > this reflects a misunderstanding, but this is never, in my opinion, > the *same* mental factor. > ------------------------------ Howard: Oh, I agree with you on that, because change is constantly in effect. As Heraclitus said: One cannot step in the same stream twice. ------------------------------ A certain mental factor can arise, with its> > characteristic and out of its conditions but I'd say it is never "the > same" as the last time a mental factor with those characteristics and > out of those conditions arose. To say so would be to say that there > is self, in a narrow sense. In other words, to suggest an existence > outside of conditions or beyond the parameters of arising, persisting, > and falling away is, to me, suggesting the existence of an eternal > dhamma within conditioned sa.msara. --------------------------------- Howard: We agree on that. ------------------------------ > > Are you postulating some sort of "free-floating" mental factor? > ----------------------------- Howard: No, I'm not. --------------------------- The> > notion of complex conditionality would mitigate against such a theory, > would it not? Can you say more about objectless emotion? --------------------------- Howard: I said it above. -------------------------- > > Until your (hopefully upcoming) clarification, I find myself thinking > that to say that there can be a mental factor in existence now that is > independent of now, even for more than one "now," is to state an > impossibility. ---------------------------- Howard: Independent of now? All there is is now. ----------------------------- > > Please let me know if my style of discourse is offensive or in need of > tweaking. I've just shadowed the group for long enough to feel like > entering in more fully. ---------------------------- Howard: Your style is just fine! No need to walk on eggshells anyway. ---------------------------- > > With loving kindness, > > Scott. > ============== With metta, Howard #60988 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 6:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/2/06 1:34:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@... writes: > Hi Howard, > > I don't believe it, Nina. There is no knowing of what does > >not exist. There is remembering it, but that is not the same. > > k: It can be an object because they are mental. Even though we > know citta cease to exist, we cannot parallel it with physical. It > is neither enscapulation. Remembrance is a powerful thing, just like > recalling the favourite music we hear. We seem to listen to it again > which in fact we did not listen, it is just sanna at work. > > > Cheers > Ken O > > ======================== Please excuse me, Ken - I don't understand your answer. With metta, Howard #60989 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 11:18 pm Subject: Re: Hello. Calming the mind. ken_aitch Hi Greg, (Nina and Scott), Welcome from me to DSG. In case it is not clear, I want to point out that you have been given two distinctly different interpretations of vipassana in answer to your question. The first is the formal kind in which one tries to put theory into practice. The second is an understanding of the nature of conditioned dhammas. Nina's message described the second one very clearly, but someone new to DSG might not realise that a wholly different form of vipassana practice was being explained. This morning, I read Scott's reply to my message on the subject of citta processes. He wrote: "Yeah, the arising and the falling away and the arising. Knowing is only this moment. And there is no self who knows anything." My first reaction was, "What is Scott on about? I write to him about citta processes and he writes back about anatta!" But then I saw his answer differently. Any explanation of Dhamma should have this effect on us. Reality is just a number of fleeting, unsatisfactory, devoid-of-self mental and physical phenomena arising and falling away by conditions. This is the understanding that the Buddha wanted to instil in us. This understanding arises to the extent that we have heard and wisely considered the true Dhamma. With respect, I suggest it has nothing to do with the other form of vipassana practice - sitting quietly or concentrating on something in an effort to make insight happen. Ken H --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Dear Gregg, > > Your question is so human, feeling disturbed because of distractions. > This problem can be seen from different angles. I have been pondering > over it while walking today. > What is true calm? It is freedom of defilements, such as attachment, > aversion, delusion, restlessness. We do not like to feel restless, we > would rather be calm. But the Buddha taught that whatever state of > mind arises, does so because there are conditions for it. We cannot > have calm whenever we want to. We can learn from this: calm arises > when there are the proper conditions for it. #60990 From: Ken O Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 11:32 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) ashkenn2k Hi Howard Sanna is powerful thing. It remembers what the previous citta knows and hence during the next citta arise, the information is pass to the next citta with its cetasikas. Just like the eg I quoted on recalling music or recalling a picture. It is memory at work and not the sense processes Cheers Ken O #60991 From: "Joop" Date: Sat Jul 1, 2006 11:52 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Q. Dependent Origination ... and cycles jwromeijn Hallo Ken I hardly have a view, I just tried to understand DO without any frame of reference. Because the Buddha said to Ananda that DO is not easy but profound. So I don't compare it immediately with other teachings and don't use it as just another way of saying te same. Just try to understand without any prejudice (view). 'Craving' does occur too in DO but not immediately before (or after) 'ignorance; most times 'ignorance' is numbered #1 and 'craving' #8. I'm taking a break for some weeks Joop --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Ken O wrote: > > Hi Joop and Charles > >..... > k: Sorry Joop, I am not surprised it is not mentioned because to me > it is implicit. It was mentioned in 4NT, that craving is the > source of becoming, but after that it does not talk becoming > conditioned about birth... So how does we going to say birth and then > death and then suffering .... . If we used the D.O at this junction, > becoming...to death, then how does ignorance takes place. Then since > we born again, why should craving take place again because in the > casual chain, it should be death after birth. Then how does ignorance > play a role in D.O. Since you said it is in the casual chain, I > would like to know your views on these > > > Cheers > Ken O > #60992 From: "ken_aitch" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 2:53 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... ken_aitch Hi Howard, You wrote to Herman: -------- > Herman, do you not directly experience sights, sounds, tastes, smells, hardness, warmth, thoughts, feelings, emotions, etc? They are all pd's. -------- I agree we constantly experience these things when we are awake, and they are pd's (paramattha dhammas). We also experience concepts, which are the other kind of pd's - pannatti dhammas. --------------- Howard: > No mystery to them. So we miss starts and ends of dhammas. So what? Maybe there are no graspable starting and ending points. I can't detect the exact beginning or ending of a sensation of warmth, but I sure do detect the sensation. That is experiencing a pd! ---------------- Every time there is the idea of "my experience" or "my detecting" the object of citta is a concept. Even in the dentist's chair the poor worldling cannot accurately say, "This is the paramattha dhamma, bodily feeling!" If he is a Dhamma student, he will know that cittas with painful vedana are experiencing undesirable bodily sense objects, but there is no satipatthana and so his knowledge is, at best, theoretical. Ken H #60994 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 2:20 am Subject: The Sun ... !!! bhikkhu_ekamuni Friends: Good Friendship is the Seed of the 7 Links to Awakening! The Blessed Buddha once said: Bhikkhus, just as dawn is the forerunner and precursor of the rising of the Sun, even & exactly so too, for any Bhikkhu is Good & Noble Friendship the forerunner and precursor of the emergence of the Seven Links to Awakening...!!! When a Bhikkhu has a Good & Noble Friend, it is to be expected that he will develop and cultivate these Seven Links to Awakening. And how does a Bhikkhu who indeed has a Good & Noble Friend develop and cultivate the Seven Links to Awakening? Here, friends, this Bhikkhu trains, develops, deepens, reinforces and refines: 1: The Awareness Link to Awakening. 2: The Investigation Link to Awakening. 3: The Energy Link to Awakening. 4: The Joy Link to Awakening. 5: The Tranquillity to Awakening. 6: The Concentration Link to Awakening. 7: The Equanimity Link to Awakening. based upon seclusion, disillusion, ceasing of craving, & gradually culminating in release, It is in exactly this way that any Bhikkhu, who has a Good & Noble Friend, truly trains, develops, deepens, intensifies, reinforces & refines the Seven Links to Awakening... Source (edited extract): The Grouped Sayings of the Buddha. Samyutta Nikaya. Book [V: 101] section 46: The Links.48: The Sun.... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bhikkhu Samahita, Sri Lanka. #60996 From: "jonoabb" Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 5:13 am Subject: Re: Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) jonoabb Hi Herman --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Jon, ... > > Not sure why you say this, and would appreciate your elaboration if > > you cared. > > Perhaps my replies to Howard and Nina will suffice, if not, just let me know. OK, I'll follow up in those threads if I have any further questions or comments. > You would say that, wouldn't you? :-) > > What do you make of the Buddha's saying that friendship is all of the holy life? 'Friendship' here means association with others who are also interested in developing the path, including particularly those whose understanding of the teachings is better than our own. Without this we would have no chance of developing the right path; any budding interest in the teachings would lead only to the development of the wrong path. > > Well that is one inference to be argued. But could it not equally be > > said that that existence of such texts indicates that the existence of > > other beings is *not* being denied. Perhaps the statement has a > > different meaning to that which you take it to have. > > > > That may well be the case. Bring forward your arguments. It's not an argument I particularly wish to advance ;-)). I was just pointing out that there was another equally plausible inference to be drawn from the facts ;-)). But I will > reserve the right to consider them as coming from a man, whom I have > met and am fonds of, who together with his lovely wife are in > Switzerland at the moment, as husband and wife, and not as nama/rupic > aggregates. ;-)), ;-)). Always enjoy talking to you, > > More inferences on your part ;-)). But as a general comment I would > > say that seeing the teachings as relating at the level of cittas, etc > > does not mean forfeiting the human aspect of the world. If anything, > > it helps one have more respect for other beings (if that's the kind of > > thing you have in mind). > > > > As I see it, a teaching about cittas is that in the context of two or > more people so engaged. What is to be recognised is the fugue into > illusion when that is the case. Any notion of disembodied cittas would > be a case in point. Sorry, but you've lost me here ;-)). By 'so engaged' you mean engaged in what? Regarding 'citta', the correctness or otherwise of others' notions is not a useful topic of discussion, it seems to me. The only question is whether or not the teachings speak about the mere experiencing of an object. Jon #60998 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 1:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhism & Solipsism (was death of dear ones.) upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/2/06 2:32:37 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ashkenn2k@... writes: > Hi Howard > > Sanna is powerful thing. It remembers what the previous citta knows > and hence during the next citta arise, the information is pass to the > next citta with its cetasikas. Just like the eg I quoted on > recalling music or recalling a picture. It is memory at work and not > the sense processes > > > Cheers > Ken O > > ======================= Okay, I understand you. But what I had said was that remembering an object or aspects of the mindstate that took that dhamma as an object is not knowing that object now. Remembering it, no matter how clearly, is not knowing it because it does not exist. What is known must exist. In the case of recalling a bodily sensation, for example, what is known now is a mind-door phenomenon, a memory, and no longer the original sensation, because that original sensation does not exist - it is gone! With metta, Howard #60999 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 2, 2006 2:25 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Knowledge of the Difference Between Naama and Ruupa: Making The... upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - In a message dated 7/2/06 5:54:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, ken_aitch@... writes: > Every time there is the idea of "my experience" or "my detecting" the > object of citta is a concept. Even in the dentist's chair the poor > worldling cannot accurately say, "This is the paramattha dhamma, > bodily feeling!" ------------------------------- Howard: Yes, yes, Ken, You're beating a dead horse. The moment we're thinking, it is all about concepts. Likewise the minute we are talking. But when there is direct experiencing of sights, sounds, etc, dhammas are involved. ------------------------------ If he is a Dhamma student, he will know that cittas> > with painful vedana are experiencing undesirable bodily sense objects, > but there is no satipatthana and so his knowledge is, at best, > theoretical. > ------------------------------- Howard: And if he is an even better Dhamma student s/he will know that there are no cittas doing anything. There is just the doing - and those doings are the so-called cittas. And as you say, if there is insight, then there will be true knowing. BTW, I'm not fond of using 'satipatthana', which means "establishing of mindfulness" or "foundation of mindfulness" or "setting forth of mindfulness", as a substitute for 'pa~n~na'. ========================== With metta, Howard