#94400 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 1:25 pm Subject: The "Reality" of Conditioned Dhammas as Described in the Suttas/Ken upasaka_howard Hi, Ken - A few items from the Sutta Pitaka: He who neither goes too far nor lags behind and knows about the world: "This is all unreal," — such a monk gives up the here and the beyond, just as a serpent sheds its worn-out skin. "Face-to-face with the Blessed One have I heard this, friend Channa. Face-to-face with him have I learned the exhortation he gave to the bhikkhu Kaccayanagotta: 'By & large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence & non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. Analogous to a variety of conventional, natural phenomena, the Buddha teaches "In the same way, a monk sees, observes, & appropriately examines any X that is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near. To him — seeing it, observing it, & appropriately examining it — it would appear empty, void, without substance: for what substance would there be in X?" where X is any rupa or nama. With metta, Howard Emptiness (From the Uraga Sutta) __________________________ Reality (From the Dvayatanupassana Sutta) #94401 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 7:58 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: nama and rupa, to Lukas. egberdina Be not afraid, Lukas, I am not trying to stop Nina from writing :-) But I will make some more comments as we go on. Cheers Herman 2009/1/4 szmicio : > Dear Nina > I will be glad if you will continue nama-rupa series. It's a very good > reminder. > I still think about my akusala. > #94402 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 8:16 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Vipassana, Survey Ch 34, no 3. egberdina Hi Nina, 2009/1/4 Nina van Gorkom : > Dear friends, > > When someone has only theoretical understanding of realities that is > the result of listening to the Dhamma, he is not able to directly > understand nma and rpa as they are. When someone understands that there are only namas and rupas, they have lapsed into analysis paralysis :-) > He does not realize that what > he sees and conceives as people and beings, is in reality only that > which appears through the eyes. Without an understanding of conditionality, there may well be a belief that there are only momentary dhammas. But DO teaches us otherwise, it enumerates the synthetic relationships between dhammas. Not only is there the appearance of dhammas, but also the conditions for their genesis. If seeing only what appears through the eye, without seeing the how and why of it arising, one may as well be blind to the Dhamma. "Do you see, Sariputta, that 'this has come into being'?" "One sees with right discernment, lord, that 'this has come into being.' Seeing with right discernment that 'this has come into being,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of what has come into being. One sees with right discernment that 'it has come into being from this nutriment.' Seeing with right discernment that 'it has come into being from this nutriment,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of the nutriment by which it has come into being. One sees with right discernment that 'from the cessation of this nutriment, what has come into being is subject to cessation.' Seeing with right discernment that 'from the cessation of this nutriment, what has come into being is subject to cessation,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of what is subject to cessation. This is how one is a learner. "And how, lord, is one a person who has fathomed the Dhamma? "One sees with right discernment, lord, that 'this has come into being.' Seeing with right discernment that 'this has come into being,' one is through disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, through lack of clinging/sustenance released from what has come into being. One sees with right discernment that 'it has come into being from this nutriment.' Seeing with right discernment that 'it has come into being from this nutriment,' one is through disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, through lack of clinging/sustenance released from the nutriment by which it has come into being. One sees with right discernment that 'from the cessation of this nutriment, what has come into being is subject to cessation.' Seeing with right discernment that 'from the cessation of this nutriment, what has come into being is subject to cessation,' one is through disenchantment, dispassion, cessation, through lack of clinging/sustenance released from what is subject to cessation. This is how one is a person who has fathomed the Dhamma. Cheers Herman #94403 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 3:37 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Robert, Ken H, Alex In a message dated 1/4/2009 6:09:56 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, kenhowardau@... writes: The suttas talk about nothing else! Only the terminology varies from sutta to sutta: sometimes it's "khandhas" sometimes "elements" sometimes "nama and rupa: and at other times it's other names (see "Useful Posts" for details). TG thinks the suttas are talking about things that don't really exist (are not absolute realities (paramattha dhammas)). What do you think? Ken H ................................................ TG: First of all, Ken H does not understand my position and does not speak to it. Second... Although I believe it is a sincere belief that some here think the Suttas "talk about nothing else" than "ultimate realities that have their own characteristics," the fact of the matter would seem to be that this is mere interpretation. The Suttas do indeed talk about elements and aggregates. But the Suttas do not substantiate these as "ultimate realities with their own characteristics." The commentarial positions of are so deeply held on to, that the terms -- nama, rupa, element, aggregate, are believed to be these "ultimate realities with their own characteristics," despite the fact the Buddha didn't seemed interested enough in that viewpoint to directly (or indirectly IMO) mention it. It seems to me that a matter considered to be of such critical importance could have at least been mentioned once by the Buddha. Oh well. Thirdly... Howard has posted some other Sutta quotes that nicely reflect this topic and should put doubts into this "ultimate reality" viewpoint. Yea, I know they won't, but they 'should.' ;-) TG OUT #94404 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 8:29 pm Subject: The 7 Noble Persons! bhikkhu0 Friends: Who and How are the 7 kinds of Noble Persons? The Blessed Buddha once explained: Monks, there are seven types of noble persons existing in the world. What seven? 1: The one freed both ways (ubhato-bhāga-vimutta), 2: The one freed by understanding (paññā-vimutta). 3: The body-witness (kāya-sakkhī), 4: The one having won view & vision (ditthippatta), 5: The one freed by faith (saddhāvimutta) 6: The striver after Dhamma (dhammānusārī), 7: The striver after faith (saddhānusārī), And how, monks, is the person freed Both Ways? As to this, monks, some person is abiding, having directly experienced with both body and mind those peaceful mental releases, which are formless, & having seen by understanding all his mental fermentations are utterly eliminated. He is freed both ways and has done what should be done. He can therefore never become negligent ever again… And how, monks, is the person freed by Understanding? As to this, monks, some person is abiding, without having directly experienced with both body & mind those peaceful mental releases, which are formless, yet having seen by understanding all his mental fermentations are utterly destroyed. He is freed by understanding and has done what should be done. He can therefore never become negligent ever again… And how monks, is the person who is a Body-Witness? As to this, monks, some person is abiding, without having directly experienced with both body & mind those peaceful mental releases, which are formless, yet having seen by understanding only some of his mental fermentations are fully annihilated. He is a body-witness & he has still something to do. If he trains hard, lives remote with good friends, and balances his abilities, then he may realise here & now, by his own super-knowledge, that matchless goal of the Noble Life for which young men of good family go forth into homelessness, entering into & remaining in it, he might dwell in the bliss of that sublime fruit. And how monks, is the person who has Won View & Vision? As to this, monks, some person is abiding, without having directly experienced with both body and mind those peaceful mental releases, which are formless, and having seen by understanding only some of his mental fermentations are utterly eradicated. However, those things explained by the Tathagata are fully understood and fully practised by him. He has won view & vision, but has still something to do. If he trains hard … then he might come to dwell in the sublime fruit. And how monks, is the person who is Freed by Faith? As to this, monks, some person is abiding, without having directly experienced with both body and mind those peaceful mental releases, which are formless, and having seen by understanding only some of his mental fermentations are utterly eradicated. But his faith in the Tathagata is settled, fixed, genuine, & established. This, monks, is called a person, who is Freed by Faith, but he has still something to do. If he trains hard … then he might come to dwell in the sublime fruit. And how monks, is the person who is Striving for Dhamma? As to this, monks, some person is abiding, without having directly experienced with both body and mind those peaceful mental releases, which are formless, and although having seen some by understanding his mental fermentations are not yet utterly destroyed! Furthermore: All those things explained by the Tathagata are still only moderately approved of and practiced by him… However, he possesses the ability of faith, energy, awareness, concentration, & understanding. This, monks, is called the person, who is striving for Dhamma, but he has still something to do. If he trains hard … then he might come to dwell in the sublime fruit. And how monks, is the person who is Striving after Faith? As to this, monks, some person is abiding, without having directly experienced with both body and mind those peaceful mental releases, which are formless, and although having seen some by understanding his mental fermentations are not yet utterly destroyed, but he has enough faith in the Tathagata, enough affection for the Buddha to develop the ability of faith, energy, awareness, concentration, & understanding. This, monks, is called the person, who is striving out of Faith, but he has still something to do. If he trains hard … then he might come to dwell in the supreme fruit in the future. I, monks, do not say that the attainment of profound knowledge suddenly comes straightaway! Rather; gaining final knowledge is achieved gradually by study, training, praxis, & steady progress... Source: Majjhima Nikaya 70. May this Way by our one-pointed effort become swift! Have a nice day! Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) http://What-Buddha-Said.net The 7 Noble Persons! #94405 From: TGrand458@... Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 3:54 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Connie In a message dated 1/4/2009 7:25:32 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, nichicon@... writes: Hi guys, TG: My understanding is that the terms "paramattha dhammas" and "sabhava" do not appear in the Suttas at all. (Well, sabhava does appear in the patisambhidamagga but there it is merely denied.) connie: and a term not appearing in the Suttas proves what? ...................................... TG: A term not appearing in the Suttas proves it isn't in the Suttas. ;-) Hard to defend that the terms "ultimate realities" and "own characteristics" are the core of the Buddha's teaching when he doesn't bother to ever bring it up. ......................................... the funny thing is both schemes (ultimate & conventional reality or whatever you care to say) acknowledge anatta, dukkha and anatta while using terms like 'individual' conventional real conventional reality or whatever you care to say) acknowledge anatta, dukkha and .................................................. TG: Yep, as I wrote earlier today, it takes a good sensibility to navigate through the Suttas. If the Suttas contain contradictions to one's conclusion about what they say or mean, then those conclusions are very suspect. When the Buddha says of elements and aggregates, that these too are not self, then the issue is deeper than a normal understanding of what a "self/person" is. While some here are busy seeing these aggregates, etc. as "ultimate realities," the Suttas describe them as -- like illusions, like a mirage, like a trick, hollow, coreless, empty, void, insubstantial, etc. An amazing disconnect. TG OUT #94406 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 9:07 pm Subject: e-card from Fiji sarahprocter... Dear Friends, I'm slowly recovering from a long journey here - to Suva, the capital of Fiji, a 3 hr+ late-night drive in the dark here from Nadi, the international capital after 2 flights via Sydney. I was rather unwell the next day, but fine now. Suva is not a place anyone would come for the Fijian dream and nor is our basic (1960s motel-like) accomodation, but it's the best on offer here. It does have a small pool, fortunately, and we got away yesterday to relax at the nearest resort with some beach. Today Jon's back into his office next door to help draft some legislation. I've been catching up with the busy list, resting and trying (without any success so far) to arrange to join a tour. All very laid-back, but lovely balmy air, friendly people (twice the size of most Hong Kongers!) and all the usual namas and rupas to keep occupied with - never a lack of distractions or signs and details to cling on to as appearing through all door-ways. I'll look forward to getting back into some threads in due course! Metta, Sarah ======== #94407 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 10:27 pm Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. kenhowardau Hi TG and Rob E, ----------------- <. . .> KH: > > TG thinks the suttas are talking about things that don't really exist (are not absolute realities (paramattha dhammas)). <. . .> > > TG: > First of all, Ken H does not understand my position and does not speak to it. ------------------ You can't have it both ways, TG: you have repeatedly said there were no such things as ultimate realities (paramattah dhammas). I remember your telling Scott there were 'conditions but no conditioned dhammas.' -------------------------- TG: > The Suttas do indeed talk about elements and aggregates. But the Suttas do not substantiate these as "ultimate realities with their own characteristics." --------------------------- If namas and rupas were not ultimate realities with their own characteristics the suttas would not have mentioned them. They would have been mere concepts, and we have more than enough concepts already. ---------------------------------- <. . .> TG: > The commentarial positions of are so deeply held on to, that the terms -- nama, rupa, element, aggregate, are believed to be these "ultimate realities with their own characteristics," despite the fact the Buddha didn't seemed interested enough in that viewpoint to directly (or indirectly IMO) mention it. It seems to me that a matter considered to be of such critical importance could have at least been mentioned once by the Buddha. Oh well. ---------------------------------- Its was "concepts" that the Buddha considerd to be not of critical importance. He said he used concepts (man, woman, chariot etc ) as mere conventional designations, and without being caught up by them. If he had considered nama and rupa as mere designations he would have said the same about them. But he didn't, of course. The idea that we should consider namas and rupas as anything other than absolute realities is too silly for words. Ken H #94408 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 11:04 pm Subject: Vipassana, Survey Ch 34, no 4. nilovg Dear friends, When sati arises and is mindful of realities and pa begins to study and investigate their characteristics, one will begin to understand that the outward appearance and all the details of things, all the different colours, are only what appears through the eyes, nothing else. Then pa begins to penetrate the characteristics of realities as not a self, not a being, not a person. If sati arises and is aware time and again, one will understand the meaning of the Buddhas words explaining that, by the development of the understanding of the realities which naturally appear, one will not cling to the outward appearance and the details of things. We read in the Middle Length Sayings (I, no. 27) in the Lesser Discourse on the Simile of the Elephants Footprint that the Buddha spoke to the brahman Jnussoni about the monks life. He said about the restraint of the senses: He, possessed of the ariyan body of moral habit, subjectively experiences unsullied well-being. Having seen visible object with the eye, he is not entranced by the general appearance, he is not entranced by the detail. If he dwells with this organ of sight uncontrolled, covetousness and dejection, evil unskilled states of mind, might predominate. So he fares along controlling it; he guards the organ of sight, he comes to have control over the organ of sight.... (The same is said with regard to the other doorways.) This kind of restraint can be achieved through the development of pa which understands the realities that appear as they are. One will begin to let go of att-sa with regard to what appears through the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the bodysense and the mind-door, in accordance with the degree of pa which has been reached. We should remember that no matter which topic or which detail the teachings deal with, it all concerns the realities of daily life. Sati should be aware of the realities which appear so that pa is able to clearly understand their characteristics. This leads to the complete eradication of defilements. ******** Nina. #94409 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jan 4, 2009 11:35 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] nama and rupa, and Vipassana, Survey Ch 34, no 3. nilovg Hi Herman, Op 5-jan-2009, om 5:16 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: >> Quote Kh S: He does not realize that what >> he sees and conceives as people and beings, is in reality only that >> which appears through the eyes. ---------- > > H: Without an understanding of conditionality, there may well be a > belief > that there are only momentary dhammas. But DO teaches us otherwise, it > enumerates the synthetic relationships between dhammas. Not only is > there the appearance of dhammas, but also the conditions for their > genesis. -------- N: The Patthanaa and D.O. are never denied. Momentary dhammas, but arisen because of conditions, and we should relate this to the present moment. Seeing now could not arise without eyesense and visible object. As mentioned all the time in the suttas and repeated all the time by Kh S. But this is an important point: we may just read it and find it too ordinary, nothing special. While we hear or read all this, it can remind us that seeing that appears now is not ours, not us, that it is a mere dhamma. We may come to realize this more and more. It is pa~n~naa and sati that may arise and realize the truth of this moment. What arises because of conditions has to fall away, it cannot stay. It is only momentary. ------- > > H: If seeing only what appears through the eye, without seeing the how > and why of it arising, one may as well be blind to the Dhamma. ------- N: The deepest cause is ignorance, because of ignorance there is birth and the arising of nama and rupa. Through the development of satipatthaana there will be less ignorance. Seeing does not see people, only what is visible. There is ignorance of what seeing is and what visible object is. Immediately we are absorbed in our thoughts about concepts of this or that person. We are not used to 'studying with sati' seeing and visible object. It seems uninteresting. Still, it is the way to have more understanding of our life, of the world. What is the world? Nama and rupa arising and falling away. We can also say: the five khandhas, that is the same. ------- Nina. #94410 From: "jonoabb" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 12:57 am Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone jonoabb Hi TG > Empty, Hollow, Coreless, Void, > > Insubstantial, Like Mirage, Like Conjurer's Trick? > > Are you sure that all of these descriptions pertain to all 5 khandhas? > .......................................................... > > > TG: Yes. Lump of Foam Sutta in Khandhasamyutta. I think you're referring to the Phena Sutta as often quoted by Howard: "Form is like a glob of foam; feeling, a bubble; perception, a mirage; fabrications, a banana tree; consciousness, a magic trick" this has been taught by the Kinsman of the Sun. However you observe them, appropriately examine them, they're empty, void to whoever sees them appropriately. http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/93592 "Empty" and "void" are the attributes that are applicable to all 5 khandhas (the other similes are each applicable only to a single khandha, and need to be considered in that light). I understand these to mean "empty/void of self", rather than "without charactersitic". > TG: Anatta (no-self) is merely the absence of something. Are you saying > that "the absence of something" is actually a "characteristic" The characteristic of "not-self" is one of 3 characteristics that pertain to all conditioned dhammas. It is not necessary to think of this as "absence of something". Given that the 3 charcteristics are apparent only to developed panna, it's not surprising that we have difficulty grasping them intellectually. > attributed to something in as an affirmation of "it" or as something "of its > own"? Amazing. I have never suggested something as an affirmation of "it" or as "something of its own", not least because I have no idea what that's supposed to mean ;-)) Jon #94411 From: "jonoabb" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:11 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation jonoabb Hi Robert > My question, Jon, along these lines is, if "the idea of a sentient > being" is a conventional concept that does not really exist [except of > course as concept,] why is it the object of metta, rather than > something actual? Doesn't this just feed delusion? Concepts do not necessarily imply wrong view. There is nothing "wrong" with concepts as object of consciousness per se. The enlightened being still thinks of the world in terms of people and things, but does so without any wrong view as to the way things are in truth and reality. > And if one were > to pick a "real" object of metta, what could it possibly be? A concept is just as much an object as a dhamma. If you wanted to identify a single dhamma as being the dhamma that is taken for a sentient being, it would I suppose be either bhavanga citta or the life-faculty mental factor. > Put another way, why would one who is trying to awaken to reality send > metta to an illusory concept of a non-existent entity? The more developed the understanding of the individual, the less idea of a "self" in relation to this or that person. Jon #94412 From: "jonoabb" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:17 am Subject: Re: Suttas in which the Buddha held back the deep teaching? jonoabb Hi Alex > > Thanks for this observation. What is the textual basis for the > > notion that jhana is continuous and thus cannot be momentary? > > > > Jon > > Remember that quote out of Therigatha about Bhikkhuni who sat for 7 > days? > > What about Buddha in MN14 talking about sitting motionless for 7 days > experience bliss and all that. > > > "'Now, I without moving my body, without uttering a word can > dwell sensitive to unalloyed pleasure for a day and a night... for > two days & nights... for three... four... five... six... seven days & > nights." > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.014.than.html Yes, but there is nothing in what you quote here that says jhana is continuous rather than momentary. Other cittas are momentary, why not jhana citta? Jon #94413 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:50 am Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone nilovg Hi Howard, Op 4-jan-2009, om 21:43 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > I don't see how one could dispute this, Nina. Seeing is always > different > in kind from hearing, for example, because sights are different in > quality > from sounds. No one confuses them. But this is still not beyond > convention, no > matter how much we think it is. -------- N: no names please. Lobha is not American, Thai, Dutch, no nationality. It is a characteristic of a paramattha dhamma, of a specific nama. Lobha is lobha no matter where and when it arises. No possessor, it arises when there are conditions for it. --------- > H: During the course of what we call "seeing" (or "hearing"), there is > constant change in the quality of the consciousness and in what is > experienced, > -------- N: Not denied, but the characteristic is just that. -------- H: > -----Merely by means of mentality, by thought construction, > we separate off from seamless reality an apparent pair of "true > existents": > a knowing and a known, two interrelated "entities" or "things". But > reality > "doesn't care" about our thinking! ;-)) ------- N: Not our thinking, thanks to the Buddha's enlightenment we learn about nama and rupa and can develop more understanding. It is not denied that nama and rupa are interrelated, but they are different dhammas: nama experiences an object and rupa does not know anything. Shall we begin here? Nina. #94414 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 2:01 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. nilovg Dear Alex, Op 5-jan-2009, om 2:17 heeft Alex het volgende geschreven: > parama + attha = "superior gain" > > NO ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS NECESSERY! ------- N: Attha has several meanings, and apart from gain or good it means here: sense or meaning. What is true in the highest sense. In contrast to conventional truth such as person, tree etc. What is really there: everchanging mental phenomena and physical phenomena that can be experienced and that can be understood more and more. With patience, khanti. Nina. #94415 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 4:09 am Subject: Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner scottduncan2 Dear All, Continuing: The Path of Purification. "12. But if this bhikkhu does not rest content with just that much and wants to break down the barriers, he should next, after that, develop lovingkindness towards a very dearly loved friend, then towards a neutral person as a very dearly loved friend, then towards a hostile person as neutral. And while he does so, he should make his mind malleable and wieldy in each instant before passing on to the next." The Path of Purity. "The monk, however, who, not contented with such fulfillment, and not deriving joy therefrom, wishes to abolish the dividing line,* should immediately develop love for a very dear person, after him for an indifferent person, after him for an enemy. And in doing so, in each compartment he should make the heart tender and wieldy, and immediately after induce Jhaana.** *That marks off the four compartments: himself, a dear love, an indifferent person, an enemy. **Upasa.mharitabba.m, explained by the Tiikaa as jhaanacitta.m upanetabba.m. Evaruupe ca puggale kaama.m appanaa sampajjati, iminaa pana bhikkhunaa taavatakeneva tu.t.thi.m anaapajjitvaa siimaasambheda.m kattukaamena tadanantara.m atippiyasahaayake, atippiyasahaayakato majjhatte, majjhattato veriipuggale mettaa bhaavetabbaa. Bhaaventena ca ekekasmi.m ko.t.thaase mudu.m kammaniya.m citta.m katvaa tadanantare tadanantare upasa.mharitabba.m. Sincerely, Scott. #94416 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 5:02 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear Rob E., Regarding: R: "Is there a basis in the suttas for such ideas as dhammas as ultimate realities, as TG suggests that there is not. If there is, can you give an example of indication of how this is shown to be correct? Or is it a later idea of the commentators?" Scott: I accept that the Suttas refer to paramattha dhammas when referring to the khandhas, the bases, the ayatanas, the elements, and so on. This is clarified in great detail in the Abhidhamma and then further in the Commentaries. I accept these sources as being in harmony. I'm sorry if this disappoints you. Sincerely, Scott. #94417 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 12:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. upasaka_howard Hi, Ken (and TG & Rob) - In a message dated 1/5/2009 1:27:53 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, kenhowardau@... writes: Hi TG and Rob E, ----------------- <. . .> KH: > > TG thinks the suttas are talking about things that don't really exist (are not absolute realities (paramattha dhammas)). <. . .> > > TG: > First of all, Ken H does not understand my position and does not speak to it. ------------------ You can't have it both ways, TG: you have repeatedly said there were no such things as ultimate realities (paramattah dhammas). I remember your telling Scott there were 'conditions but no conditioned dhammas.' -------------------------------------------- Howard: As I understand, it is the terminology 'ultimate realities' and the sense of it as substantial entities with their OWN being and nature that TG objects to, as do I. I do NOT for a second believe that TG is any more a nihilist, which is what you imply, than a substantialist. He and I both experience hardness, warmth, sights, sounds, liking, disliking, boredom, and amazement - maybe especially amazement! ;-) When the Buddha repeatedly speaks of phenomena as empty of self and substance and even as "unreal," as shown in the quotes that I sent to your attention, I find the holding to "ultimates" and "realities" and even "ABSOLUTE realities" (my emphasis) to be amazing. ----------------------------------------------- -------------------------- TG: > The Suttas do indeed talk about elements and aggregates. But the Suttas do not substantiate these as "ultimate realities with their own characteristics." --------------------------- If namas and rupas were not ultimate realities with their own characteristics the suttas would not have mentioned them. They would have been mere concepts, and we have more than enough concepts already. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: LOLOL! Ken, you've got to be kidding! The Buddha indeed repeatedly mentioned the five aggregates of mental and physical phenomena, but constantly emphasizing their being neither non-existent nor existent as entities, but as dreamlike - like bubbles, magic shows, coreless like plantain trees, etc, and even as "unreal," but never as "realities," let alone "absolute realities." You are SO off-base on this, Ken. ------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------- <. . .> TG: > The commentarial positions of are so deeply held on to, that the terms -- nama, rupa, element, aggregate, are believed to be these "ultimate realities with their own characteristics," despite the fact the Buddha didn't seemed interested enough in that viewpoint to directly (or indirectly IMO) mention it. It seems to me that a matter considered to be of such critical importance could have at least been mentioned once by the Buddha. Oh well. ---------------------------------- Its was "concepts" that the Buddha considerd to be not of critical importance. He said he used concepts (man, woman, chariot etc ) as mere conventional designations, and without being caught up by them. If he had considered nama and rupa as mere designations he would have said the same about them. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Why do you ignore what he DID say about them? It is the quite the opposite of what you have to say. ----------------------------------------------- But he didn't, of course. The idea that we should consider namas and rupas as anything other than absolute realities is too silly for words. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: It seems that you think that merely saying something makes it so. Now, if one is looking for "silly," there it is! --------------------------------------------------- Ken H ========================== With metta, Howard Emptiness (From the Uraga Sutta) __________________________ Reality (From the Dvayatanupassana Sutta) #94418 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 12:45 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. upasaka_howard Hi, Scott (and Rob) - In a message dated 1/5/2009 8:02:33 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear Rob E., Regarding: R: "Is there a basis in the suttas for such ideas as dhammas as ultimate realities, as TG suggests that there is not. If there is, can you give an example of indication of how this is shown to be correct? Or is it a later idea of the commentators?" Scott: I accept that the Suttas refer to paramattha dhammas when referring to the khandhas, the bases, the ayatanas, the elements, and so on. ------------------------------------------ Howard: That is certainly your prerogative, Scott. We all have opinions. But it was Rob's question as to whether dhammas are characterized in the suttas as ultimate realities, not necessarily in those precise words (I presume), but in asserted meaning, however it might be expressed. My reading of the suttas persuades me of quite the opposite. Can you show why my take on that is wrong? :-) ----------------------------------------- This is clarified in great detail in the Abhidhamma and then further in the Commentaries. I accept these sources as being in harmony. I'm sorry if this disappoints you. ------------------------------------------- Howard: ;-) ------------------------------------------- Sincerely, Scott. =========================== With metta, Howard Emptiness (From the Uraga Sutta) __________________________ Reality (From the Dvayatanupassana Sutta) #94419 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 6:07 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear Howard, Regarding: Howard: "...My reading of the suttas persuades me of quite the opposite. Can you show why my take on that is wrong?" Scott: I'm sorry, Howard, but I'm not interested in going against your own oft-stated persuasion. Perhaps you yourself can reiterate these views to Rob. E., showing him both sides of the argument as you do so. Sincerely, Scott. #94420 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:20 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. upasaka_howard Hi, Scott - In a message dated 1/5/2009 9:07:57 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear Howard, Regarding: Howard: "...My reading of the suttas persuades me of quite the opposite. Can you show why my take on that is wrong?" Scott: I'm sorry, Howard, but I'm not interested in going against your own oft-stated persuasion. Perhaps you yourself can reiterate these views to Rob. E., showing him both sides of the argument as you do so. --------------------------------------------------- Howard: No problem, Scott. You certainly needn't provide or search out anything. I dont believe in "giving assignments"! ;-) -------------------------------------------------- Sincerely, Scott. ========================== With metta, Howard (Anonymous) #94421 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 6:50 am Subject: Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner buddhatrue Hi Robert, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Robert Epstein" wrote: > > Sorry I'm so late, but thought I would drop back in to stop badgering > you. Sorry about that! :-) Sorry I'm late also. I have been very busy. Thanks for the apology and don't worry about it. You can badger me anytime you feel it is necessary. :-) > > Robert Metta, James #94422 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 6:52 am Subject: Re: First Noble Truth- We are All in Prison buddhatrue Hi Derek, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "derekacameron" wrote: > > James, you might enjoy the Ozay Rinpoche book about meditation and > enlightenment in prison. It is called "Freedom: Escaping the Prison of > the Mind." Derek. > Thanks for this info. I will check into it next time I am in the US. Metta, James #94423 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:09 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner buddhatrue Hi Sarah, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > Sarah > p.s James....such agreement between us these days must be a record! > ======== > Well, I hate to rain on your enthusiasm, but I don't agree with you in this regard. Changing "should" to "may" in the Vism. doesn't change the fact that they are still instructions. They have to been seen as a whole, not just the use of one word. It is obvious, when viewed as a whole, that they are instructions. I just don't happen to agree with the instructions as they are confusing to follow and don't correspond with what the Buddha taught. Metta, James #94424 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:37 am Subject: Re: [dsg] accumulations, was: cornerstone nilovg Hi Howard, I did not answer this one yet. Op 31-dec-2008, om 18:32 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Howard: > I tend to disbelieve in mind states holding an infinite, or even > really > huge, store of information. The information would need to consist of > cetasikas, and the number of cetasikas occuring at any time is > quite limited, Nina, > as you know. So, I find your perspective on this matter to be > problematical. -------- N: What is accumulated is not the cetasikas that arise at present with the citta. Perhaps that solves the problem? It is a fact that what was learnt before or done before conditions the present moment. But we have no way how that happens exactly. We only know that each citta conditions the next one by way of contiguity-condition. There is the natural strong deoendence- condition, pakatupanissaya-paccaya. Nina. #94425 From: "connie" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:44 am Subject: Sangiiti Sutta Threes (40) nichiconn dear friends, continuing after #93961 Threes (37-39) (cy: #94242, #94297, #94357): CSCD <> This certainly deserves more credence as a saying of the Buddha than the late Suttas Majhima Nikaaya 129, 130. See also Visuddhimagga 13.93ff. for more on the first four abodes. {... 2-3 ...} p40-41: 4. The animal world. The animal kingdom, together with the human realm, constitutes the only realm of beings normally visible to human sight and therefore indisputably existing (Ajita Kesakambali, like any modern rationalist, disbelieved in all the rest). There are those today in the West who object strongly to the idea that the Buddha taught that we can be reborn as animals, though at first sight the evidence is all against them. However, since tiracchaana, normally meaning 'animal', is used in Sutta i in the compounds tiracchaana-kathaa, tiracchaana-vijjaa, meaning 'low talk', 'base art', it is just possible that as a 'destination' for humans tiracchaana-yoni can be taken as a low rebirth. Some confirmation is provided by the case of Khorakkhattiya (Sutta 24, v.9 and n.244) {... 5-9 ...} p.42: 10,11. Devas Delighting in Creation; devas Wielding Power over Others' Creations. The former can create any shape they like, the latter delight in things created by others, to get them in their power. These two are the highest in the World of Sense Desires. {p.374: DN 24, 1.9. 'And Sunakkhatta heard of this, so he went to the heap of biira.na-grass in the charnel-ground where Korakkhattiya was lying, struck the body three times with his hand, and said: "Friend Korakkhattiya, do you know your fate?" And Korakkhattiya sat up and rubbed his back with his hand, and said: "Friend Sunakkhatta, I know my fate. I have been reborn among the Kaalaka~nja asuras, the very lowest grade of asuras.' And with that, he fell back again.} 244 Niraya'm vaa tiracchaana-yoni'm vaa. The statement that those who hold 'wrong views' are liable to hell or an animal rebirth is off-putting to modern readers. It is doubtful whether either term originally meant what is was later taken to mean. See Introduction, p.40f. 'A painful or beast-like rebirth' might express the meaning better. It should be realised, too, that the 'wrong view' referred to means one according to which there are no rewards and punishments for good and evil deed -- hence no operation of a moral law. This kind of view the Buddha always declared to be particularly reprehensible. Cf. n.801. 801 In the commentaries and later literature Aviici denotes the lowest of the hells (or 'purgatories', as RD and other translators have it, to indicate that no such hell is eternal). This, and a parallel passage at AN 3.56, is the only pasage in the first four Nikaayas where it is mentioned, and 'hell' does not seem to be its meaning (RD renders it 'the Waveless Deep'), though its exact sense is doubtful. Warder, in his paraphrase of this Sutta (Indian Buddhism, 168) says parenthetically: '"like purgatory", the Buddha remarks ambiguously, thinking probably of his preference for seclusion.' The Buddhist hells grow steadily worse in the popular imagination, but most of their horrors find little support in the Suttas (though see MN 129, 130). Cf. n.244 and Introduction, p.40. **olds: [ 3.40 ] (1. Sant'aavuso sattaa paccupa.t.thita-kaamaa, te paccupa.t.thitesu kaamesu vasa.m vattenti seyyathaa pi manussaa ekacce ca devaa ekacce ca vinipaatikaa. 2. . . .nimmita-kaamaa, te nimmetvaa nimmetvaa kaamesu . . . devaa Nimmaana-ratii. 3. . . . para-nimmita-kaamaa, te para-nimmitesu kaamesu . . . devaa Paranimmita-vasavattii. (kaamupapattiyo -- contrast with next) carnal enjoyment in the sense of being directed towards the worldly or material, Walshe (apparently following the commentary) takes the reference to forms of rebirth, I understand the forms of rebirth as examples of the way the forms of taking carnal enjoyment manifest themselves; for forms of rebirth, see The Ninth Lesson. In other words the way I see this, these ways carnal pleasures manifest themselves are not exclusive to these forms of rebirth, and these forms of rebirth are not limited to this mode of being, but these rebirths are just realms where these forms of taking carnal pleasure are a dominant characteristic. It's like saying: There are three hair colors: black, such as is found in Italy, China, and the US; Red such as is found in Ireland and Russia, and blond such as is found in England; as opposed to saying: There are three countries into which beings are born: China, where their hair is black; Russia where their hair is red; and the US where their hair is blond. The second way of putting it just doesn't hold up to examination. Rhys Davids: "Three uprisings of desires connected with sense: 1. There are beings, friends, whose sense-desires are bound up with the objects thereof, and they are in subjection to such desire. Such are human beings, some devas and some reborn to (one of the four) evil destinies. There are beings who have desires for that which (they have) created . . . for the creations of others; and get these into their power..." Walshe: "Three kinds of rebirth in the Realm of Sense-Desire...There are beings who desire what presents itself to them...and are in the grip of that desire . . . who desire what they have created . . . who rejoice in the creations of others. . ." ***rd: 3.40These two curiously named groups are the highest stages of life in the 'sensuous universe.' Cf. below, p.241 ... to be continued, connie, Scott, Nina #94426 From: "connie" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:47 am Subject: AS time nichiconn dear friends, now comes part 3, The Concept of the Present in the Abhidhamma: 3. The Concept of the Present in the Abhidhamma We have observed earlier (pp.29-30) how Buddhist philosophy does not stop short at the rigid and "two-dimensional" concept of time, and particularly of the present, resulting from analysis. Through its philosophy of relations involving a synthetical method, the Abhidhamma adds the third dimension of "depth in time." When subjected to analytical treatment alone, the present tends to become an insignificant point of intersection between past and future with a most elusive and even illusory nature. But when the depth dimension is added it becomes charged with energies deriving from the past and with a significance extending to the future - both in varying degrees, starting from very weak connections up to a definitely determined course, which is, however, limited to very few cases. {69} To express this dynamic view of time, special terms were required beyond the conventional and therefore too static concepts of past, present, and future. We proffer the opinion that it was for this purpose that the "triad of things arisen, not arise, and bound to arise" (uppannaa, anuppannaa, uppaadino dhammaa) was included in the Dhammasa'nga.nii (at 1035-37) and that the commentarial four categories of upannaa were formed, which will be dealt with later. {69} On the positive side, definite determination of the future holds for those who reach the four stages of awakening: the stream-enterer is assured of reaching final liberation after at most seven more births, none below the human level, the once-returner of one more birth in the sensuous realm, the nonreturner of rebirth in the form realm, and the arahant of never again taking any birth. On the negative side, those who commit the "five heinous crimes" (parricide, matricide, etc.) or adopt a morally pernicious wrong view are bound to take rebirth in the realms of misery. ... to be continued, connie #94427 From: "connie" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:49 am Subject: cornerstone nichiconn dear friends, Karunadasa continues: The relative position of the dhammas is another aspect of the subject that requires clarification. Do they harmoniously blend into a unity or do they divide themselves into a plurality? In this connection we may do well to examine two of their important characteristics. One is their actual inseparability (satsatthata, avinibbhogata),81 the other their conditioned origination (sappaccayata).82 The first refers to the fact that in a given instance of mind or matter, the elementary constituents (= dhammas) that enter into its composition are not actually separable one from another. They exist in a state of inseparable association forming, so to say, a homogeneous unity. This idea is in consonance with an earlier tradition recorded in the early Buddhist discourses. For example, in the Mahavedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya it is said that the three mental factors -- sensation (vedana), perception (sanna), and consciousness (vinnana) -- are blended (satsattha) so harmoniously that it is impossible to separate them from one another and thus establish their identity.83 The same idea finds expression in the Milindapanha.84 When Nagasena Thera is asked by King Milinda whether it is possible, in the case of mental factors which exist in harmonious combination (ekato bhavagata), to separate them out and establish a plurality as: "This is contact, and this sensation, and this mentation, and this perception," and so on, the elder answers with a simile: 81. Vsm 376, 381; AMM 43; Tkp 59. 82. Tkp 62ff. 83....(M I 480). 84. Mil 58-59. peace, connie #94428 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 2:49 am Subject: Re: [dsg] accumulations, was: cornerstone upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 1/5/2009 10:37:51 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi Howard, I did not answer this one yet. Op 31-dec-2008, om 18:32 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Howard: > I tend to disbelieve in mind states holding an infinite, or even > really > huge, store of information. The information would need to consist of > cetasikas, and the number of cetasikas occuring at any time is > quite limited, Nina, > as you know. So, I find your perspective on this matter to be > problematical. -------- N: What is accumulated is not the cetasikas that arise at present with the citta. Perhaps that solves the problem? It is a fact that what was learnt before or done before conditions the present moment. But we have no way how that happens exactly. We only know that each citta conditions the next one by way of contiguity-condition. There is the natural strong deoendence- condition, pakatupanissaya-paccaya. Nina. =========================== Thank you for your reply, Nina. It *sounds* to me like 'accumulation' is rather much a matter of metaphor. In any case, I appreciate your answering me on this. :-) With metta, Howard (Anonymous) #94429 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 4:45 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Scott In a message dated 1/5/2009 6:02:40 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Scott: I accept that the Suttas refer to paramattha dhammas when referring to the khandhas, the bases, the ayatanas, the elements, and so on. This is clarified in great detail in the Abhidhamma and then further in the Commentaries. I accept these sources as being in harmony. I'm sorry if this disappoints you. Sincerely, Scott. ....................................................... TG: I think that's fine that you think such and state it as such. It does mean, however, that you are taking the creations from the commentaries and attributing them to Suttas where such terms do not exist. I do hope that being of that methodology, you will refrain in the future of accusing others here of "creating" terms or phrases. Since you are not only applying created terms to the Suttas, you are also putting those created words into the Buddha's mouth. At least "my creations" that I may use to reveal meanings in the Suttas are known to me as "my creations," and I don't attribute such phrases to the Suttas or Buddha. You, and others here are actually claiming the Buddha taught Paramattha Dhammas and Sabhava. This is actually intellectually dishonest irregardless of whether you think its was his intent or not. However, I find it strange that you think that when the Buddha refers to aggregates, elements, etc. that he is referring to Paramattha Dhammas. It seems to me that when he refers to aggregates, elements, etc. that he is referring to aggregates, elements, etc. I guess I'm just not creative enough. :-/ Here though...in the future I want you to know that when I speak of 'pink elephants' I am actually speaking about 'cars.' That will probably work out more copasetic for your methodology. I want you to be comfortable. :-) TG OUT #94430 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 11:49 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner nilovg Dear Scott (and TG), I am just discovering another point that may be of interest and that can help others to see kusala as kusala, no person involved. Op 1-jan-2009, om 15:46 heeft Scott het volgende geschreven: > Scott: Yes, pu~n~na and pattidaana. If this kusala that is dedicated > to the idea of the being in another realm, and, I would guess, if > kusala arises within that being's stream as conditioned by an > awareness of the pu~n~na so dedicated then this is 'transfer' of > merit. ------- N: I would like to add something. His intention is already transfer of merit, regardless of the effect it may take on someone else. That is why it was said that if a particular person may not be aware of this transfer it will help others to have kusala citta. Thus, in this way kusala becomes more impersonal, no need to think of persons. I repeat: kusala is kusala. Then we do not worry when helping someone else, whether he appreciates it or not. This outlook is different from what we used to think. We always thought of the effect on other persons of our deeds. This brings us also closer to the meaning of paramattha dhamma: we can add: impersonal dhamma. Khandhas, elements, aayatanas, impersonal dhammas, paramattha dhammas. Paramattha dhamma: another way of explaining and applying anatta. May people stumble less over the term paramattha dhammas but really consider the meaning: anatta. I heard Kh Sujin say something I hesitate to repeat, since people may take it the wrong way. There was a discussion about the sutta of the four Wheels, living in a suitable place, 'perfect adjustment of oneself', and this includes right understanding of kamma and vipaaka, and then siila will be stronger. We need not think of persons but of just dhammas: citta, cetasika and rupa. Kh Sujin asked: when you think of a person, do you worry? The answer was: yes. We always have some worry about another person, will he be healthy, what will happen to him if...There will be less worry if one does not think of stories about persons, but realizes that there are just dhammas. Worrying about someone's health, his sickness, but whatever pains he will have, these are results of kamma. We can help, yes, that is kusala citta, not my kusala, a paramattha dhamma. Will my helping have any effect? No worry, there are only dhammas. I am well aware that these words are not welcome to everybody. But I do not worry:-)) Nina. #94431 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 11:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] e-card from Fiji nilovg Dear Sarah, thank you for your e-card, nice to hear from you. Perhaps it is a good opportunity to take some rest. The journey sounds almost as hard as the long, long drives in India. Best wishes to you and Jon, Nina. Op 5-jan-2009, om 6:07 heeft sarah abbott het volgende geschreven: > Suva is not a place anyone would come for the Fijian dream and nor > is our basic (1960s motel-like) accomodation, but it's the best on > offer here. It does have a small pool, fortunately, and we got away > yesterday to relax at the nearest resort with some beach. #94432 From: "Alex" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 12:59 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. truth_aerator Dear Nina and all, >Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Dear Alex, > Op 5-jan-2009, om 2:17 heeft Alex het volgende geschreven: > > > parama + attha = "superior gain" > > > > NO ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS NECESSERY! > ------- > N: Attha has several meanings, and apart from gain or good it means > here: sense or meaning. What is true in the highest sense. In > contrast to conventional truth such as person, tree etc. > What is really there: everchanging mental phenomena and physical > phenomena that can be experienced and that can be understood more and > more. With patience, khanti. > Nina. Yes, over the many centuries after Buddha's death the Pali didn't remain unchanged and new interpretations were added. Question: Can you please provide sutta quotes for paramattha found in 4 main nikayas that justify "ultimate truth vs conventional one"? Thanks and best wishes, #94433 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:17 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "I think that's fine that you think such and state it as such. It does mean, however, that you are taking the creations from the commentaries and attributing them to Suttas where such terms do not exist." Scott: Well, this is the conundrum I face with any contributor to the list who, despite its stated field of study, persists in a repetitive and persistent stand against it. Since the list is dedicated to a study of the Suttas, the Abhidhamma, and the Commentaries, I will, of course, continue to do just that, TG. But what do you expect from interactions here? What could be the point of simply telling those who don't share the doubts you have regarding the validity of the Commentarial position that said position is invalid? I don't mind that you don't agree, but why here? Why so persistently? What is it you wish to gain? I've gained by our interactions, as I've mentioned, by being able to compare and contrast the view you present with my understanding of the Suttas, the Abhidhamma, and the Commentaries. This has served to further my aim of understanding the Dhamma in this way. I don't feel that I need to contend any further with the view you present since it seems clear to me what it is. I don't know whether you hope to find agreement, praise, support, or some other sort of reactions to the contrarian (for this list) views you espouse. You seem to expect to be agreed with, and seem almost outraged when you are opposed. But here, TG, is the description of the list's scope: "A Theravada Buddhist discussion forum for anyone interested in understanding the Buddha's teachings as found in all three baskets of the Tipitaka, the original record of the Buddha's word in the Theravada tradition, and as further elucidated in the ancient commentaries of that tradition." Scott: There is no doubt that you do discuss the above, in your own way, which is fine. This isn't in question. As far as I can tell, your mode of discussion is simply to state repeatedly that the Abhidhamma (for the most part) and the Commentaries (completely) do not reflect what is found in the suttas. And the only material you use to back yourself up with is your own interpretation of the Suttas, which you repeatedly claim to be an accurate and precise take on what the Buddha actually meant - a claim I have repeatedly suggested verges on the grandiose. Why you'd not expect to find disagreement is beyond me. One thing, though, once I've satisfied myself as to the limits and flaws of the view you present, I sure don't wish to argue with you or try to persuade you to another view. This can't happen. Perhaps if you persist with others more patient than I, like the adze handle, this view might wear away and leave you with what you are looking for. Such an event will, of course, depend entirely on dhammas and conditions. ;-) TG: "I do hope that being of that methodology, you will refrain in the future of accusing others here of 'creating' terms or phrases." Scott: I think not, TG. Should I wish, at any moment, I might choose to offer my opinion about any new terms and expressions anyone might wish to coin. I don't see a need for it. The Dhamma is complete as it is. If I see any term or expression as contrary to the 'established' view, I'll say so if I wish. I may not, though, have much more to say to you since I have pretty much satisfied myself that the view you offer is incorrect - vis-a-vis the way I find myself seeing things. Having done so to my satisfaction, I don't really feel the need to have the view re- iterated. TG: "Since you are not only applying created terms to the Suttas, you are also putting those created words into the Buddha's mouth. At least 'my creations' that I may use to reveal meanings in the Suttas are known to me as 'my creations,' and I don't attribute such phrases to the Suttas or Buddha. You, and others here are actually claiming the Buddha taught Paramattha Dhammas and Sabhava. This is actually intellectually dishonest irregardless of whether you think its was his intent or not." Scott: I don't find that the new terms and expression you think 'reveal' any meanings of the Suttas that improve in any way on those extant in the Commentarial literature. I find it, as I've mentioned, rather unusually inflated to consider yourself capable of 'revealing meanings' found in the Dhamma. You are not anyone's teacher. Now, that the Dhamma is the teacher, and that dhammas are the teachers, I have no doubt. That a dhamma has a characteristic and that these differ the one from the other is obvious to anyone whose ever experienced even the tenderest arising of sati in relation to any aspect of experience. Anger differs from attachment which differs from joy and so on. Having interacted with your view rather vigourously, for which I thank you, I find no further need to do so. Last word to you, TG. Sincerely, Scott. #94434 From: "Alex" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:49 pm Subject: Re: The "Reality" of Conditioned Dhammas as Described in the Suttas/Ken truth_aerator Dear Howard, TG, KenH and all, >--- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > and knows about the world: "This is all unreal," > Analogous to a variety of conventional, natural phenomena, the >Buddha teaches "In the same way, a monk sees, observes, & >appropriately examines any X that is past, future, or present; >internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or >near. To him " seeing it, observing it, & appropriately >examining it " it would appear empty, void, without substance: >for >what substance would there be in X?" where X is any rupa or nama. > > Emptiness > >/He who does not find core or substance in any of the realms of >being, (From the Uraga Sutta) IMHO the various passages about "world is without substance" and "the world is unreal" isn't so much an ontological truths as pragmatic anicca-dukkha-anatta truths. What IMHO I believe to be the case is that the Buddha telling us that nothing in the world is stable (eternal), thus nothing can give lasting satisfaction (in fact many things have some serious drawbacks), and thus are not worthy and cannot be called "I, me, mine". ================================================== "When embraced, the rod of violence breeds danger & fear: Look at people quarreling. I will tell of how I experienced dismay. Seeing people floundering like fish in small puddles, competing with one another as I saw this, fear came into me. vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv !!!The world was entirely >without substance.< ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ All the directions were knocked out of line. Wanting a haven for myself, I saw nothing that wasn't laid claim to. Seeing nothing in the end but competition, I felt discontent. And then I saw an arrow here, so very hard to see, embedded in the heart. Overcome by this arrow you run in all directions. But simply on pulling it out you don't run, you don't sink http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/snp/snp.4.15.than.html Note in which context: "the world is without substance" is translated. IMHO. With lots of metta, #94435 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:50 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Understanding White Powder - Section 1 egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/4 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Scott: I'm the bass player. I have an Epiphone Dot (don't want to > spend the money on Gibson 335), but just fool around with that at > home. I've been using a Fender Precision bass lately, but also have a > little Epiphone Hofner 'tribute' semi hollow-body bass which, with > smooth-wrap strings, is quite fun to play. I personally like the > early punk stuff and the whole so-called 'indie' scene, but, since > we're old, the blues often happens. We do our own lame stuff, jam > endlessly to this or that riff, and are doing covers like Interpol's > Roland and Joy Division's She's Lost Control. > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVc29bYIvCM > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XjZbCIA728&feature=related > Cool. Thanks for the above. > Do you play? > I used to be ye typical church organist. Now I am just a dabbler, piano mainly. Cheers Herman #94436 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:52 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Understanding White Powder - Section 1 egberdina Thank you, Alberto, 2009/1/4 sprlrt : > Hi Herman, > > > I suppose many adult people had some experiences with toxic substances > in their youth, I had anyway. I remember that some were pleasant, > other unpleasant. I'm just grateful that taking poison didn't turn > into an addiction, a habit, the most powerful conditoning factor of > all, a.k.a. pakatupanissaya paccaya, dogs eat excrements because of > that, and like it too. > I appreciate your honesty. Cheers Herman #94437 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 2:32 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mahabhuta egberdina Hi Nina and Lukas, 2009/1/4 Nina van Gorkom : > Dear Lukas, >> >> L: Can body consiousness experience all mahabhutas simultaneously? > ------ > N: only one tangible object at a time. Citta can experience only one > object at a time. When hardness is experienced heat cannot be > experienced at the same time. The idea of "one object" needs to be very carefully expressed so as to not mislead. There should be no suggestion that there is ever only one single parramattha dhamma. As connie quoted from Karunadasa: "...... in a given instance of mind or matter, the elementary constituents (= dhammas) that enter into its composition are not actually separable one from another. They exist in a state of inseparable association forming, so to say, a homogeneous unity. This idea is in consonance with an earlier tradition recorded in the early Buddhist discourses. For example, in the Mahavedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya it is said that the three mental factors -- sensation (vedana), perception (sanna), and consciousness (vinnana) -- are blended (satsattha) so harmoniously that it is impossible to separate them from one another and thus establish their identity.83 The same idea finds expression in the Milindapanha.84 When Nagasena Thera is asked by King Milinda whether it is possible, in the case of mental factors which exist in harmonious combination (ekato bhavagata), to separate them out and establish a plurality as: "This is contact, and this sensation, and this mentation, and this perception," and so on, the elder answers with a simile: Cheers Herman #94438 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 2:44 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Vipassanaa, Survey, Ch 34, no 2. egberdina Hi Nina, 2009/1/4 Nina van Gorkom : > Hi Herman, > Op 4-jan-2009, om 0:07 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > >> Having an interest in anything is >> lobha. Without lobha, things are uninteresting. > ------- > N: Understand the citta at that moment. We may be misled by the word > interest, this can also be piiti, or rapture. This can be akusala but > also kusala. One may with kusala citta have a genuine interest in the > Dhamma, seeing its value. > Nina. > Just to clarify, the Dhamma is not an object, it is an act. If we agree on that, then seeing the value of the Dhamma is identical with: Seeing with right discernment that 'this has come into being,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of what has come into being. One sees with right discernment that 'it has come into being from this nutriment.' Seeing with right discernment that 'it has come into being from this nutriment,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of the nutriment by which it has come into being. One sees with right discernment that 'from the cessation of this nutriment, what has come into being is subject to cessation.' Seeing with right discernment that 'from the cessation of this nutriment, what has come into being is subject to cessation,' one practices for disenchantment with, for dispassion toward, for the cessation of what is subject to cessation. (SN12:31) Cheers Herman #94439 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 3:06 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Understanding White Powder - Section 1 scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "I used to be ye typical church organist. Now I am just a dabbler, piano mainly." Scott: You've got to get a Hammond, man! Sincerely, Scott. #94440 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 3:47 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner scottduncan2 Dear Nina, Regarding: N: I would like to add something. His intention is already transfer of merit, regardless of the effect it may take on someone else...I repeat: kusala is kusala. Then we do not worry when helping someone else, whether he appreciates it or not...I heard Kh Sujin say something I hesitate to repeat, since people may take it the wrong way...Kh Sujin asked: when you think of a person, do you worry? The answer was: yes. We always have some worry about another person, will he be healthy, what will happen to him if...There will be less worry if one does not think of stories about persons, but realizes that there are just dhammas. Worrying about someone's health, his sickness, but whatever pains he will have, these are results of kamma. We can help, yes, that is kusala citta, not my kusala, a paramattha dhamma. Will my helping have any effect? No worry, there are only dhammas. I am well aware that these words are not welcome to everybody. But I do not worry:-))" Scott: Thank you very much, Nina. I agree with you. Impersonal is impersonal through-and-through. No need to dilute the Dhamma. Some speak against such statements out of the terror of realising anatta. Some speak against such statements out of the need to see one's self as a helper or a kind person. You say 'kusala is kusala' and there is no 'person.' You say 'kusala is kusala regardless of whether an other sees it or not.' You say 'these are not welcome words to everybody.' I say there never was, nor ever will there be, a person outside of one's thoughts about persons. I say you're not the first person to speak these words. This is the Dhamma. Sincerly, Scott. #94441 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 4:47 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] First Noble Truth- We are All in Prison buddhatrue Hi Connie, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "connie" wrote: > > Dear James, > did you donate The Visuddhimagga as well? James: No, I got the Visuddhimagga in Taiwan so I still have that. > I don't remember whether anyone mentioned ch.14's similes, but here they are: > {83}. 'The matter of the body is like the prison because it is the site of the punishment. Perception is like the offence because owing to perception of beauty, etc., it is a cause of the punishment, which is feeling. The formations aggregate is like the punisher because it is a cause of feeling. Consciousness is like the offender because it is afflicted by feeling. James: Thank you for this! I appreciate it very much. Metta, James #94442 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 5:56 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Understanding White Powder - Section 1 egberdina Hi RobM 2009/1/2 robmoult : > Hi Herman, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" > wrote: >> I look forward to the raising of any arguments that the ayatanas are >> not central to experience in Theravada. >> > ===== > > Ayatanas yes, brain no! :-) > > But we are jumping ahead of ourselves! > Is it likely that you will be posting something on this soon? I'm happy to be "put on hold", just not indefinitely :-) Cheers Herman #94443 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 6:03 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation egberdina Hi Jon, 2009/1/5 jonoabb : > Hi Herman (and KenH) > > > I think the voice of the other is a critical factor. In the time of > the Buddha, for example, the voice of the Buddha and his chief > disciples would be a suitable condition (formost) for the development > of the path. > > But this could only happen by circumstances (i.e., not by selection). > Do you therefore believe that the value of appropriate attention can be negated by certain (inappropriate) voices? Cheers Herman #94444 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 6:56 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > Scott: I accept that the Suttas refer to paramattha dhammas when > referring to the khandhas, the bases, the ayatanas, the elements, and > so on. > ------------------------------------------ > Howard: > That is certainly your prerogative, Scott. We all have opinions. But it > was Rob's question as to whether dhammas are characterized in the suttas as > ultimate realities, not necessarily in those precise words (I presume), but in > asserted meaning, however it might be expressed. My reading of the suttas > persuades me of quite the opposite. Can you show why my take on that is wrong? > :-) Hi Howard, and Scott. I am not well read enough to give an opinion at this time, as far as the suttas go, but I appreciate both of your views. In my own colloquial way, I would say that the experience of the moment is absolute, in that it is exactly what it is, but this does not need to imply that it is frozen in any way, as opposed to flowing. In a Universe that is always changing, and in which all structures break down to smaller structures to the extent that no one can ever find the final level, whether in physics, or in perception itself, why would we think that a momentary percept represents a definite and defineable "something." It seems to me that if we do turn it into a "something" that is absolute, in the sense that it is defineable down to its toenails, we have turned it into an entity, and given it the status of a Platonic form. An individual percept may itself be frozen, but if so this is only because our limited senses are only capable of taking a "snapshot," rather than continuing to perceive the flowing nature of reality as it continues to break down and reform at every micro-moment. That is my intuitive view in any case, to be proven or disproven with greater knowledge in the future. Still I appreciate the fine precision with which many in this group attempt to discern the nature of reality. It is a worthwhile occupation in order to clarify the nature of what we are dealing with on the path, even if it does not take the place of sati itself and the refinement of direct knowledge. Best, Robert ================================== #94445 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 6:57 pm Subject: Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "buddhatrue" wrote: > > Hi Robert, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Robert Epstein" > wrote: > > > > > Sorry I'm so late, but thought I would drop back in to stop badgering > > you. Sorry about that! :-) > > Sorry I'm late also. I have been very busy. Thanks for the apology > and don't worry about it. You can badger me anytime you feel it is > necessary. :-) > > > > > Robert > > Metta, > James > Thanks James, I appreciate it. :-) Best, Robert ======================== #94446 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:07 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: Ken wrote: --------------------------- > > If namas and rupas were not ultimate realities with their own > characteristics the suttas would not have mentioned them. They would > have been mere concepts, and we have more than enough concepts > already. > ------------------------------------------------- Ken, Just to clarify, is it your position that namas and rupas exist as absolute realities independent of the act of perception, or is it the case that namas and rupas are considered to exist as "objects" within the sense organs [or cognition in the case of concepts] and that are subjectively created by the mind? Thanks, Robert ================= #94447 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:12 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] accumulations, was: cornerstone epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" wrote: > > Hi Robert, > > What I wanted to say that the Pure Lands or some eternal heaven is > much less likely. Cessation and non-occurance of aggregates is much > more likely and much more see-able. Even reflecting in retrospect on > mundane experiences of total anasthesia, unconscious time gaps and so > on gives a very close (not 100% like but close) experience of how > peaceful the 'state' is. Thanks for the clarification, Alex. That makes very good sense. I am disappointed however that you have not yet experienced nibbana. I wanted a report! :-) Best, Robert ============================= #94448 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:16 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, TGrand458@... wrote: > The Suttas require a good deal of sensibility to unravel the more > complicated messages within. Some here have chosen to be led by certain commentarial > viewpoints and appear to acquiesce authority over to the commentaries. Others > here let the Suttas lead and see the commentaries as more problematic. > Either way, its just the result of conditions interacting. That last sentence is a worthy view for everyone. It levels everything out, doesn't it? > BTW, I'm a little jaded in here so please do not let that influence you. No problem, TG. Although I am eager for certain kinds of information, I have "been around" as Scott indicated. I am just not a good enough student to have a thorough knowledge base. So I am glad that people of various orientations put up with my questions. I'm not jaded yet, just fallen down a lot. :-) Best, Robert =============================== #94449 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:20 pm Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > > The suttas talk about nothing else! Only the terminology varies from > sutta to sutta: sometimes it's "khandhas" sometimes "elements" > sometimes "nama and rupa: and at other times it's other names > (see "Useful Posts" for details). > > TG thinks the suttas are talking about things that don't really exist > (are not absolute realities (paramattha dhammas)). What do you think? > > Ken H Hi Ken H - Do things really exist, and do they exist as we perceive them? I believe that we perceive a physical universe, but that we do not perceive it as it is. Furthermore, I don't think we know the ultimate status of its substantiality. From all I've read of Buddhism it is suggested that the physical world is insubstantial, though it appears and we have interactions with it. To think that namas and rupas are floating around in some absolute realm would seem to deny the centrality that Buddhism places on the mind. It is not important what is "out there," only our own state of mind and perception. So I don't think that the reality of object is very important to Buddhism at all. In fact, Buddhism turns away from involvement with external objects of desire and revulsion, and turns inward towards the nature of the mind itself, until that mystery is resolved in nibbana. Robert = = = = = = = = = = = = = #94450 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:32 pm Subject: Further Consideration Re: [dsg] Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Co... epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: I am saying that without distinguishing between > this and not this, and between what is self and other in terms of > instrumentality (functioning in the world), learning is not possible, > and skillful action is not possible. Walking around a tree, rather > than straight through it, is not an atta view, but an understanding of > conditionality. There is nothing conceptual about understanding > conditionality, nor is it predicated on self-view. > > What is achieved in practice by saying that identity, as the > distinguishing between this and not this, is a concept? Does the act > of distinguishing thereby cease? No, the differences that are in the > world are real, and not dependent on mind. > > Cheers > > > Herman > Hi Herman! I agree with that in terms of instrumentality and learning it is necessary to distinguish between things, as well as between one's body and the tree so we don't walk into it. No problem there. Why is it useful then to bracket out the concept of self? To me, it is for a different enterprise, not for walking or learning, but for the investigation into identity, which I think is important in spiritual study. So I can answer to my name, make distinctions, etc., but when contemplating the reality of what "I" am, I think it aids higher understanding to realize that this behavior and identity are based on conventions. When one thinks the "I" is real in addition to the organism and other things, one tends to worry about oneself and protect one's interests in a way that is beyond simple instrumentality. There is a kingdom built up around the "I" and one tends to defend it. To me, that is the usefulness in deconstructing this concept. Best, Robert ============================ #94451 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:36 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "jonoabb" wrote: > The more developed the understanding of the individual, the less idea > of a "self" in relation to this or that person. > > Jon > Hi Jon! So would you say that ultimately one is sending metta to the kandhas without any view of an aggregated being? Best, Robert ------------------- #94452 From: "Scott" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 7:55 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear Rob E., Regarding: R: "In my own colloquial way, I would say that the experience of the moment is absolute, in that it is exactly what it is, but this does not need to imply that it is frozen in any way, as opposed to flowing." Scott: By 'experience', to what do you refer? Experience of what? Here is the problem, as I see it: The insubstantialist view seems to believe in something that is 'flowing' - that is, always present and always changing from one thing into another, but never absent. I see the Abhidhamma view to be of momentary dhammas, arising and then falling away, each a condition for the next, and each with a definite and non-dual characteristic and function. R: "In a Universe that is always changing, and in which all structures break down to smaller structures to the extent that no one can ever find the final level, whether in physics, or in perception itself, why would we think that a momentary percept represents a definite and defineable 'something.'" Scott: This is not Dhamma in my opinion. One, you are describing an infinite regress, which makes no sense. When the Buddha described the 'all' he was setting the level. Beyond form (ruupa) and the khandhas (naama - and leaving aside Nibbaana for now) there is nothing else. These elements are not further reducible. They are, deeply and essentially, that which they are, and really so. This is, as I understand it, a main meaning of the term paramattha dhamma. Two, you speak of 'perception' and 'percept'. How do you define these terms? Do you, like the insubstantialists, consider all - percept/perception - to blend into one flowing miasma? The Abhidhamma would suggest that there are, again, actual dhammas, with characteristic and function, impersonally, non-dually serving as perceiver/perceived. R: "It seems to me that if we do turn it into a 'something' that is absolute, in the sense that it is defineable down to its toenails, we have turned it into an entity, and given it the status of a Platonic form." Scott: We don't 'turn' anything into anything. A paramattha dhamma differs totally from the notion of a Platonic form. Paramattha dhammas are not concepts, mental constructs, ideas, or even archetypes. They are realities which exist. They are not further reducible nor do they reflect some higher order reality of which they are some copy. They are not amenable to control. Apart from Nibbaana, the conditioned realities are actually arising and falling away, functioning while present, and, if naama, serve as the actual experience we all mistake for self. R: "An individual percept may itself be frozen, but if so this is only because our limited senses are only capable of taking a 'snapshot,' rather than continuing to perceive the flowing nature of reality as it continues to break down and reform at every micro-moment." Scott: I'm not sure what is being said above. What 'breaks down?' What 'reforms?' What 'perceives?' What is 'perceived?' When you refer to 'our limited senses,' do you refer to perception rooted in ignorance (a mental factor with characteristic and function)? What is 'the flowing nature of reality?' Sincerely, Scott. #94453 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 2:59 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Robert In a message dated 1/5/2009 8:21:03 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, epsteinrob@... writes: Hi Ken H - Do things really exist, and do they exist as we perceive them? I believe that we perceive a physical universe, but that we do not perceive it as it is. Furthermore, I don't think we know the ultimate status of its substantiality. From all I've read of Buddhism it is suggested that the physical world is insubstantial, ............................................... TG: Not just the "physical world," the "mental world" as well. .................................................... though it appears and we have interactions with it. To think that namas and rupas are floating around in some absolute realm would seem to deny the centrality that Buddhism places on the mind. It is not important what is "out there," only our own state of mind and perception. So I don't think that the reality of object is very important to Buddhism at all. .............................................. TG: The "reality" is important in the sense of perceiving it correctly. I'll abide by the Suttas where such descriptions appear -- conditioned, dependent, insubstantial, coreless, empty, hollow, void, like a mirage, etc. .................................................. In fact, Buddhism turns away from involvement with external objects of desire and revulsion, and turns inward towards the nature of the mind itself, until that mystery is resolved in nibbana. ....................................................... TG: Buddhism "turns away" from the mind as well. ..................................................... Robert ....................................................... TG: This is one of the few (or maybe the only) posts you've written that I have had minor exceptions about. I think the "conditional nature" of both internal and external are well looked into by the Suttas and that a comprehensive vision of the entire process is the intention the Buddha and in fact, needed to develop insight. Without both, I think conditionality would be much harder to understand. Since ultimately it is the systematic activities of the mind that generate affliction, I would agree that investigating the mind has primacy in that regard. The post I read before this was another by you and it was quite beautifully done. Here it is... In my own colloquial way, I would say that the experience of the moment is absolute, in that it is exactly what it is, but this does not need to imply that it is frozen in any way, as opposed to flowing. In a Universe that is always changing, and in which all structures break down to smaller structures to the extent that no one can ever find the final level, whether in physics, or in perception itself, why would we think that a momentary percept represents a definite and defineable "something." It seems to me that if we do turn it into a "something" that is absolute, in the sense that it is defineable down to its toenails, we have turned it into an entity, and given it the status of a Platonic form. An individual percept may itself be frozen, but if so this is only because our limited senses are only capable of taking a "snapshot," rather than continuing to perceive the flowing nature of reality as it continues to break down and reform at every micro-moment. That is my intuitive view in any case, to be proven or disproven with greater knowledge in the future. Still I appreciate the fine precision with which many in this group attempt to discern the nature of reality. It is a worthwhile occupation in order to clarify the nature of what we are dealing with on the path, even if it does not take the place of sati itself and the refinement of direct knowledge. Best, Robert #94454 From: "gazita2002" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 8:29 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Sangiiti Sutta Threes (37-39) and Commentary, part 2. gazita2002 Hello Nina, After thinking about what I had written adn what I was feeling, I realised that paying respect can be as you have now written. I guess I was 'falling over words'. ONe can be respectful to others anytime and anyplace. And I found that one can be happy for someone when that being is seen being respectful to another. I liked yr story about Lodewijk's family - mayb 'noble' was another word I 'fell over' My doubt and dosa seem to come from listening to people constantly talking about 'this present moment is just conditioned, no person no thing' and its seems to become almost a frivolous comment. However, since then, I have realised that whatever arises is real and can be known, whatever name its given. Its doesnt last, altho it does seem to last a lot longer than just a moment. No need to fuss about what the others say, do - altho I do very much so - thanks for your encouragement, Nina, you seem to be very patient. May all beings be happy, azita --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > -------- > N: Politeness coming from the heart. In gesture or speech. It is just > daily life. Courteousness. Can also appear in your writing Emails. > Many opportunities. Or in the street: seeing a handicapped person and > making room for him or opening a door. > -------- #94455 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 3:46 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Scott and Robert In a message dated 1/5/2009 8:55:31 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear Rob E., Regarding: R: "In my own colloquial way, I would say that the experience of the moment is absolute, in that it is exactly what it is, but this does not need to imply that it is frozen in any way, as opposed to flowing." Scott: By 'experience'Scott: By 'experience', to what do you refe Here is the problem, as I see it: The insubstantialist view seems to believe in something that is 'flowing' - that is, always present and always changing from one thing into another, but never absent. .................................................. TG: No "thing" is ever present as its own "isolated identifiable" because nothing rises to the level of being "its own." Isolating objects (or namas and rupas) as "their own things" is actually the delusion we need to overcome. That's why the Buddha described the aggregates as -- hollow, empty, void, not-self, coreless, like a mirage, etc. Though this vision is obviously hard for some to grasp who seem to either misinterpret it as a state of "nothing" or "permanence." How could phenomena, that lack any kind of self, and is continually altering, be defined as permanent? It could only be correctly defined as the Buddha has done as exampled by the above terms. And he did not define elements and aggregates as ultimate realities. ........................................................ I see the Abhidhamma view to be of momentary dhammas, arising and then falling away, each a condition for the next, and each with a definite and non-dual characteristic and function. R: "In a Universe that is always changing, and in which all structures break down to smaller structures to the extent that no one can ever find the final level, whether in physics, or in perception itself, why would we think that a momentary percept represents a definite and defineable 'something.'d Scott: This is not Dhamma in my opinion. One, you are describing an infinite regress, which makes no sense. When the Buddha described the 'all' he was setting the level. Beyond form (ruupa) and the khandhas (naama - and leaving aside Nibbaana for now) there is nothing else. These elements are not further reducible. They are, deeply and essentially, that which they are, and really so. ............................................ TG: Here is the crux of the matter. A highly substantialist view of elements and aggregates...based on selective commentary analysis. Yet the Suttas indicate the nature of aggregates as -- hollow, empty, void, not-self, coreless, insubstantial, like a mirage, and so on. So, there is a major disconnect. What follows below in trying to discern terms like percept or perception is really irrelevant because the above disconnect will always render our views in opposition. What is interesting is, I'm certain Ken H both disagrees with my position and totally misunderstands it. It seems possible you misunderstand it as well. So possibly what you are arguing with, when you're arguing against my position, isn't my position at all, but just your misinterpretation of it. It seems that way anyway. TG OUT #94456 From: "connie" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 8:54 pm Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. nichiconn hi guys, just jumping in with another Commentarial quote. Scott: By 'experience', to what do you refer? Experience of what? Here is the problem, as I see it: The insubstantialist view seems to believe in something that is 'flowing' - that is, always present and always changing from one thing into another, but never absent. I see the Abhidhamma view to be of momentary dhammas, arising and then falling away, each a condition for the next, and each with a definite and non-dual characteristic and function. << Asl 336: When a lump of raw sugar is made by cooking sugar-cane juice, is the element of cohesion rigid or not? Not rigid. For it has the characteristic of flowing, it is the element of extension which has that of hardness. And the deficient cohesion becomes an excessive extension. Indeed, it abandons its status of fluidity, but not its characteristic [of flowing]. Though the lump of raw sugar is reduced or pounded, the element of extension is not pounded. Indeed the element has the characteristic of being hard; that of cohesion has the characteristic of flowing. And the deficient extension becomes excessive cohesion. It abandons its status of being in the form of a lump, but not its very own characteristic. For there is alteration in state (by way of deficiency and excess) of the four Great Essentials; but there is no such thing as alteration of characteristics. The absence of such alteration of the characteristics is shown in the A.t.thaanaparikappa Sutta: 'Verily, Aananda, of the elements of extension ... of cohesion, these four great essentials might alter their characteristic sooner that it were possible for the Ariyan disciple endowed with assured faith in the Buddha to alter.' >> peace, connie #94457 From: "keithhenriques" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 8:28 pm Subject: New To the Group keithhenriques Hello All: I am new to this groups and I am interesed in learning how to post Posts I have treid to sent this evening fhave not been working. Hope this works Keith #94458 From: "colette" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:34 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation ksheri3 "Tennis, anyone?" Hi Robert and Alan, It seems the "ball is in my court". No worries, my famed "overhead smash" will not be used here. Two totally basic issues can be addressed here. On the one hand Alan "objectifies" the or a meditation, then tortures himself because he missed the simplest aspect, by trying to reduce the meditation to the obvious minute constituent parts/aspects. Sorry, but I have no choice but to apply kabbalah here AND I WILL CERTAINLY MAKE IT A POINT TO TRY AND KEEP ANY REFERENCE TO A CREATOR DEITY OUT OF THE REPLY. The kabbalah is a representational form of cognition. In it EVERYTHING EXISTS. The kabbalah is also named "The Tree" since there are natural aspects that resemble the growth of a tree, et al. The Tree was destroyed when the aspect of "light" was placed "INTO IT". Note that, I am specifying that the light was/is an INTERNAL aspect given to the tree from an EXTERNAL SOURCE. The tree could not handle the voltage or ohms and shattered. The main parts of the tree were/are the Sephira or Vessels that could not "resist" the electrical force of the light. The shards of the vessels that shattered fell to earth and became what we call "manifestation", RUPA, things, including PEOPLE, SENTIENT BEINGS. While in kabbalistic tradition it is dictated that each and every person is a part of the tree and therefore attempts to return to the tree IT IS ALSO MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT EVERYTHING IS PART OF THE TREE AND HAS AN EQUALLY MAGNETIC ATTRACTION TO RETURN TO IT'S PLACE IN THE TREE. With that said lets go to Alan's view of a meditation. "Sending metta" -- when a person issues metta is radiates outward, EXTERNALLY, and is therefore much like SOLAR RADIATION. When the sun "radiates" in that way, how is it possible for the sun to discriminate it's radiation from a comet or asteroid or orbiting satellite or any other outer space "thing". It's like Heroshima, did the radiation discriminate it's effects between the people that had nothing to do with the army and the soldiers that the US was intending that bomb be a "causation" for? Alan is goofing around with minutia concerning the issuance of "metta" to a single person which is a "high perf." thing to do or be done in a theravadan context. "Visual cognition arises dependent on the eye and visual forms, the coming together of the three is sense-impression; dependent on sense- impression a pleasant, unpleasant oir neurtral feeling arises. Being stimulated by a pleasant feeling, he will be please, welcome it and remain attached to it; his latent disposition to desire (raganusaya) lies latent (anuseti). " The same is true for the other sensations: there is a latent dikspostion to aversion (patigha) within an unpleasant sensation and to ignorance (avijja) in a neutral sensation." William S. Waldron Waldron has "objectified" "sensations" and that is the same thing that Alan is doing with "meditation" of one sort or another. Once the act of meditation has been "objectified" it no longer remains noumena or nama IT HAS TAKEN ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RUPA OR THINGS which cause suffering. 2) Ron takes the original hallucination or sloth like attitude from Alan and goes off into the cosmos with his rockets on "full burner". He's shootin' his wad in a single shot. Not good when practicing Tantra and never good when practicing the Kundalini and Karma Sutra. Ron, are you friends with Alice Cooper? He sang, once, of being 18 and suggesting that he went "running in outer space". "'Cause he's eight teen" What would that be, a "lemniscant" which represents "infinity" and is found above the magicians head in the Arthur Edward Waite deck of tarot cards? To both Robert and Alan, "projecting" is a very dangerous thing to do in the practice of meditation. Bad things happen from neophytes that try to play with the big boys since, as Cat STevens clearly said: "baby baby it's a wild world" Part of that world which has aspects of wildness to it is that in "altered states" of consciousness such as in meditation, tantra, yoga, etc, you will certainly find, and I can guarantee you this, that when "astrally projecting" the same rules DO NOT APPLY THAT APPLY ON THIS PLANET IN THIS LIFE. Which is why I always keep a "failsafe" that allows me to break the meditation "just in case", since it has happened to me and it scared the shit out of me the few times it happened. This is a reason, as well, that advanced students do not recommend that neophytes or beginers attempt the rigors, hazards, and dangers, found through the practice of PRANAYAMA. "Just remember there's a lot of bad AND BEWARE" Cat Stevens and just so that the end is not connected to the begining in a wrong way why don't we place the quote "tennis anyone?" in the context of Monty Python's skit on Sam Pekenpau. toodles, colette --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Robert Epstein" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alan McAllister" > wrote: > > > > Ken: > > > > Your compassionate reply is appreciated. > > > > I would assume that loving-kindness meditation, at least as it is > > commonly practiced, works with concepts. For instance, if I send > > metta to my brother, I have to have some concept of my brother, and I > > rely on all the conventional associations to conjur up my sense of > > him. For the same reason, I don't see any problem with sending metta > > to myself, since "myself" is a concept. If, on the other hand, if we > > can do metta without any concepts, then it would not make sense to > > send metta to myself or anyone else for that matter. > > > > But, then again, I could be entirely wrong here. > > > > metta, > > Alan > > In a way that's always the problem, that the Path is addressed to > living beings while at the same time such living beings are admonished > that they do not really exist as such but are only piles of events and > associations. <.....> #94459 From: "colette" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 1:45 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. ksheri3 TG, How obsurd. Any student that aspires to gradiate the 6th grade knows very well that Pink Elephants have training wheels and therefore, or subsequently, cannot possibly be cars or automobiles. Do you drink castor oil in large quantities? Maybe it's nothing more than becoming used to drinking Hemlock, I know it took me a while to acquire the ability to drink hemlock on command. Or is that "stage direction"? Thanx for bringing a smile to my face today and speaking of things I know about i.e. the training wheels that are Standard form for all Pink Elephants. toodles, colette --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, TGrand458@... wrote: > > Hi Scott > > > In a message dated 1/5/2009 6:02:40 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, > scduncan@... writes: > > Scott: I accept that the Suttas refer to paramattha dhammas when > referring to the khandhas, the bases, the ayatanas, the elements, and > so on. This is clarified in great detail in the Abhidhamma and then > further in the Commentaries. I accept these sources as being in > harmony. I'm sorry if this disappoints you. > > Sincerely, > > Scott. > > ....................................................... > > > TG: I think that's fine that you think such and state it as such. It does > mean, however, that you are taking the creations from the commentaries and > attributing them to Suttas where such terms do not exist. <....> #94460 From: sarah abbott Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 9:42 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] New To the Group sarahprocter... Hi Keith, --- On Tue, 6/1/09, keithhenriques wrote: >Hello All: I am new to this groups and I am interesed in learning how to post Posts I have treid to sent this evening fhave not been working. Hope this works Keith .... S: This worked fine. I don't know why the others didn't work - maybe you hadn't subscribed to the list then? [Also, pls any newcomers (and some oldcomers) be patient as we need to 'clear' your messages initially.] Anyway, welcome to DSG. Perhaps now that you've cracked 'the code', you might like to introduce a little about yourself and background to your interest in the Dhamma. Where do you live, Keith? Metta, Sarah ========= #94461 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 4:47 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Connie In a message dated 1/5/2009 10:13:26 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, ksheri3@... writes: TG, How obsurd. Any student that aspires to gradiate the 6th grade knows very well that Pink Elephants have training wheels and therefore, or subsequently, cannot possibly be cars or automobiles. Do you drink castor oil in large quantities? Maybe it's nothing more than becoming used to drinking Hemlock, I know it took me a while to acquire the ability to drink hemlock on command. Or is that "stage direction"? ................................. TG: I'm sorry. I'll try to do better. ;-) TG OUT Thanx for bringing a smile to my face today and speaking of things I know about i.e. the training wheels that are Standard form for all Pink Elephants. toodles, colette #94462 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 4:59 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Connie, All Interesting quote. It seems to use the term "characteristic" to refer to "principles." Denies that "characteristics" can change, then shortly after references a Sutta where the Buddha talks about changing characteristics. Also talks about "flowing" being a characteristic. Really all over the map. If you have a belief...its in there somewhere. ;-) TG OUT In a message dated 1/5/2009 9:54:43 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, nichicon@... writes: << Asl 336: When a lump of raw sugar is made by cooking sugar-cane juice, is the element of cohesion rigid or not? Not rigid. For it has the characteristic of flowing, it is the element of extension which has that of hardness. And the deficient cohesion becomes an excessive extension. Indeed, it abandons its status of fluidity, but not its characteristic [of flowing]. Though the lump of raw sugar is reduced or pounded, the element of extension is not pounded. Indeed the element has the characteristic of being hard; that of cohesion has the characteristic of flowing. And the deficient extension becomes excessive cohesion. It abandons its status of being in the form of a lump, but not its very own characteristic. For there is alteration in state (by way of deficiency and excess) of the four Great Essentials; but there is no such thing as alteration of characteristics. The absence of such alteration of the characteristics is shown in the A.t.thaanaparikappa Sutta: 'Verily, Aananda, of the elements of extension ... of cohesion, these four great essentials might alter their characteristic sooner that it were possible for the Ariyan disciple endowed with assured faith in the Buddha to alter.' >> #94463 From: TGrand458@... Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 5:45 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Scott, All In a message dated 1/5/2009 2:17:40 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Regarding: TG: "I think that's fine that you think such and state it as such. It does mean, however, that you are taking the creations from the commentaries and attributing them to Suttas where such terms do not exist." Scott: Well, this is the conundrum I face with any contributor to the list who, despite its stated field of study, persists in a repetitive and persistent stand against it. Since the list is dedicated to a study of the Suttas, the Abhidhamma, and the Commentaries, I will, of course, continue to do just that, TG. ................................................ TG: I've studied all of the above. I analyze all of the above. I have found many useful things in the Abhidhamma and commentaries as I have often noted. Others I find in conflict with what is indicated in the Suttas. Is this not the purpose of this group, to interact with our understandings of such? Or is the group to blindly follow some dogmatic brochure of what we are to think? I think the latter would be too boring to last long. ................................................... But what do you expect from interactions here? What could be the point of simply telling those who don't share the doubts you have regarding the validity of the Commentarial position that said position is invalid? I don't mind that you don't agree, but why here? Why so persistently? What is it you wish to gain? ..................................................... TG: There are smart people here and wise Buddhists and this interaction brings out many useful things to contemplate on. This is reason enough. .......................................................... I've gained by our interactions, as I've mentioned, by being able to compare and contrast the view you present with my understanding of the Suttas, the Abhidhamma, and the Commentaries. This has served to further my aim of understanding the Dhamma in this way. I don't feel that I need to contend any further with the view you present since it seems clear to me what it is. ................................................... TG: Conditions will do whatever they do in accordance with conditional interactions. (I know, what is a condition.) ;-) ................................................................ I don't know whether you hope to find agreement, praise, support, or some other sort of reactions to the contrarian (for this list) views you espouse. You seem to expect to be agreed with, and seem almost outraged when you are opposed. But here, TG, is the description of the list's scope: ............................................................ TG: Quite the contrary. I am pleasantly surprised when I read things that are in accordance with my outlook. ................................................................ "A Theravada Buddhist discussion forum for anyone interested in understanding the Buddha's teachings as found in all three baskets of the Tipitaka, the original record of the Buddha's word in the Theravada tradition, and as further elucidated in the ancient commentaries of that tradition." ............................................. TG: Well, with what I have said above, and being a former Theravadin monk, and 28 years of pursuing the Buddha's teaching, I will pretentiously assume that I am qualified to discuss the above criteria even if poorly. I note that the above does not require unanimous agreement as to the meaning within such texts. .................................................... Scott: There is no doubt that you do discuss the above, in your own way, which is fine. This isn't in question. As far as I can tell, your mode of discussion is simply to state repeatedly that the Abhidhamma (for the most part) and the Commentaries (completely) do not reflect what is found in the suttas. And the only material you use to back yourself up with is your own interpretation of the Suttas, which you repeatedly claim to be an accurate and precise take on what the Buddha actually meant - a claim I have repeatedly suggested verges on the grandiose. Why you'd not expect to find disagreement is beyond me. ......................................................... TG: I quote Suttas to back up points...and I phrase things "creatively," as you would say, to try to indicate what I mean too. But I only use the Suttas as authority. You are incorrect in your statement above. I have often praised various aspects of Abhidhamma and commentaries. Unfortunately, what you consider the heart of commentary, Abhidhamma, and therefore Buddhism, is what I consider to be a "standard delusional outlook applied to a -- dhammas theory." So the disagreement is profound because it rests on the most important of matters. The "heart" of the practice. .............................................................. One thing, though, once I've satisfied myself as to the limits and flaws of the view you present, I sure don't wish to argue with you or try to persuade you to another view. This can't happen. Perhaps if you persist with others more patient than I, like the adze handle, this view might wear away and leave you with what you are looking for. Such an event will, of course, depend entirely on dhammas and conditions. ;-) ................................................ TG: At least conditions. ;-) .............................................. TG: "I do hope that being of that methodology, you will refrain in the future of accusing others here of 'creating' terms or phrases." Scott: I think not, TG. Should I wish, at any moment, I might choose to offer my opinion about any new terms and expressions anyone might wish to coin. I don't see a need for it. The Dhamma is complete as it is. ................................................. TG: The Suttas are complete. The commentaries are additions. You are of course free to say anything you want. My remark above is to indicate the double standard you often engage by. It had no intention of thwarting your tactics, just bringing them out in the light for all to see. :-) ............................................................... If I see any term or expression as contrary to the 'established' view, I'll say so if I wish. I may not, though, have much more to say to you since I have pretty much satisfied myself that the view you offer is incorrect - vis-a-vis the way I find myself seeing things. Having done so to my satisfaction, I don't really feel the need to have the view re- iterated. TG: "Since you are not only applying created terms to the Suttas, you are also putting those created words into the Buddha's mouth. At least 'my creations' that I may use to reveal meanings in the Suttas are known to me as 'my creations,' and I don't attribute such phrases to the Suttas or Buddha. You, and others here are actually claiming the Buddha taught Paramattha Dhammas and Sabhava. This is actually intellectually dishonest irregardless of whether you think its was his intent or not." Scott: I don't find that the new terms and expression you think 'reveal' any meanings of the Suttas that improve in any way on those extant in the Commentarial literature. I find it, as I've mentioned, rather unusually inflated to consider yourself capable of 'revealing meanings' found in the Dhamma. You are not anyone's teacher. ......................................................... TG: Its all a matter of interacting conditions. Everything experienced in a "teacher." ........................................................ Now, that the Dhamma is the teacher, and that dhammas are the teachers, I have no doubt. That a dhamma has a characteristic and that these differ the one from the other is obvious to anyone whose ever experienced even the tenderest arising of sati in relation to any aspect of experience. ................................................... TG: Any child can distinguish different experiences. Easy to claim -- that experience is "its own" thing. You've just thrown "dhammas" into the mix and have deferred and directed the self-view outlook to a particle type theory. Conditionality is profound because it renders "things" as other than what they appear to be. The more you see "dhammas" as their own thing, the further away from the Buddha's teaching you will get. And you will develop a substantialist theory that you will not be able to detach from. ................................................................. Anger differs from attachment which differs from joy and so on. Having interacted with your view rather vigourously, for which I thank you, I find no further need to do so. Last word to you, TG. ........................................................ TG: And good luck to you. TG OUT #94464 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 12:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: When and how did the view of Anatta translate, to self , in english ? egberdina Hi Charles, 2009/1/5 charles.dacosta@... : > Hi Sarah, > > > One point I forgot to add to this mess of ideas: Even in the West, > the soul is considered the essence of a being; but only in the West, > I think, the self is only a differentiator (from one thing/being to > another). > I think you are spot on. > Now, I believe that, in early India soul and self may been mixed. But > nnot in the West. > Good to see you're still around. The following is part of the entry on atta(n) in the PTS Pali-English Dictionary. "Meanings. 1. The soul as postulated in the animistic theories held in N India in the 6th and 7th cent. B. C. It is described in the Upanishads as a small creature, in shape like a man, dwelling in ordinary times in the heart. It escapes from the body in sleep or trance; when it returns to the body life and motion reappear. It escapes from the body at death, then continues to carry on an everlasting life of its own. " Cheers Herman #94465 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] nama and rupa, and Vipassana, Survey Ch 34, no 3. egberdina Hi Nina, 2009/1/5 Nina van Gorkom : > Hi Herman, > -------- > N: The Patthanaa and D.O. are never denied. Momentary dhammas, but > arisen because of conditions, and we should relate this to the > present moment. Seeing now could not arise without eyesense and > visible object. Yes, we are agreed. As mentioned all the time in the suttas and repeated > all the time by Kh S. > But this is an important point: we may just read it and find it too > ordinary, nothing special. While we hear or read all this, it can > remind us that seeing that appears now is not ours, not us, that it > is a mere dhamma. We may come to realize this more and more. It is > pa~n~naa and sati that may arise and realize the truth of this moment. > What arises because of conditions has to fall away, it cannot stay. > It is only momentary. > ------- >> >> H: If seeing only what appears through the eye, without seeing the how >> and why of it arising, one may as well be blind to the Dhamma. > ------- > N: The deepest cause is ignorance, because of ignorance there is > birth and the arising of nama and rupa. Through the development of > satipatthaana there will be less ignorance. > Seeing does not see people, only what is visible. I do not make a distinction between people and bodies. If I see a body, I see a person. And I know it when a body, a person, has seen me, this body. I am sure you know that moment too, when you know that someone else knows you. Let's face it, we all behave very differently when in the company of other bodies (especially strange ones), rather then when we are on our own. There is ignorance > of what seeing is and what visible object is. Immediately we are > absorbed in our thoughts about concepts of this or that person. It is true what you say. The moment we meet an unrecognised person, the first thing we do is evaluate whether me, myself, I is under threat or not. We can know this about ourselves. We > are not used to 'studying with sati' seeing and visible object. It > seems uninteresting. Still, it is the way to have more understanding > of our life, of the world. > What is the world? Nama and rupa arising and falling away. We can > also say: the five khandhas, that is the same. And when we know what the conditions are by which this process happens, then we can say it happens through this and that condition. Cheers Herman #94466 From: "jonoabb" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:20 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation jonoabb Hi Herman > > I think the voice of the other is a critical factor. In the time of > > the Buddha, for example, the voice of the Buddha and his chief > > disciples would be a suitable condition (formost) for the development > > of the path. > > > > But this could only happen by circumstances (i.e., not by selection). > > > > Do you therefore believe that the value of appropriate attention can > be negated by certain (inappropriate) voices? My understanding of the sutta passage is that "voice of another" refers to what is being spoken by the other. As regards the arising of right view, for example, if what is spoken by the other concerns the way things are in truth and reality and is expressed in a way that is meaningful for the listener, and if that is appreciated by the listener (wise attention), it may condition the arising of panna of one level or another (right view). As I said in my earlier post, the hearing of the "right thing" is a matter of circumstances (vipaka) and is not something that can be made to happen. Hope this answers your question (if not, please feel free to ask again). Jon AN 2:125-126 "Monks, there are these two conditions for the arising of wrong view. Which two? The voice of another and inappropriate attention. These are the two conditions for the arising of wrong view." "Monks, there are these two conditions for the arising of right view. Which two? The voice of another and appropriate attention. These are the two conditions for the arising of right view." #94467 From: "robmoult" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:26 am Subject: Understanding Death and Beyond - Section 3 robmoult Hi All, From my paper: ===== Generally, the suttas discuss death as an object of reflection to cause of religious urgency (samvega) and do not discuss the details of what happens at the moment of death. The early Theravda Abhdihamma texts do not provide much additional detail on what happens at the moment of death either; this is addressed in the later Theravda Abhdihamma texts. The Abhidhammattha Sangaha provides a detailed description of the mental process associated with death and rebirth. The important features of this process are as follows: - Mental states flow from one existence to the next as a natural process with no self involved - Just before death, the mind experiences a vision of kamma, a sign of kamma or a sign of destiny - The mind's reaction to this experience creates new kamma which conditions rebirth in the next existence This process reinforces a key message from the Suttas; that the mental state at the time of death conditions the next rebirth. It is therefore very important that when we are with critically ill people or as we approach our own time to die, that we cultivate a calm, peaceful mind which is free from attachment and free from remorse. The Appendix to this paper includes a list of things to be done when somebody is critically ill; this was taken from "A Guide to Proper Buddhist Funeral" by Malaysian Buddhist Cooperative Society. . Bhante Aggacitta's 1999 book, "Dying to Live", provides numerous examples of how the mind experiences visions just before death related to the destination of future rebirth. This book includes an interesting personal experience by Ven. Dr. Rastrapal Mahthera, first published in 1977, detailing how the visions perceived by a dying man changed according to his state of mind. Favourable visions appeared when his mind was religiously inclined while unfavourable visions arose when his thoughts turned worldly or were agitated. The reciting of suttas and the taking of precepts was able to affect the mental state of the dying man and, by extension, impact his future rebirth. ===== Here is the appendix to my paper, referenced above: ===== Appendix - Things to be Done When Somebody is Critically Ill Taken from "A Guide to Proper Buddhist Funeral" by Malaysian Buddhist Cooperative Society. 1. Overcome our own fear and attachment. The best way to help someone who is dying is to encourage him to have a positive, peaceful mind. That means being free of disturbing emotions such as fear, anger, attachment, depression, etc. to be able to help someone else achieve such a state of mind, we need to work first on our own state of mind, i.e. work on reducing our own fear, etc. If we ourselves have disturbing emotions regarding death, it will be very difficult to help another person overcome his. In the case of loved ones, it is best to learn to let them go. Clinging to them will cause both our mind and the mind of the dying to be disturbed. So it is advisable to be calm and peaceful, willing to listen to whatever they wish to say. Be kind, sensitive and supportive, but try to avoid strong emotional reactions. 2. The dying person too should be encouraged to accept death as a natural and inevitable phenomenon, and that all of us come according to our kamma and have to go according to our kamma. 3. He should constantly be encouraged to reflect on the good deeds that he has done, and be reassured that these wholesome deeds of his will lead him to a good rebirth and support him in his next life. 4. Family members may reassure the dying person that he need not worry about them, that he should keep his mind calm and peaceful, and that it will be all right to go when his time comes. 5. Give donations and do other meritorious deeds in his name and share the merit with him. If possible, get him personally involved in the meritorious act, or else he should be informed about it and he should acknowledge it. 6. If the dying person has faith in the Buddhasasana, a small image of the Buddha, Kuan Yin or some other Bodhisatta which the sick person has faith in, may be placed strategically by his bedside as an object for contemplation (a constant reminder of the noble qualities the icons represent). 7. Chanting of appropriate parittas [protective verses] by either monks or laymen could be organized to comfort the dying person and his family members. 8. He should be encouraged to take refuge in the Buddha, he Dhamma and the Sangha. Monks could be invited for breakfast or lunch dna and gifts in the form of requisites could be prepared for him to offer to the Sangha. 9. If the dying person has been practicing meditation, remind him of the importance of mindfulness. Encourage him to constantly note the arising and falling of events, viz. thoughts, memories, emotions, visions, sensory perceptions. 10. Dhamma friends who are practitioners of meditation can be invited to radiate loving-kindness (mett) to the dying person to ease his suffering. In their absence, you too can do it by yourself. If the dying person belongs to another religion or has little faith in the Buddhasasana, encourage him to have faith, to pray, to have positive thoughts, etc. in accordance with his religious beliefs and practices. Do not try to impose your own beliefs to convert him as this may give rise to confusion, disturbing emotions or negative thoughts in the mind of the dying. If the person has no religion, but seems to be open-minded, you can try to talk about the Dhamma, for example, about loving-kindness and compassion, about the truth of impermanence, about the Four Noble Truths, etc. You can try to talk about the Buddha, taking refuge in the Triple Gem, etc. but be sensitive: don't be aggressive; otherwise the person could react negatively. If the person has no interest in religious or spiritual matters, find ways to talk to him so that he can be free of anger, attachment, fear, etc. and have a positive, peaceful state of mind. ===== I look forward to comments / feeback from you all! Metta, Rob M :-) #94468 From: "jonoabb" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:33 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation jonoabb Hi Robert > > The more developed the understanding of the individual, the less idea > > of a "self" in relation to this or that person. > > > > Jon > > > > Hi Jon! > So would you say that ultimately one is sending metta to the kandhas > without any view of an aggregated being? As I said in an earlier post, to my understanding, the enlightened being still thinks in terms of people and things, but he/she does so without any misconception as to the the way things are in truth and reality. So, for the enlightened being, no longer any idea of "self", but thinking follows the same accustomed patterns. For example, in the case of a sotapanna who is a householder, wife and children are still wife and children. No need to "deny" conceptual references for the sake of it! Jon #94469 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:55 am Subject: Vipassanaa, Survey Ch 34. no 5. nilovg Dear friends, We should listen carefully to the Dhamma, we should study and investigate the dhammas which are already appearing, which are our ordinary, daily life. We cannot yet immediately eradicate lobha, dosa, moha and the other defilements. People desire to eradicate defilements, but they should know that defilements can only be eradicated at the moment of enlightenment, when the magga-citta, path- consciousness, arises. First personality view, sakkya ditthi, is eradicated, which takes the dhammas appearing through the six doors for self, being or person. Personality view is eradicated at the first stage of enlightenment, the stage of the streamwinner, sotpanna. After that stage has been attained, pa should be developed further so that the following stages of enlightenment can be attained and defilements can successively be eradicated. These are the stages of the once-returner, sakadgm, the non-returner, angm, and the arahat. Thus, pa can be developed only gradually. One should not try to hasten its development, one should not believe that it is sufficient just to practise for a day, a month or a year, without even understanding the right conditions for sati. Actually, sati which is samm-sati (right mindfulness) of the eightfold Path can only arise if one first studies and understands the characteristics of realities as they appear through the senses and through the mind-door. Then samm-sati can arise and be aware, and pa can begin to study and investigate realities which naturally appear in daily life, so that they can be seen as they really are. ******* Nina #94470 From: "sprlrt" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 3:22 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. sprlrt Hi Rob E, (Ken H, Scott, TG) --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Robert Epstein" wrote: > > Do things really exist, and do they exist as we perceive them? I > believe that we perceive a physical universe, but that we do not > perceive it as it is. Furthermore, I don't think we know the ultimate > status of its substantiality. From all I've read of Buddhism it is > suggested that the physical world is insubstantial, though it appears > and we have interactions with it. To think that namas and rupas are > floating around in some absolute realm would seem to deny the > centrality that Buddhism places on the mind. It is not important what > is "out there," only our own state of mind and perception. So I don't > think that the reality of object is very important to Buddhism at all. > In fact, Buddhism turns away from involvement with external objects > of desire and revulsion, and turns inward towards the nature of the > mind itself, until that mystery is resolved in nibbana. > A: Here are some quotes that might help a bit, beginning from the last parapraph of MN1 sutta (Nanamoli-Bodhi transl.): 194. ... "That is what the Blessed one said. But those bhikkhus did not [! ! !] delight in the Blessed One's word." BB note: "MA explains that the Buddha delivered this sutta to dispel the conceit that had arisen in 500 bhikkhus on account of their erudition and intellectual mastery of the Buddha's teachings." (The Ordinary Person) 3. Here bhikkhus, an untaught ordinary person [putujjana puggala], who has no regard for noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma.... perceives [sanna, i.e. remembers] earth as earth. Having perceived earth as earth... (The Disciple in Higher training) 27. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is in higher training [an ariya puggala, non yet an arahant], whose mind has not yet reached the goal, and who is still aspiring to the supreme security from bondage.... directly knows [abhijaanaati, i.e. through satipatthana] earth as earth. Having directly known earth as earth... Also MN 72: 18. This Dhamma, Vaccha, is profound, hard to see and understand, peaceful and sublime, unattainable by mere reasoning [! ! !], subtle, to be experienced by the wise. It is hard to understand when you hold another view, accept another view, accept another teaching, pursue a different training and follow a different teacher. A: The pali words in the SN 22.95, Khanda Vagga which can be interpreted to say that dhammas are not real in an absolute sense are three, PED entries: Tuccha (adj.) [Sk. tuccha, prob. rel. to Lat. tesqua deserted place, see Walde, Lat. Wtb. s. v.] empty, vain, deserted; very often combd with ritta D i.55; iii.53 (˚kumbhi); M i.207; J i.209 (˚hattha, empty -- handed); vi.365; Sn 883; Pug 45, 46; Miln 5 (+palāpa), 10 (id.), 13; DhA ii.43; PvA 202; Sdhp 431. Ritta [pp. of ricati; cp. atireka] devoid, empty, free, rid (of) M i.207 (+tuccha), 414; Vin i.157=ii.216; Sn 823 (emancipated: ritto muni=vivitta etc. Nd1 158), 844 (opp. to aritta); Th 2, 265 (see rindi); J i.29 (v. 222); iii.492; Miln 383. Asaara (n. adj.) [a + saara] that which is not substance, worthlessness; adj. worthless, vain, idle Sn 937 (= asaara nissaara saarapagata Nd1 409); Dh 11, 12 (cp. DhA i.114 for interpretation). A: Replacing unsubstantial with worthless (or vain) should do the trick :-) Khandhas like foam etc. are metaphors, i.e. not to be taken literally. Alberto #94471 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 4:20 am Subject: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner scottduncan2 Dear All, Continuing: The Path of Purification. "13. But if he has no enemy, or he is of the type of a great man who does not perceive of another as an enemy even when the other does him harm, he should not interest himself as follows: 'Now that my consciousness of lovingkindness has become wieldy towards a neutral person, I shall apply it to a hostile one'. Rather it was about one who actually has an enemy that it was said above that he should develop lovingkindness towards a hostile person as neutral." The Path of Purity. "He who has no enemy, or who, out of his gentlemanly nature does not even entertain inimical thoughts of another who may have done him harm, should not have this evil intention: 'On this neutral person my heart has now grown tender. Now I will regard him as an enemy.' But whoso has enemies it is concerning him that it was said that love should be developed towards an enemy immediately after a neutral person." Yassa pana veriipuggalo vaa natthi, mahaapurisajaatikattaa vaa anattha.m karontepi pare veriisa~n~naava nuppajjati, tena 'majjhatte me mettacitta.m kammaniya.m jaata.m, idaani na.m verimhi upasa.mharaamii 'ti byaapaarova na kaatabbo. Yassa pana atthi, ta.m sandhaaya vutta.m 'majjhattato veriipuggale mettaa bhaavetabbaa 'ti. Sincerely, Scott. #94472 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 5:10 am Subject: Re: Understanding Death and Beyond - Section 3 buddhatrue Hi Rob M. and Ajahn Jose, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "robmoult" wrote: > ===== > > I look forward to comments / feeback from you all! This is very valuable information and very important for Ajahn Jose to read and contemplate as he is currently in a hospice. I hope that he will read it and follow its instructions. Metta, James #94473 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 12:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. upasaka_howard Hi, TG (and Connie) - In a message dated 1/6/2009 1:00:24 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: Hi Connie, All Interesting quote. It seems to use the term "characteristic" to refer to "principles." Denies that "characteristics" can change, then shortly after references a Sutta where the Buddha talks about changing characteristics. Also talks about "flowing" being a characteristic. Really all over the map. If you have a belief...its in there somewhere. ;-) TG OUT ============================= This is where I see convention coming in. Whatever elements of experience share a particular feature considered to be of some importance to us we think of as instances of "the same thing," and we refer to them by the same name regardless of how much they may differ in other respects and regardless of how much they may alter. So, "heat element" (actually temperature) is always heat element because whatever phenomena have that feature are identified as a matter of convention. One might, however, just as well consider heat and cold as distinct fundamental principles that are opposite and mutually exclusive. Also, when great heat is felt, within a fraction of a second it changes to less heat and then to mere warmth and eventually to cold, and it is mere convention based on similarity to define it all as "heat element." Moreover, the "heat" of water is not experienced as the same phenomenon as the "heat" of the air in a room or as the "heat" of the touched surface of a stove top. These are actually quite different sensations, but identified due to perceived similarity. (I speak here in terms of experience, not of the chemistry/physics stories that serve an explanatory and predictive function.) Likewise for the other "great elements," and rupas in general, and namas as well. With metta, Howard (Anonymous) #94474 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 5:33 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear connie, Thanks for the quote. The main point, as I read it, is: "...It abandons its status of being in the form of a lump, but not its very own characteristic. For there is alteration in state (by way of deficiency and excess) of the four Great Essentials; **but there is no such thing as alteration of characteristics**..." Scott: The insubstantialist view, in misinterpreting terms such as 'void' and 'coreless' - synonyms of not-self - chooses to create an untenable situation wherein dhammas are shorn of the characteristics which differentiate them functionally and, hence, as they are given to and constitute experience, not only experience, but, in the case of ruupa, material nature. As noted in the Dhammasa"nga.ni (p. 184): "[652] What is that [material] form which is the fluid (aqueous) element (aapodhaatu)? That which is fluid, that which is viscid and belongs to viscous, the cohesiveness of form - this is that [material] form which is the fluid element." Scott: In a footnote, RD adds ('*...*' by me): "This is the aspect of the moist or liquid element *in an object compact of several elements*. The one essential 'mark' or aapo-dhaatu is pagghara.na.m, flowing...But 'cohesiveness of form means the cohering condition of some concrete in which there is superfluity of solid (Asl. 335). For it is by the cohesive force of the fluid element that lumps of iron or what not are made rigid. Similarily in the case of stones, mountains, palms, tusks, horns, etc. "Hence Buddhaghosa passes on to discuss the mutually related spheres of the elements and their apparent approximations to each other, as in viscous things, e.g. or congealed liquid, or boiling water. Corrupt MSS, however, render parts of the disquisition hard to follow. His conclusion is that whereas the elements may vary in their condition as phenomena, their essential mark never alters, however latent it may be. And he quotes, as the A.t.thaanaparikappa sutta, A,i,122, that it is easier for the four essentials to change their essential character than for the seeker of [Nibbaana] (the Noble Student to alter his high estate (Asl. 336)." Sincerely, Scott. #94475 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 6:11 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. nilovg Dear Alex, Op 5-jan-2009, om 21:59 heeft Alex het volgende geschreven: > Question: Can you please provide sutta quotes for paramattha found in > 4 main nikayas that justify "ultimate truth vs conventional one"? --------- N: Several times on this list texts were quoted saying: the Buddha can teach in conventional way : <...these are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Tathagata uses without misapprehending them, (DN 9, Potthapada Sutta: States of consciousness, 53, Walshe trans.)> Thus, he also teaches in another way, not as is common use in the world we can conclude. We find more clarification in the co , but you do not accept this. I do not see the two ways as one versus the other one. It depended on the audiance what they could grasp. In general I find that people ask: prove by the suttas whether there is the word paramattha dhamma. There is an instance: in truth and in reality, as was quoted before by Ven. Dhammanando. But what is more important: understand what is meant by paramattha dhamma and then see whether the essence is in the sutta, although not the word paramattha dhamma. I am thinking of khandhas, elements, etc. Let us not be tied by words, but rather understand meanings. Nina. #94476 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 6:18 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mahabhuta nilovg Hi Herman, no problem with your quote. A dhamma does not arise alone. But when speaking of object experienced by citta, each citta experiences only one object. Nina. Op 5-jan-2009, om 23:32 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > The idea of "one object" needs to be very carefully expressed so as to > not mislead. There should be no suggestion that there is ever only one > single parramattha dhamma. #94477 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 6:38 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Mahabhuta nilovg Hi Herman, Here is more material that may be of interest. By insight the compact is resolved into elements, and this is important for discerning the three characteristics. Op 6-jan-2009, om 15:18 heeft Nina van Gorkom het volgende geschreven: > Op 5-jan-2009, om 23:32 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > > > The idea of "one object" needs to be very carefully expressed so > as to > > not mislead. There should be no suggestion that there is ever > only one > > single parramattha dhamma. ------- N: Sarahs quotes: >Vism.XXI,n.3. Cf. Pe. 128. In the commentary to the Aayatana- Vibha.nga we find: 'Impermanence is obvious, as when a saucer (say) falls and breaks; ... pain is obvious, as when a boil (say) appears in the body; ... the characteristic of not-self is not obvious; ... Whether Perfect Ones arise or do not arise the characteristics of impermanence and pain are made known, but unless there is the arising of a Buddha the characteristic of not-self is not made known' (VbhA. 49-50, abridged for clarity). Again, in the commentary to Majjhima Nikaaya Sutta 22: 'Having been, it is not, therefore it is impermanent; it is impermanent for four reasons, that is, in the sense of the state of rise and fall, of change, of temporariness, and of denying permanence. It is painful on account of the mode of oppression; it is painful for four reasons, that is, in the sense of burning, of being hard to bear, of being the basis for pain, and of opposing pleasure ... It is not-self on account of the mode of insusceptibility to the exercise of power; it is not-self for four reasons, that is, in the sense of voidness, of having no owner-master, of having no Overlord, and of opposing self' (MA.ii113, abridged for clarity). Commenting on this Vis. paragraph, Pm. says: "When continuity is disrupted" means when continuity is exposed by observing the perpetual otherness of states as they go on occurring in succession. For it is not through the connectedness of states that the characteristic of impermanence becomes apparent to one who rightly observes rise and fall, but rather the characteristic becomes more thoroughly evident through their disconnectedness, as if they were iron darts.... "Resolution of the compact" is effected by resolving [what appears compact] in this way, "The earth element is one, the water element is another" etc., distinguishing each one; and in this way, "Contact is one, feeling is another" etc., distinguishing each one. "When the resolution of the compact is effected" means that what is compact as a mass and what is compact as a function or as an object has been analyzed. For when material and immaterial states have arisen mutually steadying each other, [mentality and materiality, for example,] then, owing to misinterpreting that as a unity, compactness of mass is assumed through failure to subject formations to pressure. And likewise compactness of function is assumed when, although definite differences exist in such and such states' functions, they are taken as one. And likewise compactness of object is assumed when, although differences exist in the ways in which states that take objects make them their objects, those objects are taken as one. But when they are seen after resolving them by means of knowledge into these elements, they disintegrate like froth subjected to compression by the hand. They are mere states (dhamma) occurring due to conditions and void. In this way the characteristic of not-self becomes more evident' (Pm.824). (end quote) ******* Nina. #94478 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 6:44 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self nilovg Dear Alberto, You had a discussion with Howard about visible object, a difficult subject. I thought that I perhaps could add something. This also refers to the discussion today with Herman, about one object that is experienced at a time. Op 29-dec-2008, om 17:13 heeft sprlrt het volgende geschreven: > H: As I view the matter, when we see a sight (also called "visible > object"), it is an entire palette of color. > The colors are all there, and form a variety of shapes, but the > inventory of colors and the shape-patterns they form are not part of > the sight, per se. > > A: I believe that groups of rupas making up visible object, at the > moment of its presence, take up space, itself a rupa (i.e. visual > object has shape, or form if you prefer). ------- N: As you know space is a rupa surrounding each group of rupa. Colour arises in a group consisting of the eight inseparable rupas as you know. Only colour impinges on the eyesense so that there can be seeing. The other rupas do not impinge at that moment. If we say that the group of rupas makes up visible object and that visible object takes up space, people may have misunderstanding, I think. We should emphasize that only visible object is seen. Nina. #94479 From: Sukinder Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 7:00 am Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone sukinderpal Hi Howard (and Ken H), I’m way behind in my reading, but if I waited to catch up before replying, this may not happen even one week from today. However I won’t be reacting to everything you’ve said in this post. ========== > Sukin: I don’t know. I have never read anyone to have denied > “conditioned existence” when talking about sankhata dhammas. On the > other hand I’ve seen it suggested to the effect that since a sankhata > dhamma does not “exist” independently, one then can’t make a statement > about it or know it for what it is. Therefore thinking about dhammas as > we do here on DSG is to be making ‘little selves’ out of paramattha > dhammas. This I don’t get. > ----------------------------------------------- > Howard: > That "little selves" business is another matter. It pertains to speaking > of cittas as actors or knowers rather than as knowings. It is a matter of > agency terminology that I object to. Suk: Yes, I mixed your objections with that of someone else’s. However I would still like to make a general comment, including about your own suggestion above. It seems that this particular concern is based more on philosophical (linguistics?) considerations than with the understanding of Dhamma. The former is in the realm of ideas where one is placed against another and the one which appeals ends up having influence on how one thinks about things. Conceivings are not recognized as such hence the reality / concept distinction is never taken into account. One then is at best left with the need to ‘refine the thinking’. The Dhamma on the other hand, being that about the development of right understanding of present moment experiences, has as a beginning step, distinguishing concept from reality. This conditions a need to directly understand the one knowing that otherwise one remains lost in endless proliferation with regard to the other. Without the present moment as reference point, one tries to figure things out using concepts that lead to just more thinking. I see your suggestion to replace so called ‘knowers’ with ‘knowings’ to be an instance of this. When it is stated for example, “citta is that which thinks”, this can be seen as being a statement about the reality of citta, its characteristic. It can also be seen as pointing to the reality of the present moment where otherwise the perception is of a “self who thinks”. In this case it counters just this tendency to conceive of a ‘self’ / ‘agent’. Some would say that one is then making a ‘self’ out of citta. But I don’t think so. Indeed I think it is a case of being moved by an ‘idea’ on the part of those who make such a suggestion. Were the reality / concept distinction understood to any extent, one would know that ‘ignorance’ is ignorance of namas and rupas. Any description therefore, which points to the reality of the present moment and hence the need to directly understand this, should not be countered by suggestion which only require more ‘thought’. The understanding which knows characteristic of dhammas directly, where conditionality is revealed gradually, rather than being a condition for self view to increase, decreases it. Besides, since I think that you do not object to conventional designations and descriptions such as “Howard and Sukin are angry” etc., as long as no wrong view of self is involved, why not apply the same rule with regard to such ideas as “citta is that which thinks”? =============== > It is my guess that perhaps the problem lies in that one takes into > account only the fact of a particular dhamma being ‘conditioned’ by > other dhammas, forgetting that each of these dhammas act as conditions > for the other dhammas in various ways as well, while doing their part in > performing particular functions during that one instance of arising. In > other words dhammas are both conditioned as well as ‘conditioning’, and > that they each have characteristic, function, manifestation and cause. > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Of course - all conditioned phenomena also serve as conditions. As for > the terminology of " characteristic, function, manifestation," this holds no > interest for me. Suk: Yet we all make statements about characteristics and functions all the time. Except that instead of seeing that ultimately whatever manifests is due to functions performed by dhammas with particular characteristics, those statements of ours more often than not are conditioned by wrong perceptions and views. Similarly when it comes to making statements about cause and effect….. ================ > > > In the above text, the author talks about the importance of both > > analysis and synthesis which I agree with. However I see this as being > > about a moment of experience. The fact that much discussion revolves > > around ‘paramattha dhammas’ and that these are conditioned variously and > > NOW, should show that no crucial aspect of Dhamma is being ignored. > > Rather, because you see limitation in the approach, I’ll suggest that > > this is due exactly to your own bringing in an idea re: > > ‘interrelationships among phenomena’, not only unnecessary, but > in fact misleading. > > ---------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > What is the misdirection? > > Sukin: Knowing a dhamma by its characteristic is to know that it is > conditioned. > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Sorry, Sukin. I honestly don't know what you are talking about. Suk: By your suggesting the need to know “interrelationships among phenomena” I had taken you to mean something seperate from the direct study of paramattha dhammas. I on the other hand propose that all necessary “knowledge” comes from knowing paramattha dhammas directly. Conditionality is not something separate from that which appears and is the object of any level of right understanding, including pariyatti. Understanding develops very gradually, but always with the characteristic of a paramattha dhamma as object. Your suggestion (or my interpretation of it), therefore, is one which reflects a misunderstanding of and lack of confidence in satipatthana / the 8FP, and this leads to what I think could only be some form of wrong practice. ============== > Is this not enough? There is never any idea at the moment > about ‘interrelationship among phenomena’. > ----------------------------------------- > Howard: > I fail to see how one can affirm conditionality and deny > interrelationship in the same breath! Suk: Yours sounded to me like thinking in terms of relationship between parts, sort of like a web or perhaps sequentially, and the necessity of knowing this somehow. Mine is that the understanding of conditionality is always tied to the reality which is the object of panna at any given moment, and this does not give forth to an idea about ‘relationships’ either as in a web or one following another in a sequence. ================ > Sukin: The concept of hardness is not the experience of hardness for > sure. But hardness experienced by a ‘self’ is one thing and hardness as > known by panna is another. > -------------------------------------------- > Howard: > What first-hand experience do you have of pa~n~na? And thinking, BTW, > needn't involve any sense of self. Suk: And I wasn’t suggesting that, but in referring to ‘self’ I was pointing to the difference between panna and ditthi and / or tanha. About first-hand experience of panna or anything, what is the point of the questioning? =============== > One problem with the idea, ‘web of relations’ is not convention, but an > underlying idea which seems suggestive of some kind of function given to > a ‘whole’. > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > Actually, systems of phenomena do exhibit behavior that the individual > phenomena cannot exhibit. Suk: But only in the form of a conventional story, one among many possibilities, and all food for wrong view to thrive upon. On the other hand, Right View when it arises, what is known is the characteristic of a dhamma, and this is undeniably true. :-) ============== > But what I had in mind then was your making a distinction > between concepts such as tree and say a flying earthworm. Also you often > refer to Indra’s Net. These two together gave me the impression that you > saw beyond momentary conditioned dhammas to suggest some kind of > existence / relationship beyond this. > -------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm sorry - I'm still not following you. Suk: I hope I have made it a little clearer this time. =============== > Sukin: :-) No, I was suggesting that it was you who saw beyond the need > to know presently arisen dhammas. > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, you've got me there! I sure do see that need! Suk: :-) This explains you’re constant disagreement with Ken H and my agreement with him. :-) ============ > I thought that you felt a need to see > such as ‘human beings’ not existing in isolation. But I must have > misunderstood you. > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't recall discussing anything along those lines in our > conversation, but certainly human beings (no quotes needed) do not exist in isolation. > You and I are human beings, are we not, and are we not interacting? You're not > a devotee of solipsism, are you? Suk: To identify Howard and Sukin and then to go on to deny that these two interact is silly. However this is only in the realm of “convention” and has nothing to do with the development of understanding of such things as seeing, thinking, color, hardness, feeling etc. and about conditionality which ever exists only here. ============= > And no, I don’t believe in the power of ‘thinking’, to add to anything > that might be understood directly through the five sense doors and the mind. > ------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > The power of thinking made possible the computer that you are using! Suk: Should I thank someone for this? ;-) Worldly knowledge is never ending. The study of Dhamma is the study of the leaves in the hand, those that which exists and continues to grow in the forest is quite unnecessary. Best wishes for the New Year. Metta, Sukin #94480 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 3:13 am Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone upasaka_howard Hi, Sukin - In a message dated 1/6/2009 10:01:57 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, sukinder@... writes: Hi Howard (and Ken H), I’m way behind in my reading, but if I waited to catch up before replying, this may not happen even one week from today. However I won’t be reacting to everything you’ve said in this post. ========== > Sukin: I don’t know. I have never read anyone to have denied > “conditioned existence” when talking about sankhata dhammas. On the > other hand I’ve seen it suggested to the effect that since a sankhata > dhamma does not “exist” independently, one then can’t make a statement > about it or know it for what it is. Therefore thinking about dhammas as > we do here on DSG is to be making ‘little selves’ out of paramattha > dhammas. This I don’t get. > ----------------------------------------------- > Howard: > That "little selves" business is another matter. It pertains to speaking > of cittas as actors or knowers rather than as knowings. It is a matter of > agency terminology that I object to. Suk: Yes, I mixed your objections with that of someone else’s. However I would still like to make a general comment, including about your own suggestion above. It seems that this particular concern is based more on philosophical (linguistics?) considerations than with the understanding of Dhamma. The former is in the realm of ideas where one is placed against another and the one which appeals ends up having influence on how one thinks about things. Conceivings are not recognized as such hence the reality / concept distinction is never taken into account. One then is at best left with the need to ‘refine the thinking’. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't understand the foregoing, Sukin. -------------------------------------------- The Dhamma on the other hand, being that about the development of right understanding of present moment experiences, has as a beginning step, distinguishing concept from reality. -------------------------------------------- Howard: I certainly do distinguish concept from reality, but I differ with some here on what is concept-only. But more importatly, I am not familiar with the Buddha anywhere having taught that distinguishing concept from reality is the first (or even early) step. -------------------------------------------- This conditions a need to directly understand the one knowing that otherwise one remains lost in endless proliferation with regard to the other. Without the present moment as reference point, one tries to figure things out using concepts that lead to just more thinking. I see your suggestion to replace so called ‘knowers’ with ‘knowings’ to be an instance of this. -------------------------------------------- Howard: No, it is instead an attempt to be careful of our speech and thinking so as not to befoul our perception. It is an attempt to not reinforce our tendency towards reification, but, instead, to encourage relinquishment. BTW, you seem to be saying that reality is to be directly known, and thinking will not accomplish that. If so, I agree with you. However, some thinking supports that, and other thinkinjg does there opposite. --------------------------------------------- When it is stated for example, “citta is that which thinks”, this can be seen as being a statement about the reality of citta, its characteristic. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: No! There are no "things that think"! There is just thinking. --------------------------------------------- It can also be seen as pointing to the reality of the present moment where otherwise the perception is of a “self who thinks”. -------------------------------------------- Howard: Thinking, like everything else, occurs exactly when it occurs, and we always call that "now" or "this moment." ----------------------------------------------- In this case it counters just this tendency to conceive of a ‘self’ / ‘agent’. Some would say that one is then making a ‘self’ out of citta. But I don’t think so. -------------------------------------------- Howard: But I do. To each his own! ;-) ----------------------------------------- Indeed I think it is a case of being moved by an ‘idea’ on the part of those who make such a suggestion. Were the reality / concept distinction understood to any extent, one would know that ‘ignorance’ is ignorance of namas and rupas. -------------------------------------------- Howard: Ignorance as defined by the Buddha is ignorance of the 4 noble truths. He said that outright. ------------------------------------------- Any description therefore, which points to the reality of the present moment and hence the need to directly understand this, should not be countered by suggestion which only require more ‘thought’. ----------------------------------------- Howard: I quite agree. In fact, I emphasize that all the time! ------------------------------------------- The understanding which knows characteristic of dhammas directly, where conditionality is revealed gradually, rather than being a condition for self view to increase, decreases it. Besides, since I think that you do not object to conventional designations and descriptions such as “Howard and Sukin are angry” etc., as long as no wrong view of self is involved, why not apply the same rule with regard to such ideas as “citta is that which thinks”? -------------------------------------------- Howard: Because it is a subtle trap. There is danger in it. And that terminology is easily avoidable. --------------------------------------- =============== > It is my guess that perhaps the problem lies in that one takes into > account only the fact of a particular dhamma being ‘conditioned’ by > other dhammas, forgetting that each of these dhammas act as conditions > for the other dhammas in various ways as well, while doing their part in > performing particular functions during that one instance of arising. In > other words dhammas are both conditioned as well as ‘conditioning’, and > that they each have characteristic, function, manifestation and cause. > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Of course - all conditioned phenomena also serve as conditions. As for > the terminology of " characteristic, function, manifestation," this holds no > interest for me. Suk: Yet we all make statements about characteristics and functions all the time. Except that instead of seeing that ultimately whatever manifests is due to functions performed by dhammas with particular characteristics, those statements of ours more often than not are conditioned by wrong perceptions and views. Similarly when it comes to making statements about cause and effect….. ================ > > > In the above text, the author talks about the importance of both > > analysis and synthesis which I agree with. However I see this as being > > about a moment of experience. The fact that much discussion revolves > > around ‘paramattha dhammas’ and that these are conditioned variously and > > NOW, should show that no crucial aspect of Dhamma is being ignored. > > Rather, because you see limitation in the approach, I’ll suggest that > > this is due exactly to your own bringing in an idea re: > > ‘interrelationships among phenomena’, not only unnecessary, but > in fact misleading. > > ---------------------------------------------- > > Howard: > > What is the misdirection? > > Sukin: Knowing a dhamma by its characteristic is to know that it is > conditioned. > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Sorry, Sukin. I honestly don't know what you are talking about. Suk: By your suggesting the need to know “interrelationships among phenomena” I had taken you to mean something seperate from the direct study of paramattha dhammas. -------------------------------------------------- Howard: Relationships among things is not known only by knowing the individual things, and especially not when those things are treated as entities. -------------------------------------------------- I on the other hand propose that all necessary “knowledge” comes from knowing paramattha dhammas directly. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Have you constructed banners with that imprinted? For me, that is just sloganeering. And it effectively dismisses dependent origination and conditional relations. -------------------------------------------------- Conditionality is not something separate from that which appears and is the object of any level of right understanding, including pariyatti. Understanding develops very gradually, but always with the characteristic of a paramattha dhamma as object. ----------------------------------------------- Howard: That is parroting, IMO. Do you engage in mindfully attending to phenomena or just memorize textual slogans? It is like a catechism! You know, Sukin, the Patthana isn't called "The Great Book" of the Abhidhamma Pitaka for nothing. -------------------------------------------- Your suggestion (or my interpretation of it), therefore, is one which reflects a misunderstanding of and lack of confidence in satipatthana / the 8FP, and this leads to what I think could only be some form of wrong practice. ============== > Is this not enough? There is never any idea at the moment > about ‘interrelationship among phenomena’. > ----------------------------------------- > Howard: > I fail to see how one can affirm conditionality and deny > interrelationship in the same breath! Suk: Yours sounded to me like thinking in terms of relationship between parts, sort of like a web or perhaps sequentially, and the necessity of knowing this somehow. ------------------------------------------ Howard: Parts? I don't follow you. ----------------------------------------- Mine is that the understanding of conditionality is always tied to the reality which is the object of panna at any given moment, and this does not give forth to an idea about ‘relationships’ either as in a web or one following another in a sequence. ================ > Sukin: The concept of hardness is not the experience of hardness for > sure. But hardness experienced by a ‘self’ is one thing and hardness as > known by panna is another. > -------------------------------------------- > Howard: > What first-hand experience do you have of pa~n~na? And thinking, BTW, > needn't involve any sense of self. Suk: And I wasn’t suggesting that, but in referring to ‘self’ I was pointing to the difference between panna and ditthi and / or tanha. About first-hand experience of panna or anything, what is the point of the questioning? =============== > One problem with the idea, ‘web of relations’ is not convention, but an > underlying idea which seems suggestive of some kind of function given to > a ‘whole’. > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > Actually, systems of phenomena do exhibit behavior that the individual > phenomena cannot exhibit. Suk: But only in the form of a conventional story, one among many possibilities, and all food for wrong view to thrive upon. On the other hand, Right View when it arises, what is known is the characteristic of a dhamma, and this is undeniably true. :-) ============== > But what I had in mind then was your making a distinction > between concepts such as tree and say a flying earthworm. Also you often > refer to Indra’s Net. These two together gave me the impression that you > saw beyond momentary conditioned dhammas to suggest some kind of > existence / relationship beyond this. > -------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm sorry - I'm still not following you. Suk: I hope I have made it a little clearer this time. =============== > Sukin: :-) No, I was suggesting that it was you who saw beyond the need > to know presently arisen dhammas. > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Well, you've got me there! I sure do see that need! Suk: :-) This explains you’re constant disagreement with Ken H and my agreement with him. :-) --------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't have a collection of blinders. IMO, one should not restrict what is seen. --------------------------------------------- ============ > I thought that you felt a need to see > such as ‘human beings’ not existing in isolation. But I must have > misunderstood you. > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't recall discussing anything along those lines in our > conversation, but certainly human beings (no quotes needed) do not exist in isolation. > You and I are human beings, are we not, and are we not interacting? You're not > a devotee of solipsism, are you? Suk: To identify Howard and Sukin and then to go on to deny that these two interact is silly. However this is only in the realm of “convention” and has nothing to do with the development of understanding of such things as seeing, thinking, color, hardness, feeling etc. and about conditionality which ever exists only here. ============= > And no, I don’t believe in the power of ‘thinking’, to add to anything > that might be understood directly through the five sense doors and the mind. > ------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > The power of thinking made possible the computer that you are using! Suk: Should I thank someone for this? ;-) ------------------------------------------------- Howard: I suppose so. Many people. ---------------------------------------------- Worldly knowledge is never ending. -------------------------------------------- Howard: What about Dhamma knowledge, widely disseminated over the internet thanks to many, many people who made good use of thinking. None of them awakened by that means, but what they did is certainly helpful in our journey towards awakening. -------------------------------------------- The study of Dhamma is the study of the leaves in the hand, those that which exists and continues to grow in the forest is quite unnecessary. --------------------------------------------- Howard: Were it not for concepts and thinking, there would never have been the Buddhadhamma available for study and following. Thank *goodness* for concepts and thinking! --------------------------------------------- Best wishes for the New Year. ------------------------------------------ Howard: You too! ;-) Just ignore the fact, however that this is just concept! ;-)) ----------------------------------------- Metta, Sukin ========================= With metta, Howard Emptiness (From the Uraga Sutta) __________________________ Reality (From the Dvayatanupassana Sutta) #94481 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 9:11 am Subject: AS time nichiconn dear friends, Nyanaponika continues: But the "triad of things arisen" was not intended to supercede the "triad of things past, present, and future" which remains at Dhs 1038-40. The latter has an importance of its own in the much more frequent cases when it is necessary to distinguish between the three periods of time and the objects existing in them. Also, as a corrective against the opposite extreme, this triad is required in order to insist on the (relative) differentiation of the three periods of time and to counter the tendency to obliterate them completely. This tendency (as well as its opposite) appears again and again in the history of philosophy, and the following emphatic words of the Buddha may well have been directed against similar contemporary ideas: Monks, there are three unconfounded appelations, expressions, and designations. Unconfounded before, they are now unconfounded and connot be confounded; they are not rejected by wise ascetics and brahmins. Which are these three? For such corporeality (feeling, etc.) that is past, gone, and changed, "It has been," is here the (right) statement, the usage, the designation. The statement "It is" does not apply to it, the statement "It will be" does not apply to it. (SN III 71-72) {70} {70} Similarly, the sutta continues, "It is" is the appropriate designation for present things, not "It has been" or "It will be"; and "It will be" is the appropriate designation for future things, not "It has been" or "It is." connie #94482 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 9:15 am Subject: cornerstone nichiconn dear friends, now, for the simile: << "Suppose, O king, the cook in the royal household were to make a syrup or a sauce and were to put into it curds, and salt, and ginger, and cumin seed, and pepper and other ingredients. And suppose the king were to say to him: 'Pick out for me the flavours of the curds and of the salt, and of the ginger, and of the cumin seed, and of the pepper, and of all the things you have put into it.' Now would it be possible, great king, separating off one from another those flavours that had thus run together, to pick out each one, so that one could say: 'Here is the sourness, and here the saltiness, and here the pungency, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness'?" 85 In like manner, it is maintained, we should understand the position of the mental dhammas in relation to one another.86 85. The Questions of King Milinda, trans. T.W. Rhys Davids (reprint: New York, 1963), p.97. 86. For other illustrations, see DhsA 273, MA II 287, Abhvk 293. >> to be continued, connie #94483 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 4:58 am Subject: Void, Coreless, Insubstantial, etc TGrand458@... Hi All Terms such as -- void, coreless, insubstantial, etc. are NOT terms the merely mean "no-self," they are rather aspects of phenomena that are no self....i.e., all phenomena. The Buddha would have been a fool to described the aggregates as -- no-self, and no-self, and no-self, and no-self, etc. The differences in terms place a different slant on aspects of 'no-self phenomena.' They help the mind garner a better overall view. Please do not be mislead by some who would slough off these important terms as mere repetitions of "no-self." TG OUT #94484 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 5:02 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Void, Coreless, Insubstantial, etc TGrand458@... Hi All again Typo corrections on this... should have read -- Terms such as -- void, coreless, insubstantial, etc. are NOT terms that merely mean "no-self"; they are, rather, aspects of phenomena that are no self....i.e.they are, rather TG OUT #94485 From: "keithhenriques" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 6:16 am Subject: Reply re White Powder Commentary from Kith keithhenriques I am still having difficulty posting. Perhaps, I am not yet authorized. Hello Herman: I wonder how arguments relating the assertian that the ayatanas are "central to experience in Theravada" may relate to the four Asavas: The Asava of sensuality The Asava of rebirth The Asava of speculative oppinion (especially vain conceits, madness and or infactuation). The Asava of ingnorance Thank you for your kind considerations. Keith #94486 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 11:49 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. nichiconn Dear Scott, Howard, TG, All yes, ** there is no such thing as alteration of characteristics ** was the main point to the quote; that the "change" occurring in the moment is not a change in characteristic. And yes, TG, if I believe anything, it's in there somewhere; our readings/interpretations of both the sutta and commentarial portions of it seem to be radically different, though. Howard: So, "heat element" (actually temperature) is always heat element because whatever phenomena have that feature are identified as a matter of convention. connie: "have that"... will TG allow that expression? The word we use to identify "that" is conventional, but neither the "having" nor the "that" is "merely conceptual". It's the old "this, in arising, evokes the/it's own name" thing. peace, connie #94487 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 7:42 am Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone upasaka_howard Hi, Sukin (and Ken) - In a message dated 1/6/2009 11:14:25 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@... writes: Hi, Sukin - In a message dated 1/6/2009 10:01:57 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, sukinder@... writes: Hi Howard (and Ken H), ========================= Ken please forgive my oversight in not including you in my salutation in that reply to Sukin! With metta, Howard (Anonymous) #94488 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 7:45 am Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone upasaka_howard Hi, Connie - In a message dated 1/6/2009 12:15:32 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, nichicon@... writes: dear friends, now, for the simile: << "Suppose, O king, the cook in the royal household were to make a syrup or a sauce and were to put into it curds, and salt, and ginger, and cumin seed, and pepper and other ingredients. And suppose the king were to say to him: 'Pick out for me the flavours of the curds and of the salt, and of the ginger, and of the cumin seed, and of the pepper, and of all the things you have put into it.' Now would it be possible, great king, separating off one from another those flavours that had thus run together, to pick out each one, so that one could say: 'Here is the sourness, and here the saltiness, and here the pungency, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness'?" 85 In like manner, it is maintained, we should understand the position of the mental dhammas in relation to one another.86 85. The Questions of King Milinda, trans. T.W. Rhys Davids (reprint: New York, 1963), p.97. 86. For other illustrations, see DhsA 273, MA II 287, Abhvk 293. >> to be continued, connie =============================== Actually, I have an aunt, now in her 90's, who in her younger days taste a dish of any sort and identify every one of the ingredients! ;-) With metta, Howard (Anonymous) #94489 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 7:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. upasaka_howard Hi, Connie - In a message dated 1/6/2009 2:49:27 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, nichicon@... writes: Dear Scott, Howard, TG, All yes, ** there is no such thing as alteration of characteristics ** was the main point to the quote; that the "change" occurring in the moment is not a change in characteristic. And yes, TG, if I believe anything, it's in there somewhere; our readings/interpretations of both the sutta and commentarial portions of it seem to be radically different, though. Howard: So, "heat element" (actually temperature) is always heat element because whatever phenomena have that feature are identified as a matter of convention. connie: "have that"... will TG allow that expression? The word we use to identify "that" is conventional, but neither the "having" nor the "that" is "merely conceptual". It's the old "this, in arising, evokes the/it's own name" thing. peace, connie =========================== At any instant, whatever is, is exactly as it is and not otherwise. But what different-context and different-moment phenomena we identify (each with the other) and what at any instant we view as an entity - these are matters of convention. With metta, Howard Emptiness (From the Uraga Sutta) __________________________ Reality (From the Dvayatanupassana Sutta) #94490 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:13 pm Subject: Re: accumulations nichiconn dear Howard, Howard: It *sounds* to me like 'accumulation' is rather much a matter of metaphor. connie: and maybe this is too apple-orangish, but looking at the "body is old kamma" idea, the same body or person from birth to death, but the body shows the physical side of accumulation. just a thought. peace, connie #94491 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:25 pm Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. nichiconn Hi again, Howard, Howard: At any instant, whatever is, is exactly as it is and not otherwise. But what different-context and different-moment phenomena we identify (each with the other) and what at any instant we view as an entity - these are matters of convention. connie: like your aunt being able to say 'so much ginger, so much clove'. each particular taste being 'entity'? I just keep coming back to the question of whether Buddha taught just a conventional understanding or whether there was something more to it, or, if I can be forgiven the expression: underlying it. peace, connie #94492 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 8:32 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: accumulations upasaka_howard Hi, Connie - In a message dated 1/6/2009 4:13:36 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, nichicon@... writes: dear Howard, Howard: It *sounds* to me like 'accumulation' is rather much a matter of metaphor. connie: and maybe this is too apple-orangish, but looking at the "body is old kamma" idea, the same body or person from birth to death, but the body shows the physical side of accumulation. just a thought. peace, connie ================================ I see the similarity. With metta, Howard (Anonymous) #94493 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 8:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. upasaka_howard Hi, Connie - In a message dated 1/6/2009 4:26:10 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, nichicon@... writes: Hi again, Howard, Howard: At any instant, whatever is, is exactly as it is and not otherwise. But what different-context and different-moment phenomena we identify (each with the other) and what at any instant we view as an entity - these are matters of convention. connie: like your aunt being able to say 'so much ginger, so much clove'. each particular taste being 'entity'? I just keep coming back to the question of whether Buddha taught just a conventional understanding or whether there was something more to it, or, if I can be forgiven the expression: underlying it. peace, connie ============================== I see convention and reality as intermixed elements of experience, with the reality component thought-less and wordless. (Hard to describe.) With metta, Howard Emptiness (From the Uraga Sutta) __________________________ Reality (From the Dvayatanupassana Sutta) #94494 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:41 pm Subject: Re: Void, Coreless, Insubstantial, etc scottduncan2 Dear All, Regarding: TG: "Terms such as -- void, coreless, insubstantial, etc. are NOT terms the merely mean 'no-self,' they are rather aspects of phenomena that are no self....i.e., all phenomena." Scott: From the Su~n~nalokasutta.m (SN 35, 85): "...Void is the world...because it is void of a self and anything belonging to a self' (...su~n~na.m attena vaa attaniyena vaa... )." The Insubstantialist view stems from a great misunderstanding of the meaning of anatta and its synonyms. This view keeps fighting back to the surface (like a drowning sectarian). It is simply an attempt to force a theoretical evolution to suggest that 'voidness' means anything more than 'void of self' and that 'coreless' means anything more than 'without a core of self.' It is an impossibility that a characteristic be a characteristic of nothing, and this is exactly what the Insubstantialist view would suggest. There can be no characteristic of nothing. It goes beyond the mark to eradicate the reality of dhammas and somehow assert that characteristics have some sort of reality though. TG: "...Please do not be mislead by some who would slough off these important terms as mere repetitions of 'no-self.'" Scott: Um, yeah - don't be mislead (whoever you are)... ;-) Sincerely, Scott. #94495 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:44 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone egberdina Hi KenH and TG, 2009/1/4 kenhowardau : > HI TG, > > > Quite often people can read something and get the wrong impression, > can't they? Take a hypothetical case in which someone reads those > sutta quotes and thinks they mean "nothing exists!" > Sorry if I'm doubling up on anything you've already said, TG. Let's take hypothetical Herman. He reads the early suttas, and understands them to teach that there is no soul, no valid basis for the caste system or Brahmanical cosmology, in short, that Brahmanical society is full of BS. > In this hypothetical case that person's friends explain, "The suttas > are saying that the things that really exist are devoid of a lasting > self (atta). The suttas are not saying the things that exist are > somehow devoid of existence. That would be impossible - a > contradiction in terms - wouldn't it?" Yes , it would. > > Then the first person says, "Oh yes, how silly of me, thanks for > pointing that out." And his friends say, "It wasn't silly at all, old > chap, anyone can make a mistake." :-) > > --- > > Now let's take another hypothetical case in which Person A is still > not convinced. His friends point to the ancient commentaries, which > back up what they have already explained. Hypothetical Herman must point out here that the commentaries go way beyond pointing out the BS of Brahmanical society. The suttas point to right view as being no view of existence, or non-existence, but seeing dependent origination. Or his friends say, "These > sutta quotes must be understood in the context of the entire > Tipitaka, mustn't they? > The Buddha was the only teacher who taught > anatta, and he explained it in many different ways to many different > people. If someone were to read one of those explanations and > misunderstand it, that person could remedy his mistake by comparing > the explanation with other explanations in other suttas. Couldn't he? > > "Anatta means there is no permanent being that carries on from past > to present to future. Some people in the Buddha's day thought (like > you do) that anatta might have meant there was nothing at all. (!) To > them the Buddha explained that he was not one of the teachers who > taught "nothing exists:" he was one of the teachers who > taught "things do exist." Not quite. He taught DO. DO is a process, not a thing. He certainly taught that the process of DO was happening. > And what were those things? They were > citta, cetasika and rupa. They were the things that bore inherent > characteristics, one of which was anatta (no permanent self or soul)." It is not only Brahmanical society that is full of BS :-) It is interesting to note that when a revolutionary like the Buddha comes along and upturns the apple cart of mainstream views, the next generations will just revert to the same old views, just with new labels on them. > > If, in this hypothetical case, person A is still not convinced then > his friends must consider the possibility that he has another agenda. > Maybe he is a spy from one of those naughty externalist teachings and > is just trying to lure people away from the true teaching (of > anatta). > > So what if he is? Even in such an extreme case it still wouldn't hurt > to discuss the Dhamma with him - for as long as he was willing. > Maybe at some time - in this life or in a future life - he will > benefit from it. In the long run, may we all come to understand that there is no loss or gain, no progress or regress, but only never-ending gress. Cheers Herman (hypothetically) #94496 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 2:01 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] re: cornerstone egberdina Hi connie, 2009/1/5 connie : > dear friends, > > how does this sound: > > there is no point to even saying 'conventional reality' if there is no *other kind* - it would be as redundant as 'paramattha dhamma.' You are quite right. If everything has/is the same characteristic, it means the characteristic is unknown. We do know characteristics absolutely, but only in relation to other characteristics. We know this characteristic in relation to not-this characteristic. Cheers Herman #94497 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 2:20 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Understanding White Powder - Section 1 egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/6 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Regarding: > > H: "I used to be ye typical church organist. Now I am just a dabbler, > piano mainly." > > Scott: You've got to get a Hammond, man! > You're making me dribble out the sides of my mouth :-) I used to have a Hammond clone, with a standalone Leslie. It was sweet. I traded it in........ for my first computer. Ignorance abounds :-) Cheers Herman #94498 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 2:32 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/6 Scott : > Dear Nina, > > > Scott: Thank you very much, Nina. I agree with you. Impersonal is > impersonal through-and-through. No need to dilute the Dhamma. > > Some speak against such statements out of the terror of realising > anatta. Some speak against such statements out of the need to see > one's self as a helper or a kind person. > > You say 'kusala is kusala' and there is no 'person.' You > say 'kusala is kusala regardless of whether an other sees it or > not.' You say 'these are not welcome words to everybody.' > > I say there never was, nor ever will there be, a person outside of > one's thoughts about persons. The fact of the matter remains that stating this does not end thinking about persons. If this is the sum total of the Dhamma, then the Dhamma is a mere tautology. I say you're not the first person to > speak these words. > > This is the Dhamma. > Cheers Herman #94499 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 2:50 pm Subject: Re: Further Consideration Re: [dsg] Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Co... egberdina Hi RobertE, 2009/1/6 Robert Epstein : > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" > wrote: > I hope you don't mind if I carry on with the discussion, even though I think we understand each other already. But I find it interesting and useful to consider the implications of what you say. > > Why is it useful then to bracket out the concept of self? To me, it > is for a different enterprise, not for walking or learning, but for > the investigation into identity, which I think is important in > spiritual study. Do you bracket out your past in such an investigation? I see my past as being specifically mine, and no-one else's. My past is absolute in that it is unchangeable, and I can never not have been it. I am identified by my past. > > When one thinks the "I" is real in addition to the organism and other > things, one tends to worry about oneself and protect one's interests > in a way that is beyond simple instrumentality. There is a kingdom > built up around the "I" and one tends to defend it. To me, that is > the usefulness in deconstructing this concept. > I can see value in what you say, but there is something missing. And that is "the other". Being self-centred on a desert island is not harmful. It is only in the company of others that excessive self-interest, and the defence of self-interest is harmful. But, this raises the question. If we're going to deconstruct the notion of "I", don't we thereby deconstruct the notion of other "I" 's as well, and thereby end up living as though on a desert island anyway? Please don't feel obliged to carry on if you're not inclined to do so. Cheers Herman #94500 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 2:54 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "The fact of the matter remains that stating this does not end thinking about persons..." Scott: Of course it doesn't, Herman. It seems a truism to have to make that statement. H: "...If this is the sum total of the Dhamma, then the Dhamma is a mere tautology." Scott: How so? Sincerely, Scott. #94501 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 2:57 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Understanding White Powder - Section 1 scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding (the Unthinkable): H: "...I used to have a Hammond clone, with a standalone Leslie. It was sweet. I traded it in........ for my first computer. Ignorance abounds" :-) Scott: OMG - seriously. Sincerely, Scott. #94502 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 3:07 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Reply re White Powder Commentary from Kith egberdina Hi Keith, 2009/1/7 keithhenriques : > I am still having difficulty posting. > Perhaps, I am not yet authorized. Welcome to the group. Perhaps you are not receiving all the emails? You can go to the dhammastudy group on Yahoo and read them there if you like. Sarah sent this email yesterday as part of a reply to your first post. "[Also, pls any newcomers (and some oldcomers) be patient as we need to 'clear' your messages initially.]" > > Hello Herman: > I wonder how arguments relating the assertian that the ayatanas > are "central to > experience in Theravada" may relate to the four Asavas: > The Asava of sensuality > The Asava of rebirth > The Asava of speculative oppinion (especially vain conceits, madness > and or infactuation). > The Asava of ingnorance > > Thank you for your kind considerations. Thank you for your question. I see it this way. The ayatanas follow nama-rupa and precede sensation / contact in all versions of DO that I am aware of. That is enough to make the ayatanas central to experience in Theravada. In relation to the asavas, some of these have their place in some versions of DO, and not in others. Sensuality and rebirth are the domain of craving, which follows feeling in DO. Ignorance, in some versions of DO is the beginning of the cycle. The asava of views seems to be an odd one out. What do you think? Cheers Herman #94503 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 3:18 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/7 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Regarding: > > H: "The fact of the matter remains that stating this does not end > thinking about persons..." > > Scott: Of course it doesn't, Herman. It seems a truism to have to > make that statement. > > H: "...If this is the sum total of the Dhamma, then the Dhamma > is a mere tautology." > > Scott: How so? > You wrote: > I say there never was, nor ever will there be, a person outside of > one's thoughts about persons. You seemed to be acknowledging the reality of one's thinking about persons. I read you to mean that apart from persons thinking about persons, there are no persons. It sounded much like "without persons there are no persons" to me. Perhaps I read you wrong? Or is tautology the wrong term to use? But even so, the Dhamma does include many, many 'train yourself thus" 's and they must be included in any summation of what the Dhamma is. Cheers Herman #94504 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 3:20 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "...being a former Theravadin monk..." Scott: Very cool, TG. Anumodaana, man. I'm glad to know this about you! Sincerely, Scott. #94505 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Mon Jan 5, 2009 9:56 pm Subject: Nona Crema Persona Suprema! bhikkhu0 Friends: There are only these Nine Superior and Noble Persons! The perfectly self-awakened Buddha... (SammaSamBuddho) The solitary self-awakened Buddha... (Paccekasambuddho) The one released both ways... (Ubhatobhāgavimutto) The one released by understanding... (Paññavimutto) The body-witness of direct experience... (Kāyasakkhī) The view-winner of true comprehension... (Ditthipattto) The one released by faith... (Saddhāvimutto) The one guided by Dhamma... (Dhammānusārī) The one guided by faith... (Saddhānusārī) 1: What sort of person is an perfectly self-awakened Buddha? Here a certain person who, in regard to teachings he has not heard of before, himself thoroughly understands the 4 noble truths and attains the omniscience thereof as well as complete mastery over the fruitions! This sort of person is said to be a perfectly self-awakened Buddha... 2: What sort of person is a solitary self-awakened Buddha? Here a certain person who, in regard to teachings he has not heard of before, himself thoroughly understands the 4 noble truths, but attains neither the omniscience, nor the mastery over the fruitions thereof... This sort of person is said to be a solitary self-awakened Buddha... 3: What sort of person is released in both ways? Here a certain person himself experiencing directly & touches bodily the eight stages of liberation, and furthermore by comprehending them by understanding, his mental fermentations are completely eliminated. This sort of person is said to be one released in both ways... 4: What sort of person is released by understanding? Here a certain person without experiencing the eight stages of liberation, but having perceived them through understanding, his mental fermentations are completely eliminated. Such one is one released by understanding... 5: What sort of person is a body-witness of direct experience? Here a certain person himself experiences the eight stages of liberation, and yet having perceived them also through understanding, only some of his mental fermentations are completely eliminated. This sort of person is said to be a body-witness of direct experience... 6: What sort of person is one, who has won view? Here a certain person truly understands, that this is suffering , that such is the cause of suffering, that such is the ceasing of suffering, and that such is the Way leading to the ceasing of suffering. The teachings explained by the Thus-come-thus-gone One, are comprehended by him and also practised! Yet having comprehended them, only some of his mental fermentations are eliminated. Such person is a Noble view-winner of straight comprehension... 7: What sort of person is released by Faith ? Here a certain person truly understands that this is suffering , that such is the cause of suffering, that such is the ceasing of suffering, and that such is the Way leading to the ceasing of suffering. The teachings explained by the Thus-come-thus-gone One, are comprehended by him and also practised! Yet having comprehended them, only some of his mental fermentations are completely eliminated, though not in the same way, nor to the same degree as the view-winner. This sort of person is said to be one released by faith. 8: What sort of person is one guided by Dhamma? The ability of understanding of a person, who is about to realize the fruition stage of a stream-attainer develops quite much, when he cultivates the noble way , which brings with it understanding and is initiated by understanding... This sort of person is said to be one guided by Dhamma. Such a person striving after the fruition stage of stream-attaining is one guided by Dhamma, while the same person established in the fruition is one who has won view. 9: What sort of person is one guided by Faith ? The ability of Faith of one about to realize the fruition stage of stream-attaining develops to a large extent. He cultivates the noble way , which brings with it faith and is initiated by faith . This sort of person is said to be one guided by faith . Such a person striving after the fruit of stream-attaining is one guided by faith, while the same person established in the fruition is released by faith. Source: The 4th Higher Science = Abhidhamma Book: The Personality Concept: Puggala-Paññatti. http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=130096 <....> Have a nice day!a Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) ... Nona Crema Persona Suprema! #94506 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 4:54 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "You wrote: 'I say there never was, nor ever will there be, a person outside of one's thoughts about persons.' You seemed to be acknowledging the reality of one's thinking about persons. I read you to mean that apart from persons thinking about persons, there are no persons. It sounded much like 'without persons there are no persons' to me. Perhaps I read you wrong? Or is tautology the wrong term to use?" Scott: Okay, I see where you're coming from now. Yes, I'd say 'tautology' is the wrong term. I would suggest that this is more in the realm of a paradox. First of all, I accept that there is a distinction to be made between sammutti sacca (conventional truth) and paramattha sacca (ultimate truth). Second of all, I accept that these distinct modes of expression refer to the same truth - they do not represent separate truths as these would be mutually exclusive. This is why I suggest that one is dealing here with a (n apparent?) paradox. The paradox is that, although there never is, never was, nor will there ever be a person (paramattha sacca), a person (sammutti sacca) conceives of persons, i.e., 'person' is merely conceptual. The 'conceiving' is not done by a person when considered according to paramattha sacca. H: "But even so, the Dhamma does include many, many 'train yourself thus''s and they must be included in any summation of what the Dhamma is." Scott: Thinking by way of sammutti sacca, one talks of persons training themselves. Thinking by way of paramattha sacca, 'training' is the not-subject-to-control-but-subject-only-to-conditions unfolding and development of dhammas arising and falling away. No person. It is a mere convention to speak of persons. This is anatta. Sincerely, Scott. #94507 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 1:15 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone TGrand458@... Hi Herman I like sound of "Hypothetical Herman." I think it would make a great cartoon character. ;-) TG OUT #94508 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 6:40 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner sarahprocter... Dear All in the Metta corner (esp. those who still believe they should direct/radiate metta to themselves!!), A little repetition for emphasis.... --- On Sat, 3/1/09, Scott wrote: The Path of Purification. "......But this [initial development towards oneself] refers to [making oneself] an example. For even if he developed lovingkindness for a hundred or a thousand years in this way, 'I am happy' and so on, absorption would never arise. But if he develops it in this way: 'I am happy. Just as I want to be happy and dread pain, as I want to live and not to die, so do other beings, too', making himself the example, then desire for other beings' welfare and happiness arises in him. And this method is indicated by the Blessed One's saying: 'I visited all quarters with my mind Nor found I any dearer than myself; Self is likewise to every other dear; Who loves himself will never harm another' (S.i,75; Ud 47)." **** Sarah: #38798 After King Pasenadi and Queen Mallika concluded that indeed there was No one dearer than themselves, the Buddha spoke these lines in Udana, 5- 1, `Dear' (Masefield trans): "Having explored all quarters with the mind, one would simply not attain That dearer than the self in any place; thus is the self dear separately To others - therefore one desiring self should not harm another." The commentary adds: ".....One would simply not attain that dearer than the self in any place (n'ev'ajjhagaapiyataram attanaa kvaci): whatever man, seeking out with every endeavour someone else (more) excessively dear than the self, would neither attain nor behold (such) in any place, anywhere in the (ten) quarters.Thus is the self dear separately to others (evam piyo puthu attaa paresa.m): thus is the self alone dear separately, severally, to this and that being, by way of the non-discovery of anyone dearer than the self. "Therefore one desiring self should not harm another (tasmaa na hi.mse param attakaama): since each being holds the self dear in that way, isone desiring happiness for that self, one for whom dukkha is repulsive, therefore one desiring self, in wanting well-being and happiness for that self, should not harm, should not kill, should not even antagonise with the hand....and so on, another being, upwards from and including even a mere ant or (other) samll insect. for when dukkha is caused by oneself to some other, that (dukkha) is, after an interval of time, observed in one's (own) self, as though it were passing over therefrom. For this is the law of karma." ***** #69419 S: We hold ourselves very dear with attachment. No need to hold ourselves any dearer! We're already obsessed with our own wishes! But as indicated in the Udana, the Buddha reminded us to appreciate that just as we hold ourselves so 'dear', we can also appreciate the same is true for others. Therefore we should treat everyone with friendliness and kindness when we have the chance. #45968 S: What we take for Self, rightly or wrongly. Whether or not there is any understanding at any level about the 5 khandhas, still it is oneself that we find most dear with or without wrong view. Even for a sotapanna, it is 'his' or 'her' rupas, vedanas, sannas, sankharas and vinnanas that are held most dear. For example, at a funeral, what do we weep for it it's not out of attachment to our own feeling etc? Metta, Sarah ======== #94509 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 7:01 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] cornerstone sarahprocter... Hi Connie & others along the way, I'll be chipping in belatedly with some of my comments, now I know we don't all have to be in agreement, thanks Ken H, lol. In brief, Herman, I think some parts a)are very helpful, some b) are mixed, some c) I don't follow and some d) wrong.... Here's a mixed bag without much of the a): --- On Sat, 3/1/09, connie wrote: >Karunadasa continues: >The description of dhammas as paramattha means not only their objective existence (paramatthato vijjamanata) but also their cognizability in an ultimate sense (paramatthato upalabbhamanata) .73 The first refers to the fact that the dhammas obtain as the ultimate, irreducible data of empirical existence. The second refers to the fact that, as such, the content of our cognition can also be finally analysed into the self-same elements. This is not to suggest that it is only the dhammas that become objects of knowledge; for it is specifically stated that even pannattis, i.e. concepts, which are the products of the synthetical function of the mind and hence lack objective counterparts, are also knowable (neyya).74 73. See VsmM 227; Mvn 258; ItiA 142. 74. Abhvk 445. .... S: Pannattis - In what sense "knowable" is the question. "Pannattis....products of the synthetical function of the mind..". Does this mean they are thought about? Wasn't "synthetical" the word used to describe the Patthana? Does this mean the understanding of conditions is thought about? And btw, what texts do Mvn and Abhvk refer to? Can we check the "supporting refs here?" (By we, I mean anyone except me as I don't have texts here. I'm looking f/w to ItiA - but still hadn't arrived by the time we left.....) ... c for K:> In point of fact, in the technical terminology of the Abhidhamma, the term dhamma is sometimes used in a wider sense to include anything that is knowable.75 In this sense, not only the ultimate realities -- the dhammas proper -- but also the products of mental interpretation are called dhammas. To distinguish the two, the latter are called asabhava-dhammas, i.e. dhammas devoid of objective reality. .... S: Hmmmm - But asabhava dhammas are not pannattis, concepts (the products of that "synthetical function"). For example, space element, the intimations or the arising etc of rupas are asabhava dhammas but not concepts. ... >76 The use of this term in this wider sense is reminiscent of its earlier meaning as shown in the Pali Nikayas, where it is used in a very general sense to include all cognizable things on the empirical level. However, there is this situation to be noted: Although both dhammas and concepts (pannattis or asabhava-dhammas) constitute the content of knowledge, it is into the dhammas that the content of knowledge can be finally analysed. Thus there is a close parallelism between the dhammas on the one hand and the contents of knowledge on the other. That is to say, the ultimate irreducible data of cognition are the subjective counterparts of the ultimate irreducible data of objective existence. .... S: Now we come to a good example of "c) I don't follow". As the essay suggests, isn't it all a 'theory' without any understanding of dhammas, realities to be directly known? Metta, Sarah ====== #94510 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 7:09 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation sarahprocter... Hi Herman (& Ken H), --- On Sun, 4/1/09, Herman Hofman wrote: >AN 2:125-126 "Monks, there are these two conditions for the arising of wrong view. Which two? The voice of another and inappropriate attention. These are the two conditions for the arising of wrong view." "Monks, there are these two conditions for the arising of right view. Which two? The voice of another and appropriate attention. These are the two conditions for the arising of right view." .... S: I like the quote:-) I'll leave the further discussion to Ken! It all comes down to what is heard and how it's attended to, of course.... White powder in the news even here in Suva - the American consulate is closed because of a white powder offering.... There's no escape except through the development of the 8fold Path. Metta, Sarah p.s lovely Fijian music in the background as I type.....not an escape either, of course:-). ========= #94511 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 2:27 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Void, Coreless, Insubstantial, etc TGrand458@... Dear All Side note: Scott has vowed to stop discussing with me (TG) so we are now apparently addressing our responses to each other by addressing care of "All." LOL In a message dated 1/6/2009 2:41:57 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear All, Regarding: TG: "Terms such as -- void, coreless, insubstantial, etc. are NOT terms the merely mean 'no-self,' they are rather aspects of phenomena that are no self....i.e.phenomena that are no Scott: From the Su~n~nalokasutta.Scott: From the Su "...Void is the world...because it is void of a self and anything belonging to a self' ............................................... TG: This is exactly as I have stated. That these terms are aspects of 'no-self' and not just a replacement of no-self. Shall we go deeper and look at Sutta terms calling the Five Aggregates -- Illusion, alien, coreless, insubstantail? No. We dare not go further. (Monsanto's Inner Space Disney ride reference.) ................................................. (...su~n~na.(...su~n~na.m attena vaa atta The Insubstantialist view stems ..................................................... TG: Let me finish this sentence for Scott. The insubstantialist view stems ... from a Sutta where the Buddha say that the Five Aggregates are insubstantial. LOL Now, lets' look below and see what Scott wrote shall we? .......................................................... from a great misunderstanding of the meaning of anatta and its synonyms. This view keeps fighting back to the surface (like a drowning sectarian). .......................................................... TG: I hope that "drowning sectarian," AKA The Buddha, has dried up by now. This is just too easy. ................................................... It is simply an attempt to force a theoretical evolution to suggest that 'voidness' means anything more than 'void of self' and that 'coreless' means anything more than 'without a core of self.' ........................................................ TG: This point would have some validity IF the terms were solely directed toward "whole aggregations" such as 'persons," "animals," "trees," etc. However, the term "self," as in 'no-self.' is dealing with the elements/aggregates "themselves." Why would the Buddha speak of an "element" and say THAT was no-self? And say THAT element was void, coreless, insubstantial, alien, illusion, like a mirage, like a trick? This takes thing to a whole different level. There is no "forced theoretical evolution" as Scott would suggest. The terms and usage are in the source/Suttas. It is the evolution of the commentaries that are haplessly unable to resolve the original presentation of the Buddha. Well, in light of that, let me correct myself. There IS a "forced theoretical evolution" ... and it comes to us from the Commentaries. .............................................................. It is an impossibility that a characteristic be a characteristic of nothing, and this is exactly what the Insubstantialist view would suggest. .................................................... TG: I was uncertain if Scott understood the "conditionality position" or not. Now I am certain...he doesn't. He's on the same page as Ken H. Repeating... the "insubstantialist view" was presented by the Buddha. :-) But if it makes Scott happy to continuously disparage it, I'm happy for him and I hope it brings him closer to enlightenment. Phenomena arise in complete dependence. The qualities that appear do indeed appear, but lack anything "of themselves." They are always 'hollow' of themselves and constantly changing. It is how the mind "handles" the experiencing of phenomena will determine whether affliction grows or diminishes. The building up of phenomena into "ultimate realities," that one is supposed to deeply indulge in, is on the side of attachment as I see it. Phenomena/elements/aggregates need to be detached from, even if they are to be seen as "murderers, death, a disease, a dart." Indeed, the Buddha has directed his students minds to see phenomena in these ways, but NOT as ultimate realities with their own characteristics.. It would be infinitely more accurate to claim the Buddha taught that "consciousness" (for example) was a dart (as a mere metaphor of pain)...than to claim he taught it was an ultimate reality. Ultimate realities and Own characteristics are not even addressed in the Suttas. It seems that a commentarial view that claims these are the crux of the matter, could find the Buddha saying such at least once. As Johnnie Cochran might have said -- If you can't come up with quotes, your arguments a hoax. TG OUT #94512 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 2:32 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... You're not supposed to be writing to me Scott. ;-) Oh, it was a long time ago and I don't like to bring it up, but I wanted to make the case I was no enemy of Theravada ... which you sometimes seem to suggest. But thanks I guess. TG In a message dated 1/6/2009 4:20:32 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear TG, Regarding: TG: "...being a former Theravadin monk..." Scott: Very cool, TG. Anumodaana, man. I'm glad to know this about you! Sincerely, Scott. #94513 From: "Scott" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 7:54 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear All (ha ha), TG: "You're not supposed to be writing to me Scott. ;-)" Scott: Ah cannae help mesel. TG: "Oh, it was a long time ago and I don't like to bring it up, but I wanted to make the case I was no enemy of Theravada ... which you sometimes seem to suggest." Scott: Maybe not then, but somehow you went rogue later on... ;-) TG: "But thanks I guess." Scott: You're welcome, I'm sure. I still think its cool. Sincerely, Scott. #94514 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 8:37 pm Subject: Re: cornerstone nichiconn Thanks, Sarah - and Ken! Looking forward to having some of my unquestioned assumptions blown out of the water! S: Pannattis - In what sense "knowable" is the question. "Pannattis....products of the synthetical function of the mind..". Does this mean they are thought about? Wasn't "synthetical" the word used to describe the Patthana? Does this mean the understanding of conditions is thought about? And btw, what texts do Mvn and Abhvk refer to? c: hmmm... or at least learning a bit more about what it means to read critically. Sorry I can't help with Abhvk, etc... I don't remember seeing any 'abbreviations' section on the web editions. karunadasa: In this sense, not only the ultimate realities -- the dhammas proper -- but also the products of mental interpretation are called dhammas. To distinguish the two, the latter are called asabhava-dhammas, i.e. dhammas devoid of objective reality. .... S: Hmmmm - But asabhava dhammas are not pannattis, concepts (the products of that "synthetical function"). For example, space element, the intimations or the arising etc of rupas are asabhava dhammas but not concepts. c: ok. The arising etc of rupas would be somewhat different from 'the time of' arising etc? Asl 58-59 (p.78): To expand: Time is only a concept derived from this or that phenomenon, such as (a) states expressed in such phrases as, 'temporal (aspect of) mind,' 'temporal (aspect of) matter'; (b) the phenomenal occurrence expressed by such phrases as 'the past' and 'the future'; (c) the phenomenal succession in an organism expressed by 'the time of seed-germination' and 'the time of sprouting'; [59] (d) the characteristic marks of phenomena expressed by 'the time of genesis' and 'the time of decay'; (e) the functions of phenomena expressed by 'the time of feeling,' and 'the time of cognizing'; (f) functions of beings expressed by 'the time of bathing' and 'the time of drinking'; (g) the modes of posture expressed by 'the time of going' and 'the time of stopping'; (h) the revolution of the moon, sun, etc., expressed by 'morning, evening, day, and night'; or (i) the grouping of days and nights, etc., into periods expressed by 'half-month,' 'month.' It should be understood that this (abstract time) is a mere concept, because it is not existing by its own nature. c: can you help me with this one then? Asl 225 (p304): Of the three Paths, the Path of one emerging by means of impermanence is the Signless; that of one emerging by means of ill is the Undesired; that of one emerging by means of soullesness is the Empty. Thus by the Suttanta expositions it has brought out and shown. But (to object:) what has insight leading to emergence for its object? The three characteristics. What is called a characteristic is the same as a concept, and it is not a state that can be said to be limited or sublime, etc. And whoso discerns the three characteristics as impermanence, ill, soullessness, to him the five aggregates become like a corpse tied to his neck. Knowledge, having the complexes as its object, emerges from them. So a bhikkhu, desirious of buying a bowl, might see one brought by a bowl-merchant, and glad and delighted would think, 'I will take it.' On examining it he might see holes, whereupon he loses all attachment, not for the holes, but for the bowl. Similarly, noting the three characteristics [the student] has no further attachment for conditioned things. He transcends any such thing by means of knowledge, having such thing as object. peace, connie #94515 From: "glenjohnann" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 9:01 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] accumulations, was: cornerstone glenjohnann Hello Nina --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > -------- > N: What is accumulated is not the cetasikas that arise at present > with the citta. Perhaps that solves the problem? > It is a fact that what was learnt before or done before conditions > the present moment. But we have no way how that happens exactly. We > only know that each citta conditions the next one by way of > contiguity-condition. There is the natural strong deoendence- > condition, pakatupanissaya-paccaya. > Nina. So, when we have been talking about accumulations, what we are really meaning is conditions? Can you elaborate (or set me straight if I am not clear on this). Ann #94516 From: TGrand458@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 4:09 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Scott In a message dated 1/6/2009 8:54:45 P.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear All (ha ha), TG: "You're not supposed to be writing to me Scott. ;-)" Scott: Ah cannae help mesel. ........................................... TG: LOL That's pretty good. ............................................ TG: "Oh, it was a long time ago and I don't like to bring it up, but I wanted to make the case I was no enemy of Theravada ... which you sometimes seem to suggest." Scott: Maybe not then, but somehow you went rogue later on... ;-) ............................................................. TG: I dis-rogued that's why. ;-) TG OUT #94517 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 9:28 pm Subject: The Ideal Person! bhikkhu0 Friends: Which 7 Knowledges makes a Person Ideal? 1: Knower of the Dhamma, Principles, and Causes (Dhammaññūtā): The ideal monastic person knows the speeches, the sayings, the stories, & the poems of the Buddha. He furthermore knows all the inspirations, question/answer sessions & commentarial explanations. The ideal lay person knows the right principles of lay life, & what is rational & advantageous to do. He knows and understands the duties & responsibilities of his own & other posts & occupations. 2: Knower of the Goals, Objectives, and Meanings (Atthaññūtā): The ideal monastic person fully knows the complete meaning of this and that speech and text. The ideal lay person knows the aim of his duty, or occupation & the real purpose of life: Happiness! 3: Knower of Oneself (Mattaññūtā): The ideal monastic person knows how far he remembers the texts, & how deep he reaches in meditation. He is aware of how far his moral purity, his faith, energy, awareness, concentration, & understanding is. The ideal lay person knows his exact status, level, strength, knowledge, ability, & degree of morality. He then acts accordingly and does what is needed to improve and reach greater & higher maturity. 4: Knower of Moderation (Attaññūtā): The ideal monastic person knows moderation in using any alms food, robes, lodgings, and medicines. The ideal lay person knows moderation in consumption, spending, speech, work, rest, & recreation. 5: Knower of Right Occasion (Kalaññūtā): The ideal monastic person knows the right time for study, meditation, practical work, & solitude. The ideal lay person knows the proper and punctual occasion for any dealing with other people. 6: Knower of Groups (Parisaññūtā): The ideal monastic person knows any group of Nobles, priests, recluses, and householders and how one ideally should approach, sit, speak, & behave in any such group for the greatest mutual advantage. The ideal lay person knows individual differences, temperaments, abilities, & virtues of other people. He knows this community have these rules & regulations; culture & tradition; they have these needs. 7: Knower of Persons (Puggalaññūtā): The ideal monastic person knows those who wish to see Nobles, hear true Dhamma, & pay attention. He knows those who are aware, testing, learning, & who acts accordingly. He knows those who do not. The ideal lay person knows whether particular other people should be associated with, what can be learned from them, & how they should be related to, employed, praised, criticized, advised, & taught. Source: AN IV 113. <...> Have a nice day! Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) http://What-Buddha-Said.net The Ideal Person! #94518 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 11:06 pm Subject: Further Consideration Re: [dsg] Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Co... epsteinrob Hi Herman! I am happy to carry on with this interesting discussion. Rob E: > > Why is it useful then to bracket out the concept of self? To me, it > > is for a different enterprise, not for walking or learning, but for > > the investigation into identity, which I think is important in > > spiritual study. > Herman: > Do you bracket out your past in such an investigation? > > I see my past as being specifically mine, and no-one else's. My past > is absolute in that it is unchangeable, and I can never not have been > it. I am identified by my past. Herman, I have a slightly different take on this. First of all, I don't see the past as an immutable "thing." There is no "is past" if you don't mind the clunky philosophical category; meaning that the past is nothing other than a collection of thoughts, memories, reflections, impressions, misapprehensions at times, reconsiderations, that arise in particular patterns, some redundant, but still always changing. As time goes on, one's memories may change, some will be emphasized, others de-emphasized; even some events that others may have identified you with will be gone and they will associate you with others. So I don't actually agree that the past is immutable and defines you. In fact, I think it is constantly shifting like everything else, has plenty of interchangeable components and in fact it is your attention and that of others, and the values you have at any given time that defines the past and creates it as what is appears to be. For instance, I used to be a smoker when I was quite young, and gave it up in my '20s. After that I was a yoga teacher for about 15 years, and no one would believe that I used to smoke. There was a period of time when I was always identified with a cigarette and used to draw on them pretty hard too. It was part of a "tough" image I had as a kid with people who knew me then. I was also called "Bobby" then. When I was a yoga teacher in my mid-twenties and beyond, I didn't have a tough image and I didn't smoke. I had decided to go in a different direction. When I thought of cigarettes during that period it seemed like a weird dream or aberration, not really "me" and others felt that way too. Now I'm in yet another phase as an acting teacher. My work with yoga has receded a bit in my mind and people know me in a completely different way. I'm also older and don't identify with a lot of things I thought about myself when I was younger. Women used to look at me in a certain way when I was young and I looked a certain way. Now I notice that women look at me like a Dad or an older guy. It's a different identity to be sure. So my past, you could say, has been "transformed" several times, and there are different available sets of memories that slide into place quite conveniently to match my chosen identity. I don't think it's fixed *at all.* In fact, even now, in my social world, the set of memories I have in common with my child are quite different than the ones I have with my old friends. My child is the only one in the world I think who sees me as the "protector-sometimes mean-weird beloved-get me food-math homework guy." And my wife has a certain set of ideas about me. I don't even think there's one "me" to hang onto really, even conventionally, but a set of roles that I carry on with according to the situation. > > When one thinks the "I" is real in addition to the organism and other > > things, one tends to worry about oneself and protect one's interests > > in a way that is beyond simple instrumentality. > > I can see value in what you say, but there is something missing. And > that is "the other". Being self-centred on a desert island is not > harmful. It is only in the company of others that excessive > self-interest, and the defence of self-interest is harmful. But, this > raises the question. If we're going to deconstruct the notion of "I", > don't we thereby deconstruct the notion of other "I" 's as well, and > thereby end up living as though on a desert island anyway? Herman, I don't see the logic in this. It appears to me that by de-emphasizing the "I" we become more available to others, not less. The idea that we have to ignore others or isolate ourselves because we do not see them as "I"s or ourselves as "I"s does not make sense to me. Let's say you are all wrapped up in what is important to you, because you [generic you] is busy serving the "I." A guy asks you the time and you think "G*ddamn it, I've got to get to work; why is this guy bothering me?" and you register irritation. This is all because of the "I" being served. You're not honoring this other guy's "I." You wish he would get out of your way, so you're treating him like an object, not a person, anyway. Now let's say you have put the "I" aside and you are just going about your business. You're not drooling into your shirt or anything by losing the "I" emphasis, you just aren't busy thinking about yourself like an island to defend unto itself; you're just doing whatever is appropriate at the time. You still go to work, etc., but you're not worried about "what's going to happen to poor me." So you run into this same guy and he asks you the time, and you stop pleasantly and say "Gee, it's 9 am. Is there anything else I can do for you?" because your self-serving interest is out of the way. Perhaps you even think to yourself "Well I may be a little bit late because of this, but this guy needs a bit of assistance, so I'll just give him a moment of my time." And he says "Well actually I'm looking for a store that sells flowers." So you direct him down the street, etc. Then you happily go to work, pleased that you were able to help someone out on the way to work. The fact that you are not thinking "I I I" does not make him invisisble, it just makes you more available. So I would say it is the opposite - the "I" makes you an isolated island, it is a barrier; and getting it out of the way makes you more perceptive of others and more available to help. I can think of many examples, but I'll save some space at this point. > Please don't feel obliged to carry on if you're not inclined to do so. It's a lovely conversation and one of my favorite topics. I'll look forward to your response. [Now I'm getting too nice; I'll have to sharpen up. :-) ] Best, Robert ================================== #94519 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 11:17 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "jonoabb" wrote: > > Hi Robert > > > > The more developed the understanding of the individual, the less > idea > > > of a "self" in relation to this or that person. > > > > > > Jon > > > > > > > Hi Jon! > > So would you say that ultimately one is sending metta to the kandhas > > without any view of an aggregated being? > > As I said in an earlier post, to my understanding, the enlightened > being still thinks in terms of people and things, but he/she does so > without any misconception as to the the way things are in truth and > reality. > > So, for the enlightened being, no longer any idea of "self", but > thinking follows the same accustomed patterns. > > For example, in the case of a sotapanna who is a householder, wife > and children are still wife and children. > > No need to "deny" conceptual references for the sake of it! > > Jon > Hi Jon. I understand how for practical purposes you would continue to think conventionally, but without the idea of self. But it still confuses me why you would do so in metta practice, where I think you would be wanting to send the metta to the reality, not the convention. I cannot get this clear. If I know the beings I am sending metta to do not actually exist as such, but are just shifting collections of kandhas, why not send the metta to these kandhas in the hope that they will be pacified and be at peace, rather than reifying them into concepts of beings? Thanks, Robert ============================== #94520 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 11:23 pm Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "sprlrt" wrote: > A: Here are some quotes that might help a bit, beginning from the last > parapraph of MN1 sutta (Nanamoli-Bodhi transl.): > > 194. ... "That is what the Blessed one said. But those bhikkhus did > not [! ! !] delight in the Blessed One's word." > BB note: "MA explains that the Buddha delivered this sutta to dispel > the conceit that had arisen in 500 bhikkhus on account of their > erudition and intellectual mastery of the Buddha's teachings." > > (The Ordinary Person) > 3. Here bhikkhus, an untaught ordinary person [putujjana puggala], who > has no regard for noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in > their Dhamma.... > perceives [sanna, i.e. remembers] earth as earth. Having perceived > earth as earth... > > (The Disciple in Higher training) > 27. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is in higher training [an ariya puggala, > non yet an arahant], whose mind has not yet reached the goal, and who > is still aspiring to the supreme security from bondage.... > directly knows [abhijaanaati, i.e. through satipatthana] earth as > earth. Having directly known earth as earth... > > Also MN 72: > > 18. This Dhamma, Vaccha, is profound, hard to see and understand, > peaceful and sublime, unattainable by mere reasoning [! ! !], subtle, > to be experienced by the wise. It is hard to understand when you hold > another view, accept another view, accept another teaching, pursue a > different training and follow a different teacher. > > A: The pali words in the SN 22.95, Khanda Vagga which can be > interpreted to say that dhammas are not real in an absolute sense are > three, PED entries: Hi Alberto. Would it be correct to summarize by saying that these quotes support the idea that physical dhammas are insubstantial? I am having a bit of a hard time deciphering them. Thanks, Rob E ---------------------------- #94521 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 11:34 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob Hi Scott! --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Scott" wrote: > Scott: We don't 'turn' anything into anything. A paramattha dhamma > differs totally from the notion of a Platonic form. Paramattha > dhammas are not concepts, mental constructs, ideas, or even > archetypes. They are realities which exist. They are not further > reducible nor do they reflect some higher order reality of which they > are some copy. They are not amenable to control. Apart from > Nibbaana, the conditioned realities are actually arising and falling > away, functioning while present, and, if naama, serve as the actual > experience we all mistake for self. Dear Scott, I do not see the basis for the establishment of a view that there are actual physical or other objects that are frozen in particular moments and have an absolute nature. If this were so, how do they fall away? When they do, they change, they have phases of becoming, being and falling away according to the Abhidhamma. So how long do each of these phases take? And in what sense does something that has phases have an absolute reality? This seems contradictory to me. It seems instead, that like all dhammas, they have a shifting, becoming, decaying reality and that there is no point at which an absolute characteristic can be identified that is not in the process of change. I don't pretend to know what a dhamma actually is unto itself. That is the business of philosophers and they have never reached any final conclusion. When we speak of a certain characteristic and say that is *the* characteristic of a particular object, we are choosing it for emphasis. Even this characteristic must be changing and shifting as the object becomes and then decays, so how can it be absolute? Our perception is limited in the sense that we only see what our mundane senses allow. If we went beyond the mundane senses, likely what we would see is the full process of becoming and falling away which applies to all the kandhas, and all things in this life. As you say, Nibbana is a separate issue, upon which I am not qualified to speak and will not speculate at the present time. Best, Robert ================================== #94522 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 11:38 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob Hi TG! --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, TGrand458@... wrote: > TG: This is one of the few (or maybe the only) posts you've written that I > have had minor exceptions about. > > > I think the "conditional nature" of both internal and external are well > looked into by the Suttas and that a comprehensive vision of the entire process > is the intention the Buddha and in fact, needed to develop insight. Without > both, I think conditionality would be much harder to understand. > > > Since ultimately it is the systematic activities of the mind that generate > affliction, I would agree that investigating the mind has primacy in that > regard. Just to clarify, is it the emphasis on going inward away from the nature of objects that you are slightly objecting to? If so, I would be interested to hear why the perception of objects in the world is of importance. I'm not saying it is not important in dail life, but I would think the nature of thought and mind would also resolve that which is perceived. Best, Rob E. ================= #94523 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 12:16 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. kenhowardau Hi Robert E, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Robert Epstein" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@ wrote: > > Ken wrote: > --------------------------- > > > > If namas and rupas were not ultimate realities with their own > > characteristics the suttas would not have mentioned them. They would > > have been mere concepts, and we have more than enough concepts > > already. > > ------------------------------------------------- > > Ken, > Just to clarify, is it your position that namas and rupas exist as > absolute realities independent of the act of perception, or is it the > case that namas and rupas are considered to exist as "objects" within > the sense organs [or cognition in the case of concepts] and that are > subjectively created by the mind? > ----------------- Sorry Robert, I don't understand your question. (I think there might be a typo in there too, which doesn't help.) Perhaps we should go back to the starting point suggested by Nina to Howard: "Namas experience an object: rupas don't experience anything." Are we agreed on that? Ken H #94524 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 12:26 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. kenhowardau Hi Robert E, Now it's my turn to get behind in my DSG reading. I see there have been developments in this thread, but I will post now and catch up later: --------------- <. . .> R: > Do things really exist, ---------------- Do you mean, is there really kamma, and is there really vipakka? Yes, those things do really exist. So too does the cause of kamma and vipaka (lobha) really exist. And their cessation (nibbana)! And the path leading to their cessation (magga-citta)! Those things are all absolute realities. -------------------------- H: > and do they exist as we perceive them? ------------------------- Nama-dhammas experience other dhammas. They don't necessarily know what they are experiencing, but they react to them anyway - in accordance with conditions. Mostly they react with moha - ignorance of the true characteristic of dhammas. Occasionally - in the case of dana and sila - they react without ignorance. And on extremely rare occasions they react with right understanding (bhavana). Each of those occasions occupies the time-space of a single, momentary, citta. ----------------------------------- R: > I believe that we perceive a physical universe, but that we do not perceive it as it is. Furthermore, I don't think we know the ultimate status of its substantiality. From all I've read of Buddhism it is suggested that the physical world is insubstantial, though it appears and we have interactions with it. To think that namas and rupas are floating around in some absolute realm would seem to deny the centrality that Buddhism places on the mind. It is not important what is "out there," only our own state of mind and perception. So I don't think that the reality of object is very important to Buddhism at all. In fact, Buddhism turns away from involvement with external objects of desire and revulsion, and turns inward towards the nature of the mind itself, until that mystery is resolved in nibbana. --------------------------- That sounds very wrong to me. Insight - and only insight - leads to nibbana. And insight is 'right understanding of dhammas.' Ken H #94525 From: "sprlrt" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 12:39 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. sprlrt Hi Rob E, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Robert Epstein" wrote: > > Would it be correct to summarize by saying that these quotes support > the idea that physical dhammas are insubstantial? I think that they support the idea that dhammas (both physical and mental) are not worth (asaara) clinging because they are anatta, anicca and dukkha. And also that dhammas as such (anatta, anicca and dukkha) can be known directly, just at the moment of their extremely short lifespan, i.e. now, only by sati and panna, before they change into concepts, the objects of reasoning. Concepts are insubstantial, while most physical and all mental dhammas are sabhava, each with its own distinct, immutable, absolutely real nature. Alberto #94526 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 12:40 am Subject: Re: [dsg] re: cornerstone egberdina Hi connie, I just had a re-read of what I sent you, and wasn't very impressed. There was one word missing. I'll repost what I said with the missing word in capitals. Isn't is funny how what is not there influences what is there? :-) > You are quite right. If everything has/is the same characteristic, it > means the characteristic is unknown. We do NOT know characteristics > absolutely, but only in relation to other characteristics. We know > this characteristic in relation to not-this characteristic. Cheers Herman #94527 From: "jonoabb" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 1:51 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation jonoabb Hi Rob > I understand how for practical purposes you would continue to think > conventionally, but without the idea of self. But it still confuses > me why you would do so in metta practice, where I think you would be > wanting to send the metta to the reality, not the convention. I > cannot get this clear. What you refer to here as "metta practice" can only occur in one for whom metta has become a habit and the panna that knows kusala moments from akusala moments has been well developed. So I think we should talk about "ordinary" metta first. When the object of consciousness is a being, and the consciousness is kusala, then metta (adosa mental factor) will be present. When the object is not a being and the consciousness is kusala, the same adosa mental factor will be present, but it is not called "metta". Metta is not, and cannot, be something which is generated and then directed ("sent") towards a selected being/group of beings or whatever. [BTW, you are mistaken in thinking I was referring to myself. I was simply setting out what I understand, from a stduy of the teachings, to be the teachings.] > If I know the beings I am sending metta to do > not actually exist as such, but are just shifting collections of > kandhas, why not send the metta to these kandhas in the hope that they > will be pacified and be at peace, rather than reifying them into > concepts of beings? But "collections of khandhas" is just another [more PC] term for beings ;-)) If the world is truly seen (i.e., with developed panna) in terms of collections of khandhas, that would be what I was referriug to in an earlier post as thinking in concepts but without wrong view. Jon #94528 From: "matheesha" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 2:32 am Subject: Google Saffron matheesha333 Google-based Theravada search engine, referencing over 100 Theravada sites on the Internet... http://www.google.com/coop/cse?cx=005450833152705498271:hcbjbznmwso #94529 From: "sprlrt" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 2:47 am Subject: Re: how to view the self sprlrt Dear Nina, > A: I believe that groups of rupas making up visible object, at the > moment of its presence, take up space, itself a rupa (i.e. visual > object has shape, or form if you prefer). N: As you know space is a rupa surrounding each group of rupa. Colour arises in a group consisting of the eight inseparable rupas as you know. A: I agree. N: Only colour impinges on the eyesense so that there can be seeing. The other rupas do not impinge at that moment. If we say that the group of rupas makes up visible object and that visible object takes up space, people may have misunderstanding, I think. A: Here there's a shift from vanno/visible rupa to ruparammana/visible object. N: We should emphasize that only visible object is seen. A: When considering it as arammana/object of citta, I agree, but I also think that we should distinguish between vanno/visible rupa and ruparammana, visible object, what cittas experience in eye door processes. Visible rupa arise and fall independently from visible object, i.e. whether it is an object of citta or not, while visible object cannot exist without visible rupa, eye sense/pasada rupa, eye consciousness/cakkhu vinnana etc., and I was referring to vanno visible rupa (though I called it visible object). Alberto #94530 From: "Scott" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 4:23 am Subject: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner scottduncan2 Dear All, Continuing: The Path of Purification. "[Getting Rid of Resentment] "14. If resentment arises in him when he applies his mind to a hostile person because he remembers wrongs done by that person, he should get rid of the resentment by entering repeatedly into lovingkindness [jhaana] towards any of the first mentioned persons and then, after he has emerged each time, directing lovingkindness towards that person." The Path of Purity. "If, while he is directing his mind towards an enemy, he recalls the offenses that have been committed against himself and hatred arises in him, he should dispel it be repeatedly dwelling with love on that one, among the previous persons, in regard to whom he has over and over again entered into, and emerged from, love." Sace panassa verimhi cittamupasaṃharato tena kataaparaadhaanussara.nena pa.tighamuppajjati, athaanena purimapuggalesu yattha katthaci punappuna.m metta.m samaapajjitvaa vu.t.thahitvaa punappuna.m ta.m puggala.m mettaayantena pa.tigha.m vinodetabba.m. Sincerely, Scott. #94531 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 11:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] accumulations, was: cornerstone upasaka_howard Hi, Ann (and Nina & all) - In a message dated 1/7/2009 12:01:20 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, glenjohnann@... writes: Hello Nina --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > -------- > N: What is accumulated is not the cetasikas that arise at present > with the citta. Perhaps that solves the problem? > It is a fact that what was learnt before or done before conditions > the present moment. But we have no way how that happens exactly. We > only know that each citta conditions the next one by way of > contiguity-condition. There is the natural strong deoendence- > condition, pakatupanissaya-paccaya. > Nina. So, when we have been talking about accumulations, what we are really meaning is conditions? Can you elaborate (or set me straight if I am not clear on this). Ann ============================== Ann, please for give me for replying to your post as a vehicle for pointing out something general about accumulations I had forgotten: The consciousness-way school of Mahayana (or proto-Mahayana) picked up on the accumulation notion in the early school of Sarvastivada as source for its development of its notion of storehouse consciousness (alaya-vijnana) that is considers the fundamental consciousness that carries "seeds". Actually, my reading seems to show that Yogacara/Vijnanavada was very strongly influenced in a positive direction by Sarvastivadin Abhidhamma, as opposed to Madhyamika, which was more of a negative response to substantialist elements in it. With metta, Howard (From the Diamond Sutra) #94532 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jan 6, 2009 11:54 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. upasaka_howard Hi, TG (and Scott) - In a message dated 1/7/2009 12:09:56 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, TGrand458@... writes: TG: "Oh, it was a long time ago and I don't like to bring it up, but I wanted to make the case I was no enemy of Theravada ... which you sometimes seem to suggest." Scott: Maybe not then, but somehow you went rogue later on... ;-) ............................................................. TG: I dis-rogued that's why. ;-) -------------------------------------------------------- Howard: ARGH!!!!!! =========================== With metta, Howard (Anonymous) #94533 From: "Scott" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 5:32 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear TG, Real Paa.li scholars, Regarding: TG: "I dis-rogued that's why. ;-)" Scott: I second Howard's, um, 'motion' on this one. ;-/ In other news, just a bit of research. From the Phe.napi.n.duupamasutta.m (SN 22, 95) comes the oft quoted phrase, here in relation to form (Bh. Bodhi, trans., p. 951): "...So, whatever kind of form there is...a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in form?" ...Tassa ta.m passato nijjhaayato yoniso upaparikkhato rittaka~n~neva khaayati , tucchaka~n~neva khaayati, asaaraka~n~neva khaayati. Ki~nhi siyaa, bhikkhave, ruupe saaro? 'Void': "Ritta [pp. of ri~ncati; cp. atireka] devoid, empty, free, rid (of).." 'Hollow': "Tuccha (adj.)...empty, vain, deserted; very often combd with ritta..." 'Insubstantial': "Asaara (n. adj.) [a + saara] that which is not substance, worthlessness; adj. worthless, vain, idle..." 'It would appear to him': "Khaayati...to seem to be, to appear like..." Scott: I'd like to know more about the way in which 'ka~n~neva' modifies these words. Sincerely, Scott. #94534 From: "keithhenriques" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 5:47 am Subject: Reply to Connie re: discrimination of mixed elements keithhenriques I still cannot seem to post except through the web site. Is that how it is done rather than by using the reply function Best Regards, Keith Henriques Hello Again Connie: I think Buddha taught to others according to their overall ability to understand Dharma. No doubt there is always more than "convential Understanding" in all the teachings from the very beginning "Jakata Tales" to the "Perfection of Wisdom Sutras". (Perhaps the Tantric teachings are even another level of teachings). We are born as a tangle in an entanglement of Kharma of all kinds from begingless time to thsi present rebirth where everything we experience is due to that past Kharma and all that we do creats new Kharmic seeds. Collective Kharma dertermines how we experience this world of human rebirth. This life is all very much like the "Stew-Soup" Buddha is describing. Until we can break the 12 links of dependent origination and begin to move towards a level of higher "wisdom" and knowledge of our most subtle mind, I do not believe we will be able effectively distinguish the Kharma that creates and drives our lives. Best Regards, Keith #94535 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 7:02 am Subject: Vipassanaa, Survey Ch 34. no 6. nilovg Dear friends, The development of satipatthna is a threefold training (sikkh): training in higher morality, adhisla sikkh training in higher consciousness, adhicitta sikkh training in higher wisdom, adhipa sikkh When sati is aware of the realities which are appearing, there is higher sla, sla which is more refined. Sati is aware of the characteristics of citta, cetasika and rpa. It is aware of kusala dhammas and akusala dhammas before actions through the body or through speech arise. Satipatthna is training in higher consciousness, which means concentration, samdhi or ekaggat cetasika. When samm-sati arises there is concentration on the nma or rpa which appears, on the dhamma which arises and falls away very rapidly. Satipatthna is training in higher wisdom, because pa investigates and studies in detail the characteristics of realities as they are appearing in daily life, so that they can be known as they are. Q. : Everything you have explained is very beneficial for me at this moment. But, although I have some understanding of what I heard, my understanding is not yet sufficient. When I practise satipatthna I immediately cling to a concept of self who is making use of sati. I am only a beginner and, as far as I know myself, I have not even attained the first stage of insight which knows the difference between the characteristic of nma and of rpa, nma-rpa-pariccheda- a. What should I do to have more understanding? S. : If someone tries to do something special with the aim to develop insight, his life will be very complicated. How can he act in the right way if there is still a concept of self who will do particular things? If people wish to do particular things in order to have more understanding, they are clinging. They cling to the understanding of nma and rpa which have arisen already. Satipatthna is the dhamma which is aware of whatever reality appears through one of the six doors, such as the dhamma appearing through the eyes, visible object, when there is seeing at this moment. Then satipatthna can be naturally aware and pa can begin to study and investigate the true nature of nma and rpa. ********** Nina. #94536 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 7:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: how to view the self nilovg Dear Alberto, Op 7-jan-2009, om 11:47 heeft sprlrt het volgende geschreven: > A: When considering it as arammana/object of citta, I agree, but I > also think that we should distinguish between vanno/visible rupa and > ruparammana, visible object, what cittas experience in eye door > processes. Visible rupa arise and fall independently from visible > object, i.e. whether it is an object of citta or not, while visible > object cannot exist without visible rupa, eye sense/pasada rupa, eye > consciousness/cakkhu vinnana etc., and I was referring to vanno > visible rupa (though I called it visible object). --------- N: Colour, hardness or any other rupa arise and fall away whether experienced or not. I agree, when it is experienced by citta it is an object, aaramma.na. It is hard to know what it exactly is, unless sati arises and is aware of it. I just heard on a recording that there can also be thinking without words, and when we believe that there is the seeing of something, it may very well be that there is already thinking of that 'something', but without words, thus, not seeing just what appears through eyesense. Nina. #94537 From: "connie" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 7:27 am Subject: cornerstone nichiconn dear friends, Following on from the tasty simile, Karunadasa continues: This situation is true of the material dhammas, too. In this connection the Atthasalini adds that the material dhammas, such as colour, taste, odour, etc., cannot be separated from one another like particles of sand.87 The colour of the mango, for instance, cannot be physically separated from its taste or odour. They remain in inseparable association. This is what is called positional inseparability (padesato avinibbhogata).88 On the basis of this principle of positional inseparability it is maintained that there is no quantitative difference (pamanato) among the material elements that enter into the composition of material objects. The difference is only qualitative. And this qualitative difference is based on what is called ussada, i.e. intensity or extrusion.89 To give an example: As the four primary elements of matter are invariably present in every instance of matter, for they are necessarily co-existent (sahajata) and positionally inseparable (padesato avinibbhoga),90 the question arises why there is a diversity in material objects. The diversity, it is maintained, is not due to a difference in quantity (pamana) but to a difference in intensity (ussada).91 That is to say, in a given material object one primary element is more intense than the others. For instance, in a relatively solid thing such as a stone, although all the primary elements are present, the earth element is more intense or "extruded" than the others. So is the water element in liquids, the heat element in fire, and the air element in gases.92 {87. DhsA 270. 88. See ADS 28; VsmS 389. 89. See VsmM 451; Abhvk 273. 90. See Tkp 3, 14, 16; ADS 28. 91. VsmM 451; Abhvk 273. 92. See Y. Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter (Colombo, 1967), p.26.} #94538 From: "connie" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 7:27 am Subject: AS time nichiconn dear friends, Nyanaponika goes on to say: Within the Buddhist fold the philosophical trend to obliterate the distinction between the three periods of time came very much to the fore with the Sarvaastivaadins, who maintained that dharmas (conceived as the ultimate unchangeable elements of existence) persist through all three periods of time, which have only conventional validity, and that things appearing in these three time periods have only phenomenal existence. These ideas obviously contradict two basic conceptions of Buddhist doctrine, namely, impermanence and insubstntiality. In view of such consequences it is therefore imperative not to forget the relative differentiation of time manifested in the fact of change or impermanence. Following the principle of the twofold method, we stress this complementary aspect just here before proceeding to deal with the other, more neglected aspect of the relations between the three periods of time, in which partial interpenetration is prominent. ... to be continued, connie #94539 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 7:33 am Subject: Re: [dsg] accumulations, was: cornerstone nilovg Dear Ann and Howard, Op 7-jan-2009, om 6:01 heeft glenjohnann het volgende geschreven: > N: What is accumulated is not the cetasikas that arise at present > > with the citta. Perhaps that solves the problem? > > It is a fact that what was learnt before or done before conditions > > the present moment. But we have no way how that happens exactly. > We > > only know that each citta conditions the next one by way of > > contiguity-condition. There is the natural strong deoendence- > > condition, pakatupanissaya-paccaya. > ---------- N: My first sentence here was in response to Howard to what he said, but I forgot the context. First a clarification: the akusala cetasikas or sobhana cetasikas arising now with the citta fall away and are then accumulated, there are all the time new accumulations. I do not think of a store consciousness, how could that exist next to the citta that arises. -------- > > A:So, when we have been talking about accumulations, what we are > really > meaning is conditions? Can you elaborate (or set me straight if I am > not clear on this). ------- N: Yes, what has been accumulated is a condition for the arising again of similar qualities. Understanding and all the perfections are accumulated as sankhaarakkhandha, supporting one another and thus pa~n~naa can develop, eventually to lokuttara pa~n~naa. For instance, we listen and listen and also consider what we hear and then there will be more and more understanding. I listened to Pakinnaka no 11, and the discussion was about Kundali sutta (often here discussed with Tep) and commentary. Kh Sujin spoke about the guarding of the doorways (indriya samvara) and this conditions sucarita (virtuous conduct) through body, speech and mind. We should understand more about sucarita and ducarita (non-virtous conduct) through body, speech and mind. As to the latter, we do not have to think only of the ten akusala kammas, but also of the very slight akusala cittas (leg, leg, noj, noj). As soon as a pleasant object is experienced through the eyedoor, there is no motion yet of body or speech, but when there is attachment there is 'bad conduct' through the mind, mano-ducarita. So, there are many more moments of lobha than we ever thought. Good to be reminded of the very slight akusala, and this is accumulated all the time. She said, when we brush our teeth and there is no kusala, there are many moments of akusala, there is likely to be mano-duccarita. When we speak to someone else there can be awareness of nama and rupa and then there is good conduct through speech. I am reading in Thai the Co and there are here explanations about vipassanaa. Thus, we can be grateful for any reminder; these are accumulated and help the growth of pa~n~naa. **** Nina #94540 From: "szmicio" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 7:49 am Subject: cittaja rupa szmicio Dear Dhamma friends Can vipakacitta produce a rupa? Best wishes Lukas #94541 From: TGrand458@... Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 3:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Rob E. In a message dated 1/7/2009 12:38:26 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, epsteinrob@... writes: Just to clarify, is it the emphasis on going inward away from the nature of objects that you are slightly objecting to? ............................................... TG: I don't really understand this so won't try to handle it. .............................................. If so, I would be interested to hear why the perception of objects in the world is of importance. .......................................................... TG: The perception of "the objects of the world" is important because that's all there is. ;-) I.E., our bodies and minds are also of the same nature as "external phenomena." To me, investigating the "internal" or "external" is the same type of investigation...although only the "internal" can add the investigative aspect of direct experience. And investigating the 'interaction' between the two is also important. If you can understand the nature of any of it, you will understand the nature of all of it...and vice versa. That's my take. I think the above answers the below statement as well. TG OUT ................................................. I'm not saying it is not important in dail life, but I would think the nature of thought and mind would also resolve that which is perceived. Best, Rob E. #94542 From: TGrand458@... Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 4:17 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Scott (and Howard) In a message dated 1/7/2009 6:32:22 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, scduncan@... writes: Dear TG, Real Paa.li scholars, Regarding: TG: "I dis-rogued that's why. ;-)" Scott: I second Howard's, um, 'motion' on this one. ;-/ ............................................ TG: Actually he said ARGH!!!!!! I know...what's in a term? ;-) I thought it was funny though. I guess I'm in the minority... if Howard's appalled, it must be bad. Looks like it caused a little pain for Howard, so maybe it will inspire him to get the H out of Samsara faster. See, value everywhere. More below on your translations... ..................................... In other news, just a bit of research. From the Phe.napi.n.duupamasFrom the Phe.napi.n.duupamasut phrase, here in relation to form (Bh. Bodhi, trans., p. 951): "...So, whatever kind of form there is...a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in form?" ...Tassa ta.m passato nijjhaayato yoniso upaparikkhato rittaka~n~neva khaayati , tucchaka~n~neva khaayati, asaaraka~n~neva khaayati. Ki~nhi siyaa, bhikkhave, ruupe saaro? 'Void': "Ritta [pp. of ri~ncati; cp. atireka] devoid, empty, free, rid (of).." 'Hollow': "Tuccha (adj.)...empty, vain, deserted; very often combd with ritta..." 'Insubstantial''Insubstantial': "Asaara (n. adj.) [a + saara] t substance, worthlessness; adj. worthless, vain, idle..." ............................................. TG: The lack of substance is obvious (to me). But I really appreciate seeing the "worthless" aspect of this term. I've been dealing with the term "feeble" ... as one description of conditioned phenomena, as of late. Worthless is great, but for my purposes, too strong. Thanks for the translations Scott. I'd be very interested in, from the same sutta -- coreless, illusion, mirage (mirage probably obvious). I think this can all be put together to make an incredibly powerful statement about the nature of aggregates. TG OUT #94543 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 11:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] cittaja rupa nilovg Dear Lukas, Op 7-jan-2009, om 16:49 heeft szmicio het volgende geschreven: > Can vipakacitta produce a rupa? ------- N: Yes, but not all vipaakacittas produce rupa. I quote from my Rupas: < Throughout life citta produces rpa, but not all cittas can produce rpa. As we have seen, the rebirth-consciousness does not produce rpa. Among the cittas that do not produce rpa are also the sense- cognitions of seeing, hearing, etc. Seeing only sees, it has no other capacity. Some cittas can produce rpas but not bodily intimation and speech intimation, and some cittas can produce the two kinds of intimation. Among the cittas that can produce the two kinds of intimation are the kusala cittas of the sense-sphere (thus not those that attain absorption or jhna and those that realize enlightenment), and the akusala cittas.> Nina. #94544 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 11:15 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Google Saffron nilovg Dear Matheesha, good to see you again. How are you doing? Nina. Op 7-jan-2009, om 11:32 heeft matheesha het volgende geschreven: > Google-based Theravada search engine, referencing over 100 Theravada > sites on the Internet... #94545 From: "connie" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 11:19 am Subject: discrimination of mixed elements nichiconn Hello Keith, Nice to see you again & i hope the posting problem is resolved soon. Usually, I just email to dhammastudygroup"at"yahoogroups.com ("at" of course, being just the @ symbol). Are you still in San Francisco? good luck, connie #94546 From: "connie" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 11:27 am Subject: cornerstone nichiconn Hi Herman, I recall a few times it definitely seemed I knew the sensation of intense and sudden pain without there being room / time for any other consideration. o, absolutely! peace, connie .... Isn't is funny how what is not there influences what is there? :-) > You are quite right. If everything has/is the same characteristic, it > means the characteristic is unknown. We do NOT know characteristics > absolutely, but only in relation to other characteristics. We know > this characteristic in relation to not-this characteristic. #94547 From: "connie" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 11:36 am Subject: re: cornerstone nichiconn dear Sarah & All, S: Hmmmm - But asabhava dhammas are not pannattis, concepts (the products of that "synthetical function"). For example, space element, the intimations or the arising etc of rupas are asabhava dhammas but not concepts. c: Putting aside the concept question, don't the asabhava dhammas have to be known in relation to other things? I mean, intimations can only be known thru 'thinking about' and space is defined in terms of other rupas; maybe not in 'infinite space' but i'm not there... even tho it may seem like it sometimes, haha. peace, connie #94548 From: "Alex" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 3:21 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. truth_aerator Dear Scott, TG and all, >"Scott" wrote: > Scott: I second Howard's, um, 'motion' on this one. ;-/ > > In other news, just a bit of research. > > From the Phe.napi.n.duupamasutta.m (SN 22, 95) comes the oft quoted > phrase, here in relation to form (Bh. Bodhi, trans., p. 951): > > "...So, whatever kind of form there is...a bhikkhu inspects it, > ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to >him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could >there be in form?" In my understanding, considering and experience the above refers to inconstancy and impermanence of Form/Body and so on. I do NOT believe that the Buddha was taking an "illusionist view" of the world. What he stressed is that no rupa (or anything else) is worthy to be clung to. It is insubstantial, in short enough period of time it will burst, fall apart and decay. IMHO to talk about existence or non-existence of things beyond bare experience is most often outside of Noble 8 fold path and Buddha Dhamma. Dhamma is about a step by step, gradual and sequential letting go of craving for EVERYTHING. It has nothing to do with becoming a PhD in ontology. With metta, Alex #94549 From: "Alex" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 3:27 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. truth_aerator Dear RobertE, Scott and all, >Robert Epstein" wrote: > > Hi Scott! > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Scott" wrote: > > > Scott: We don't 'turn' anything into anything. A paramattha >dhamma > > differs totally from the notion of a Platonic form. Paramattha > > dhammas are not concepts, mental constructs, ideas, or even > > archetypes. >1) They are realities which exist. >2)They are not further reducible nor do they reflect some higher >order reality of which theyare some copy. Scott, you are saying pretty much the same things, that there are ultimate reality, like Platonic Forms. > > Nibbaana, the conditioned realities are actually arising and >falling away, functioning while present, and, if naama, serve as the >actual experience we all mistake for self. Then they are fully conditioned like anything else. Nothing ultimate, nor non-reducible. They do have arising, persisting, perishing. That itself is already a reduction in them. > Dear Scott, > I do not see the basis for the establishment of a view that there are > actual physical or other objects that are frozen in particular moments > and have an absolute nature. If this were so, how do they fall away? > When they do, they change, they have phases of becoming, being and > falling away according to the Abhidhamma. So how long do each of > these phases take? And in what sense does something that has phases > have an absolute reality? This seems contradictory to me. Robert: It is contradictory about ultimate realities being conditioned like anything else. This is a backdoor that the self can sneak in and for craving to grow in. > It seems > instead, that like all dhammas, they have a shifting, becoming, > decaying reality and that there is no point at which an absolute > characteristic can be identified that is not in the process of >change. Exactly. It is unfortunately that while Buddha talked about EVENTS rather than entities like atta, the later scholastics started to reify concepts in exactly the same way as some Hindu Atta philosophers. With metta, Alex #94550 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 5:46 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mahabhuta egberdina Hi Nina, 2009/1/7 Nina van Gorkom : > Hi Herman, > no problem with your quote. A dhamma does not arise alone. But when > speaking of object experienced by citta, each citta experiences only > one object. Could I ask you to clarify what you mean by "one object"? Can that one object be complex ie have/be multiple, simultaneous characteristics? Cheers Herman #94551 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 5:53 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Void, Coreless, Insubstantial, etc egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/7 Scott : > Dear All, > > Regarding: > > TG: "Terms such as -- void, coreless, insubstantial, etc. are NOT > terms the merely mean 'no-self,' they are rather aspects of > phenomena that are no self....i.e., all phenomena." > > Scott: From the Su~n~nalokasutta.m (SN 35, 85): > > "...Void is the world...because it is void of a self and anything > belonging to a self' > > (...su~n~na.m attena vaa attaniyena vaa... )." > > The Insubstantialist view stems from a great misunderstanding of the > meaning of anatta and its synonyms. This view keeps fighting back > to the surface (like a drowning sectarian). A very nice turn of phrase :-) > > > It is simply an attempt to force a theoretical evolution to suggest > that 'voidness' means anything more than 'void of self' and > that 'coreless' means anything more than 'without a core of self.' > It is an impossibility that a characteristic be a characteristic of > nothing, and this is exactly what the Insubstantialist view would > suggest. > > There can be no characteristic of nothing. It goes beyond the mark > to eradicate the reality of dhammas and somehow assert that > characteristics have some sort of reality though. The reality is that dhammas are anicca. The individual characteristic of an individual dhamma is pure, unadulterated, latter-day, insightless bunkum :-) Cheers Herman #94552 From: "Scott" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 8:23 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: Void, Coreless, Insubstantial, etc scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "The reality is that dhammas are anicca. The individual characteristic of an individual dhamma is pure, unadulterated, latter-day, insightless bunkum :-)" Scott: I liked my prose better. ;-) Okay. We agree that dhammas are anicca. But, given the last statement, we must define anicca and dhamma differently. What is it, in your view, that has the characteristic of anicca if there are no 'individual dhammas'? Sincerely, Scott. #94553 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 8:30 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/7 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Regarding: > > > First of all, I accept that there is a distinction to be made between > sammutti sacca (conventional truth) and paramattha sacca (ultimate > truth). Second of all, I accept that these distinct modes of > expression refer to the same truth - they do not represent separate > truths as these would be mutually exclusive. This is why I suggest > that one is dealing here with a (n apparent?) paradox. > I agree with you, there is not a conventional truth that is different from an ultimate truth. Something cannot be conventionally false and ultimately true, or vice versa. > The paradox is that, although there never is, never was, nor will > there ever be a person (paramattha sacca), a person (sammutti sacca) > conceives of persons, i.e., 'person' is merely conceptual. The > 'conceiving' is not done by a person when considered according to > paramattha sacca. > > H: "But even so, the Dhamma does include many, many 'train yourself > thus''s and they must be included in any summation of what the Dhamma is." > > Scott: Thinking by way of sammutti sacca, one talks of persons > training themselves. Yes, and such a statement is unreservedly true if it is made with the understanding that a person is a being devoid of a soul. Thinking by way of paramattha sacca, 'training' > is the not-subject-to-control-but-subject-only-to-conditions unfolding > and development of dhammas arising and falling away. No person. > I see the not-subject-to-control-but section as being superfluous. I accept that training happens subject to conditions, some known, some unknown. The person is simply the continuity between the former and later conditioned states. What word do you use to refer to that continuity, that nexus between the former and the later, in terms of paramattha sacca? Cheers Herman #94554 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 9:06 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Void, Coreless, Insubstantial, etc egberdina Hi Scott (and connie), 2009/1/8 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Regarding: > > H: "The reality is that dhammas are anicca. The individual > characteristic of an individual dhamma is pure, unadulterated, > latter-day, insightless bunkum :-)" > > Scott: I liked my prose better. ;-) Okay. We agree that dhammas are > anicca. But, given the last statement, we must define anicca and > dhamma differently. What is it, in your view, that has the > characteristic of anicca if there are no 'individual dhammas'? > I would say that it is a leading question. The question presupposes some essential thing that is uniquely identifiable. The Abhidhamma, I believe, makes it quite clear that from a multiplicity of causes a multiplicity of effects ensue, in a never-ending sequence. Whatever that is ever known or identified, as having this quality or that characteristic, is in fact always a melange (do you like that word? It means nothing more than mixture, but I use it simply for effect :-). I do like it when you say miasma). As connie recently quoted from Nagasena vs King Milinda: "Suppose, O king, the cook in the royal household were to make a syrup or a sauce and were to put into it curds, and salt, and ginger, and cumin seed, and pepper and other ingredients. And suppose the king were to say to him: 'Pick out for me the flavours of the curds and of the salt, and of the ginger, and of the cumin seed, and of the pepper, and of all the things you have put into it.' Now would it be possible, great king, separating off one from another those flavours that had thus run together, to pick out each one, so that one could say: 'Here is the sourness, and here the saltiness, and here the pungency, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness'?" 85 In like manner, it is maintained, we should understand the position of the mental dhammas in relation to one another.86 A dhamma does not appear in isolation, in sequence, one by one; dhammas appear in clumps, as synthetic wholes. There is never a single quality or characteristic, there are always many. It is this never static complexity that is nicely captured by the word anicca, IMO. We should not confuse the selective advertence to and grasping at what was never there in isolation, and no longer available for inspection, as being the succesfull identification of an irreducible reality. Cheers Herman #94555 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 9:13 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation egberdina Hi Jon, 2009/1/6 jonoabb : > Hi Herman > > > As regards the arising of right view, for example, if what is spoken > by the other concerns the way things are in truth and reality and is > expressed in a way that is meaningful for the listener, and if that > is appreciated by the listener (wise attention), it may condition the > arising of panna of one level or another (right view). > > As I said in my earlier post, the hearing of the "right thing" is a > matter of circumstances (vipaka) and is not something that can be > made to happen. > > Hope this answers your question (if not, please feel free to ask > again). > Thank you, it does answer my question in part. Do you believe that it is possible to have wise attention when listening to statements that are false? Cheers Herman #94556 From: "connie" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 9:39 pm Subject: re: cornerstone nichiconn Hi Scott, Herman, Herman: A dhamma does not appear in isolation, in sequence, one by one; dhammas appear in clumps, as synthetic wholes. There is never a single quality or characteristic, there are always many. It is this never static complexity that is nicely captured by the word anicca, IMO. We should not confuse the selective advertence to and grasping at what was never there in isolation, and no longer available for inspection, as being the succesfull identification of an irreducible reality. c: having nothing of her own to say, **quotes**: http://sacred-texts.com/bud/sbe35/sbe3507.htm 15. The king said: 'When those conditions (whose marks you have just specified) have run together, is it possible, by bending them apart one to one side and one to the other, to make the distinction between them clear, so that one can say:,' This is contact, and this sensation, and this idea, and this intention, and this perception, and this reflection, and this investigation"?' 'No: that cannot be done.' 'Give me an illustration.' 'Suppose, O king, the cook in the royal household were to make a syrup or a sauce, and were to put into it curds, and salt, and ginger, and cummin seed, and pepper, and other ingredients. And suppose the king were to say to him: "Pick out for me the flavour of the curds, and of the salt, and of the ginger, and of the cummin seed, and of the pepper, and of all the things you have put into it." Now would it be possible, great king, separating off one from another those flavours that had thus run together, to pick out each one, so that one could say: "Here is the sourness, and here the saltness, and here the pungency, and here the acidity, and here the astringency, and here the sweetness"?' 'No, that would not be possible. **But each flavour would nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.**' 'And just so, great king, with respect to those conditions we were discussing.' 'Very good, Naagasena!' peace, connie #94557 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 10:13 pm Subject: Re: Further Consideration Re: [dsg] Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Co... egberdina Hi Rob E, 2009/1/7 Robert Epstein : > Hi Herman! > I am happy to carry on with this interesting discussion. > Cool! > Herman: >> Do you bracket out your past in such an investigation? >> >> I see my past as being specifically mine, and no-one else's. My past >> is absolute in that it is unchangeable, and I can never not have been >> it. I am identified by my past. > > Herman, I have a slightly different take on this. First of all, I > don't see the past as an immutable "thing." There is no "is past" if > you don't mind the clunky philosophical category; meaning that the > past is nothing other than a collection of thoughts, memories, > reflections, impressions, misapprehensions at times, reconsiderations, > that arise in particular patterns, some redundant, but still always > changing. I like the way how you just say about all of the above, in one fell swoop, that it is "nothing other" :-) I would say that it only constitutes about 99.99% of the autobiographical narrative that is all of our reality. > As time goes on, one's memories may change, some will be > emphasized, others de-emphasized; even some events that others may > have identified you with will be gone and they will associate you with > others. I agree with all that. It is a nice description of the ebb and flow of what of our past is selectively attended to and how past experiences are re-lived and re-evaluated. > So I don't actually agree that the past is immutable and > defines you. In fact, What I believe to be immutable and defining of the past are the facts of the past. Things like what I did, how I felt, what I wanted. It will never not be true that I was angry at such and such, that I was unhappy in such and such a situation, that I wanted this and that, there and then. Also, it will always be true that I lived in this and that house, that these and those were my mother, father, brothers, relatives, friends, that I went to this school and that, had these jobs, was married to this and that woman etc etc. No amount of re living and re-evaluation of the past will change what is factual about my past. > I think it is constantly shifting like > everything else, has plenty of interchangeable components and in fact > it is your attention and that of others, and the values you have at > any given time that defines the past and creates it as what is appears > to be. > What you are describing is the present, which is forever being added to your past. > For instance, I used to be a smoker when I was quite young, and gave > it up in my '20s. After that I was a yoga teacher for about 15 years, > and no one would believe that I used to smoke. There was a period of > time when I was always identified with a cigarette and used to draw on > them pretty hard too. It was part of a "tough" image I had as a kid > with people who knew me then. I was also called "Bobby" then. When > I was a yoga teacher in my mid-twenties and beyond, I didn't have a > tough image and I didn't smoke. I had decided to go in a different > direction. When I thought of cigarettes during that period it seemed > like a weird dream or aberration, not really "me" and others felt that > way too. > > Now I'm in yet another phase as an acting teacher. My work with yoga > has receded a bit in my mind and people know me in a completely > different way. I'm also older and don't identify with a lot of things > I thought about myself when I was younger. Women used to look at me > in a certain way when I was young and I looked a certain way. Now I > notice that women look at me like a Dad or an older guy. It's a > different identity to be sure. So my past, you could say, has been > "transformed" several times, and there are different available sets of > memories that slide into place quite conveniently to match my chosen > identity. I don't think it's fixed *at all.* OK. Your identity is changing. But not in some haphazard way. Your identity stays firmly rooted in your past, because none of your past is being deleted, your past is merely being added to. No matter what you do today, your mother and father will always have been your father and mother, and the same for the day of your birth. And the facts of your past are the unmistakable backdrop in which you must be who you are now. >> I can see value in what you say, but there is something missing. And >> that is "the other". Being self-centred on a desert island is not >> harmful. It is only in the company of others that excessive >> self-interest, and the defence of self-interest is harmful. But, this >> raises the question. If we're going to deconstruct the notion of "I", >> don't we thereby deconstruct the notion of other "I" 's as well, and >> thereby end up living as though on a desert island anyway? > > Herman, I don't see the logic in this. It appears to me that by > de-emphasizing the "I" we become more available to others, not less. It seems to me, that by emphasising other I's, you are not deconstructing I at all. Let's take it to an extreme. A person who becomes a servile doormat, in servitude to others only, has not lost their sense of self at all. The idea that "they are selves, but I am not" is a perversion of the ancient wisdom "It takes one to know one" :-) > The idea that we have to ignore others or isolate ourselves because we > do not see them as "I"s or ourselves as "I"s does not make sense to > me. Let's say you are all wrapped up in what is important to you, > because you [generic you] is busy serving the "I." A guy asks you the > time and you think "G*ddamn it, I've got to get to work; why is this > guy bothering me?" and you register irritation. This is all because of > the "I" being served. You're not honoring this other guy's "I." You > wish he would get out of your way, so you're treating him like an > object, not a person, anyway. Now let's say you have put the "I" > aside and you are just going about your business. You're not drooling > into your shirt or anything by losing the "I" emphasis, you just > aren't busy thinking about yourself like an island to defend unto > itself; you're just doing whatever is appropriate at the time. You > still go to work, etc., but you're not worried about "what's going to > happen to poor me." So you run into this same guy and he asks you the > time, and you stop pleasantly and say "Gee, it's 9 am. Is there > anything else I can do for you?" because your self-serving interest is > out of the way. Perhaps you even think to yourself "Well I may be a > little bit late because of this, but this guy needs a bit of > assistance, so I'll just give him a moment of my time." And he says > "Well actually I'm looking for a store that sells flowers." So you > direct him down the street, etc. Then you happily go to work, pleased > that you were able to help someone out on the way to work. The fact > that you are not thinking "I I I" does not make him invisisble, it > just makes you more available. So I would say it is the opposite - > the "I" makes you an isolated island, it is a barrier; and getting it > out of the way makes you more perceptive of others and more available > to help. OK. I understand what you are saying. But I don't think what you wrote is a deconstruction of the "I". You wrote about the "I" who wants to live happily in a world full of other I's who are also happy. And to achieve that, you were happy to make a small sacrifice, to make a little gain in your quest for a happy world. Nobody will fault you for that. But wanting remains fundamental to this quest, or any other quest for that matter. And an unavoidable product of wanting is the I who wants. Unless there is an I who is accepting of all possible outcomes, the suffering I must enter into any quest. >> Please don't feel obliged to carry on if you're not inclined to do so. > > It's a lovely conversation and one of my favorite topics. I'll look > forward to your response. [Now I'm getting too nice; I'll have to > sharpen up. :-) ] The same goes for me. Catch you later :-) Cheers Herman #94558 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 10:50 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] re: cornerstone egberdina Hi connie, 2009/1/8 connie : > Hi Scott, Herman, > > > c: having nothing of her own to say, **quotes**: > > 'No, that would not be possible. **But each flavour would nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.**' > Having quoted it, what do you suppose it to mean? Does it mean to suggest that when a multitude of different characteristics are present, that they do not have a modifying affect on each other? Cheers Herman #94559 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 11:49 pm Subject: Vipassanaa, Survey Ch 34. no 7. nilovg Dear friends, Q. : How should we develop satipatthna when we are seeing? S. : When there is seeing you can be aware and realize that what appears to seeing is a type of reality which only appears through the eyes. When we see hairs, a table, a chair, a pillar or a hall, we should know that what is seen is in reality only that which appears through the eyes. It does not appear through the ears, the nose, the tongue or the bodysense. When pa has not been developed to the degree of knowing the difference between the characteristics of nma and rpa, this stage of insight cannot arise. Q. : When I receive a Dhamma book about the practice in daily life I read it many times, because I want to be able to practise. However, all the time there is a concept of self, there is self who sees when there is seeing. I cannot realize that colour is rpa, seeing is nma. I keep on thinking about all that has been explained, but I cannot be aware of nma and rpa in the right way. Please, could you explain to me how to be aware? S. : When there is seeing which experiences an object through the eyes, can you at that moment investigate the characteristic of the dhamma which naturally appears? It is essential to know how understanding should be developed, so that later on pa can become accomplished to the degree of the first stage of insight, knowledge of the difference between nama and rpa. First of all sati can be aware and study the different characteristics of nma and rpa which are naturally appearing through any of the doorways. ******** Nina. #94560 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 11:59 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mahabhuta nilovg Dear Herman, Op 8-jan-2009, om 2:46 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > Could I ask you to clarify what you mean by "one object"? Can that one > object be complex ie have/be multiple, simultaneous characteristics? -------- N: No simultaneous charactreistics. Seeing can only experience colour, nothing else. Colour has its own characteristic, it is different from sound. Hearing only hears sound, nothing else. The citta which thinks can think of a table or many stories. Here there are many cittas thinking of different objects, but there arises only one citta at a time. When we speak of characteristics we mean: what can be directly experienced. In this sense the word characteristic does not apply to concepts. If we remember this we can avoid turning in circles when discussing characteristics of realities or paramattha dhammas. Nina. #94561 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 12:02 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob Hi TG. What you say makes sense. I have no objection. Best, Rob E. ======================= --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, TGrand458@... wrote: > TG: The perception of "the objects of the world" is important because > that's all there is. ;-) I.E., our bodies and minds are also of the same nature > as "external phenomena." To me, investigating the "internal" or "external" > is the same type of investigation...although only the "internal" can add the > investigative aspect of direct experience. And investigating the > 'interaction' between the two is also important. If you can understand the nature of any > of it, you will understand the nature of all of it...and vice versa. That's > my take. > #94562 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 12:06 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob Hi Alex! --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" wrote: > > It seems > > instead, that like all dhammas, they have a shifting, becoming, > > decaying reality and that there is no point at which an absolute > > characteristic can be identified that is not in the process of > >change. > > Exactly. It is unfortunately that while Buddha talked about EVENTS > rather than entities like atta, the later scholastics started to > reify concepts in exactly the same way as some Hindu Atta > philosophers. > > > With metta, > > > Alex Thanks for that explanation, Alex. It makes sense. An absolute reality would be something to hold onto, even if it is specified as momentary in its absoluteness. Best, Robert =================== #94563 From: Dhamma Group Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 12:57 pm Subject: Fools & Hell - I * dhammagroup Namo Tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammâ Sambuddhassa! Sakyamuni Sambuddha Vihara <...> ________________________________ Taken from AccessToInsight.org1 Translated from Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu TO RECOGNIZE THE FOOL AND THE WISE ONE Majjhima Nikaya 3.9 - Balapanditasuttam2 (Fools & Hell - I)Continued from previous instalment Commentary: The Lord Buddha explains the magnitude/amount and nature of suffering to be experienced in hell by someone who does wrong through mind, speech and body and constantly/habitually goes outside the boundaries of the five precepts. Bhikkhus (monks), the fool misbehaving by body, speech and mind, at the breakup of the body after death, goes to decrease, is born in hell. Saying it rightly that hell is completely unwelcome and disagreeable. It is not easy to give a comparison for that unpleasantness. Explanation: The Lord Buddha explains to monks that following death a fool who does wrong through thought, word and deed goes to hell, which is unwelcome, disagreeable and unpleasant to the point that it is not easy to give a comparison. Then a certain bhikkhu said. "Venerable sir, is it possible to give a comparison ( simile)?" The Blessed One said "It is possible bhikkhu. An evil doer, a robber is taken hold and shown to the king and is told. Great king, this is a robber, an evil doer, mete the suitable punishment to him. Then the king would say. 'Good one, whip this person six thousand times in the morning,' He is whipped six thousand times in the morning. In the mid day the king would ask 'Good one, how is that man?' 'Great king he is alive as he was,' Then the king would say. 'Good one, whip this person six thousand times in the mid day,' He is whipped six thousand times in the mid day. In the evening the king would ask 'Good one, how is that man?' 'Great king he is alive as he was,' Then the king would say. 'Good one, whip this person six thousand times in the evening,' He is whipped six thousand times in the evening. Bhikkhus. Would that man whipped six thousand times three times a day feel unpleasant and displeased?" "Even if given sixty whips, he would feel unpleasant and displeased, so what to speak of it when given six thousand whips three times a day?" Explanation: On being asked if it is possible to give a simile of the (magnitude/amount of) pain experienced in hell, the Lord Buddha presents the simile of how a King would command a robber to be whipped six thousand times in the morning, noon and evening; each time enquiring whether the robber had died! The Lord Buddha asks when the pain experienced through sixty lashes would be unbearable, how much more unbearable six thousand lashes, three times a day would be. Then the Blessed One took a small stone that fitted his fist and addressed the bhikkus. 'Bhikkhus, which is bigger in size, the stone in my fist or the Himalaya mountains?' "Venerable sir, the stone in your fist cannot be reckoned as a comparison, not even as a quarter, nor even as a sign for the Great Himalayas." "In the same manner bhikkhus, the unpleasantess and displeasure experienced on account of giving six thousand whips three times a day cannot be reckoned as a comparison, not even as a quarter, nor even as a sign for the unpleasantness and displeasure experienced in hell. The warders of hell give him the fivefold binding. That is two hot iron spikes are sent through his two palms, and two other hot spikes are sent through his two feet and the fifth hot iron spike is sent through his chest. On account of this he experiences sharp piercing unpleasant feelings. Yet he does not die, until his demerit finishes. Next the warders of hell conduct him and hammer him. On account of this he experiences sharp piercing unpleasant feelings. Yet he does not die, until his demerit finishes. Next the warders of hell take him upside down and cut him with a knife. On account of this too he experiences sharp piercing unpleasant feelings. Yet he does not die, until his demerit finishes. Next the warders of hell yoke him to a cart and make him go to and fro on a ground that is flaming and ablaze. On account of this too he experiences sharp piercing unpleasant feelings. Yet he does not die, until his demerit finishes. Next the warders of hell make him ascend and descend a rock of burning ambers. On account of this he experiences sharp piercing unpleasant feelings. Yet he does not die, until his demerit finishes. Next the warders of hell throw him upside down into a boiling, blazing pot of molten. Therehe is cooked in the molten scum, and he on his own accord dives in comes up and goes across in the molten pot. On account of this too he experiences sharp piercing unpleasant feelings. Yet he does not die, until his demerit finishes. Next the warders of hell throw him to the Great Hell. Bhikkhus, the Great Hell is square and has four gates. It's divided into two and is enclosed with an iron wall. The top is closed with an iron lid. The floor spreads upto seven hundred miles and it stands there every day. Explanation: The Lord Buddha then goes onto explain that the pain experienced through six thousand lashes, three times a day cannot be compared to the pain experienced in hell, in the same way a small stone cannot be compared to the Himalayan mountains. He then explain the various punishments inflicted in hell with five hot iron spikes sent through the body, hammering (on the body), cutting (of the body) with a knife, yoking one to a cart and making one go back and forth on a ground that is blazing with fire, making one climb up and down a rock with burning embers, being thrown upside down into a blazing pot of boiling molten (lava) where one voluntarily dives in and out of and is cooked therein in all instances experiencing sharp, piercingly unpleasant feelings; but in all cases one does not die until one's demerit runs out. One is then thrown into the Great Hell ( where one suffers more suffering). I may explain the unpleasantness of the hell in various ways, yet it is not easy to explain that unpleasantness completely. Explanation: The Lord Buddha says that even though he explains the unpleasantness of hell in various ways, it is not easy to explain the unpleasantness completely. To be continued... .... Source: This discourse (sutta) can be found in full here http://www.mettanet.org/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/Majjhima3/129-ba\ lapandita-e.html Notes1. More suttas can be found here http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sutta.html and here http://www.mettanet.org/tipitaka/index.html 2. This sutta can be found in full here http://www.mettanet.org/tipitaka/2Sutta-Pitaka/2Majjhima-Nikaya/Majjhima3/129-ba\ lapandita-e.html <....> ________________________________ Visit Sakyamuni Sambuddha Vihara on the Web: www.vihara.org.au ________________________________ <....> #94564 From: "Bhikkhu Samahita" Date: Wed Jan 7, 2009 8:44 pm Subject: The 50 types of Being! bhikkhu0 Friends: The Division of Human Types: 1. What sort of person is one released occasionally? Here a person goes on experiencing the eight stages of deliverance* from time to time, and having seen & understood them through insight, only some of his mental impurities (kilesas ) are completely destroyed. Such a person is said to be released occasionally. * The 4 lower jhānas + 4 formless jhānas 2. What sort of person is one released not only occasionally? Here a person goes on experiencing the eight stages of deliverance though not only from time to time, and having seen & known them through insight, all his mental impurities are completely destroyed. Such a person is said to be released not only occasionally. 3. What sort of person is one of perturbable nature? Here a person obtains the 4 lower jhānas & also the 4 formless jhānas , but he does not obtain them with the certainty he desires, nor without difficulty, nor without travail. Neither does he enter, nor emerge from them where-ever he wants, nor when-ever he wants, nor as long as he wish to. There remains the possibility that neglect overcoming him should perturb those attainments. Such a person is said to be of perturbable nature. 4. What sort of person is one of imperturbable nature? Here a person obtains the 4 lower jhānas & also the 4 formless jhānas , and he does indeed obtain them with the certainty he desires, without any difficulty, effortless. He enters into, remains in, and emerges from them where-ever he desires, when-ever he desires, and as long as he desires. There remains no possibility that neglect should overcome him & perturb those attainments. Such a person is said to be of imperturbable nature. 5. What sort of person is one of imperfect nature? Here a person obtains the 4 lower jhānas & also the 4 formless jhānas , but he does not obtain them with the certainty he desires, nor without difficulty, nor without travail. Neither does he enter, nor emerge from them where-ever he desires, nor when-ever he desires, nor as long as he desires. There remains the possibility that neglect overcoming him should perturb those attainments. Such a person is said to be of imperfect nature. 6. What sort of person is one of faultless nature Here a person obtains the 4 lower jhānas & also the 4 formless jhānas , and he does indeed obtain them with the certainty he desires, without any difficulty, effortless. He enters into, remains in, and emerges from them where-ever he desires, when-ever he desires, and as long as he desires. There remains no possibility that neglect should overcome him & perturb those attainments, causing him to give up his attainments. Such a person is said to be of faultless nature. 7. What sort of person is he, who is made competent by intention? Here a person obtains the 4 lower jhānas & also the 4 formless jhānas , but he does not obtain them with the certainty he desires, nor without difficulty, nor without travail. Neither does he enter, nor emerge from them where-ever he desires, nor when-ever he desires, nor as long as he desires. If he follows this up by intending not to fall away, he does not fall away, if he does not so deliberately intend, he does indeed fall away from them. Such a person is said to be a person, who is made competent by intention. 8. What sort of person is he, who is made competent by guarding? Here a person obtains the 4 lower jhānas & also the 4 formless jhānas , but he does not obtain them with the certainty he desires, nor without difficulty, nor without travail. Neither does he enter, nor emerge from them where-ever he desires, nor when-ever he desires, nor as long as he desires. If he is watchful and guards them, he does not fall away from those states. If he is neither watchful, nor guards them, he does fall away from them. Such a person is said to be a person, who is made competent by guarding. 9. What sort of person is said to be an ordinary person (puthujjana )? The person whose first three obstructing fetters # have not yet been eliminated, and who is not going to do anything to put these away, such a person is said to be an ordinary person = puthujjana . Comment #: Fetter 1: Personality-belief (sakkāya-ditthi ) Fetter 2: Sceptical doubt (vicikicchā ) Fetter 3: Clinging to mere rules and ritual (Sīlabbata-Parāmāsa; s. upādāna ) 10. What sort of person is one become of the Noble family? The person, who is endowed with those conditions immediately after entering the Noble State, is said now to be one of the Noble family. <....> The various kinds of Physical Frames are obvious, since they are visible! The various kinds of Mental Types are not trivial, since they are invisible! .... Source: Abhidhamma Pitaka, Puggala Paññatti. Excerpted from the PTS appreciated translation by Bimala Charan Law 1924. http://www.pariyatti.com/book.cgi?prod_id=130096 Have a nice day! Friendship is the Greatest * Bhikkhu Samahita * Sri Lanka :-) ... The 50 Human Types! #94565 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 12:37 am Subject: Further Consideration Re: [dsg] Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Co... epsteinrob Hi Herman! Still attached to memory, I see. he he he..... --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: Rob E.: > > So I don't actually agree that the past is immutable and > > defines you. In fact, > Herman: > What I believe to be immutable and defining of the past are the facts > of the past. Things like what I did, how I felt, what I wanted. I would contend that all of this was of a subjective mix at the time it happened, and continues to change and shift as you go forward with it as a memory. None of it is clear or objective at all. At the time you crossed the street and almost got hit by a car, you felt surprise and fear - didn't even know what happened. Later it became solidified as an event that you learned about and you could "remember it" in your mind's eye as if an observer seeing exactly what happened. At first, it played at high speed with instantaneity as if it were happening again. Later it became grey and slower and seemed like something that hapened at a reasonable speed. There is no objective reality to memory, but only a description combined with images which change drastically at each stage of life. None of it is absolute, fixed or definite. Not even the events. And I would contend that your feelings now color your old feelings and that you know longer have a clear view of how you felt at the time. Brazen of me, I know, but that's my experience. > It will never not be true that I was angry at such and such, that I > was unhappy in such and such a situation, that I wanted this and > that,there and then. Still, that is a gloss, and only the most general aspect of memory. These facts do not provide the meanings that are important now or even necessarily then, they are just what happened in some overall way. They certainly do not constitute a unique self, just a set of pages in an old book. You can attach to them if you like, but they're not you. Also, it will always be true that I lived in this and > that house, that these and those were my mother, father, brothers, > relatives, friends, that I went to this school and that, had these > jobs, was married to this and that woman etc etc. > > No amount of re living and re-evaluation of the past will change what > is factual about my past. Or at least what you remember of what is factual. We change the facts too, to suit our view of ourselves. Examples can be found upon closer inspection.... > > I think it is constantly shifting like > > everything else, has plenty of interchangeable components and in fact > > it is your attention and that of others, and the values you have at > > any given time that defines the past and creates it as what is appears > > to be. > > > > What you are describing is the present, which is forever being added > to your past. You believe, apparently, that the past is real. It is only a present mental event, has no reality "out there" at all once it is over. "Music, after it is over, is gone like the air - you can never capture it again." -Eric Dolphy > > For instance, I used to be a smoker when I was quite young, and gave > > it up in my '20s. After that I was a yoga teacher for about 15 years, > > and no one would believe that I used to smoke... ...there are different available sets of > > memories that slide into place quite conveniently to match my chosen > > identity. I don't think it's fixed *at all.* > > OK. Your identity is changing. But not in some haphazard way. Your > identity stays firmly rooted in your past, because none of your past > is being deleted, your past is merely being added to. No,it's being quite selectively attended. I can call on it, like going to the library, but the stuff and people I used to think about at the former time have receded greatly; and they are as inconsequential as a book I haven't read in years. You can't sasy it's all there, except on principle, not in fact. Not on a daily, lived basis. No matter what > you do today, your mother and father will always have been your father > and mother, They are highly different people than they were then. You can say that who they were then do not exist; are fictions of memory. and the same for the day of your birth. An abstract fact. You have no idea what that "day" was, except as a number on a certificate. And the facts of > your past are the unmistakable backdrop in which you must be who you > are now. I agree they're a backdrop, but more like a cloud being blown in the wind and changing shape than a firm and heavy curtain behind me. > > > >> I can see value in what you say, but there is something missing. And > >> that is "the other". Being self-centred on a desert island is not > >> harmful. It is only in the company of others that excessive > >> self-interest, and the defence of self-interest is harmful. But, this > >> raises the question. If we're going to deconstruct the notion of "I", > >> don't we thereby deconstruct the notion of other "I" 's as well, and > >> thereby end up living as though on a desert island anyway? > > > > Herman, I don't see the logic in this. It appears to me that by > > de-emphasizing the "I" we become more available to others, not less. > > It seems to me, that by emphasising other I's, you are not > deconstructing I at all. You think they are "I"s. Just because I acknowledge their organic being in a spontaneous way, doesn't mean I am viewing them as entities with an internal self. Let's take it to an extreme. A person who > becomes a servile doormat, in servitude to others only, has not lost > their sense of self at all. The idea that "they are selves, but I am > not" is a perversion of the ancient wisdom "It takes one to know one" > :-) This is a straw man. I am talking about someone whose sense of self is loosened and less important and thus they are more available to others. It's a pragmatic reality, not a philosophical construct. > > The idea that we have to ignore others or isolate ourselves because we > > do not see them as "I"s or ourselves as "I"s does not make sense to > > me. Let's say you are all wrapped up in what is important to you, > > because you [generic you] is busy serving the "I." A guy asks you the > > time and you think "G*ddamn it, I've got to get to work; why is this > > guy bothering me?" and you register irritation. This is all because of > > the "I" being served. You're not honoring this other guy's "I." You > > wish he would get out of your way, so you're treating him like an > > object, not a person, anyway. Now let's say you have put the "I" > > aside and you are just going about your business. You're not drooling > > into your shirt or anything by losing the "I" emphasis, you just > > aren't busy thinking about yourself like an island to defend unto > > itself; you're just doing whatever is appropriate at the time. You > > still go to work, etc., but you're not worried about "what's going to > > happen to poor me." So you run into this same guy and he asks you the > > time, and you stop pleasantly and say "Gee, it's 9 am. Is there > > anything else I can do for you?" because your self-serving interest is > > out of the way. Perhaps you even think to yourself "Well I may be a > > little bit late because of this, but this guy needs a bit of > > assistance, so I'll just give him a moment of my time." And he says > > "Well actually I'm looking for a store that sells flowers." So you > > direct him down the street, etc. Then you happily go to work, pleased > > that you were able to help someone out on the way to work. The fact > > that you are not thinking "I I I" does not make him invisisble, it > > just makes you more available. So I would say it is the opposite - > > the "I" makes you an isolated island, it is a barrier; and getting it > > out of the way makes you more perceptive of others and more available > > to help. I left the above story in because I think it is a pretty strong proof of what I am talking about. I have met people like this; they do exist, and it is the lack of a strong "I" to defend that makes them accessible to others. They have more time, more openness, more availability, because they are not defending their kingdom. I dont' think you have acknowledged this example adequately. :) > > OK. I understand what you are saying. But I don't think what you wrote > is a deconstruction of the "I". You wrote about the "I" who wants to > live happily in a world full of other I's who are also happy. That's an I-attached, I-based interpretation of what I demonstrated. It is you who are insisting that the "I" remains prominent, but I don't see any evidence for that in my scenario. Rather, the I is either transparent or nearly absent. You don't seem to want to admit the possibility that this upsurge in generosity could come by not thinking of selves at all, rather than an equality of selves, but I believe that is just a concept, rather than a reality. In Nibbana there is no presumption of self of any kind, yet the Buddha does not dismiss and ignore people; rather he teaches them, so why is the self a necessary construct in order to treat people well? You seem to imply that the enlightened would be more selfish rather than selfless by eschewing the self, and this simply does not make any sense. And to > achieve that, you were happy to make a small sacrifice, to make a > little gain in your quest for a happy world. Nobody will fault you for > that. > > But wanting remains fundamental to this quest, or any other quest for > that matter. Another presumption on your part. What about just responding becasue you're available, no wants involved? Do you believe that it is possible to go beyond normal human drives, and if not, what is your estimation of the Buddhist path? And an unavoidable product of wanting is the I who wants. If this is so, there is no awakening to Nibbana, which involves abandoning the self-concept and personal desires, including all aversion and attachment. You seem to be saying this - the goal of Buddhism - is impossible and thus the end of suffering is also impossible. Is this so? > Unless there is an I who is accepting of all possible outcomes, the > suffering I must enter into any quest. There is no suffering I and non-suffering I. The I = suffering. Check with the Buddha on this. > > >> Please don't feel obliged to carry on if you're not inclined to do so. > > > > It's a lovely conversation and one of my favorite topics. I'll look > > forward to your response. [Now I'm getting too nice; I'll have to > > sharpen up. :-) ] > > The same goes for me. > > Catch you later :-) > > Cheers > > Herman Be well, Herman. Hope I'm not too harsh. There's a lot to say, so I'm just saying it straight out. The self is not an easy subject to tackle! :-) Remember when you said that I might not be the same Robert that you remembered? Well, you made my point. No one is. Best, Robert ====================== > #94566 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 12:39 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob Hi Ken! > ----------------- > > Sorry Robert, I don't understand your question. (I think there might > be a typo in there too, which doesn't help.) Perhaps we should go > back to the starting point suggested by Nina to Howard: "Namas > experience an object: rupas don't experience anything." > > Are we agreed on that? > > Ken H > I think so. :-) Best, Robert ==================== #94567 From: "sprlrt" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 2:08 am Subject: Re: cornerstone sprlrt Hi Connie, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "connie" wrote: > c: Putting aside the concept question, don't the asabhava dhammas have to be known in relation to other things? I mean, intimations can only be known thru 'thinking about' and space is defined in terms of other rupas; maybe not in 'infinite space' but i'm not there... even tho it may seem like it sometimes, haha. Intimations are cittaja rupa arising in groups, kalapas, either of nonads (8 inseparable + body intimation) or decads (8 + sound + verbal intimation), they (the single two rupa, not the groups) can be known through the mind door only and by satipatthana only. But sound, in case of speach, and visible rupa, in case of bodily intimation, inpinge on their corresponding sense doors, I think. Alberto #94568 From: "jonoabb" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 3:11 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation jonoabb Hi Herman > Do you believe that it is possible to have wise attention when > listening to statements that are false? I understand "wise attention" to be the translation used for the Pali term "yoniso manasikara" (the mental factor of manasikara when it accompanies a wholesome mental state). The arising of a wholesome mental state while listening to statements that are false cannot be precluded (such as, for example, there being metta for the speaker). Of course, false statements about the way things are could be a condition for wrong view, either at the time or at some later stage. What kind of scenario did you have in mind? Jon #94569 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 3:24 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: asabhava, was cornerstone nilovg Dear Connie and Alberto, Op 8-jan-2009, om 11:08 heeft sprlrt het volgende geschreven: > > c: Putting aside the concept question, don't the asabhava dhammas > have to be known in relation to other things? ------ N: Asabhava ruupa: I quote from my Rupas: Rpas can be classified as sabhva rpas, rpas with their own distinct nature, and asabhva rpas, rpas without their own distinct nature. The twelve gross rpas and six among the subtle rpas that are: cohesion, nutrition, life faculty, heart-base, femininity and masculinity are rupas each with their own distinct nature and characteristic, they are sabhva rpas. The other ten subtle rpas do not have their own distinct nature, they are asabhva rpas. Among these are the two kinds of intimation, bodily intimation and speech intimation, which are a certain, unique change in the eight inseparable rpas produced by citta. Moreover, the three qualities of lightness, plasticity and wieldiness, classified together with the two rpas of intimation as vikra rpas (rpa as changeability or alteration) are included in the asabhva rpas. Furthermore, the rpa space (aksa or pariccheda rpa) that delimits the groups of rpa, as well as the four rpas that are the characteristics of origination, continuity, decay and impermanence, are included. --------- > Connie: I mean, intimations can > only be known thru 'thinking about' and space is defined in terms of > other rupas; maybe not in 'infinite space' but i'm not there... even > tho it may seem like it sometimes, haha. > > Aberto: Intimations are cittaja rupa arising in groups, kalapas, > either of > nonads (8 inseparable + body intimation) or decads (8 + sound + verbal > intimation), they (the single two rupa, not the groups) can be known > through the mind door only and by satipatthana only. ------ N: Yes. ------- > A: But sound, in > case of speech, and visible rupa, in case of bodily intimation, > inpinge on their corresponding sense doors, I think. ------ N: But when they convey a special meaning to someone else this meaning is known through the mind-door. However, after having heard the sound or seen the colour. ------ Nina. #94570 From: "jonoabb" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 3:38 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. jonoabb Hi Howard and Rob (TG and Scott) > Howard: > That is certainly your prerogative, Scott. We all have opinions. But it > was Rob's question as to whether dhammas are characterized in the suttas as > ultimate realities, not necessarily in those precise words (I presume), but in > asserted meaning, however it might be expressed. I'm sure it will come as no surprise to you that the commentarial explanation of paramattha dhammas etc. is regarded as having its basis in the suttas. Although I don't have the sutta references (nor the UP category) handy, a quick check of Nyanatiloka's Dictionary gives the following: The two truths - ultimate and conventional - appear in that form only in the commentaries, but are implied in a sutta-distinction of 'explicit (or direct) meaning' (nītattha, q.v.) and 'implicit meaning (to be inferred)' (neyyattha). Further, the Buddha repeatedly mentioned his reservations when using conventional speech, e.g. in D. 9: "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Perfect One (Tathāgata) uses without misapprehending them." See also S. I. 25. The term paramattha, in the sense here used, occurs in the first para. of the Kathāvatthu, a work of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (s. Guide, p. 62). http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/n_r/paramattha.htm vohāra-sacca: etc. The terms paramattha-, vohāra-, sammuti-: etc., belong as such to the commentarial literature, but their significance is clearly shown in the old sutta texts, e.g. D. 9: 'loka-sāmaā, loka-vohāra'; further (D 33): 'sammuti-āna', etc. http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/dic4_append.htm Jon #94571 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 4:19 am Subject: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner scottduncan2 Dear All, Continuing: The Path of Purification. "15. But if it does not die out in spite of his efforts, then: "Let him reflect upon the saw With other figures of such kind, And strive, and strive repeatedly, To leave resentment behind. "He should admonish himself in this way: 'Now, you who get angry, has not the Blessed One said this: "Bhikkhus, even if bandits brutally severed limb from limb with a two-handed saw, he who entertained hate in his heart on that account would not be one who carried out my teaching" (M.i,129)? And this: "To repay angry men in kind Is worse than to be angry first; Repay not angry men in kind And win a battle hard to win. "The weal of both he does promote, His and and the the other's too, Who shall another's anger know And mindfully maintain his peace" (S.i,162)?..." The Path of Purity. "If in spite of his efforts it does not vanish, then he should strive repeatedly to put it away by recalling the admonitions of the parable of the Saw, and others, reproving himself on this wise: 'Ho! thou man of anger, has not the Blessed One uttered these sayings: 'Monks, were spies and thieves with a double-handled saw to cut the various limbs from a man, and he were to be angry in mind thereat, he on that account would not be a follower of my religion' (Majjhima i, 129); "Worse of the two is he who, when reviled, Reviles again. Who doth not, when reviled, Revile again, a twofold victory wins. Both of the other and himself he seeks The good; for he the other's angry mood Doth understand and groweth calm and still (Kindred Sayings i, 285)..." Sace evampi vaayamato na nibbaati, atha - Kakacuupamaovaada-aadiina.m anusaarato; Pa.tighassa pahaanaaya, gha.titabba.m punappuna.m. Ta~nca kho iminaa aakaarena attaana.m ovadanteneva 'are kujjhanapurisa, nanu vutta.m bhagavataa - 'Ubhatoda.n.dakena cepi, bhikkhave, kakacena coraa ocarakaa a"ngama"ngaani okanteyyu.m, tatraapi yo mano padoseyya. Na me so tena saasanakaro'ti (ma. ni. 1.232) ca, 'Tasseva tena paapiyo, yo kuddha.m pa.tikujjhati; Kuddhamappa.tikujjhanto, sa"ngaama.m jeti dujjaya.m. 'Ubhinnamattha.m carati, attano ca parassa ca; Para.m sa"nkupita.m ~natvaa, yo sato upasammatii 'ti ca. (sa.m. ni. 1.188); ... Sincerely, Scott. #94572 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 4:41 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Corner scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: Me: "Thinking by way of sammutti sacca, one talks of persons training themselves." H: "Yes, and such a statement is unreservedly true if it is made with the understanding that a person is a being devoid of a soul." Scott: I accept that a capacity to accept 'such a statement,' even intellectually, rests on a small measure of 'real' understanding. H: "I see the not-subject-to-control-but section as being superfluous..." Scott: And I do not. H: "...I accept that training happens subject to conditions, some known, some unknown. The person is simply the continuity between the former and later conditioned states. What word do you use to refer to that continuity, that nexus between the former and the later, in terms of paramattha sacca?" Scott: No word. I don't accept that the person 'is simply the continuity between the former and later conditioned states' if by that is meant that the 'person,' therefore, has to be granted some sort of reality status. The 'person' is a concept - a superfluous product of thought and a designation which facilitates communication about realities. When there is talk of a person (sammutti sacca) I accept that this mode of expression refers to ultimate realities (paramattha sacca). In this sense there is no contradiction; but this in no way leads to the conclusion that 'the person' is therefore 'real.' Being a concept, and not a reality, a 'person' is not a 'nexus' between anything that has ultimate reality. A 'person' is a product of thought - pa~n~natti. One thinks of 'a person' because one tends to think in terms of wholes conditioned by ignorance of the object of perception. This is the mere synthetic process of thinking. Sincerely, Scott. #94573 From: upasaka@... Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 12:05 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. upasaka_howard Hi, Jon (and Rob, TG, and Scott) - In a message dated 1/8/2009 6:39:03 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: Hi Howard and Rob (TG and Scott) > Howard: > That is certainly your prerogative, Scott. We all have opinions. But it > was Rob's question as to whether dhammas are characterized in the suttas as > ultimate realities, not necessarily in those precise words (I presume), but in > asserted meaning, however it might be expressed. I'm sure it will come as no surprise to you that the commentarial explanation of paramattha dhammas etc. is regarded as having its basis in the suttas. --------------------------------------------- Howard: Regarded by *whom*, Jon? In any case, the question is what in the suttas can be pointed to that describes the elements of the five khandhas as ultimate realities. What people's opinions are is not the point. ---------------------------------------------- Although I don't have the sutta references (nor the UP category) handy, a quick check of Nyanatiloka's Dictionary gives the following: The two truths - ultimate and conventional - appear in that form only in the commentaries, but are implied in a sutta-distinction of 'explicit (or direct) meaning' (nītattha, q.v.) and 'implicit meaning (to be inferred)' (neyyattha). Further, the Buddha repeatedly mentioned his reservations when using conventional speech, e.g. in D. 9: "These are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world, which the Perfect One (Tathāgata) uses without misapprehending them." See also S. I. 25. The term paramattha, in the sense here used, occurs in the first para. of the Kathāvatthu, a work of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (s. Guide, p. 62). http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/n_r/paramattha.htm ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: There is no doubt that the Buddha distinguished concept from reality in the suttas, but the issue at hand is far more specific than that. The issue is that the elements of the five khandhas have been described in the suttas as quite opposite from being "ultimate realities." What I have seen in the suttas with regard to elements of the five khandhas is how they are anicca, dukkha, and anatta, how they are conditioned, insubstantial, and, as in the Phena Sutta, like a glob of foam, a bubble, a mirage, (hollow like) a banana tree, and magic trick, and, as in the Uraga Sutta,, even unreal(!). --------------------------------------------------- vohāra-sacca: etc. The terms paramattha-, vohāra-, sammuti-: etc., belong as such to the commentarial literature, but their significance is clearly shown in the old sutta texts, e.g. D. 9: 'loka-sāmaññā, loka-vohāra'; further (D 33): 'sammuti-ñāna', etc. http://www.palikanon.com/english/wtb/dic4_append.htm ------------------------------------------------------ Howard: I fail to see how this addresses the issue raised by Rob. =========================== With metta, Howard Emptiness (From the Uraga Sutta) __________________________ Reality (From the Dvayatanupassana Sutta) #94574 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 5:14 am Subject: [dsg] Re: Void, Coreless, Insubstantial, etc scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: Me: "...What is it, in your view, that has the characteristic of anicca if there are no 'individual dhammas'?" H: "I would say that it is a leading question. The question presupposes some essential thing that is uniquely identifiable." Scott: Yes, this I accept, that is, there *is* some essential thing that can be identified. Is this more miasma I see, rising before me? H: "The Abhidhamma, I believe, makes it quite clear that from a multiplicity of causes a multiplicity of effects ensue, in a never-ending sequence. Whatever that is ever known or identified, as having this quality or that characteristic, is in fact always a melange (do you like that word? It means nothing more than mixture, but I use it simply for effect :-). I do like it when you say miasma)." Scott: I say 'miasma' when the Insubstantialist view seeks to strip dhammas of their distinct characteristics in the service of furthering a misunderstanding of the meaning of the ti-lakkha.na - things are not said to 'fall away' but are said to simply and constantly morph into something else. What else does this describe than miasma? I'd say 'soup' (or perhaps 'stew' depending on my mood) if I thought this was well understood by the Insubstantialists. I also say 'miasma' because it is simply fun to say and one doesn't often have the chance to say it. Yes. I accept that distinct dhammas interact 'within' each moment of consciousness. Abhidhamma analysis also is clear to maintain that, while these all arise together in their various combinations and with their various characteristics - each contributing to the 'quality' of the moment - all fall away together. I accept that developed understanding will be sharp and refined enough to know the quality of each characteristic. This characteristic of pa~n~naa is not defeated by the complexity of each moment and this, in part, is the depth of the Dhamma - a glimpse of the accomplishment of a Buddha whose understanding was developed to the highest degree possible, and whose understanding penetrated dhammas to the most subtle degree possible. H: "As connie recently quoted from Nagasena vs King Milinda...A dhamma does not appear in isolation, in sequence, one by one; dhammas appear in clumps, as synthetic wholes. There is never a single quality or characteristic, there are always many. It is this never static complexity that is nicely captured by the word anicca, IMO. We should not confuse the selective advertence to and grasping at what was never there in isolation, and no longer available for inspection, as being the succesful identification of an irreducible reality." Scott: The quote is excellent. What you say above is excellent. I, however, accept that the Buddha taught each separate reality because these were all known to him. However, to return to the point of anicca, which rests on the fact that all these co-arising and distinct dhammas fall away, consider this: Visuddhimagga XX 47: "Herein, taking up is rebirth-linking. Putting down is death. So the meditator allots one hundred years for this 'taking up' and 'putting down' and he attributes the three characteristics to formations. How? All formations between these limits are impermanent. Why? Because of the occurrence of rise and fall, because of change, because of temporariness, and because of preclusion of permanence. But since arisen formations have arrived at presence, and when present are afflicted by ageing, and on arriving at ageing are bound to dissolve, they are therefore painful because of continual oppression, because of being hard to bear, because of being the basis of suffering, and because of precluding pleasure. And since no one has any power over arisen formations in the three instances,'Let them not reach presence', 'Let those that have reached presence not age', 'Let those that have reached ageing not dissolve', and they are void of the possibility of any power being exercised over them, they are therefore not-self because void, because ownerless, because unsusceptible to the wielding of power, and because of precluding a self." Scott: Now, how do you define anicca? Sincerely, Scott. #94575 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 5:30 am Subject: Re: cornerstone scottduncan2 Dear connie (and Herman), Regarding: c: "...'No, that would not be possible. **But each flavour would nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.**'" Scott: The Very Very Most Main Point Ever - in this particular discussion. Sincerely, Scott. #94576 From: "abhidhammika" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 6:58 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. abhidhammika Dear Scott, Nina and all How are you? Happy new year! Scott wrote: "I'd like to know more about the way in which 'ka~n~neva' modifies these words." Suan answered: rittaka~n~neva -> rittakam eva tucchaka~n~neva - tucchakam eva asaaraka~n~neva - asaarakam eva Ritta and rittaka have the same meaning. So have the other two sets of words. So, only the adverb 'eva' modifies those words. Thus, the clause: "it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial" can be fully translated as "it would appear to him to be only void, only hollow, only insubstantial." Best wishes, Suan Lu Zaw www.bodhioogy.org --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Scott" wrote: Dear TG, Real Paa.li scholars, Regarding: TG: "I dis-rogued that's why. ;-)" Scott: I second Howard's, um, 'motion' on this one. ;-/ In other news, just a bit of research. From the Phe.napi.n.duupamasutta.m (SN 22, 95) comes the oft quoted phrase, here in relation to form (Bh. Bodhi, trans., p. 951): "...So, whatever kind of form there is...a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in form?" ...Tassa ta.m passato nijjhaayato yoniso upaparikkhato rittaka~n~neva khaayati , tucchaka~n~neva khaayati, asaaraka~n~neva khaayati. Ki~nhi siyaa, bhikkhave, ruupe saaro? 'Void': "Ritta [pp. of ri~ncati; cp. atireka] devoid, empty, free, rid (of).." 'Hollow': "Tuccha (adj.)...empty, vain, deserted; very often combd with ritta..." 'Insubstantial': "Asaara (n. adj.) [a + saara] that which is not substance, worthlessness; adj. worthless, vain, idle..." 'It would appear to him': "Khaayati...to seem to be, to appear like..." Scott: I'd like to know more about the way in which 'ka~n~neva' modifies these words. Sincerely, Scott. #94577 From: "connie" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 7:54 am Subject: cornerstone nichiconn Hi Herman > c: having nothing of her own to say, **quotes**: > > 'No, that would not be possible. **But each flavour would nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.**' > H: Having quoted it, what do you suppose it to mean? c: The characteristic does not change. H: Does it mean to suggest that when a multitude of different characteristics are present, that they do not have a modifying affect on each other? c: If we are both shown the same photograph and asked to tell it's story, the stories are likely to differ, but the photograph doesn't change. Given the same ingredients and asked to follow the same recipe, it's not unheard of for our two soups to turn out different. peace, connie #94578 From: "connie" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 7:54 am Subject: AS time nichiconn dear friends, finishing the section on The Depth Dimension of Time, Nyanaponika says: Before dealing with the term , which is particularly relevant in that connection, we shall mention briefly the three divisions of the term , "present." {71} These three kinds of the "present" are given in an order of increasing duration: 1. The "momentary present" (kha.na-paccuppanna), extending only over the three phases of a single moment of consciousness: this is to be regarded as the present in the strict sense, though not actually perceptible. 2. The "serial present" (santati-paccuppanna), comprising a series or continuum (santati) of moments. The Atthasaalinii records the definitions made by two schools. The first (the reciters of the Majjhima Nikaaya) says that it lasts for one or two continua (santati), which are defined by examples such as the time required for things to become visible after an abrupt change from daylight to a dark room or conversely. The second school of thought (the reciters of the Sa'myutta Nikaaya) distinguishes material and mental continua. The former are explained by the aforementioned and other examples, the latter by the duration of two or three processes of impulsion (javanaviithi), that is, by two or three processes of impulsion (javanaviithi), that is, by two or three processes of a complete perception, each lasting sixteen moments. We should hesitate to ascrie actual perceptibility to a duration of two or three processes, though on the other hand the earlier examples imply a duration somewhat too long to convey the idea of "present." Still we must suppose that the second division, the "serial present," is intendted to refer to the actual experience of a "now." 3. The third division stands apart: it is the present with reference to the present life term or present birth process (addhaa-paccuppanna). {71} This discussion is based on Asl 420 and the parallel passage at Vism 431. ... to be continued, connie - Researches in Buddhist Psychology http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/abhistudy.pdf - Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time 4th ed., rev'd. - Wisdom/BPS 1998 #94579 From: "connie" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 7:54 am Subject: cornerstone nichiconn dear friends, Karunadasa continues: The best illustration for the relative position of the material elements is given in the Visuddhimagga where it is said: "And just as whomsoever the great creatures such as the spirits grasp hold of (possess), they have no standing place either inside him or outside him and yet they have no standing independently of him, so too these elements are not found to stand either inside or outside each other, yet they have no standing independently of one another." 93 This explanation is justified on the following grounds: If they were to exist inside each other, then they would not perform their respective functions. If they were to exist outside each other, then they would be resolvable.94 The principle of positional inseparability is also resorted to as a critique of the distinction between substance and quality. Hence it is contended that in the case of material elements which are positionally inseparable it is not possible to say: "This is the quality of that one and that is the quality of this one." 95 93. Vsm 387. 94. VsmM 364; see also Abhvk 248. 95. Vsm 444-45. , connie #94580 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 8:00 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob Hi Ken. --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: Rob E.: ...To think that namas and rupas are > floating around in some absolute realm would seem to deny the > centrality that Buddhism places on the mind. It is not important what > is "out there," only our own state of mind and perception. So I don't > think that the reality of object is very important to Buddhism at all. > In fact, Buddhism turns away from involvement with external objects > of desire and revulsion, and turns inward towards the nature of the > mind itself, until that mystery is resolved in nibbana. > --------------------------- > > That sounds very wrong to me. Insight - and only insight - leads to > nibbana. And insight is 'right understanding of dhammas.' > > Ken H I would not say Ken, that Right Understanding does *not* include correct seeing of dhammas, but is it the dhammas that become enlightened, or the mind? I would say that dhammas are certainly what is perceived, but in nibbana, is any dhamma perceived? I think the progress of insight is from what we think dhammas are, to what they actually are - which is most likely perceptual fabrications since we don't see through anything but our organs of sense and mind - and then finally away from all kandhas to the direct perception of nibbana itself. What the perception of nibbana consists of is another matter, to be sure. Best, Rob E. ======================== #94581 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 8:20 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. scottduncan2 Dear Suan, Regarding: S: "How are you? Happy new year!" Scott: I feel, at times, molested like ruupa, but otherwise fine. Happy New Year to you as well. S: "...So, only the adverb 'eva' modifies those words..." Scott: Thank you very much; apologies for failing to recognize this simple point. In your opinion, does the Paa.li meaning of the words rittaka, tucchaka, asaaraka, suggest that these are synonyms of the word anatta? Sincerely, Scott. #94582 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 8:32 am Subject: [dsg] Sangiiti Sutta Threes (40) and commentary. nilovg Dear friends, Sutta: RDs [ 3.40 ] Three uprisings of desires connected with sense: (1) There are beings, friends, whose sense-desires are bound up with the objects thereof, and they are in subjection to such desire. Such are human beings, some devas and some reborn to [one of the four] evil destinies. (2) There are beings who have desires for that which [they have] creates; such are the devas so called (Nimmaanarati), who having created one thing after another are in subjection to such desires. (3) There are beings who have desires for the creations of others; and get these into their power; such are the devas3.40 so called (Paranimmita-vaasavatti). --------- (Pali: Tisso kaamuupapattiyo santaavuso sattaa paccupa.t.thitakaamaa, te paccupa.t.thitesu kaamesu vasa.m vattenti, seyyathaapi manussaa ekacce ca devaa ekacce ca vinipaatikaa. Aya.m pa.thamaa kaamuupapatti. Santaavuso, sattaa nimmitakaamaa, te nimminitvaa nimminitvaa kaamesu vasa.m vattenti, seyyathaapi devaa nimmaanaratii. Aya.m dutiyaa kaamuupapatti. Santaavuso sattaa paranimmitakaamaa, te paranimmitesu kaamesu vasa.m vattenti, seyyathaapi devaa paranimmitavasavattii. Aya.m tatiyaa kaamuupapatti.) ----------- N: The Co. explains further that beings in the planes where sense objects are experienced are subject to desire for these objects. The planes of the sense sphere are the unhappy planes, the human plane and the six classes of deva-planes. -------- Co: Arising of sense desires (kaamupapattiyo): pursuance, acquisition of the object of sense desire. ------ The subco adds: endowed with sense objects. -------- Humans are subject to sense objects. Wherever the citta is enamoured, they give hundred or thousand for womanfolk , take them and enjoy their possession. Some devas living in the four devaplanes also enjoy desirable objects and are subjected to these. --------- The subco adds, the devaplanes beginning with the first class: the devas of the four Kings (catumahaaraajika), up to the Tusita devas. N: The second class are the devas of the heaven of the Thirtythree (Taavati.msa) and the third those of the Yaama sphere. The fourth class are the Tusita devas. Thus, these are four lower classes of the six classes. It is the result of kusala kamma to be born in a deva plane. Since kusala kammas have different degrees, also the results are of different degrees. ------- Co: Some beings of unhappy planes, except those in the Hell planes, beings such as fish or turtle are subjected to sense objects. -------- N: Now, the Co deals with the two higher planes of the six classes of deva planes: the devas who delight in creating (nimmaanarati) and the devas who wield power over others creations (paranimmitavasavatti). The Dispeller of Delusion(II, p. 290) states about the latter: The Co states about the devas who delight in creating that they create whatever visible object they wish, such as yellow or blue. The Co refers to the text about the devas that created those things in the presence of the Ven. Anuruddha. We read in the Gradual Sayings (Book of the ights, Ch V the Observance Day, IV, 256) that devas visited Anuruddha and claimed that they could assume any colour they desired. Ven. Anuruddha wished that they would become blue, with blue faces, garments and finery. Those devas, knowing his thoughts, became all blue. The same happened when the Ven. Auruddha thought of them to become all yellow, red or white. Then the devas played lovely music for him, but Auruddha kept his senses well under control. ------- N: These are examples of beings born in sensuous planes who experience sense objects and are enslaved by them. We want to continue seeing, hearing and living and thus there are conditions for rebirth again and again. When sati of the level of satipatthaana arises, there is awareness of nama and rupa and one is not enslaved by the outward appearance of things. ---------- Co: Kaamuupapattiyoti kaamuupasevanaa kaamappa.tilaabhaa vaa. Paccupa.t.thitakaamaati nibaddhakaamaa nibaddhaaramma.naa.... *************************** Nina. #94583 From: TGrand458@... Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 4:03 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. TGrand458@... Hi Jon In a message dated 1/8/2009 4:39:13 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, jonabbott@... writes: I'm sure it will come as no surprise to you that the commentarial explanation of paramattha dhammas etc. is regarded as having its basis in the suttas. ......................................................... TG: Regarded by who? Sure... regarded by those who have 'interpreted' Suttas in such a fashion to uphold those views. But where does the Buddha actually speak about it? Nowhere it seems. Any school of Buddhism, or any school of any religion for that matter, will think their tenents are grounded...based on their views and interpretations of such. Since there is a dispute as to whether the Buddha taught anything such as "ultimate realities," we ask for Sutta sources and evidence. But there seem to be no direct references by the Buddha to such a thing. So the mere opinion based on problematic interpretations that the Buddha taught such, is way to weak to be accepted without an extremely compelling Sutta case to back it up. The case has not risen to that level. TG OUT #94584 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 9:05 am Subject: Re: The Introduction of New Terms and Expressions. epsteinrob Hi Alberto! --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "sprlrt" wrote: > > Hi Rob E, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Robert Epstein" > wrote: > > > > Would it be correct to summarize by saying that these quotes support > > the idea that physical dhammas are insubstantial? > > > I think that they support the idea that dhammas (both physical and > mental) are not worth (asaara) clinging because they are anatta, > anicca and dukkha. > And also that dhammas as such (anatta, anicca and dukkha) can be known > directly, just at the moment of their extremely short lifespan, i.e. > now, only by sati and panna, before they change into concepts, the > objects of reasoning. > Concepts are insubstantial, while most physical and all mental dhammas > are sabhava, each with its own distinct, immutable, absolutely real > nature. > > Alberto Please, Alberto, define for me what you mean by "real nature." It cannot be a mere abstraction but must refer to something specific. I understand the key word is "characteristic" but if there is a characteristic that is absolutely real and unchanging - at least for the moment - it would then be immune from the fate of all things within samsara. Does it not establish a kind of absolute transcendent nature for those exact things that are supposed to be subject to annica? Does it not provide for a satisfying security in the absolute reality of these things within the very realm that dukkha is supposed to arise? And is this not in contradiction to the Buddha's entire scheme, in which satisfaction leads to disidentifying the kandhas as self? Best, Robert ============================ #94585 From: "Robert Epstein" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 9:08 am Subject: [dsg] Re: The object of meditation in metta meditation epsteinrob Hi Jon! --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "jonoabb" wrote: > But "collections of khandhas" is just another [more PC] term for > beings ;-)) > > If the world is truly seen (i.e., with developed panna) in terms of > collections of khandhas, that would be what I was referriug to in an > earlier post as thinking in concepts but without wrong view. Would there be an even more advanced view in which the view of beings as khandas would be transcended as well? And then what would be the object of metta? Thanks, Rob E. ========================== #94586 From: "connie" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 10:22 am Subject: last: #94425 Threes (40) (cy: #94582) nichiconn your play, man. still stonily copying away in Expositor; I'll add the footnotes and hope to catch the grossest of my mistakes on the next run through; but also expecting the pharmacy to call anytime to say the refill's ready. still not entirely - uh, make that hardly - appreciative, but keep reminding myself the detractors are doing me a favor - neither my expression nor my understanding being precise enough. supposed to stay up in the melting range here the next few days. the kids are expecting again - July, it sounds like. their second. later. #94587 From: "nichiconn" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 11:38 am Subject: Re: last: #94425 Threes (40) (cy: #94582) nichiconn sorry, All, obviously, this last wasn't meant to come here. peace, connie #94588 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 12:24 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: cornerstone egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/9 Scott : > Dear connie (and Herman), > > Regarding: > > c: "...'No, that would not be possible. **But each flavour would > nevertheless be distinctly present by its characteristic sign.**'" > > Scott: The Very Very Most Main Point Ever - in this particular discussion. > Having selected this snippet as being of VVMMPE quality, what do you suppose it to mean? Cheers Herman #94589 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 2:11 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: cornerstone scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "Having selected this snippet as being of VVMMPE quality, what do you suppose it to mean?" Scott: What it says: Characteristics retain their distinct flavour while in the mix. Sincerely, Scott. #94590 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 2:30 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: cornerstone egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/9 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Regarding: > > H: "Having selected this snippet as being of VVMMPE quality, what do > you suppose it to mean?" > > Scott: What it says: Characteristics retain their distinct flavour > while in the mix. > Catch22. If characteristics are never apart from the mix, ie have never been distinct, how can your author suggest that there is the distinct flavour of a characteristic? Cheers Herman #94591 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 3:23 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: cornerstone scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "Catch22." Scott: Life. H: "If characteristics are never apart from the mix, ie have never been distinct, how can your author suggest that there is the distinct flavour of a characteristic?" Scott: Haven't you ever experienced, say, a pleasant feeling - like joy? Sincerely, Scott. #94592 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 3:27 pm Subject: Re: Further Consideration Re: [dsg] Visuddhimagga IX Mettaabhaavanaakathaa Co... egberdina Hi Rob E, 2009/1/8 Robert Epstein : > Hi Herman! We obvioulsy disagree on a lot, but I am pretty sure that we do not misunderstand each other. So I won't address each point you are making, but I'll just snip randomly and make some general comments here and there. > Still attached to memory, I see. he he he..... Yes, it's true. I would say that only the forest dweller and the occasional homeless person is anywhere near free of their past. > >> It will never not be true that I was angry at such and such, that I >> was unhappy in such and such a situation, that I wanted this and >> that,there and then. > > Still, that is a gloss, and only the most general aspect of memory. > These facts do not provide the meanings that are important now or even > necessarily then, they are just what happened in some overall way. > They certainly do not constitute a unique self, just a set of pages in > an old book. You can attach to them if you like, but they're not you. Hey, guess what, your life when you are living it, it is a gloss. Your wife, your children, your work, your house, all that you are familiar with, they are glosses. Doesn't mean they don't constitute 99.99% of where your effort and attention is invested. > > You believe, apparently, that the past is real. It is only a present > mental event, has no reality "out there" at all once it is over. > > "Music, after it is over, is gone like the air - you can never capture > it again." -Eric Dolphy > Mostly, we live only our past. We do again today what we did yesterday, ad infinitum. There is nothing that compels this to happen, still, it is what we do. > > And the facts of >> your past are the unmistakable backdrop in which you must be who you >> are now. > > I agree they're a backdrop, but more like a cloud being blown in the > wind and changing shape than a firm and heavy curtain behind me. > You never see the present (as Nyanaponika Thera says in connie's quote, it is imperceptible), you see only your past, ever. True enough, you do not see all of your past at once, but this morphing cloud is nonetheless entirely constructed from your specific, actual, factual past. And whatever you do next, though there is nothing that compels you to do it, will nevertheless become an ingredient in some future present that is likewise impercebtible, but entirely constructed from the past. That's old kamma for you :-) > > Let's take it to an extreme. A person who >> becomes a servile doormat, in servitude to others only, has not lost >> their sense of self at all. The idea that "they are selves, but I am >> not" is a perversion of the ancient wisdom "It takes one to know one" >> :-) > > This is a straw man. I am talking about someone whose sense of self > is loosened and less important and thus they are more available to > others. It's a pragmatic reality, not a philosophical construct. > I don't think it is a straw man. The person who makes themselves more available to others is still investing in some form of project, some future that will be different to how things are. You might call it pragmatic reality, I call it roll on samsara, roll on. >> > The idea that we have to ignore others or isolate ourselves because we >> > do not see them as "I"s or ourselves as "I"s does not make sense to >> > me. Let's say you are all wrapped up in what is important to you, >> > because you [generic you] is busy serving the "I." A guy asks you the >> > time and you think "G*ddamn it, I've got to get to work; why is this >> > guy bothering me?" and you register irritation. This is all because of >> > the "I" being served. You're not honoring this other guy's "I." You >> > wish he would get out of your way, so you're treating him like an >> > object, not a person, anyway. Now let's say you have put the "I" >> > aside and you are just going about your business. You're not drooling >> > into your shirt or anything by losing the "I" emphasis, you just >> > aren't busy thinking about yourself like an island to defend unto >> > itself; you're just doing whatever is appropriate at the time. You >> > still go to work, etc., but you're not worried about "what's going to >> > happen to poor me." So you run into this same guy and he asks you the >> > time, and you stop pleasantly and say "Gee, it's 9 am. Is there >> > anything else I can do for you?" because your self-serving interest is >> > out of the way. Perhaps you even think to yourself "Well I may be a >> > little bit late because of this, but this guy needs a bit of >> > assistance, so I'll just give him a moment of my time." And he says >> > "Well actually I'm looking for a store that sells flowers." So you >> > direct him down the street, etc. Then you happily go to work, pleased >> > that you were able to help someone out on the way to work. The fact >> > that you are not thinking "I I I" does not make him invisisble, it >> > just makes you more available. So I would say it is the opposite - >> > the "I" makes you an isolated island, it is a barrier; and getting it >> > out of the way makes you more perceptive of others and more available >> > to help. > > I left the above story in because I think it is a pretty strong proof > of what I am talking about. I have met people like this; they do > exist, and it is the lack of a strong "I" to defend that makes them > accessible to others. They have more time, more openness, more > availability, because they are not defending their kingdom. > > I dont' think you have acknowledged this example adequately. :) The question that needs to be asked is "what is genuinely a worthwhile project to invest in?" >> >> But wanting remains fundamental to this quest, or any other quest for >> that matter. > > Another presumption on your part. What about just responding becasue > you're available, no wants involved? If there is no attachment to outcomes, then whatever happens or is done is acceptable. Do you believe that it is > possible to go beyond normal human drives, and if not, what is your > estimation of the Buddhist path? > It is not Pure Land with shiny happy people, that's for sure. It is cessation > And an unavoidable product of wanting is the I who wants. > > If this is so, there is no awakening to Nibbana, which involves > abandoning the self-concept and personal desires, including all > aversion and attachment. You seem to be saying this - the goal of > Buddhism - is impossible and thus the end of suffering is also > impossible. Is this so? The awakening to Nibbana is not possible while there is craving of any kind. Wanting the world to be a particular way, or just different to how it is, or even just wanting a world, any world, none of that is other than roll on samsara roll on. As long as the futility and absurdity of our quests, including our quest for the welfare of others is not recognised, nibbana will hardly be an attractive option. Nibbana is definitely a possibility. First, it is temporary. Then, final. > >> Unless there is an I who is accepting of all possible outcomes, the >> suffering I must enter into any quest. > > There is no suffering I and non-suffering I. The I = suffering. > Check with the Buddha on this. > I was just stating the DO principle that craving precedes becoming. > > Be well, Herman. Hope I'm not too harsh. There's a lot to say, so > I'm just saying it straight out. The self is not an easy subject to > tackle! :-) > > Remember when you said that I might not be the same Robert that you > remembered? Well, you made my point. No one is. > Well, I hope that denying the relation that is the continuity between your past and future makes you feel better :-) Cheers Herman #94593 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 3:30 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: cornerstone egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/9 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Regarding: > > H: "Catch22." > > Scott: Life. > > H: "If characteristics are never apart from the mix, ie have never been > distinct, how can your author suggest that there is the distinct > flavour of a characteristic?" > > Scott: Haven't you ever experienced, say, a pleasant feeling - like > joy? > Sure, always in a context, in a situation, if you will. Cheers Herman #94594 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 3:33 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: cornerstone scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "Sure, always in a context, in a situation, if you will." Scott: That being the case, how do you manage to know its joy - you know, amidst all that context and what not? Sincerely, Scott. #94595 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 3:55 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: cornerstone egberdina Hi Scott, 2009/1/9 Scott : > Dear Herman, > > Regarding: > > H: "Sure, always in a context, in a situation, if you will." > > Scott: That being the case, how do you manage to know its joy - you > know, amidst all that context and what not? > It's a leading question if you are implying that joy or pleasant feeling is known independently of the context. What arises at any time is a synthetic whole, something like : pleasant feeling while licking this ice cream. All of the characteristics are known, at once. Cheers Herman #94596 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 5:19 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Mahabhuta egberdina Hi Nina, 2009/1/8 Nina van Gorkom : > Dear Herman, > Op 8-jan-2009, om 2:46 heeft Herman Hofman het volgende geschreven: > >> Could I ask you to clarify what you mean by "one object"? Can that one >> object be complex ie have/be multiple, simultaneous characteristics? > -------- > N: No simultaneous charactreistics. Thanks for your comments. Leaving aside different sense doors for the moment, can multiple characteristics through one door be known at once? For example, can blue, yellow, red, green, purple be all seen at once? Kind Regards Herman Seeing can only experience > colour, nothing else. Colour has its own characteristic, it is > different from sound. Hearing only hears sound, nothing else. The > citta which thinks can think of a table or many stories. Here there > are many cittas thinking of different objects, but there arises only > one citta at a time. > When we speak of characteristics we mean: what can be directly > experienced. In this sense the word characteristic does not apply to > concepts. > If we remember this we can avoid turning in circles when discussing > characteristics of realities or paramattha dhammas. > > Nina. #94597 From: "connie" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 5:33 pm Subject: Re: cornerstone nichiconn Dear Friends, > Scott: That being the case, how do you manage to know its joy - you know, amidst all that context and what not? > H: It's a leading question if you are implying that joy or pleasant feeling is known independently of the context. What arises at any time is a synthetic whole, something like : pleasant feeling while licking this ice cream. All of the characteristics are known, at once. c: which, as Nina and Alberto were kind enough to remind me today, is the difference between satipatthana and 'me' knowing. peace, connie #94598 From: "Scott" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 6:17 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: cornerstone scottduncan2 Dear Herman, Regarding: H: "It's a leading question if you are implying that joy or pleasant feeling is known independently of the context." Scott: While I'll agree that it's a good question, perhaps adequate, I'd appreciate it if you'd stop heaping so much praise on such a simple question. It's hardly a leading question. H: "What arises at any time is a synthetic whole, something like : pleasant feeling while licking this ice cream. All of the characteristics are known, at once." Scott: Herman, while 'pleasant feeling' is a reality with characteristic, 'licking this ice cream cone' certainly is not. Can I ask you to specify the various realities and their characteristics to which this conventional description refers? And then, I guess, you'll need to account for the characteristic of the reality that knows, while at it. Sincerely, Scott. #94599 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Thu Jan 8, 2009 6:26 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: cornerstone egberdina Hi connie, 2009/1/9 connie : > Dear Friends, > >> Scott: That being the case, how do you manage to know its joy - you know, amidst all that context and what not? >> > > H: It's a leading question if you are implying that joy or pleasant feeling is known independently of the context. > > What arises at any time is a synthetic whole, something like : pleasant feeling while licking this ice cream. All of the characteristics are known, at once. > > c: which, as Nina and Alberto were kind enough to remind me today, is the difference between satipatthana and 'me' knowing. I know that I risk being labelled a detractor, but I'm merely asking the obvious question, and do so in good faith. Were either Alberto or Nina kind enough to say how satipatthana is known? Also, you introduced 'me' into this, not me. :-) Cheers Herman =========== * Howard's signature blocks: == A change in anything is a change in everything (Anonymous) == Entrances to holiness are everywhere. The possibility of ascent is all the time, even at unlikely times and through unlikely places. There is no place without the Presence (From Mishkan T'filah, the new Reform prayerbook) == He who does not find core or substance in any of the realms of being, like flowers which are vainly sought in fig trees that bear none " such a seeker gives up the here and the beyond, just as a serpent sheds its worn-out skin. (From the Uraga Sutta) == Suppose there were a river, flowing down from the mountains "going far, its current swift, carrying everything with it" and a man would open channels leading away from it on both sides, so that the current in the middle of the river would be dispersed, diffused, & dissipated; it wouldn't go far, its current wouldn't be swift, and it wouldn't carry everything with it. In the same way, when a seeker has not abandoned these five obstacles, hindrances that overwhelm awareness and weaken discernment, i.e., sensual desire, ill will, sloth & torpor, restlessness & anxiety, and sceptical doubt, when s/he is without strength and too weak in discernment to understand what is for one's own benefit, to understand what is for the benefit of others, to understand what is for the benefit of both, then to realize a superior human state, a truly noble distinction in knowledge & vision: that is impossible (From the Avarana Sutta) == Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream (From the Diamond Sutra) == When knowing what is to be known, he doesn't construe an [object as] known. He doesn't construe an unknown. He doesn't construe an [object] to-be-known. He doesn't construe a knower. (The Buddha, speaking of himself in the Kalakarama Sutta) == See how the world together with the devas has self-conceit for what is not-self. Enclosed by mind-and-body it imagines, 'This is real.' Whatever they imagine it to be, it is quite different from that. It is unreal, of a false nature and perishable. Nibbana, not false in nature, that the Noble Ones know as true. Indeed, by the penetration of the true, they are completely stilled and realize final deliverance. (From the Dvayatanupassana Sutta) == /Just as when a person whose turban or head was on fire would put forth extra desire, effort, diligence, endeavor, undivided mindfulness, & alertness to put out the fire on his turban or head; in the same way, the monk should put forth extra desire, effort, diligence, endeavor, undivided mindfulness, & alertness for the abandoning of those very same evil, unskillful qualities./ (From the Sacitta Sutta)